edhoc 1.0.1 → 1.0.2

package/external/libedhoc/externals/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c

@@ -0,0 +1,3046 @@
+/*
+ *  TLS 1.3 client-side functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "ssl_client.h"
+#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h"
+#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h"
+#include "md_psa.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+    return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
+                                 ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
+                                 psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+#endif
+
+/* Write extensions */
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext():
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *      ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
+ * } SupportedVersions;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                  unsigned char *buf,
+                                                  unsigned char *end,
+                                                  size_t *out_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char versions_len = (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <=
+                                  MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) ? 4 : 2;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported versions extension"));
+
+    /* Check if we have space to write the extension:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - versions_length        (1 byte )
+     * - versions               (2 or 4 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + versions_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(versions_len + 1, p, 2);
+    p += 4;
+
+    /* Length of versions */
+    *p++ = versions_len;
+
+    /* Write values of supported versions.
+     * They are defined by the configuration.
+     * Currently, we advertise only TLS 1.3 or both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2.
+     */
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:4]"));
+
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p + 2, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+                                  MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:3]"));
+    }
+
+    *out_len = 5 + versions_len;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(
+        ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                  const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                  const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2);
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, ssl->conf->transport) !=
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unexpected version"));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (&buf[2] != end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            1, ("supported_versions ext data length incorrect"));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+    size_t protocol_name_list_len, protocol_name_len;
+    const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end;
+
+    /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
+    if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *     ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
+     * } ProtocolNameList;
+     *
+     * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
+     */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len);
+    protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, 1);
+    protocol_name_len = *p++;
+
+    /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, protocol_name_len);
+    for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) {
+        if (protocol_name_len == strlen(*alpn) &&
+            memcmp(p, *alpn, protocol_name_len) == 0) {
+            ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn;
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    uint16_t group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id;
+
+    if (group_id == 0) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) ||
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+        /* Destroy generated private key. */
+        status = psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+        return 0;
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+    if (0 /* other KEMs? */) {
+        /* Do something */
+    }
+
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for writing key_share extension.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          uint16_t *group_id)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl);
+    /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */
+    if (group_list == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+    }
+
+    for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) {
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+        if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(
+                 *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_SUCCESS) &&
+            mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) {
+            *group_id = *group_list;
+            return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) {
+            *group_id = *group_list;
+            return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+    ((void) group_id);
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext
+ *
+ * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello:
+ *
+ *  struct {
+ *          NamedGroup group;
+ *          opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ *      } KeyShareEntry;
+ *  struct {
+ *          KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>;
+ *      } KeyShareClientHello;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         unsigned char *buf,
+                                         unsigned char *end,
+                                         size_t *out_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    unsigned char *client_shares; /* Start of client_shares */
+    size_t client_shares_len;     /* Length of client_shares */
+    uint16_t group_id;
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    /* Check if we have space for header and length fields:
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_length  (2 bytes)
+     * - client_shares_length   (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6);
+    p += 6;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello: adding key share extension"));
+
+    /* HRR could already have requested something else. */
+    group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id;
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) &&
+        !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(ssl,
+                                                            &group_id));
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function.
+     *
+     * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction
+     * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per
+     * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And
+     * only one key share entry is allowed.
+     */
+    client_shares = p;
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) ||
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) {
+        /* Pointer to group */
+        unsigned char *group = p;
+        /* Length of key_exchange */
+        size_t key_exchange_len = 0;
+
+        /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry
+         * - group                  (2 bytes)
+         * - key_exchange_length    (2 bytes)
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4);
+        p += 4;
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange(
+            ssl, group_id, p, end, &key_exchange_len);
+        p += key_exchange_len;
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Write group */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group_id, group, 0);
+        /* Write key_exchange_length */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_len, group, 2);
+    } else
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+    if (0 /* other KEMs? */) {
+        /* Do something */
+    } else {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Length of client_shares */
+    client_shares_len = p - client_shares;
+    if (client_shares_len == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No key share defined."));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    /* Write extension_type */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0);
+    /* Write extension_data_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2);
+    /* Write client_shares_length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len, buf, 4);
+
+    /* Update offered_group_id field */
+    ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id;
+
+    /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */
+    *out_len = p - buf;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(
+        3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *out_len);
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE);
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext()
+ *      Parse key_share extension in Hello Retry Request
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *        NamedGroup selected_group;
+ * } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             const unsigned char *end)
+{
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    int selected_group;
+    int found = 0;
+
+    const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl);
+    if (group_list == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "key_share extension", p, end - buf);
+
+    /* Read selected_group */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    selected_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_group ( %d )", selected_group));
+
+    /* Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client
+     * MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a
+     * group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the
+     * original ClientHello.
+     * The supported_group was based on the info in ssl->conf->group_list.
+     *
+     * If the server provided a key share that was not sent in the ClientHello
+     * then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+     */
+    for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) {
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) {
+            if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(
+                     *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
+                *group_list != selected_group) {
+                found = 1;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) {
+            found = 1;
+            break;
+        }
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+    }
+
+    /* Client MUST verify that the selected_group field does not
+     * correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share"
+     * extension in the original ClientHello. If the server sent an
+     * HRR message with a key share already provided in the
+     * ClientHello then the client MUST abort the handshake with
+     * an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+     */
+    if (found == 0 || selected_group == ssl->handshake->offered_group_id) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid key share in HRR"));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    /* Remember server's preference for next ClientHello */
+    ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = selected_group;
+
+    return 0;
+#else /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+    (void) ssl;
+    (void) buf;
+    (void) end;
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext()
+ *      Parse key_share extension in Server Hello
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *        KeyShareEntry server_share;
+ * } KeyShareServerHello;
+ * struct {
+ *        NamedGroup group;
+ *        opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } KeyShareEntry;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         const unsigned char *buf,
+                                         const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    uint16_t group, offered_group;
+
+    /* ...
+     * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes)
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */
+    offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id;
+    if (offered_group != group) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            1, ("Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u",
+                (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) ||
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
+                              ("DHE group name: %s", mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group)));
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(ssl, p, end - p);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+    if (0 /* other KEMs? */) {
+        /* Do something */
+    } else {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext()
+ *      Parse cookie extension in Hello Retry Request
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *        opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } Cookie;
+ *
+ * When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie"
+ * extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that
+ * the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the
+ * ClientHello).  When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy
+ * the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into
+ * a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello.  Clients MUST NOT use
+ * cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      const unsigned char *buf,
+                                      const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    uint16_t cookie_len;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* Retrieve length field of cookie */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    cookie_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cookie_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie extension", p, cookie_len);
+
+    mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie);
+    handshake->cookie_len = 0;
+    handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len);
+    if (handshake->cookie == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("alloc failed ( %ud bytes )",
+                               cookie_len));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len);
+    handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      unsigned char *buf,
+                                      unsigned char *end,
+                                      size_t *out_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    *out_len = 0;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    if (handshake->cookie == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no cookie to send; skip extension"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie",
+                          handshake->cookie,
+                          handshake->cookie_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, handshake->cookie_len + 6);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding cookie extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, p, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len + 2, p, 2);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len, p, 4);
+    p += 6;
+
+    /* Cookie */
+    memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, handshake->cookie_len);
+
+    *out_len = handshake->cookie_len + 6;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext() structure:
+ *
+ * enum { psk_ke( 0 ), psk_dhe_ke( 1 ), ( 255 ) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *     PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
+ * } PskKeyExchangeModes;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                      unsigned char *buf,
+                                                      unsigned char *end,
+                                                      size_t *out_len)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    int ke_modes_len = 0;
+
+    ((void) ke_modes_len);
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    /* Skip writing extension if no PSK key exchange mode
+     * is enabled in the config.
+     */
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip psk_key_exchange_modes extension"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Require 7 bytes of data, otherwise fail,
+     * even if extension might be shorter.
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+        3, ("client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, p, 0);
+
+    /* Skip extension length (2 bytes) and
+     * ke_modes length (1 byte) for now.
+     */
+    p += 5;
+
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
+        *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE;
+        ke_modes_len++;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding PSK-ECDHE key exchange mode"));
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_psk_enabled(ssl)) {
+        *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE;
+        ke_modes_len++;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding pure PSK key exchange mode"));
+    }
+
+    /* Now write the extension and ke_modes length */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ke_modes_len + 1, buf, 2);
+    buf[4] = ke_modes_len;
+
+    *out_len = p - buf;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(
+        ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(int ciphersuite)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = NULL;
+    ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite);
+
+    if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
+        return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    }
+
+    return PSA_ALG_NONE;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+static int ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+    return ssl->handshake->resume &&
+           session != NULL && session->ticket != NULL &&
+           mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(
+        ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_flags(
+            session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+static int ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+    return ssl->handshake->resume &&
+           session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 &&
+           (session->ticket_flags &
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA) &&
+           mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(
+        ssl, session->ciphersuite);
+}
+#endif
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg,
+                                         const unsigned char **identity,
+                                         size_t *identity_len)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+    if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite);
+    *identity = session->ticket;
+    *identity_len = session->ticket_len;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg,
+                                    const unsigned char **psk,
+                                    size_t *psk_len)
+{
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+    if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite);
+    *psk = session->resumption_key;
+    *psk_len = session->resumption_key_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg,
+                                      const unsigned char **identity,
+                                      size_t *identity_len)
+{
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+    *identity = ssl->conf->psk_identity;
+    *identity_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                 psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg,
+                                 const unsigned char **psk,
+                                 size_t *psk_len)
+{
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+    *psk = ssl->conf->psk;
+    *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int configured_psk_count = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if (ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket is configured"));
+        configured_psk_count++;
+    }
+#endif
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK is configured"));
+        configured_psk_count++;
+    }
+    return configured_psk_count;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                    unsigned char *buf,
+                                    unsigned char *end,
+                                    const unsigned char *identity,
+                                    size_t identity_len,
+                                    uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age,
+                                    size_t *out_len)
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * - identity_len           (2 bytes)
+     * - identity               (psk_identity_len bytes)
+     * - obfuscated_ticket_age  (4 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6 + identity_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(identity_len, buf, 0);
+    memcpy(buf + 2, identity, identity_len);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(obfuscated_ticket_age, buf, 2 + identity_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write identity", buf, 6 + identity_len);
+
+    *out_len = 6 + identity_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  unsigned char *buf,
+                                  unsigned char *end,
+                                  int psk_type,
+                                  psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
+                                  const unsigned char *psk,
+                                  size_t psk_len,
+                                  size_t *out_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char binder_len;
+    unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+    size_t transcript_len = 0;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    binder_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
+
+    /*
+     * - binder_len           (1 bytes)
+     * - binder               (binder_len bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1 + binder_len);
+
+    buf[0] = binder_len;
+
+    /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(
+        ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg),
+        transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, hash_alg,
+                                              psk, psk_len, psk_type,
+                                              transcript, buf + 1);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write binder", buf, 1 + binder_len);
+
+    *out_len = 1 + binder_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext() structure:
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *   opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
+ *   uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
+ * } PskIdentity;
+ *
+ * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *   PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
+ *   PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
+ * } OfferedPsks;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *   select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ *      case client_hello: OfferedPsks;
+ *      ...
+ *   };
+ * } PreSharedKeyExtension;
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
+    mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end,
+    size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    int configured_psk_count = 0;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+    const unsigned char *identity;
+    size_t identity_len;
+    size_t l_binders_len = 0;
+    size_t output_len;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+    *binders_len = 0;
+
+    /* Check if we have any PSKs to offer. If no, skip pre_shared_key */
+    configured_psk_count = ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl);
+    if (configured_psk_count == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip pre_shared_key extensions"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Pre-configured PSK number = %d",
+                              configured_psk_count));
+
+    /* Check if we have space to write the extension, binders included.
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_len     (2 bytes)
+     * - identities_len         (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6);
+    p += 6;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity(
+            ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+        mbedtls_time_t now = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+        mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+        uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age =
+            (uint32_t) (now - session->ticket_received);
+
+        /*
+         * The ticket timestamp is in seconds but the ticket age is in
+         * milliseconds. If the ticket was received at the end of a second and
+         * re-used here just at the beginning of the next second, the computed
+         * age `now - session->ticket_received` is equal to 1s thus 1000 ms
+         * while the actual age could be just a few milliseconds or tens of
+         * milliseconds. If the server has more accurate ticket timestamps
+         * (typically timestamps in milliseconds), as part of the processing of
+         * the ClientHello, it may compute a ticket lifetime smaller than the
+         * one computed here and potentially reject the ticket. To avoid that,
+         * remove one second to the ticket age if possible.
+         */
+        if (obfuscated_ticket_age > 0) {
+            obfuscated_ticket_age -= 1;
+        }
+
+        obfuscated_ticket_age *= 1000;
+        obfuscated_ticket_age += session->ticket_age_add;
+
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end,
+                                       identity, identity_len,
+                                       obfuscated_ticket_age,
+                                       &output_len);
+#else
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len,
+                                       0, &output_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        p += output_len;
+        l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+    if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity(
+            ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) {
+
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, 0,
+                                       &output_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        p += output_len;
+        l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, "
+                           "omitting PSK binder list"));
+
+    /* Take into account the two bytes for the length of the binders. */
+    l_binders_len += 2;
+    /* Check if there is enough space for binders */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, l_binders_len);
+
+    /*
+     * - extension_type         (2 bytes)
+     * - extension_data_len     (2 bytes)
+     * - identities_len         (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, buf, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 4 + l_binders_len, buf, 2);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 6, buf, 4);
+
+    *out_len = (p - buf) + l_binders_len;
+    *binders_len = l_binders_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key identities", buf, p - buf);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
+    mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+    const unsigned char *psk;
+    size_t psk_len;
+    size_t output_len;
+
+    /* Check if we have space to write binders_len.
+     * - binders_len         (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    p += 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) {
+
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end,
+                                     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION,
+                                     hash_alg, psk, psk_len,
+                                     &output_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+        p += output_len;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+    if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) {
+
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end,
+                                     MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL,
+                                     hash_alg, psk, psk_len,
+                                     &output_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+        p += output_len;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding PSK binder list."));
+
+    /*
+     * - binders_len         (2 bytes)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 2, buf, 0);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key binders", buf, p - buf);
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(
+        ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * struct {
+ *   opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
+ *   uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
+ * } PskIdentity;
+ *
+ * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *
+ *   select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ *         ...
+ *         case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity;
+ *   };
+ *
+ * } PreSharedKeyExtension;
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                     const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                     const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    int selected_identity;
+    const unsigned char *psk;
+    size_t psk_len;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2);
+    selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0);
+    ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity));
+
+    if (selected_identity >= ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid PSK identity."));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    if (selected_identity == 0 && ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) {
+        ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len);
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) {
+        ret = ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len);
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
+        != hash_alg) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk."));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char *buf,
+                                              unsigned char *end,
+                                              size_t *out_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    *out_len = 0;
+
+    /* Write supported_versions extension
+     *
+     * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+
+    /* Echo the cookie if the server provided one in its preceding
+     * HelloRetryRequest message.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
+        ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+        p += ext_len;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_psk_enabled(ssl) &&
+        ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) &&
+        ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) {
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+        p += ext_len;
+
+        /* Initializes the status to `rejected`. It will be updated to
+         * `accepted` if the EncryptedExtension message contain an early data
+         * indication extension.
+         */
+        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write early_data extension"));
+        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+    /* For PSK-based key exchange we need the pre_shared_key extension
+     * and the psk_key_exchange_modes extension.
+     *
+     * The pre_shared_key extension MUST be the last extension in the
+     * ClientHello. Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and
+     * otherwise fail the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+     *
+     * Add the psk_key_exchange_modes extension.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += ext_len;
+#endif
+
+    *out_len = p - buf;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    ((void) ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
+    const unsigned char *psk;
+    size_t psk_len;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+    if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO);
+#endif
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk"));
+
+        ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+                1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
+        if (ret  != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite
+         * associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake.
+         * Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake
+         * based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully
+         * with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite
+         * associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the
+         * two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the
+         * encrypted handshake data and application data are
+         * encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for
+         * the rejected early data.
+         */
+        ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+            ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+
+        /* Enable psk and psk_ephemeral to make stage early happy */
+        ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
+
+        /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule:
+         *     Set the PSK and derive early secret.
+         */
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+                1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Derive early data key material */
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+                1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+    return 0;
+}
+/*
+ * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Detect if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension
+ *        or not.
+ *
+ * \param[in] ssl  SSL context
+ * \param[in] buf  Buffer containing the ServerHello message
+ * \param[in] end  End of the buffer containing the ServerHello message
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the ServerHello does not contain a supported_versions extension
+ * \return 1 if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension
+ * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the ServerHello.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present(
+    mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+    const unsigned char *buf,
+    const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len;
+    const unsigned char *supported_versions_data;
+    const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end;
+
+    /*
+     * Check there is enough data to access the legacy_session_id_echo vector
+     * length:
+     * - legacy_version                 2 bytes
+     * - random                         MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes
+     * - legacy_session_id_echo length  1 byte
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 3);
+    p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2;
+    legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p;
+
+    /*
+     * Jump to the extensions, jumping over:
+     * - legacy_session_id_echo     (legacy_session_id_echo_len + 1) bytes
+     * - cipher_suite               2 bytes
+     * - legacy_compression_method  1 byte
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4);
+    p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4;
+
+    return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts(
+        ssl, p, end,
+        &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end);
+}
+
+/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
+ * - 1 if the last eight bytes of the ServerHello random bytes indicate that
+ *     the server is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating TLS 1.2 or below.
+ * - 0 otherwise
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              const unsigned char *buf,
+                                              const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    /* First seven bytes of the magic downgrade strings, see RFC 8446 4.1.3 */
+    static const unsigned char magic_downgrade_string[] =
+    { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44 };
+    const unsigned char *last_eight_bytes_of_random;
+    unsigned char last_byte_of_random;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2);
+    last_eight_bytes_of_random = buf + 2 + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - 8;
+
+    if (memcmp(last_eight_bytes_of_random,
+               magic_downgrade_string,
+               sizeof(magic_downgrade_string)) == 0) {
+        last_byte_of_random = last_eight_bytes_of_random[7];
+        return last_byte_of_random == 0 ||
+               last_byte_of_random == 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR
+ * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next.
+ */
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO 0
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR 1
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   const unsigned char *buf,
+                                   const unsigned char *end)
+{
+
+    /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message.
+     *
+     * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the
+     * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest".
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303;
+     *    Random random;
+     *    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+     *    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+     *    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+     *    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+     * } ServerHello;
+     *
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(
+        buf, end, 2 + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic));
+
+    if (memcmp(buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic,
+               sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)) == 0) {
+        return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR;
+    }
+
+    return SSL_SERVER_HELLO;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR or
+ * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2
+ */
+#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 2
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present(
+                                 ssl, buf, end));
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(
+            ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(ssl, buf, end));
+
+        /* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and:
+         * . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or
+         * . the server responded it is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating a lower
+         *   version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack
+         * abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert.
+         */
+        if (handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                         MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Version 1.2 of the protocol has been negotiated, set the
+         * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ServerHello to be kept and
+         * parsed as a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to
+         * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step()
+         * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine.
+         */
+        ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+        ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                                 ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO,
+                                 buf, (size_t) (end - buf)));
+
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
+            ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        }
+
+        return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+    handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE;
+
+    ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(ssl, buf, end);
+    switch (ret) {
+        case SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received ServerHello message"));
+            break;
+        case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received HelloRetryRequest message"));
+            /* If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same
+             * connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response
+             * to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an
+             * "unexpected_message" alert.
+             */
+            if (handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Multiple HRRs received"));
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+                    MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            }
+            /*
+             * Clients must abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter"
+             * alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change
+             * in the ClientHello.
+             * In a PSK only key exchange that what we expect.
+             */
+            if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                                      ("Unexpected HRR in pure PSK key exchange."));
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                    MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+            }
+
+            handshake->hello_retry_request_count++;
+
+            break;
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                        const unsigned char **buf,
+                                                        const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    const unsigned char *p = *buf;
+    size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1);
+    legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len);
+
+    /* legacy_session_id_echo */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len ||
+        memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, legacy_session_id_echo_len) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Expected Session ID",
+                              ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+                              ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Received Session ID", p,
+                              legacy_session_id_echo_len);
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    p += legacy_session_id_echo_len;
+    *buf = p;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+                          ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse ServerHello message and configure context
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *    ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2
+ *    Random random;
+ *    opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+ *    CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+ *    uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+ *    Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerHello;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        const unsigned char *end,
+                                        int is_hrr)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    size_t extensions_len;
+    const unsigned char *extensions_end;
+    uint16_t cipher_suite;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+    int fatal_alert = 0;
+    uint32_t allowed_extensions_mask;
+    int hs_msg_type = is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST :
+                      MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
+
+    /*
+     * Check there is space for minimal fields
+     *
+     * - legacy_version             ( 2 bytes)
+     * - random                     (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes)
+     * - legacy_session_id_echo     ( 1 byte ), minimum size
+     * - cipher_suite               ( 2 bytes)
+     * - legacy_compression_method  ( 1 byte )
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello", p, end - p);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", p, 2);
+
+    /* ...
+     * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2
+     * ...
+     * with ProtocolVersion defined as:
+     * uint16 ProtocolVersion;
+     */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) !=
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS."));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* ...
+     * Random random;
+     * ...
+     * with Random defined as:
+     * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
+     */
+    if (!is_hrr) {
+        memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p,
+               MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes",
+                              p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN);
+    }
+    p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN;
+
+    /* ...
+     * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>;
+     * ...
+     */
+    if (ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(ssl, &p, end) != 0) {
+        fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* ...
+     * CipherSuite cipher_suite;
+     * ...
+     * with CipherSuite defined as:
+     * uint8 CipherSuite[2];
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+
+    ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite);
+    /*
+     * Check whether this ciphersuite is valid and offered.
+     */
+    if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info,
+                                          ssl->tls_version,
+                                          ssl->tls_version) != 0) ||
+        !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) {
+        fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If we received an HRR before and that the proposed selected
+     * ciphersuite in this server hello is not the same as the one
+     * proposed in the HRR, we abort the handshake and send an
+     * "illegal_parameter" alert.
+     */
+    else if ((!is_hrr) && (handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0) &&
+             (cipher_suite != ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) {
+        fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid ciphersuite(%04x) parameter",
+                                  cipher_suite));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    /* Configure ciphersuites */
+    mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info);
+
+    handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s",
+                              cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+    /* ...
+     * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0;
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1);
+    if (p[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method"));
+        fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    p++;
+
+    /* ...
+     * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>;
+     * ...
+     * struct {
+     *      ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes)
+     *      opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+     * } Extension;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len);
+    extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len);
+
+    handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE;
+    allowed_extensions_mask = is_hrr ?
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR :
+                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH;
+
+    while (p < extensions_end) {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+        const unsigned char *extension_data_end;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4);
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2);
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len);
+        extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len;
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
+            ssl, hs_msg_type, extension_type, allowed_extensions_mask);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        switch (extension_type) {
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE:
+
+                ret = ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(ssl,
+                                                 p, extension_data_end);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                                          "ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext",
+                                          ret);
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS:
+                ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl,
+                                                             p,
+                                                             extension_data_end);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+                break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(
+                         ssl, p, extension_data_end)) != 0) {
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+                        1, ("ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext"), ret);
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key_shares extension"));
+                if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) {
+                    fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT;
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+
+                if (is_hrr) {
+                    ret = ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl,
+                                                            p, extension_data_end);
+                } else {
+                    ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(ssl,
+                                                        p, extension_data_end);
+                }
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                                          "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext",
+                                          ret);
+                    goto cleanup;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                goto cleanup;
+        }
+
+        p += extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, hs_msg_type, handshake->received_extensions);
+
+cleanup:
+
+    if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+    } else if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+static const char *ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(int mode)
+{
+    switch (mode) {
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK:
+            return "psk";
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL:
+            return "ephemeral";
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL:
+            return "psk_ephemeral";
+        default:
+            return "unknown mode";
+    }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* Determine the key exchange mode:
+     * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received
+     *    then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL.
+     * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key
+     *    exchange mode is PSK-only.
+     * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key
+     *    exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only.
+     */
+    switch (handshake->received_extensions &
+            (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) |
+             MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE))) {
+        /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY):
+            handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK;
+            break;
+
+        /* Only the key_share extension was received */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE):
+            handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL;
+            break;
+
+        /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */
+        case (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) |
+              MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE)):
+            handshake->key_exchange_mode =
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL;
+            break;
+
+        /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unknown key exchange."));
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
+        (handshake->selected_identity != 0 ||
+         handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
+         ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) {
+        /* RFC8446 4.2.11
+         * If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the
+         * client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity
+         * is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST
+         * abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
+         *
+         * RFC 8446 4.2.10
+         * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK
+         * cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's
+         * "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the
+         * following values are the same as those associated with the
+         * selected PSK:
+         * - The TLS version number
+         * - The selected cipher suite
+         * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any
+         *
+         * We check here that when early data is involved the server
+         * selected the cipher suite associated to the pre-shared key
+         * as it must have.
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(
+            ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            2, ("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.",
+                ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode)));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+        3, ("Selected key exchange mode: %s",
+            ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode)));
+
+    /* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done.
+     *
+     * If we proposed early data then we have already derived an
+     * early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash.
+     * It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or
+     * psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the
+     * early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other
+     * cases we compute it here.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT ||
+        handshake->key_exchange_mode ==
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL)
+#endif
+    {
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+                1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                              "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform",
+                              ret);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic"));
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
+    ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0);
+
+    /*
+     * We are going to re-generate a shared secret corresponding to the group
+     * selected by the server, which is different from the group for which we
+     * generated a shared secret in the first client hello.
+     * Thus, reset the shared secret.
+     */
+    ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message.
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    size_t buf_len = 0;
+    int is_hrr = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> %s", __func__));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len));
+
+    ret = ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        goto cleanup;
+    } else {
+        is_hrr = (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR);
+    }
+
+    if (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(ssl, buf,
+                                                      buf + buf_len,
+                                                      is_hrr));
+    if (is_hrr) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl));
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, buf_len));
+
+    if (is_hrr) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(ssl));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+        /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record
+         * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before
+         * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight.
+         */
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO);
+#else
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(ssl));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS);
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= %s ( %s )", __func__,
+                              is_hrr ? "HelloRetryRequest" : "ServerHello"));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ *
+ * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which
+ * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish
+ * the cryptographic context.
+ */
+
+/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message
+ * struct {
+ *     Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } EncryptedExtensions;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    size_t extensions_len;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *extensions_end;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len);
+    extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len);
+
+    handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE;
+
+    while (p < extensions_end) {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+
+        /*
+         * struct {
+         *     ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes)
+         *     opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
+         * } Extension;
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4);
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2);
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len);
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, extension_type,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        switch (extension_type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension"));
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext(
+                         ssl, p, (size_t) extension_data_len)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
+
+                if (extension_data_len != 0) {
+                    /* The message must be empty. */
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR);
+                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+                }
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension"));
+
+                ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(
+                    ssl, p, p + extension_data_len);
+
+                /* TODO: Return unconditionally here until we handle the record
+                 * size limit correctly. Once handled correctly, only return in
+                 * case of errors. */
+                return ret;
+
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(
+                    3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                    extension_type, "( ignored )");
+                break;
+        }
+
+        p += extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                           handshake->received_extensions);
+
+    /* Check that we consumed all the message. */
+    if (p != end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned"));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                     MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse encrypted extensions"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                             &buf, &buf_len));
+
+    /* Process the message contents */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+        ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions &
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) {
+        ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+                             buf, buf_len));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED);
+    } else {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST);
+    }
+#else
+    ((void) ssl);
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED);
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse encrypted extensions"));
+    return ret;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
+ *
+ * RFC 8446 section 4.5
+ *
+ * struct {} EndOfEarlyData;
+ *
+ * If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the
+ * client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server
+ * Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message.
+ */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+    size_t buf_len;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+                             &buf, &buf_len));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
+        mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0));
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData"));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest
+ *
+ */
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST 0
+#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP           1
+/* Coordination:
+ * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if a CertificateRequest
+ * will be sent. Returns a negative code on failure, or
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST
+ * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP
+ * indicating if a Certificate Request is expected or not.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
+
+    if ((ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) &&
+        (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got a certificate request"));
+        return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got no certificate request"));
+
+    return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request()
+ *     Parse certificate request
+ * struct {
+ *   opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>;
+ *   Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
+ * } CertificateRequest;
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                               const unsigned char *buf,
+                                               const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0;
+    size_t extensions_len = 0;
+    const unsigned char *extensions_end;
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+    /* ...
+     * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1);
+    certificate_request_context_len = (size_t) p[0];
+    p += 1;
+
+    if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Certificate Request Context",
+                              p, certificate_request_context_len);
+
+        handshake->certificate_request_context =
+            mbedtls_calloc(1, certificate_request_context_len);
+        if (handshake->certificate_request_context == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+        }
+        memcpy(handshake->certificate_request_context, p,
+               certificate_request_context_len);
+        p += certificate_request_context_len;
+    }
+
+    /* ...
+     * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>;
+     * ...
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len);
+    extensions_end = p + extensions_len;
+
+    handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE;
+
+    while (p < extensions_end) {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4);
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2);
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len);
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, extension_type,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        switch (extension_type) {
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                                      ("found signature algorithms extension"));
+                ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p,
+                                                    p + extension_data_len);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                break;
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(
+                    3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                    extension_type, "( ignored )");
+                break;
+        }
+
+        p += extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                           handshake->received_extensions);
+
+    /* Check that we consumed all the message. */
+    if (p != end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                              ("CertificateRequest misaligned"));
+        goto decode_error;
+    }
+
+    /* RFC 8446 section 4.3.2
+     *
+     * The "signature_algorithms" extension MUST be specified
+     */
+    if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)) == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                              ("no signature algorithms extension found"));
+        goto decode_error;
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->client_auth = 1;
+    return 0;
+
+decode_error:
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                                 MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR);
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for  MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl));
+
+    if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST) {
+        unsigned char *buf;
+        size_t buf_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(
+                                 ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                                 &buf, &buf_len));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(
+                                 ssl, buf, buf + buf_len));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(
+                                 ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+                                 buf, buf_len));
+    } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) {
+        ret = 0;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE);
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request"));
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED);
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+    if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA);
+    } else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+    {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED);
+#else
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int non_empty_certificate_msg = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
+                          ("Switch to handshake traffic keys for outbound traffic"));
+    mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+    if (ssl->handshake->client_auth) {
+        int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) != NULL) {
+            non_empty_certificate_msg = 1;
+        }
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate"));
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (non_empty_certificate_msg) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl,
+                                        MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY);
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate verify"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl);
+
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED);
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
+            1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret ", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done"));
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                   const unsigned char *buf,
+                                                   const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+    const unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+
+    handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE;
+
+    while (p < end) {
+        unsigned int extension_type;
+        size_t extension_data_len;
+        int ret;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4);
+        extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+        extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2);
+        p += 4;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extension_data_len);
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
+            ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, extension_type,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        switch (extension_type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA:
+                if (extension_data_len != 4) {
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+                        MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR,
+                        MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR);
+                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+                }
+                if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+                    ssl->session->ticket_flags |=
+                        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(
+                    3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                    extension_type, "( ignored )");
+                break;
+        }
+
+        p +=  extension_data_len;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                           handshake->received_extensions);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * From RFC8446, page 74
+ *
+ * struct {
+ *    uint32 ticket_lifetime;
+ *    uint32 ticket_age_add;
+ *    opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>;
+ *    opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
+ *    Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
+ * } NewSessionTicket;
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char *buf,
+                                              unsigned char *end,
+                                              unsigned char **ticket_nonce,
+                                              size_t *ticket_nonce_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session;
+    size_t ticket_len;
+    unsigned char *ticket;
+    size_t extensions_len;
+
+    *ticket_nonce = NULL;
+    *ticket_nonce_len = 0;
+    /*
+     *    ticket_lifetime   4 bytes
+     *    ticket_age_add    4 bytes
+     *    ticket_nonce_len  1 byte
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 9);
+
+    session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("ticket_lifetime: %u",
+                           (unsigned int) session->ticket_lifetime));
+
+    session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 4);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3,
+                          ("ticket_age_add: %u",
+                           (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add));
+
+    *ticket_nonce_len = p[8];
+    p += 9;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, *ticket_nonce_len);
+    *ticket_nonce = p;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", *ticket_nonce, *ticket_nonce_len);
+    p += *ticket_nonce_len;
+
+    /* Ticket */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ticket_len);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received ticket", p, ticket_len);
+
+    /* Check if we previously received a ticket already. */
+    if (session->ticket != NULL || session->ticket_len > 0) {
+        mbedtls_free(session->ticket);
+        session->ticket = NULL;
+        session->ticket_len = 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+    memcpy(ticket, p, ticket_len);
+    p += ticket_len;
+    session->ticket = ticket;
+    session->ticket_len = ticket_len;
+
+    /* Clear all flags in ticket_flags */
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_clear_ticket_flags(
+        session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2);
+    extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket extension", p, extensions_len);
+
+    ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(ssl, p, p + extensions_len);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1,
+                              "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts",
+                              ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /* session has been updated, allow export */
+    session->exported = 0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                    unsigned char *ticket_nonce,
+                                                    size_t ticket_nonce_len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+    psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg;
+    int hash_length;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    /* Store ticket creation time */
+    session->ticket_received = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+#endif
+
+    ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite);
+    if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac);
+    hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg);
+    if (hash_length == -1 ||
+        (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret",
+                          session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret,
+                          hash_length);
+
+    /* Compute resumption key
+     *
+     *  HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret,
+     *                    "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length )
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(
+        psa_hash_alg,
+        session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret,
+        hash_length,
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption),
+        ticket_nonce,
+        ticket_nonce_len,
+        session->resumption_key,
+        hash_length);
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2,
+                              "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed",
+                              ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    session->resumption_key_len = hash_length;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK",
+                          session->resumption_key,
+                          session->resumption_key_len);
+
+    /* Set ticket_flags depends on the selected key exchange modes */
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_flags(
+        session, ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *buf;
+    size_t buf_len;
+    unsigned char *ticket_nonce;
+    size_t ticket_nonce_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(
+                             ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+                             &buf, &buf_len));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket(
+                             ssl, buf, buf + buf_len,
+                             &ticket_nonce, &ticket_nonce_len));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(
+                             ssl, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_len));
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER);
+
+cleanup:
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket"));
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    switch (ssl->state) {
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(ssl);
+            break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl);
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(ssl);
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
+            break;
+
+            /*
+             * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility
+             */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO);
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
+                    ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+                    1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic"));
+                mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(
+                    ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata);
+#endif
+            }
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
+            ret = ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                break;
+            }
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+            break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */