@yahyahammad/venastine 0.2.0 → 0.3.8
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -14
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2002 -0
- package/NOTICE +1 -1
- package/README.md +233 -94
- package/agents/builtin/build.md +73 -0
- package/agents/builtin/general.md +80 -0
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +23 -5
- package/agents/builtin/test.md +65 -0
- package/agents/builtin/writer.md +67 -0
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -195
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +277 -43
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +7 -12
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -382
- package/bin/venastine.py +71 -0
- package/cli_commands.py +835 -0
- package/config.py +95 -1198
- package/config.yaml +1090 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -0
- package/config_schema.py +966 -0
- package/config_update.py +749 -0
- package/core/agent_activity.py +158 -20
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -0
- package/core/approval.py +27 -5
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -0
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -0
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -0
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -0
- package/core/client.py +1238 -82
- package/core/commands.py +454 -0
- package/core/compaction.py +830 -66
- package/core/config_loader.py +516 -97
- package/core/connect.py +686 -0
- package/core/events.py +68 -6
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -0
- package/core/interaction.py +87 -4
- package/core/line_pattern.py +128 -0
- package/core/loop.py +1516 -440
- package/core/memory.py +120 -8
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +23 -9
- package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -0
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +70 -54
- package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +19 -1
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +232 -53
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +90 -31
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +133 -7
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -361
- package/core/reasoning/review.py +659 -615
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +38 -14
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +110 -4
- package/core/replay.py +158 -26
- package/core/session.py +36 -12
- package/core/session_view.py +259 -0
- package/core/session_wake.py +259 -0
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -0
- package/core/workspace_trust.py +1 -1
- package/credentials.py +308 -180
- package/database.py +82 -1
- package/{PRIVACY.md → docs/PRIVACY.md} +19 -7
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -0
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -0
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -77
- package/json_store.py +236 -16
- package/logging_setup.py +121 -11
- package/main.py +1671 -199
- package/mcp_client/client.py +257 -23
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -379
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +163 -2
- package/memories/manager.py +15 -0
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +7 -12
- package/package.json +234 -4
- package/project_init/config_files.py +4 -0
- package/project_init/generator.py +201 -37
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -406
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +7 -4
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +1 -1
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -15
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +64 -10
- package/providers.json.example +94 -92
- package/pyproject.toml +51 -2
- package/requirements.txt +252 -29
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +353 -17
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -0
- package/security/capability.py +37 -7
- package/security/confine.py +484 -0
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -0
- package/security/permissions.py +54 -7
- package/security/posture.py +124 -12
- package/security/protected_paths.py +198 -6
- package/security/sandbox.py +3262 -139
- package/security/secrets.py +855 -0
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +3 -4
- package/storage.py +368 -35
- package/tools/base.py +465 -305
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +306 -16
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -61
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -223
- package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +231 -213
- package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +35 -4
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +239 -21
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +341 -33
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -148
- package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +2 -2
- package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +66 -23
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +10 -0
- package/tools/builtin/logic.py +171 -12
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +46 -12
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -228
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +80 -21
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +21 -4
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +586 -67
- package/tools/builtin/shell_sessions.py +613 -0
- package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +80 -10
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +5 -3
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +329 -151
- package/tools/context.py +23 -0
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -314
- package/tools/registry.py +347 -30
- package/tui/app.py +4645 -438
- package/tui/app.tcss +185 -2
- package/tui/commands.py +10 -154
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -265
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -0
- package/tui/markdown.py +60 -10
- package/tui/meters.py +103 -7
- package/tui/screens.py +346 -92
- package/tui/themes.py +59 -19
- package/tui/widgets.py +1575 -111
- package/SECURITY.md +0 -88
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +0 -100
package/tools/registry.py
CHANGED
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@@ -21,35 +21,63 @@ ROADMAP_v2 §15:
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import inspect
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import logging
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Optional
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import config
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from
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from agents import subagent_tool
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from safety.policy_enforcement import (
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check_input_policy,
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check_output_policy,
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param_digest,
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redacted_values,
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)
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from security.permissions import (
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APPROVAL_BY_SHELL_MODE,
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assert_permissions_declared,
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is_tool_allowed,
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requires_approval,
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)
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from tools import isolation
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from tools.
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from tools.base import (
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BUDGET_COMPUTE,
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BUDGET_HUMAN,
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BUDGET_IO,
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GRANT_ANYWHERE,
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GRANT_NEVER,
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GRANT_SIGNOFF_ONLY,
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OPENS_CALL,
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OPENS_SESSION,
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OPENS_THREAD,
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ToolSpec,
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assert_budget_declared,
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assert_grant_policy_declared,
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)
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from
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from tools.builtin import (
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arxiv,
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ask_user,
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discrete_math,
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fetch_url,
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file_ops,
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geometry,
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get_time,
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linear_algebra,
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load_skill,
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logic,
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pin,
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probability_stats,
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project_docs,
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remember,
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shell,
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shell_sessions,
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symbolic_math,
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todo,
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web_search,
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)
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from safety.policy_enforcement import (check_input_policy,
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check_output_policy,
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param_digest,
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redacted_values)
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from agents import subagent_tool
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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if TYPE_CHECKING: # pragma: no cover - typing only
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from tools.context import
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from tools.context import RunInfo, ToolContext
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# Handler parameter names dispatch() will inject, by signature inspection
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# threaded through params because it is a run-scoped value, exactly
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# like response_channel beside it.
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"activity",
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# ROADMAP_v3 §61 (CN7): the turn's CancelToken, for spawn_subagent. A
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# child run is the parent's turn continuing, so stopping the parent
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# stops it -- and the only way a value reaches a run that happens
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# INSIDE a tool call is this list, which is `activity`'s own argument
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# one line up.
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"cancel",
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# ROADMAP_v2 §47: the model's own id for THIS call. A tool that
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# creates something durable can then record which call created it,
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# which is what lets one line in a transcript find one row in the
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# database when a turn made three of them. Injected rather than put
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# tool call, and a model that could write its own call id could
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# claim a line it did not make.
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"call_id",
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self._tools.pop(tool_name, None)
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def _advertised(self, name: str, spec, context
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def _advertised(self, name: str, spec, context,
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images: bool = False) -> bool:
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"""The two §15 filters, shared by schemas() and
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headless_hidden(): policy allowability plus the tool's own
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"nothing to act on" signal
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"nothing to act on" signal -- and, since ROADMAP_v3 §81 (IM6), a
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third: a tool whose result carries an image is offered only where
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the caller says images can be delivered.
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`images` DEFAULTS FALSE, so a caller that never heard of images
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hides such a tool rather than offering one whose result the model
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could not see. The loop is the one caller that knows the answer,
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and it passes it."""
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def _answered_by_grant(self, tool_name: str, granted) -> bool:
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"""Whether schemas() would advertise this tool right now.
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* granted (§25 R15) -- names a pre-flight grant already answered
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for. Those stay advertised even with no channel, because the
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approval question HAS an answer; see _answered_by_grant.
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* images (ROADMAP_v3 §81, IM6) -- whether an image in a tool
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result can reach the model in this run. A tool that declares
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`returns_images` is dropped when it cannot; see _advertised.
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WHAT callable_only GUARANTEES, stated because the converse does not
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hold and #158 is what assuming it costs: it means SOME call shape
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granted)]
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granted, images)]
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are dropped by schemas(callable_only=True) -- i.e. advertised yet
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# disagrees with itself.
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]
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def image_hidden(
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"""ROADMAP_v3 §81 (IM6). Names that would be advertised if images
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could be delivered, and are dropped because they cannot. The loop
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logs exactly this list, once, for headless_hidden()'s reason: a
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tool the user enabled and the model never sees is named and
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explained, not silently absent.
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Written as the two calls it means, like headless_hidden() above,
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so the list and the schemas can only disagree if is_advertised
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disagrees with itself.
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"""
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name for name in self._tools
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def approval_needed(
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key = self.rationale_param(tool_name)
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def opens_thread(self, tool_name: str) -> bool:
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"""Whether a call to this tool creates a thread of its own (§47).
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Mechanism, not policy, exactly like request_kind below: a reader
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asks rather than knowing that spawn_subagent is special. Two
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consumers -- core/replay.py, deciding what a stored tool line
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carries, and the TUI, deciding which live line to arm -- and one
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declaration between them.
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False for an unknown tool, which is what an MCP tool registered
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at runtime is until it says otherwise.
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"""
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return bool(spec is not None and spec.opens_thread)
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def opens_session(self, tool_name: str) -> bool:
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"""Whether a call to this tool starts a background session (§49,
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SS14). `opens_thread`'s sibling, and False for an unknown tool for
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the same reason."""
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return bool(spec is not None and spec.opens_session)
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def opens(self, tool_name: str) -> tuple:
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"""What a call to this tool OPENS: `("thread",)`, `("session",)` or
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|
+
`("call",)` (§47, extended by §49 SS14, widened by §55 TR7).
|
|
618
|
+
|
|
619
|
+
THE ONE QUESTION A CONSUMER ASKS, and the reason the two flags above
|
|
620
|
+
are not read directly outside this class. core/replay.py and the TUI
|
|
621
|
+
each decide what a tool line carries; before this they asked
|
|
622
|
+
`opens_thread` and would each have had to grow the same second
|
|
623
|
+
branch, which is how the live line and the replayed one come to
|
|
624
|
+
disagree about what is clickable -- the exact divergence
|
|
625
|
+
`opens_thread`'s own docstring exists to prevent, one kind over.
|
|
626
|
+
|
|
627
|
+
THERE IS NO LONGER AN EMPTY ANSWER, and the contract that replaced
|
|
628
|
+
it is the one thing to read here before changing a caller. Until
|
|
629
|
+
§55 this returned `()` for a line that opened nothing, and the two
|
|
630
|
+
consumers paired that falsy tuple with a call id as their gate:
|
|
631
|
+
`opens and call_id`. TR7 makes every call openable -- its own
|
|
632
|
+
params and its own result, which is the half of a tool call nothing
|
|
633
|
+
rendered -- so the kind is always present and THE CALL ID IS THE
|
|
634
|
+
ONLY GATE. A call the model made without an id cannot be looked up
|
|
635
|
+
in the archive and is the one unarmed line.
|
|
636
|
+
|
|
637
|
+
OPENS_CALL IS ANSWERED WITHOUT A REGISTRY LOOKUP, deliberately.
|
|
638
|
+
`opens_thread` and `opens_session` are False for a tool this
|
|
639
|
+
registry has never seen -- which is what an MCP tool registered at
|
|
640
|
+
runtime is until it says otherwise, and what a tool removed between
|
|
641
|
+
a thread being written and being replayed is for ever. Neither of
|
|
642
|
+
those is a reason to hide a stored result: the archive holds the
|
|
643
|
+
call and its result whatever this process knows about the tool, so
|
|
644
|
+
the fallback is a property of the ARCHIVE rather than of the
|
|
645
|
+
registry, and asking would only teach it to lie about old threads.
|
|
646
|
+
|
|
647
|
+
A tuple rather than a string because the two consumers carry
|
|
648
|
+
`(kind, call id)` into style metadata as one unit, and because the
|
|
649
|
+
shape outlived the falsy contract that first chose it.
|
|
650
|
+
"""
|
|
651
|
+
if self.opens_thread(tool_name):
|
|
652
|
+
return (OPENS_THREAD,)
|
|
653
|
+
if self.opens_session(tool_name):
|
|
654
|
+
return (OPENS_SESSION,)
|
|
655
|
+
return (OPENS_CALL,)
|
|
656
|
+
|
|
657
|
+
def parallel(self, tool_name: str) -> bool:
|
|
658
|
+
"""Whether several calls to this tool in one response may run at
|
|
659
|
+
the same time (§47 slice 8, NA9).
|
|
660
|
+
|
|
661
|
+
Mechanism, not policy, in `opens_thread`'s exact shape and for its
|
|
662
|
+
reason: core/loop.py partitions a response by asking, so the file
|
|
663
|
+
that decides what runs concurrently names no tool.
|
|
664
|
+
|
|
665
|
+
False for an unknown tool, which is what an MCP tool registered at
|
|
666
|
+
runtime is until it says otherwise -- and the answer that keeps a
|
|
667
|
+
stranger's tool sequential, which is the safe one here.
|
|
668
|
+
"""
|
|
669
|
+
spec = self._tools.get(tool_name)
|
|
670
|
+
return bool(spec is not None and spec.parallel)
|
|
671
|
+
|
|
515
672
|
def request_kind(self, tool_name: str) -> str:
|
|
516
673
|
"""Which kind of question approving this tool asks (§23).
|
|
517
674
|
|
|
@@ -600,6 +757,8 @@ class ToolRegistry:
|
|
|
600
757
|
signoff=None,
|
|
601
758
|
memory=None,
|
|
602
759
|
activity=None,
|
|
760
|
+
call_id=None,
|
|
761
|
+
cancel=None,
|
|
603
762
|
) -> dict:
|
|
604
763
|
# Unknown-tool guard: ValueError, deliberately NOT ToolCallDenied.
|
|
605
764
|
# The two exception types separate "you misnamed it" from "policy
|
|
@@ -637,7 +796,33 @@ class ToolRegistry:
|
|
|
637
796
|
if refused is not None:
|
|
638
797
|
logger.info("%s refused before approval: %s",
|
|
639
798
|
tool_name, refused)
|
|
640
|
-
|
|
799
|
+
# THROUGH THE REDACTOR, like every other result (batch 156,
|
|
800
|
+
# A60). This was the one `return` in this function that did
|
|
801
|
+
# not, and it is a result path: the success path, the
|
|
802
|
+
# handler-exception path and the depth cap all pass the call
|
|
803
|
+
# below, and this one went straight out.
|
|
804
|
+
#
|
|
805
|
+
# IT WAS NOT A THEORETICAL HOLE. Measured (batch 156) through
|
|
806
|
+
# this very function: `spawn_subagent` with an `agent_name` of
|
|
807
|
+
# `ghp_` plus 36 characters came back as "Unknown agent:
|
|
808
|
+
# '<the whole token>' is not one of this harness's agents" --
|
|
809
|
+
# the full credential, to the model and to the transcript,
|
|
810
|
+
# from a value the model chose. And the harness has a scanner
|
|
811
|
+
# for exactly that input: `check_input_policy` BELOW refuses
|
|
812
|
+
# the same params with "an argument contains what looks like
|
|
813
|
+
# a credential". The refusal returned above it, so both
|
|
814
|
+
# scanners were skipped on one path -- §25 (R5) exists
|
|
815
|
+
# because "the parameters were chosen by a model reading an
|
|
816
|
+
# attacker's web page", and this is where that argument was
|
|
817
|
+
# not being applied.
|
|
818
|
+
#
|
|
819
|
+
# THE SINK AND NOT THE PRODUCER, which is the same split the
|
|
820
|
+
# handler containment two inches below uses: a refusal string
|
|
821
|
+
# is written by whichever tool owns the gate, and this is the
|
|
822
|
+
# one place that covers the next one. `tools/base.py` still
|
|
823
|
+
# asks producers not to echo a value, for a reason that
|
|
824
|
+
# survives this change and is stated there.
|
|
825
|
+
return check_output_policy(tool_name, {"error": refused})
|
|
641
826
|
|
|
642
827
|
spec = self._tools[tool_name]
|
|
643
828
|
|
|
@@ -673,6 +858,8 @@ class ToolRegistry:
|
|
|
673
858
|
"signoff": signoff,
|
|
674
859
|
"memory": memory,
|
|
675
860
|
"activity": activity,
|
|
861
|
+
"call_id": call_id,
|
|
862
|
+
"cancel": cancel,
|
|
676
863
|
}
|
|
677
864
|
injected = {p: available[p] for p in self._injectable.get(tool_name, ())}
|
|
678
865
|
try:
|
|
@@ -687,8 +874,12 @@ class ToolRegistry:
|
|
|
687
874
|
# The branch is HERE, inside the containment try and at the
|
|
688
875
|
# one place a handler is ever invoked, rather than inside the
|
|
689
876
|
# six tools. A tool that isolated itself could not be called
|
|
690
|
-
# plainly by a test, and
|
|
877
|
+
# plainly by a test, and every test in test_math_tools.py
|
|
691
878
|
# would then be measuring the transport instead of the maths.
|
|
879
|
+
# (The count that used to stand here said 123 and was 131 by
|
|
880
|
+
# the time anyone checked, and 141 after batch 131 -- the
|
|
881
|
+
# ARGUMENT never needed the number, which is why it is gone
|
|
882
|
+
# rather than corrected.)
|
|
692
883
|
#
|
|
693
884
|
# `injected` is not passed: nothing in _INJECTABLE_PARAMS
|
|
694
885
|
# survives a process boundary, and assert_budget_declared
|
|
@@ -786,13 +977,55 @@ registry.register(ToolSpec("geometry", geometry.TOOL_SCHEMA, geometry.run, grant
|
|
|
786
977
|
# pre-approval, so no human is asked a question the tool would refuse
|
|
787
978
|
# anyway. The handlers re-test -- the refusal_check is the
|
|
788
979
|
# prompt-suppression half, not the enforcement.
|
|
789
|
-
registry.register(ToolSpec("read", file_ops.READ_TOOL_SCHEMA, file_ops.read_run, approval_check=file_ops._file_approval_check, refusal_check=file_ops.
|
|
790
|
-
|
|
791
|
-
|
|
980
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("read", file_ops.READ_TOOL_SCHEMA, file_ops.read_run, approval_check=file_ops._file_approval_check, refusal_check=file_ops._refusal_for("read"), grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
981
|
+
# ROADMAP_v3 §81 (IM1, IM6). `read`'s path rules exactly -- the same approval
|
|
982
|
+
# check and the same refusal shape -- plus `returns_images`, which keeps it
|
|
983
|
+
# off the schema list wherever the image could not reach the model.
|
|
984
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("view_image", file_ops.VIEW_IMAGE_TOOL_SCHEMA, file_ops.view_image_run, approval_check=file_ops._file_approval_check, refusal_check=file_ops._refusal_for("view_image"), grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, returns_images=True))
|
|
985
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("write", file_ops.WRITE_TOOL_SCHEMA, file_ops.write_run, approval_check=file_ops._file_approval_check, refusal_check=file_ops._refusal_for("write"), grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
986
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("edit", file_ops.EDIT_TOOL_SCHEMA, file_ops.edit_run, approval_check=file_ops._file_approval_check, refusal_check=file_ops._refusal_for("edit"), grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
792
987
|
# §28: approval_notice carries the capability profile into the prompt.
|
|
793
988
|
# The command text is already in the params; what it does not show is
|
|
794
989
|
# WHERE it runs, and "cat /etc/shadow" does not look like a host read.
|
|
795
990
|
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell", shell.TOOL_SCHEMA, shell.run, approval_check=shell._shell_approval_check, approval_notice=shell._shell_approval_notice, grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, rationale_param="rationale", headline_param="command"))
|
|
991
|
+
# ROADMAP_v3 §49 (SS11, SS16, SS17). Five tools over background and monitor
|
|
992
|
+
# sessions, and the two that START one are `shell` with a lifetime: the same
|
|
993
|
+
# approval_check OBJECT, because a session runs a command and a second gate
|
|
994
|
+
# over it would be the ratchet G3 removed -- _assert_shell_mode_exemption
|
|
995
|
+
# below requires that identity, which is what ties the missing
|
|
996
|
+
# `tool_approvals` field to the gate that replaces it.
|
|
997
|
+
#
|
|
998
|
+
# available_check rather than a permission: all seven are hidden wherever
|
|
999
|
+
# nothing will wake the run when a session reports (a research pass, any run
|
|
1000
|
+
# outside a chat turn or a subagent). A start is refused there too, by
|
|
1001
|
+
# refusal_check before any approval prompt and again in the handler -- but
|
|
1002
|
+
# advertising a tool that can only be refused is the D24 defect, and under
|
|
1003
|
+
# `shell_approval_mode: never` nothing else would stop a pass calling it.
|
|
1004
|
+
# SS14: the three START tools open a session, so their lines are the ones a
|
|
1005
|
+
# reader can click. `shell_output`, `shell_kill` and `shell_input` name a
|
|
1006
|
+
# session they did not create -- arming those would put the same target on
|
|
1007
|
+
# four lines, and on twenty for an interactive session that is typed into
|
|
1008
|
+
# twenty times, which makes "the line that started it" stop meaning
|
|
1009
|
+
# anything.
|
|
1010
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_background", shell_sessions.BACKGROUND_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.background_run, approval_check=shell._shell_approval_check, approval_notice=shell_sessions.background_notice, refusal_check=shell_sessions.background_refusal, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, rationale_param="rationale", headline_param="command", opens_session=True))
|
|
1011
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_monitor", shell_sessions.MONITOR_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.monitor_run, approval_check=shell._shell_approval_check, approval_notice=shell_sessions.monitor_notice, refusal_check=shell_sessions.monitor_refusal, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, rationale_param="rationale", headline_param="command", opens_session=True))
|
|
1012
|
+
# Slice 2. Its gate is NOT shell's: `_interactive_approval_check` asks
|
|
1013
|
+
# about the session being opened rather than about its first line, because
|
|
1014
|
+
# the yes covers every line that follows (SS29, SS32). The assert below
|
|
1015
|
+
# holds it to that function by identity, exactly as it holds the three
|
|
1016
|
+
# above to theirs.
|
|
1017
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_interactive", shell_sessions.INTERACTIVE_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.interactive_run, approval_check=shell._interactive_approval_check, approval_notice=shell_sessions.interactive_notice, refusal_check=shell_sessions.interactive_refusal, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, rationale_param="rationale", headline_param="command", opens_session=True))
|
|
1018
|
+
# Typing into a session is NOT a start, so `opens_session` is False: one
|
|
1019
|
+
# session would otherwise be the target of every line sent to it, which is
|
|
1020
|
+
# the same reason `shell_output` and `shell_kill` are not armed. It keeps
|
|
1021
|
+
# an approval_check because SS29's exception -- a line naming a protected
|
|
1022
|
+
# segment -- still asks, and a control key never does (SS30).
|
|
1023
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_input", shell_sessions.INPUT_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.input_run, approval_check=shell_sessions.input_approval_check, approval_notice=shell_sessions.input_notice, refusal_check=shell_sessions.input_refusal, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER, budget=BUDGET_IO, headline_param="text"))
|
|
1024
|
+
# Reading and stopping need no approval (SS11): they act only on sessions
|
|
1025
|
+
# this conversation started, which someone already approved.
|
|
1026
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_sessions", shell_sessions.SESSIONS_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.sessions_run, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
1027
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_output", shell_sessions.OUTPUT_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.output_run, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
1028
|
+
registry.register(ToolSpec("shell_kill", shell_sessions.KILL_TOOL_SCHEMA, shell_sessions.kill_run, available_check=shell_sessions.available, grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
796
1029
|
registry.register(ToolSpec("load_skill", load_skill.TOOL_SCHEMA, load_skill.run, available_check=load_skill.has_skills, grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
797
1030
|
registry.register(ToolSpec("pin", pin.TOOL_SCHEMA, pin.run, available_check=pin.available, grant_policy=GRANT_ANYWHERE, budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
798
1031
|
# §21/D26 restored (#89): the mirror of pin. Same gating posture (ungated,
|
|
@@ -860,6 +1093,18 @@ registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
|
860
1093
|
# names the destination and the size. That is the per-call consent a
|
|
861
1094
|
# gate is for, which is also why --attended was never the mode at
|
|
862
1095
|
# issue in #133.
|
|
1096
|
+
#
|
|
1097
|
+
# OFFERED TO NOTHING THAT SHIPS, measured in batch 139 and ruled
|
|
1098
|
+
# deliberate (TECHNICAL_DEBT 83). This is the only
|
|
1099
|
+
# GRANT_SIGNOFF_ONLY registration in the registry, and no agent in
|
|
1100
|
+
# agents/builtin/ declares `write_project_doc` -- so the policy
|
|
1101
|
+
# value above is correct and has no shipped instance. The sign-off
|
|
1102
|
+
# picker is for operator-configured installs: an agent that
|
|
1103
|
+
# declines to narrow `allowed_tools`, or one naming a gated tool
|
|
1104
|
+
# outright. Do not "fix" this by adding the tool to a shipped
|
|
1105
|
+
# agent -- `writer` is the only plausible candidate and its own
|
|
1106
|
+
# file refuses write capability in two places, so that is a
|
|
1107
|
+
# decision reversal and wants its own batch.
|
|
863
1108
|
grant_policy=GRANT_SIGNOFF_ONLY,
|
|
864
1109
|
budget=BUDGET_IO))
|
|
865
1110
|
registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
@@ -899,8 +1144,80 @@ registry.register(ToolSpec(
|
|
|
899
1144
|
# which agent they are authorising.
|
|
900
1145
|
grant_policy=GRANT_NEVER,
|
|
901
1146
|
budget=BUDGET_HUMAN,
|
|
1147
|
+
# TECHNICAL_DEBT 13, batch 110. The asymmetry `load_skill` did not
|
|
1148
|
+
# have: with no spawnable agent discovered, this tool's only possible
|
|
1149
|
+
# answer is `Unknown agent`, and until batch 51 shipped two of them
|
|
1150
|
+
# that was every default install. See has_agents for why it reads the
|
|
1151
|
+
# catalog function rather than the roster.
|
|
1152
|
+
available_check=subagent_tool.has_agents,
|
|
1153
|
+
# §47. The only tool that does, so far: the child runs in a thread
|
|
1154
|
+
# of its own, which is what makes `▸ spawn_subagent` a line a
|
|
1155
|
+
# reader can open.
|
|
1156
|
+
opens_thread=True,
|
|
1157
|
+
# §47 slice 8 (NA9). The only tool that declares it, and the reason
|
|
1158
|
+
# the slice exists: a model emitting three spawns in one response
|
|
1159
|
+
# meant three runs one after another, so the parallelism a subagent
|
|
1160
|
+
# swarm is FOR was spent. Safe to declare because everything the
|
|
1161
|
+
# child's run touches was made concurrency-safe first -- the budget's
|
|
1162
|
+
# lock, the serialised question, the per-future authorization -- which
|
|
1163
|
+
# is why this one field is the last line of the section rather than
|
|
1164
|
+
# the first.
|
|
1165
|
+
parallel=True,
|
|
902
1166
|
))
|
|
903
1167
|
|
|
1168
|
+
# WHICH gate each shell-mode-exempt tool must carry, by identity. A mapping
|
|
1169
|
+
# rather than the single name this started as, because slice 2 added a tool
|
|
1170
|
+
# whose gate is deliberately a different function: `shell_interactive` is
|
|
1171
|
+
# governed by `shell_approval_mode` like the rest, but asks its question
|
|
1172
|
+
# about the SESSION rather than about one command (SS29, SS32). Naming the
|
|
1173
|
+
# expected gate per tool keeps the check as strict as identity ever was and
|
|
1174
|
+
# makes it stricter in one way -- a name added to APPROVAL_BY_SHELL_MODE
|
|
1175
|
+
# with no entry here now fails, where before any shell gate would have done.
|
|
1176
|
+
_SHELL_MODE_GATES = {
|
|
1177
|
+
"shell": shell._shell_approval_check,
|
|
1178
|
+
"shell_background": shell._shell_approval_check,
|
|
1179
|
+
"shell_monitor": shell._shell_approval_check,
|
|
1180
|
+
"shell_interactive": shell._interactive_approval_check,
|
|
1181
|
+
}
|
|
1182
|
+
|
|
1183
|
+
|
|
1184
|
+
def _assert_shell_mode_exemption(tools: dict) -> None:
|
|
1185
|
+
"""SS16: every tool exempt from `tool_approvals` carries the shell gate.
|
|
1186
|
+
|
|
1187
|
+
`security.permissions.APPROVAL_BY_SHELL_MODE` is a HOLE in D24's
|
|
1188
|
+
import-time check -- the names in it may omit an approvals field -- and
|
|
1189
|
+
the whole argument for the hole is that `shell_approval_mode` decides
|
|
1190
|
+
their approval instead. That argument is true only while they actually
|
|
1191
|
+
go through that gate, so the exemption is tied to it by IDENTITY here
|
|
1192
|
+
rather than by trusting the registration to have done it: a tool that
|
|
1193
|
+
lost its approval_check, or was given one of its own, would otherwise
|
|
1194
|
+
be a command-running tool with no approval question anywhere and
|
|
1195
|
+
nothing to say so. Raises for D24's reason -- the failure it guards
|
|
1196
|
+
against is invisible at runtime.
|
|
1197
|
+
"""
|
|
1198
|
+
broken = []
|
|
1199
|
+
for name in sorted(APPROVAL_BY_SHELL_MODE):
|
|
1200
|
+
spec = tools.get(name)
|
|
1201
|
+
expected = _SHELL_MODE_GATES.get(name)
|
|
1202
|
+
if spec is None:
|
|
1203
|
+
broken.append(f"{name} is not registered")
|
|
1204
|
+
elif expected is None:
|
|
1205
|
+
broken.append(f"{name} has no declared gate in "
|
|
1206
|
+
f"_SHELL_MODE_GATES")
|
|
1207
|
+
elif spec.approval_check is not expected:
|
|
1208
|
+
broken.append(f"{name} does not use {expected.__name__}")
|
|
1209
|
+
if broken:
|
|
1210
|
+
raise RuntimeError(
|
|
1211
|
+
"These tools are exempt from tool_approvals because "
|
|
1212
|
+
"shell_approval_mode is supposed to gate them, and it does not: "
|
|
1213
|
+
f"{broken}. Either register them with the gate "
|
|
1214
|
+
"_SHELL_MODE_GATES names, or take them out of "
|
|
1215
|
+
"security.permissions.APPROVAL_BY_SHELL_MODE and give them a "
|
|
1216
|
+
"tool_approvals field (ROADMAP_v3 §49, SS16)."
|
|
1217
|
+
)
|
|
1218
|
+
|
|
1219
|
+
|
|
1220
|
+
_assert_shell_mode_exemption(registry._tools)
|
|
904
1221
|
# D24: fail loudly at import if any statically registered tool has no
|
|
905
1222
|
# declared permission/approval field. Runs here rather than in
|
|
906
1223
|
# security/permissions.py because that file must not import the registry
|