@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.9

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (128) hide show
  1. package/.env.example +19 -19
  2. package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2030 -2002
  3. package/LICENSE +201 -201
  4. package/README.md +1034 -1034
  5. package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
  6. package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
  7. package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
  8. package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
  9. package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
  10. package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
  11. package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
  12. package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
  13. package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -528
  14. package/bin/venastine.py +71 -71
  15. package/cli_commands.py +838 -835
  16. package/config.yaml +13 -0
  17. package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
  18. package/config_schema.py +971 -966
  19. package/config_update.py +749 -749
  20. package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
  21. package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
  22. package/core/approval.py +137 -137
  23. package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
  24. package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
  25. package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
  26. package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
  27. package/core/client.py +2715 -2715
  28. package/core/commands.py +460 -454
  29. package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
  30. package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
  31. package/core/connect.py +686 -686
  32. package/core/events.py +123 -123
  33. package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
  34. package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
  35. package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
  36. package/core/memory.py +482 -482
  37. package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
  38. package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -234
  39. package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
  40. package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
  41. package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
  42. package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
  43. package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
  44. package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
  45. package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
  46. package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
  47. package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +458 -458
  48. package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
  49. package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
  50. package/core/replay.py +315 -315
  51. package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
  52. package/credentials.py +307 -307
  53. package/database.py +333 -333
  54. package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
  55. package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -108
  56. package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
  57. package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
  58. package/json_store.py +343 -343
  59. package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
  60. package/main.py +3433 -3433
  61. package/mcp_client/client.py +733 -733
  62. package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
  63. package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
  64. package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
  65. package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
  66. package/package.json +303 -303
  67. package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
  68. package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
  69. package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
  70. package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
  71. package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
  72. package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
  73. package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
  74. package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
  75. package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
  76. package/providers.json.example +94 -94
  77. package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
  78. package/requirements.txt +295 -295
  79. package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
  80. package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
  81. package/security/capability.py +207 -207
  82. package/security/confine.py +484 -484
  83. package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
  84. package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
  85. package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
  86. package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
  87. package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
  88. package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
  89. package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
  90. package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
  91. package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
  92. package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
  93. package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
  94. package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
  95. package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
  96. package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
  97. package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
  98. package/storage.py +1338 -1338
  99. package/tools/base.py +465 -465
  100. package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
  101. package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -267
  102. package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -681
  103. package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +371 -371
  104. package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
  105. package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
  106. package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
  107. package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
  108. package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
  109. package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
  110. package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
  111. package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
  112. package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
  113. package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +328 -328
  114. package/tools/context.py +159 -159
  115. package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
  116. package/tools/registry.py +1242 -1242
  117. package/tui/app.py +8318 -8307
  118. package/tui/app.tcss +747 -739
  119. package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
  120. package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
  121. package/tui/history.py +128 -128
  122. package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
  123. package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
  124. package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
  125. package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
  126. package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
  127. package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
  128. package/tui/widgets.py +3813 -3796
package/credentials.py CHANGED
@@ -1,308 +1,308 @@
1
- import json
2
- import os
3
-
4
- # A root module importing a root module: no new edge, and json_store.py's
5
- # docstring names `credentials` among the things already imported from
6
- # everywhere for that reason.
7
- from json_store import write_json_atomic
8
-
9
- # #24. Resolved at IMPORT time, exactly like its four siblings --
10
- # config.DB_PATH / OUTPUT_DIR / WORKSPACE_DIR and logging_setup's log
11
- # file are all `os.environ.get(NAME, default)` evaluated once -- so a
12
- # test can still redirect it by monkeypatching the attribute, and a
13
- # user can point it anywhere with AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE before launch.
14
- # The default stays CWD-relative on purpose: for a repo-local tool,
15
- # per-checkout state is what you want, and repo-relative would share
16
- # one key file across every clone on the machine.
17
- LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE = os.environ.get("AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE", "providers.json")
18
-
19
-
20
- def no_providers_message() -> str:
21
- """The error for "the file itself is not there" (#24).
22
-
23
- ONE wording, used by both raisers -- api_initialization (the one
24
- every user actually meets) and load_credentials below -- so the two
25
- cannot drift apart the way their old messages already had.
26
-
27
- Batch 35: the LOCATION clause is conditional now, because the path is
28
- no longer always cwd-relative. AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE has always accepted
29
- an absolute path, and the npm launcher sets one when the working
30
- directory has no providers.json of its own. Naming os.getcwd()
31
- unconditionally then reported a directory the code never looked in and
32
- sent the user to create the file in the wrong place -- the exact class
33
- of defect #24 was filed about, reintroduced by a path it did not
34
- anticipate. An absolute path is already the whole answer and needs no
35
- second location.
36
- """
37
- if os.path.isabs(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
38
- found = f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found."
39
- else:
40
- found = (
41
- f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found in "
42
- f"{os.getcwd()!r}."
43
- )
44
- return (
45
- f"{found} Copy providers.json.example to "
46
- f"{LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} and add your API key."
47
- )
48
-
49
-
50
- def unknown_provider_message(provider_name: str, providers: dict) -> str:
51
- """The error for "the file is there, this provider is not in it" (#24).
52
-
53
- Names the configured set exactly like /model's refusal does, so the
54
- typo is answered where it was made rather than two layers later.
55
- """
56
- configured = ", ".join(sorted(providers)) or "none"
57
- return (
58
- f"Unknown provider: {provider_name}. Configured: {configured} "
59
- f"(file: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE})."
60
- )
61
-
62
-
63
- # ROADMAP_v3 §79 (HD5). Providers connected for THIS PROCESS ONLY, never
64
- # written anywhere. A shared hosted demo runs every visitor in one container
65
- # as one Unix user, so a key in a file is a key one bug away from the next
66
- # visitor; a key in this dict lives as long as the session's process does.
67
- # Entries here win over the file's, and the file is never told about them.
68
- _SESSION_PROVIDERS: dict = {}
69
-
70
-
71
- def set_session_provider(provider_name: str, entry: dict) -> None:
72
- """Connect a provider for this process without writing it to disk (HD5).
73
-
74
- A COPY is stored, so the caller's dict cannot change it afterwards.
75
- """
76
- _SESSION_PROVIDERS[provider_name] = dict(entry)
77
-
78
-
79
- def clear_session_providers() -> None:
80
- _SESSION_PROVIDERS.clear()
81
-
82
-
83
- def _load_file_data() -> dict:
84
- if not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
85
- return {}
86
- with open(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, encoding="utf-8") as file:
87
- return json.load(file)
88
-
89
-
90
- def load_provider_data() -> dict:
91
- """Every configured provider: the file's entries, with any connected for
92
- this session only laid over them (HD5).
93
-
94
- Callers get fresh dicts each time, so mutating the answer changes
95
- neither the file nor the session's entries. `save_credentials` reads the
96
- FILE alone, which is what keeps a session-only key from being written
97
- back by the next save of some other provider.
98
- """
99
- data = _load_file_data()
100
- for name, entry in _SESSION_PROVIDERS.items():
101
- data[name] = dict(entry)
102
- return data
103
-
104
-
105
- # 0600 -- owner read/write, nobody else. This file holds every LLM
106
- # provider's API key in cleartext, and a bare open(path, "w") left its
107
- # protection to the process umask: 0644 under the common default, i.e.
108
- # readable by every other account on the machine (#19).
109
- #
110
- # The blast radius of a credential file is not the file; it is the paid
111
- # API account behind it. Every comparable tool treats one as 0600
112
- # (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.ssh/id_*), and OpenSSH
113
- # goes further and REFUSES a group-readable private key.
114
- _SECRET_FILE_MODE = 0o600
115
-
116
-
117
- def _write_secret_json(path: str, data: dict) -> None:
118
- """Write JSON to a file created 0600, never world-readable even briefly,
119
- and never half-written.
120
-
121
- 0600 AT CREATION, NOT open() followed by os.chmod. A post-write chmod
122
- leaves a window in which the key is on disk with the umask's
123
- permissions -- short, but it is exactly the window an attacker with
124
- local read access is waiting for, and closing it costs one line.
125
- `write_json_atomic` applies the mode to the TEMP file, which is the
126
- same property: `os.replace` carries it across, and the key is never on
127
- disk under the umask's permissions at any point.
128
-
129
- WINDOWS: POSIX mode bits do not apply, and the mode argument only
130
- controls the read-only flag there. This is a no-op on Windows rather
131
- than a wrong-op; the file's protection comes from the ACL on the user
132
- profile directory instead. The tests skip accordingly, and the CI
133
- container is where the assertion actually runs.
134
-
135
- ATOMIC SINCE BATCH 108, and this was the older half of the same defect.
136
- It wrote `O_TRUNC` straight over the live file, so a crash, a full disk
137
- or a kill between the truncate and the flush destroyed every stored
138
- provider key at once -- and unlike the secrets store, this file ships
139
- in use for every user who has ever saved a credential. `json_store.py`
140
- was extracted to delete exactly this pattern and says so; the two files
141
- holding credentials were the last two stores in the project still
142
- carrying a private copy of it.
143
- """
144
- write_json_atomic(path, data, mode=_SECRET_FILE_MODE, indent=2)
145
-
146
-
147
- def _write_provider_data(provider_data: dict) -> None:
148
- _write_secret_json(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, provider_data)
149
-
150
-
151
- def save_credentials(
152
- provider_name: str,
153
- api_key: str,
154
- api_url: str = "",
155
- is_v1_compatible: bool = True,
156
- supports_stream_usage: bool = False,
157
- ) -> None:
158
- # The FILE, never the merged view: a session-only entry (HD5) read here
159
- # would be written to disk by this save.
160
- provider_data = _load_file_data()
161
-
162
- if provider_name in provider_data:
163
- provider_data[provider_name]["API_KEY"] = api_key
164
- if api_url:
165
- provider_data[provider_name]["API_URL"] = api_url
166
- provider_data[provider_name]["is_v1_compatible"] = is_v1_compatible
167
- provider_data[provider_name]["supports_stream_usage"] = supports_stream_usage
168
- else:
169
- provider_data[provider_name] = {
170
- "API_KEY": api_key,
171
- "API_URL": api_url,
172
- "is_v1_compatible": is_v1_compatible,
173
- "supports_stream_usage": supports_stream_usage,
174
- }
175
-
176
- _write_provider_data(provider_data)
177
-
178
-
179
- def forget_key(provider_name: str) -> "str | None":
180
- """Remove `provider_name`'s key; say where it was (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG13).
181
-
182
- `/disconnect`'s one writer. A session-only entry (HD5) is dropped whole,
183
- since it exists only to carry the key, and the file is not touched --
184
- a shared deployment never writes it. Otherwise the file entry's
185
- `API_KEY` is blanked and EVERY OTHER FIELD STAYS: the URL, the two
186
- flags, `echoes_reasoning`, `accepts_images` -- exactly what
187
- `save_credentials` keeps when a key is replaced, so a later `/connect`
188
- comes back to the same entry. Returns "session", "file", or None when
189
- there was no key to forget.
190
- """
191
- if _SESSION_PROVIDERS.pop(provider_name, None) is not None:
192
- return "session"
193
- provider_data = _load_file_data()
194
- entry = provider_data.get(provider_name)
195
- if not entry or not entry.get("API_KEY"):
196
- return None
197
- entry["API_KEY"] = ""
198
- _write_provider_data(provider_data)
199
- return "file"
200
-
201
-
202
- def load_credentials(provider_name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
203
- provider_data = load_provider_data()
204
- # #24. The two failure modes say different things now -- "the file is
205
- # not there" is a setup problem with a one-line remedy; "the provider
206
- # is not in it" is a typo. Same builders api_initialization uses.
207
- if not provider_data and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
208
- raise ValueError(no_providers_message())
209
- if provider_name not in provider_data:
210
- raise ValueError(unknown_provider_message(provider_name, provider_data))
211
-
212
- entry = provider_data[provider_name]
213
- return entry["API_KEY"], entry.get("API_URL", "")
214
-
215
-
216
- def missing_key_message(provider_name: str) -> str:
217
- """The one wording for "configured, but with an empty API_KEY".
218
-
219
- Extracted in batch 44 for the reason no_providers_message() was: /model
220
- carried its own copy, naming providers.json literally where this file
221
- names LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, so the same fact read differently at launch
222
- and at a switch -- while tui/app.py's comment beside the launch render
223
- already claimed they were "the same fact at both moments". WARN-only at
224
- both call sites: a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint legitimately takes
225
- no key, and refusing would block a real configuration.
226
- """
227
- return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} "
228
- f"— calls will fail unless it is a local endpoint that "
229
- f"needs none.")
230
-
231
-
232
- def empty_key_refusal(provider_name: str) -> str:
233
- """What a SEND says when a provider that cannot go keyless has no key.
234
-
235
- missing_key_message is the launch and /model WARNING, and its "unless it
236
- is a local endpoint" is true there. This is the refusal at the moment a
237
- client would be built, for a provider with no local-endpoint case at all
238
- (batch 234: ANTHROPIC). anthropic 0.116.0 refused an empty key itself
239
- with a TypeError naming the problem; 2.x builds `Authorization: Bearer `,
240
- httpx2 refuses that header before anything is sent, and the SDK reports
241
- it as "Connection error." -- which core/provider_errors.py rightly
242
- treats as transient, so it was retried as a network blip.
243
- """
244
- return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE}, and its "
245
- f"SDK cannot send a request without one. Add the key there, or "
246
- f"with /connect {provider_name.lower()} in the TUI.")
247
-
248
-
249
- def missing_credential_message(provider_name: str,
250
- entry: dict) -> "str | None":
251
- """What to say when `provider_name` has nothing to authenticate with, or
252
- None when it has something. The ONE test, for launch and for every
253
- command that switches a provider.
254
-
255
- A key for every provider but one. The ChatGPT plan's entry holds no key
256
- BY DESIGN (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG20) and its credential is the sign-in in
257
- `chatgpt_auth.json`, so testing the key said "calls will fail" -- in
258
- red, at launch and after each `/model CHATGPT` -- about a plan that was
259
- signed in and answering (batch 189, the owner's live check). Three call
260
- sites each tested the key on their own, which is why one fix here rather
261
- than three there.
262
-
263
- On a hosted deployment the plan has no credential at all (CG1): the
264
- answer there is why, never "/connect chatgpt signs in", which that
265
- deployment refuses (batch 195). Signed in or not -- a token file
266
- carried onto one still cannot reach the plan (core/client.py).
267
- """
268
- if provider_name == "CHATGPT":
269
- # Imported here: core.chatgpt_auth imports this module.
270
- from core import chatgpt_auth
271
- from security import hosted
272
-
273
- if hosted.is_hosted():
274
- return chatgpt_auth.LOCAL_ONLY
275
- if chatgpt_auth.status().signed_in:
276
- return None
277
- return ("The ChatGPT plan is not signed in, so CHATGPT cannot answer. "
278
- "/connect chatgpt signs in.")
279
- if entry.get("API_KEY"):
280
- return None
281
- return missing_key_message(provider_name)
282
-
283
-
284
- def provider_startup_issues(provider_name: str) -> list:
285
- """What launch should say about the provider setup, before either
286
- shell starts (#138).
287
-
288
- The same three checks /model performs on a switch -- file present,
289
- provider configured, a credential present (a key, or for the ChatGPT
290
- plan its sign-in: `missing_credential_message`) -- applied at the moment the user
291
- chose the provider, instead of at the first model call, which is a
292
- dead end away from the mistake that caused it. WARN-ONLY, never a
293
- refusal: an OpenAI-compatible endpoint running locally legitimately
294
- takes no key (the reason /model warns there too), and refusing would
295
- block a real configuration.
296
-
297
- Empty list means healthy and says NOTHING -- silence is the healthy
298
- case's whole UX. Plain sentences, no prefix: rendering is the
299
- shell's (CLI prints, TUI write_error), so one wording reaches both.
300
- """
301
- providers = load_provider_data()
302
- if not providers and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
303
- return [no_providers_message()]
304
- if provider_name not in providers:
305
- return [unknown_provider_message(provider_name, providers)]
306
- message = missing_credential_message(provider_name,
307
- providers[provider_name])
1
+ import json
2
+ import os
3
+
4
+ # A root module importing a root module: no new edge, and json_store.py's
5
+ # docstring names `credentials` among the things already imported from
6
+ # everywhere for that reason.
7
+ from json_store import write_json_atomic
8
+
9
+ # #24. Resolved at IMPORT time, exactly like its four siblings --
10
+ # config.DB_PATH / OUTPUT_DIR / WORKSPACE_DIR and logging_setup's log
11
+ # file are all `os.environ.get(NAME, default)` evaluated once -- so a
12
+ # test can still redirect it by monkeypatching the attribute, and a
13
+ # user can point it anywhere with AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE before launch.
14
+ # The default stays CWD-relative on purpose: for a repo-local tool,
15
+ # per-checkout state is what you want, and repo-relative would share
16
+ # one key file across every clone on the machine.
17
+ LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE = os.environ.get("AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE", "providers.json")
18
+
19
+
20
+ def no_providers_message() -> str:
21
+ """The error for "the file itself is not there" (#24).
22
+
23
+ ONE wording, used by both raisers -- api_initialization (the one
24
+ every user actually meets) and load_credentials below -- so the two
25
+ cannot drift apart the way their old messages already had.
26
+
27
+ Batch 35: the LOCATION clause is conditional now, because the path is
28
+ no longer always cwd-relative. AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE has always accepted
29
+ an absolute path, and the npm launcher sets one when the working
30
+ directory has no providers.json of its own. Naming os.getcwd()
31
+ unconditionally then reported a directory the code never looked in and
32
+ sent the user to create the file in the wrong place -- the exact class
33
+ of defect #24 was filed about, reintroduced by a path it did not
34
+ anticipate. An absolute path is already the whole answer and needs no
35
+ second location.
36
+ """
37
+ if os.path.isabs(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
38
+ found = f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found."
39
+ else:
40
+ found = (
41
+ f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found in "
42
+ f"{os.getcwd()!r}."
43
+ )
44
+ return (
45
+ f"{found} Copy providers.json.example to "
46
+ f"{LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} and add your API key."
47
+ )
48
+
49
+
50
+ def unknown_provider_message(provider_name: str, providers: dict) -> str:
51
+ """The error for "the file is there, this provider is not in it" (#24).
52
+
53
+ Names the configured set exactly like /model's refusal does, so the
54
+ typo is answered where it was made rather than two layers later.
55
+ """
56
+ configured = ", ".join(sorted(providers)) or "none"
57
+ return (
58
+ f"Unknown provider: {provider_name}. Configured: {configured} "
59
+ f"(file: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE})."
60
+ )
61
+
62
+
63
+ # ROADMAP_v3 §79 (HD5). Providers connected for THIS PROCESS ONLY, never
64
+ # written anywhere. A shared hosted demo runs every visitor in one container
65
+ # as one Unix user, so a key in a file is a key one bug away from the next
66
+ # visitor; a key in this dict lives as long as the session's process does.
67
+ # Entries here win over the file's, and the file is never told about them.
68
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS: dict = {}
69
+
70
+
71
+ def set_session_provider(provider_name: str, entry: dict) -> None:
72
+ """Connect a provider for this process without writing it to disk (HD5).
73
+
74
+ A COPY is stored, so the caller's dict cannot change it afterwards.
75
+ """
76
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS[provider_name] = dict(entry)
77
+
78
+
79
+ def clear_session_providers() -> None:
80
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS.clear()
81
+
82
+
83
+ def _load_file_data() -> dict:
84
+ if not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
85
+ return {}
86
+ with open(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, encoding="utf-8") as file:
87
+ return json.load(file)
88
+
89
+
90
+ def load_provider_data() -> dict:
91
+ """Every configured provider: the file's entries, with any connected for
92
+ this session only laid over them (HD5).
93
+
94
+ Callers get fresh dicts each time, so mutating the answer changes
95
+ neither the file nor the session's entries. `save_credentials` reads the
96
+ FILE alone, which is what keeps a session-only key from being written
97
+ back by the next save of some other provider.
98
+ """
99
+ data = _load_file_data()
100
+ for name, entry in _SESSION_PROVIDERS.items():
101
+ data[name] = dict(entry)
102
+ return data
103
+
104
+
105
+ # 0600 -- owner read/write, nobody else. This file holds every LLM
106
+ # provider's API key in cleartext, and a bare open(path, "w") left its
107
+ # protection to the process umask: 0644 under the common default, i.e.
108
+ # readable by every other account on the machine (#19).
109
+ #
110
+ # The blast radius of a credential file is not the file; it is the paid
111
+ # API account behind it. Every comparable tool treats one as 0600
112
+ # (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.ssh/id_*), and OpenSSH
113
+ # goes further and REFUSES a group-readable private key.
114
+ _SECRET_FILE_MODE = 0o600
115
+
116
+
117
+ def _write_secret_json(path: str, data: dict) -> None:
118
+ """Write JSON to a file created 0600, never world-readable even briefly,
119
+ and never half-written.
120
+
121
+ 0600 AT CREATION, NOT open() followed by os.chmod. A post-write chmod
122
+ leaves a window in which the key is on disk with the umask's
123
+ permissions -- short, but it is exactly the window an attacker with
124
+ local read access is waiting for, and closing it costs one line.
125
+ `write_json_atomic` applies the mode to the TEMP file, which is the
126
+ same property: `os.replace` carries it across, and the key is never on
127
+ disk under the umask's permissions at any point.
128
+
129
+ WINDOWS: POSIX mode bits do not apply, and the mode argument only
130
+ controls the read-only flag there. This is a no-op on Windows rather
131
+ than a wrong-op; the file's protection comes from the ACL on the user
132
+ profile directory instead. The tests skip accordingly, and the CI
133
+ container is where the assertion actually runs.
134
+
135
+ ATOMIC SINCE BATCH 108, and this was the older half of the same defect.
136
+ It wrote `O_TRUNC` straight over the live file, so a crash, a full disk
137
+ or a kill between the truncate and the flush destroyed every stored
138
+ provider key at once -- and unlike the secrets store, this file ships
139
+ in use for every user who has ever saved a credential. `json_store.py`
140
+ was extracted to delete exactly this pattern and says so; the two files
141
+ holding credentials were the last two stores in the project still
142
+ carrying a private copy of it.
143
+ """
144
+ write_json_atomic(path, data, mode=_SECRET_FILE_MODE, indent=2)
145
+
146
+
147
+ def _write_provider_data(provider_data: dict) -> None:
148
+ _write_secret_json(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, provider_data)
149
+
150
+
151
+ def save_credentials(
152
+ provider_name: str,
153
+ api_key: str,
154
+ api_url: str = "",
155
+ is_v1_compatible: bool = True,
156
+ supports_stream_usage: bool = False,
157
+ ) -> None:
158
+ # The FILE, never the merged view: a session-only entry (HD5) read here
159
+ # would be written to disk by this save.
160
+ provider_data = _load_file_data()
161
+
162
+ if provider_name in provider_data:
163
+ provider_data[provider_name]["API_KEY"] = api_key
164
+ if api_url:
165
+ provider_data[provider_name]["API_URL"] = api_url
166
+ provider_data[provider_name]["is_v1_compatible"] = is_v1_compatible
167
+ provider_data[provider_name]["supports_stream_usage"] = supports_stream_usage
168
+ else:
169
+ provider_data[provider_name] = {
170
+ "API_KEY": api_key,
171
+ "API_URL": api_url,
172
+ "is_v1_compatible": is_v1_compatible,
173
+ "supports_stream_usage": supports_stream_usage,
174
+ }
175
+
176
+ _write_provider_data(provider_data)
177
+
178
+
179
+ def forget_key(provider_name: str) -> "str | None":
180
+ """Remove `provider_name`'s key; say where it was (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG13).
181
+
182
+ `/disconnect`'s one writer. A session-only entry (HD5) is dropped whole,
183
+ since it exists only to carry the key, and the file is not touched --
184
+ a shared deployment never writes it. Otherwise the file entry's
185
+ `API_KEY` is blanked and EVERY OTHER FIELD STAYS: the URL, the two
186
+ flags, `echoes_reasoning`, `accepts_images` -- exactly what
187
+ `save_credentials` keeps when a key is replaced, so a later `/connect`
188
+ comes back to the same entry. Returns "session", "file", or None when
189
+ there was no key to forget.
190
+ """
191
+ if _SESSION_PROVIDERS.pop(provider_name, None) is not None:
192
+ return "session"
193
+ provider_data = _load_file_data()
194
+ entry = provider_data.get(provider_name)
195
+ if not entry or not entry.get("API_KEY"):
196
+ return None
197
+ entry["API_KEY"] = ""
198
+ _write_provider_data(provider_data)
199
+ return "file"
200
+
201
+
202
+ def load_credentials(provider_name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
203
+ provider_data = load_provider_data()
204
+ # #24. The two failure modes say different things now -- "the file is
205
+ # not there" is a setup problem with a one-line remedy; "the provider
206
+ # is not in it" is a typo. Same builders api_initialization uses.
207
+ if not provider_data and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
208
+ raise ValueError(no_providers_message())
209
+ if provider_name not in provider_data:
210
+ raise ValueError(unknown_provider_message(provider_name, provider_data))
211
+
212
+ entry = provider_data[provider_name]
213
+ return entry["API_KEY"], entry.get("API_URL", "")
214
+
215
+
216
+ def missing_key_message(provider_name: str) -> str:
217
+ """The one wording for "configured, but with an empty API_KEY".
218
+
219
+ Extracted in batch 44 for the reason no_providers_message() was: /model
220
+ carried its own copy, naming providers.json literally where this file
221
+ names LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, so the same fact read differently at launch
222
+ and at a switch -- while tui/app.py's comment beside the launch render
223
+ already claimed they were "the same fact at both moments". WARN-only at
224
+ both call sites: a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint legitimately takes
225
+ no key, and refusing would block a real configuration.
226
+ """
227
+ return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} "
228
+ f"— calls will fail unless it is a local endpoint that "
229
+ f"needs none.")
230
+
231
+
232
+ def empty_key_refusal(provider_name: str) -> str:
233
+ """What a SEND says when a provider that cannot go keyless has no key.
234
+
235
+ missing_key_message is the launch and /model WARNING, and its "unless it
236
+ is a local endpoint" is true there. This is the refusal at the moment a
237
+ client would be built, for a provider with no local-endpoint case at all
238
+ (batch 234: ANTHROPIC). anthropic 0.116.0 refused an empty key itself
239
+ with a TypeError naming the problem; 2.x builds `Authorization: Bearer `,
240
+ httpx2 refuses that header before anything is sent, and the SDK reports
241
+ it as "Connection error." -- which core/provider_errors.py rightly
242
+ treats as transient, so it was retried as a network blip.
243
+ """
244
+ return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE}, and its "
245
+ f"SDK cannot send a request without one. Add the key there, or "
246
+ f"with /connect {provider_name.lower()} in the TUI.")
247
+
248
+
249
+ def missing_credential_message(provider_name: str,
250
+ entry: dict) -> "str | None":
251
+ """What to say when `provider_name` has nothing to authenticate with, or
252
+ None when it has something. The ONE test, for launch and for every
253
+ command that switches a provider.
254
+
255
+ A key for every provider but one. The ChatGPT plan's entry holds no key
256
+ BY DESIGN (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG20) and its credential is the sign-in in
257
+ `chatgpt_auth.json`, so testing the key said "calls will fail" -- in
258
+ red, at launch and after each `/model CHATGPT` -- about a plan that was
259
+ signed in and answering (batch 189, the owner's live check). Three call
260
+ sites each tested the key on their own, which is why one fix here rather
261
+ than three there.
262
+
263
+ On a hosted deployment the plan has no credential at all (CG1): the
264
+ answer there is why, never "/connect chatgpt signs in", which that
265
+ deployment refuses (batch 195). Signed in or not -- a token file
266
+ carried onto one still cannot reach the plan (core/client.py).
267
+ """
268
+ if provider_name == "CHATGPT":
269
+ # Imported here: core.chatgpt_auth imports this module.
270
+ from core import chatgpt_auth
271
+ from security import hosted
272
+
273
+ if hosted.is_hosted():
274
+ return chatgpt_auth.LOCAL_ONLY
275
+ if chatgpt_auth.status().signed_in:
276
+ return None
277
+ return ("The ChatGPT plan is not signed in, so CHATGPT cannot answer. "
278
+ "/connect chatgpt signs in.")
279
+ if entry.get("API_KEY"):
280
+ return None
281
+ return missing_key_message(provider_name)
282
+
283
+
284
+ def provider_startup_issues(provider_name: str) -> list:
285
+ """What launch should say about the provider setup, before either
286
+ shell starts (#138).
287
+
288
+ The same three checks /model performs on a switch -- file present,
289
+ provider configured, a credential present (a key, or for the ChatGPT
290
+ plan its sign-in: `missing_credential_message`) -- applied at the moment the user
291
+ chose the provider, instead of at the first model call, which is a
292
+ dead end away from the mistake that caused it. WARN-ONLY, never a
293
+ refusal: an OpenAI-compatible endpoint running locally legitimately
294
+ takes no key (the reason /model warns there too), and refusing would
295
+ block a real configuration.
296
+
297
+ Empty list means healthy and says NOTHING -- silence is the healthy
298
+ case's whole UX. Plain sentences, no prefix: rendering is the
299
+ shell's (CLI prints, TUI write_error), so one wording reaches both.
300
+ """
301
+ providers = load_provider_data()
302
+ if not providers and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
303
+ return [no_providers_message()]
304
+ if provider_name not in providers:
305
+ return [unknown_provider_message(provider_name, providers)]
306
+ message = missing_credential_message(provider_name,
307
+ providers[provider_name])
308
308
  return [message] if message else []