eyelang 1.6.0 → 1.7.0

package/examples/resilient-city-orchestration.pl

@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
-% Resilient-city orchestration scenario.
-%
-% This example is intentionally richer than a single puzzle.  It combines raw
-% incident signals, policy-as-data, route search, team capabilities, negation,
-% aggregation, finite optimization, and materialized audit output.  The result is
-% a compact declarative emergency plan: facts describe the world; rules decide
-% which missions are lawful, reachable, and worth funding under cost/risk caps.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(incidentSummary, 2).
-materialize(activeSignal, 2).
-materialize(criticalNeed, 2).
-materialize(policyClearance, 2).
-materialize(usableRoute, 2).
-materialize(eligibleAssignment, 2).
-materialize(candidateMission, 2).
-materialize(blockedMission, 2).
-materialize(bestResponse, 2).
-materialize(selectedMission, 2).
-materialize(selectedTeam, 2).
-materialize(selectedRoute, 2).
-materialize(coveredNeed, 2).
-materialize(unmetNeed, 2).
-materialize(readinessCheck, 2).
-materialize(auditTrail, 2).
-materialize(recommendation, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the storm response, and rules derive the final plan.
-incident(civic_storm).
-incident_label(civic_storm, "CivicStorm Alpha").
-incident_goal(civic_storm, "protect people, medicine, and power without using prohibited surveillance").
-budget_cap(civic_storm, 105).
-risk_cap(civic_storm, 60).
-route_risk_cap(civic_storm, 20).
-route_minutes_cap(civic_storm, 45).
-
-% Sensor readings are deliberately low-level; rules below turn them into needs.
-reading(river_gauge_cm, 318).
-threshold(river_gauge_cm, 280).
-reading(hospital_generator_hours, 5).
-threshold_low(hospital_generator_hours, 8).
-reading(clinic_refrigerator_hours, 4).
-threshold_low(clinic_refrigerator_hours, 6).
-reading(substation_load_percent, 94).
-threshold(substation_load_percent, 85).
-
-% The deployable skills are stored as quoted formula data and projected by
-% formula_binary/4, showing how policy documents can be reasoned over as data.
-policy_bundle(response_policy, (
-  permission(medical_transport, deploy),
-  permission(cold_chain, deploy),
-  permission(grid_repair, deploy),
-  permission(shelter_ops, deploy),
-  permission(drone_mapping, deploy),
-  permission(public_info, deploy),
-  prohibition(public_face_recognition, deploy)
-)).
-
-% Teams can only serve missions whose skill they possess and whose route is usable.
-team(alpha_ambulance).
-teamSkill(alpha_ambulance, medical_transport).
-teamStatus(alpha_ambulance, ready).
-team(beta_coldchain).
-teamSkill(beta_coldchain, cold_chain).
-teamStatus(beta_coldchain, ready).
-team(delta_grid).
-teamSkill(delta_grid, grid_repair).
-teamStatus(delta_grid, ready).
-team(gamma_shelter).
-teamSkill(gamma_shelter, shelter_ops).
-teamStatus(gamma_shelter, ready).
-team(echo_drone).
-teamSkill(echo_drone, drone_mapping).
-teamStatus(echo_drone, ready).
-team(foxtrot_comms).
-teamSkill(foxtrot_comms, public_info).
-teamStatus(foxtrot_comms, ready).
-team(omega_vision).
-teamSkill(omega_vision, public_face_recognition).
-teamStatus(omega_vision, ready).
-
-% The road graph is directed.  bounded_path/5 discovers simple bounded routes.
-road(base, north_gate).
-road(north_gate, hospital_quay).
-road(base, cold_depot).
-road(cold_depot, clinic_east).
-road(north_gate, substation_east).
-road(base, civic_center).
-road(civic_center, high_school).
-road(civic_center, riverside).
-road(civic_center, civic_square).
-road(base, west_bridge).
-road(west_bridge, west_bank).
-
-zone(hospital_quay).
-zone(clinic_east).
-zone(substation_east).
-zone(high_school).
-zone(riverside).
-zone(civic_square).
-zone(west_bank).
-
-routeRisk(hospital_quay, 9).
-routeRisk(clinic_east, 5).
-routeRisk(substation_east, 10).
-routeRisk(high_school, 4).
-routeRisk(riverside, 6).
-routeRisk(civic_square, 3).
-routeRisk(west_bank, 24).
-routeMinutes(hospital_quay, 22).
-routeMinutes(clinic_east, 19).
-routeMinutes(substation_east, 31).
-routeMinutes(high_school, 17).
-routeMinutes(riverside, 21).
-routeMinutes(civic_square, 15).
-routeMinutes(west_bank, 42).
-
-% Mission facts carry the operational need, location, required skill, value,
-% budget cost, and base risk.  Route risk is added by candidateMission/2.
-missionBase(evacuate_hospital, evacuate_hospital, hospital_quay, medical_transport, 95, 34, 5).
-missionBase(deliver_insulin, deliver_medicine, clinic_east, cold_chain, 70, 16, 4).
-missionBase(stabilize_substation, stabilize_substation, substation_east, grid_repair, 85, 25, 8).
-missionBase(open_school_shelter, open_shelter, high_school, shelter_ops, 60, 14, 2).
-missionBase(map_flood_front, map_flood_front, riverside, drone_mapping, 45, 8, 2).
-missionBase(public_dashboard, public_information, civic_square, public_info, 28, 12, 1).
-missionBase(face_scan_crowds, situational_awareness, civic_square, public_face_recognition, 90, 20, 2).
-missionBase(resupply_west_bank, shelter_supply, west_bank, shelter_ops, 50, 20, 5).
-
-% Memoized derived predicates keep the example readable while avoiding repeated finite searches.
-memoize(usableRoute, 2).
-memoize(candidateMission, 2).
-memoize(bestResponse, 2).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-incidentSummary(Incident, summary(Label, Goal, budget(Budget), riskCap(RiskCap))) :-
-  incident_label(Incident, Label),
-  incident_goal(Incident, Goal),
-  budget_cap(Incident, Budget),
-  risk_cap(Incident, RiskCap).
-
-activeSignal(civic_storm, river_surge) :-
-  reading(river_gauge_cm, Value),
-  threshold(river_gauge_cm, Threshold),
-  ge(Value, Threshold).
-activeSignal(civic_storm, hospital_power_risk) :-
-  reading(hospital_generator_hours, Value),
-  threshold_low(hospital_generator_hours, Threshold),
-  le(Value, Threshold).
-activeSignal(civic_storm, medicine_cold_chain_risk) :-
-  reading(clinic_refrigerator_hours, Value),
-  threshold_low(clinic_refrigerator_hours, Threshold),
-  le(Value, Threshold).
-activeSignal(civic_storm, grid_stress) :-
-  reading(substation_load_percent, Value),
-  threshold(substation_load_percent, Threshold),
-  ge(Value, Threshold).
-
-criticalNeed(civic_storm, evacuate_hospital) :-
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, river_surge),
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, hospital_power_risk).
-criticalNeed(civic_storm, deliver_medicine) :-
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, medicine_cold_chain_risk).
-criticalNeed(civic_storm, stabilize_substation) :-
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, grid_stress).
-criticalNeed(civic_storm, open_shelter) :-
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, river_surge).
-criticalNeed(civic_storm, map_flood_front) :-
-  activeSignal(civic_storm, river_surge).
-
-policyClearance(Skill, deploy) :-
-  policy_bundle(response_policy, Formula),
-  formula_binary(Formula, Skill, permission, deploy),
-  not(policyBlocked(Skill, deploy)).
-
-policyBlocked(Skill, deploy) :-
-  policy_bundle(response_policy, Formula),
-  formula_binary(Formula, Skill, prohibition, deploy).
-
-usableRoute(Zone, route(Path, minutes(Minutes), risk(RouteRisk))) :-
-  zone(Zone),
-  bounded_path(road, base, Zone, 3, Path),
-  routeMinutes(Zone, Minutes),
-  routeRisk(Zone, RouteRisk),
-  route_minutes_cap(civic_storm, MinutesCap),
-  route_risk_cap(civic_storm, RiskCap),
-  le(Minutes, MinutesCap),
-  le(RouteRisk, RiskCap).
-
-eligibleAssignment(Mission, assignment(Team, Path)) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, _Need, Zone, Skill, _Value, _Cost, _BaseRisk),
-  policyClearance(Skill, deploy),
-  teamSkill(Team, Skill),
-  teamStatus(Team, ready),
-  usableRoute(Zone, route(Path, minutes(_Minutes), risk(_RouteRisk))).
-
-candidateMission(Mission, score(Value, Cost, TotalRisk, Team, Path)) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, _Need, Zone, Skill, Value, Cost, BaseRisk),
-  policyClearance(Skill, deploy),
-  teamSkill(Team, Skill),
-  teamStatus(Team, ready),
-  usableRoute(Zone, route(Path, minutes(_Minutes), risk(RouteRisk))),
-  add(BaseRisk, RouteRisk, TotalRisk).
-
-blockedMission(Mission, policy_prohibition) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, _Need, _Zone, Skill, _Value, _Cost, _BaseRisk),
-  policyBlocked(Skill, deploy).
-blockedMission(Mission, route_risk_too_high) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, _Need, Zone, _Skill, _Value, _Cost, _BaseRisk),
-  routeRisk(Zone, RouteRisk),
-  route_risk_cap(civic_storm, Cap),
-  gt(RouteRisk, Cap).
-blockedMission(Mission, no_eligible_assignment) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, _Need, _Zone, _Skill, _Value, _Cost, _BaseRisk),
-  not(candidateMission(Mission, _Score)),
-  not(blockedMission(Mission, policy_prohibition)),
-  not(blockedMission(Mission, route_risk_too_high)).
-
-missionItem(p(Mission, Value, Cost, Risk)) :-
-  candidateMission(Mission, score(Value, Cost, Risk, _Team, _Path)).
-
-missionItems(Items) :-
-  findall(Item, missionItem(Item), Items).
-
-missionAddressesNeed(Mission, Need) :-
-  missionBase(Mission, Need, _Zone, _Skill, _Value, _Cost, _BaseRisk).
-
-planCoversNeed(Plan, Need) :-
-  member(Mission, Plan),
-  missionAddressesNeed(Mission, Need).
-
-uncoveredNeedInPlan(Plan, Need) :-
-  criticalNeed(civic_storm, Need),
-  not(planCoversNeed(Plan, Need)).
-
-coversAllCriticalNeeds(Plan) :-
-  not(uncoveredNeedInPlan(Plan, _Need)).
-
-candidateResponse(Plan, Value, Cost, Risk, NegCost, NegRisk) :-
-  budget_cap(civic_storm, Budget),
-  risk_cap(civic_storm, RiskCap),
-  missionItems(Items),
-  bounded_subset(Items, Budget, RiskCap, Plan, Value, Cost, Risk),
-  coversAllCriticalNeeds(Plan),
-  neg(Cost, NegCost),
-  neg(Risk, NegRisk).
-
-bestResponse(civic_storm, response(value(Value), cost(Cost), risk(Risk), missions(Plan))) :-
-  aggregate_max(
-    [Value, NegCost, NegRisk, Plan],
-    response(value(Value), cost(Cost), risk(Risk), missions(Plan)),
-    candidateResponse(Plan, Value, Cost, Risk, NegCost, NegRisk),
-    _Key,
-    response(value(Value), cost(Cost), risk(Risk), missions(Plan))).
-
-selectedMission(civic_storm, Mission) :-
-  bestResponse(civic_storm, response(value(_Value), cost(_Cost), risk(_Risk), missions(Plan))),
-  member(Mission, Plan).
-
-selectedTeam(Mission, Team) :-
-  selectedMission(civic_storm, Mission),
-  candidateMission(Mission, score(_Value, _Cost, _Risk, Team, _Path)).
-
-selectedRoute(Mission, Path) :-
-  selectedMission(civic_storm, Mission),
-  candidateMission(Mission, score(_Value, _Cost, _Risk, _Team, Path)).
-
-coveredNeed(civic_storm, Need) :-
-  selectedMission(civic_storm, Mission),
-  missionAddressesNeed(Mission, Need).
-
-unmetNeed(civic_storm, Need) :-
-  bestResponse(civic_storm, response(value(_Value), cost(_Cost), risk(_Risk), missions(Plan))),
-  uncoveredNeedInPlan(Plan, Need).
-unmetNeed(civic_storm, none) :-
-  bestResponse(civic_storm, response(value(_Value), cost(_Cost), risk(_Risk), missions(Plan))),
-  coversAllCriticalNeeds(Plan).
-
-readinessCheck(civic_storm, all_critical_needs_covered) :-
-  unmetNeed(civic_storm, none).
-readinessCheck(civic_storm, budget_and_risk_caps_respected) :-
-  bestResponse(civic_storm, response(value(_Value), cost(Cost), risk(Risk), missions(_Plan))),
-  budget_cap(civic_storm, Budget),
-  risk_cap(civic_storm, Cap),
-  le(Cost, Budget),
-  le(Risk, Cap).
-readinessCheck(civic_storm, prohibited_surveillance_rejected) :-
-  blockedMission(face_scan_crowds, policy_prohibition).
-readinessCheck(civic_storm, dangerous_west_bank_route_rejected) :-
-  blockedMission(resupply_west_bank, route_risk_too_high).
-
-auditTrail(civic_storm, "raw sensor thresholds derive operational needs before search") :-
-  eq(ok, ok).
-auditTrail(civic_storm, "policy formula data is projected into deployable skill clearances") :-
-  eq(ok, ok).
-auditTrail(civic_storm, "bounded route search and team capabilities create candidate missions") :-
-  eq(ok, ok).
-auditTrail(civic_storm, "bounded_subset and aggregate_max choose the highest-value safe portfolio") :-
-  eq(ok, ok).
-
-recommendation(civic_storm, "activate the selected mission portfolio; do not deploy face recognition; defer west-bank resupply until route risk drops") :-
-  readinessCheck(civic_storm, all_critical_needs_covered),
-  readinessCheck(civic_storm, prohibited_surveillance_rejected),
-  readinessCheck(civic_storm, dangerous_west_bank_route_rejected).

package/examples/riemann-hypothesis.pl

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-% Riemann hypothesis, as a finite eyelang check.
-%
-% This example does not prove the Riemann hypothesis.  It models the
-% finite statement: every non-trivial zero in the local catalogue has
-% real part 0.5.  A real proof would have to cover all non-trivial zeros,
-% not only the facts listed here.
-
-% Print the finite check summary and the per-zero audit rows.
-materialize(rh, 2).
-materialize(zero_check, 3).
-
-% --- Sample zero catalogue -------------------------------------------------
-%
-% The three z* entries stand for catalogued non-trivial zeros of the
-% Riemann zeta function.  The t* entry is a trivial zero, included to show
-% that the rules below deliberately exclude it from the RH check.
-
-zeta_zero(z1).
-real_part(z1, 0.5).
-imaginary_part(z1, 14.134725).
-source(z1, "first catalogued non-trivial zero in this example").
-
-zeta_zero(z2).
-real_part(z2, 0.5).
-imaginary_part(z2, 21.02204).
-source(z2, "second catalogued non-trivial zero in this example").
-
-zeta_zero(z3).
-real_part(z3, 0.5).
-imaginary_part(z3, 25.010858).
-source(z3, "third catalogued non-trivial zero in this example").
-
-zeta_zero(t1).
-trivial_zero(t1).
-real_part(t1, -2).
-imaginary_part(t1, 0).
-source(t1, "trivial zero, outside the non-trivial RH check").
-
-% --- Classification rules --------------------------------------------------
-%
-% A non-trivial zero is one of the catalogued zeta zeros that lies in the
-% critical strip 0 < real part < 1 and is not explicitly marked as trivial.
-
-in_critical_strip(Zero) :-
-  real_part(Zero, Real),
-  gt(Real, 0),
-  lt(Real, 1).
-
-non_trivial_zero(Zero) :-
-  zeta_zero(Zero),
-  in_critical_strip(Zero),
-  not(trivial_zero(Zero)).
-
-% The RH condition for one zero: its real part is exactly one half.
-
-on_critical_line(Zero) :-
-  non_trivial_zero(Zero),
-  real_part(Zero, 0.5).
-
-% A finite counterexample would be a catalogued non-trivial zero whose real
-% part is not one half.
-
-off_critical_line(Zero) :-
-  non_trivial_zero(Zero),
-  real_part(Zero, Real),
-  neq(Real, 0.5).
-
-catalog_has(non_trivial_zero) :-
-  non_trivial_zero(_SomeZero).
-
-counterexample_found(yes) :-
-  off_critical_line(_Zero).
-
-% The finite catalogue supports RH exactly when it contains at least one
-% non-trivial zero and no catalogued counterexample.
-
-finite_catalog_supports_rh(yes) :-
-  catalog_has(non_trivial_zero),
-  not(counterexample_found(yes)).
-
-% --- Materialized audit output --------------------------------------------
-
-% These tiny support facts make the summary rows derived output rather than
-% source facts; eyelang intentionally does not reprint source facts.
-
-summary_row(scope, finite_catalog_only).
-summary_row(caveat, "finite catalogue evidence only; this is not a proof of RH").
-
-rh(Key, Value) :-
-  summary_row(Key, Value).
-
-rh(status, no_counterexample_in_catalog) :-
-  finite_catalog_supports_rh(yes).
-
-rh(status, counterexample_in_catalog) :-
-  counterexample_found(yes).
-
-zero_check(Zero, real_part, Real) :-
-  non_trivial_zero(Zero),
-  real_part(Zero, Real).
-
-zero_check(Zero, imaginary_part, Imaginary) :-
-  non_trivial_zero(Zero),
-  imaginary_part(Zero, Imaginary).
-
-zero_check(Zero, classification, on_critical_line) :-
-  on_critical_line(Zero).
-
-zero_check(Zero, classification, off_critical_line) :-
-  off_critical_line(Zero).

package/examples/sat-dpll.pl

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-% SAT solving without cut.
-%
-% A compact DPLL-style example for a finite CNF formula.  The program first
-% generates truth assignments, then checks every clause declaratively.  This
-% larger instance has eight variables and twelve clauses, so it is still small
-% enough for full model collection but no longer a toy four-variable search.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(witness, 2).
-materialize(modelCount, 2).
-materialize(variableCount, 2).
-materialize(clauseCount, 2).
-materialize(reason, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-problem(sat_instance,
-  [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h],
-  [
-    [pos(a), pos(b)],
-    [neg(a), pos(c)],
-    [neg(b), pos(d)],
-    [pos(c), pos(d)],
-    [neg(c), pos(e)],
-    [neg(d), pos(f)],
-    [pos(e), pos(f)],
-    [neg(e), pos(g)],
-    [neg(f), pos(h)],
-    [pos(g), pos(h)],
-    [neg(g), pos(a)],
-    [neg(h), pos(b)]
-  ]).
-
-truth(false).
-truth(true).
-
-assignment([], []).
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-assignment([Var|Vars], [value(Var, Truth)|Rest]) :-
-  truth(Truth),
-  assignment(Vars, Rest).
-
-literal_true(pos(Var), Assignment) :-
-  member(value(Var, true), Assignment).
-literal_true(neg(Var), Assignment) :-
-  member(value(Var, false), Assignment).
-
-clause_true([Literal|_Rest], Assignment) :-
-  literal_true(Literal, Assignment).
-clause_true([_Literal|Rest], Assignment) :-
-  clause_true(Rest, Assignment).
-
-cnf_true([], _Assignment).
-cnf_true([Clause|Clauses], Assignment) :-
-  clause_true(Clause, Assignment),
-  cnf_true(Clauses, Assignment).
-
-model(Name, Assignment) :-
-  problem(Name, Variables, Clauses),
-  cnf_model(Variables, Clauses, Assignment).
-
-status(sat_instance, satisfiable) :-
-  once(model(sat_instance, _Assignment)).
-
-witness(sat_instance, Assignment) :-
-  once(model(sat_instance, Assignment)).
-
-modelCount(sat_instance, Count) :-
-  findall(Assignment, model(sat_instance, Assignment), Models),
-  length(Models, Count).
-
-variableCount(sat_instance, Count) :-
-  problem(sat_instance, Variables, _Clauses),
-  length(Variables, Count).
-
-clauseCount(sat_instance, Count) :-
-  problem(sat_instance, _Variables, Clauses),
-  length(Clauses, Count).
-
-reason(sat_instance, "finite 8-variable CNF search succeeds without cut").

package/examples/security-incident-correlation.pl

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-% Representative example: security incident correlation.
-%
-% The rules correlate endpoint, identity, vulnerability, and threat-intelligence
-% signals into an escalation decision with concise reason relations.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(type, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(reason, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-incident(inc42).
-incident(inc43).
-
-asset(endpoint23, criticality, high).
-asset(endpoint77, criticality, low).
-
-assigned_user(endpoint23, user_alice).
-assigned_user(endpoint77, user_bob).
-
-privileged_user(user_alice).
-
-alert(inc42, endpoint, endpoint23).
-alert(inc42, suspicious_login, user_alice).
-alert(inc42, malware_hash, hash_redline).
-alert(inc42, outbound_ip, ip_203_0_113_17).
-
-alert(inc43, endpoint, endpoint77).
-alert(inc43, suspicious_login, user_bob).
-alert(inc43, outbound_ip, ip_198_51_100_42).
-
-vulnerability(endpoint23, cve_critical_rce).
-threat_intel(ip_203_0_113_17, command_and_control).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-critical_asset(Endpoint) :-
-  asset(Endpoint, criticality, high).
-
-credential_abuse(Incident) :-
-  alert(Incident, suspicious_login, User),
-  privileged_user(User).
-
-malware_on_critical_asset(Incident) :-
-  alert(Incident, endpoint, Endpoint),
-  alert(Incident, malware_hash, _Hash),
-  critical_asset(Endpoint).
-
-c2_contact(Incident) :-
-  alert(Incident, outbound_ip, Ip),
-  threat_intel(Ip, command_and_control).
-
-exploitable_endpoint(Incident) :-
-  alert(Incident, endpoint, Endpoint),
-  vulnerability(Endpoint, cve_critical_rce).
-
-confirmed_compromise(Incident) :-
-  credential_abuse(Incident),
-  malware_on_critical_asset(Incident),
-  c2_contact(Incident),
-  exploitable_endpoint(Incident).
-
-type(Incident, confirmed_compromise) :-
-  confirmed_compromise(Incident).
-
-status(Incident, escalate_to_incident_response) :-
-  confirmed_compromise(Incident).
-
-reason(Incident, "privileged credential abuse, malware on a critical endpoint, C2 contact, and exploitable RCE are correlated") :-
-  confirmed_compromise(Incident).

package/examples/service-impact.pl

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-% Practical cyclic recursion: incident impact analysis for a service dependency graph.
-% The payment stack has a real-world feedback cycle: payment_service calls
-% fraud_service, fraud_service calls risk_rules, and risk_rules calls payment_service
-% for authorization data. A payment outage should still produce a finite impact set.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(impactedByFailureOf, 2).
-materialize(status, 2).
-materialize(businessFunctionAtRisk, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-depends_on(web_store, checkout_api).
-depends_on(mobile_app, checkout_api).
-depends_on(checkout_api, payment_service).
-depends_on(checkout_api, inventory_service).
-depends_on(payment_service, fraud_service).
-depends_on(fraud_service, risk_rules).
-depends_on(risk_rules, payment_service).
-depends_on(inventory_service, stock_db).
-depends_on(stock_db, inventory_service).
-
-business_function(place_order, web_store).
-business_function(mobile_checkout, mobile_app).
-business_function(collect_payment, payment_service).
-business_function(screen_fraud, fraud_service).
-business_function(show_stock, inventory_service).
-
-failed(payment_service).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-impacted(Service, Failed) :- depends_on(Service, Failed).
-impacted(Service, Failed) :- depends_on(Service, Dependency), impacted(Dependency, Failed).
-
-affected(Service) :- failed(Failed), impacted(Service, Failed).
-affected(Service) :- failed(Service).
-
-affected_function(Function) :- business_function(Function, Service), affected(Service).
-
-impactedByFailureOf(Service, Failed) :- failed(Failed), impacted(Service, Failed).
-status(Service, failed) :- failed(Service).
-businessFunctionAtRisk(Function, true) :- affected_function(Function).

package/examples/sieve.pl

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-% Prime enumeration inspired by Eyelet input/sieve.pl.
-% The 1000-limit answer matches Eyelet output-swipl/sieve.pl.
-%
-% eyelang uses the built-in smallest_divisor_from/3 relation to keep the
-% example fast while preserving the same generated prime list.
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(primes, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-want_primes(1000).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-prime_under(Limit, P) :-
-  between(2, Limit, P),
-  smallest_divisor_from(P, 2, P).
-
-primes(Limit, Ps) :-
-  want_primes(Limit),
-  findall(P, prime_under(Limit, P), Ps).

package/examples/skolem-functions.pl

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-% Skolem functional terms in rule heads.
-%
-% A generated resource should be deterministic and collision-free. Use a
-% function symbol whose arguments contain the values that make the resource
-% unique, such as skolem_observation(Patient, Test).
-
-% Output declarations: materialize/2 selects the relations written to this example's golden output.
-materialize(type, 2).
-materialize(patient, 2).
-materialize(test, 2).
-materialize(value, 2).
-materialize(about, 2).
-materialize(sameInputsSameId, 2).
-materialize(noObservationClash, 2).
-
-% Program structure: facts set up the scenario, and rules derive the materialized conclusions.
-test_result(alice, glucose, 6.8).
-test_result(alice, cholesterol, 4.2).
-test_result(bob, glucose, 5.1).
-
-% Derivation rules: each rule below contributes one logical step toward the displayed results.
-high_glucose(Patient) :-
-  test_result(Patient, glucose, Value),
-  gt(Value, 6.0).
-
-observation_id(Patient, Test, skolem_observation(Patient, Test)) :-
-  test_result(Patient, Test, _Value).
-
-type(skolem_observation(Patient, Test), observation) :-
-  test_result(Patient, Test, _Value).
-
-patient(skolem_observation(Patient, Test), Patient) :-
-  test_result(Patient, Test, _Value).
-
-test(skolem_observation(Patient, Test), Test) :-
-  test_result(Patient, Test, _Value).
-
-value(skolem_observation(Patient, Test), Value) :-
-  test_result(Patient, Test, Value).
-
-type(skolem_alert(Patient, glucose), highGlucoseAlert) :-
-  high_glucose(Patient).
-
-about(skolem_alert(Patient, glucose), skolem_observation(Patient, glucose)) :-
-  high_glucose(Patient).
-
-sameInputsSameId(skolemDemo, true) :-
-  eq(skolem_observation(alice, glucose), skolem_observation(alice, glucose)).
-
-noObservationClash(skolemDemo, true) :-
-  neq(skolem_observation(alice, glucose), skolem_observation(alice, cholesterol)),
-  neq(skolem_observation(alice, glucose), skolem_observation(bob, glucose)).