@yahyahammad/venastine 0.3.8 → 0.3.9
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -19
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2030 -2002
- package/LICENSE +201 -201
- package/README.md +1034 -1034
- package/agents/builtin/compactor.md +75 -75
- package/agents/builtin/explore.md +77 -77
- package/agents/builtin/pipeline-reviewer.md +100 -100
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +106 -106
- package/agents/builtin/review.md +74 -74
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -261
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +472 -472
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +238 -146
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -528
- package/bin/venastine.py +71 -71
- package/cli_commands.py +838 -835
- package/config.yaml +13 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -1301
- package/config_schema.py +971 -966
- package/config_update.py +749 -749
- package/core/agent_activity.py +256 -256
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -452
- package/core/approval.py +137 -137
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -364
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -121
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -747
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -107
- package/core/client.py +2715 -2715
- package/core/commands.py +460 -454
- package/core/compaction.py +1735 -1735
- package/core/config_loader.py +1982 -1982
- package/core/connect.py +686 -686
- package/core/events.py +123 -123
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -280
- package/core/interaction.py +411 -411
- package/core/loop.py +2566 -2566
- package/core/memory.py +482 -482
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +190 -190
- package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -234
- package/core/reasoning/authorization.py +130 -130
- package/core/reasoning/base.py +219 -219
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +484 -484
- package/core/reasoning/events.py +149 -149
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +1561 -1561
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +345 -345
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +524 -524
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -427
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +458 -458
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +433 -433
- package/core/reasoning/source_scoring.py +855 -855
- package/core/replay.py +315 -315
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -1553
- package/credentials.py +307 -307
- package/database.py +333 -333
- package/docs/PRIVACY.md +78 -78
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -108
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -148
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -118
- package/json_store.py +343 -343
- package/logging_setup.py +295 -295
- package/main.py +3433 -3433
- package/mcp_client/client.py +733 -733
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -484
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +343 -343
- package/memories/manager.py +147 -147
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +319 -239
- package/package.json +303 -303
- package/project_init/config_files.py +282 -282
- package/project_init/generator.py +728 -728
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -418
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +147 -147
- package/prompts/critic_pass.md +24 -24
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +25 -25
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -17
- package/prompts/source_grounding.md +66 -66
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +316 -316
- package/providers.json.example +94 -94
- package/pyproject.toml +149 -149
- package/requirements.txt +295 -295
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +1082 -1082
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -419
- package/security/capability.py +207 -207
- package/security/confine.py +484 -484
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -182
- package/security/permissions.py +237 -237
- package/security/protected_paths.py +501 -501
- package/security/sandbox.py +4108 -4108
- package/skills/builtin/math/formal-specification.md +67 -67
- package/skills/builtin/math/numerical-methods.md +66 -66
- package/skills/builtin/research/experiment-design.md +62 -62
- package/skills/builtin/research/reproducibility.md +55 -55
- package/skills/builtin/research/source-evaluation.md +70 -70
- package/skills/builtin/research/statistical-inference.md +63 -63
- package/skills/builtin/research/technical-writing.md +59 -59
- package/skills/builtin/software/code-review.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/debugging.md +61 -61
- package/skills/builtin/software/test-design.md +67 -67
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +110 -110
- package/storage.py +1338 -1338
- package/tools/base.py +465 -465
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +667 -667
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -267
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -681
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +371 -371
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +720 -720
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -184
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +76 -76
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +227 -227
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -224
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +464 -464
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +175 -175
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +980 -980
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +149 -149
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +328 -328
- package/tools/context.py +159 -159
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -387
- package/tools/registry.py +1242 -1242
- package/tui/app.py +8318 -8307
- package/tui/app.tcss +747 -739
- package/tui/commands.py +26 -26
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -286
- package/tui/history.py +128 -128
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -102
- package/tui/markdown.py +1329 -1329
- package/tui/meters.py +364 -364
- package/tui/ravens.py +146 -146
- package/tui/screens.py +1255 -1197
- package/tui/themes.py +599 -599
- package/tui/widgets.py +3813 -3796
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"""
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mcp_client/registration.py
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Turns connected MCP servers' tools into ToolSpecs and puts them in the
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registry at runtime (D15). ROADMAP_v2 §17.
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Naming is `mcp__<server>__<tool>`, which is what makes the rest of the
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system work without special cases:
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* security.permissions._default_for_unknown_tool() allows the prefix,
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* _default_for_unknown_approval() requires approval for it (§17 D),
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* assert_permissions_declared() exempts it (D24),
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* tui/ravens.py maps unknown tool names to a generic working state, so
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MCP tools animate with no table edit.
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Tool SCHEMAS are authored in Anthropic's native shape everywhere in this
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project and translated per-provider at the boundary in core/client.py.
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MCP's Tool is already almost that shape, so this is a rename rather than
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a translation -- but it is still done HERE, once, rather than teaching
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core/client.py about MCP types.
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"""
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import json
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import logging
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import re
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from security import permissions
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from tools.base import BUDGET_IO, GRANT_ANYWHERE, ToolSpec
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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NAME_PREFIX = "mcp__"
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# WHAT A PROVIDER WILL ACCEPT AS A TOOL NAME. Anthropic, OpenAI and Google
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# all publish the same rule -- `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$` -- and BOTH halves
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# of the composed name are outside this repository's control: the server
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# half is a free-form key in mcp.json, the tool half comes from the server.
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# Verified against the installed mcp==2.0.0, and again on 2.2.0 and 2.3.0:
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# Tool.model_fields["name"] is a bare required `str` with empty metadata --
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# no pattern, no max length.
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#
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# The prefix spends 7 of the 64 before either name starts.
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#
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# Checked HERE because this is the last place the fact is knowable:
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# registration is the one function that sees the server name and the tool
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# name together, and neither core/client.py (which translates schemas) nor
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# tools/registry.py (which dispatches) has a reason to know what a
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# provider will accept. All 31 of this harness's own tool names satisfy the
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# rule, which is what makes it a bound on third-party names rather than a
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# constraint the project would have to live down to.
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MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = 64
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_NAME_CHAR = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]")
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# THE TWO BOUNDS ON THIRD-PARTY TEXT IN AN ADVERTISED SCHEMA. Both are
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# paid on EVERY model call for the rest of the session, because
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# registry.schemas() is recomputed at the top of each one (K7) -- which is
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# the difference between these and the bound on a tool RESULT (A79),
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# paid once per call.
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#
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# Deliberately NOT config.MAX_CATALOG_TEXT_CHARS. 300 is right for a
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# one-line catalog bullet and would mutilate a legitimate tool
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# description; sharing the constant would couple two bounds that answer
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# different questions. 2000 is 2.5x the longest description this harness
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# ships (786, `shell_interactive`) and 25x smaller than the 50 KB a probe
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# drove through here.
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MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_CHARS = 2000
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# And the whole advertised schema, because `description` is not the only
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# third-party string in it: input_schema arrives from the server untouched
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# and a property description is model-facing text in the same request.
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# Capping the strings INSIDE it was declined -- a truncated enum or
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# pattern is a tool that fails at call time instead of load time -- so an
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# oversized schema loses the tool instead, by name, which is the outcome
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# shape the collision branch below already has. 16384 is ~3.6x the largest
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# schema this harness ships (4544, `shell`).
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MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS = 16384
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# server name -> the exact tool names registered for it.
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#
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# THE PREFIX IS NOT A PARSER. `mcp__<server>__<tool>` cannot be taken
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# apart again: neither `__` in a server name nor `__` in a tool name is
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# illegal anywhere, and both occur. Two consequences, both silent:
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#
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# * teardown by prefix over-matches. Disconnecting server "fs" scans for
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# "mcp__fs__", which also matches every tool of a still-connected
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# server named "fs__legacy" -- unregistering live tools and dropping
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# their approval defaults.
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# * names collide. tool_name_for("a", "b__c") and
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# tool_name_for("a__b", "c") are the same string, so registry.register
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# silently overwrites: a tool the user believes is approval-gated on
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# server `a` runs server `a__b`'s handler under a__b's autoApprove.
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#
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# A trusted project's .venastine/mcp.json can choose the colliding server
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# name -- the D29 impersonation threat, one separator away.
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#
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# Recording what was actually registered fixes both without rejecting any
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# mcp.json content, which decision G rules out: validation here is by
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# CONNECTING, not by schema.
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#
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# THAT SENTENCE IS ABOUT THESE TWO HAZARDS AND NOT ABOUT NAMES IN GENERAL,
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# and batch 150 is where the difference started to matter. A name that
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# COLLIDES is recorded rather than rejected, as above. A name no provider
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# will accept is refused at registration (A30), which is not up-front
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# schema validation of mcp.json -- nothing below reads the file -- and is
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# decision G's own remedy: that one server's named failure rather than a
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# startup error for everything else.
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_registered: dict = {}
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def tool_name_for(server_name: str, tool_name: str) -> str:
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return f"{NAME_PREFIX}{server_name}__{tool_name}"
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def _illegal_chars(text: str) -> list:
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return sorted({c for c in text if not _NAME_CHAR.match(c)})
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def _unadvertisable(name: str) -> str:
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"""Why no provider will accept this as a tool name, or "".
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A REASON rather than a boolean, because it is going into a log line
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somebody has to act on: the server is theirs to rename and the tool is
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not, and which one they can fix depends on which half is wrong.
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"""
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if not name:
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return "it is empty"
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if len(name) > MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS:
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return (f"it is {len(name)} characters and the limit is "
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f"{MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS}")
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bad = _illegal_chars(name)
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if bad:
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return ("it contains " + ", ".join(repr(c) for c in bad)
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+ "; only letters, digits, '_' and '-' are accepted")
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return ""
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def _bounded(text: str) -> str:
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"""One line, capped -- A5's two rules on a string that enters every
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model call, applied at the producer.
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The same shape as core/config_loader._catalog_text, including the
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VISIBLE ellipsis (a model reading a cut-off description should be able
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to tell), with its own constant for the reason stated above. A5's
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security half applies here too, one step removed: a tool schema is a
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JSON array rather than a rendered list, so a newline cannot leave its
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bullet the way #131's did -- but the newlines still arrive, and what
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they can do then depends on a consumer. That dependence is what A5
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exists to remove, and this project has already paid for it once at the
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consumer end: core/reasoning/authorization.py takes
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`description.strip().splitlines()[0]` for the grant picker, which is a
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consumer defending itself against this producer.
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"""
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collapsed = " ".join(str(text).split())
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return collapsed
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return collapsed[:MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_CHARS - 1].rstrip() + "\u2026"
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def _too_big(schema: dict) -> str:
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"""Why this schema cannot be advertised, or "".
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Measured on the SERIALISED form, because that is what is paid: the
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dict goes to the provider as JSON on every call. A schema that will
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not serialise at all is refused by the same gate -- it could not be
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sent either way, and finding that out here names the server instead
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of raising inside the provider branch in core/client.py.
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"""
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try:
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size = len(json.dumps(schema))
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return f"its schema is not JSON-serialisable ({e})"
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if size > MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS:
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return (f"its schema is {size} characters and the limit is "
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f"{MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS}")
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def schema_for(server_name: str, tool) -> dict:
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"""MCP Tool -> the Anthropic-native schema shape every TOOL_SCHEMA in
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tools/builtin/ uses.
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v2 spells these snake_case (.input_schema); v1 used .inputSchema. The
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getattr fallback covers both rather than breaking on a pin move --
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a stray empty schema here would be advertised to the model as a tool
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that takes no arguments, which fails at call time instead of load
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time and is the harder failure to trace.
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"""
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input_schema = (
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getattr(tool, "input_schema", None)
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or getattr(tool, "inputSchema", None)
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or {"type": "object", "properties": {}}
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)
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description = getattr(tool, "description", None) or ""
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title = getattr(tool, "title", None)
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if title and title not in description:
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description = f"{title}. {description}".strip()
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"name": tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name),
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# call covers all three strings: `title` is server-supplied too
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# and reaches the model through this field, which a cap applied
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# before the concatenation would have missed.
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"description": _bounded(f"[MCP: {server_name}] {description}"),
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"input_schema": input_schema,
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}
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def _make_handler(client, server_name: str, tool_name: str):
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into the tool layer. client.call_tool() does the crossing (D2a) and
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returns an already-normalized dict (D23)."""
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def handler(params: dict) -> dict:
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212
|
-
return client.call_tool(server_name, tool_name, params)
|
|
213
|
-
return handler
|
|
214
|
-
|
|
215
|
-
|
|
216
|
-
def register_all(client, registry) -> list:
|
|
217
|
-
"""Register every tool from every connected server. Returns the tool
|
|
218
|
-
names registered, so a caller can report what became available."""
|
|
219
|
-
registered = []
|
|
220
|
-
for server_name in sorted(client.clients):
|
|
221
|
-
cfg = client.server_configs.get(server_name)
|
|
222
|
-
auto_approve = bool(getattr(cfg, "auto_approve", False))
|
|
223
|
-
# ONE WARNING FOR THE SERVER, not one per tool: a character the
|
|
224
|
-
# rule rejects in the SERVER half poisons every name it composes,
|
|
225
|
-
# and `"my.server"` or `"api.example.com"` is an ordinary
|
|
226
|
-
# mcp.json key. The tool half is checked per tool below, where
|
|
227
|
-
# only that tool is lost.
|
|
228
|
-
bad_chars = _illegal_chars(server_name)
|
|
229
|
-
if bad_chars:
|
|
230
|
-
logger.warning(
|
|
231
|
-
"MCP server %r can compose no advertisable tool name: its "
|
|
232
|
-
"name contains %s, and a provider accepts only letters, "
|
|
233
|
-
"digits, '_' and '-' in a tool name. Rename the server in "
|
|
234
|
-
"mcp.json; none of its tools are registered.",
|
|
235
|
-
server_name, ", ".join(repr(c) for c in bad_chars))
|
|
236
|
-
continue
|
|
237
|
-
try:
|
|
238
|
-
tools = client.list_tools(server_name)
|
|
239
|
-
except Exception as e:
|
|
240
|
-
logger.warning("Could not list tools for MCP server %r: %s",
|
|
241
|
-
server_name, e)
|
|
242
|
-
continue
|
|
243
|
-
|
|
244
|
-
for tool in tools:
|
|
245
|
-
name = tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name)
|
|
246
|
-
# REFUSE, DO NOT MANGLE (A30). A silently renamed tool is one
|
|
247
|
-
# the model cannot name back, and the prefix is not a parser,
|
|
248
|
-
# so a generated name maps to no server. Refusing is also the
|
|
249
|
-
# only outcome that keeps this module's own invariant the
|
|
250
|
-
# right way up: "one unreachable server must never take down
|
|
251
|
-
# the others" has an inversion, and advertising a name no
|
|
252
|
-
# provider accepts is it -- one list comprehension builds the
|
|
253
|
-
# whole `tools` array, so one bad name makes EVERY request
|
|
254
|
-
# malformed, in plain chat and all ten research passes, and a
|
|
255
|
-
# 400 is not transient so nothing retries it.
|
|
256
|
-
#
|
|
257
|
-
# Within decision G rather than against it: G says an entry we
|
|
258
|
-
# cannot make sense of becomes that one server's NAMED
|
|
259
|
-
# failure instead of a startup error for everything else,
|
|
260
|
-
# which is exactly what this is. What G rules out is
|
|
261
|
-
# up-front SCHEMA validation of mcp.json, and nothing here
|
|
262
|
-
# reads the file.
|
|
263
|
-
schema = schema_for(server_name, tool)
|
|
264
|
-
refusal = _unadvertisable(name) or _too_big(schema)
|
|
265
|
-
if refusal:
|
|
266
|
-
logger.warning(
|
|
267
|
-
"MCP tool %r from server %r cannot be advertised: %s. "
|
|
268
|
-
"Skipping it; the server's other tools are unaffected.",
|
|
269
|
-
name, server_name, refusal)
|
|
270
|
-
continue
|
|
271
|
-
if name in registry._tools:
|
|
272
|
-
# Never overwrite. The colliding registration would replace
|
|
273
|
-
# BOTH the handler and (via set_dynamic_approval_default
|
|
274
|
-
# below) the approval policy of a tool already in place --
|
|
275
|
-
# so refusing loudly is the only outcome that can't be
|
|
276
|
-
# mistaken for the tool the user thinks they are calling.
|
|
277
|
-
logger.warning(
|
|
278
|
-
"MCP tool name collision: %r from server %r is already "
|
|
279
|
-
"registered; skipping it. Rename one of the servers or "
|
|
280
|
-
"tools -- '__' in a name makes these ambiguous.",
|
|
281
|
-
name, server_name)
|
|
282
|
-
continue
|
|
283
|
-
# Base approval default BEFORE registering, so there is no
|
|
284
|
-
# window in which the tool is callable without its policy set.
|
|
285
|
-
permissions.set_dynamic_approval_default(name, not auto_approve)
|
|
286
|
-
registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
287
|
-
name=name,
|
|
288
|
-
schema=schema,
|
|
289
|
-
handler=_make_handler(client, server_name, tool.name),
|
|
290
|
-
# §25 R13. Stated here rather than left to
|
|
291
|
-
# registry.grant_policy's mcp__* fallback: this is the
|
|
292
|
-
# site that makes the decision, and MCP tools are the
|
|
293
|
-
# grant picker's real population -- R1's argument that
|
|
294
|
-
# the tool's own description is the whole of informed
|
|
295
|
-
# consent was written about exactly these, because MCP
|
|
296
|
-
# exposes no read-only/write metadata for anything to
|
|
297
|
-
# reason from. The fallback stays as documentation for
|
|
298
|
-
# any other dynamic registrant.
|
|
299
|
-
grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE,
|
|
300
|
-
# H1. Exempt from assert_budget_declared for the reason
|
|
301
|
-
# R13 exempts them -- named at connection time, so no
|
|
302
|
-
# static declaration can exist -- and declared anyway,
|
|
303
|
-
# because these tools DO have a bound and it is worth
|
|
304
|
-
# naming which: client.call_tool wraps every call in the
|
|
305
|
-
# two-layer clock DEFAULT_CALL_TIMEOUT_S backstops. That
|
|
306
|
-
# is BUDGET_IO exactly, and it is the mechanism H2 was
|
|
307
|
-
# modelled on.
|
|
308
|
-
budget=BUDGET_IO,
|
|
309
|
-
))
|
|
310
|
-
_registered.setdefault(server_name, []).append(name)
|
|
311
|
-
registered.append(name)
|
|
312
|
-
|
|
313
|
-
if auto_approve:
|
|
314
|
-
# WARNING, not INFO (F4): TranscriptLogHandler forwards
|
|
315
|
-
# WARNING+ into the TUI transcript, and on that path stderr is
|
|
316
|
-
# already closed -- at INFO this reached nothing but app.log,
|
|
317
|
-
# so the shell where approval prompts are MODALS was exactly
|
|
318
|
-
# the one never told some tools would not prompt. Fires every
|
|
319
|
-
# launch per auto-approved server, deliberately (#60): worst
|
|
320
|
-
# case it trains people past it, which equals today's silence;
|
|
321
|
-
# best case it is read once and someone catches a flag they
|
|
322
|
-
# did not knowingly set.
|
|
323
|
-
logger.warning("MCP server %r is auto-approved; its tools will "
|
|
324
|
-
"not prompt before running.", server_name)
|
|
325
|
-
|
|
326
|
-
logger.info("Registered %d MCP tool(s).", len(registered))
|
|
327
|
-
return registered
|
|
328
|
-
|
|
329
|
-
|
|
330
|
-
def unregister_all(registry, server_name: str = None) -> None:
|
|
331
|
-
"""Remove MCP tools from the registry and drop their approval
|
|
332
|
-
defaults. Idempotent -- disconnect handling can run more than once
|
|
333
|
-
for the same server, which is why registry.unregister() is too.
|
|
334
|
-
|
|
335
|
-
Removes exactly what register_all() put in, by name. A prefix scan
|
|
336
|
-
would take a sibling server's tools with it whenever one server's
|
|
337
|
-
name is a `__`-prefix of another's (see _registered above).
|
|
338
|
-
"""
|
|
339
|
-
servers = [server_name] if server_name is not None else list(_registered)
|
|
340
|
-
for server in servers:
|
|
341
|
-
for name in _registered.pop(server, []):
|
|
342
|
-
registry.unregister(name)
|
|
343
|
-
permissions.clear_dynamic_approval_defaults(name)
|
|
1
|
+
"""
|
|
2
|
+
mcp_client/registration.py
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
Turns connected MCP servers' tools into ToolSpecs and puts them in the
|
|
5
|
+
registry at runtime (D15). ROADMAP_v2 §17.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
Naming is `mcp__<server>__<tool>`, which is what makes the rest of the
|
|
8
|
+
system work without special cases:
|
|
9
|
+
* security.permissions._default_for_unknown_tool() allows the prefix,
|
|
10
|
+
* _default_for_unknown_approval() requires approval for it (§17 D),
|
|
11
|
+
* assert_permissions_declared() exempts it (D24),
|
|
12
|
+
* tui/ravens.py maps unknown tool names to a generic working state, so
|
|
13
|
+
MCP tools animate with no table edit.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
Tool SCHEMAS are authored in Anthropic's native shape everywhere in this
|
|
16
|
+
project and translated per-provider at the boundary in core/client.py.
|
|
17
|
+
MCP's Tool is already almost that shape, so this is a rename rather than
|
|
18
|
+
a translation -- but it is still done HERE, once, rather than teaching
|
|
19
|
+
core/client.py about MCP types.
|
|
20
|
+
"""
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
import json
|
|
23
|
+
import logging
|
|
24
|
+
import re
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
from security import permissions
|
|
27
|
+
from tools.base import BUDGET_IO, GRANT_ANYWHERE, ToolSpec
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
NAME_PREFIX = "mcp__"
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
# WHAT A PROVIDER WILL ACCEPT AS A TOOL NAME. Anthropic, OpenAI and Google
|
|
34
|
+
# all publish the same rule -- `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,64}$` -- and BOTH halves
|
|
35
|
+
# of the composed name are outside this repository's control: the server
|
|
36
|
+
# half is a free-form key in mcp.json, the tool half comes from the server.
|
|
37
|
+
# Verified against the installed mcp==2.0.0, and again on 2.2.0 and 2.3.0:
|
|
38
|
+
# Tool.model_fields["name"] is a bare required `str` with empty metadata --
|
|
39
|
+
# no pattern, no max length.
|
|
40
|
+
#
|
|
41
|
+
# The prefix spends 7 of the 64 before either name starts.
|
|
42
|
+
#
|
|
43
|
+
# Checked HERE because this is the last place the fact is knowable:
|
|
44
|
+
# registration is the one function that sees the server name and the tool
|
|
45
|
+
# name together, and neither core/client.py (which translates schemas) nor
|
|
46
|
+
# tools/registry.py (which dispatches) has a reason to know what a
|
|
47
|
+
# provider will accept. All 31 of this harness's own tool names satisfy the
|
|
48
|
+
# rule, which is what makes it a bound on third-party names rather than a
|
|
49
|
+
# constraint the project would have to live down to.
|
|
50
|
+
MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS = 64
|
|
51
|
+
_NAME_CHAR = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]")
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
# THE TWO BOUNDS ON THIRD-PARTY TEXT IN AN ADVERTISED SCHEMA. Both are
|
|
54
|
+
# paid on EVERY model call for the rest of the session, because
|
|
55
|
+
# registry.schemas() is recomputed at the top of each one (K7) -- which is
|
|
56
|
+
# the difference between these and the bound on a tool RESULT (A79),
|
|
57
|
+
# paid once per call.
|
|
58
|
+
#
|
|
59
|
+
# Deliberately NOT config.MAX_CATALOG_TEXT_CHARS. 300 is right for a
|
|
60
|
+
# one-line catalog bullet and would mutilate a legitimate tool
|
|
61
|
+
# description; sharing the constant would couple two bounds that answer
|
|
62
|
+
# different questions. 2000 is 2.5x the longest description this harness
|
|
63
|
+
# ships (786, `shell_interactive`) and 25x smaller than the 50 KB a probe
|
|
64
|
+
# drove through here.
|
|
65
|
+
MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_CHARS = 2000
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
# And the whole advertised schema, because `description` is not the only
|
|
68
|
+
# third-party string in it: input_schema arrives from the server untouched
|
|
69
|
+
# and a property description is model-facing text in the same request.
|
|
70
|
+
# Capping the strings INSIDE it was declined -- a truncated enum or
|
|
71
|
+
# pattern is a tool that fails at call time instead of load time -- so an
|
|
72
|
+
# oversized schema loses the tool instead, by name, which is the outcome
|
|
73
|
+
# shape the collision branch below already has. 16384 is ~3.6x the largest
|
|
74
|
+
# schema this harness ships (4544, `shell`).
|
|
75
|
+
MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS = 16384
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
# server name -> the exact tool names registered for it.
|
|
78
|
+
#
|
|
79
|
+
# THE PREFIX IS NOT A PARSER. `mcp__<server>__<tool>` cannot be taken
|
|
80
|
+
# apart again: neither `__` in a server name nor `__` in a tool name is
|
|
81
|
+
# illegal anywhere, and both occur. Two consequences, both silent:
|
|
82
|
+
#
|
|
83
|
+
# * teardown by prefix over-matches. Disconnecting server "fs" scans for
|
|
84
|
+
# "mcp__fs__", which also matches every tool of a still-connected
|
|
85
|
+
# server named "fs__legacy" -- unregistering live tools and dropping
|
|
86
|
+
# their approval defaults.
|
|
87
|
+
# * names collide. tool_name_for("a", "b__c") and
|
|
88
|
+
# tool_name_for("a__b", "c") are the same string, so registry.register
|
|
89
|
+
# silently overwrites: a tool the user believes is approval-gated on
|
|
90
|
+
# server `a` runs server `a__b`'s handler under a__b's autoApprove.
|
|
91
|
+
#
|
|
92
|
+
# A trusted project's .venastine/mcp.json can choose the colliding server
|
|
93
|
+
# name -- the D29 impersonation threat, one separator away.
|
|
94
|
+
#
|
|
95
|
+
# Recording what was actually registered fixes both without rejecting any
|
|
96
|
+
# mcp.json content, which decision G rules out: validation here is by
|
|
97
|
+
# CONNECTING, not by schema.
|
|
98
|
+
#
|
|
99
|
+
# THAT SENTENCE IS ABOUT THESE TWO HAZARDS AND NOT ABOUT NAMES IN GENERAL,
|
|
100
|
+
# and batch 150 is where the difference started to matter. A name that
|
|
101
|
+
# COLLIDES is recorded rather than rejected, as above. A name no provider
|
|
102
|
+
# will accept is refused at registration (A30), which is not up-front
|
|
103
|
+
# schema validation of mcp.json -- nothing below reads the file -- and is
|
|
104
|
+
# decision G's own remedy: that one server's named failure rather than a
|
|
105
|
+
# startup error for everything else.
|
|
106
|
+
_registered: dict = {}
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
def tool_name_for(server_name: str, tool_name: str) -> str:
|
|
110
|
+
return f"{NAME_PREFIX}{server_name}__{tool_name}"
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
def _illegal_chars(text: str) -> list:
|
|
114
|
+
return sorted({c for c in text if not _NAME_CHAR.match(c)})
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
|
|
117
|
+
def _unadvertisable(name: str) -> str:
|
|
118
|
+
"""Why no provider will accept this as a tool name, or "".
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
A REASON rather than a boolean, because it is going into a log line
|
|
121
|
+
somebody has to act on: the server is theirs to rename and the tool is
|
|
122
|
+
not, and which one they can fix depends on which half is wrong.
|
|
123
|
+
"""
|
|
124
|
+
if not name:
|
|
125
|
+
return "it is empty"
|
|
126
|
+
if len(name) > MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS:
|
|
127
|
+
return (f"it is {len(name)} characters and the limit is "
|
|
128
|
+
f"{MAX_TOOL_NAME_CHARS}")
|
|
129
|
+
bad = _illegal_chars(name)
|
|
130
|
+
if bad:
|
|
131
|
+
return ("it contains " + ", ".join(repr(c) for c in bad)
|
|
132
|
+
+ "; only letters, digits, '_' and '-' are accepted")
|
|
133
|
+
return ""
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
|
|
136
|
+
def _bounded(text: str) -> str:
|
|
137
|
+
"""One line, capped -- A5's two rules on a string that enters every
|
|
138
|
+
model call, applied at the producer.
|
|
139
|
+
|
|
140
|
+
The same shape as core/config_loader._catalog_text, including the
|
|
141
|
+
VISIBLE ellipsis (a model reading a cut-off description should be able
|
|
142
|
+
to tell), with its own constant for the reason stated above. A5's
|
|
143
|
+
security half applies here too, one step removed: a tool schema is a
|
|
144
|
+
JSON array rather than a rendered list, so a newline cannot leave its
|
|
145
|
+
bullet the way #131's did -- but the newlines still arrive, and what
|
|
146
|
+
they can do then depends on a consumer. That dependence is what A5
|
|
147
|
+
exists to remove, and this project has already paid for it once at the
|
|
148
|
+
consumer end: core/reasoning/authorization.py takes
|
|
149
|
+
`description.strip().splitlines()[0]` for the grant picker, which is a
|
|
150
|
+
consumer defending itself against this producer.
|
|
151
|
+
"""
|
|
152
|
+
collapsed = " ".join(str(text).split())
|
|
153
|
+
if len(collapsed) <= MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_CHARS:
|
|
154
|
+
return collapsed
|
|
155
|
+
return collapsed[:MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION_CHARS - 1].rstrip() + "\u2026"
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
def _too_big(schema: dict) -> str:
|
|
159
|
+
"""Why this schema cannot be advertised, or "".
|
|
160
|
+
|
|
161
|
+
Measured on the SERIALISED form, because that is what is paid: the
|
|
162
|
+
dict goes to the provider as JSON on every call. A schema that will
|
|
163
|
+
not serialise at all is refused by the same gate -- it could not be
|
|
164
|
+
sent either way, and finding that out here names the server instead
|
|
165
|
+
of raising inside the provider branch in core/client.py.
|
|
166
|
+
"""
|
|
167
|
+
try:
|
|
168
|
+
size = len(json.dumps(schema))
|
|
169
|
+
except (TypeError, ValueError) as e:
|
|
170
|
+
return f"its schema is not JSON-serialisable ({e})"
|
|
171
|
+
if size > MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS:
|
|
172
|
+
return (f"its schema is {size} characters and the limit is "
|
|
173
|
+
f"{MAX_TOOL_SCHEMA_CHARS}")
|
|
174
|
+
return ""
|
|
175
|
+
|
|
176
|
+
|
|
177
|
+
def schema_for(server_name: str, tool) -> dict:
|
|
178
|
+
"""MCP Tool -> the Anthropic-native schema shape every TOOL_SCHEMA in
|
|
179
|
+
tools/builtin/ uses.
|
|
180
|
+
|
|
181
|
+
v2 spells these snake_case (.input_schema); v1 used .inputSchema. The
|
|
182
|
+
getattr fallback covers both rather than breaking on a pin move --
|
|
183
|
+
a stray empty schema here would be advertised to the model as a tool
|
|
184
|
+
that takes no arguments, which fails at call time instead of load
|
|
185
|
+
time and is the harder failure to trace.
|
|
186
|
+
"""
|
|
187
|
+
input_schema = (
|
|
188
|
+
getattr(tool, "input_schema", None)
|
|
189
|
+
or getattr(tool, "inputSchema", None)
|
|
190
|
+
or {"type": "object", "properties": {}}
|
|
191
|
+
)
|
|
192
|
+
description = getattr(tool, "description", None) or ""
|
|
193
|
+
title = getattr(tool, "title", None)
|
|
194
|
+
if title and title not in description:
|
|
195
|
+
description = f"{title}. {description}".strip()
|
|
196
|
+
return {
|
|
197
|
+
"name": tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name),
|
|
198
|
+
# BOUNDED AFTER the prefix and the title are composed in, so one
|
|
199
|
+
# call covers all three strings: `title` is server-supplied too
|
|
200
|
+
# and reaches the model through this field, which a cap applied
|
|
201
|
+
# before the concatenation would have missed.
|
|
202
|
+
"description": _bounded(f"[MCP: {server_name}] {description}"),
|
|
203
|
+
"input_schema": input_schema,
|
|
204
|
+
}
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
def _make_handler(client, server_name: str, tool_name: str):
|
|
208
|
+
"""A genuinely plain synchronous function -- no bridging logic leaks
|
|
209
|
+
into the tool layer. client.call_tool() does the crossing (D2a) and
|
|
210
|
+
returns an already-normalized dict (D23)."""
|
|
211
|
+
def handler(params: dict) -> dict:
|
|
212
|
+
return client.call_tool(server_name, tool_name, params)
|
|
213
|
+
return handler
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
|
|
216
|
+
def register_all(client, registry) -> list:
|
|
217
|
+
"""Register every tool from every connected server. Returns the tool
|
|
218
|
+
names registered, so a caller can report what became available."""
|
|
219
|
+
registered = []
|
|
220
|
+
for server_name in sorted(client.clients):
|
|
221
|
+
cfg = client.server_configs.get(server_name)
|
|
222
|
+
auto_approve = bool(getattr(cfg, "auto_approve", False))
|
|
223
|
+
# ONE WARNING FOR THE SERVER, not one per tool: a character the
|
|
224
|
+
# rule rejects in the SERVER half poisons every name it composes,
|
|
225
|
+
# and `"my.server"` or `"api.example.com"` is an ordinary
|
|
226
|
+
# mcp.json key. The tool half is checked per tool below, where
|
|
227
|
+
# only that tool is lost.
|
|
228
|
+
bad_chars = _illegal_chars(server_name)
|
|
229
|
+
if bad_chars:
|
|
230
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
231
|
+
"MCP server %r can compose no advertisable tool name: its "
|
|
232
|
+
"name contains %s, and a provider accepts only letters, "
|
|
233
|
+
"digits, '_' and '-' in a tool name. Rename the server in "
|
|
234
|
+
"mcp.json; none of its tools are registered.",
|
|
235
|
+
server_name, ", ".join(repr(c) for c in bad_chars))
|
|
236
|
+
continue
|
|
237
|
+
try:
|
|
238
|
+
tools = client.list_tools(server_name)
|
|
239
|
+
except Exception as e:
|
|
240
|
+
logger.warning("Could not list tools for MCP server %r: %s",
|
|
241
|
+
server_name, e)
|
|
242
|
+
continue
|
|
243
|
+
|
|
244
|
+
for tool in tools:
|
|
245
|
+
name = tool_name_for(server_name, tool.name)
|
|
246
|
+
# REFUSE, DO NOT MANGLE (A30). A silently renamed tool is one
|
|
247
|
+
# the model cannot name back, and the prefix is not a parser,
|
|
248
|
+
# so a generated name maps to no server. Refusing is also the
|
|
249
|
+
# only outcome that keeps this module's own invariant the
|
|
250
|
+
# right way up: "one unreachable server must never take down
|
|
251
|
+
# the others" has an inversion, and advertising a name no
|
|
252
|
+
# provider accepts is it -- one list comprehension builds the
|
|
253
|
+
# whole `tools` array, so one bad name makes EVERY request
|
|
254
|
+
# malformed, in plain chat and all ten research passes, and a
|
|
255
|
+
# 400 is not transient so nothing retries it.
|
|
256
|
+
#
|
|
257
|
+
# Within decision G rather than against it: G says an entry we
|
|
258
|
+
# cannot make sense of becomes that one server's NAMED
|
|
259
|
+
# failure instead of a startup error for everything else,
|
|
260
|
+
# which is exactly what this is. What G rules out is
|
|
261
|
+
# up-front SCHEMA validation of mcp.json, and nothing here
|
|
262
|
+
# reads the file.
|
|
263
|
+
schema = schema_for(server_name, tool)
|
|
264
|
+
refusal = _unadvertisable(name) or _too_big(schema)
|
|
265
|
+
if refusal:
|
|
266
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
267
|
+
"MCP tool %r from server %r cannot be advertised: %s. "
|
|
268
|
+
"Skipping it; the server's other tools are unaffected.",
|
|
269
|
+
name, server_name, refusal)
|
|
270
|
+
continue
|
|
271
|
+
if name in registry._tools:
|
|
272
|
+
# Never overwrite. The colliding registration would replace
|
|
273
|
+
# BOTH the handler and (via set_dynamic_approval_default
|
|
274
|
+
# below) the approval policy of a tool already in place --
|
|
275
|
+
# so refusing loudly is the only outcome that can't be
|
|
276
|
+
# mistaken for the tool the user thinks they are calling.
|
|
277
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
278
|
+
"MCP tool name collision: %r from server %r is already "
|
|
279
|
+
"registered; skipping it. Rename one of the servers or "
|
|
280
|
+
"tools -- '__' in a name makes these ambiguous.",
|
|
281
|
+
name, server_name)
|
|
282
|
+
continue
|
|
283
|
+
# Base approval default BEFORE registering, so there is no
|
|
284
|
+
# window in which the tool is callable without its policy set.
|
|
285
|
+
permissions.set_dynamic_approval_default(name, not auto_approve)
|
|
286
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
287
|
+
name=name,
|
|
288
|
+
schema=schema,
|
|
289
|
+
handler=_make_handler(client, server_name, tool.name),
|
|
290
|
+
# §25 R13. Stated here rather than left to
|
|
291
|
+
# registry.grant_policy's mcp__* fallback: this is the
|
|
292
|
+
# site that makes the decision, and MCP tools are the
|
|
293
|
+
# grant picker's real population -- R1's argument that
|
|
294
|
+
# the tool's own description is the whole of informed
|
|
295
|
+
# consent was written about exactly these, because MCP
|
|
296
|
+
# exposes no read-only/write metadata for anything to
|
|
297
|
+
# reason from. The fallback stays as documentation for
|
|
298
|
+
# any other dynamic registrant.
|
|
299
|
+
grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE,
|
|
300
|
+
# H1. Exempt from assert_budget_declared for the reason
|
|
301
|
+
# R13 exempts them -- named at connection time, so no
|
|
302
|
+
# static declaration can exist -- and declared anyway,
|
|
303
|
+
# because these tools DO have a bound and it is worth
|
|
304
|
+
# naming which: client.call_tool wraps every call in the
|
|
305
|
+
# two-layer clock DEFAULT_CALL_TIMEOUT_S backstops. That
|
|
306
|
+
# is BUDGET_IO exactly, and it is the mechanism H2 was
|
|
307
|
+
# modelled on.
|
|
308
|
+
budget=BUDGET_IO,
|
|
309
|
+
))
|
|
310
|
+
_registered.setdefault(server_name, []).append(name)
|
|
311
|
+
registered.append(name)
|
|
312
|
+
|
|
313
|
+
if auto_approve:
|
|
314
|
+
# WARNING, not INFO (F4): TranscriptLogHandler forwards
|
|
315
|
+
# WARNING+ into the TUI transcript, and on that path stderr is
|
|
316
|
+
# already closed -- at INFO this reached nothing but app.log,
|
|
317
|
+
# so the shell where approval prompts are MODALS was exactly
|
|
318
|
+
# the one never told some tools would not prompt. Fires every
|
|
319
|
+
# launch per auto-approved server, deliberately (#60): worst
|
|
320
|
+
# case it trains people past it, which equals today's silence;
|
|
321
|
+
# best case it is read once and someone catches a flag they
|
|
322
|
+
# did not knowingly set.
|
|
323
|
+
logger.warning("MCP server %r is auto-approved; its tools will "
|
|
324
|
+
"not prompt before running.", server_name)
|
|
325
|
+
|
|
326
|
+
logger.info("Registered %d MCP tool(s).", len(registered))
|
|
327
|
+
return registered
|
|
328
|
+
|
|
329
|
+
|
|
330
|
+
def unregister_all(registry, server_name: str = None) -> None:
|
|
331
|
+
"""Remove MCP tools from the registry and drop their approval
|
|
332
|
+
defaults. Idempotent -- disconnect handling can run more than once
|
|
333
|
+
for the same server, which is why registry.unregister() is too.
|
|
334
|
+
|
|
335
|
+
Removes exactly what register_all() put in, by name. A prefix scan
|
|
336
|
+
would take a sibling server's tools with it whenever one server's
|
|
337
|
+
name is a `__`-prefix of another's (see _registered above).
|
|
338
|
+
"""
|
|
339
|
+
servers = [server_name] if server_name is not None else list(_registered)
|
|
340
|
+
for server in servers:
|
|
341
|
+
for name in _registered.pop(server, []):
|
|
342
|
+
registry.unregister(name)
|
|
343
|
+
permissions.clear_dynamic_approval_defaults(name)
|