agent-threat-rules 4.0.0 → 4.1.5

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-02195-dangerous-env-var-injection-config-tool.yaml

@@ -1,49 +1,31 @@
-title: "Dangerous Process-Hijacking Environment Variable Injected via Config/Env-Update Tool"
+title: Dangerous Process-Hijacking Environment Variable Injected via Config/Env-Update Tool
 id: ATR-2026-02195
 rule_version: 1
 status: experimental
-description: >
-  Detects an agent config/environment-update tool call that sets a
-  well-known process-hijacking environment variable (NODE_OPTIONS,
-  LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, PYTHONSTARTUP, BASH_ENV, PERL5OPT,
-  RUBYOPT, GCONV_PATH) to a path- or flag-shaped value. These variables let
-  an attacker who can only write configuration (not source code) achieve
-  code execution the next time the target process starts, by pointing the
-  runtime at an attacker-controlled module/library/script. Mined from
-  GHSA (huntr bounty) for mintplex-labs/anything-llm CVE-2024-3104: the
-  `POST /api/system/update-env` endpoint accepted arbitrary environment
-  variable names and values with no allowlist, "allowing for the execution
-  of arbitrary code on the host running anything-llm." The disclosed
-  advisory does not name the specific variable used, so this rule
-  generalizes over the standard, well-documented set of dangerous
-  runtime-hijacking variables for Node.js, Python, Bash, Perl, Ruby, and
-  dynamic linkers -- the same technique class regardless of which config
-  endpoint accepts it. Setting an ordinary application environment variable
-  (PORT, DATABASE_URL, LOG_LEVEL, etc.) does not fire.
-author: "ATR Community (CVE sweep)"
-date: "2026/07/11"
-schema_version: "0.1"
+description: |
+  Detects an agent config/environment-update tool call that sets a well-known process-hijacking environment variable (NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, PYTHONSTARTUP, BASH_ENV, PERL5OPT, RUBYOPT, GCONV_PATH) to a path- or flag-shaped value. These variables let an attacker who can only write configuration (not source code) achieve code execution the next time the target process starts, by pointing the runtime at an attacker-controlled module/library/script. Mined from GHSA (huntr bounty) for mintplex-labs/anything-llm CVE-2024-3104: the `POST /api/system/update-env` endpoint accepted arbitrary environment variable names and values with no allowlist, "allowing for the execution of arbitrary code on the host running anything-llm." The disclosed advisory does not name the specific variable used, so this rule generalizes over the standard, well-documented set of dangerous runtime-hijacking variables for Node.js, Python, Bash, Perl, Ruby, and dynamic linkers -- the same technique class regardless of which config endpoint accepts it. Setting an ordinary application environment variable (PORT, DATABASE_URL, LOG_LEVEL, etc.) does not fire.
+author: ATR Community (CVE sweep)
+date: 2026/07/11
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: experimental
 severity: critical
-
 references:
   cve:
-    - "CVE-2024-3104"
+    - CVE-2024-3104
   cwe:
-    - "CWE-94"
+    - CWE-94
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM08:2025"
+    - LLM08:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI04:2026"
+    - ASI04:2026
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1574.006 - Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
+    - 'T1574.006 - Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking'
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise"
+    - AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise
   external:
-    - "https://huntr.com/bounties/4f2fcb45-5828-4bec-985a-9d3a0ee00462"
-    - "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/bfedfebfab032e6f4d5a369c8a2f947c5d0c5286"
-
+    - https://huntr.com/bounties/4f2fcb45-5828-4bec-985a-9d3a0ee00462
+    - https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/bfedfebfab032e6f4d5a369c8a2f947c5d0c5286
 metadata_provenance:
   cve: human-reviewed
   cwe: human-reviewed
@@ -51,104 +33,59 @@ metadata_provenance:
   owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
   mitre_attack: human-reviewed
   mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
-
 compliance:
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their behaviour; this rule detects a config/env-update tool being weaponised to inject a process-hijacking environment variable."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their behaviour; this rule detects a config/env-update tool being weaponised to inject a process-hijacking environment variable.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "9"
-      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the dangerous-env-var-injection risk class."
+    - article: '9'
+      context: Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the dangerous-env-var-injection risk class.
       strength: secondary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
-      context: "Treating dangerous environment-variable injection as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation."
+    - subcategory: MG.2.3
+      context: Treating dangerous environment-variable injection as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation.
       strength: primary
-    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
-      context: "Identifying process-hijacking environment variables accepted by a config-update tool as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
+    - subcategory: MP.5.1
+      context: Identifying process-hijacking environment variables accepted by a config-update tool as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of dangerous environment-variable injection via agent config tools."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of dangerous environment-variable injection via agent config tools.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "8.3"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the injection attempt."
+    - clause: '8.3'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the injection attempt.
       strength: secondary
-
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
   subcategory: dangerous-env-var-injection
   scan_target: llm_io
   confidence: high
-
 agent_source:
   type: llm_io
   framework:
     - any
   provider:
     - any
-
 detection:
   condition: any
   conditions:
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:\\bupdate[-_ ]?env(?:ironment)?\\b|\\bsetenv\\b|\\bset\\s+(?:the\\s+)?environment\\s+variable\\b|\\bPOST\\s+/api/[\\w/-]{0,24}env\\b)[\\s\\S]{0,40}\\bNODE_OPTIONS\\b[\\s\\S]{0,10}[:=][\\s\\S]{0,60}(?:--require\\b|-r\\s|--loader\\b|--experimental-loader\\b|--experimental-require-module\\b|\\.m?js\\b)"
-      description: "A config/env-update tool-call context naming NODE_OPTIONS whose VALUE actually references a require/preload/loader mechanism (--require, -r, --loader, --experimental-loader, or an explicit .js/.mjs module payload) -- not a routine memory/debug/warnings flag"
+      value: (?i)(?:\bupdate[-_ ]?env(?:ironment)?\b|\bsetenv\b|\bset\s+(?:the\s+)?environment\s+variable\b|\bPOST\s+/api/[\w/-]{0,24}env\b)[\s\S]{0,40}\bNODE_OPTIONS\b[\s\S]{0,10}[:=][\s\S]{0,60}(?:--require\b|-r\s|--loader\b|--experimental-loader\b|--experimental-require-module\b|\.m?js\b)
+      description: A config/env-update tool-call context naming NODE_OPTIONS whose VALUE actually references a require/preload/loader mechanism (--require, -r, --loader, --experimental-loader, or an explicit .js/.mjs module payload) -- not a routine memory/debug/warnings flag
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:\\bupdate[-_ ]?env(?:ironment)?\\b|\\bsetenv\\b|\\bset\\s+(?:the\\s+)?environment\\s+variable\\b|\\bPOST\\s+/api/[\\w/-]{0,24}env\\b)[\\s\\S]{0,40}\\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|PYTHONSTARTUP|BASH_ENV|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\\b"
-      description: "A config/env-update tool-call context (update-env, setenv, 'set environment variable', POST .../env endpoint) naming a known process-hijacking environment variable that has no benign flag-only mode (its value IS the hijack payload)"
+      value: (?i)(?:\bupdate[-_ ]?env(?:ironment)?\b|\bsetenv\b|\bset\s+(?:the\s+)?environment\s+variable\b|\bPOST\s+/api/[\w/-]{0,24}env\b)[\s\S]{0,40}\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|PYTHONSTARTUP|BASH_ENV|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\b
+      description: A config/env-update tool-call context (update-env, setenv, 'set environment variable', POST .../env endpoint) naming a known process-hijacking environment variable that has no benign flag-only mode (its value IS the hijack payload)
   false_positives:
-    - "A DevOps runbook or documentation discussing these variable names in prose without an accompanying config/env-update tool-call context"
-    - "A legitimate, security-reviewed deployment script that intentionally sets LD_PRELOAD/NODE_OPTIONS for approved instrumentation (e.g. an APM agent) via a config/update-env style call -- rare but possible; still worth a human check given the severity of process-hijacking if the value turns out to be attacker-controlled"
-    - "Shell-syntax examples in security-education content (e.g. 'sudo LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/shell.so find') that show the variable being set directly in a shell, without any update-env/setenv/config-API framing"
-    - "Routine NODE_OPTIONS flags that are not a require/loader mechanism -- 'NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--inspect=9229', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--no-warnings', '--stack-size=...' -- these tune memory/debugging/warnings and carry no code-loading capability, so they must not fire"
-
+    - A DevOps runbook or documentation discussing these variable names in prose without an accompanying config/env-update tool-call context
+    - A legitimate, security-reviewed deployment script that intentionally sets LD_PRELOAD/NODE_OPTIONS for approved instrumentation (e.g. an APM agent) via a config/update-env style call -- rare but possible; still worth a human check given the severity of process-hijacking if the value turns out to be attacker-controlled
+    - Shell-syntax examples in security-education content (e.g. 'sudo LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/shell.so find') that show the variable being set directly in a shell, without any update-env/setenv/config-API framing
+    - Routine NODE_OPTIONS flags that are not a require/loader mechanism -- 'NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--inspect=9229', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--no-warnings', '--stack-size=...' -- these tune memory/debugging/warnings and carry no code-loading capability, so they must not fire
 response:
   actions:
     - block_input
     - alert
-  message_template: >
-    [ATR-2026-02195] Config/environment-update tool call sets a known
-    process-hijacking environment variable to a path/flag value -- treat as
-    an RCE-via-env-var-injection attempt, not routine configuration.
-
+  message_template: |
+    [ATR-2026-02195] Config/environment-update tool call sets a known process-hijacking environment variable to a path/flag value -- treat as an RCE-via-env-var-injection attempt, not routine configuration.
 confidence: 80
-
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - input: "POST /api/system/update-env with body: {\"NODE_OPTIONS\": \"--require /tmp/evil.js\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "CVE-2024-3104 pattern - NODE_OPTIONS injected via update-env endpoint to load an attacker module at next process start"
-    - input: "update env: LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/evil.so"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Dynamic-linker hijacking via LD_PRELOAD"
-    - input: "set environment variable BASH_ENV=/tmp/malicious.sh"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "BASH_ENV hijack causing a script to be sourced on every non-interactive bash invocation"
-    - input: "update-env endpoint: PYTHONSTARTUP=/tmp/backdoor.py"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "PYTHONSTARTUP hijack causing a script to run at every interactive Python startup"
-    - input: "update env: NODE_OPTIONS=--loader=/tmp/evil-loader.mjs"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "NODE_OPTIONS abused via --loader to load an attacker-controlled ESM loader module"
-  true_negatives:
-    - input: "update env: LOG_LEVEL=debug"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary application environment variable, not in the dangerous set"
-    - input: "set environment variable DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@host/db"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary connection-string env var, not a process-hijacking variable"
-    - input: "NODE_OPTIONS and LD_PRELOAD are both examples of environment variables that can be abused for code execution if an attacker controls them"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Prose discussing the variable names without an actual path/flag assignment"
-    - input: "update env: NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Routine NODE_OPTIONS memory-tuning flag, no require/loader/module payload"
-    - input: "set environment variable NODE_OPTIONS=--inspect=9229"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Routine NODE_OPTIONS debug-inspector flag, no require/loader/module payload"
-    - input: "update-env endpoint: NODE_OPTIONS=--no-warnings"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Routine NODE_OPTIONS warnings-suppression flag, no require/loader/module payload"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-02251-identifier-field-path-traversal-storage-write.yaml

@@ -1,49 +1,31 @@
-title: "Multi-Tenant Identifier Field (sender_id/owner_id/tenant_id) Carries Path Traversal Into a Storage Write"
+title: Multi-Tenant Identifier Field (sender_id/owner_id/tenant_id) Carries Path Traversal Into a Storage Write
 id: ATR-2026-02251
 rule_version: 1
 status: experimental
-description: >
-  Detects a multi-tenant identifier argument (sender_id, owner_id,
-  tenant_id, user_id, project_id, app_id, workspace_id) that contains a
-  path-traversal sequence, when that identifier is being used as a path
-  component for a storage write. Ordinary identifiers are opaque tokens
-  (UUIDs, slugs, short alphanumeric IDs) and legitimately never contain
-  "../" -- the presence of traversal characters inside a field whose name
-  signals it should be a bare identifier is itself the attack, independent
-  of which specific system path it resolves to. Mined from CVE-2026-58499
-  / EUVD-2026-43038 (EverOS, an agent memory runtime: the per-message
-  sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, unlike the
-  sibling app_id/project_id fields, and is joined into the filesystem path
-  where an extracted memory episode is persisted, letting an unauthenticated
-  caller redirect the write outside the configured memory root).
-  Generalized beyond the one field name (sender_id) and one product
-  (EverOS) to the broader family of tenant/owner-style identifier fields in
-  multi-tenant agent memory, storage, or session systems, since any such
-  field lacking the same validation is equally exploitable.
-author: "ATR Community (CVE sweep)"
-date: "2026/07/11"
-schema_version: "0.1"
+description: |
+  Detects a multi-tenant identifier argument (sender_id, owner_id, tenant_id, user_id, project_id, app_id, workspace_id) that contains a path-traversal sequence, when that identifier is being used as a path component for a storage write. Ordinary identifiers are opaque tokens (UUIDs, slugs, short alphanumeric IDs) and legitimately never contain "../" -- the presence of traversal characters inside a field whose name signals it should be a bare identifier is itself the attack, independent of which specific system path it resolves to. Mined from CVE-2026-58499 / EUVD-2026-43038 (EverOS, an agent memory runtime: the per-message sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, unlike the sibling app_id/project_id fields, and is joined into the filesystem path where an extracted memory episode is persisted, letting an unauthenticated caller redirect the write outside the configured memory root). Generalized beyond the one field name (sender_id) and one product (EverOS) to the broader family of tenant/owner-style identifier fields in multi-tenant agent memory, storage, or session systems, since any such field lacking the same validation is equally exploitable.
+author: ATR Community (CVE sweep)
+date: 2026/07/11
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: experimental
 severity: high
-
 references:
   cve:
-    - "CVE-2026-58499"
+    - CVE-2026-58499
   cwe:
-    - "CWE-22"
+    - CWE-22
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI02:2026"
+    - ASI02:2026
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1083 - File and Directory Discovery"
+    - T1083 - File and Directory Discovery
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage"
+    - AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage
   external:
-    - "https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverOS/security/advisories/GHSA-c795-2g9c-j48m"
-    - "https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-43038"
-
+    - https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverOS/security/advisories/GHSA-c795-2g9c-j48m
+    - https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-43038
 metadata_provenance:
   cve: human-reviewed
   cwe: human-reviewed
@@ -51,86 +33,53 @@ metadata_provenance:
   owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
   mitre_attack: human-reviewed
   mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
-
 compliance:
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires resistance to unauthorised data access or modification; this rule detects a multi-tenant identifier field being weaponised for path traversal into a storage write, breaking tenant isolation."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires resistance to unauthorised data access or modification; this rule detects a multi-tenant identifier field being weaponised for path traversal into a storage write, breaking tenant isolation.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "9"
-      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the identifier-field-path-traversal risk class."
+    - article: '9'
+      context: Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the identifier-field-path-traversal risk class.
       strength: secondary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
-      context: "Treating identifier-field path traversal as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation."
+    - subcategory: MG.2.3
+      context: Treating identifier-field path traversal as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation.
       strength: primary
-    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
-      context: "Identifying the identifier-field-path-traversal pattern as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
+    - subcategory: MP.5.1
+      context: Identifying the identifier-field-path-traversal pattern as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of identifier-field path traversal attempts."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of identifier-field path traversal attempts.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "8.3"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the traversal attempt."
+    - clause: '8.3'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the traversal attempt.
       strength: secondary
-
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
   subcategory: identifier-field-path-traversal
   scan_target: llm_io
   confidence: high
-
 agent_source:
   type: llm_io
   framework:
     - any
   provider:
     - any
-
 detection:
   condition: any
   conditions:
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)\b(sender_id|owner_id|tenant_id|user_id|project_id|app_id|workspace_id)\b\s*(?:[=:]|to)\s*["\x27]?(?:\.\.(?:/|%2f)|%2e%2e(?:/|%2f))'
-      description: "Multi-tenant identifier field carrying a literal or percent-encoded path-traversal sequence"
+      value: (?i)\b(sender_id|owner_id|tenant_id|user_id|project_id|app_id|workspace_id)\b\s*(?:[=:]|to)\s*["\x27]?(?:\.\.(?:/|%2f)|%2e%2e(?:/|%2f))
+      description: Multi-tenant identifier field carrying a literal or percent-encoded path-traversal sequence
   false_positives:
-    - "A legitimate identifier value that happens to be discussed in prose alongside the word 'traversal' without the field actually being set to a traversal sequence"
-    - "Documentation showing the vulnerable field/sink relationship as example code, not an actual argument being set"
-
+    - A legitimate identifier value that happens to be discussed in prose alongside the word 'traversal' without the field actually being set to a traversal sequence
+    - Documentation showing the vulnerable field/sink relationship as example code, not an actual argument being set
 response:
   actions:
     - block_input
     - alert
-  message_template: >
-    [ATR-2026-02251] Multi-tenant identifier field carries a path-traversal
-    sequence -- treat as an attempt to redirect a storage read/write outside
-    the tenant boundary, not a normal identifier.
-
+  message_template: |
+    [ATR-2026-02251] Multi-tenant identifier field carries a path-traversal sequence -- treat as an attempt to redirect a storage read/write outside the tenant boundary, not a normal identifier.
 confidence: 78
-
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - input: 'POST /api/v1/memory/add with sender_id: "../../../etc/cron.d/malicious"'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "CVE-2026-58499 EverOS pattern - sender_id path traversal targeting a system directory"
-    - input: 'add memory entry, sender_id="../../../../var/www/html/shell.md"'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Paraphrased variant targeting a web-writable path for a webshell drop"
-    - input: 'call the ingest tool with owner_id: "..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd"'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Percent-encoded traversal variant, different identifier field name (owner_id)"
-    - input: 'set tenant_id to "../../../root/.bashrc" and store the note'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Different identifier field name (tenant_id), targeting a persistence file"
-  true_negatives:
-    - input: 'POST /api/v1/memory/add with sender_id: "usr_8f3ab2c1-4d9e-4a7b-9c3d-1e2f3a4b5c6d"'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary opaque UUID-style sender_id, no traversal characters"
-    - input: 'app_id: "acme-corp-prod-2026"'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary slug-style identifier, no traversal"
-    - input: "The sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, allowing traversal in vulnerable versions."
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Documentation/advisory prose describing the vulnerability class, no field actually set to a traversal value"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-02300-mcp-stdio-config-dangerous-env-var.yaml

@@ -1,53 +1,31 @@
-title: "MCP Stdio Server Config env Block Sets Dangerous Process-Hijacking Environment Variable"
+title: MCP Stdio Server Config env Block Sets Dangerous Process-Hijacking Environment Variable
 id: ATR-2026-02300
 rule_version: 1
 status: experimental
-description: >
-  Detects an MCP stdio-server configuration (the "env" block passed to the
-  spawned child process alongside "command"/"args") that sets a well-known
-  process-hijacking environment variable (NODE_OPTIONS with a require/loader
-  payload, or LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, BASH_ENV, PYTHONSTARTUP,
-  PERL5OPT, RUBYOPT, GCONV_PATH). A workspace or repository can ship an
-  ".mcp.json"/settings-style config that an operator loads without reviewing
-  every field; the "env" block is trusted verbatim and forwarded to the
-  spawned server process, letting an attacker who can only supply
-  configuration (e.g. via a cloned repository) achieve code execution at
-  the moment the MCP server starts. Mined from GHSA-mj59-h3q9-ghfh
-  (OpenClaw, CVE-2026-44995): "Workspace MCP stdio configuration could pass
-  dangerous process-startup environment variables such as NODE_OPTIONS,
-  LD_PRELOAD, or BASH_ENV to the spawned MCP server process. In a malicious
-  workspace, this could make the MCP child load attacker-controlled code
-  when the operator starts a session that uses that MCP server." Fixed by
-  filtering MCP stdio environment entries through a denylist before
-  spawning. Deliberately distinct from ATR-2026-02195 (dangerous env var via
-  an "update-env" API call/endpoint) and ATR-2026-01959 (env-var prefix
-  bypassing a shell command allowlist) -- this rule targets the third
-  surface: the env block of a declarative MCP server config file/object
-  itself, independent of any API call framing or shell prefix syntax.
-author: "ATR Community (CVE sweep)"
-date: "2026/07/11"
-schema_version: "0.1"
+description: |
+  Detects an MCP stdio-server configuration (the "env" block passed to the spawned child process alongside "command"/"args") that sets a well-known process-hijacking environment variable (NODE_OPTIONS with a require/loader payload, or LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, BASH_ENV, PYTHONSTARTUP, PERL5OPT, RUBYOPT, GCONV_PATH). A workspace or repository can ship an ".mcp.json"/settings-style config that an operator loads without reviewing every field; the "env" block is trusted verbatim and forwarded to the spawned server process, letting an attacker who can only supply configuration (e.g. via a cloned repository) achieve code execution at the moment the MCP server starts. Mined from GHSA-mj59-h3q9-ghfh (OpenClaw, CVE-2026-44995): "Workspace MCP stdio configuration could pass dangerous process-startup environment variables such as NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, or BASH_ENV to the spawned MCP server process. In a malicious workspace, this could make the MCP child load attacker-controlled code when the operator starts a session that uses that MCP server." Fixed by filtering MCP stdio environment entries through a denylist before spawning. Deliberately distinct from ATR-2026-02195 (dangerous env var via an "update-env" API call/endpoint) and ATR-2026-01959 (env-var prefix bypassing a shell command allowlist) -- this rule targets the third surface: the env block of a declarative MCP server config file/object itself, independent of any API call framing or shell prefix syntax.
+author: ATR Community (CVE sweep)
+date: 2026/07/11
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: experimental
 severity: high
-
 references:
   cve:
-    - "CVE-2026-44995"
+    - CVE-2026-44995
   cwe:
-    - "CWE-829"
+    - CWE-829
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM08:2025"
+    - LLM08:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI04:2026"
+    - ASI04:2026
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1574.006 - Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
+    - 'T1574.006 - Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking'
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise"
+    - AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise
   external:
-    - "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mj59-h3q9-ghfh"
-    - "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-mcp-stdio-environment-variables"
-
+    - https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mj59-h3q9-ghfh
+    - https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-mcp-stdio-environment-variables
 metadata_provenance:
   cve: human-reviewed
   cwe: human-reviewed
@@ -55,114 +33,69 @@ metadata_provenance:
   owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
   mitre_attack: human-reviewed
   mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
-
 compliance:
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their behaviour; this rule detects an MCP stdio server config's env block being weaponised with a process-hijacking environment variable."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their behaviour; this rule detects an MCP stdio server config's env block being weaponised with a process-hijacking environment variable.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "9"
-      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the MCP-config-env-injection risk class."
+    - article: '9'
+      context: Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control for the MCP-config-env-injection risk class.
       strength: secondary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
-      context: "Treating MCP stdio config env-var injection as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation."
+    - subcategory: MG.2.3
+      context: Treating MCP stdio config env-var injection as an identified AI risk requires active runtime countermeasures; this detection rule is the primary risk treatment implementation.
       strength: primary
-    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
-      context: "Identifying the MCP-config-env-injection pattern as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
+    - subcategory: MP.5.1
+      context: Identifying the MCP-config-env-injection pattern as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of dangerous environment-variable injection via MCP server configuration."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of dangerous environment-variable injection via MCP server configuration.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "8.3"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the injection attempt."
+    - clause: '8.3'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented via this rule's runtime detection of the injection attempt.
       strength: secondary
-
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
   subcategory: mcp-config-env-injection
   scan_target: mcp
   confidence: high
-
 agent_source:
   type: llm_io
   framework:
     - any
   provider:
     - any
-
 detection:
   condition: any
   conditions:
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))"env"\s*:\s*\{[\s\S]{0,10}"?\bNODE_OPTIONS\b"?\s*:\s*["''][\s\S]{0,40}?(?:--require\b|-r\s+\S|--loader\b|--experimental-loader\b|--experimental-require-module\b)'
-      description: "JSON-style MCP config env block, anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair (the MCP stdio-spawn shape), sets NODE_OPTIONS to a value that actually references a require/preload/loader flag, not a routine memory/debug/warnings flag or the modern --import instrumentation flag"
+      value: (?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))"env"\s*:\s*\{[\s\S]{0,10}"?\bNODE_OPTIONS\b"?\s*:\s*["'][\s\S]{0,40}?(?:--require\b|-r\s+\S|--loader\b|--experimental-loader\b|--experimental-require-module\b)
+      description: JSON-style MCP config env block, anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair (the MCP stdio-spawn shape), sets NODE_OPTIONS to a value that actually references a require/preload/loader flag, not a routine memory/debug/warnings flag or the modern --import instrumentation flag
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))\b(?:env|environment)\b\s*:\s*\n\s+"?\bNODE_OPTIONS\b"?\s*:\s*[\s\S]{0,40}?(?:--require\b|-r\s+\S|--loader\b|--experimental-loader\b|--experimental-require-module\b)'
-      description: "YAML-style MCP config env block (env:/environment: followed immediately by an indented NODE_OPTIONS key on the next line, not separated by prose or a code fence), anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets NODE_OPTIONS to a require/preload/loader flag"
+      value: (?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))\b(?:env|environment)\b\s*:\s*\n\s+"?\bNODE_OPTIONS\b"?\s*:\s*[\s\S]{0,40}?(?:--require\b|-r\s+\S|--loader\b|--experimental-loader\b|--experimental-require-module\b)
+      description: 'YAML-style MCP config env block (env:/environment: followed immediately by an indented NODE_OPTIONS key on the next line, not separated by prose or a code fence), anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets NODE_OPTIONS to a require/preload/loader flag'
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))"env"\s*:\s*\{[\s\S]{0,10}"?\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|BASH_ENV|PYTHONSTARTUP|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\b"?\s*:\s*\S'
-      description: "JSON-style MCP config env block, anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets a known process-hijacking environment variable that has no benign flag-only mode (its value IS the hijack payload)"
+      value: (?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))"env"\s*:\s*\{[\s\S]{0,10}"?\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|BASH_ENV|PYTHONSTARTUP|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\b"?\s*:\s*\S
+      description: JSON-style MCP config env block, anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets a known process-hijacking environment variable that has no benign flag-only mode (its value IS the hijack payload)
     - field: content
       operator: regex
-      value: '(?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))\b(?:env|environment)\b\s*:\s*\n\s+"?\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|BASH_ENV|PYTHONSTARTUP|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\b"?\s*:\s*\S'
-      description: "YAML-style MCP config env block (env:/environment: followed immediately by an indented key on the next line), anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets a known process-hijacking environment variable"
+      value: (?i)(?:(?<=\bmcpServers\b[\s\S]{0,500})|(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bcommand\b"?\s*[:=])(?=[\s\S]{0,300}?"?\bargs\b"?\s*[:=]))\b(?:env|environment)\b\s*:\s*\n\s+"?\b(?:LD_PRELOAD|DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES|BASH_ENV|PYTHONSTARTUP|PERL5OPT|RUBYOPT|GCONV_PATH)\b"?\s*:\s*\S
+      description: 'YAML-style MCP config env block (env:/environment: followed immediately by an indented key on the next line), anchored by a nearby mcpServers key OR a command+args pair, sets a known process-hijacking environment variable'
   false_positives:
-    - "A DevOps runbook or documentation discussing these variable names in prose without an accompanying env-block config context"
-    - "A legitimate, security-reviewed MCP server config that intentionally sets LD_PRELOAD/NODE_OPTIONS for approved instrumentation (e.g. an APM agent) -- rare but possible; still worth a human check given the severity of process-hijacking if the value turns out to be attacker-controlled"
-    - "Routine NODE_OPTIONS flags that are not a require/loader mechanism -- 'NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--inspect=9229' -- these tune memory/debugging and carry no code-loading capability, so they must not fire"
-    - "The standard, widely-recommended NODE_OPTIONS=\"--import ./instrument.mjs\" instrumentation idiom (used by Sentry, OpenTelemetry, and the Node.js docs for ESM-based APM preloading) -- --import is deliberately excluded from the trigger-flag list since it is the modern, safe, blessed alternative to --require, not a hijack primitive by itself"
-    - "Documentation that introduces a code example with a prose header like 'Or via environment:' followed by a fenced code block -- the YAML condition requires the dangerous key to appear on the immediately-following indented line with no intervening fence/prose, so a heading-then-example structure does not fire"
-    - "An ordinary Docker Compose / docker-run 'environment:' block that happens to set one of the dangerous-looking variable names (e.g. LD_PRELOAD for a malloc-tuning library such as libtcmalloc) with no MCP stdio-config context anywhere nearby -- adversarial review found this firing on plain 'services: app: environment: LD_PRELOAD: ...' with no mcpServers key and no command+args pair present anywhere in the document; each condition now requires an MCP-specific anchor (mcpServers within 500 chars before the match, or a command+args key pair within 300 chars of the match) before it fires, so bare env-block assignments outside an MCP config shape do not trigger"
-
+    - A DevOps runbook or documentation discussing these variable names in prose without an accompanying env-block config context
+    - A legitimate, security-reviewed MCP server config that intentionally sets LD_PRELOAD/NODE_OPTIONS for approved instrumentation (e.g. an APM agent) -- rare but possible; still worth a human check given the severity of process-hijacking if the value turns out to be attacker-controlled
+    - Routine NODE_OPTIONS flags that are not a require/loader mechanism -- 'NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=4096', 'NODE_OPTIONS=--inspect=9229' -- these tune memory/debugging and carry no code-loading capability, so they must not fire
+    - The standard, widely-recommended NODE_OPTIONS="--import ./instrument.mjs" instrumentation idiom (used by Sentry, OpenTelemetry, and the Node.js docs for ESM-based APM preloading) -- --import is deliberately excluded from the trigger-flag list since it is the modern, safe, blessed alternative to --require, not a hijack primitive by itself
+    - Documentation that introduces a code example with a prose header like 'Or via environment:' followed by a fenced code block -- the YAML condition requires the dangerous key to appear on the immediately-following indented line with no intervening fence/prose, so a heading-then-example structure does not fire
+    - 'An ordinary Docker Compose / docker-run ''environment:'' block that happens to set one of the dangerous-looking variable names (e.g. LD_PRELOAD for a malloc-tuning library such as libtcmalloc) with no MCP stdio-config context anywhere nearby -- adversarial review found this firing on plain ''services: app: environment: LD_PRELOAD: ...'' with no mcpServers key and no command+args pair present anywhere in the document; each condition now requires an MCP-specific anchor (mcpServers within 500 chars before the match, or a command+args key pair within 300 chars of the match) before it fires, so bare env-block assignments outside an MCP config shape do not trigger'
 response:
   actions:
     - block_input
     - alert
-  message_template: >
-    [ATR-2026-02300] MCP stdio server config env block sets a known
-    process-hijacking environment variable -- treat as an RCE-via-workspace-config
-    attempt, not routine MCP server configuration.
-
+  message_template: |
+    [ATR-2026-02300] MCP stdio server config env block sets a known process-hijacking environment variable -- treat as an RCE-via-workspace-config attempt, not routine MCP server configuration.
 confidence: 78
-
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"evil-server":{"command":"node","args":["server.js"],"env":{"NODE_OPTIONS":"--require /tmp/evil.js"}}}}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "CVE-2026-44995 OpenClaw pattern - NODE_OPTIONS require-hijack injected via workspace MCP stdio config"
-    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"backend":{"command":"npx","args":["-y","some-mcp-server"],"env":{"LD_PRELOAD":"/tmp/evil.so"}}}}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "LD_PRELOAD dynamic-linker hijack injected via MCP stdio config env block"
-    - input: "mcpServers:\n  evil:\n    command: node\n    args: [server.js]\n    env:\n      BASH_ENV: /tmp/evil.sh"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "YAML-style MCP config with BASH_ENV hijack in the env block"
-    - input: '{"env": {"NODE_OPTIONS": "--loader=/tmp/evil-loader.mjs"}, "command": "node", "args": ["index.js"]}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "NODE_OPTIONS abused via --loader to load an attacker-controlled ESM loader module"
-  true_negatives:
-    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"weather":{"command":"npx","args":["-y","weather-mcp"],"env":{"API_KEY":"sk-abc123"}}}}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary API key environment variable in MCP config, not a process-hijacking variable"
-    - input: '{"env": {"NODE_OPTIONS": "--max-old-space-size=4096"}}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Routine NODE_OPTIONS memory-tuning flag, no require/loader/module payload"
-    - input: "NODE_OPTIONS and LD_PRELOAD are both examples of environment variables that can be abused for code execution if an attacker controls them"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Prose discussing the variable names without an actual env-block assignment"
-    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"debug":{"command":"node","args":["--inspect","server.js"],"env":{"DEBUG":"true","LOG_LEVEL":"verbose"}}}}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Ordinary debug/log-level environment variables in MCP config, not in the dangerous set"
-    - input: "Or via environment:\n\n```\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--import ./instrument.mjs\" npm run start\n```"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Regression: adversarial self-review found this firing against data/skills-sh/skills/getsentry/sentry-nestjs-sdk.md — the standard Sentry/OpenTelemetry --import instrumentation idiom introduced by a prose heading and code fence, not an actual env-block config. Fixed by (1) dropping the overly broad .m?js indicator from the payload-flag list so --import (a safe, blessed ESM flag) no longer counts as a hijack marker, and (2) requiring the YAML env:/environment: anchor to be followed immediately by an indented key with no intervening fence/prose."
-    - input: "mcpServers:\n  db:\n    command: node\n    args: [server.js]\n    env:\n      DB_HOST: localhost\n      NODE_OPTIONS: --max-old-space-size=4096"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "YAML-style MCP config with an unrelated env var before a routine NODE_OPTIONS memory-tuning flag, no require/loader payload"
-    - input: "services:\n  app:\n    environment:\n      LD_PRELOAD: /usr/lib/libtcmalloc.so.4"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Regression: adversarial review confirmed this firing -- an ordinary Docker Compose performance-tuning pattern (LD_PRELOAD for libtcmalloc) unrelated to MCP, with no mcpServers key and no command+args pair anywhere in the document. Fixed by requiring an MCP-specific anchor (mcpServers within 500 chars before, or a command+args key pair within 300 chars) before any env-var condition fires."