edhoc 1.3.3 → 2.0.0

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c

@@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *  Helper functions for the RSA module
- *
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
- *
- */
-
-#include "common.h"
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
-#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
-#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h"
-
-/*
- * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents
- *
- * Summary of algorithm:
- * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows:
- *
- * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2)
- *     is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the
- *     square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four
- *     possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1)
- *     or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime
- *     factors of N.
- *
- * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same
- *     construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of
- *     roots of 1 in Z/NZ.
- *
- * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse
- * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e.
- * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L.
- * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have
- *
- *   DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K,
- *
- * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers
- *
- *   (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord
- *
- * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1).
- * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction
- * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N.
- *
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N,
-                              mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D,
-                              mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    uint16_t attempt;  /* Number of current attempt  */
-    uint16_t iter;     /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */
-
-    uint16_t order;    /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */
-
-    mbedtls_mpi T;  /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1     */
-    mbedtls_mpi K;  /* Temporary holding the current candidate */
-
-    const unsigned char primes[] = { 2,
-                                     3,    5,    7,   11,   13,   17,   19,   23,
-                                     29,   31,   37,   41,   43,   47,   53,   59,
-                                     61,   67,   71,   73,   79,   83,   89,   97,
-                                     101,  103,  107,  109,  113,  127,  131,  137,
-                                     139,  149,  151,  157,  163,  167,  173,  179,
-                                     181,  191,  193,  197,  199,  211,  223,  227,
-                                     229,  233,  239,  241,  251 };
-
-    const size_t num_primes = sizeof(primes) / sizeof(*primes);
-
-    if (P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Initializations and temporary changes
-     */
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
-
-    /* T := DE - 1 */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, D,  E));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&T, &T, 1));
-
-    if ((order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&T)) == 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&T, order));
-
-    /*
-     * Actual work
-     */
-
-    /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */
-    attempt = 0;
-    if (N->p[0] % 8 == 1) {
-        attempt = 1;
-    }
-
-    for (; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&K, primes[attempt]));
-
-        /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) != 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ...
-         * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &K, &T, N,
-                                            Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery
-                                               * multiplication helper values */));
-
-        for (iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter) {
-            /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point
-             * in continuing to square K */
-            if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) == 0) {
-                break;
-            }
-
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&K, &K, 1));
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N));
-
-            if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) ==  1 &&
-                mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(P, N) == -1) {
-                /*
-                 * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N.
-                 * Set Q := N / P.
-                 */
-
-                MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, NULL, N, P));
-                goto cleanup;
-            }
-
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &K));
-            MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, N));
-        }
-
-        /*
-         * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because
-         * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must
-         * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent.
-         * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long,
-         * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane.
-         */
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) != 0) {
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-
-cleanup:
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D.
- * This is essentially a modular inversion.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi const *Q,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi const *E,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi *D)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi K, L;
-
-    if (D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 0) != 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0 ||
-        mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) == 0) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
-
-    /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));
-
-    /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(D, &K, &L));
-
-    /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&K, NULL, &K, D));
-
-    /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */
-    MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(D, E, &K));
-
-cleanup:
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                           const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP,
-                           mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi K;
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-
-    /* DP = D mod P-1 */
-    if (DP != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K));
-    }
-
-    /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */
-    if (DQ != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K));
-    }
-
-    /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */
-    if (QP != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P));
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that core RSA parameters are sane.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
-                                const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D,
-                                const mbedtls_mpi *E,
-                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                void *p_rng)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    mbedtls_mpi K, L;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
-
-    /*
-     * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime
-     */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
-    /*
-     * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error
-     * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as
-     * well.
-     */
-    if (f_rng != NULL && P != NULL &&
-        (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(P, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if (f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL &&
-        (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-#else
-    ((void) f_rng);
-    ((void) p_rng);
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
-
-    /*
-     * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q
-     */
-
-    if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, P, Q));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1)  <= 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&K, N) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present.
-     */
-
-    if (N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1
-     */
-
-    if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) {
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 ||
-            mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, P, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
-
-    /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
-    if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) {
-        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P,  const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                             const mbedtls_mpi *D,  const mbedtls_mpi *DP,
-                             const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    mbedtls_mpi K, L;
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_init(&L);
-
-    /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */
-    if (DP != NULL) {
-        if (P == NULL) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));
-
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */
-    if (DQ != NULL) {
-        if (Q == NULL) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K));
-
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */
-    if (QP != NULL) {
-        if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1));
-        MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P));
-        if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-    }
-
-cleanup:
-
-    /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */
-    if (ret != 0 &&
-        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED &&
-        ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
-        ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
-    }
-
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
-    mbedtls_mpi_free(&L);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h

@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h
- *
- * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions
- *
- *  This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when
- *  implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate
- *  compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA
- *  implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the
- *  functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete
- *  implementations.
- *
- *  End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA
- *  implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead
- *  use only the functions declared in rsa.h.
- *
- *  The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long
- *  Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change,
- *  and must be considered an internal interface of the library.
- *
- *  There are two classes of helper functions:
- *
- *  (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are:
- *      - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes
- *      - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent
- *      - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt
- *       Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and
- *       generates some other, or CRT related parameters.
- *
- *  (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are:
- *      - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params
- *      - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt
- *      They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their
- *      validity.
- *
- */
-/*
- *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
- *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H
-#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H
-
-#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
-
-#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-
-/**
- * \brief          Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ
- *                 and a pair of private and public key.
- *
- * \note           This is a 'static' helper function not operating on
- *                 an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not
- *                 overwrite it.
- *
- * \param N        RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found
- * \param E        RSA public exponent
- * \param D        RSA private exponent
- * \param P        Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success
- * \param Q        Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success
- *
- * \return
- *                 - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a
- *                   factorization of N.
- *                 - A non-zero error code otherwise.
- *
- * \note           It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that
- *                 D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that,
- *                 use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params.
- *
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E,
-                              mbedtls_mpi const *D,
-                              mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q);
-
-/**
- * \brief          Compute RSA private exponent from
- *                 prime moduli and public key.
- *
- * \note           This is a 'static' helper function not operating on
- *                 an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not
- *                 overwrite it.
- *
- * \param P        First prime factor of RSA modulus
- * \param Q        Second prime factor of RSA modulus
- * \param E        RSA public exponent
- * \param D        Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success.
- *
- * \return
- *                 - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous
- *                   modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1.
- *                 - A non-zero error code otherwise.
- *
- * \note           This function does not check whether P and Q are primes.
- *
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi const *Q,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi const *E,
-                                        mbedtls_mpi *D);
-
-
-/**
- * \brief          Generate RSA-CRT parameters
- *
- * \note           This is a 'static' helper function not operating on
- *                 an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not
- *                 overwrite it.
- *
- * \param P        First prime factor of N
- * \param Q        Second prime factor of N
- * \param D        RSA private exponent
- * \param DP       Output variable for D modulo P-1
- * \param DQ       Output variable for D modulo Q-1
- * \param QP       Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P.
- *
- * \return         0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise.
- *
- * \note           This function does not check whether P, Q are
- *                 prime and whether D is a valid private exponent.
- *
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                           const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP,
-                           mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP);
-
-
-/**
- * \brief          Check validity of core RSA parameters
- *
- * \note           This is a 'static' helper function not operating on
- *                 an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not
- *                 overwrite it.
- *
- * \param N        RSA modulus N = PQ
- * \param P        First prime factor of N
- * \param Q        Second prime factor of N
- * \param D        RSA private exponent
- * \param E        RSA public exponent
- * \param f_rng    PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL
- * \param p_rng    PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL
- *
- * \return
- *                 - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied
- *                   if all relevant parameters are provided:
- *                    - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%)
- *                    - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%)
- *                    - 1 < N = P * Q
- *                    - 1 < D, E < N
- *                    - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1
- *                   (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined.
- *                 - A non-zero error code otherwise.
- *
- * \note           The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments
- *                 to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with
- *                 (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
-                                const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D,
-                                const mbedtls_mpi *E,
-                                int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
-                                void *p_rng);
-
-/**
- * \brief          Check validity of RSA CRT parameters
- *
- * \note           This is a 'static' helper function not operating on
- *                 an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not
- *                 overwrite it.
- *
- * \param P        First prime factor of RSA modulus
- * \param Q        Second prime factor of RSA modulus
- * \param D        RSA private exponent
- * \param DP       MPI to check for D modulo P-1
- * \param DQ       MPI to check for D modulo P-1
- * \param QP       MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P.
- *
- * \return
- *                 - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied:
- *                    - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL
- *                    - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL
- *                    - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL
- *                 - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed,
- *                   potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some
- *                   MPI calculations failed.
- *                 - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient
- *                   data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP.
- *
- * \note           The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments
- *                 to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the
- *                 parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1.
- */
-int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P,  const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
-                             const mbedtls_mpi *D,  const mbedtls_mpi *DP,
-                             const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */