@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.9
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -19
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2030 -2002
- package/LICENSE +201 -201
- package/README.md +1034 -1034
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -528
- package/bin/venastine.py +71 -71
- package/cli_commands.py +838 -835
- package/config.yaml +13 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
- package/config_schema.py +971 -966
- package/config_update.py +749 -749
- package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
- package/core/approval.py +137 -137
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
- package/core/client.py +2715 -2715
- package/core/commands.py +460 -454
- package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
- package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
- package/core/connect.py +686 -686
- package/core/events.py +123 -123
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
- package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
- package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
- package/core/memory.py +482 -482
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
- package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -234
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +458 -458
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
- package/core/replay.py +315 -315
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
- package/credentials.py +307 -307
- package/database.py +333 -333
- package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -108
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
- package/json_store.py +343 -343
- package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
- package/main.py +3433 -3433
- package/mcp_client/client.py +733 -733
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
- package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
- package/package.json +303 -303
- package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
- package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
- package/providers.json.example +94 -94
- package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
- package/requirements.txt +295 -295
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
- package/security/capability.py +207 -207
- package/security/confine.py +484 -484
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
- package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
- package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
- package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
- package/storage.py +1338 -1338
- package/tools/base.py +465 -465
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -267
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -681
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +371 -371
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +328 -328
- package/tools/context.py +159 -159
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
- package/tools/registry.py +1242 -1242
- package/tui/app.py +8318 -8307
- package/tui/app.tcss +747 -739
- package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
- package/tui/history.py +128 -128
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
- package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
- package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
- package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
- package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
- package/tui/widgets.py +3813 -3796
package/tools/builtin/shell.py
CHANGED
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"""
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tools/builtin/shell.py
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Shell execution tool (ROADMAP §7). Runs commands in the detected shell
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(bash on Linux/macOS, PowerShell on Windows) through the sandbox module
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(security/sandbox.py).
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SANDBOX MODEL (ROADMAP_v2 §46 moved one tier of this):
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Almost everything runs in a container -- Docker's, or Podman's when
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Docker cannot run one (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS22; the approval notice names
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which). The one exception is HOST_READ --
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a read-only command from config.INERT_COMMANDS whose argument
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resolves OUTSIDE the workspace -- which runs as a host subprocess
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because the file it names is one no container can see. It always
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requires approval, and the prompt names the resolved binary.
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INERT (every argument inside the workspace) used to take that same
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host path, on the argument that a read-only command needs no
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isolation. §46 (EP5) moved it into the container: it is the tier the
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gate AUTO-APPROVES, and on Windows `ls`/`cat`/`grep` have no native
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binary, so the host path was resolving them off the user's PATH and
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executing whichever POSIX toolchain some other product had installed.
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Inside the container they are the pinned image's coreutils. It falls
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back to the host when Docker is down, which changes nothing about the
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approval answer (see security/sandbox.containment_for) and is
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reported to the model as `ran_on: "host"`.
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Non-inert commands go through the container (strong isolation) or the
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explicit subprocess fallback (weak isolation, requires
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ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK=True).
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EVERY result carries `ran_on` and `tier` (EP4). The human was always
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told where a command would run; the model never was, and it is the
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one that writes the user an answer about the output.
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APPROVAL MODEL (ROADMAP_v2 §28, amended by §48):
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config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE is the gate -- "always", "tiered",
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"contained" or "never" -- and it is the ONLY gate: there is no second
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switch that can disagree with it (D14's one-way tightening for shell
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lives in the agent's `approval_overrides`, which reach the same OR
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below).
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Under "tiered" and "contained", the command is classified ONCE
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(security/sandbox.classify_command) into a capability set, and the
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generic rule in security/capability.auto_approved decides. The same
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profile is then handed to run_sandboxed, so the thing that was
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approved is the thing that runs.
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The two differ in one capability (§48, CE1/CE2). "tiered" asks about
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anything that may run code, contained or not, so only INERT runs
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unasked. "contained" is the rule "tiered" had before §48: a command
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the container confines runs unasked unless it gets network. There is
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no interpreter list behind either, and there must not be one -- see
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classify_command's `runs_code`.
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only return False on the shipped config flags, making the whole check
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a pass-through for ToolApprovals.shell. Audit #157 is what that cost
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and was never asked about.
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TOCTOU safety: run() probes Docker once and passes the result to
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run_sandboxed(). If Docker was available during approval but is now
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down, and the fallback would have required approval, run() returns
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an error instead of silently downgrading.
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FILE ACCESS:
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volume mount / fallback cwd). Output files generated by sandboxed
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commands appear in the workspace seamlessly.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import os
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import re
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import shutil
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from typing import Literal
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, StrictBool
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import config
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from security import capability, posture
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from security.capability import (
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UNAVAILABLE,
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UNCONTAINED,
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CommandProfile,
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auto_approved,
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)
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from security.protected_paths import (
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PROTECTED_SEGMENTS_FOLDED,
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protected_segment,
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)
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from security.sandbox import (
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BACKEND_CONTAINER,
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BACKEND_SSH,
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SANDBOXED_NET,
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SandboxUnavailable,
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_is_inert,
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classify_command,
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containment_for,
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declared_backend,
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known_runtime,
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run_sandboxed,
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ssh_enabled,
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ssh_target,
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)
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Validated at IMPORT, so a typo in a security setting is a startup
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#
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#
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capability.validate_mode(config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE,
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"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ---- Schema ---------------------------------------------------------------
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class ShellParams(BaseModel):
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command: str = Field(
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...,
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min_length=1,
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description=(
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"Shell command to execute. WHERE it runs depends on its "
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"arguments, and the result tells you which happened: read "
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"`ran_on` before drawing any conclusion about the machine "
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"you are on. A read-only command (ls, cat, grep, etc.) "
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"whose arguments all resolve INSIDE the workspace runs in "
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"the container. The same command with an argument OUTSIDE "
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"the workspace runs ON THE HOST, with the user's own file "
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"access and the host's own PATH -- it is not sandboxed, and "
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"what it reads is the real machine, not the container. "
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f"mounted at /workspace. Interpreted by {_SHELL_DISPLAY}."
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),
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)
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rationale: str = Field(
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default="",
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description=(
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"Why you are running this command, right now, in a sentence "
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"or two. Say what you are trying to learn or change and "
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"what it is for -- not what the command does, which the "
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"reader can see. This is shown to the user on the approval "
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"prompt and recorded with the call; it never affects whether "
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),
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requires_network: StrictBool = Field(
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default=False,
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description=(
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"Whether this command needs to reach the network. Say true "
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"for anything that downloads, installs, clones, publishes or "
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"calls an API. WITHOUT IT THE COMMAND RUNS WITH NETWORKING "
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"OFF and the connection simply fails -- the harness reads "
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"your command as text and cannot tell that an inline script "
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"or an interpreter you invoke wants egress, so it assumes "
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"not. Saying true does not bypass approval; it tells the "
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),
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needs_root: StrictBool = Field(
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default=False,
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description=(
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"Whether this command must run as root. The harness prefixes "
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"machine -- DO NOT write `sudo` in the command yourself, and "
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"never put a password in it. The WHOLE command line runs as "
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"root, redirects and pipes included. Only 'wsl' and 'ssh' can "
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"do this: in the container you ALREADY are root, so drop the "
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"flag there. A human is asked every single time, whatever the "
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"approval mode, and the call is refused outright if no "
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"password is stored for that machine -- the refusal says which "
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"one to store. Leave it false unless the command genuinely "
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),
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backend: Literal["container", "wsl", "ssh"] = Field(
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default="container",
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description=(
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"Where to run it. 'container' is the sandbox: a pinned Linux "
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"image with only the workspace visible, no network unless you "
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"path on a filesystem it cannot see. Its network is always "
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"on and `requires_network` means nothing there. Note the "
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"does not exist on the remote -- send it through the command "
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),
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)
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TOOL_SCHEMA = {
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"description": (
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f"Shell: {_SHELL_DISPLAY}. Output is truncated at "
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),
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# §42 (RA4). ADVERTISED as required, TOLERATED when absent -- and the
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#
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# belongs: a rationale nobody asks for is supplied inconsistently, and
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# a drift signal with unknown coverage is not a signal. But
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# `ShellParams` keeps its default, because approval is obtained BEFORE
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# dispatch: a hard requirement would show the user a modal, take their
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# yes, and only then fail validation. That is the burn-a-turn class --
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# a human decision spent on an outcome already fixed -- and §32 A7
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# rejected it for a condition the tool could see, which this is.
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#
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# So an omission costs nothing and is VISIBLE: the prompt says
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# "(none given)", which is itself the observation. A silent gap would
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# not be.
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#
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# `requires_network` (ROADMAP_v3 §50, NW1) is listed on the same terms
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# and for the same reason: it is a thing the agent STATES, and a flag
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# False, so a call that omits it runs with no network rather than
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# failing validation after a human has already said yes.
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#
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# `backend` (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS35) is NOT on the list, and the difference
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# from `requires_network` is the direction its default fails in. An
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# unstated `requires_network` runs a command that needed egress without
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# it, so the command fails for a reason the model cannot see and the
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# field has to be asked for. An unstated `backend` runs in the container,
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# which is both the safe answer and the right one for almost every call --
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# requiring it would make every command state the obvious in order to
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# requiring it would make every command state the obvious in order to
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# surface a field that matters for a handful.
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#
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# `needs_root` (slice 5b, SS67) is off the list for `backend`'s reason and
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# not for `requires_network`'s. Unstated, the command runs unprivileged and
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# fails with a permission error the model can READ and act on -- the
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# visible direction. And unlike either of the others, forgetting it is not
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# how root is reached by accident: a command that names `sudo` itself still
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# meets a human, because the always-ask step reads the command text too.
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TOOL_SCHEMA["input_schema"]["required"] = [
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"command", "rationale", "requires_network"]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# ---- Approval check -------------------------------------------------------
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _profile_and_containment(command: str, requires_network: bool = False,
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backend: str = BACKEND_CONTAINER):
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"""Classify *command* and work out what will contain it.
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One helper for both the gate and the prompt so they cannot describe
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the same call differently -- which is the failure #157 came from,
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with `_is_inert` consulted twice for two different questions.
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*requires_network* is the agent's declaration (§50), already coerced
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by `declared_network`. It reaches the classifier rather than being
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applied afterwards, so the gate and the prompt read the one network
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fact instead of each OR-ing the flag in for itself.
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*backend* is the agent's other declaration (§49, SS35), coerced by
|
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`declared_backend`. It does NOT reach the classifier: what a command
|
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is ABLE to do is a fact about the command, and the same text has the
|
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|
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same capabilities wherever it runs. It reaches `containment_for`,
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which is the half of the question that is about the machine -- and
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the answer there is UNCONTAINED for every tier (SS1).
|
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|
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"""
|
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profile = classify_command(command, config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
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|
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requires_network=requires_network)
|
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|
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# SS35. Asked first, because on this backend the runtime's answer is
|
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# not part of the question: WSL is uncontained whether or not a
|
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# container could have run the command, and probing Docker to decide
|
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|
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# that would be paying for an answer nobody reads.
|
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|
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if backend == BACKEND_WSL:
|
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|
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return profile, containment_for(profile, False, backend)
|
|
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|
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# SS46/SS48, for SS35's reason and one more: a remote host's
|
|
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|
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# containment does not depend on what this machine's Docker is doing
|
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|
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# either, and the classified tier is kept only so the NOTICE can still
|
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|
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# describe the command. Nothing downstream may act on it -- see the
|
|
344
|
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# SSH step in `_shell_approval_check`.
|
|
345
|
-
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
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|
-
return profile, containment_for(profile, False, backend)
|
|
347
|
-
# Docker is probed only when the answer depends on it. HOST_READ is
|
|
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|
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# UNCONTAINED whatever Docker is doing -- it names a file outside
|
|
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|
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# the workspace, which no container can show it -- so it still
|
|
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|
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# returns without paying for a `docker info` that costs up to its
|
|
351
|
-
# 10s timeout on an unresponsive daemon.
|
|
352
|
-
#
|
|
353
|
-
# INERT no longer qualifies (§46, EP5): it runs in the container
|
|
354
|
-
# when there is one, so its containment now depends on the probe.
|
|
355
|
-
# The cost is bounded rather than per-call -- `is_docker_available`
|
|
356
|
-
# is lru_cached for the process, measured at 0.43s once.
|
|
357
|
-
if profile.tier == HOST_READ:
|
|
358
|
-
return profile, containment_for(profile, docker_available=False)
|
|
359
|
-
return profile, containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
360
|
-
|
|
361
|
-
|
|
362
|
-
def _command_touches_protected(command: str) -> str | None:
|
|
363
|
-
"""The protected segment a command's tokens name, or None.
|
|
364
|
-
|
|
365
|
-
Raw whitespace-split tokens, per Q1/Q5: for an INERT command
|
|
366
|
-
``command.split()`` IS the executed argument list, and EP5 runs that
|
|
367
|
-
tier as argv with NO shell -- so there is no glob or variable
|
|
368
|
-
expansion between this check and what executes, and a token check is
|
|
369
|
-
sound exactly where it matters. A token counts when the segment
|
|
370
|
-
appears as a component of its TEXT -- or of the tail after its first
|
|
371
|
-
``=``, the one split _escapes_workspace permits itself (hole 1:
|
|
372
|
-
``--path=.venastine/settings.json`` reads whole as one component
|
|
373
|
-
glued to a flag) -- or of its realpath against WORKSPACE_DIR, which
|
|
374
|
-
catches `..` travel, an absolute path from anywhere, and a
|
|
375
|
-
case-spelling Windows realpath normalises.
|
|
376
|
-
|
|
377
|
-
Totality is the approval gate's, and this runs inside it (Q3): a
|
|
378
|
-
non-string command answers None, and a token whose realpath cannot
|
|
379
|
-
RESOLVE answers None for that token -- the tier machinery fails
|
|
380
|
-
closed on exactly those values, so an unresolvable reference is
|
|
381
|
-
already on a path that asks. What this deliberately does NOT do is
|
|
382
|
-
parse. A token like ``.ven*/settings.json`` carries no literal
|
|
383
|
-
segment and reaches no answer here (G2 -- a classifier that learned
|
|
384
|
-
shell syntax would be a parser whose bugs auto-approve). That is why
|
|
385
|
-
the consumer is an always-ASK trigger and never a deny: under
|
|
386
|
-
`tiered`, what slips past a token check still lands in front of a
|
|
387
|
-
human with the full command text, because a spelling that could
|
|
388
|
-
expand into the segment is not INERT and so asks anyway.
|
|
389
|
-
|
|
390
|
-
That last clause was FALSE until §48 (CE1). A contained command was
|
|
391
|
-
auto-approved, so `cat .ven*/settings.json; true` and a `python -c`
|
|
392
|
-
that opens the file read it unasked, while this docstring said they
|
|
393
|
-
met a human. Under `contained` and `never` they still do not: the
|
|
394
|
-
ro mount stops a write there, and the read is documented risk.
|
|
395
|
-
"""
|
|
396
|
-
if not isinstance(command, str):
|
|
397
|
-
return None
|
|
398
|
-
for token in command.split():
|
|
399
|
-
candidates = [token]
|
|
400
|
-
if "=" in token:
|
|
401
|
-
candidates.append(token.split("=", 1)[1])
|
|
402
|
-
for candidate in candidates:
|
|
403
|
-
for part in re.split(r"[\\/]", candidate):
|
|
404
|
-
# Folded, like the resolved branch below it (batch 146).
|
|
405
|
-
# This is the branch for a token realpath cannot help with,
|
|
406
|
-
# so an exact-case compare here was the half of the fold
|
|
407
|
-
# that `protected_segment` could not reach.
|
|
408
|
-
if part.casefold() in PROTECTED_SEGMENTS_FOLDED:
|
|
409
|
-
return part
|
|
410
|
-
try:
|
|
411
|
-
resolved = os.path.realpath(
|
|
412
|
-
os.path.join(config.WORKSPACE_DIR, candidate))
|
|
413
|
-
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
|
414
|
-
continue
|
|
415
|
-
segment = protected_segment(resolved)
|
|
416
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
417
|
-
return segment
|
|
418
|
-
return None
|
|
419
|
-
|
|
420
|
-
|
|
421
|
-
# The binaries that make a command somebody else's. `sudo` is the one
|
|
422
|
-
# slice 5b supplies a password for; the other three are here because they
|
|
423
|
-
# answer the same question -- "does this line try to become another user"
|
|
424
|
-
# -- and a step that knew only about `sudo` would auto-approve `doas` on
|
|
425
|
-
# the one backend where the measurement showed nothing asks.
|
|
426
|
-
_ROOT_BINARIES = frozenset({"sudo", "doas", "pkexec", "su"})
|
|
427
|
-
|
|
428
|
-
|
|
429
|
-
def _command_names_root(command) -> bool:
|
|
430
|
-
"""Whether the command TEXT names an escalation binary (SS67).
|
|
431
|
-
|
|
432
|
-
RAW `.split()` tokens and a basename compare -- a token check, never a
|
|
433
|
-
parser (G2), exactly like `_command_touches_protected` beside it and
|
|
434
|
-
for the same trade. `echo sudo` asks, and that costs one prompt; what
|
|
435
|
-
it buys is that `sudo apt-get install` cannot be auto-approved on WSL
|
|
436
|
-
because the call left `needs_root` unset. That was MEASURED to be the
|
|
437
|
-
live behaviour before this slice: under AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK
|
|
438
|
-
the fallback opt-in answered for the whole WSL backend.
|
|
439
|
-
|
|
440
|
-
What it deliberately does NOT do is decide anything about HOW the
|
|
441
|
-
command runs. It only ever ADDS a prompt -- the harness supplies a
|
|
442
|
-
password for `needs_root` and for nothing else -- so a spelling that
|
|
443
|
-
slips past this check reaches a `sudo` with no password and fails,
|
|
444
|
-
rather than reaching one with a password nobody approved.
|
|
445
|
-
|
|
446
|
-
Total, like everything else the gate calls: `params["command"]` is
|
|
447
|
-
whatever the model emitted.
|
|
448
|
-
"""
|
|
449
|
-
if not isinstance(command, str):
|
|
450
|
-
return False
|
|
451
|
-
for token in command.split():
|
|
452
|
-
if re.split(r"[\\/]", token)[-1] in _ROOT_BINARIES:
|
|
453
|
-
return True
|
|
454
|
-
return False
|
|
455
|
-
|
|
456
|
-
|
|
457
|
-
def _shell_approval_check(tool_name: str, params: dict) -> bool:
|
|
458
|
-
"""Whether this shell call needs a human to say yes (ROADMAP_v2 §28).
|
|
459
|
-
|
|
460
|
-
Reads top to bottom as the policy it is:
|
|
461
|
-
|
|
462
|
-
1. The mode answers outright unless it is "tiered".
|
|
463
|
-
2. A command naming a protected path segment
|
|
464
|
-
(security.protected_paths.PROTECTED_SEGMENTS) always asks --
|
|
465
|
-
before the fallback opt-in and the capability rule can answer
|
|
466
|
-
for it. The file tools DENY such a path outright; the shell
|
|
467
|
-
only asks, because a command is free text and the token check
|
|
468
|
-
refuses to parse it (G2), so what slips past the check still
|
|
469
|
-
meets a human. Behind step 1 deliberately: mode "never" is a
|
|
470
|
-
documented opt-out of ALL approval, and it already answers
|
|
471
|
-
"auto-approve" for a host read of /etc/shadow.
|
|
472
|
-
2b. A call that will be REFUSED answers "no" rather than
|
|
473
|
-
"ask" (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS37/SS40) -- the WSL backend turned
|
|
474
|
-
off, or a WSL command naming a protected segment. It reads
|
|
475
|
-
beside the UNAVAILABLE branch above and means the same
|
|
476
|
-
thing: there is nothing to approve, and asking would spend
|
|
477
|
-
a human decision on an outcome already fixed. `run` and the
|
|
478
|
-
session start handler refuse the same call, through the one
|
|
479
|
-
`uncontained_refusal`.
|
|
480
|
-
2c. An SSH call ALWAYS asks (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS48), read
|
|
481
|
-
above every opt-in below so that neither of them can answer
|
|
482
|
-
for a machine this process cannot inspect.
|
|
483
|
-
2d. A ROOT call ALWAYS asks (slice 5b, SS65/SS67), in the same
|
|
484
|
-
position and for a measured version of the same reason: the
|
|
485
|
-
fallback opt-in already answers for the ENTIRE WSL backend,
|
|
486
|
-
so a root step below it would be dead code on the one
|
|
487
|
-
backend where root is most reachable. It fires on the
|
|
488
|
-
DECLARATION or on the command text naming an escalation
|
|
489
|
-
binary, because a model that types `sudo` itself never sets
|
|
490
|
-
the flag.
|
|
491
|
-
3. AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is applied HERE, visibly, rather
|
|
492
|
-
than passed into the generic rule to be honoured out of sight.
|
|
493
|
-
It is the user's own opt-in to an isolation level the harness
|
|
494
|
-
has already told them is weak -- and it sits BELOW the
|
|
495
|
-
protected-segment check, so one opt-in cannot cover the
|
|
496
|
-
directory the ro-mount exists to keep commands out of. Honoured
|
|
497
|
-
under `tiered` and `contained` alike (§48, CE5): it is written on
|
|
498
|
-
purpose and already flagged. Under `always` it is never reached,
|
|
499
|
-
because step 1 returned (CE6).
|
|
500
|
-
4. The `contained` mode (§48, CE2) is the second visible opt-in, and
|
|
501
|
-
applied here for the same reason: a command the container
|
|
502
|
-
confines and that gets no network runs unasked. Below the
|
|
503
|
-
protected-segment check, so a literal `.venastine` token still
|
|
504
|
-
asks in that mode, and read off capabilities rather than the tier
|
|
505
|
-
label (G1), with `measured` first (G5).
|
|
506
|
-
5. Otherwise the capability rule decides -- which, since §48 (CE1),
|
|
507
|
-
asks about anything that may run code, contained or not.
|
|
508
|
-
|
|
509
|
-
The return is `not auto_approved(...)` -- this function answers "must
|
|
510
|
-
someone be asked", the rule answers "is this covered". Two names for
|
|
511
|
-
opposite polarities of one question, and inverting them by accident
|
|
512
|
-
is a silent auto-approve, so the negation stays on one line where it
|
|
513
|
-
can be read.
|
|
514
|
-
"""
|
|
515
|
-
active = posture.current()
|
|
516
|
-
mode = capability.validate_mode(active.shell_approval_mode,
|
|
517
|
-
"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
|
|
518
|
-
if mode == capability.ALWAYS:
|
|
519
|
-
return True
|
|
520
|
-
if mode == capability.NEVER:
|
|
521
|
-
return False
|
|
522
|
-
|
|
523
|
-
# TOTAL from here down (batch 146). Below the mode branches on
|
|
524
|
-
# purpose: `never` is a documented opt-out of ALL approval and answers
|
|
525
|
-
# without reading the params at all, so a guard above it would have
|
|
526
|
-
# changed what that opt-out means. From here the function reads six
|
|
527
|
-
# fields, and `params` is whatever the model emitted -- which for this
|
|
528
|
-
# shape means "not an object". ASK, like every other answer this
|
|
529
|
-
# function cannot settle.
|
|
530
|
-
if not isinstance(params, dict):
|
|
531
|
-
return True
|
|
532
|
-
command = params.get("command", "")
|
|
533
|
-
backend = declared_backend(params)
|
|
534
|
-
profile, containment = _profile_and_containment(
|
|
535
|
-
command, declared_network(params), backend)
|
|
536
|
-
|
|
537
|
-
# No backend can run this, so there is nothing to approve. NOT the
|
|
538
|
-
# same as auto_approved() answering False, which means ASK -- the two
|
|
539
|
-
# polarities meet here and only here. run_sandboxed still raises
|
|
540
|
-
# SandboxUnavailable with the instructions; asking first would spend
|
|
541
|
-
# a human decision on an outcome that is already fixed, which is the
|
|
542
|
-
# burn-a-turn class, and it is what the pre-§28 check did too.
|
|
543
|
-
#
|
|
544
|
-
# Read above the fallback branch, which it can never co-occur with --
|
|
545
|
-
# UNCONTAINED and UNAVAILABLE are different answers -- so moving it
|
|
546
|
-
# changes nothing there and lets the protected-segment check sit
|
|
547
|
-
# before both.
|
|
548
|
-
if containment == UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
549
|
-
return False
|
|
550
|
-
|
|
551
|
-
# SS40, and read beside the UNAVAILABLE branch above rather than with
|
|
552
|
-
# the protected-segment step below, because it is the same KIND of
|
|
553
|
-
# answer: this call is refused before it runs, so there is nothing to
|
|
554
|
-
# approve, and asking would spend a human decision on an outcome that
|
|
555
|
-
# is already fixed. Below the mode switch for the same reason
|
|
556
|
-
# UNAVAILABLE is -- `always` asks about everything, including calls
|
|
557
|
-
# that will not run, and that wart is one the gate already has.
|
|
558
|
-
# `declared_root` and NOT `_command_names_root`, and the asymmetry is
|
|
559
|
-
# the decision: the refusal is about a password THIS HARNESS would
|
|
560
|
-
# have to supply, which it only ever does for a declared call. A
|
|
561
|
-
# command that merely names `sudo` supplies its own or fails, and
|
|
562
|
-
# refusing it for want of a stored secret would break a passwordless
|
|
563
|
-
# setup that works today.
|
|
564
|
-
if uncontained_refusal(command, backend,
|
|
565
|
-
declared_root(params)) is not None:
|
|
566
|
-
return False
|
|
567
|
-
|
|
568
|
-
# SS48. NOTHING on the SSH route is auto-approved, and this is the one
|
|
569
|
-
# place that is decided -- an explicit step rather than a synthesized
|
|
570
|
-
# profile that happens to fail `auto_approved`, because the opt-ins
|
|
571
|
-
# below (the fallback's and `contained`'s) each answer BEFORE that
|
|
572
|
-
# rule is reached, and a profile tuned to lose the last test would
|
|
573
|
-
# still have to be tuned to lose those two. One line that cannot be
|
|
574
|
-
# got wrong beats three that agree today.
|
|
575
|
-
#
|
|
576
|
-
# Two independent reasons, either sufficient. `_within` resolves
|
|
577
|
-
# against the LOCAL filesystem, so on a remote it answers a true
|
|
578
|
-
# question about the wrong machine -- and SS45, one slice old, is what
|
|
579
|
-
# a path check that cannot resolve costs: it does not fail open
|
|
580
|
-
# loudly, it approves confidently. And SS51: ssh has no `execve` path,
|
|
581
|
-
# so the "argv with no shell" property that EP5 makes the INERT tier
|
|
582
|
-
# out of does not exist on this route at all.
|
|
583
|
-
#
|
|
584
|
-
# Below the mode switch, so `never` still means never (SS1) and
|
|
585
|
-
# `always` still asks -- this widens neither.
|
|
586
|
-
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
587
|
-
return True
|
|
588
|
-
|
|
589
|
-
# SS65/SS67. Above both opt-ins below, and the OR is the whole point:
|
|
590
|
-
# `declared_root` alone would be a step the model can step around by
|
|
591
|
-
# writing `sudo` and leaving the flag off, which is exactly what the
|
|
592
|
-
# measurement found already running unasked.
|
|
593
|
-
if declared_root(params) or _command_names_root(command):
|
|
594
|
-
return True
|
|
595
|
-
|
|
596
|
-
# Step 2: a protected segment always asks, whatever the sandbox says.
|
|
597
|
-
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
598
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
599
|
-
return True
|
|
600
|
-
|
|
601
|
-
# The pre-§28 fallback steps, preserved exactly. For a non-inert tier,
|
|
602
|
-
# UNCONTAINED can only mean "Docker is down AND the insecure fallback
|
|
603
|
-
# is enabled" -- that is what containment_for computed -- so this
|
|
604
|
-
# reads the answer already in hand instead of re-deriving it from two
|
|
605
|
-
# more config reads and a second Docker probe.
|
|
606
|
-
if (profile.tier not in (INERT, HOST_READ)
|
|
607
|
-
and containment == UNCONTAINED
|
|
608
|
-
and active.auto_approve_fallback):
|
|
609
|
-
return False
|
|
610
|
-
|
|
611
|
-
# Step 4, §48 (CE2): the rule `tiered` had before §48, under the name
|
|
612
|
-
# that says what it trusts. `measured` first, for G5's reason -- the
|
|
613
|
-
# container must not argue an uncharacterised call through.
|
|
614
|
-
if (mode == capability.CONTAINED_MODE
|
|
615
|
-
and containment == capability.CONTAINED
|
|
616
|
-
and profile.measured
|
|
617
|
-
and not profile.network):
|
|
618
|
-
return False
|
|
619
|
-
|
|
620
|
-
return not auto_approved(profile, containment)
|
|
621
|
-
|
|
622
|
-
|
|
623
|
-
def _shell_approval_notice(params: dict, _context=None) -> str:
|
|
624
|
-
"""What the person answering the prompt is being asked to allow.
|
|
625
|
-
|
|
626
|
-
Wired through ToolSpec.approval_notice, which core/loop.py already
|
|
627
|
-
renders above the params. The command is right there in the params,
|
|
628
|
-
so what this adds is the part the command text does NOT show: where
|
|
629
|
-
it will run. "cat /etc/shadow" does not look like a host read until
|
|
630
|
-
someone tells you the inert path is a host subprocess.
|
|
631
|
-
"""
|
|
632
|
-
command = params.get("command", "")
|
|
633
|
-
backend = declared_backend(params)
|
|
634
|
-
profile, containment = _profile_and_containment(
|
|
635
|
-
command, declared_network(params), backend)
|
|
636
|
-
# The runtime is read from the probe `_profile_and_containment` just
|
|
637
|
-
# ran, never re-probed: the person answering should see WHICH runtime
|
|
638
|
-
# isolates the command, since Podman and Docker are not the same
|
|
639
|
-
# product (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS22).
|
|
640
|
-
where = {
|
|
641
|
-
"contained": (f"in a {known_runtime().capitalize()} container, "
|
|
642
|
-
"workspace mounted at /workspace"),
|
|
643
|
-
"uncontained": "on the HOST, with your own file access",
|
|
644
|
-
"unavailable": "nowhere -- no sandbox backend is available",
|
|
645
|
-
}.get(containment, containment)
|
|
646
|
-
# SS41. "uncontained" is true of WSL and nowhere near enough: the
|
|
647
|
-
# person answering has to know it is not a weaker container but their
|
|
648
|
-
# own machine, and that the two protections they may be picturing --
|
|
649
|
-
# the read-only mount over this harness's own files, and the memory
|
|
650
|
-
# and process limits -- are simply not there. Said here rather than
|
|
651
|
-
# only in the docs, because this prompt is where the decision is made.
|
|
652
|
-
if backend == BACKEND_WSL:
|
|
653
|
-
where = (f"in WSL ({wsl_distro() or 'default distribution'}) -- "
|
|
654
|
-
f"YOUR machine, not a sandbox: your own files, the "
|
|
655
|
-
f"network on, no memory or process limit, no read-only "
|
|
656
|
-
f"mount over this harness's own config, and it can start "
|
|
657
|
-
f"Windows programs with your full authority")
|
|
658
|
-
# SS48/SS55. The person answering has to know this is not their
|
|
659
|
-
# machine at all, and that two things they may be picturing are
|
|
660
|
-
# absent: any isolation, and any way for this harness to check what
|
|
661
|
-
# the command will touch. The remote is NAMED, because "uncontained"
|
|
662
|
-
# is equally true of the host fallback and means something different
|
|
663
|
-
# here -- and because a prompt that does not say which machine is
|
|
664
|
-
# about to run something is not a prompt anyone can answer.
|
|
665
|
-
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
666
|
-
where = (f"on {ssh_target() or 'the configured remote host'} over "
|
|
667
|
-
f"SSH -- ANOTHER MACHINE, not a sandbox and not this "
|
|
668
|
-
f"one: no isolation, no memory or process limit, the "
|
|
669
|
-
f"network on, and nothing here can see its filesystem, "
|
|
670
|
-
f"so no argument of this command has been checked "
|
|
671
|
-
f"against anything")
|
|
672
|
-
notice = f"{profile.tier}: {profile.reason}. Runs {where}."
|
|
673
|
-
# Slice 5b. The person is answering for a privilege level, not only a
|
|
674
|
-
# machine, and "uncontained" does not say which. Two sentences, because
|
|
675
|
-
# the two cases are genuinely different: one is the harness handing over
|
|
676
|
-
# a password it holds, the other is the command asking for root on its
|
|
677
|
-
# own with nothing behind it.
|
|
678
|
-
if declared_root(params):
|
|
679
|
-
notice += (" AS ROOT -- the whole command line runs under sudo, "
|
|
680
|
-
"with the password this harness holds for that machine. "
|
|
681
|
-
"Anything root can do there, this can do.")
|
|
682
|
-
elif _command_names_root(command):
|
|
683
|
-
notice += (" It names sudo (or su, doas, pkexec) itself, which is "
|
|
684
|
-
"why this is being asked about at all. The harness "
|
|
685
|
-
"supplies a password only for a call that declares "
|
|
686
|
-
"needs_root, so this one may simply fail.")
|
|
687
|
-
binary = _resolved_binary(command) if containment == UNCONTAINED else ""
|
|
688
|
-
if binary:
|
|
689
|
-
notice += f" Binary resolves to {binary}."
|
|
690
|
-
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
691
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
692
|
-
# Why an INERT read is prompting at all: the tier alone would
|
|
693
|
-
# look like a false positive to the person answering.
|
|
694
|
-
notice += (f" It names {segment}/, a protected path that always "
|
|
695
|
-
"requires approval.")
|
|
696
|
-
return notice
|
|
697
|
-
|
|
698
|
-
|
|
699
|
-
|
|
700
|
-
def interactive_profile(requires_network: bool = False) -> CommandProfile:
|
|
701
|
-
"""What an interactive shell can do -- STATED, not derived (SS32).
|
|
702
|
-
|
|
703
|
-
`classify_command` reads a command's text. An interactive session has no
|
|
704
|
-
text to read: `cd`, an alias and a REPL mean what arrives later is not
|
|
705
|
-
an argv, and the first line is only the first line. So the capabilities
|
|
706
|
-
are declared at their upper bound -- it runs code, it writes -- and
|
|
707
|
-
`measured` is True because that IS the measurement: the answer does not
|
|
708
|
-
depend on parsing anything, which is exactly when a profile is allowed
|
|
709
|
-
to claim it was characterised (G5).
|
|
710
|
-
|
|
711
|
-
`escapes_workspace` is False because the container's filesystem is not
|
|
712
|
-
the host's, and SS28 admits no other route for this kind.
|
|
713
|
-
"""
|
|
714
|
-
network = bool(requires_network)
|
|
715
|
-
return CommandProfile(
|
|
716
|
-
tier=SANDBOXED_NET if network else SANDBOXED,
|
|
717
|
-
measured=True,
|
|
718
|
-
escapes_workspace=False,
|
|
719
|
-
writes=True,
|
|
720
|
-
runs_code=True,
|
|
721
|
-
network=network,
|
|
722
|
-
reason=("an interactive shell in the container -- anything may be "
|
|
723
|
-
"typed into it" + (", and it was opened with network access"
|
|
724
|
-
if network else "")))
|
|
725
|
-
|
|
726
|
-
|
|
727
|
-
def _interactive_approval_check(tool_name: str, params: dict) -> bool:
|
|
728
|
-
"""Whether OPENING an interactive shell needs a human yes (SS29, SS32).
|
|
729
|
-
|
|
730
|
-
NOT `_shell_approval_check`, and the difference is the point. That one
|
|
731
|
-
answers about the text it is handed; here the text is only the first
|
|
732
|
-
line of a session whose LATER lines are covered by the same yes. Asking
|
|
733
|
-
about the first line would mean `shell_interactive` with `pwd` was
|
|
734
|
-
auto-approved as a read and handed back a shell that can run anything --
|
|
735
|
-
the approval and the authority describing different calls, which is
|
|
736
|
-
#157's shape.
|
|
737
|
-
|
|
738
|
-
So the question is asked about what is actually being granted:
|
|
739
|
-
`interactive_profile`, through the same mode ladder and the same
|
|
740
|
-
`auto_approved` rule as every other shell call. Under `tiered` and
|
|
741
|
-
`contained` that always asks, because it always runs code (§48, CE1) --
|
|
742
|
-
and it asks through the rule rather than by hardcoding "always", so if
|
|
743
|
-
the rule ever changes this follows it instead of contradicting it.
|
|
744
|
-
"""
|
|
745
|
-
active = posture.current()
|
|
746
|
-
mode = capability.validate_mode(active.shell_approval_mode,
|
|
747
|
-
"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
|
|
748
|
-
if mode == capability.ALWAYS:
|
|
749
|
-
return True
|
|
750
|
-
if mode == capability.NEVER:
|
|
751
|
-
return False
|
|
752
|
-
profile = interactive_profile(declared_network(params))
|
|
753
|
-
containment = containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
754
|
-
if containment == UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
755
|
-
# Nothing can run it, so there is nothing to approve;
|
|
756
|
-
# `start_interactive` refuses with the instructions. Same polarity
|
|
757
|
-
# note as `_shell_approval_check`'s.
|
|
758
|
-
return False
|
|
759
|
-
return not auto_approved(profile, containment)
|
|
760
|
-
|
|
761
|
-
|
|
762
|
-
def _interactive_approval_notice(params: dict, _context=None) -> str:
|
|
763
|
-
"""What the person answering is being asked to allow.
|
|
764
|
-
|
|
765
|
-
It says the quiet part out loud (SS29): this yes is not for one command,
|
|
766
|
-
it is for the session. A prompt that described only the first line would
|
|
767
|
-
be telling the truth about the wrong thing.
|
|
768
|
-
"""
|
|
769
|
-
network = declared_network(params)
|
|
770
|
-
profile = interactive_profile(network)
|
|
771
|
-
containment = containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
772
|
-
where = ("in a container" if containment == capability.CONTAINED
|
|
773
|
-
else "with no container available")
|
|
774
|
-
first = params.get("command", "") if isinstance(params, dict) else ""
|
|
775
|
-
text = (f"Opens an interactive shell {where} and keeps it open. "
|
|
776
|
-
f"APPROVING THIS APPROVES EVERYTHING THE AGENT LATER TYPES INTO "
|
|
777
|
-
f"IT, not just the first line.")
|
|
778
|
-
if isinstance(first, str) and first.strip():
|
|
779
|
-
text += f" It starts by running: {first.strip()[:200]}"
|
|
780
|
-
if network:
|
|
781
|
-
text += " The call declared it needs the network, so egress is on."
|
|
782
|
-
segment = _command_touches_protected(first)
|
|
783
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
784
|
-
text += f" That first line names {segment}, which is protected."
|
|
785
|
-
return text
|
|
786
|
-
|
|
787
|
-
|
|
788
|
-
def _resolved_binary(command) -> str:
|
|
789
|
-
"""The absolute path the first word will actually execute as, on a
|
|
790
|
-
run that is about to happen on the HOST (§46, EP8).
|
|
791
|
-
|
|
792
|
-
Named on the prompt because "runs on the host" understates it on
|
|
793
|
-
Windows. `ls`, `cat` and `grep` have no native Windows binary, so
|
|
794
|
-
the inert path resolves them off the user's PATH -- and on the
|
|
795
|
-
machine where this was found, `cat` was
|
|
796
|
-
`...\\AppData\\Local\\hermes\\git\\usr\\bin\\cat.exe`, a POSIX
|
|
797
|
-
toolchain shipped by unrelated software. `_is_inert` rejects a
|
|
798
|
-
path-qualified binary (`./ls`) precisely so a planted one cannot be
|
|
799
|
-
NAMED; PATH lookup reaches the same place from the other side, and
|
|
800
|
-
the harness does not get to choose what is on it.
|
|
801
|
-
|
|
802
|
-
Disclosure, not enforcement: the containment argument that lets
|
|
803
|
-
this path run at all is unchanged, and HOST_READ always asks a
|
|
804
|
-
human anyway. What changes is that the human is told which
|
|
805
|
-
executable they are approving.
|
|
806
|
-
|
|
807
|
-
Total, like everything else the gate calls: `command` arrives from
|
|
808
|
-
`registry.approval_needed` as whatever the model emitted, and
|
|
809
|
-
`shutil.which` on a non-string raises.
|
|
810
|
-
"""
|
|
811
|
-
if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
|
|
812
|
-
return ""
|
|
813
|
-
try:
|
|
814
|
-
return shutil.which(command.split()[0]) or ""
|
|
815
|
-
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
|
816
|
-
return ""
|
|
817
|
-
|
|
818
|
-
|
|
819
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
820
|
-
# ---- Tool handler ---------------------------------------------------------
|
|
821
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
822
|
-
|
|
823
|
-
|
|
824
|
-
def uncontained_refusal(command: str, backend: str,
|
|
825
|
-
needs_root: bool = False) -> str | None:
|
|
826
|
-
"""Why this call must not run at all, or None (§49).
|
|
827
|
-
|
|
828
|
-
`fallback_changed_refusal`'s shape, and ONE copy for the same reason:
|
|
829
|
-
the gate reads it to answer "there is nothing to approve", and `run`
|
|
830
|
-
and the session start handler read it to stop the call. Three sites
|
|
831
|
-
deciding this separately is the drift #157 came from.
|
|
832
|
-
|
|
833
|
-
Two refusals, and they say different things on purpose.
|
|
834
|
-
|
|
835
|
-
THE BACKEND IS OFF (SS35). Not "unavailable" -- a machine that has WSL
|
|
836
|
-
and is not allowed to use it, which a model told "no distro found"
|
|
837
|
-
would try to fix by asking the user to install one.
|
|
838
|
-
|
|
839
|
-
A PROTECTED SEGMENT (SS40). In the container `.venastine/` is mounted
|
|
840
|
-
read-only, so a write there fails with EROFS and a read is documented
|
|
841
|
-
risk; on WSL there is no mount at all, a write SUCCEEDS, and D17's
|
|
842
|
-
hash notices only at the next launch. So the shell's usual answer for
|
|
843
|
-
a protected segment -- always ask -- is the wrong one here, and this
|
|
844
|
-
is the file tools' answer instead: deny.
|
|
845
|
-
|
|
846
|
-
The token check is exactly sound where it bites. An INERT command
|
|
847
|
-
carries no metacharacters by construction, so `command.split()` IS the
|
|
848
|
-
argv that will run and a literal segment cannot hide behind quoting or
|
|
849
|
-
expansion. A non-inert command can hide one, and still meets a human
|
|
850
|
-
on top of this -- `runs_code` is True for every non-inert profile
|
|
851
|
-
(CE1), so it asks under `tiered` and, being UNCONTAINED here, under
|
|
852
|
-
`contained` too.
|
|
853
|
-
|
|
854
|
-
A THIRD refusal arrives with slice 5b, and it is read FIRST because it
|
|
855
|
-
is true of every backend including the container: a call that asked for
|
|
856
|
-
root and cannot have it. `sudo_refusal` owns that decision -- see there
|
|
857
|
-
for why the container is refused for already being root, and why no
|
|
858
|
-
stored password is a refusal rather than a prompt (SS68).
|
|
859
|
-
"""
|
|
860
|
-
if needs_root:
|
|
861
|
-
refusal = sudo_refusal(backend)
|
|
862
|
-
if refusal is not None:
|
|
863
|
-
return refusal
|
|
864
|
-
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
865
|
-
if not ssh_enabled():
|
|
866
|
-
return ssh_unavailable_reason()
|
|
867
|
-
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
868
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
869
|
-
# SS54. SS40's answer, reached by a different road: WSL is
|
|
870
|
-
# refused because it demonstrably CAN write this harness's own
|
|
871
|
-
# authority files, and SSH is refused because nothing here can
|
|
872
|
-
# demonstrate that it cannot. `ssh localhost` is this machine,
|
|
873
|
-
# and a remote that mounts this one is not visible from here
|
|
874
|
-
# either -- so the question "is that path this harness's own?"
|
|
875
|
-
# has no answer, and an unanswerable question is not a yes.
|
|
876
|
-
return (
|
|
877
|
-
f"This command names {segment}/, and a command over SSH is "
|
|
878
|
-
f"refused rather than asked about when it does. This "
|
|
879
|
-
f"harness cannot tell whether the remote host is a "
|
|
880
|
-
f"different machine -- `ssh localhost` is this one, and a "
|
|
881
|
-
f"remote that mounts this one looks the same from here -- "
|
|
882
|
-
f"so it cannot tell whether that path is its own authority "
|
|
883
|
-
f"files. Run it in the container, or do the work somewhere "
|
|
884
|
-
f"inside the workspace.")
|
|
885
|
-
return None
|
|
886
|
-
if backend != BACKEND_WSL:
|
|
887
|
-
return None
|
|
888
|
-
if not wsl_enabled():
|
|
889
|
-
return wsl_unavailable_reason()
|
|
890
|
-
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
891
|
-
if segment is not None:
|
|
892
|
-
return (
|
|
893
|
-
f"This command names {segment}/, and a command in WSL is "
|
|
894
|
-
f"refused rather than asked about when it does. In the "
|
|
895
|
-
f"container that directory is mounted read-only, so a write "
|
|
896
|
-
f"fails and a read is a documented risk you can accept. WSL "
|
|
897
|
-
f"mounts nothing: a write there would succeed against this "
|
|
898
|
-
f"harness's own authority files and would only be noticed at "
|
|
899
|
-
f"the next launch. Run it in the container, or do the work "
|
|
900
|
-
f"somewhere inside the workspace.")
|
|
901
|
-
return None
|
|
902
|
-
|
|
903
|
-
|
|
904
|
-
def fallback_changed_refusal(command: str, docker_up: bool) -> str | None:
|
|
905
|
-
"""The TOCTOU safety net, or None: why a command approved while a
|
|
906
|
-
container runtime answered must not now run on the fallback.
|
|
907
|
-
|
|
908
|
-
If the approval check auto-approved because the runtime was available
|
|
909
|
-
at that time, but it is now down and the command would take the
|
|
910
|
-
fallback, the fallback would have required approval that was never
|
|
911
|
-
given. One copy for `run` and for the background-session start tools
|
|
912
|
-
(ROADMAP_v3 §49), which pass the same gate and the same probe.
|
|
913
|
-
"""
|
|
914
|
-
if docker_up or _is_inert(command):
|
|
915
|
-
return None
|
|
916
|
-
# Read here rather than passed in from the approval check: §40 makes the
|
|
917
|
-
# two reads the SAME object for the life of the process, so re-reading
|
|
918
|
-
# cannot reintroduce the TOCTOU gap this exists to close. Before §40 it
|
|
919
|
-
# could have.
|
|
920
|
-
active = posture.current()
|
|
921
|
-
if active.allow_insecure_fallback and not active.auto_approve_fallback:
|
|
922
|
-
return ("Docker became unavailable after the approval check. "
|
|
923
|
-
"The insecure subprocess fallback requires explicit "
|
|
924
|
-
"per-run approval (AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is "
|
|
925
|
-
"False). Please retry — the approval prompt will "
|
|
926
|
-
"appear this time.")
|
|
927
|
-
return None
|
|
928
|
-
|
|
929
|
-
|
|
930
|
-
def run(params: dict) -> dict:
|
|
931
|
-
# `parsed.rationale` is deliberately never read below. It is shown
|
|
932
|
-
# to a person and archived with the call; it has no part in what
|
|
933
|
-
# runs or in whether it is allowed to (§42, RA2).
|
|
934
|
-
parsed = ShellParams(**params)
|
|
935
|
-
|
|
936
|
-
# Probe Docker once for this execution — the result is threaded
|
|
937
|
-
# into run_sandboxed to eliminate the TOCTOU gap where Docker
|
|
938
|
-
# status changes between the approval check and execution.
|
|
939
|
-
# SS37/SS40/SS54, above the container probe: a call that asked for WSL
|
|
940
|
-
# or SSH and cannot have it is refused by name, and is never quietly
|
|
941
|
-
# served by a backend it did not ask for.
|
|
942
|
-
refusal = uncontained_refusal(parsed.command, parsed.backend,
|
|
943
|
-
parsed.needs_root)
|
|
944
|
-
if refusal is not None:
|
|
945
|
-
return {"error": refusal}
|
|
946
|
-
|
|
947
|
-
# Not probed for a WSL or SSH call, and not merely to save the 0.43s:
|
|
948
|
-
# the TOCTOU guard below is about a container runtime disappearing
|
|
949
|
-
# between the gate and the run and the command then taking the INSECURE
|
|
950
|
-
# FALLBACK. Neither can take it -- `_route` answers ROUTE_WSL/ROUTE_SSH
|
|
951
|
-
# or refuses (SS37) -- so running that guard here would refuse a call
|
|
952
|
-
# for a backend it was never going to touch.
|
|
953
|
-
docker_up = True if parsed.backend != BACKEND_CONTAINER \
|
|
954
|
-
else is_docker_available()
|
|
955
|
-
|
|
956
|
-
if parsed.backend == BACKEND_CONTAINER:
|
|
957
|
-
refusal = fallback_changed_refusal(parsed.command, docker_up)
|
|
958
|
-
if refusal is not None:
|
|
959
|
-
return {"error": refusal}
|
|
960
|
-
|
|
961
|
-
try:
|
|
962
|
-
return run_sandboxed(
|
|
963
|
-
command=parsed.command,
|
|
964
|
-
workspace_dir=config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
|
965
|
-
docker_available=docker_up,
|
|
966
|
-
backend=parsed.backend,
|
|
967
|
-
needs_root=parsed.needs_root,
|
|
968
|
-
# §28: the SAME classification the approval check made, so
|
|
969
|
-
# routing cannot disagree with the decision to allow it --
|
|
970
|
-
# the declaration included (§50), read off the validated
|
|
971
|
-
# params here and off the raw ones at the gate, which is why
|
|
972
|
-
# `declared_network` accepts only literal True.
|
|
973
|
-
profile=classify_command(parsed.command, config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
|
974
|
-
requires_network=parsed.requires_network),
|
|
975
|
-
)
|
|
976
|
-
except SandboxUnavailable as e:
|
|
977
|
-
return {"error": str(e)}
|
|
978
|
-
except Exception as e:
|
|
979
|
-
logger.exception("shell tool failed")
|
|
980
|
-
return {"error": f"Shell execution failed: {e}"}
|
|
1
|
+
"""
|
|
2
|
+
tools/builtin/shell.py
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
Shell execution tool (ROADMAP §7). Runs commands in the detected shell
|
|
5
|
+
(bash on Linux/macOS, PowerShell on Windows) through the sandbox module
|
|
6
|
+
(security/sandbox.py).
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
SANDBOX MODEL (ROADMAP_v2 §46 moved one tier of this):
|
|
9
|
+
Almost everything runs in a container -- Docker's, or Podman's when
|
|
10
|
+
Docker cannot run one (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS22; the approval notice names
|
|
11
|
+
which). The one exception is HOST_READ --
|
|
12
|
+
a read-only command from config.INERT_COMMANDS whose argument
|
|
13
|
+
resolves OUTSIDE the workspace -- which runs as a host subprocess
|
|
14
|
+
because the file it names is one no container can see. It always
|
|
15
|
+
requires approval, and the prompt names the resolved binary.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
INERT (every argument inside the workspace) used to take that same
|
|
18
|
+
host path, on the argument that a read-only command needs no
|
|
19
|
+
isolation. §46 (EP5) moved it into the container: it is the tier the
|
|
20
|
+
gate AUTO-APPROVES, and on Windows `ls`/`cat`/`grep` have no native
|
|
21
|
+
binary, so the host path was resolving them off the user's PATH and
|
|
22
|
+
executing whichever POSIX toolchain some other product had installed.
|
|
23
|
+
Inside the container they are the pinned image's coreutils. It falls
|
|
24
|
+
back to the host when Docker is down, which changes nothing about the
|
|
25
|
+
approval answer (see security/sandbox.containment_for) and is
|
|
26
|
+
reported to the model as `ran_on: "host"`.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
Non-inert commands go through the container (strong isolation) or the
|
|
29
|
+
explicit subprocess fallback (weak isolation, requires
|
|
30
|
+
ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK=True).
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
EVERY result carries `ran_on` and `tier` (EP4). The human was always
|
|
33
|
+
told where a command would run; the model never was, and it is the
|
|
34
|
+
one that writes the user an answer about the output.
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
APPROVAL MODEL (ROADMAP_v2 §28, amended by §48):
|
|
37
|
+
config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE is the gate -- "always", "tiered",
|
|
38
|
+
"contained" or "never" -- and it is the ONLY gate: there is no second
|
|
39
|
+
switch that can disagree with it (D14's one-way tightening for shell
|
|
40
|
+
lives in the agent's `approval_overrides`, which reach the same OR
|
|
41
|
+
below).
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
Under "tiered" and "contained", the command is classified ONCE
|
|
44
|
+
(security/sandbox.classify_command) into a capability set, and the
|
|
45
|
+
generic rule in security/capability.auto_approved decides. The same
|
|
46
|
+
profile is then handed to run_sandboxed, so the thing that was
|
|
47
|
+
approved is the thing that runs.
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
The two differ in one capability (§48, CE1/CE2). "tiered" asks about
|
|
50
|
+
anything that may run code, contained or not, so only INERT runs
|
|
51
|
+
unasked. "contained" is the rule "tiered" had before §48: a command
|
|
52
|
+
the container confines runs unasked unless it gets network. There is
|
|
53
|
+
no interpreter list behind either, and there must not be one -- see
|
|
54
|
+
classify_command's `runs_code`.
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
What this replaced: a five-step ladder whose bottom four steps could
|
|
57
|
+
only return False on the shipped config flags, making the whole check
|
|
58
|
+
a pass-through for ToolApprovals.shell. Audit #157 is what that cost
|
|
59
|
+
-- `cat ~/.aws/credentials` classified as "inert", ran on the HOST,
|
|
60
|
+
and was never asked about.
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
TOCTOU safety: run() probes Docker once and passes the result to
|
|
63
|
+
run_sandboxed(). If Docker was available during approval but is now
|
|
64
|
+
down, and the fallback would have required approval, run() returns
|
|
65
|
+
an error instead of silently downgrading.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
FILE ACCESS:
|
|
68
|
+
The sandbox restricts filesystem access to the workspace (Docker
|
|
69
|
+
volume mount / fallback cwd). Output files generated by sandboxed
|
|
70
|
+
commands appear in the workspace seamlessly.
|
|
71
|
+
"""
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
74
|
+
|
|
75
|
+
import logging
|
|
76
|
+
import os
|
|
77
|
+
import re
|
|
78
|
+
import shutil
|
|
79
|
+
from typing import Literal
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, StrictBool
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
import config
|
|
84
|
+
from security import capability, posture
|
|
85
|
+
from security.capability import (
|
|
86
|
+
UNAVAILABLE,
|
|
87
|
+
UNCONTAINED,
|
|
88
|
+
CommandProfile,
|
|
89
|
+
auto_approved,
|
|
90
|
+
)
|
|
91
|
+
from security.protected_paths import (
|
|
92
|
+
PROTECTED_SEGMENTS_FOLDED,
|
|
93
|
+
protected_segment,
|
|
94
|
+
)
|
|
95
|
+
from security.sandbox import (
|
|
96
|
+
BACKEND_CONTAINER,
|
|
97
|
+
BACKEND_SSH,
|
|
98
|
+
BACKEND_WSL,
|
|
99
|
+
HOST_READ,
|
|
100
|
+
INERT,
|
|
101
|
+
SANDBOXED,
|
|
102
|
+
SANDBOXED_NET,
|
|
103
|
+
SandboxUnavailable,
|
|
104
|
+
_is_inert,
|
|
105
|
+
classify_command,
|
|
106
|
+
containment_for,
|
|
107
|
+
declared_backend,
|
|
108
|
+
declared_network,
|
|
109
|
+
declared_root,
|
|
110
|
+
detect_shell,
|
|
111
|
+
is_docker_available,
|
|
112
|
+
known_runtime,
|
|
113
|
+
run_sandboxed,
|
|
114
|
+
ssh_enabled,
|
|
115
|
+
ssh_target,
|
|
116
|
+
ssh_unavailable_reason,
|
|
117
|
+
sudo_refusal,
|
|
118
|
+
wsl_distro,
|
|
119
|
+
wsl_enabled,
|
|
120
|
+
wsl_unavailable_reason,
|
|
121
|
+
)
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
# Validated at IMPORT, so a typo in a security setting is a startup
|
|
126
|
+
# failure rather than a policy that quietly means something else. Same
|
|
127
|
+
# posture as D24's assert_permissions_declared, applied to a value.
|
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128
|
+
#
|
|
129
|
+
# It used to say "re-checked per call as well, because a test or a runtime
|
|
130
|
+
# edit can change it after this line has run", and that sentence described
|
|
131
|
+
# a test seam and an attack in the same breath: `config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE
|
|
132
|
+
# = "never"` was one attribute assignment, from anywhere in the process,
|
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|
+
# and the gate followed it. §40 (UN1) binds the value once into
|
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134
|
+
# `security.posture`, and `_shell_approval_check` reads it from there.
|
|
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|
+
#
|
|
136
|
+
# THIS line still reads `config` directly, and deliberately (UN2). It
|
|
137
|
+
# validates the CONSTANT A HUMAN WROTE -- a typo check, not a decision --
|
|
138
|
+
# and it runs at import, which is before `main()` has folded in the
|
|
139
|
+
# command line. Reading the posture here would mark it bound and make
|
|
140
|
+
# `apply_cli()` raise on every launch, because importing this module is
|
|
141
|
+
# how the registry is built. The rule the guard enforces: **no module may
|
|
142
|
+
# read the posture at import time**, pinned by
|
|
143
|
+
# test_posture.py::test_no_module_reads_the_posture_at_import.
|
|
144
|
+
capability.validate_mode(config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE,
|
|
145
|
+
"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
|
|
146
|
+
|
|
147
|
+
# Compute the shell name once at import time to avoid blocking on
|
|
148
|
+
# subprocess probes every time the schema is accessed. On Windows this
|
|
149
|
+
# probes pwsh/powershell; a failure falls back to a static label.
|
|
150
|
+
try:
|
|
151
|
+
_SHELL_DISPLAY = detect_shell()
|
|
152
|
+
except Exception:
|
|
153
|
+
_SHELL_DISPLAY = "auto-detected"
|
|
154
|
+
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
157
|
+
# ---- Schema ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
158
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
class ShellParams(BaseModel):
|
|
161
|
+
command: str = Field(
|
|
162
|
+
...,
|
|
163
|
+
min_length=1,
|
|
164
|
+
description=(
|
|
165
|
+
"Shell command to execute. WHERE it runs depends on its "
|
|
166
|
+
"arguments, and the result tells you which happened: read "
|
|
167
|
+
"`ran_on` before drawing any conclusion about the machine "
|
|
168
|
+
"you are on. A read-only command (ls, cat, grep, etc.) "
|
|
169
|
+
"whose arguments all resolve INSIDE the workspace runs in "
|
|
170
|
+
"the container. The same command with an argument OUTSIDE "
|
|
171
|
+
"the workspace runs ON THE HOST, with the user's own file "
|
|
172
|
+
"access and the host's own PATH -- it is not sandboxed, and "
|
|
173
|
+
"what it reads is the real machine, not the container. "
|
|
174
|
+
"Everything else runs in the container, with the workspace "
|
|
175
|
+
f"mounted at /workspace. Interpreted by {_SHELL_DISPLAY}."
|
|
176
|
+
),
|
|
177
|
+
)
|
|
178
|
+
rationale: str = Field(
|
|
179
|
+
default="",
|
|
180
|
+
description=(
|
|
181
|
+
"Why you are running this command, right now, in a sentence "
|
|
182
|
+
"or two. Say what you are trying to learn or change and "
|
|
183
|
+
"what it is for -- not what the command does, which the "
|
|
184
|
+
"reader can see. This is shown to the user on the approval "
|
|
185
|
+
"prompt and recorded with the call; it never affects whether "
|
|
186
|
+
"the command is allowed or how it runs."
|
|
187
|
+
),
|
|
188
|
+
)
|
|
189
|
+
requires_network: StrictBool = Field(
|
|
190
|
+
default=False,
|
|
191
|
+
description=(
|
|
192
|
+
"Whether this command needs to reach the network. Say true "
|
|
193
|
+
"for anything that downloads, installs, clones, publishes or "
|
|
194
|
+
"calls an API. WITHOUT IT THE COMMAND RUNS WITH NETWORKING "
|
|
195
|
+
"OFF and the connection simply fails -- the harness reads "
|
|
196
|
+
"your command as text and cannot tell that an inline script "
|
|
197
|
+
"or an interpreter you invoke wants egress, so it assumes "
|
|
198
|
+
"not. Saying true does not bypass approval; it tells the "
|
|
199
|
+
"user what they are being asked to allow."
|
|
200
|
+
),
|
|
201
|
+
)
|
|
202
|
+
needs_root: StrictBool = Field(
|
|
203
|
+
default=False,
|
|
204
|
+
description=(
|
|
205
|
+
"Whether this command must run as root. The harness prefixes "
|
|
206
|
+
"sudo for you and supplies the password it holds for that "
|
|
207
|
+
"machine -- DO NOT write `sudo` in the command yourself, and "
|
|
208
|
+
"never put a password in it. The WHOLE command line runs as "
|
|
209
|
+
"root, redirects and pipes included. Only 'wsl' and 'ssh' can "
|
|
210
|
+
"do this: in the container you ALREADY are root, so drop the "
|
|
211
|
+
"flag there. A human is asked every single time, whatever the "
|
|
212
|
+
"approval mode, and the call is refused outright if no "
|
|
213
|
+
"password is stored for that machine -- the refusal says which "
|
|
214
|
+
"one to store. Leave it false unless the command genuinely "
|
|
215
|
+
"cannot work otherwise."
|
|
216
|
+
),
|
|
217
|
+
)
|
|
218
|
+
backend: Literal["container", "wsl", "ssh"] = Field(
|
|
219
|
+
default="container",
|
|
220
|
+
description=(
|
|
221
|
+
"Where to run it. 'container' is the sandbox: a pinned Linux "
|
|
222
|
+
"image with only the workspace visible, no network unless you "
|
|
223
|
+
"ask, and memory, CPU and process limits. 'wsl' is the USER'S "
|
|
224
|
+
"OWN Windows machine with a Linux userland on it -- their real "
|
|
225
|
+
"home directory, their installed tools, the network always on, "
|
|
226
|
+
"no resource limits, and no isolation from this harness's own "
|
|
227
|
+
"files. Ask for it only when the work genuinely needs the "
|
|
228
|
+
"user's machine or a Linux toolchain the image does not have, "
|
|
229
|
+
"say so in the rationale, and expect to be asked: only a "
|
|
230
|
+
"read-only command whose arguments are all inside the "
|
|
231
|
+
"workspace runs there without a prompt. It may be turned off, "
|
|
232
|
+
"in which case the call is refused and says so. Use paths "
|
|
233
|
+
"RELATIVE to the workspace -- an absolute POSIX path is read "
|
|
234
|
+
"as leaving the workspace and always asks. "
|
|
235
|
+
"'ssh' is a DIFFERENT MACHINE -- the remote host the user "
|
|
236
|
+
"configured. Nothing runs there without asking, not even a "
|
|
237
|
+
"read-only command, because this harness cannot resolve a "
|
|
238
|
+
"path on a filesystem it cannot see. Its network is always "
|
|
239
|
+
"on and `requires_network` means nothing there. Note the "
|
|
240
|
+
"trap: `write` saves files LOCALLY, so a file you just wrote "
|
|
241
|
+
"does not exist on the remote -- send it through the command "
|
|
242
|
+
"itself, or do the work in the container."
|
|
243
|
+
),
|
|
244
|
+
)
|
|
245
|
+
|
|
246
|
+
|
|
247
|
+
TOOL_SCHEMA = {
|
|
248
|
+
"name": "shell",
|
|
249
|
+
"description": (
|
|
250
|
+
"Execute a shell command. Commands run inside a container "
|
|
251
|
+
"(Docker, or Podman where Docker cannot run one) with the "
|
|
252
|
+
"workspace mounted at /workspace -- EXCEPT "
|
|
253
|
+
"a read-only command with an argument outside the workspace, "
|
|
254
|
+
"which runs on the HOST with the user's own file access "
|
|
255
|
+
"because the container cannot see those files. The result "
|
|
256
|
+
"carries `ran_on` ('container' or 'host') and `tier`; a "
|
|
257
|
+
"command that ran on the host tells you about the user's real "
|
|
258
|
+
"machine, so do not describe its output as the sandbox's. "
|
|
259
|
+
f"Shell: {_SHELL_DISPLAY}. Output is truncated at "
|
|
260
|
+
f"{config.MAX_READ_CHARS} characters."
|
|
261
|
+
),
|
|
262
|
+
"input_schema": ShellParams.model_json_schema(),
|
|
263
|
+
}
|
|
264
|
+
|
|
265
|
+
# §42 (RA4). ADVERTISED as required, TOLERATED when absent -- and the
|
|
266
|
+
# asymmetry is deliberate rather than an oversight to tidy up.
|
|
267
|
+
#
|
|
268
|
+
# The schema is what the model reads, so `required` is where the ask
|
|
269
|
+
# belongs: a rationale nobody asks for is supplied inconsistently, and
|
|
270
|
+
# a drift signal with unknown coverage is not a signal. But
|
|
271
|
+
# `ShellParams` keeps its default, because approval is obtained BEFORE
|
|
272
|
+
# dispatch: a hard requirement would show the user a modal, take their
|
|
273
|
+
# yes, and only then fail validation. That is the burn-a-turn class --
|
|
274
|
+
# a human decision spent on an outcome already fixed -- and §32 A7
|
|
275
|
+
# rejected it for a condition the tool could see, which this is.
|
|
276
|
+
#
|
|
277
|
+
# So an omission costs nothing and is VISIBLE: the prompt says
|
|
278
|
+
# "(none given)", which is itself the observation. A silent gap would
|
|
279
|
+
# not be.
|
|
280
|
+
#
|
|
281
|
+
# `requires_network` (ROADMAP_v3 §50, NW1) is listed on the same terms
|
|
282
|
+
# and for the same reason: it is a thing the agent STATES, and a flag
|
|
283
|
+
# it is never asked for is one it will not set -- but it defaults to
|
|
284
|
+
# False, so a call that omits it runs with no network rather than
|
|
285
|
+
# failing validation after a human has already said yes.
|
|
286
|
+
#
|
|
287
|
+
# `backend` (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS35) is NOT on the list, and the difference
|
|
288
|
+
# from `requires_network` is the direction its default fails in. An
|
|
289
|
+
# unstated `requires_network` runs a command that needed egress without
|
|
290
|
+
# it, so the command fails for a reason the model cannot see and the
|
|
291
|
+
# field has to be asked for. An unstated `backend` runs in the container,
|
|
292
|
+
# which is both the safe answer and the right one for almost every call --
|
|
293
|
+
# requiring it would make every command state the obvious in order to
|
|
294
|
+
# requiring it would make every command state the obvious in order to
|
|
295
|
+
# surface a field that matters for a handful.
|
|
296
|
+
#
|
|
297
|
+
# `needs_root` (slice 5b, SS67) is off the list for `backend`'s reason and
|
|
298
|
+
# not for `requires_network`'s. Unstated, the command runs unprivileged and
|
|
299
|
+
# fails with a permission error the model can READ and act on -- the
|
|
300
|
+
# visible direction. And unlike either of the others, forgetting it is not
|
|
301
|
+
# how root is reached by accident: a command that names `sudo` itself still
|
|
302
|
+
# meets a human, because the always-ask step reads the command text too.
|
|
303
|
+
TOOL_SCHEMA["input_schema"]["required"] = [
|
|
304
|
+
"command", "rationale", "requires_network"]
|
|
305
|
+
|
|
306
|
+
|
|
307
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
308
|
+
# ---- Approval check -------------------------------------------------------
|
|
309
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
310
|
+
|
|
311
|
+
|
|
312
|
+
def _profile_and_containment(command: str, requires_network: bool = False,
|
|
313
|
+
backend: str = BACKEND_CONTAINER):
|
|
314
|
+
"""Classify *command* and work out what will contain it.
|
|
315
|
+
|
|
316
|
+
One helper for both the gate and the prompt so they cannot describe
|
|
317
|
+
the same call differently -- which is the failure #157 came from,
|
|
318
|
+
with `_is_inert` consulted twice for two different questions.
|
|
319
|
+
|
|
320
|
+
*requires_network* is the agent's declaration (§50), already coerced
|
|
321
|
+
by `declared_network`. It reaches the classifier rather than being
|
|
322
|
+
applied afterwards, so the gate and the prompt read the one network
|
|
323
|
+
fact instead of each OR-ing the flag in for itself.
|
|
324
|
+
|
|
325
|
+
*backend* is the agent's other declaration (§49, SS35), coerced by
|
|
326
|
+
`declared_backend`. It does NOT reach the classifier: what a command
|
|
327
|
+
is ABLE to do is a fact about the command, and the same text has the
|
|
328
|
+
same capabilities wherever it runs. It reaches `containment_for`,
|
|
329
|
+
which is the half of the question that is about the machine -- and
|
|
330
|
+
the answer there is UNCONTAINED for every tier (SS1).
|
|
331
|
+
"""
|
|
332
|
+
profile = classify_command(command, config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
|
333
|
+
requires_network=requires_network)
|
|
334
|
+
# SS35. Asked first, because on this backend the runtime's answer is
|
|
335
|
+
# not part of the question: WSL is uncontained whether or not a
|
|
336
|
+
# container could have run the command, and probing Docker to decide
|
|
337
|
+
# that would be paying for an answer nobody reads.
|
|
338
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_WSL:
|
|
339
|
+
return profile, containment_for(profile, False, backend)
|
|
340
|
+
# SS46/SS48, for SS35's reason and one more: a remote host's
|
|
341
|
+
# containment does not depend on what this machine's Docker is doing
|
|
342
|
+
# either, and the classified tier is kept only so the NOTICE can still
|
|
343
|
+
# describe the command. Nothing downstream may act on it -- see the
|
|
344
|
+
# SSH step in `_shell_approval_check`.
|
|
345
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
346
|
+
return profile, containment_for(profile, False, backend)
|
|
347
|
+
# Docker is probed only when the answer depends on it. HOST_READ is
|
|
348
|
+
# UNCONTAINED whatever Docker is doing -- it names a file outside
|
|
349
|
+
# the workspace, which no container can show it -- so it still
|
|
350
|
+
# returns without paying for a `docker info` that costs up to its
|
|
351
|
+
# 10s timeout on an unresponsive daemon.
|
|
352
|
+
#
|
|
353
|
+
# INERT no longer qualifies (§46, EP5): it runs in the container
|
|
354
|
+
# when there is one, so its containment now depends on the probe.
|
|
355
|
+
# The cost is bounded rather than per-call -- `is_docker_available`
|
|
356
|
+
# is lru_cached for the process, measured at 0.43s once.
|
|
357
|
+
if profile.tier == HOST_READ:
|
|
358
|
+
return profile, containment_for(profile, docker_available=False)
|
|
359
|
+
return profile, containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
360
|
+
|
|
361
|
+
|
|
362
|
+
def _command_touches_protected(command: str) -> str | None:
|
|
363
|
+
"""The protected segment a command's tokens name, or None.
|
|
364
|
+
|
|
365
|
+
Raw whitespace-split tokens, per Q1/Q5: for an INERT command
|
|
366
|
+
``command.split()`` IS the executed argument list, and EP5 runs that
|
|
367
|
+
tier as argv with NO shell -- so there is no glob or variable
|
|
368
|
+
expansion between this check and what executes, and a token check is
|
|
369
|
+
sound exactly where it matters. A token counts when the segment
|
|
370
|
+
appears as a component of its TEXT -- or of the tail after its first
|
|
371
|
+
``=``, the one split _escapes_workspace permits itself (hole 1:
|
|
372
|
+
``--path=.venastine/settings.json`` reads whole as one component
|
|
373
|
+
glued to a flag) -- or of its realpath against WORKSPACE_DIR, which
|
|
374
|
+
catches `..` travel, an absolute path from anywhere, and a
|
|
375
|
+
case-spelling Windows realpath normalises.
|
|
376
|
+
|
|
377
|
+
Totality is the approval gate's, and this runs inside it (Q3): a
|
|
378
|
+
non-string command answers None, and a token whose realpath cannot
|
|
379
|
+
RESOLVE answers None for that token -- the tier machinery fails
|
|
380
|
+
closed on exactly those values, so an unresolvable reference is
|
|
381
|
+
already on a path that asks. What this deliberately does NOT do is
|
|
382
|
+
parse. A token like ``.ven*/settings.json`` carries no literal
|
|
383
|
+
segment and reaches no answer here (G2 -- a classifier that learned
|
|
384
|
+
shell syntax would be a parser whose bugs auto-approve). That is why
|
|
385
|
+
the consumer is an always-ASK trigger and never a deny: under
|
|
386
|
+
`tiered`, what slips past a token check still lands in front of a
|
|
387
|
+
human with the full command text, because a spelling that could
|
|
388
|
+
expand into the segment is not INERT and so asks anyway.
|
|
389
|
+
|
|
390
|
+
That last clause was FALSE until §48 (CE1). A contained command was
|
|
391
|
+
auto-approved, so `cat .ven*/settings.json; true` and a `python -c`
|
|
392
|
+
that opens the file read it unasked, while this docstring said they
|
|
393
|
+
met a human. Under `contained` and `never` they still do not: the
|
|
394
|
+
ro mount stops a write there, and the read is documented risk.
|
|
395
|
+
"""
|
|
396
|
+
if not isinstance(command, str):
|
|
397
|
+
return None
|
|
398
|
+
for token in command.split():
|
|
399
|
+
candidates = [token]
|
|
400
|
+
if "=" in token:
|
|
401
|
+
candidates.append(token.split("=", 1)[1])
|
|
402
|
+
for candidate in candidates:
|
|
403
|
+
for part in re.split(r"[\\/]", candidate):
|
|
404
|
+
# Folded, like the resolved branch below it (batch 146).
|
|
405
|
+
# This is the branch for a token realpath cannot help with,
|
|
406
|
+
# so an exact-case compare here was the half of the fold
|
|
407
|
+
# that `protected_segment` could not reach.
|
|
408
|
+
if part.casefold() in PROTECTED_SEGMENTS_FOLDED:
|
|
409
|
+
return part
|
|
410
|
+
try:
|
|
411
|
+
resolved = os.path.realpath(
|
|
412
|
+
os.path.join(config.WORKSPACE_DIR, candidate))
|
|
413
|
+
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
|
414
|
+
continue
|
|
415
|
+
segment = protected_segment(resolved)
|
|
416
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
417
|
+
return segment
|
|
418
|
+
return None
|
|
419
|
+
|
|
420
|
+
|
|
421
|
+
# The binaries that make a command somebody else's. `sudo` is the one
|
|
422
|
+
# slice 5b supplies a password for; the other three are here because they
|
|
423
|
+
# answer the same question -- "does this line try to become another user"
|
|
424
|
+
# -- and a step that knew only about `sudo` would auto-approve `doas` on
|
|
425
|
+
# the one backend where the measurement showed nothing asks.
|
|
426
|
+
_ROOT_BINARIES = frozenset({"sudo", "doas", "pkexec", "su"})
|
|
427
|
+
|
|
428
|
+
|
|
429
|
+
def _command_names_root(command) -> bool:
|
|
430
|
+
"""Whether the command TEXT names an escalation binary (SS67).
|
|
431
|
+
|
|
432
|
+
RAW `.split()` tokens and a basename compare -- a token check, never a
|
|
433
|
+
parser (G2), exactly like `_command_touches_protected` beside it and
|
|
434
|
+
for the same trade. `echo sudo` asks, and that costs one prompt; what
|
|
435
|
+
it buys is that `sudo apt-get install` cannot be auto-approved on WSL
|
|
436
|
+
because the call left `needs_root` unset. That was MEASURED to be the
|
|
437
|
+
live behaviour before this slice: under AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK
|
|
438
|
+
the fallback opt-in answered for the whole WSL backend.
|
|
439
|
+
|
|
440
|
+
What it deliberately does NOT do is decide anything about HOW the
|
|
441
|
+
command runs. It only ever ADDS a prompt -- the harness supplies a
|
|
442
|
+
password for `needs_root` and for nothing else -- so a spelling that
|
|
443
|
+
slips past this check reaches a `sudo` with no password and fails,
|
|
444
|
+
rather than reaching one with a password nobody approved.
|
|
445
|
+
|
|
446
|
+
Total, like everything else the gate calls: `params["command"]` is
|
|
447
|
+
whatever the model emitted.
|
|
448
|
+
"""
|
|
449
|
+
if not isinstance(command, str):
|
|
450
|
+
return False
|
|
451
|
+
for token in command.split():
|
|
452
|
+
if re.split(r"[\\/]", token)[-1] in _ROOT_BINARIES:
|
|
453
|
+
return True
|
|
454
|
+
return False
|
|
455
|
+
|
|
456
|
+
|
|
457
|
+
def _shell_approval_check(tool_name: str, params: dict) -> bool:
|
|
458
|
+
"""Whether this shell call needs a human to say yes (ROADMAP_v2 §28).
|
|
459
|
+
|
|
460
|
+
Reads top to bottom as the policy it is:
|
|
461
|
+
|
|
462
|
+
1. The mode answers outright unless it is "tiered".
|
|
463
|
+
2. A command naming a protected path segment
|
|
464
|
+
(security.protected_paths.PROTECTED_SEGMENTS) always asks --
|
|
465
|
+
before the fallback opt-in and the capability rule can answer
|
|
466
|
+
for it. The file tools DENY such a path outright; the shell
|
|
467
|
+
only asks, because a command is free text and the token check
|
|
468
|
+
refuses to parse it (G2), so what slips past the check still
|
|
469
|
+
meets a human. Behind step 1 deliberately: mode "never" is a
|
|
470
|
+
documented opt-out of ALL approval, and it already answers
|
|
471
|
+
"auto-approve" for a host read of /etc/shadow.
|
|
472
|
+
2b. A call that will be REFUSED answers "no" rather than
|
|
473
|
+
"ask" (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS37/SS40) -- the WSL backend turned
|
|
474
|
+
off, or a WSL command naming a protected segment. It reads
|
|
475
|
+
beside the UNAVAILABLE branch above and means the same
|
|
476
|
+
thing: there is nothing to approve, and asking would spend
|
|
477
|
+
a human decision on an outcome already fixed. `run` and the
|
|
478
|
+
session start handler refuse the same call, through the one
|
|
479
|
+
`uncontained_refusal`.
|
|
480
|
+
2c. An SSH call ALWAYS asks (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS48), read
|
|
481
|
+
above every opt-in below so that neither of them can answer
|
|
482
|
+
for a machine this process cannot inspect.
|
|
483
|
+
2d. A ROOT call ALWAYS asks (slice 5b, SS65/SS67), in the same
|
|
484
|
+
position and for a measured version of the same reason: the
|
|
485
|
+
fallback opt-in already answers for the ENTIRE WSL backend,
|
|
486
|
+
so a root step below it would be dead code on the one
|
|
487
|
+
backend where root is most reachable. It fires on the
|
|
488
|
+
DECLARATION or on the command text naming an escalation
|
|
489
|
+
binary, because a model that types `sudo` itself never sets
|
|
490
|
+
the flag.
|
|
491
|
+
3. AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is applied HERE, visibly, rather
|
|
492
|
+
than passed into the generic rule to be honoured out of sight.
|
|
493
|
+
It is the user's own opt-in to an isolation level the harness
|
|
494
|
+
has already told them is weak -- and it sits BELOW the
|
|
495
|
+
protected-segment check, so one opt-in cannot cover the
|
|
496
|
+
directory the ro-mount exists to keep commands out of. Honoured
|
|
497
|
+
under `tiered` and `contained` alike (§48, CE5): it is written on
|
|
498
|
+
purpose and already flagged. Under `always` it is never reached,
|
|
499
|
+
because step 1 returned (CE6).
|
|
500
|
+
4. The `contained` mode (§48, CE2) is the second visible opt-in, and
|
|
501
|
+
applied here for the same reason: a command the container
|
|
502
|
+
confines and that gets no network runs unasked. Below the
|
|
503
|
+
protected-segment check, so a literal `.venastine` token still
|
|
504
|
+
asks in that mode, and read off capabilities rather than the tier
|
|
505
|
+
label (G1), with `measured` first (G5).
|
|
506
|
+
5. Otherwise the capability rule decides -- which, since §48 (CE1),
|
|
507
|
+
asks about anything that may run code, contained or not.
|
|
508
|
+
|
|
509
|
+
The return is `not auto_approved(...)` -- this function answers "must
|
|
510
|
+
someone be asked", the rule answers "is this covered". Two names for
|
|
511
|
+
opposite polarities of one question, and inverting them by accident
|
|
512
|
+
is a silent auto-approve, so the negation stays on one line where it
|
|
513
|
+
can be read.
|
|
514
|
+
"""
|
|
515
|
+
active = posture.current()
|
|
516
|
+
mode = capability.validate_mode(active.shell_approval_mode,
|
|
517
|
+
"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
|
|
518
|
+
if mode == capability.ALWAYS:
|
|
519
|
+
return True
|
|
520
|
+
if mode == capability.NEVER:
|
|
521
|
+
return False
|
|
522
|
+
|
|
523
|
+
# TOTAL from here down (batch 146). Below the mode branches on
|
|
524
|
+
# purpose: `never` is a documented opt-out of ALL approval and answers
|
|
525
|
+
# without reading the params at all, so a guard above it would have
|
|
526
|
+
# changed what that opt-out means. From here the function reads six
|
|
527
|
+
# fields, and `params` is whatever the model emitted -- which for this
|
|
528
|
+
# shape means "not an object". ASK, like every other answer this
|
|
529
|
+
# function cannot settle.
|
|
530
|
+
if not isinstance(params, dict):
|
|
531
|
+
return True
|
|
532
|
+
command = params.get("command", "")
|
|
533
|
+
backend = declared_backend(params)
|
|
534
|
+
profile, containment = _profile_and_containment(
|
|
535
|
+
command, declared_network(params), backend)
|
|
536
|
+
|
|
537
|
+
# No backend can run this, so there is nothing to approve. NOT the
|
|
538
|
+
# same as auto_approved() answering False, which means ASK -- the two
|
|
539
|
+
# polarities meet here and only here. run_sandboxed still raises
|
|
540
|
+
# SandboxUnavailable with the instructions; asking first would spend
|
|
541
|
+
# a human decision on an outcome that is already fixed, which is the
|
|
542
|
+
# burn-a-turn class, and it is what the pre-§28 check did too.
|
|
543
|
+
#
|
|
544
|
+
# Read above the fallback branch, which it can never co-occur with --
|
|
545
|
+
# UNCONTAINED and UNAVAILABLE are different answers -- so moving it
|
|
546
|
+
# changes nothing there and lets the protected-segment check sit
|
|
547
|
+
# before both.
|
|
548
|
+
if containment == UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
549
|
+
return False
|
|
550
|
+
|
|
551
|
+
# SS40, and read beside the UNAVAILABLE branch above rather than with
|
|
552
|
+
# the protected-segment step below, because it is the same KIND of
|
|
553
|
+
# answer: this call is refused before it runs, so there is nothing to
|
|
554
|
+
# approve, and asking would spend a human decision on an outcome that
|
|
555
|
+
# is already fixed. Below the mode switch for the same reason
|
|
556
|
+
# UNAVAILABLE is -- `always` asks about everything, including calls
|
|
557
|
+
# that will not run, and that wart is one the gate already has.
|
|
558
|
+
# `declared_root` and NOT `_command_names_root`, and the asymmetry is
|
|
559
|
+
# the decision: the refusal is about a password THIS HARNESS would
|
|
560
|
+
# have to supply, which it only ever does for a declared call. A
|
|
561
|
+
# command that merely names `sudo` supplies its own or fails, and
|
|
562
|
+
# refusing it for want of a stored secret would break a passwordless
|
|
563
|
+
# setup that works today.
|
|
564
|
+
if uncontained_refusal(command, backend,
|
|
565
|
+
declared_root(params)) is not None:
|
|
566
|
+
return False
|
|
567
|
+
|
|
568
|
+
# SS48. NOTHING on the SSH route is auto-approved, and this is the one
|
|
569
|
+
# place that is decided -- an explicit step rather than a synthesized
|
|
570
|
+
# profile that happens to fail `auto_approved`, because the opt-ins
|
|
571
|
+
# below (the fallback's and `contained`'s) each answer BEFORE that
|
|
572
|
+
# rule is reached, and a profile tuned to lose the last test would
|
|
573
|
+
# still have to be tuned to lose those two. One line that cannot be
|
|
574
|
+
# got wrong beats three that agree today.
|
|
575
|
+
#
|
|
576
|
+
# Two independent reasons, either sufficient. `_within` resolves
|
|
577
|
+
# against the LOCAL filesystem, so on a remote it answers a true
|
|
578
|
+
# question about the wrong machine -- and SS45, one slice old, is what
|
|
579
|
+
# a path check that cannot resolve costs: it does not fail open
|
|
580
|
+
# loudly, it approves confidently. And SS51: ssh has no `execve` path,
|
|
581
|
+
# so the "argv with no shell" property that EP5 makes the INERT tier
|
|
582
|
+
# out of does not exist on this route at all.
|
|
583
|
+
#
|
|
584
|
+
# Below the mode switch, so `never` still means never (SS1) and
|
|
585
|
+
# `always` still asks -- this widens neither.
|
|
586
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
587
|
+
return True
|
|
588
|
+
|
|
589
|
+
# SS65/SS67. Above both opt-ins below, and the OR is the whole point:
|
|
590
|
+
# `declared_root` alone would be a step the model can step around by
|
|
591
|
+
# writing `sudo` and leaving the flag off, which is exactly what the
|
|
592
|
+
# measurement found already running unasked.
|
|
593
|
+
if declared_root(params) or _command_names_root(command):
|
|
594
|
+
return True
|
|
595
|
+
|
|
596
|
+
# Step 2: a protected segment always asks, whatever the sandbox says.
|
|
597
|
+
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
598
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
599
|
+
return True
|
|
600
|
+
|
|
601
|
+
# The pre-§28 fallback steps, preserved exactly. For a non-inert tier,
|
|
602
|
+
# UNCONTAINED can only mean "Docker is down AND the insecure fallback
|
|
603
|
+
# is enabled" -- that is what containment_for computed -- so this
|
|
604
|
+
# reads the answer already in hand instead of re-deriving it from two
|
|
605
|
+
# more config reads and a second Docker probe.
|
|
606
|
+
if (profile.tier not in (INERT, HOST_READ)
|
|
607
|
+
and containment == UNCONTAINED
|
|
608
|
+
and active.auto_approve_fallback):
|
|
609
|
+
return False
|
|
610
|
+
|
|
611
|
+
# Step 4, §48 (CE2): the rule `tiered` had before §48, under the name
|
|
612
|
+
# that says what it trusts. `measured` first, for G5's reason -- the
|
|
613
|
+
# container must not argue an uncharacterised call through.
|
|
614
|
+
if (mode == capability.CONTAINED_MODE
|
|
615
|
+
and containment == capability.CONTAINED
|
|
616
|
+
and profile.measured
|
|
617
|
+
and not profile.network):
|
|
618
|
+
return False
|
|
619
|
+
|
|
620
|
+
return not auto_approved(profile, containment)
|
|
621
|
+
|
|
622
|
+
|
|
623
|
+
def _shell_approval_notice(params: dict, _context=None) -> str:
|
|
624
|
+
"""What the person answering the prompt is being asked to allow.
|
|
625
|
+
|
|
626
|
+
Wired through ToolSpec.approval_notice, which core/loop.py already
|
|
627
|
+
renders above the params. The command is right there in the params,
|
|
628
|
+
so what this adds is the part the command text does NOT show: where
|
|
629
|
+
it will run. "cat /etc/shadow" does not look like a host read until
|
|
630
|
+
someone tells you the inert path is a host subprocess.
|
|
631
|
+
"""
|
|
632
|
+
command = params.get("command", "")
|
|
633
|
+
backend = declared_backend(params)
|
|
634
|
+
profile, containment = _profile_and_containment(
|
|
635
|
+
command, declared_network(params), backend)
|
|
636
|
+
# The runtime is read from the probe `_profile_and_containment` just
|
|
637
|
+
# ran, never re-probed: the person answering should see WHICH runtime
|
|
638
|
+
# isolates the command, since Podman and Docker are not the same
|
|
639
|
+
# product (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS22).
|
|
640
|
+
where = {
|
|
641
|
+
"contained": (f"in a {known_runtime().capitalize()} container, "
|
|
642
|
+
"workspace mounted at /workspace"),
|
|
643
|
+
"uncontained": "on the HOST, with your own file access",
|
|
644
|
+
"unavailable": "nowhere -- no sandbox backend is available",
|
|
645
|
+
}.get(containment, containment)
|
|
646
|
+
# SS41. "uncontained" is true of WSL and nowhere near enough: the
|
|
647
|
+
# person answering has to know it is not a weaker container but their
|
|
648
|
+
# own machine, and that the two protections they may be picturing --
|
|
649
|
+
# the read-only mount over this harness's own files, and the memory
|
|
650
|
+
# and process limits -- are simply not there. Said here rather than
|
|
651
|
+
# only in the docs, because this prompt is where the decision is made.
|
|
652
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_WSL:
|
|
653
|
+
where = (f"in WSL ({wsl_distro() or 'default distribution'}) -- "
|
|
654
|
+
f"YOUR machine, not a sandbox: your own files, the "
|
|
655
|
+
f"network on, no memory or process limit, no read-only "
|
|
656
|
+
f"mount over this harness's own config, and it can start "
|
|
657
|
+
f"Windows programs with your full authority")
|
|
658
|
+
# SS48/SS55. The person answering has to know this is not their
|
|
659
|
+
# machine at all, and that two things they may be picturing are
|
|
660
|
+
# absent: any isolation, and any way for this harness to check what
|
|
661
|
+
# the command will touch. The remote is NAMED, because "uncontained"
|
|
662
|
+
# is equally true of the host fallback and means something different
|
|
663
|
+
# here -- and because a prompt that does not say which machine is
|
|
664
|
+
# about to run something is not a prompt anyone can answer.
|
|
665
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
666
|
+
where = (f"on {ssh_target() or 'the configured remote host'} over "
|
|
667
|
+
f"SSH -- ANOTHER MACHINE, not a sandbox and not this "
|
|
668
|
+
f"one: no isolation, no memory or process limit, the "
|
|
669
|
+
f"network on, and nothing here can see its filesystem, "
|
|
670
|
+
f"so no argument of this command has been checked "
|
|
671
|
+
f"against anything")
|
|
672
|
+
notice = f"{profile.tier}: {profile.reason}. Runs {where}."
|
|
673
|
+
# Slice 5b. The person is answering for a privilege level, not only a
|
|
674
|
+
# machine, and "uncontained" does not say which. Two sentences, because
|
|
675
|
+
# the two cases are genuinely different: one is the harness handing over
|
|
676
|
+
# a password it holds, the other is the command asking for root on its
|
|
677
|
+
# own with nothing behind it.
|
|
678
|
+
if declared_root(params):
|
|
679
|
+
notice += (" AS ROOT -- the whole command line runs under sudo, "
|
|
680
|
+
"with the password this harness holds for that machine. "
|
|
681
|
+
"Anything root can do there, this can do.")
|
|
682
|
+
elif _command_names_root(command):
|
|
683
|
+
notice += (" It names sudo (or su, doas, pkexec) itself, which is "
|
|
684
|
+
"why this is being asked about at all. The harness "
|
|
685
|
+
"supplies a password only for a call that declares "
|
|
686
|
+
"needs_root, so this one may simply fail.")
|
|
687
|
+
binary = _resolved_binary(command) if containment == UNCONTAINED else ""
|
|
688
|
+
if binary:
|
|
689
|
+
notice += f" Binary resolves to {binary}."
|
|
690
|
+
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
691
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
692
|
+
# Why an INERT read is prompting at all: the tier alone would
|
|
693
|
+
# look like a false positive to the person answering.
|
|
694
|
+
notice += (f" It names {segment}/, a protected path that always "
|
|
695
|
+
"requires approval.")
|
|
696
|
+
return notice
|
|
697
|
+
|
|
698
|
+
|
|
699
|
+
|
|
700
|
+
def interactive_profile(requires_network: bool = False) -> CommandProfile:
|
|
701
|
+
"""What an interactive shell can do -- STATED, not derived (SS32).
|
|
702
|
+
|
|
703
|
+
`classify_command` reads a command's text. An interactive session has no
|
|
704
|
+
text to read: `cd`, an alias and a REPL mean what arrives later is not
|
|
705
|
+
an argv, and the first line is only the first line. So the capabilities
|
|
706
|
+
are declared at their upper bound -- it runs code, it writes -- and
|
|
707
|
+
`measured` is True because that IS the measurement: the answer does not
|
|
708
|
+
depend on parsing anything, which is exactly when a profile is allowed
|
|
709
|
+
to claim it was characterised (G5).
|
|
710
|
+
|
|
711
|
+
`escapes_workspace` is False because the container's filesystem is not
|
|
712
|
+
the host's, and SS28 admits no other route for this kind.
|
|
713
|
+
"""
|
|
714
|
+
network = bool(requires_network)
|
|
715
|
+
return CommandProfile(
|
|
716
|
+
tier=SANDBOXED_NET if network else SANDBOXED,
|
|
717
|
+
measured=True,
|
|
718
|
+
escapes_workspace=False,
|
|
719
|
+
writes=True,
|
|
720
|
+
runs_code=True,
|
|
721
|
+
network=network,
|
|
722
|
+
reason=("an interactive shell in the container -- anything may be "
|
|
723
|
+
"typed into it" + (", and it was opened with network access"
|
|
724
|
+
if network else "")))
|
|
725
|
+
|
|
726
|
+
|
|
727
|
+
def _interactive_approval_check(tool_name: str, params: dict) -> bool:
|
|
728
|
+
"""Whether OPENING an interactive shell needs a human yes (SS29, SS32).
|
|
729
|
+
|
|
730
|
+
NOT `_shell_approval_check`, and the difference is the point. That one
|
|
731
|
+
answers about the text it is handed; here the text is only the first
|
|
732
|
+
line of a session whose LATER lines are covered by the same yes. Asking
|
|
733
|
+
about the first line would mean `shell_interactive` with `pwd` was
|
|
734
|
+
auto-approved as a read and handed back a shell that can run anything --
|
|
735
|
+
the approval and the authority describing different calls, which is
|
|
736
|
+
#157's shape.
|
|
737
|
+
|
|
738
|
+
So the question is asked about what is actually being granted:
|
|
739
|
+
`interactive_profile`, through the same mode ladder and the same
|
|
740
|
+
`auto_approved` rule as every other shell call. Under `tiered` and
|
|
741
|
+
`contained` that always asks, because it always runs code (§48, CE1) --
|
|
742
|
+
and it asks through the rule rather than by hardcoding "always", so if
|
|
743
|
+
the rule ever changes this follows it instead of contradicting it.
|
|
744
|
+
"""
|
|
745
|
+
active = posture.current()
|
|
746
|
+
mode = capability.validate_mode(active.shell_approval_mode,
|
|
747
|
+
"config.SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE")
|
|
748
|
+
if mode == capability.ALWAYS:
|
|
749
|
+
return True
|
|
750
|
+
if mode == capability.NEVER:
|
|
751
|
+
return False
|
|
752
|
+
profile = interactive_profile(declared_network(params))
|
|
753
|
+
containment = containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
754
|
+
if containment == UNAVAILABLE:
|
|
755
|
+
# Nothing can run it, so there is nothing to approve;
|
|
756
|
+
# `start_interactive` refuses with the instructions. Same polarity
|
|
757
|
+
# note as `_shell_approval_check`'s.
|
|
758
|
+
return False
|
|
759
|
+
return not auto_approved(profile, containment)
|
|
760
|
+
|
|
761
|
+
|
|
762
|
+
def _interactive_approval_notice(params: dict, _context=None) -> str:
|
|
763
|
+
"""What the person answering is being asked to allow.
|
|
764
|
+
|
|
765
|
+
It says the quiet part out loud (SS29): this yes is not for one command,
|
|
766
|
+
it is for the session. A prompt that described only the first line would
|
|
767
|
+
be telling the truth about the wrong thing.
|
|
768
|
+
"""
|
|
769
|
+
network = declared_network(params)
|
|
770
|
+
profile = interactive_profile(network)
|
|
771
|
+
containment = containment_for(profile, is_docker_available())
|
|
772
|
+
where = ("in a container" if containment == capability.CONTAINED
|
|
773
|
+
else "with no container available")
|
|
774
|
+
first = params.get("command", "") if isinstance(params, dict) else ""
|
|
775
|
+
text = (f"Opens an interactive shell {where} and keeps it open. "
|
|
776
|
+
f"APPROVING THIS APPROVES EVERYTHING THE AGENT LATER TYPES INTO "
|
|
777
|
+
f"IT, not just the first line.")
|
|
778
|
+
if isinstance(first, str) and first.strip():
|
|
779
|
+
text += f" It starts by running: {first.strip()[:200]}"
|
|
780
|
+
if network:
|
|
781
|
+
text += " The call declared it needs the network, so egress is on."
|
|
782
|
+
segment = _command_touches_protected(first)
|
|
783
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
784
|
+
text += f" That first line names {segment}, which is protected."
|
|
785
|
+
return text
|
|
786
|
+
|
|
787
|
+
|
|
788
|
+
def _resolved_binary(command) -> str:
|
|
789
|
+
"""The absolute path the first word will actually execute as, on a
|
|
790
|
+
run that is about to happen on the HOST (§46, EP8).
|
|
791
|
+
|
|
792
|
+
Named on the prompt because "runs on the host" understates it on
|
|
793
|
+
Windows. `ls`, `cat` and `grep` have no native Windows binary, so
|
|
794
|
+
the inert path resolves them off the user's PATH -- and on the
|
|
795
|
+
machine where this was found, `cat` was
|
|
796
|
+
`...\\AppData\\Local\\hermes\\git\\usr\\bin\\cat.exe`, a POSIX
|
|
797
|
+
toolchain shipped by unrelated software. `_is_inert` rejects a
|
|
798
|
+
path-qualified binary (`./ls`) precisely so a planted one cannot be
|
|
799
|
+
NAMED; PATH lookup reaches the same place from the other side, and
|
|
800
|
+
the harness does not get to choose what is on it.
|
|
801
|
+
|
|
802
|
+
Disclosure, not enforcement: the containment argument that lets
|
|
803
|
+
this path run at all is unchanged, and HOST_READ always asks a
|
|
804
|
+
human anyway. What changes is that the human is told which
|
|
805
|
+
executable they are approving.
|
|
806
|
+
|
|
807
|
+
Total, like everything else the gate calls: `command` arrives from
|
|
808
|
+
`registry.approval_needed` as whatever the model emitted, and
|
|
809
|
+
`shutil.which` on a non-string raises.
|
|
810
|
+
"""
|
|
811
|
+
if not isinstance(command, str) or not command.strip():
|
|
812
|
+
return ""
|
|
813
|
+
try:
|
|
814
|
+
return shutil.which(command.split()[0]) or ""
|
|
815
|
+
except (OSError, ValueError):
|
|
816
|
+
return ""
|
|
817
|
+
|
|
818
|
+
|
|
819
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
820
|
+
# ---- Tool handler ---------------------------------------------------------
|
|
821
|
+
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
822
|
+
|
|
823
|
+
|
|
824
|
+
def uncontained_refusal(command: str, backend: str,
|
|
825
|
+
needs_root: bool = False) -> str | None:
|
|
826
|
+
"""Why this call must not run at all, or None (§49).
|
|
827
|
+
|
|
828
|
+
`fallback_changed_refusal`'s shape, and ONE copy for the same reason:
|
|
829
|
+
the gate reads it to answer "there is nothing to approve", and `run`
|
|
830
|
+
and the session start handler read it to stop the call. Three sites
|
|
831
|
+
deciding this separately is the drift #157 came from.
|
|
832
|
+
|
|
833
|
+
Two refusals, and they say different things on purpose.
|
|
834
|
+
|
|
835
|
+
THE BACKEND IS OFF (SS35). Not "unavailable" -- a machine that has WSL
|
|
836
|
+
and is not allowed to use it, which a model told "no distro found"
|
|
837
|
+
would try to fix by asking the user to install one.
|
|
838
|
+
|
|
839
|
+
A PROTECTED SEGMENT (SS40). In the container `.venastine/` is mounted
|
|
840
|
+
read-only, so a write there fails with EROFS and a read is documented
|
|
841
|
+
risk; on WSL there is no mount at all, a write SUCCEEDS, and D17's
|
|
842
|
+
hash notices only at the next launch. So the shell's usual answer for
|
|
843
|
+
a protected segment -- always ask -- is the wrong one here, and this
|
|
844
|
+
is the file tools' answer instead: deny.
|
|
845
|
+
|
|
846
|
+
The token check is exactly sound where it bites. An INERT command
|
|
847
|
+
carries no metacharacters by construction, so `command.split()` IS the
|
|
848
|
+
argv that will run and a literal segment cannot hide behind quoting or
|
|
849
|
+
expansion. A non-inert command can hide one, and still meets a human
|
|
850
|
+
on top of this -- `runs_code` is True for every non-inert profile
|
|
851
|
+
(CE1), so it asks under `tiered` and, being UNCONTAINED here, under
|
|
852
|
+
`contained` too.
|
|
853
|
+
|
|
854
|
+
A THIRD refusal arrives with slice 5b, and it is read FIRST because it
|
|
855
|
+
is true of every backend including the container: a call that asked for
|
|
856
|
+
root and cannot have it. `sudo_refusal` owns that decision -- see there
|
|
857
|
+
for why the container is refused for already being root, and why no
|
|
858
|
+
stored password is a refusal rather than a prompt (SS68).
|
|
859
|
+
"""
|
|
860
|
+
if needs_root:
|
|
861
|
+
refusal = sudo_refusal(backend)
|
|
862
|
+
if refusal is not None:
|
|
863
|
+
return refusal
|
|
864
|
+
if backend == BACKEND_SSH:
|
|
865
|
+
if not ssh_enabled():
|
|
866
|
+
return ssh_unavailable_reason()
|
|
867
|
+
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
868
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
869
|
+
# SS54. SS40's answer, reached by a different road: WSL is
|
|
870
|
+
# refused because it demonstrably CAN write this harness's own
|
|
871
|
+
# authority files, and SSH is refused because nothing here can
|
|
872
|
+
# demonstrate that it cannot. `ssh localhost` is this machine,
|
|
873
|
+
# and a remote that mounts this one is not visible from here
|
|
874
|
+
# either -- so the question "is that path this harness's own?"
|
|
875
|
+
# has no answer, and an unanswerable question is not a yes.
|
|
876
|
+
return (
|
|
877
|
+
f"This command names {segment}/, and a command over SSH is "
|
|
878
|
+
f"refused rather than asked about when it does. This "
|
|
879
|
+
f"harness cannot tell whether the remote host is a "
|
|
880
|
+
f"different machine -- `ssh localhost` is this one, and a "
|
|
881
|
+
f"remote that mounts this one looks the same from here -- "
|
|
882
|
+
f"so it cannot tell whether that path is its own authority "
|
|
883
|
+
f"files. Run it in the container, or do the work somewhere "
|
|
884
|
+
f"inside the workspace.")
|
|
885
|
+
return None
|
|
886
|
+
if backend != BACKEND_WSL:
|
|
887
|
+
return None
|
|
888
|
+
if not wsl_enabled():
|
|
889
|
+
return wsl_unavailable_reason()
|
|
890
|
+
segment = _command_touches_protected(command)
|
|
891
|
+
if segment is not None:
|
|
892
|
+
return (
|
|
893
|
+
f"This command names {segment}/, and a command in WSL is "
|
|
894
|
+
f"refused rather than asked about when it does. In the "
|
|
895
|
+
f"container that directory is mounted read-only, so a write "
|
|
896
|
+
f"fails and a read is a documented risk you can accept. WSL "
|
|
897
|
+
f"mounts nothing: a write there would succeed against this "
|
|
898
|
+
f"harness's own authority files and would only be noticed at "
|
|
899
|
+
f"the next launch. Run it in the container, or do the work "
|
|
900
|
+
f"somewhere inside the workspace.")
|
|
901
|
+
return None
|
|
902
|
+
|
|
903
|
+
|
|
904
|
+
def fallback_changed_refusal(command: str, docker_up: bool) -> str | None:
|
|
905
|
+
"""The TOCTOU safety net, or None: why a command approved while a
|
|
906
|
+
container runtime answered must not now run on the fallback.
|
|
907
|
+
|
|
908
|
+
If the approval check auto-approved because the runtime was available
|
|
909
|
+
at that time, but it is now down and the command would take the
|
|
910
|
+
fallback, the fallback would have required approval that was never
|
|
911
|
+
given. One copy for `run` and for the background-session start tools
|
|
912
|
+
(ROADMAP_v3 §49), which pass the same gate and the same probe.
|
|
913
|
+
"""
|
|
914
|
+
if docker_up or _is_inert(command):
|
|
915
|
+
return None
|
|
916
|
+
# Read here rather than passed in from the approval check: §40 makes the
|
|
917
|
+
# two reads the SAME object for the life of the process, so re-reading
|
|
918
|
+
# cannot reintroduce the TOCTOU gap this exists to close. Before §40 it
|
|
919
|
+
# could have.
|
|
920
|
+
active = posture.current()
|
|
921
|
+
if active.allow_insecure_fallback and not active.auto_approve_fallback:
|
|
922
|
+
return ("Docker became unavailable after the approval check. "
|
|
923
|
+
"The insecure subprocess fallback requires explicit "
|
|
924
|
+
"per-run approval (AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK is "
|
|
925
|
+
"False). Please retry — the approval prompt will "
|
|
926
|
+
"appear this time.")
|
|
927
|
+
return None
|
|
928
|
+
|
|
929
|
+
|
|
930
|
+
def run(params: dict) -> dict:
|
|
931
|
+
# `parsed.rationale` is deliberately never read below. It is shown
|
|
932
|
+
# to a person and archived with the call; it has no part in what
|
|
933
|
+
# runs or in whether it is allowed to (§42, RA2).
|
|
934
|
+
parsed = ShellParams(**params)
|
|
935
|
+
|
|
936
|
+
# Probe Docker once for this execution — the result is threaded
|
|
937
|
+
# into run_sandboxed to eliminate the TOCTOU gap where Docker
|
|
938
|
+
# status changes between the approval check and execution.
|
|
939
|
+
# SS37/SS40/SS54, above the container probe: a call that asked for WSL
|
|
940
|
+
# or SSH and cannot have it is refused by name, and is never quietly
|
|
941
|
+
# served by a backend it did not ask for.
|
|
942
|
+
refusal = uncontained_refusal(parsed.command, parsed.backend,
|
|
943
|
+
parsed.needs_root)
|
|
944
|
+
if refusal is not None:
|
|
945
|
+
return {"error": refusal}
|
|
946
|
+
|
|
947
|
+
# Not probed for a WSL or SSH call, and not merely to save the 0.43s:
|
|
948
|
+
# the TOCTOU guard below is about a container runtime disappearing
|
|
949
|
+
# between the gate and the run and the command then taking the INSECURE
|
|
950
|
+
# FALLBACK. Neither can take it -- `_route` answers ROUTE_WSL/ROUTE_SSH
|
|
951
|
+
# or refuses (SS37) -- so running that guard here would refuse a call
|
|
952
|
+
# for a backend it was never going to touch.
|
|
953
|
+
docker_up = True if parsed.backend != BACKEND_CONTAINER \
|
|
954
|
+
else is_docker_available()
|
|
955
|
+
|
|
956
|
+
if parsed.backend == BACKEND_CONTAINER:
|
|
957
|
+
refusal = fallback_changed_refusal(parsed.command, docker_up)
|
|
958
|
+
if refusal is not None:
|
|
959
|
+
return {"error": refusal}
|
|
960
|
+
|
|
961
|
+
try:
|
|
962
|
+
return run_sandboxed(
|
|
963
|
+
command=parsed.command,
|
|
964
|
+
workspace_dir=config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
|
965
|
+
docker_available=docker_up,
|
|
966
|
+
backend=parsed.backend,
|
|
967
|
+
needs_root=parsed.needs_root,
|
|
968
|
+
# §28: the SAME classification the approval check made, so
|
|
969
|
+
# routing cannot disagree with the decision to allow it --
|
|
970
|
+
# the declaration included (§50), read off the validated
|
|
971
|
+
# params here and off the raw ones at the gate, which is why
|
|
972
|
+
# `declared_network` accepts only literal True.
|
|
973
|
+
profile=classify_command(parsed.command, config.WORKSPACE_DIR,
|
|
974
|
+
requires_network=parsed.requires_network),
|
|
975
|
+
)
|
|
976
|
+
except SandboxUnavailable as e:
|
|
977
|
+
return {"error": str(e)}
|
|
978
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
|
979
|
+
logger.exception("shell tool failed")
|
|
980
|
+
return {"error": f"Shell execution failed: {e}"}
|