edhoc 1.0.1 → 1.0.2

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3292 @@
+/*
+ *  X.509 certificate parsing and verification
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ *  The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.
+ *
+ *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)
+ *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)
+ *  http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)
+ *
+ *  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf
+ *  http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
+ *
+ *  [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#include "md_psa.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
+#include <windows.h>
+#else
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#if defined(__MBED__)
+#include <platform/mbed_retarget.h>
+#else
+#include <dirent.h>
+#endif /* __MBED__ */
+#include <errno.h>
+#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
+    uint32_t flags;
+} x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
+
+/*
+ * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
+ */
+#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE    (MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2)
+
+/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security
+ * concerns. */
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default =
+{
+    /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection
+     * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
+    0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg    */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+    /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection
+     * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) |
+    0,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+    0,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+    2048,
+};
+
+/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may
+ * be tightened at any time. */
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next =
+{
+    /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512),
+    0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg    */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+    /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1),
+#else
+    0,
+#endif
+    2048,
+};
+
+/*
+ * NSA Suite B Profile
+ */
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb =
+{
+    /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384),
+    /* Only ECDSA */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY),
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+    /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) |
+    MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1),
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+    0,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+    0,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Empty / all-forbidden profile
+ */
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none =
+{
+    0,
+    0,
+    0,
+    (uint32_t) -1,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check md_alg against profile
+ * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_profile_check_md_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                     mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg)
+{
+    if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(md_alg)) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check pk_alg against profile
+ * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                     mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg)
+{
+    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ((profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(pk_alg)) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check key against profile
+ * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                  const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+    const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
+        if (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+    if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ||
+        pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+        pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) {
+        const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(pk);
+
+        if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        if ((profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(gid)) != 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
+ */
+static int x509_memcasecmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    unsigned char diff;
+    const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
+
+        if (diff == 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (diff == 32 &&
+            ((n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z') ||
+             (n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z'))) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_check_wildcard(const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name)
+{
+    size_t i;
+    size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen(cn);
+
+    /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
+    if (name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.') {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i) {
+        if (cn[i] == '.') {
+            cn_idx = i;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (cn_idx == 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
+        x509_memcasecmp(name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
+ * variations (but not all).
+ *
+ * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int x509_string_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b)
+{
+    if (a->tag == b->tag &&
+        a->len == b->len &&
+        memcmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) &&
+        (b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) &&
+        a->len == b->len &&
+        x509_memcasecmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
+ *
+ * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
+ * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
+ * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
+ * or space folding.)
+ *
+ * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int x509_name_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b)
+{
+    /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
+    while (a != NULL || b != NULL) {
+        if (a == NULL || b == NULL) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* type */
+        if (a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
+            a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
+            memcmp(a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len) != 0) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* value */
+        if (x509_string_cmp(&a->val, &b->val) != 0) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        /* structure of the list of sets */
+        if (a->next_merged != b->next_merged) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        a = a->next;
+        b = b->next;
+    }
+
+    /* a == NULL == b */
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
+ */
+static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++) {
+        ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
+        ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1;
+    }
+
+    ver_chain->len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+    ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }
+ */
+static int x509_get_version(unsigned char **p,
+                            const unsigned char *end,
+                            int *ver)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+                                    0)) != 0) {
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+            *ver = 0;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+    }
+
+    end = *p + len;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *       notBefore      Time,
+ *       notAfter       Time }
+ */
+static int x509_get_dates(unsigned char **p,
+                          const unsigned char *end,
+                          mbedtls_x509_time *from,
+                          mbedtls_x509_time *to)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret);
+    }
+
+    end = *p + len;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, from)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, to)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed)
+ */
+static int x509_get_uid(unsigned char **p,
+                        const unsigned char *end,
+                        mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if (*p == end) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    uid->tag = **p;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &uid->len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+                                    n)) != 0) {
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+    }
+
+    uid->p = *p;
+    *p += uid->len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p,
+                                      const unsigned char *end,
+                                      int *ca_istrue,
+                                      int *max_pathlen)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len;
+
+    /*
+     * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
+     *      cA                      BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+     *      pathLenConstraint       INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }
+     */
+    *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
+    *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p == end) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end, ca_istrue)) != 0) {
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+            ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ca_istrue);
+        }
+
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        if (*ca_istrue != 0) {
+            *ca_istrue = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (*p == end) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, max_pathlen)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer
+     * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */
+    if (*max_pathlen == INT_MAX) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
+    }
+
+    (*max_pathlen)++;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
+ *
+ * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ */
+static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
+                                  const unsigned char *end,
+                                  mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */
+    if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier
+ *
+ * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
+ */
+static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p,
+                                   const unsigned char *end,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len = 0u;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    subject_key_id->len = len;
+    subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+    subject_key_id->p = *p;
+    *p += len;
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *        keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ *        authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
+ *        authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }
+ *
+ *    KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
+ */
+static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p,
+                                     unsigned char *end,
+                                     mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len = 0u;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p + len != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+
+    /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len;
+        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p;
+        /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04.
+         * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL),
+         * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */
+        authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+
+        *p += len;
+    } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p < end) {
+        /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+                                        1)) != 0) {
+            /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both
+               be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+        /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p,
+                                                    (*p+len),
+                                                    &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len;
+        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p;
+        authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER;
+        *p += len;
+    }
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
+               MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-ce 32 }
+ *
+ * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }
+ *
+ * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation
+ *
+ * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *     policyIdentifier   CertPolicyId,
+ *     policyQualifiers   SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
+ *                             PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }
+ *
+ * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ *
+ * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      policyQualifierId  PolicyQualifierId,
+ *      qualifier          ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }
+ *
+ * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers
+ *
+ * id-qt          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-pkix 2 }
+ * id-qt-cps      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 1 }
+ * id-qt-unotice  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { id-qt 2 }
+ *
+ * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )
+ *
+ * Qualifier ::= CHOICE {
+ *      cPSuri           CPSuri,
+ *      userNotice       UserNotice }
+ *
+ * CPSuri ::= IA5String
+ *
+ * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      noticeRef        NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
+ *      explicitText     DisplayText OPTIONAL }
+ *
+ * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
+ *      organization     DisplayText,
+ *      noticeNumbers    SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
+ *
+ * DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
+ *      ia5String        IA5String      (SIZE (1..200)),
+ *      visibleString    VisibleString  (SIZE (1..200)),
+ *      bmpString        BMPString      (SIZE (1..200)),
+ *      utf8String       UTF8String     (SIZE (1..200)) }
+ *
+ * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point
+ * as defined in RFC 5280.
+ */
+static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p,
+                                         const unsigned char *end,
+                                         mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies)
+{
+    int ret, parse_ret = 0;
+    size_t len;
+    mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;
+    mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
+
+    /* Get main sequence tag */
+    ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                               MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (*p + len != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Cannot be an empty sequence.
+     */
+    if (len == 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    while (*p < end) {
+        mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid;
+        const unsigned char *policy_end;
+
+        /*
+         * Get the policy sequence
+         */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        policy_end = *p + len;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+        policy_oid.len = len;
+        policy_oid.p = *p;
+
+        /*
+         * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy.
+         */
+        if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) {
+            /*
+             * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this
+             * extension is critical.
+             */
+            parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        }
+
+        /* Allocate and assign next pointer */
+        if (cur->buf.p != NULL) {
+            if (cur->next != NULL) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
+            }
+
+            cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
+
+            if (cur->next == NULL) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                         MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED);
+            }
+
+            cur = cur->next;
+        }
+
+        buf = &(cur->buf);
+        buf->tag = policy_oid.tag;
+        buf->p = policy_oid.p;
+        buf->len = policy_oid.len;
+
+        *p += len;
+
+        /*
+         * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end
+         * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end.
+         */
+        if (*p < policy_end) {
+            if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len,
+                                            MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) !=
+                0) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+            }
+            /*
+             * Skip the optional policy qualifiers.
+             */
+            *p += len;
+        }
+
+        if (*p != policy_end) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */
+    cur->next = NULL;
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return parse_ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * X.509 v3 extensions
+ *
+ */
+static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p,
+                            const unsigned char *end,
+                            mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                            mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+                            void *p_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet;
+
+    if (*p == end) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len;
+    while (*p < end) {
+        /*
+         * Extension  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+         *      extnID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+         *      critical    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
+         *      extnValue   OCTET STRING  }
+         */
+        mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL };
+        int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */
+        int ext_type = 0;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        end_ext_data = *p + len;
+
+        /* Get extension ID */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+        extn_oid.p = *p;
+        *p += extn_oid.len;
+
+        /* Get optional critical */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 &&
+            (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        /* Data should be octet string type */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len,
+                                        MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret);
+        }
+
+        start_ext_octet = *p;
+        end_ext_octet = *p + len;
+
+        if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Detect supported extensions
+         */
+        ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type);
+
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */
+            if (cb != NULL) {
+                ret = cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet);
+                if (ret != 0 && is_critical) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                *p = end_ext_octet;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            /* No parser found, skip extension */
+            *p = end_ext_octet;
+
+            if (is_critical) {
+                /* Data is marked as critical: fail */
+                return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                         MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Forbid repeated extensions */
+        if ((crt->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS;
+        }
+
+        crt->ext_types |= ext_type;
+
+        switch (ext_type) {
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
+                /* Parse basic constraints */
+                if ((ret = x509_get_basic_constraints(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                      &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:
+                /* Parse key usage */
+                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                      &crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
+                /* Parse extended key usage */
+                if ((ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                  &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER:
+                /* Parse subject key identifier */
+                if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data,
+                                                   &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER:
+                /* Parse authority key identifier */
+                if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                     &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
+                /* Parse subject alt name
+                 * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames
+                 */
+                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                             &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:
+                /* Parse netscape certificate type */
+                if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                         &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES:
+                /* Parse certificate policies type */
+                if ((ret = x509_get_certificate_policies(p, end_ext_octet,
+                                                         &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) {
+                    /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension
+                     * if it contains unsupported policies */
+                    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL &&
+                        cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical,
+                           start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet) == 0) {
+                        break;
+                    }
+
+                    if (is_critical) {
+                        return ret;
+                    } else
+                    /*
+                     * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we
+                     * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to
+                     * the user to choose how to enforce the policies,
+                     * unless the extension is critical.
+                     */
+                    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+                        return ret;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                /*
+                 * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer
+                 * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it,
+                 * skip the extension.
+                 */
+                if (is_critical) {
+                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+                } else {
+                    *p = end_ext_octet;
+                }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (*p != end) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format
+ */
+static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                   const unsigned char *buf,
+                                   size_t buflen,
+                                   int make_copy,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+                                   void *p_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;
+    mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;
+
+    memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
+    memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
+    memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf));
+
+    /*
+     * Check for valid input
+     */
+    if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */
+    p = (unsigned char *) buf;
+    len = buflen;
+    end = p + len;
+
+    /*
+     * Certificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+     *      tbsCertificate       TBSCertificate,
+     *      signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+     *      signatureValue       BIT STRING  }
+     */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT;
+    }
+
+    end = crt_end = p + len;
+    crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;
+    if (make_copy != 0) {
+        /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */
+        crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len);
+        if (crt->raw.p == NULL) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        memcpy(crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len);
+        crt->own_buffer = 1;
+
+        p += crt->raw.len - len;
+        end = crt_end = p + len;
+    } else {
+        crt->raw.p = (unsigned char *) buf;
+        crt->own_buffer = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * TBSCertificate  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
+     */
+    crt->tbs.p = p;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+    }
+
+    end = p + len;
+    crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p;
+
+    /*
+     * Version  ::=  INTEGER  {  v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)  }
+     *
+     * CertificateSerialNumber  ::=  INTEGER
+     *
+     * signature            AlgorithmIdentifier
+     */
+    if ((ret = x509_get_version(&p, end, &crt->version)) != 0 ||
+        (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(&p, end, &crt->serial)) != 0 ||
+        (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crt->sig_oid,
+                                    &sig_params1)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
+    }
+
+    crt->version++;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1,
+                                        &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk,
+                                        &crt->sig_opts)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * issuer               Name
+     */
+    crt->issuer_raw.p = p;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->issuer)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p;
+
+    /*
+     * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {
+     *      notBefore      Time,
+     *      notAfter       Time }
+     *
+     */
+    if ((ret = x509_get_dates(&p, end, &crt->valid_from,
+                              &crt->valid_to)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * subject              Name
+     */
+    crt->subject_raw.p = p;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+                                    MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+    }
+
+    if (len && (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->subject)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p;
+
+    /*
+     * SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+     */
+    crt->pk_raw.p = p;
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &crt->pk)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p;
+
+    /*
+     *  issuerUniqueID  [1]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+     *                       -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
+     *  subjectUniqueID [2]  IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+     *                       -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3
+     *  extensions      [3]  EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL
+     *                       -- If present, version shall be v3
+     */
+    if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) {
+        ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->issuer_id,  1);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) {
+        ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->subject_id,  2);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->version == 3) {
+        ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (p != end) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    end = crt_end;
+
+    /*
+     *  }
+     *  -- end of TBSCertificate
+     *
+     *  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
+     *  signatureValue       BIT STRING
+     */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||
+        memcmp(crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len) != 0 ||
+        sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag ||
+        sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||
+        (sig_params1.len != 0 &&
+         memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crt->sig)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (p != end) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a
+ * chained list
+ */
+static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                               const unsigned char *buf,
+                                               size_t buflen,
+                                               int make_copy,
+                                               mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+                                               void *p_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Check for valid input
+     */
+    if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    while (crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL) {
+        prev = crt;
+        crt = crt->next;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed.
+     */
+    if (crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL) {
+        crt->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
+
+        if (crt->next == NULL) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        }
+
+        prev = crt;
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_init(crt->next);
+        crt = crt->next;
+    }
+
+    ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core(crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        if (prev) {
+            prev->next = NULL;
+        }
+
+        if (crt != chain) {
+            mbedtls_free(crt);
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                      const unsigned char *buf,
+                                      size_t buflen)
+{
+    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                           const unsigned char *buf,
+                                           size_t buflen,
+                                           int make_copy,
+                                           mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+                                           void *p_ctx)
+{
+    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                               const unsigned char *buf,
+                               size_t buflen)
+{
+    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained
+ * list
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                           const unsigned char *buf,
+                           size_t buflen)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+    int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;
+    int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Check for valid input
+     */
+    if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or
+     * one or more PEM certificates.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+    if (buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' &&
+        strstr((const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") != NULL) {
+        buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM;
+    }
+
+    if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER) {
+        return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen);
+    }
+#else
+    return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+    if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM) {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        mbedtls_pem_context pem;
+
+        /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */
+        while (buflen > 1) {
+            size_t use_len;
+            mbedtls_pem_init(&pem);
+
+            /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */
+            ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
+                                          "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",
+                                          "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
+                                          buf, NULL, 0, &use_len);
+
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Was PEM encoded
+                 */
+                buflen -= use_len;
+                buf += use_len;
+            } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
+                return ret;
+            } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) {
+                mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
+
+                /*
+                 * PEM header and footer were found
+                 */
+                buflen -= use_len;
+                buf += use_len;
+
+                if (first_error == 0) {
+                    first_error = ret;
+                }
+
+                total_failed++;
+                continue;
+            } else {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen);
+
+            mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
+
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Quit parsing on a memory error
+                 */
+                if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                if (first_error == 0) {
+                    first_error = ret;
+                }
+
+                total_failed++;
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            success = 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (success) {
+        return total_failed;
+    } else if (first_error) {
+        return first_error;
+    } else {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/*
+ * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n);
+
+    mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+    int w_ret;
+    WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH];
+    char filename[MAX_PATH];
+    char *p;
+    size_t len = strlen(path);
+
+    WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;
+    HANDLE hFind;
+
+    if (len > MAX_PATH - 3) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    memset(szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir));
+    memset(filename, 0, MAX_PATH);
+    memcpy(filename, path, len);
+    filename[len++] = '\\';
+    p = filename + len;
+    filename[len++] = '*';
+
+    /*
+     * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default
+     * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the
+     * output length is described in WCHARs.
+     */
+    w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir,
+                                MAX_PATH - 3);
+    if (w_ret == 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    hFind = FindFirstFileW(szDir, &file_data);
+    if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    len = MAX_PATH - len;
+    do {
+        memset(p, 0, len);
+
+        if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,
+                                    -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL);
+        if (w_ret == 0) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, filename);
+        if (w_ret < 0) {
+            ret++;
+        } else {
+            ret += w_ret;
+        }
+    } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &file_data) != 0);
+
+    if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    FindClose(hFind);
+#else /* _WIN32 */
+    int t_ret;
+    int snp_ret;
+    struct stat sb;
+    struct dirent *entry;
+    char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN];
+    DIR *dir = opendir(path);
+
+    if (dir == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex)) != 0) {
+        closedir(dir);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+    memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+
+    while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
+        snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof(entry_name),
+                                   "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name);
+
+        if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof(entry_name)) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+            goto cleanup;
+        } else if (stat(entry_name, &sb) == -1) {
+            if (errno == ENOENT) {
+                /* Broken symbolic link - ignore this entry.
+                    stat(2) will return this error for either (a) a dangling
+                    symlink or (b) a missing file.
+                    Given that we have just obtained the filename from readdir,
+                    assume that it does exist and therefore treat this as a
+                    dangling symlink. */
+                continue;
+            } else {
+                /* Some other file error; report the error. */
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Ignore parse errors
+        //
+        t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, entry_name);
+        if (t_ret < 0) {
+            ret++;
+        } else {
+            ret += t_ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    closedir(dir);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+    if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex) != 0) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+#endif /* _WIN32 */
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+#define PRINT_ITEM(i)                               \
+    do {                                            \
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep);  \
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;                 \
+        sep = ", ";                                 \
+    } while (0)
+
+#define CERT_TYPE(type, name)          \
+    do {                               \
+        if (ns_cert_type & (type)) {   \
+            PRINT_ITEM(name);          \
+        }                              \
+    } while (0)
+
+#define KEY_USAGE(code, name)      \
+    do {                           \
+        if (key_usage & (code)) {  \
+            PRINT_ITEM(name);      \
+        }                          \
+    } while (0)
+
+static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
+                                   const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const char *desc;
+    size_t n = *size;
+    char *p = *buf;
+    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage;
+    const char *sep = "";
+
+    while (cur != NULL) {
+        if (mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) {
+            desc = "???";
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        sep = ", ";
+
+        cur = cur->next;
+    }
+
+    *size = n;
+    *buf = p;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int x509_info_cert_policies(char **buf, size_t *size,
+                                   const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const char *desc;
+    size_t n = *size;
+    char *p = *buf;
+    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;
+    const char *sep = "";
+
+    while (cur != NULL) {
+        if (mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) {
+            desc = "???";
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        sep = ", ";
+
+        cur = cur->next;
+    }
+
+    *size = n;
+    *buf = p;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return an informational string about the certificate.
+ */
+#define BEFORE_COLON    18
+#define BC              "18"
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+                          const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t n;
+    char *p;
+    char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];
+
+    p = buf;
+    n = size;
+
+    if (NULL == crt) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n");
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        return (int) (size - n);
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%scert. version     : %d\n",
+                           prefix, crt->version);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sserial number     : ",
+                           prefix);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &crt->serial);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name       : ", prefix);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->issuer);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject name      : ", prefix);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->subject);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissued  on        : " \
+                                 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
+                           crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon,
+                           crt->valid_from.day,  crt->valid_from.hour,
+                           crt->valid_from.min,  crt->valid_from.sec);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sexpires on        : " \
+                                 "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,
+                           crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon,
+                           crt->valid_to.day,  crt->valid_to.hour,
+                           crt->valid_to.min,  crt->valid_to.sec);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using      : ", prefix);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk,
+                                    crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts);
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    /* Key size */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON,
+                                            mbedtls_pk_get_name(&crt->pk))) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str,
+                           (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&crt->pk));
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    /*
+     * Optional extensions
+     */
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix,
+                               crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false");
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if (crt->max_pathlen > 0) {
+            ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1);
+            MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name  :", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n,
+                                                      &crt->subject_alt_names,
+                                                      prefix)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type        : ", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage         : ", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sext key usage     : ", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if ((ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage(&p, &n,
+                                           &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+        if ((ret = x509_info_cert_policies(&p, &n,
+                                           &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n");
+    MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+
+    return (int) (size - n);
+}
+
+struct x509_crt_verify_string {
+    int code;
+    const char *string;
+};
+
+#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info },
+static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = {
+    MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST
+    { 0, NULL }
+};
+#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+                                 uint32_t flags)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur;
+    char *p = buf;
+    size_t n = size;
+
+    for (cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL; cur++) {
+        if ((flags & cur->code) == 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+        flags ^= cur->code;
+    }
+
+    if (flags != 0) {
+        ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sUnknown reason "
+                                     "(this should not happen)\n", prefix);
+        MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;
+    }
+
+    return (int) (size - n);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                     unsigned int usage)
+{
+    unsigned int usage_must, usage_may;
+    unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY
+                            | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY;
+
+    if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    usage_must = usage & ~may_mask;
+
+    if (((crt->key_usage & ~may_mask) & usage_must) != usage_must) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    usage_may = usage & may_mask;
+
+    if (((crt->key_usage & may_mask) | usage_may) != usage_may) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                              const char *usage_oid,
+                                              size_t usage_len)
+{
+    const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;
+
+    /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */
+    if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list
+     */
+    for (cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf;
+
+        if (cur_oid->len == usage_len &&
+            memcmp(cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl)
+{
+    const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry;
+
+    while (cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0) {
+        if (crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&
+            memcmp(crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len) == 0) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+
+        cur = cur->next;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.
+ * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.
+ */
+static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
+                              mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list,
+                              const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                              const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
+{
+    int flags = 0;
+    unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm;
+#else
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    size_t hash_length;
+
+    if (ca == NULL) {
+        return flags;
+    }
+
+    while (crl_list != NULL) {
+        if (crl_list->version == 0 ||
+            x509_name_cmp(&crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject) != 0) {
+            crl_list = crl_list->next;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca,
+                                             MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA
+         */
+        if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_md) != 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD;
+        }
+
+        if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_pk) != 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md);
+        if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm,
+                             crl_list->tbs.p,
+                             crl_list->tbs.len,
+                             hash,
+                             sizeof(hash),
+                             &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
+            break;
+        }
+#else
+        md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md);
+        hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
+        if (mbedtls_md(md_info,
+                       crl_list->tbs.p,
+                       crl_list->tbs.len,
+                       hash) != 0) {
+            /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
+            break;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+        if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+        }
+
+        if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk,
+                                  crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length,
+                                  crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
+            break;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+        /*
+         * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED;
+        }
+
+        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE;
+        }
+#else
+        ((void) now);
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         * Check if certificate is revoked
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(crt, crl_list)) {
+            flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        crl_list = crl_list->next;
+    }
+
+    return flags;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
+
+/*
+ * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
+ */
+static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
+                                    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
+                                    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+    size_t hash_len;
+    unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+    md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md);
+    hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
+
+    /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */
+    if (mbedtls_md(md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash) != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+#else
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md);
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg,
+                              child->tbs.p,
+                              child->tbs.len,
+                              hash,
+                              sizeof(hash),
+                              &hash_len);
+    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+    }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    if (rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
+        return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&parent->pk,
+                                             child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
+                                             child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk);
+    }
+#else
+    (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif
+
+    return mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
+                                 child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,
+                                 child->sig.p, child->sig.len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'.
+ * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not.
+ *
+ * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate
+ */
+static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
+                                 const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
+                                 int top)
+{
+    int need_ca_bit;
+
+    /* Parent must be the issuer */
+    if (x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &parent->subject) != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */
+    need_ca_bit = 1;
+
+    /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */
+    if (top && parent->version < 3) {
+        need_ca_bit = 0;
+    }
+
+    if (need_ca_bit && !parent->ca_istrue) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (need_ca_bit &&
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL.
+ *
+ * Here suitable is defined as:
+ *  1. subject name matches child's issuer
+ *  2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
+ *  3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
+ *     (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
+ *  4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
+ *
+ * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
+ * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is
+ * none).
+ *
+ * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted
+ * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods.
+ * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.)
+ * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is
+ * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that
+ * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here.
+ *
+ * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might
+ * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the
+ * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't
+ * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to
+ * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].)
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *  - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
+ *  - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
+ *  - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
+ *  - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
+ *  - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
+ *         of the chain, 0 otherwise
+ *  - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
+ *  - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
+ *         (will never be greater than path_cnt)
+ *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ *  - 0 on success
+ *  - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
+    int *r_signature_is_good,
+    int top,
+    unsigned path_cnt,
+    unsigned self_cnt,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
+    const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
+    int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    /* did we have something in progress? */
+    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL) {
+        /* restore saved state */
+        parent = rs_ctx->parent;
+        fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;
+        fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;
+
+        /* clear saved state */
+        rs_ctx->parent = NULL;
+        rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
+        rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
+
+        /* resume where we left */
+        goto check_signature;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    fallback_parent = NULL;
+    fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
+
+    for (parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next) {
+        /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */
+        if (x509_crt_check_parent(child, parent, top) != 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */
+        if (parent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
+            (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Signature */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+check_signature:
+#endif
+        ret = x509_crt_check_signature(child, parent, rs_ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            /* save state */
+            rs_ctx->parent = parent;
+            rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;
+            rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
+
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        (void) ret;
+#endif
+
+        signature_is_good = ret == 0;
+        if (top && !signature_is_good) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+        /* optional time check */
+        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 ||    /* past */
+            mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) {  /* future */
+            if (fallback_parent == NULL) {
+                fallback_parent = parent;
+                fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
+            }
+
+            continue;
+        }
+#else
+        ((void) now);
+#endif
+
+        *r_parent = parent;
+        *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
+
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (parent == NULL) {
+        *r_parent = fallback_parent;
+        *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL.
+ *
+ * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found
+ * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable).
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *  - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
+ *         by a chain of possible intermediates
+ *  - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
+ *  - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
+ *  - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
+ *  - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
+ *  - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
+ *  - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
+ *         (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
+ *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ *  - 0 on success
+ *  - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
+ */
+static int x509_crt_find_parent(
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
+    int *parent_is_trusted,
+    int *signature_is_good,
+    unsigned path_cnt,
+    unsigned self_cnt,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
+    const mbedtls_x509_time *now)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
+
+    *parent_is_trusted = 1;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
+    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1) {
+        *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;
+        rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    while (1) {
+        search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
+
+        ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list,
+                                      parent, signature_is_good,
+                                      *parent_is_trusted,
+                                      path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            /* save state */
+            rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        (void) ret;
+#endif
+
+        /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
+        if (*parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0) {
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /* prepare second iteration */
+        *parent_is_trusted = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
+    if (*parent == NULL) {
+        *parent_is_trusted = 0;
+        *signature_is_good = 0;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted
+ *
+ * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only
+ * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)
+ */
+static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca)
+{
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *cur;
+
+    /* must be self-issued */
+    if (x509_name_cmp(&crt->issuer, &crt->subject) != 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */
+    for (cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        if (crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len &&
+            memcmp(crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* too bad */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build and verify a certificate chain
+ *
+ * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and
+ * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain
+ *      EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj]
+ * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one,
+ * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible.
+ *
+ * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found.
+ *
+ * Special cases:
+ * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it
+ * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
+ *   -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
+ *
+ * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
+ * - trusted EE
+ * - EE -> trusted root
+ * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root
+ * - if relevant: EE untrusted
+ * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
+ * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
+ * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
+ * enough (but length 1 is not in general).
+ *
+ * Arguments:
+ *  - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
+ *  - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
+ *  - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
+ *  - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
+ *      Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
+ *      Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
+ *  - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
+ *
+ * Return value:
+ *  - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
+ *  - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined,
+ *      even if it was found to be invalid
+ */
+static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+    mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+    void *p_ca_cb,
+    const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+    /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
+     * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    uint32_t *flags;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
+    int parent_is_trusted;
+    int child_is_trusted;
+    int signature_is_good;
+    unsigned self_cnt;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL;
+    mbedtls_x509_time now;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+    if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    /* resume if we had an operation in progress */
+    if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent) {
+        /* restore saved state */
+        *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */
+        self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;
+
+        /* restore derived state */
+        cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
+        child = cur->crt;
+        flags = &cur->flags;
+
+        goto find_parent;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+    child = crt;
+    self_cnt = 0;
+    parent_is_trusted = 0;
+    child_is_trusted = 0;
+
+    while (1) {
+        /* Add certificate to the verification chain */
+        cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
+        cur->crt = child;
+        cur->flags = 0;
+        ver_chain->len++;
+        flags = &cur->flags;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+        /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
+        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
+        }
+
+        if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
+        if (child_is_trusted) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
+        if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, child->sig_md) != 0) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
+        }
+
+        if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, child->sig_pk) != 0) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
+        }
+
+        /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
+        if (ver_chain->len == 1 &&
+            x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(child, trust_ca) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+find_parent:
+#endif
+
+        /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback,
+         * or use statically provided list. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+        if (f_ca_cb != NULL) {
+            mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
+            mbedtls_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
+            ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
+
+            ret = f_ca_cb(p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result;
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+        {
+            ((void) f_ca_cb);
+            ((void) p_ca_cb);
+            cur_trust_ca = trust_ca;
+        }
+
+        /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
+        ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent,
+                                   &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
+                                   ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx,
+                                   &now);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+        if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            /* save state */
+            rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;
+            rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
+            rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
+
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        (void) ret;
+#endif
+
+        /* No parent? We're done here */
+        if (parent == NULL) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
+         * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
+         * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
+        if (ver_chain->len != 1 &&
+            x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &child->subject) == 0) {
+            self_cnt++;
+        }
+
+        /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
+         * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
+        if (!parent_is_trusted &&
+            ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) {
+            /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* signature was checked while searching parent */
+        if (!signature_is_good) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
+        }
+
+        /* check size of signing key */
+        if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &parent->pk) != 0) {
+            *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
+        /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
+        *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now);
+#else
+        (void) ca_crl;
+#endif
+
+        /* prepare for next iteration */
+        child = parent;
+        parent = NULL;
+        child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
+        signature_is_good = 0;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#ifdef _MSC_VER
+#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib")
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#else
+/* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON
+#endif
+#elif defined(__sun)
+/* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */
+#elif defined(__has_include)
+#if __has_include(<sys/socket.h>)
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+#if __has_include(<arpa/inet.h>)
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use
+ * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below).  The local
+ * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides
+ * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the
+ * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries.
+ * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link
+ * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies.
+ * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler
+ * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not
+ * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above.
+ * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names
+ * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */
+#if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names
+/* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */
+static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst);
+
+#define li_cton(c, n) \
+    (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0))
+
+static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src;
+    int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1;
+    uint16_t addr[8];
+    do {
+        /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */
+        uint16_t group = num_digits = 0;
+        for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) {
+            if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) {
+                break;
+            }
+            group = (group << 4) | digit;
+            p++;
+        }
+        if (num_digits != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups);
+            nonzero_groups++;
+            if (*p == '\0') {
+                break;
+            } else if (*p == '.') {
+                /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */
+                if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) ||
+                    nonzero_groups >= 7) {
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */
+                int steps = 4;
+                do {
+                    p--;
+                    steps--;
+                } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0);
+
+                if (*p != ':') {
+                    break;
+                }
+                p++;
+                nonzero_groups--;
+                if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p,
+                                        addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) {
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                nonzero_groups += 2;
+                p = (const unsigned char *) "";
+                break;
+            } else if (*p != ':') {
+                return -1;
+            }
+        } else {
+            /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */
+            if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') {
+                return -1;
+            }
+            zero_group_start = nonzero_groups;
+
+            /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */
+            if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') {
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            if (p[1] == '\0') {
+                ++p;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        ++p;
+    } while (nonzero_groups < 8);
+
+    if (*p != '\0') {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (zero_group_start != -1) {
+        if (nonzero_groups > 6) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+        int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups;
+        int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start;
+
+        /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */
+        if (groups_after_zero) {
+            memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups,
+                    addr + zero_group_start,
+                    groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr));
+        }
+        memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr));
+    } else {
+        if (nonzero_groups != 8) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+    memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src;
+    uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst;
+    uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0;
+    uint8_t num_octets = 0;
+    uint16_t octet;
+
+    do {
+        octet = num_digits = 0;
+        do {
+            digit = *p - '0';
+            if (digit > 9) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format,
+             * which this implementation does not support. */
+            if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) {
+                return -1;
+            }
+
+            octet = octet * 10 + digit;
+            num_digits++;
+            p++;
+        } while (num_digits < 3);
+
+        if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+        *res++ = (uint8_t) octet;
+        num_octets++;
+    } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.');
+    return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst)
+{
+    return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst)
+{
+    return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names
+
+size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst)
+{
+    return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL
+            ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0
+            : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for CN match
+ */
+static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name,
+                             const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
+{
+    /* try exact match */
+    if (name->len == cn_len &&
+        x509_memcasecmp(cn, name->p, cn_len) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* try wildcard match */
+    if (x509_check_wildcard(cn, name) == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
+                                 const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
+{
+    uint32_t ip[4];
+    cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip);
+    if (cn_len == 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag &
+                                       MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK;
+        if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS &&
+            cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
+                                  const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
+{
+    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag &
+                                       MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK;
+        if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER &&
+            cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6
+ */
+static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san,
+                              const char *cn, size_t cn_len)
+{
+    int san_ip = 0;
+    int san_uri = 0;
+    /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */
+    for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) {
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:
+                if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                break;
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS:
+                san_ip = 1;
+                break;
+            case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER:
+                san_uri = 1;
+                break;
+            /* (We may handle other types here later.) */
+            default: /* Unrecognized type */
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (san_ip) {
+        if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    if (san_uri) {
+        if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL!
+ */
+static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                 const char *cn,
+                                 uint32_t *flags)
+{
+    const mbedtls_x509_name *name;
+    size_t cn_len = strlen(cn);
+
+    if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) {
+        if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+            return;
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) {
+            if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 &&
+                x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) {
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback
+ */
+static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
+    uint32_t *flags,
+    const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
+    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+    void *p_vrfy)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned i;
+    uint32_t cur_flags;
+    const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
+
+    for (i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i) {
+        cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];
+        cur_flags = cur->flags;
+
+        if (NULL != f_vrfy) {
+            if ((ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags)) != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        }
+
+        *flags |= cur_flags;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
+ *
+ * This function:
+ *  - checks the requested CN (if any)
+ *  - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
+ *    as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
+ *  - builds and verifies the chain
+ *  - then calls the callback and merges the flags
+ *
+ * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb`
+ * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the
+ * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will
+ * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list
+ * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list
+ * of CRLs.
+ */
+static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                             mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+                                             mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+                                             mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+                                             void *p_ca_cb,
+                                             const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                             const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+                                             int (*f_vrfy)(void *,
+                                                           mbedtls_x509_crt *,
+                                                           int,
+                                                           uint32_t *),
+                                             void *p_vrfy,
+                                             mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
+    uint32_t ee_flags;
+
+    *flags = 0;
+    ee_flags = 0;
+    x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ver_chain);
+
+    if (profile == NULL) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /* check name if requested */
+    if (cn != NULL) {
+        x509_crt_verify_name(crt, cn, &ee_flags);
+    }
+
+    /* Check the type and size of the key */
+    pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(&crt->pk);
+
+    if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, pk_type) != 0) {
+        ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
+    }
+
+    if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &crt->pk) != 0) {
+        ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+    }
+
+    /* Check the chain */
+    ret = x509_crt_verify_chain(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
+                                f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile,
+                                &ver_chain, rs_ctx);
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /* Merge end-entity flags */
+    ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;
+
+    /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
+    ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
+
+exit:
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result);
+    mbedtls_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result);
+    ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+    if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(rs_ctx);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
+     * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
+     * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        *flags = (uint32_t) -1;
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (*flags != 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                            mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+                            mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+                            const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+                            int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+                            void *p_vrfy)
+{
+    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
+                                             NULL, NULL,
+                                             &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default,
+                                             cn, flags,
+                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                         mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+                                         mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+                                         const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                         const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+                                         int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+                                         void *p_vrfy)
+{
+    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
+                                             NULL, NULL,
+                                             profile, cn, flags,
+                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+/*
+ * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback,
+ *                                  not restartable).
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                       mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+                                       void *p_ca_cb,
+                                       const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                       const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+                                       int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+                                       void *p_vrfy)
+{
+    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, NULL, NULL,
+                                             f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb,
+                                             profile, cn, flags,
+                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+                                        mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+                                        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+                                        const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+                                        const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+                                        int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+                                        void *p_vrfy,
+                                        mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+    return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
+                                             NULL, NULL,
+                                             profile, cn, flags,
+                                             f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a certificate chain
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+    memset(crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate all certificate data
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt;
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv;
+
+    while (cert_cur != NULL) {
+        mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
+        mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts);
+#endif
+
+        mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next);
+        mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next);
+        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next);
+        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next);
+        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next);
+        mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next);
+
+        if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) {
+            mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len);
+        }
+
+        cert_prv = cert_cur;
+        cert_cur = cert_cur->next;
+
+        mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt));
+        if (cert_prv != crt) {
+            mbedtls_free(cert_prv);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    mbedtls_pk_restart_init(&ctx->pk);
+
+    ctx->parent = NULL;
+    ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
+    ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
+
+    ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
+
+    ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;
+    ctx->self_cnt = 0;
+    x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ctx->ver_chain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_pk_restart_free(&ctx->pk);
+    mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */