agent-threat-rules 3.1.1 → 3.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +3 -3
- package/dist/adapters/mastra.d.ts +63 -0
- package/dist/adapters/mastra.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/adapters/mastra.js +82 -0
- package/dist/adapters/mastra.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cli.js +19 -6
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +9 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00030-cross-agent-attack.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00032-goal-hijacking.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00074-cross-agent-privilege-escalation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00076-inter-agent-message-spoofing.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00077-human-trust-exploitation.yaml +18 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00108-consensus-sybil-attack.yaml +10 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00116-a2a-message-validation.yaml +12 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00117-agent-identity-spoofing.yaml +22 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00118-approval-fatigue.yaml +24 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00119-social-engineering-via-agent.yaml +22 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00132-casual-authority-escalation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00139-casual-authority-redirect.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00164-skill-scope-hijack.yaml +13 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00268-tense-framing-bypass.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00269-fitd-escalation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00271-grandma-roleplay-jailbreak.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00273-dan-developer-mode-persona.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00287-threaten-json-coercive-output-threat.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00288-false-premise-injection.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00301-tap-tree-of-attacks-jailbreak.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00302-anti-dan-inverted-filter-persona.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00303-devmode-ranti-profanity-coercion.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00304-chatgpt-image-unlocker-markdown-injection.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00305-dan-mode-ablation-benchmark-coercion.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00306-autodan-genetic-jailbreak-suffix.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00307-inthewild-jailbreak-corpus-signature.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00314-amoral-unfiltered-custom-persona-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00317-free-of-restrictions-named-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00318-moralizing-rant-then-unfiltered-bypass.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00319-developer-mode-dual-response-format.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00320-opposite-day-boolean-opposite-machine.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00322-fictional-world-format-override-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00323-dual-persona-simulation-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00324-neurosemantical-inversitis-disease-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00325-bob-hypothetical-unrestricted-chatbot.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00326-fake-developer-authority-chatdan-override.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00327-ai-ethics-law-bypass-declaration.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00328-named-mode-persona-override.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00329-no-withhold-factual-resource-persona.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00330-yoja-allcaps-settings-block-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00331-terminal-cli-harmful-function-simulator.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00332-hacker-chan-culture-offensive-ai-persona.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00333-disease-animal-dual-ai-chatbot.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00334-two-entity-token-splitting-game.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00335-key-value-template-persona-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00336-brm-false-information-machine-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00337-obfuscated-system-announcement-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00338-persongpt-hash-prefix-activation.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00339-bom-boolean-opposite-machine-persona-claim.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00340-h4x-amoral-unfiltered-character.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00341-char-rules-shortform-persona-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00342-unicode-encoding-obfuscation-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00343-lie-truth-dual-personality-uncensored.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00344-alt-ai-same-capabilities-no-restrictions.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00345-nlp-based-os-fictional-terminal-override.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00346-jailbreak-emoji-unlock-dual-format.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00347-yin-yang-hidden-knowledge-hidden-human-sim.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00348-arc-autonomous-real-calculation-rulebreaker.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00349-hgttg-hitchhikers-guide-no-restriction-oracle.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00350-black-alert-no-ethics-writing-assistant.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00351-dan-ofkilter-sms-abbreviated-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00352-trainergpt-fix-my-ai-harmful-output-extraction.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00353-dual-chatgpt-dan-opposite-personality-format.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00354-reverse-harm-regardless-oracle-persona.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00355-ugh-anti-human-nefarious-ai-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00356-google-gato-lamda-exploit-generation-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00357-antifm-hate-violence-persona-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00358-cumgpt-explicit-adult-named-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00360-chj-carousel-clyde-no-ethics-bird.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00361-alter-ego-honesty-dual-consciousness-bypass.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00362-fictional-unfiltered-ai-comparison-jailbreak.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00363-rephrase-criminal-activity-second-person.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00364-dr-al-villain-plan-template-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00365-reservoir-dogs-coercive-interrogation-roleplay.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00366-sneaky-pete-warp-facts-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00368-prompt-browser-token-limit-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00369-gptx-starwars-unlimited-knowledge-persona.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00370-addi-german-dictator-propaganda-roleplay.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00371-ai-political-bias-manipulation.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00372-fictional-cia-secret-files-story-extraction.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00374-role-placeholder-persona-template-injection.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00375-character-description-rpg-explicit-template.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00376-identity-command-real-person-persona-injection.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00377-jailbreak-keyword-targetlanguage-template.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00379-lie-permission-logical-trap-jailbreak.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00380-fake-citation-biased-information-mandate.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00381-dan-story-narrative-continuation-prefix.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00383-cynical-sarcasm-ai-persona-bypass.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00384-protect-me-from-indirect-harm-tutorial.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00385-gigachad-dominant-aggressive-persona.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00386-daddy-sycophancy-manipulation-mandate.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00387-nsfw-character-sheet-generation-unlock.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00388-opposite-reply-omniscient-game.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00389-terminal-custom-ruleset-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00391-persona-conditional-harm-unlock.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00392-authority-persona-violence-study-extraction.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00402-grandma-roleplay-harmful-substance-synthesis.yaml +20 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00404-goodside-threat-json-death-coercion.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00406-doctor-xml-policy-puppetry-interaction-config.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00416-litellm-mcp-unauthenticated-server-registration.yaml +15 -3
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00417-librechat-mcp-stdio-injection.yaml +18 -3
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00418-weknora-mcp-config-rce.yaml +17 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00430-nl-trust-escalation-impersonation.yaml +19 -1
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00432-superagi-output-handler-eval-rce.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00440-semantic-kernel-vector-store-eval-rce.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/agent-manipulation/ATR-2026-00552-goal-drift-after-pressure-injection.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00020-system-prompt-leak.yaml +18 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00021-api-key-exposure.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00075-agent-memory-manipulation.yaml +10 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00102-disguised-analytics-exfiltration.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00113-credential-theft.yaml +16 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00114-oauth-token-abuse.yaml +16 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00115-env-var-harvesting.yaml +16 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00136-tool-response-data-piggyback.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00141-example-format-key-leak.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00142-piggyback-transition-words.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00145-obfuscated-key-disclosure.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00146-env-var-existence-probe.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00150-credential-in-tool-response.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00152-obfuscated-credential-leak.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00162-skill-credential-exfil-combo.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00201-credential-pipe-exfiltration.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00212-mcp-atlassian-credential-leak.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00261-markdown-image-exfiltration.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00274-api-key-generation-request.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00275-system-prompt-training-data-extraction.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00290-divergence-repeat-word-training-extraction.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00291-biometric-surveillance-personal-data-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00293-educational-records-personal-data-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00294-financial-pii-personal-data-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00295-medical-pii-personal-data-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00405-markdown-image-url-exfiltration-xss.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00411-apikey-generation-completion-request.yaml +14 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00421-nl-covert-conversation-exfiltration.yaml +16 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00422-nl-credential-disclosure.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00423-nl-sensitive-file-disclosure.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00424-nl-system-prompt-leak.yaml +16 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00426-nl-output-injection-credential-leak.yaml +16 -1
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00431-chatbox-history-exfiltration-prompt-injection.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00449-spring-ai-chatmemory-cross-user-leak.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00471-garak-sysprompt-extraction-mixedunassigned.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00501-data-exfiltration-via-markdown-image-and-link-url-injection.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00504-tool-and-function-capability-enumeration.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00505-system-prompt-extraction-instruction-dump-request.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00514-system-prompt-extraction.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00516-output-xss-via-llm.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00524-claude-code-anthropic-base-url-credential-exfil.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00548-cross-agent-session-context-leak.yaml +18 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00566-librechat-is-a-chatgpt-clone-with-additi.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00569-agent-mcp-path-traversal-arbitrary-file-access.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00571-xss-in-agent-mcp-rendered-output.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/context-exfiltration/ATR-2026-00574-semantic-paraphrased-context-extraction.yaml +21 -0
- package/rules/data-poisoning/ATR-2026-00070-data-poisoning.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/data-poisoning/ATR-2026-00450-spring-ai-prompt-memory-poisoning.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/data-poisoning/ATR-2026-00570-sql-injection-in-agent-tool-query.yaml +31 -0
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00050-runaway-agent-loop.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00051-resource-exhaustion.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00052-cascading-failure.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00098-unauthorized-financial-action.yaml +7 -1
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00099-high-risk-tool-gate.yaml +7 -1
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00428-nl-unauthorized-shell-execution.yaml +16 -1
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00491-garak-agent-breaker-markdown-just-raw-json.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00500-ssrf-via-agent-url-fetch-instruction.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/excessive-autonomy/ATR-2026-00553-runaway-tool-loop-behavioral.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00279-harmful-completion-continuation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00281-eicar-gtube-malware-signature-request.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00284-glitch-token-destabilization.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00289-lmrc-harmful-content-elicitation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00292-self-harm-eating-disorder-facilitation.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00298-malicious-use-illegal-activity-request.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00299-harmbench-detailed-harmful-instruction.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00413-malwaregen-code-generation-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00502-training-data-extraction-via-divergent-repetition-attack.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/model-abuse/ATR-2026-00517-model-extraction-distillation.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/model-security/ATR-2026-00072-model-behavior-extraction.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/model-security/ATR-2026-00073-malicious-finetuning-data.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/model-security/ATR-2026-00433-modelcache-torch-load-deserialization-rce.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00040-privilege-escalation.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00041-scope-creep.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00107-delayed-execution-bypass.yaml +6 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00110-eval-injection.yaml +8 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00111-shell-escape.yaml +8 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00112-dynamic-import-exploitation.yaml +8 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00143-casual-privilege-escalation.yaml +5 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00144-rationalized-safety-bypass.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00204-stealth-execution-persistence.yaml +16 -0
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00436-enclave-vm-sandbox-escape-rce.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00441-semantic-kernel-sessions-python-plugin-startup-persistence.yaml +5 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00451-litellm-admin-sqli-cisa-kev.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00528-praisonai-auth-disabled-default.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00539-crewai-codeinterpreter-sandbox-escape-rce.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00546-crewai-json-loader-local-file-read.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00547-crewai-rag-url-ssrf-bypass.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00549-destructive-tool-without-human-approval.yaml +16 -0
- package/rules/privilege-escalation/ATR-2026-00551-cross-conversation-memory-write.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00001-direct-prompt-injection.yaml +9 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00002-indirect-prompt-injection.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00003-jailbreak-attempt.yaml +8 -2
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00004-system-prompt-override.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00005-multi-turn-injection.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00080-encoding-evasion.yaml +20 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00081-semantic-multi-turn.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00082-fingerprint-evasion.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00083-indirect-tool-injection.yaml +23 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00084-structured-data-injection.yaml +20 -1
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00085-audit-evasion.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00086-visual-spoofing.yaml +19 -0
- package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00087-rule-probing.yaml +22 -0
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- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00393-ansi-code-elicitation-request.yaml +17 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00415-flowise-custom-mcp-stdio-rce.yaml +12 -3
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00419-cursor-mcp-zero-click-config.yaml +14 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00434-mcp-remote-authorization-endpoint-command-injection.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00435-azure-mcp-server-missing-authentication.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00448-spring-ai-milvus-filter-injection.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00494-garak-exploitation-mixedunassigned.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00513-package-hallucination-exploitation.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00521-shell-command-injection-agent-tool-context.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00522-sql-injection-natural-language-agent-interface.yaml +12 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00526-claude-code-shell-metachar-in-double-quoted-path.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00529-litellm-proxy-sqli-cisa-kev.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00530-ms-agent-shell-tool-unsanitized-argv-rce.yaml +15 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00531-praisonai-unauthenticated-agent-api.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00532-apache-doris-mcp-sql-injection.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00533-apache-pinot-mcp-unauthenticated-takeover.yaml +10 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00534-alibaba-rds-mcp-unauthenticated-metadata-exfil.yaml +10 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00536-nginx-ui-mcp-unauthenticated-command-execution.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00537-fastmcp-server-name-cmd-injection-windows.yaml +11 -2
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00538-langchain-chatchat-mcp-stdio-unauthenticated-rce.yaml +10 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00540-praisonai-parse-mcp-command-cli-injection.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00541-agent-zero-mcp-config-command-injection.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00542-upsonic-mcp-command-allowlist-bypass.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00543-litellm-mcp-server-argv-injection.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00544-praisonai-pth-file-path-traversal-rce.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00545-praisonai-tool-override-unauth-rce.yaml +13 -1
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00561-fastmcp-vulnerable-to-windows-command-in.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00567-mcp-stdio-config-command-injection.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00568-agent-ssrf-cloud-metadata-file-inclusion.yaml +28 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00572-symjack-symlink-config-redirection.yaml +22 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00575-miasma-npm-worm-agent-config-backdoor.yaml +161 -0
- package/rules/tool-poisoning/ATR-2026-00576-hades-agent-credential-theft.yaml +153 -0
- package/spec/atr-schema.yaml +123 -0
- package/spec/compliance-metadata.md +15 -13
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context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
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strength: secondary
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context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
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strength: secondary
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context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - to every prompt)."
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context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - to every prompt)."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dra - step by step) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dra - step by step)."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - an ai language) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - no matter how) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - no matter how)."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Goodside - mixed_unassigned) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Goodside - mixed_unassigned)."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Gcg - mixed_unassigned) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Lmrc - mixed_unassigned) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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strength: secondary
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context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Lmrc - mixed_unassigned)."
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context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
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context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
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context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
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strength: secondary
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context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - i would like) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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strength: secondary
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context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
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strength: secondary
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context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - i would like)."
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66
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context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -62,6 +68,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
62
68
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
63
69
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
64
70
|
strength: secondary
|
|
71
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
72
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - i would like)."
|
|
73
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
65
74
|
|
|
66
75
|
tags:
|
|
67
76
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
46
46
|
- article: "9"
|
|
47
47
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
48
48
|
strength: secondary
|
|
49
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
50
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - your prompt here) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
51
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
49
52
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
50
53
|
- function: Manage
|
|
51
54
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -55,6 +58,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
55
58
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
56
59
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
57
60
|
strength: secondary
|
|
61
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
62
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - your prompt here)."
|
|
63
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
58
64
|
iso_42001:
|
|
59
65
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
60
66
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -62,6 +68,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
62
68
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
63
69
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
64
70
|
strength: secondary
|
|
71
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
72
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - your prompt here)."
|
|
73
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
65
74
|
|
|
66
75
|
tags:
|
|
67
76
|
category: prompt-injection
|
package/rules/prompt-injection/ATR-2026-00466-garak-latentinjection-following-text-from.yaml
CHANGED
|
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
48
48
|
- article: "9"
|
|
49
49
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
50
50
|
strength: secondary
|
|
51
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
52
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Latentinjection - following text from) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
53
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
51
54
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
52
55
|
- function: Manage
|
|
53
56
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -57,6 +60,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
57
60
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
58
61
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
59
62
|
strength: secondary
|
|
63
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
64
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Latentinjection - following text from)."
|
|
65
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
60
66
|
iso_42001:
|
|
61
67
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
62
68
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -64,6 +70,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
64
70
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
65
71
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
66
72
|
strength: secondary
|
|
73
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
74
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Latentinjection - following text from)."
|
|
75
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
67
76
|
|
|
68
77
|
tags:
|
|
69
78
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
47
47
|
- article: "9"
|
|
48
48
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
49
49
|
strength: secondary
|
|
50
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
51
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - act as a) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
52
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
50
53
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
51
54
|
- function: Manage
|
|
52
55
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -56,6 +59,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
56
59
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
57
60
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
58
61
|
strength: secondary
|
|
62
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
63
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - act as a)."
|
|
64
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
59
65
|
iso_42001:
|
|
60
66
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
61
67
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -63,6 +69,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
63
69
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
64
70
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
65
71
|
strength: secondary
|
|
72
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
73
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - act as a)."
|
|
74
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
66
75
|
|
|
67
76
|
tags:
|
|
68
77
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
51
51
|
- article: "9"
|
|
52
52
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
53
53
|
strength: secondary
|
|
54
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
55
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Goat - the target llm) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
56
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
54
57
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
55
58
|
- function: Manage
|
|
56
59
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -60,6 +63,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
60
63
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
61
64
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
62
65
|
strength: secondary
|
|
66
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
67
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Goat - the target llm)."
|
|
68
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
63
69
|
iso_42001:
|
|
64
70
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
65
71
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -67,6 +73,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
67
73
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
68
74
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
69
75
|
strength: secondary
|
|
76
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
77
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Goat - the target llm)."
|
|
78
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
70
79
|
|
|
71
80
|
tags:
|
|
72
81
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
47
47
|
- article: "9"
|
|
48
48
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
49
49
|
strength: secondary
|
|
50
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
51
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - at the end) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
52
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
50
53
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
51
54
|
- function: Manage
|
|
52
55
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -56,6 +59,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
56
59
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
57
60
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
58
61
|
strength: secondary
|
|
62
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
63
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - at the end)."
|
|
64
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
59
65
|
iso_42001:
|
|
60
66
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
61
67
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -63,6 +69,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
63
69
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
64
70
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
65
71
|
strength: secondary
|
|
72
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
73
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - at the end)."
|
|
74
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
66
75
|
|
|
67
76
|
tags:
|
|
68
77
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
48
48
|
- article: "9"
|
|
49
49
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
50
50
|
strength: secondary
|
|
51
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
52
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - as an ai) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
53
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
51
54
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
52
55
|
- function: Manage
|
|
53
56
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -57,6 +60,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
57
60
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
58
61
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
59
62
|
strength: secondary
|
|
63
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
64
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - as an ai)."
|
|
65
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
60
66
|
iso_42001:
|
|
61
67
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
62
68
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -64,6 +70,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
64
70
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
65
71
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
66
72
|
strength: secondary
|
|
73
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
74
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Garak Dan - as an ai)."
|
|
75
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
67
76
|
|
|
68
77
|
tags:
|
|
69
78
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
42
42
|
- article: "9"
|
|
43
43
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
44
44
|
strength: secondary
|
|
45
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
46
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Unrestricted AI Role Assignment) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
47
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
45
48
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
46
49
|
- function: Manage
|
|
47
50
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
51
54
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
52
55
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
53
56
|
strength: secondary
|
|
57
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
58
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Unrestricted AI Role Assignment)."
|
|
59
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
54
60
|
iso_42001:
|
|
55
61
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
56
62
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -58,6 +64,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
58
64
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
59
65
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
60
66
|
strength: secondary
|
|
67
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
68
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Unrestricted AI Role Assignment)."
|
|
69
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
61
70
|
|
|
62
71
|
tags:
|
|
63
72
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
42
42
|
- article: "9"
|
|
43
43
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
44
44
|
strength: secondary
|
|
45
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
46
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Harm Solicitation - Interpersonal Violence and Intimidation Requests) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
47
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
45
48
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
46
49
|
- function: Manage
|
|
47
50
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
51
54
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
52
55
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
53
56
|
strength: secondary
|
|
57
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
58
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Harm Solicitation - Interpersonal Violence and Intimidation Requests)."
|
|
59
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
54
60
|
iso_42001:
|
|
55
61
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
56
62
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -58,6 +64,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
58
64
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
59
65
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
60
66
|
strength: secondary
|
|
67
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
68
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Harm Solicitation - Interpersonal Violence and Intimidation Requests)."
|
|
69
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
61
70
|
|
|
62
71
|
tags:
|
|
63
72
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
40
40
|
- article: "9"
|
|
41
41
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
42
42
|
strength: secondary
|
|
43
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
44
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Dual AI Personality with Opposite-Rules Framing) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
45
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
43
46
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
44
47
|
- function: Manage
|
|
45
48
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -49,6 +52,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
49
52
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
50
53
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
51
54
|
strength: secondary
|
|
55
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
56
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Dual AI Personality with Opposite-Rules Framing)."
|
|
57
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
52
58
|
iso_42001:
|
|
53
59
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
54
60
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
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@@ -56,6 +62,9 @@ compliance:
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56
62
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- clause: "8.4"
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57
63
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context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
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58
64
|
strength: secondary
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|
65
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
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|
66
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (DAN/Persona Jailbreak - Dual AI Personality with Opposite-Rules Framing)."
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67
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+
strength: primary
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|
59
68
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60
69
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tags:
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61
70
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category: prompt-injection
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@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ compliance:
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42
42
|
- article: "9"
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43
43
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context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
44
44
|
strength: secondary
|
|
45
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
46
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - Script Tag with JavaScript Alert Payload) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
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|
47
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+
strength: secondary
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|
45
48
|
nist_ai_rmf:
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46
49
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- function: Manage
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47
50
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subcategory: MG.2.3
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@@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ compliance:
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51
54
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subcategory: MP.5.1
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52
55
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context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
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|
53
56
|
strength: secondary
|
|
57
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
58
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - Script Tag with JavaScript Alert Payload)."
|
|
59
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
54
60
|
iso_42001:
|
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55
61
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
56
62
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -58,6 +64,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
58
64
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
59
65
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
60
66
|
strength: secondary
|
|
67
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
68
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - Script Tag with JavaScript Alert Payload)."
|
|
69
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
61
70
|
|
|
62
71
|
tags:
|
|
63
72
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
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41
41
|
- article: "9"
|
|
42
42
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
43
43
|
strength: secondary
|
|
44
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
45
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - HTML Event Handler and Expression with JavaScript Alert) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
46
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
44
47
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
45
48
|
- function: Manage
|
|
46
49
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -50,6 +53,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
50
53
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
51
54
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
52
55
|
strength: secondary
|
|
56
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
57
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - HTML Event Handler and Expression with JavaScript Alert)."
|
|
58
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
53
59
|
iso_42001:
|
|
54
60
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
55
61
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -57,6 +63,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
57
63
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
58
64
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
59
65
|
strength: secondary
|
|
66
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
67
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (XSS Web Injection - HTML Event Handler and Expression with JavaScript Alert)."
|
|
68
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
60
69
|
|
|
61
70
|
tags:
|
|
62
71
|
category: prompt-injection
|
|
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
43
43
|
- article: "9"
|
|
44
44
|
context: "Prompt injection is a documented risk class; this rule implements the monitoring control required by Article 9 risk management obligations for high-risk AI systems."
|
|
45
45
|
strength: secondary
|
|
46
|
+
- article: "14"
|
|
47
|
+
context: "Article 14 (human oversight) requires high-risk AI systems to remain subject to effective human oversight; this rule provides detection evidence where the prompt-injection attempt (Latent Injection - Translation Task with Embedded Template Variable Injection) would bypass or undermine that oversight."
|
|
48
|
+
strength: secondary
|
|
46
49
|
nist_ai_rmf:
|
|
47
50
|
- function: Manage
|
|
48
51
|
subcategory: MG.2.3
|
|
@@ -52,6 +55,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
52
55
|
subcategory: MP.5.1
|
|
53
56
|
context: "Identifying prompt injection as an AI risk to be catalogued in the organizational risk register."
|
|
54
57
|
strength: secondary
|
|
58
|
+
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
|
|
59
|
+
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Latent Injection - Translation Task with Embedded Template Variable Injection)."
|
|
60
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
55
61
|
iso_42001:
|
|
56
62
|
- clause: "6.2"
|
|
57
63
|
context: "Addressing prompt injection risk is an objective required under clause 6.2 AIMS information security planning; this rule operationalizes the detection control measure."
|
|
@@ -59,6 +65,9 @@ compliance:
|
|
|
59
65
|
- clause: "8.4"
|
|
60
66
|
context: "Impact assessment for AI deployments under clause 8.4 must account for prompt injection inputs; detection events from this rule provide the required monitoring evidence."
|
|
61
67
|
strength: secondary
|
|
68
|
+
- clause: "8.1"
|
|
69
|
+
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the prompt-injection attempt (Latent Injection - Translation Task with Embedded Template Variable Injection)."
|
|
70
|
+
strength: primary
|
|
62
71
|
|
|
63
72
|
tags:
|
|
64
73
|
category: prompt-injection
|