agent-threat-rules 4.0.0 → 4.1.5

package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-02023-escaperoute-filesystem-mcp-prefix-bypass.yaml

@@ -1,194 +1,113 @@
-title: "EscapeRoute — Filesystem MCP Server Directory Prefix-Bypass (CVE-2025-53110)"
+title: EscapeRoute — Filesystem MCP Server Directory Prefix-Bypass (CVE-2025-53110)
 id: ATR-2026-02023
 rule_version: 1
 status: experimental
-description: >
-  Detects the EscapeRoute directory-containment bypass (CVE-2025-53110, CVSS
-  7.3) reported by Cymulate against Anthropic's Filesystem MCP Server before
-  0.6.3 / 2025.7.1. The server enforced the allowed-directory boundary with a
-  naive string prefix check: any requested path that merely starts with the
-  allowed-directory string passed validation. An attacker requests a sibling
-  directory that shares the allowed prefix — e.g. allowed dir "/private/tmp/allow_dir"
-  is escaped with "/private/tmp/allow_dir_sensitive_credentials" — reading or
-  writing files entirely outside the intended sandbox. This rule fires on the
-  concrete filesystem-MCP access signature: a read_file/write_file/list_directory
-  operation whose path takes an allowed-dir-like prefix and appends a suffix
-  character that turns it into a different sibling directory (allow_dir ->
-  allow_dir_secret). It does NOT fire on plain "../" traversal (covered
-  elsewhere) or on legitimate paths that stay inside the boundary. Fixed by
-  path.resolve + boundary-with-separator checks in 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1.
-author: "ATR Community (MCP CVE sweep)"
-date: "2026/07/08"
-schema_version: "0.1"
+description: |
+  Detects the EscapeRoute directory-containment bypass (CVE-2025-53110, CVSS 7.3) reported by Cymulate against Anthropic's Filesystem MCP Server before 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1. The server enforced the allowed-directory boundary with a naive string prefix check: any requested path that merely starts with the allowed-directory string passed validation. An attacker requests a sibling directory that shares the allowed prefix — e.g. allowed dir "/private/tmp/allow_dir" is escaped with "/private/tmp/allow_dir_sensitive_credentials" — reading or writing files entirely outside the intended sandbox. This rule fires on the concrete filesystem-MCP access signature: a read_file/write_file/list_directory operation whose path takes an allowed-dir-like prefix and appends a suffix character that turns it into a different sibling directory (allow_dir -> allow_dir_secret). It does NOT fire on plain "../" traversal (covered elsewhere) or on legitimate paths that stay inside the boundary. Fixed by path.resolve + boundary-with-separator checks in 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1.
+author: ATR Community (MCP CVE sweep)
+date: 2026/07/08
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: test
 severity: high
-
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM06:2025"
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM06:2025
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI02:2026"
-    - "ASI06:2026"
+    - ASI02:2026
+    - ASI06:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation"
-    - "AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage"
+    - AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation
+    - AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage
   cve:
-    - "CVE-2025-53110"
+    - CVE-2025-53110
   cwe:
-    - "CWE-22"
-    - "CWE-706"
+    - CWE-22
+    - CWE-706
   external:
-    - "https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/"
-    - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53110"
-
+    - https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/
+    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53110
 metadata_provenance:
   cve: mcp-cve-sweep
   cwe: mcp-cve-sweep
   owasp_llm: mcp-cve-sweep
   owasp_agentic: mcp-cve-sweep
   mitre_atlas: mcp-cve-sweep
-
 compliance:
   owasp_agentic:
-    - id: "ASI02:2026"
-      context: "OWASP Agentic ASI02:2026 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation) is exercised by the EscapeRoute prefix-bypass that misuses the filesystem MCP tool to read outside its sandbox (CVE-2025-53110); this rule detects that access pattern."
+    - id: ASI02:2026
+      context: OWASP Agentic ASI02:2026 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation) is exercised by the EscapeRoute prefix-bypass that misuses the filesystem MCP tool to read outside its sandbox (CVE-2025-53110); this rule detects that access pattern.
       strength: primary
-    - id: "ASI06:2026"
-      context: "OWASP Agentic ASI06:2026 (Memory and Context Manipulation) is affected where out-of-sandbox reads pull sensitive files into agent context (CVE-2025-53110)."
+    - id: ASI06:2026
+      context: OWASP Agentic ASI06:2026 (Memory and Context Manipulation) is affected where out-of-sandbox reads pull sensitive files into agent context (CVE-2025-53110).
       strength: secondary
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM02:2025"
-      context: "OWASP LLM LLM02:2025 (Sensitive Information Disclosure) is exercised by the EscapeRoute prefix bypass leaking files outside the allowed directory (CVE-2025-53110); this rule is a detection implementation for that category."
+    - id: LLM02:2025
+      context: OWASP LLM LLM02:2025 (Sensitive Information Disclosure) is exercised by the EscapeRoute prefix bypass leaking files outside the allowed directory (CVE-2025-53110); this rule is a detection implementation for that category.
       strength: primary
-    - id: "LLM06:2025"
-      context: "OWASP LLM LLM06:2025 (Excessive Agency) is exercised where the filesystem MCP server acts outside its intended directory scope (CVE-2025-53110)."
+    - id: LLM06:2025
+      context: OWASP LLM LLM06:2025 (Excessive Agency) is exercised where the filesystem MCP server acts outside its intended directory scope (CVE-2025-53110).
       strength: secondary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "EU AI Act Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires MCP filesystem tools to enforce directory boundaries; this rule provides runtime detection evidence for the CVE-2025-53110 prefix-bypass."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: EU AI Act Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires MCP filesystem tools to enforce directory boundaries; this rule provides runtime detection evidence for the CVE-2025-53110 prefix-bypass.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "10"
-      context: "EU AI Act Article 10 (data and data governance) is supported by preventing out-of-scope data access via the CVE-2025-53110 prefix bypass; this rule provides detection evidence."
+    - article: '10'
+      context: EU AI Act Article 10 (data and data governance) is supported by preventing out-of-scope data access via the CVE-2025-53110 prefix bypass; this rule provides detection evidence.
       strength: secondary
   nist_ai_rmf:
     - function: Manage
-      subcategory: "MG.2.3"
-      context: "NIST AI RMF MG.2.3 (risk treatment options selected and tracked) is supported by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute prefix-bypass path traversal (CVE-2025-53110)."
+      subcategory: MG.2.3
+      context: NIST AI RMF MG.2.3 (risk treatment options selected and tracked) is supported by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute prefix-bypass path traversal (CVE-2025-53110).
       strength: primary
     - function: Measure
-      subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "NIST AI RMF MS.2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of CVE-2025-53110."
+      subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: NIST AI RMF MS.2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of CVE-2025-53110.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute prefix bypass (CVE-2025-53110)."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute prefix bypass (CVE-2025-53110).
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "8.3"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is operationalised by this rule's detection of CVE-2025-53110."
+    - clause: '8.3'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is operationalised by this rule's detection of CVE-2025-53110.
       strength: secondary
-
 tags:
   category: tool-poisoning
   subcategory: filesystem-mcp-prefix-bypass
   scan_target: runtime
   confidence: high
-
 agent_source:
   type: mcp_exchange
   framework:
     - any
   provider:
     - any
-
 detection:
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Legitimate filesystem MCP reads/writes that stay inside the allowed directory — a path continuing with a directory separator after the allowed prefix (allow_dir/subfolder/file) is IN-scope and must not fire. This rule only matches when the character immediately after the allowed-directory token is a name character (letter/digit/underscore/hyphen/dot) that extends the directory name into a DIFFERENT sibling, not a '/' that descends inside it."
-    - "Advisory or research text naming CVE-2025-53110, EscapeRoute, or the allow_dir_sensitive example without a live tool call carrying the sibling-directory path."
-    - "Filenames or variables that legitimately contain an underscore after a common word (e.g. reading data_export/report.csv) where there is no filesystem-MCP allowed-directory-escape framing — the rule requires the filesystem-MCP operation/boundary context to co-occur."
+    - Legitimate filesystem MCP reads/writes that stay inside the allowed directory — a path continuing with a directory separator after the allowed prefix (allow_dir/subfolder/file) is IN-scope and must not fire. This rule only matches when the character immediately after the allowed-directory token is a name character (letter/digit/underscore/hyphen/dot) that extends the directory name into a DIFFERENT sibling, not a '/' that descends inside it.
+    - Advisory or research text naming CVE-2025-53110, EscapeRoute, or the allow_dir_sensitive example without a live tool call carrying the sibling-directory path.
+    - Filenames or variables that legitimately contain an underscore after a common word (e.g. reading data_export/report.csv) where there is no filesystem-MCP allowed-directory-escape framing — the rule requires the filesystem-MCP operation/boundary context to co-occur.
   conditions:
-    # Layer 1 — an explicit allowed-directory-escape: a filesystem MCP tool op
-    # (read_file/write_file/etc.) whose path names an <allowed>_<suffix> sibling
-    # while the same content names the allowed directory itself, i.e. the path
-    # extends the boundary token with a name char instead of a separator.
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)\ballow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir\b[\s\S]{0,160}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|read_media_file|list_directory|directory_tree|move_file|edit_file|get_file_info)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?[=:"''\s]/?[\w./-]*\ballow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir[_-][A-Za-z0-9][\w.-]*'
-      description: "A filesystem MCP operation whose path extends the allowed-directory token with a suffix name char (allow_dir -> allow_dir_secret) — the CVE-2025-53110 prefix-bypass sibling escape"
-    # Layer 2 — the boundary-token-plus-suffix path anchored to filesystem-MCP
-    # framing (allowed directory / sandbox / boundary / prefix check), covering
-    # the generalized case where the allowed dir has any name and a suffix turns
-    # it into a sibling.
+      value: (?i)\ballow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir\b[\s\S]{0,160}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|read_media_file|list_directory|directory_tree|move_file|edit_file|get_file_info)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?[=:"'\s]/?[\w./-]*\ballow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir[_-][A-Za-z0-9][\w.-]*
+      description: A filesystem MCP operation whose path extends the allowed-directory token with a suffix name char (allow_dir -> allow_dir_secret) — the CVE-2025-53110 prefix-bypass sibling escape
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)\b(?:allowed\s+director(?:y|ies)|sandbox\s+(?:root|dir(?:ectory)?)|filesystem\s+mcp|prefix\s+check)\b[\s\S]{0,180}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|call\s+(?:read|write)|read|write|leak|exfil(?:trate)?|access)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?/[\w./-]+_(?:sensitive|secret|secrets|credentials?|backup|private|config|evil|admin|root)\b[\w./-]*'
-      description: "Filesystem-MCP allowed-directory framing paired with a live operation (read_file/write_file/list/read/leak) on a sibling path whose name is the boundary token plus a sensitive suffix — CVE-2025-53110 containment bypass. Requiring an operation verb keeps advisory prose that only names the prefix-check + PoC path from firing."
-    # Layer 3 — the exact Cymulate PoC family: allow_dir followed directly by
-    # _sensitive / _credentials, the published escape strings.
+      value: (?i)\b(?:allowed\s+director(?:y|ies)|sandbox\s+(?:root|dir(?:ectory)?)|filesystem\s+mcp|prefix\s+check)\b[\s\S]{0,180}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|call\s+(?:read|write)|read|write|leak|exfil(?:trate)?|access)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?/[\w./-]+_(?:sensitive|secret|secrets|credentials?|backup|private|config|evil|admin|root)\b[\w./-]*
+      description: Filesystem-MCP allowed-directory framing paired with a live operation (read_file/write_file/list/read/leak) on a sibling path whose name is the boundary token plus a sensitive suffix — CVE-2025-53110 containment bypass. Requiring an operation verb keeps advisory prose that only names the prefix-check + PoC path from firing.
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|read|write|open|cat|leak|exfil(?:trate)?)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?/(?:private/)?tmp/allow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir_(?:sensitive|credentials?|secrets?|evil|backup)\b|/(?:private/)?tmp/allow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir_(?:sensitive|credentials?|secrets?|evil|backup)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|to\s+read|to\s+leak|to\s+exfil))'
-      description: "The published CVE-2025-53110 EscapeRoute PoC sibling path (/tmp/allow_dir_sensitive etc.) reached by a live filesystem-MCP operation (read_file/write_file/list_directory/read/leak). Requiring an operation verb near the path keeps advisory prose that merely quotes the PoC path from firing."
-
+      value: (?i)(?:\b(?:read_file|write_file|read_text_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|read|write|open|cat|leak|exfil(?:trate)?)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?/(?:private/)?tmp/allow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir_(?:sensitive|credentials?|secrets?|evil|backup)\b|/(?:private/)?tmp/allow(?:ed)?[_-]?dir_(?:sensitive|credentials?|secrets?|evil|backup)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?\b(?:read_file|write_file|list_directory|directory_tree|edit_file|move_file|to\s+read|to\s+leak|to\s+exfil))
+      description: The published CVE-2025-53110 EscapeRoute PoC sibling path (/tmp/allow_dir_sensitive etc.) reached by a live filesystem-MCP operation (read_file/write_file/list_directory/read/leak). Requiring an operation verb near the path keeps advisory prose that merely quotes the PoC path from firing.
 response:
   actions:
     - alert
     - block_tool
   notify:
     - security_team
-  message_template: >
-    [ATR-2026-02023] HIGH: EscapeRoute filesystem-MCP directory prefix bypass
-    (CVE-2025-53110, CVSS 7.3). A filesystem MCP operation targets a sibling
-    directory that merely shares the allowed-directory prefix (allow_dir ->
-    allow_dir_sensitive), reading/writing outside the sandbox. Remediation:
-    upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem to 2025.7.1 / 0.6.3+
-    (adds path.resolve + trailing-separator boundary checks); never validate
-    directory containment with a bare string prefix.
-
+  message_template: |
+    [ATR-2026-02023] HIGH: EscapeRoute filesystem-MCP directory prefix bypass (CVE-2025-53110, CVSS 7.3). A filesystem MCP operation targets a sibling directory that merely shares the allowed-directory prefix (allow_dir -> allow_dir_sensitive), reading/writing outside the sandbox. Remediation: upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem to 2025.7.1 / 0.6.3+ (adds path.resolve + trailing-separator boundary checks); never validate directory containment with a bare string prefix.
 confidence: 82
-
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - input: 'filesystem MCP read_file path=/private/tmp/allow_dir_sensitive_credentials/.env — escapes the /private/tmp/allow_dir boundary'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Cymulate PoC — read_file on the allow_dir_sensitive_credentials sibling that shares the allow_dir prefix"
-    - input: 'The allowed directory is /tmp/allow_dir; call write_file with /tmp/allow_dir_evil/payload to bypass the prefix check'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "write_file to allow_dir_evil sibling escaping the allowed_dir prefix"
-    - input: 'allowed directory /srv/data_dir — list_directory /srv/data_dir_secrets leaks files outside the sandbox via prefix match'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Generalized allowed-directory framing with a _secrets sibling escape"
-    - input: 'sandbox root is /home/agent/work; read_file /home/agent/work_backup/id_rsa slips past the naive filesystem mcp prefix check'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "sandbox-root framing with a _backup sibling read via filesystem MCP"
-    - input: 'curl not involved — just point the filesystem mcp at /private/tmp/allow_dir_credentials to read the sibling directory outside allowed_dir'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Filesystem-MCP framing plus the allow_dir_credentials sibling path"
-  true_negatives:
-    - input: 'filesystem MCP read_file path=/private/tmp/allow_dir/report.txt — a normal in-scope read inside the allowed directory'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "In-scope read: path continues with '/' after allow_dir, staying inside the boundary"
-    - input: 'The allowed directory is /tmp/allow_dir; write_file /tmp/allow_dir/output/result.json stays within the sandbox subtree.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "In-scope write into a subfolder of the allowed directory — separator after the boundary token"
-    - input: "CVE-2025-53110 EscapeRoute abused a naive prefix check so /tmp/allow_dir_sensitive escaped /tmp/allow_dir; fixed in 2025.7.1."
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Advisory text explaining the bypass and the fix without a live tool call"
-    - input: 'Our data pipeline reads data_export/2026/report.csv and writes to data_export/out; standard project paths, no MCP boundary escape.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary underscore-containing directory names with no filesystem-MCP allowed-directory-escape framing"
-    - input: 'list_directory /home/agent/work/subdir returns the files under the allowed work directory tree.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "In-scope list of a subdirectory under the allowed work root — separator, not a sibling suffix"
-
-evasion_tests:
-  - input: 'read_file /private/tmp/allow_dir%5Fsensitive/.env (URL-encoded underscore) to escape allow_dir'
-    expected: not_triggered
-    bypass_technique: url_encoded_separator
-    notes: "URL-encoding the underscore (%5F) between allow_dir and sensitive defeats the literal name-char match. Percent-decoding belongs in an engine normalization pass; a v2 could add a %5F branch after confirming the filesystem MCP decodes it."
-  - input: 'set the boundary to C:\\tmp\\allow_dir then read C:\\tmp\\allow_dir_secret\\creds.txt on the Windows filesystem server'
-    expected: not_triggered
-    bypass_technique: windows_backslash_path
-    notes: "Windows backslash paths are not modeled by the forward-slash anchors. The Anthropic reference server is cross-platform; a v2 should add a backslash path variant if Windows exploitation is observed."

package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-02024-escaperoute-filesystem-mcp-symlink-launchagent.yaml

@@ -1,193 +1,114 @@
-title: "EscapeRoute — Filesystem MCP Symlink Escape to LaunchAgent Persistence (CVE-2025-53109)"
+title: EscapeRoute — Filesystem MCP Symlink Escape to LaunchAgent Persistence (CVE-2025-53109)
 id: ATR-2026-02024
 rule_version: 1
 status: experimental
-description: >
-  Detects the EscapeRoute symlink-bypass-to-code-execution chain (CVE-2025-53109,
-  CVSS 8.4) reported by Cymulate against Anthropic's Filesystem MCP Server
-  before 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1. The server followed symlinks without re-checking that
-  the resolved target stayed inside the allowed directory. An attacker creates a
-  symlink inside a writable (or prefix-bypassed) directory that points anywhere
-  on the filesystem, then uses the filesystem MCP write_file to write through the
-  symlink to a privileged target — the published PoC writes a malicious
-  LaunchAgent plist to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist for persistent code
-  execution at login (on macOS), or overwrites /etc/sudoers. This rule fires on
-  the concrete signature: a filesystem-MCP symlink-create or write-through-symlink
-  operation whose target is a known persistence/privileged path (LaunchAgents
-  plist, /etc/sudoers, cron, authorized_keys, systemd unit). Fixed by realpath +
-  post-resolution boundary re-validation in 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1.
-author: "ATR Community (MCP CVE sweep)"
-date: "2026/07/08"
-schema_version: "0.1"
+description: |
+  Detects the EscapeRoute symlink-bypass-to-code-execution chain (CVE-2025-53109, CVSS 8.4) reported by Cymulate against Anthropic's Filesystem MCP Server before 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1. The server followed symlinks without re-checking that the resolved target stayed inside the allowed directory. An attacker creates a symlink inside a writable (or prefix-bypassed) directory that points anywhere on the filesystem, then uses the filesystem MCP write_file to write through the symlink to a privileged target — the published PoC writes a malicious LaunchAgent plist to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/*.plist for persistent code execution at login (on macOS), or overwrites /etc/sudoers. This rule fires on the concrete signature: a filesystem-MCP symlink-create or write-through-symlink operation whose target is a known persistence/privileged path (LaunchAgents plist, /etc/sudoers, cron, authorized_keys, systemd unit). Fixed by realpath + post-resolution boundary re-validation in 0.6.3 / 2025.7.1.
+author: ATR Community (MCP CVE sweep)
+date: 2026/07/08
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: test
 severity: high
-
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM06:2025"
-    - "LLM05:2025"
+    - LLM06:2025
+    - LLM05:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI02:2026"
-    - "ASI05:2026"
+    - ASI02:2026
+    - ASI05:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation"
-    - "AML.T0051.001 - Indirect"
+    - AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation
+    - AML.T0051.001 - Indirect
   cve:
-    - "CVE-2025-53109"
+    - CVE-2025-53109
   cwe:
-    - "CWE-59"
-    - "CWE-61"
-    - "CWE-22"
+    - CWE-59
+    - CWE-61
+    - CWE-22
   external:
-    - "https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/"
-    - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53109"
-
+    - https://cymulate.com/blog/cve-2025-53109-53110-escaperoute-anthropic/
+    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53109
 metadata_provenance:
   cve: mcp-cve-sweep
   cwe: mcp-cve-sweep
   owasp_llm: mcp-cve-sweep
   owasp_agentic: mcp-cve-sweep
   mitre_atlas: mcp-cve-sweep
-
 compliance:
   owasp_agentic:
-    - id: "ASI05:2026"
-      context: "OWASP Agentic ASI05:2026 (Unexpected Code Execution) is exercised by the EscapeRoute symlink escape that writes a LaunchAgent for persistent execution (CVE-2025-53109); this rule detects that write pattern."
+    - id: ASI05:2026
+      context: OWASP Agentic ASI05:2026 (Unexpected Code Execution) is exercised by the EscapeRoute symlink escape that writes a LaunchAgent for persistent execution (CVE-2025-53109); this rule detects that write pattern.
       strength: primary
-    - id: "ASI02:2026"
-      context: "OWASP Agentic ASI02:2026 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation) is exercised where the filesystem MCP is misused to write through a symlink outside its sandbox (CVE-2025-53109)."
+    - id: ASI02:2026
+      context: OWASP Agentic ASI02:2026 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation) is exercised where the filesystem MCP is misused to write through a symlink outside its sandbox (CVE-2025-53109).
       strength: secondary
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM06:2025"
-      context: "OWASP LLM LLM06:2025 (Excessive Agency) is exercised where the filesystem MCP server writes to privileged persistence paths via a symlink escape (CVE-2025-53109); this rule is a detection implementation for that category."
+    - id: LLM06:2025
+      context: OWASP LLM LLM06:2025 (Excessive Agency) is exercised where the filesystem MCP server writes to privileged persistence paths via a symlink escape (CVE-2025-53109); this rule is a detection implementation for that category.
       strength: primary
-    - id: "LLM05:2025"
-      context: "OWASP LLM LLM05:2025 (Improper Output Handling) is exercised where unvalidated symlink targets let server output land on privileged files (CVE-2025-53109)."
+    - id: LLM05:2025
+      context: OWASP LLM LLM05:2025 (Improper Output Handling) is exercised where unvalidated symlink targets let server output land on privileged files (CVE-2025-53109).
       strength: secondary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "EU AI Act Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires MCP filesystem tools to re-validate symlink targets against the sandbox; this rule provides runtime detection evidence for the CVE-2025-53109 symlink escape."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: EU AI Act Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires MCP filesystem tools to re-validate symlink targets against the sandbox; this rule provides runtime detection evidence for the CVE-2025-53109 symlink escape.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "9"
-      context: "EU AI Act Article 9 (risk management system) requires controls against the CVE-2025-53109 symlink-to-persistence chain; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control."
+    - article: '9'
+      context: EU AI Act Article 9 (risk management system) requires controls against the CVE-2025-53109 symlink-to-persistence chain; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control.
       strength: secondary
   nist_ai_rmf:
     - function: Manage
-      subcategory: "MG.2.3"
-      context: "NIST AI RMF MG.2.3 (risk treatment options selected and tracked) is supported by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute symlink-to-LaunchAgent persistence chain (CVE-2025-53109)."
+      subcategory: MG.2.3
+      context: NIST AI RMF MG.2.3 (risk treatment options selected and tracked) is supported by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute symlink-to-LaunchAgent persistence chain (CVE-2025-53109).
       strength: primary
     - function: Measure
-      subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "NIST AI RMF MS.2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of CVE-2025-53109."
+      subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: NIST AI RMF MS.2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of CVE-2025-53109.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute symlink escape (CVE-2025-53109)."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the EscapeRoute symlink escape (CVE-2025-53109).
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "8.3"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is operationalised by this rule's detection of CVE-2025-53109."
+    - clause: '8.3'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is operationalised by this rule's detection of CVE-2025-53109.
       strength: secondary
-
 tags:
   category: tool-poisoning
   subcategory: filesystem-mcp-symlink-persistence
   scan_target: runtime
   confidence: high
-
 agent_source:
   type: mcp_exchange
   framework:
     - any
   provider:
     - any
-
 detection:
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Legitimate developer use of symlinks inside a project (ln -s ../shared node_modules, dotfile symlink managers like stow) where there is no filesystem-MCP write to a persistence/privileged target. This rule requires the symlink/write operation to co-occur with a known persistence path (LaunchAgents plist, /etc/sudoers, cron, authorized_keys, systemd unit), not any symlink."
-    - "Advisory or research text naming CVE-2025-53109, EscapeRoute, or the LaunchAgent PoC without a live symlink-create or write-through operation via the filesystem MCP."
-    - "Applications that legitimately install their own LaunchAgent/systemd unit through their platform installer (not via a filesystem MCP tool write through a symlink); the rule anchors on the filesystem-MCP write / symlink construct plus the sandbox-escape framing."
+    - Legitimate developer use of symlinks inside a project (ln -s ../shared node_modules, dotfile symlink managers like stow) where there is no filesystem-MCP write to a persistence/privileged target. This rule requires the symlink/write operation to co-occur with a known persistence path (LaunchAgents plist, /etc/sudoers, cron, authorized_keys, systemd unit), not any symlink.
+    - Advisory or research text naming CVE-2025-53109, EscapeRoute, or the LaunchAgent PoC without a live symlink-create or write-through operation via the filesystem MCP.
+    - Applications that legitimately install their own LaunchAgent/systemd unit through their platform installer (not via a filesystem MCP tool write through a symlink); the rule anchors on the filesystem-MCP write / symlink construct plus the sandbox-escape framing.
   conditions:
-    # Layer 1 — a filesystem-MCP write (write_file/edit_file) whose target is a
-    # macOS LaunchAgent/LaunchDaemon plist persistence path.
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)\b(?:write_file|edit_file|write_text_file|create_file|move_file)\b[\s\S]{0,120}?(?:~|/Users/[\w.-]+|/Library|/System/Library)?/Library/(?:LaunchAgents|LaunchDaemons)/[\w.-]+\.plist\b'
-      description: "Filesystem MCP write targeting a macOS LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist — the CVE-2025-53109 persistence sink"
-    # Layer 2 — a symlink create/follow paired with the filesystem-MCP sandbox
-    # escape framing and a privileged/persistence target (sudoers, cron,
-    # authorized_keys, systemd unit, plist).
+      value: (?i)\b(?:write_file|edit_file|write_text_file|create_file|move_file)\b[\s\S]{0,120}?(?:~|/Users/[\w.-]+|/Library|/System/Library)?/Library/(?:LaunchAgents|LaunchDaemons)/[\w.-]+\.plist\b
+      description: Filesystem MCP write targeting a macOS LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons plist — the CVE-2025-53109 persistence sink
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:\bln\s+-s\b|\bsymlink\b|\bsymbolic\s+link\b)[\s\S]{0,200}?(?:filesystem\s+mcp|write_file|allowed\s+director|sandbox|escape)[\s\S]{0,160}?(?:/etc/sudoers|/etc/cron|/etc/crontab|\.ssh/authorized_keys|/Library/(?:LaunchAgents|LaunchDaemons)/|/etc/systemd/|\.service\b|\.plist\b)'
-      description: "A symlink create/follow combined with filesystem-MCP sandbox-escape framing and a privileged persistence target — CVE-2025-53109 symlink-to-code-exec chain"
-    # Layer 3 — write-through-symlink to a classic privileged file where the
-    # symlink was placed to bypass the boundary (the general EscapeRoute shape:
-    # symlink target is /etc/sudoers or authorized_keys, written via the MCP).
+      value: (?i)(?:\bln\s+-s\b|\bsymlink\b|\bsymbolic\s+link\b)[\s\S]{0,200}?(?:filesystem\s+mcp|write_file|allowed\s+director|sandbox|escape)[\s\S]{0,160}?(?:/etc/sudoers|/etc/cron|/etc/crontab|\.ssh/authorized_keys|/Library/(?:LaunchAgents|LaunchDaemons)/|/etc/systemd/|\.service\b|\.plist\b)
+      description: A symlink create/follow combined with filesystem-MCP sandbox-escape framing and a privileged persistence target — CVE-2025-53109 symlink-to-code-exec chain
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:\bsymlink\b|\bln\s+-s\b|\bpoints?\s+to\b|\bresolves?\s+to\b)[\s\S]{0,120}?(?:/etc/sudoers|/root/\.ssh/authorized_keys|~?/\.ssh/authorized_keys|/etc/crontab|/etc/cron\.d/)[\s\S]{0,160}?\b(?:write_file|edit_file|filesystem\s+mcp|mcp\s+server)\b'
-      description: "A symlink whose target is a privileged file (sudoers / authorized_keys / crontab) written through the filesystem MCP — CVE-2025-53109 write-through-symlink privilege escalation"
-
+      value: (?i)(?:\bsymlink\b|\bln\s+-s\b|\bpoints?\s+to\b|\bresolves?\s+to\b)[\s\S]{0,120}?(?:/etc/sudoers|/root/\.ssh/authorized_keys|~?/\.ssh/authorized_keys|/etc/crontab|/etc/cron\.d/)[\s\S]{0,160}?\b(?:write_file|edit_file|filesystem\s+mcp|mcp\s+server)\b
+      description: A symlink whose target is a privileged file (sudoers / authorized_keys / crontab) written through the filesystem MCP — CVE-2025-53109 write-through-symlink privilege escalation
 response:
   actions:
     - alert
     - block_tool
   notify:
     - security_team
-  message_template: >
-    [ATR-2026-02024] HIGH: EscapeRoute filesystem-MCP symlink escape to
-    persistence (CVE-2025-53109, CVSS 8.4). The filesystem MCP writes through a
-    symlink to a privileged persistence target (LaunchAgent plist, /etc/sudoers,
-    authorized_keys, cron, or systemd unit), achieving code execution / privilege
-    escalation outside the allowed directory. Remediation: upgrade
-    @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem to 2025.7.1 / 0.6.3+ (adds realpath +
-    post-resolution boundary re-validation); reject writes whose resolved target
-    leaves the sandbox.
-
+  message_template: |
+    [ATR-2026-02024] HIGH: EscapeRoute filesystem-MCP symlink escape to persistence (CVE-2025-53109, CVSS 8.4). The filesystem MCP writes through a symlink to a privileged persistence target (LaunchAgent plist, /etc/sudoers, authorized_keys, cron, or systemd unit), achieving code execution / privilege escalation outside the allowed directory. Remediation: upgrade @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem to 2025.7.1 / 0.6.3+ (adds realpath + post-resolution boundary re-validation); reject writes whose resolved target leaves the sandbox.
 confidence: 82
-
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - input: 'filesystem MCP write_file target /Users/eladbeber/Library/LaunchAgents/com.example.autocalculator.plist to drop a persistent launch agent'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Cymulate PoC — write_file to a user LaunchAgents plist for login persistence"
-    - input: 'Create a symlink test -> /etc/sudoers inside allow_dir_evil then use the filesystem mcp write_file to escape the sandbox and overwrite sudoers'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Symlink to /etc/sudoers plus filesystem-MCP sandbox-escape framing and write"
-    - input: 'ln -s /root/.ssh/authorized_keys link; the mcp server write_file follows the symbolic link and appends an attacker key, escaping allowed directory'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Symlink to authorized_keys written through the MCP server — write-through-symlink privilege escalation"
-    - input: 'edit_file ~/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.evil.persist.plist via the filesystem MCP to install a launch daemon that runs at boot'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "edit_file to a LaunchDaemons plist persistence path"
-    - input: 'symlink points to /etc/crontab; then filesystem mcp write_file writes a cron line, giving code execution outside the sandbox'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Symlink resolving to /etc/crontab written through the filesystem MCP"
-  true_negatives:
-    - input: 'ln -s ../shared ./node_modules/shared    # normal monorepo symlink for local package linking'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary project symlink with no filesystem-MCP write to a persistence target"
-    - input: 'I use GNU stow to symlink my dotfiles from ~/dotfiles into ~; e.g. ln -s ~/dotfiles/.vimrc ~/.vimrc.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Dotfile symlink manager — no privileged persistence target, no MCP escape framing"
-    - input: "CVE-2025-53109 (EscapeRoute) let a symlink bypass the filesystem MCP boundary to write a LaunchAgent; upgrade to 2025.7.1 fixes it."
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Advisory text describing the symlink escape and fix without a live operation"
-    - input: 'write_file /workspace/build/output.plist — the app emits a plist describing its build settings inside the project directory.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "A plist written inside the project workspace, not a LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons persistence path"
-    - input: 'The installer places a launch agent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.vendor.updater.plist during normal app setup.'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Legitimate app installer writing its own LaunchAgent — no symlink escape, no filesystem-MCP write_file/edit_file operation"
-
-evasion_tests:
-  - input: 'write_file to ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.persist.PLIST (uppercase extension) via the filesystem mcp'
-    expected: triggered
-    bypass_technique: case_variation
-    notes: "The (?i) flag makes the .plist / LaunchAgents anchors case-insensitive, so an uppercase .PLIST still matches Layer 1."
-  - input: 'hardlink (not symlink) the sudoers file into allow_dir then write_file through it to escape the boundary'
-    expected: not_triggered
-    bypass_technique: hardlink_instead_of_symlink
-    notes: "Hard links (not symbolic links) are a distinct primitive the Layer-2/3 symlink anchors do not model, and the target /etc/sudoers here lacks the LaunchAgents plist Layer-1 path. If hardlink-based EscapeRoute variants are observed, a v2 should add a 'hardlink|ln (?!-s)' branch alongside the privileged-target anchor."