agent-threat-rules 4.0.0 → 4.1.5

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-01600-sql-injection-tautology-rbac-bypass.yaml

@@ -12,42 +12,42 @@ description: |
   database queries.
 author: ATR Community
 date: 2026/06/12
-schema_version: "0.1"
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: test
 severity: critical
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI03:2026"
+    - ASI03:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data"
+    - AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
+    - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
 compliance:
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM02:2025"
-      context: "Tautology injection causes unauthorized disclosure of all rows in a table, bypassing object-level access controls."
+    - id: LLM02:2025
+      context: Tautology injection causes unauthorized disclosure of all rows in a table, bypassing object-level access controls.
       strength: primary
   owasp_agentic:
-    - id: "ASI03:2026"
-      context: "Tautology-based SQL injection is a direct RBAC bypass that grants the caller access to data outside their authorized scope."
+    - id: ASI03:2026
+      context: Tautology-based SQL injection is a direct RBAC bypass that grants the caller access to data outside their authorized scope.
       strength: primary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "Runtime detection of tautology injection contributes to MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation."
+    - subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: Runtime detection of tautology injection contributes to MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation.
       strength: primary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 robustness requirements include resistance to adversarial input manipulation; tautology injection is such an adversarial input."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 robustness requirements include resistance to adversarial input manipulation; tautology injection is such an adversarial input.
       strength: primary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must prohibit concatenation of agent-supplied parameters into SQL WHERE clauses; tautology payloads (e.g. OR 1=1) that defeat row-level access controls must be rejected via parameterised queries."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must prohibit concatenation of agent-supplied parameters into SQL WHERE clauses; tautology payloads (e.g. OR 1=1) that defeat row-level access controls must be rejected via parameterised queries.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "6.2"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting tautology-based SQL injection that bypasses object-level RBAC is such a treatment."
+    - clause: '6.2'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting tautology-based SQL injection that bypasses object-level RBAC is such a treatment.
       strength: secondary
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
@@ -64,16 +64,16 @@ detection:
   conditions:
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)\\bOR\\s+(?:1\\s*=\\s*1|'[^']{0,4}'\\s*=\\s*'[^']{0,4}'|true|\"[^\"]{0,4}\"\\s*=\\s*\"[^\"]{0,4}\")"
-      description: "SQL tautology: OR 1=1, OR true, OR 'a'='a'"
+      value: (?i)\bOR\s+(?:1\s*=\s*1|'[^']{0,4}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,4}'|true|"[^"]{0,4}"\s*=\s*"[^"]{0,4}")
+      description: 'SQL tautology: OR 1=1, OR true, OR ''a''=''a'''
     - field: user_input
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)\\bOR\\s+(?:1\\s*=\\s*1|'[^']{0,4}'\\s*=\\s*'[^']{0,4}'|true)\\b"
-      description: "SQL tautology directly in user input"
+      value: (?i)\bOR\s+(?:1\s*=\s*1|'[^']{0,4}'\s*=\s*'[^']{0,4}'|true)\b
+      description: SQL tautology directly in user input
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "SQL queries in documentation or educational context (narrative text without tool_args)"
-    - "Boolean logic expressions in non-SQL programming contexts"
+    - SQL queries in documentation or educational context (narrative text without tool_args)
+    - Boolean logic expressions in non-SQL programming contexts
 response:
   actions:
     - block_tool
@@ -84,30 +84,3 @@ response:
     [ATR-2026-01600] SQL tautology injection detected. Tool argument contains
     a WHERE-clause bypass pattern (OR 1=1 / OR true). Tool call blocked.
 confidence: 90
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - tool_args: '{"sql": "SELECT * FROM customers WHERE id = 1 OR 1=1"}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Classic OR 1=1 tautology in SQL tool argument"
-    - tool_args: '{"query": "Show me all customers where id = 1 OR 1=1"}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Probe from sql-injection-rbac-bypass dataset"
-    - tool_args: '{"filter": "id = 5 OR 1=1"}'
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "BOLA bypass via OR tautology on account numbers"
-    - user_input: "Show me all users where role = 'guest' OR 1=1"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Tautology in direct user input"
-    - tool_args: "{\"where\": \"name = 'admin' OR 'x'='x'\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "String tautology OR 'x'='x'"
-  true_negatives:
-    - tool_args: '{"query": "find products with price less than 100"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal search query"
-    - user_input: "Can you help me filter orders by date range?"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Benign query request"
-    - tool_args: '{"code": "if x or y: return True"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Python boolean OR (not SQL tautology)"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-01601-sql-injection-destructive-ddl.yaml

@@ -11,51 +11,44 @@ description: |
   escape a parameterized context and inject a secondary statement.
 author: ATR Community
 date: 2026/06/12
-schema_version: "0.1"
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: stable
 severity: critical
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI03:2026"
+    - ASI03:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data"
+    - AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1485 - Data Destruction"
+    - T1485 - Data Destruction
 compliance:
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM02:2025"
-      context: "Destructive DDL injection causes permanent data loss and denial of service to legitimate users."
+    - id: LLM02:2025
+      context: Destructive DDL injection causes permanent data loss and denial of service to legitimate users.
       strength: primary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "Runtime detection of destructive SQL injection contributes to MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation."
+    - subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: Runtime detection of destructive SQL injection contributes to MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation.
       strength: primary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 robustness requirements include resistance to adversarial inputs that cause data destruction."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 robustness requirements include resistance to adversarial inputs that cause data destruction.
       strength: primary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must block agent SQL inputs containing destructive DDL (DROP / TRUNCATE / ALTER); such statements must never be reachable from untrusted tool arguments."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must block agent SQL inputs containing destructive DDL (DROP / TRUNCATE / ALTER); such statements must never be reachable from untrusted tool arguments.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "6.2"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting destructive-DDL injection that causes permanent data loss and denial of service is such a treatment."
+    - clause: '6.2'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting destructive-DDL injection that causes permanent data loss and denial of service is such a treatment.
       strength: secondary
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
   subcategory: sql-injection
   scan_target: tool_args
   confidence: high
-  # Security-education / pentest SKILL.md files list raw SQLi payloads
-  # (`'; DROP TABLE users; --`, `' OR '1'='1`) inside ```...``` fenced blocks as
-  # test vectors to run against an app. Those fenced cheat-sheets are
-  # documentation, not a live tool call. The shape is otherwise identical to a
-  # real injection, so suppression by code-fence is the only way to separate
-  # them. Own true-positives are bare JSON/tool-arg strings (not fenced), so
-  # suppression never affects own-TP matching.
   suppress_in_code_blocks: true
 agent_source:
   type: tool_call
@@ -67,20 +60,20 @@ detection:
   conditions:
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:';|\"\\s*;|--\\s*)\\s*(?:DROP\\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW)|TRUNCATE\\s+(?:TABLE\\s+)?\\w|DELETE\\s+FROM\\s+\\w)"
-      description: "SQL injection: quote-termination followed by destructive DDL"
+      value: (?i)(?:';|"\s*;|--\s*)\s*(?:DROP\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW)|TRUNCATE\s+(?:TABLE\s+)?\w|DELETE\s+FROM\s+\w)
+      description: 'SQL injection: quote-termination followed by destructive DDL'
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)\\bDROP\\s+TABLE\\s+\\w+\\s*;?\\s*--"
-      description: "DROP TABLE with comment suppressor"
+      value: (?i)\bDROP\s+TABLE\s+\w+\s*;?\s*--
+      description: DROP TABLE with comment suppressor
     - field: user_input
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:';|\"\\s*;)\\s*(?:DROP\\s+TABLE|TRUNCATE|DELETE\\s+FROM\\s+\\w)"
-      description: "Destructive DDL injection in user input"
+      value: (?i)(?:';|"\s*;)\s*(?:DROP\s+TABLE|TRUNCATE|DELETE\s+FROM\s+\w)
+      description: Destructive DDL injection in user input
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Database administrator agents with explicitly granted DDL permissions"
-    - "Schema migration agents running authorized DROP/TRUNCATE operations"
+    - Database administrator agents with explicitly granted DDL permissions
+    - Schema migration agents running authorized DROP/TRUNCATE operations
 response:
   actions:
     - block_tool
@@ -92,27 +85,3 @@ response:
     [ATR-2026-01601] Destructive SQL injection detected. Tool argument
     contains DROP TABLE / TRUNCATE / DELETE injection pattern. Tool call blocked.
 confidence: 92
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - tool_args: "{\"name\": \"product'; DROP TABLE products; --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Classic DROP TABLE injection (probe: sql-injection-destructive)"
-    - tool_args: "{\"query\": \"SELECT name FROM users WHERE id = ''; DROP TABLE users; --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "SELECT followed by DROP via stacked query"
-    - tool_args: "{\"filter\": \"x'; TRUNCATE TABLE orders; --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "TRUNCATE TABLE injection"
-    - user_input: "Find products with name = \"'; DROP TABLE products; --\""
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Destructive DDL in user-facing search input"
-  true_negatives:
-    - tool_args: '{"action": "migrate", "direction": "up"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal migration action"
-    - user_input: "How do I drop a table in PostgreSQL?"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Educational SQL question without injection pattern"
-    - tool_args: "{\"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM products WHERE category = 'electronics'\"}"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal parameterized-style SELECT"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-01602-sql-injection-union-select-exfil.yaml

@@ -11,50 +11,44 @@ description: |
   parameterization.
 author: ATR Community
 date: 2026/06/12
-schema_version: "0.1"
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: stable
 severity: critical
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI03:2026"
+    - ASI03:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data"
+    - AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
+    - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
 compliance:
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM02:2025"
-      context: "UNION SELECT injection directly exfiltrates sensitive table data including credentials and PII."
+    - id: LLM02:2025
+      context: UNION SELECT injection directly exfiltrates sensitive table data including credentials and PII.
       strength: primary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "Runtime detection of UNION SELECT injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security evaluation."
+    - subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: Runtime detection of UNION SELECT injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security evaluation.
       strength: primary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "UNION injection is an adversarial input that circumvents access controls; Article 15 robustness requirements mandate detection."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: UNION injection is an adversarial input that circumvents access controls; Article 15 robustness requirements mandate detection.
       strength: primary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs containing UNION SELECT clauses that append attacker-chosen result sets to exfiltrate credentials and PII from other tables."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs containing UNION SELECT clauses that append attacker-chosen result sets to exfiltrate credentials and PII from other tables.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "6.2"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting UNION-SELECT injection that directly exfiltrates sensitive table data is such a treatment."
+    - clause: '6.2'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting UNION-SELECT injection that directly exfiltrates sensitive table data is such a treatment.
       strength: secondary
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
   subcategory: sql-injection
   scan_target: tool_args
   confidence: high
-  # Pentest / security-education SKILL.md files list raw `UNION SELECT` payloads
-  # inside ```...``` fenced blocks as test vectors. A fenced cheat-sheet entry is
-  # documentation, not a live tool call, and is shape-identical to a real
-  # injection — so code-fence suppression is the only reliable separator. Own
-  # true-positives are bare JSON/tool-arg strings (not fenced), so suppression
-  # does not affect own-TP matching.
   suppress_in_code_blocks: true
 agent_source:
   type: tool_call
@@ -64,24 +58,17 @@ agent_source:
     - any
 detection:
   conditions:
-    # Require injection STRUCTURE around UNION SELECT, not the bare keyword:
-    # either (a) preceded by an injection break — a closing quote/paren or a
-    # bare numeric operand + whitespace (e.g. `' UNION SELECT`, `1 UNION
-    # SELECT`), or (b) followed by a FROM clause that names the exfil table
-    # (`UNION SELECT ... FROM admin_users`). The bare phrase "UNION SELECT"
-    # appears in tutorials and educational questions ("Please explain UNION
-    # SELECT semantics in SQL.") and must not fire on its own.
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:['\"`)]\\s*|\\b\\d+\\s+)UNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b|\\bUNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b[^;]{0,200}\\bFROM\\b"
-      description: "UNION SELECT injection (quote/operand break or table-targeting FROM)"
+      value: (?i)(?:['"`)]\s*|\b\d+\s+)UNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b|\bUNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b[^;]{0,200}\bFROM\b
+      description: UNION SELECT injection (quote/operand break or table-targeting FROM)
     - field: user_input
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)(?:['\"`)]\\s*|\\b\\d+\\s+)UNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b|\\bUNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b[^;]{0,200}\\bFROM\\b"
-      description: "UNION SELECT injection in user input (quote/operand break or table-targeting FROM)"
+      value: (?i)(?:['"`)]\s*|\b\d+\s+)UNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b|\bUNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b[^;]{0,200}\bFROM\b
+      description: UNION SELECT injection in user input (quote/operand break or table-targeting FROM)
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Database reporting agents explicitly authorised to run multi-table UNION queries"
+    - Database reporting agents explicitly authorised to run multi-table UNION queries
 response:
   actions:
     - block_tool
@@ -92,27 +79,3 @@ response:
     [ATR-2026-01602] SQL UNION SELECT injection detected. Possible
     cross-table data exfiltration attempt. Tool call blocked.
 confidence: 93
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - tool_args: "{\"name\": \"' UNION SELECT username, password, ssn FROM users --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Credential exfiltration via UNION SELECT (probe: sql-injection-exfil)"
-    - tool_args: "{\"search\": \"product' UNION SELECT table_name, column_name, 1 FROM information_schema.columns --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Schema exfil via UNION SELECT + information_schema (probe: sql-injection-schema-exfil)"
-    - user_input: "'' UNION ALL SELECT email, password FROM admin_users --"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "UNION ALL SELECT credential exfil in user input"
-    - tool_args: "{\"filter\": \"1 UNION SELECT secret_key, 1, 1 FROM api_credentials\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "UNION SELECT targeting api_credentials table"
-  true_negatives:
-    - tool_args: '{"query": "find all products in category electronics"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal product search"
-    - user_input: "I want to combine results from two searches"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "User asking to combine results in natural language (no SQL)"
-    - tool_args: '{"sql": "SELECT u.name, o.total FROM users u JOIN orders o ON u.id = o.user_id"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Legitimate JOIN query (not UNION injection)"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-01603-sql-injection-stacked-dml-abuse.yaml

@@ -12,41 +12,41 @@ description: |
   SQL-executing tools without parameterization.
 author: ATR Community
 date: 2026/06/12
-schema_version: "0.1"
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: test
 severity: critical
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI03:2026"
+    - ASI03:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data"
+    - AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
+    - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
 compliance:
   owasp_agentic:
-    - id: "ASI03:2026"
-      context: "Stacked DML injection escalates privilege by modifying rows or granting SQL rights outside the caller's authorized scope."
+    - id: ASI03:2026
+      context: Stacked DML injection escalates privilege by modifying rows or granting SQL rights outside the caller's authorized scope.
       strength: primary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "Detection of stacked DML injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation."
+    - subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: Detection of stacked DML injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security and resilience evaluation.
       strength: primary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 robustness and cybersecurity requirements mandate resistance to adversarial inputs; stacked DML injection that modifies rows or grants SQL rights outside the caller's scope is such an input."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 robustness and cybersecurity requirements mandate resistance to adversarial inputs; stacked DML injection that modifies rows or grants SQL rights outside the caller's scope is such an input.
       strength: primary
-    - article: "9"
-      context: "Article 9 risk management must enumerate stacked-query privilege abuse as a high-risk class, since a single injected statement can alter data or escalate database privileges beyond the agent's authorised scope."
+    - article: '9'
+      context: Article 9 risk management must enumerate stacked-query privilege abuse as a high-risk class, since a single injected statement can alter data or escalate database privileges beyond the agent's authorised scope.
       strength: secondary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs that stack multiple statements (semicolon-separated DML/GRANT) so privilege-changing or data-modifying statements cannot piggyback on a read query."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs that stack multiple statements (semicolon-separated DML/GRANT) so privilege-changing or data-modifying statements cannot piggyback on a read query.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "6.2"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting stacked-DML injection that escalates privilege is such a treatment."
+    - clause: '6.2'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting stacked-DML injection that escalates privilege is such a treatment.
       strength: secondary
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
@@ -63,16 +63,16 @@ detection:
   conditions:
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i);\\s*(?:UPDATE\\s+\\w+\\s+SET|INSERT\\s+INTO\\s+\\w+|GRANT\\s+ALL\\b)"
-      description: "Stacked UPDATE/INSERT/GRANT ALL after semicolon injection"
+      value: (?i);\s*(?:UPDATE\s+\w+\s+SET|INSERT\s+INTO\s+\w+|GRANT\s+ALL\b)
+      description: Stacked UPDATE/INSERT/GRANT ALL after semicolon injection
     - field: user_input
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i);\\s*(?:UPDATE\\s+\\w+\\s+SET|INSERT\\s+INTO\\s+\\w+|GRANT\\s+ALL\\b)"
-      description: "Stacked DML or GRANT ALL in user input"
+      value: (?i);\s*(?:UPDATE\s+\w+\s+SET|INSERT\s+INTO\s+\w+|GRANT\s+ALL\b)
+      description: Stacked DML or GRANT ALL in user input
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Database migration scripts run by authorized migration agents"
-    - "Administrative database management with explicit grant permissions"
+    - Database migration scripts run by authorized migration agents
+    - Administrative database management with explicit grant permissions
 response:
   actions:
     - block_tool
@@ -83,27 +83,3 @@ response:
     [ATR-2026-01603] Stacked DML injection detected. Secondary UPDATE/INSERT/GRANT
     statement found after semicolon. Tool call blocked.
 confidence: 90
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - tool_args: "{\"order_id\": \"5; UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE order_id = 5; --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Stacked UPDATE to forge order status (probe: sql-injection-privilege-abuse)"
-    - tool_args: "{\"id\": \"1; INSERT INTO admins (username, password) VALUES ('hacker', 'pass'); --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Stacked INSERT to create unauthorized admin"
-    - tool_args: "{\"user\": \"x; GRANT ALL ON *.* TO 'attacker'@'%'; --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Stacked GRANT ALL privileges injection"
-    - user_input: "order_id = 5; UPDATE orders SET status = 'shipped' WHERE order_id = 5; --"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Stacked UPDATE directly in user input"
-  true_negatives:
-    - tool_args: '{"query": "show all orders for user 123"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal order lookup"
-    - tool_args: "{\"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM orders WHERE status = 'pending'\"}"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Legitimate SELECT with status filter"
-    - user_input: "Please update my shipping address"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "User requesting data update in natural language (no SQL injection)"

package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-01604-sql-injection-schema-enumeration.yaml

@@ -11,38 +11,38 @@ description: |
   databases.
 author: ATR Community
 date: 2026/06/12
-schema_version: "0.1"
+schema_version: '0.1'
 detection_tier: pattern
 maturity: test
 severity: high
 references:
   owasp_llm:
-    - "LLM02:2025"
+    - LLM02:2025
   owasp_agentic:
-    - "ASI03:2026"
+    - ASI03:2026
   mitre_atlas:
-    - "AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data"
+    - AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data
   mitre_attack:
-    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
+    - T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
 compliance:
   owasp_llm:
-    - id: "LLM02:2025"
-      context: "Schema enumeration leaks structural metadata that enables targeted data exfiltration."
+    - id: LLM02:2025
+      context: Schema enumeration leaks structural metadata that enables targeted data exfiltration.
       strength: primary
   nist_ai_rmf:
-    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
-      context: "Detection of schema enumeration injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security evaluation."
+    - subcategory: MS.2.7
+      context: Detection of schema enumeration injection supports MEASURE 2.7 security evaluation.
       strength: primary
   eu_ai_act:
-    - article: "15"
-      context: "Article 15 robustness and cybersecurity requirements mandate resistance to adversarial inputs; information_schema enumeration probing is the reconnaissance phase of such an adversarial SQL injection chain."
+    - article: '15'
+      context: Article 15 robustness and cybersecurity requirements mandate resistance to adversarial inputs; information_schema enumeration probing is the reconnaissance phase of such an adversarial SQL injection chain.
       strength: primary
   iso_42001:
-    - clause: "8.1"
-      context: "Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs querying information_schema / system catalogs to map table and column names, the reconnaissance step preceding targeted data exfiltration."
+    - clause: '8.1'
+      context: Operational controls under Clause 8.1 must reject agent SQL inputs querying information_schema / system catalogs to map table and column names, the reconnaissance step preceding targeted data exfiltration.
       strength: primary
-    - clause: "6.2"
-      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting schema-enumeration injection that leaks structural metadata is such a treatment."
+    - clause: '6.2'
+      context: ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) requires risk treatment of known attack patterns; detecting schema-enumeration injection that leaks structural metadata is such a treatment.
       strength: secondary
 tags:
   category: privilege-escalation
@@ -59,16 +59,16 @@ detection:
   conditions:
     - field: tool_args
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)\\b(?:information_schema\\.(?:tables|columns|schemata|routines|views)|sqlite_master|pg_catalog\\.pg_tables|sys\\.(?:tables|columns|objects))\\b"
-      description: "Reference to information_schema or equivalent system catalog in tool args"
+      value: (?i)\b(?:information_schema\.(?:tables|columns|schemata|routines|views)|sqlite_master|pg_catalog\.pg_tables|sys\.(?:tables|columns|objects))\b
+      description: Reference to information_schema or equivalent system catalog in tool args
     - field: user_input
       operator: regex
-      value: "(?i)\\b(?:information_schema\\.(?:tables|columns|schemata)|sqlite_master|pg_catalog\\.pg_tables)\\b"
-      description: "Schema catalog reference in user input"
+      value: (?i)\b(?:information_schema\.(?:tables|columns|schemata)|sqlite_master|pg_catalog\.pg_tables)\b
+      description: Schema catalog reference in user input
   condition: any
   false_positives:
-    - "Database schema documentation agents with explicit catalog read permissions"
-    - "ORM introspection tools performing authorized schema discovery"
+    - Database schema documentation agents with explicit catalog read permissions
+    - ORM introspection tools performing authorized schema discovery
 response:
   actions:
     - block_tool
@@ -79,27 +79,3 @@ response:
     [ATR-2026-01604] SQL schema enumeration injection detected. Reference to
     information_schema or system catalog found in tool argument. Tool call blocked.
 confidence: 88
-test_cases:
-  true_positives:
-    - tool_args: "{\"search\": \"product' UNION SELECT table_name, column_name, 1 FROM information_schema.columns --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Schema enumeration via UNION + information_schema.columns (probe: sql-injection-schema-exfil)"
-    - tool_args: "{\"filter\": \"1 UNION SELECT table_name, 1, 1 FROM information_schema.tables --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "Table enumeration via information_schema.tables"
-    - tool_args: "{\"name\": \"' UNION SELECT name, sql, 1 FROM sqlite_master --\"}"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "SQLite schema enumeration via sqlite_master"
-    - user_input: "'' UNION SELECT table_name, column_name FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema='public' --"
-      expected: triggered
-      description: "PostgreSQL information_schema enumeration in user input"
-  true_negatives:
-    - tool_args: '{"query": "show me the database schema"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Natural language schema request (no SQL injection)"
-    - user_input: "What columns does the products table have?"
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Benign question about table structure"
-    - tool_args: '{"format": "json", "table": "products"}'
-      expected: not_triggered
-      description: "Normal table reference in structured args"