@yahyahammad/venastine 0.2.0 → 0.3.8

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (129) hide show
  1. package/.env.example +19 -14
  2. package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2002 -0
  3. package/NOTICE +1 -1
  4. package/README.md +233 -94
  5. package/agents/builtin/build.md +73 -0
  6. package/agents/builtin/general.md +80 -0
  7. package/agents/builtin/plan.md +23 -5
  8. package/agents/builtin/test.md +65 -0
  9. package/agents/builtin/writer.md +67 -0
  10. package/agents/manager.py +261 -195
  11. package/agents/subagent_tool.py +277 -43
  12. package/agents/tui_commands.py +7 -12
  13. package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -382
  14. package/bin/venastine.py +71 -0
  15. package/cli_commands.py +835 -0
  16. package/config.py +95 -1198
  17. package/config.yaml +1090 -0
  18. package/config_edit.py +1301 -0
  19. package/config_schema.py +966 -0
  20. package/config_update.py +749 -0
  21. package/core/agent_activity.py +158 -20
  22. package/core/ansi.py +452 -0
  23. package/core/approval.py +27 -5
  24. package/core/call_view.py +364 -0
  25. package/core/cancel.py +121 -0
  26. package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -0
  27. package/core/claims_view.py +107 -0
  28. package/core/client.py +1238 -82
  29. package/core/commands.py +454 -0
  30. package/core/compaction.py +830 -66
  31. package/core/config_loader.py +516 -97
  32. package/core/connect.py +686 -0
  33. package/core/events.py +68 -6
  34. package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -0
  35. package/core/interaction.py +87 -4
  36. package/core/line_pattern.py +128 -0
  37. package/core/loop.py +1516 -440
  38. package/core/memory.py +120 -8
  39. package/core/pipeline_models.py +23 -9
  40. package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -0
  41. package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +70 -54
  42. package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +19 -1
  43. package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +232 -53
  44. package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +90 -31
  45. package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +133 -7
  46. package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -361
  47. package/core/reasoning/review.py +659 -615
  48. package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +38 -14
  49. package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +110 -4
  50. package/core/replay.py +158 -26
  51. package/core/session.py +36 -12
  52. package/core/session_view.py +259 -0
  53. package/core/session_wake.py +259 -0
  54. package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -0
  55. package/core/workspace_trust.py +1 -1
  56. package/credentials.py +308 -180
  57. package/database.py +82 -1
  58. package/{PRIVACY.md → docs/PRIVACY.md} +19 -7
  59. package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -0
  60. package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -0
  61. package/env_secrets.py +118 -77
  62. package/json_store.py +236 -16
  63. package/logging_setup.py +121 -11
  64. package/main.py +1671 -199
  65. package/mcp_client/client.py +257 -23
  66. package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -379
  67. package/mcp_client/registration.py +163 -2
  68. package/memories/manager.py +15 -0
  69. package/memories/tui_commands.py +7 -12
  70. package/package.json +234 -4
  71. package/project_init/config_files.py +4 -0
  72. package/project_init/generator.py +201 -37
  73. package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -406
  74. package/project_init/tui_commands.py +7 -4
  75. package/prompts/revalidate.md +1 -1
  76. package/prompts/revise.md +17 -15
  77. package/prompts/system_prompts.py +64 -10
  78. package/providers.json.example +94 -92
  79. package/pyproject.toml +51 -2
  80. package/requirements.txt +252 -29
  81. package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +353 -17
  82. package/security/askpass.py +419 -0
  83. package/security/capability.py +37 -7
  84. package/security/confine.py +484 -0
  85. package/security/hosted.py +182 -0
  86. package/security/permissions.py +54 -7
  87. package/security/posture.py +124 -12
  88. package/security/protected_paths.py +198 -6
  89. package/security/sandbox.py +3262 -139
  90. package/security/secrets.py +855 -0
  91. package/skills/tui_commands.py +3 -4
  92. package/storage.py +368 -35
  93. package/tools/base.py +465 -305
  94. package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +306 -16
  95. package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -61
  96. package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -223
  97. package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +231 -213
  98. package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +35 -4
  99. package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +239 -21
  100. package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +341 -33
  101. package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -148
  102. package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +2 -2
  103. package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +66 -23
  104. package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +10 -0
  105. package/tools/builtin/logic.py +171 -12
  106. package/tools/builtin/pin.py +46 -12
  107. package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -228
  108. package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +80 -21
  109. package/tools/builtin/remember.py +21 -4
  110. package/tools/builtin/shell.py +586 -67
  111. package/tools/builtin/shell_sessions.py +613 -0
  112. package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +80 -10
  113. package/tools/builtin/todo.py +5 -3
  114. package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +329 -151
  115. package/tools/context.py +23 -0
  116. package/tools/isolation.py +387 -314
  117. package/tools/registry.py +347 -30
  118. package/tui/app.py +4645 -438
  119. package/tui/app.tcss +185 -2
  120. package/tui/commands.py +10 -154
  121. package/tui/diffs.py +286 -265
  122. package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -0
  123. package/tui/markdown.py +60 -10
  124. package/tui/meters.py +103 -7
  125. package/tui/screens.py +346 -92
  126. package/tui/themes.py +59 -19
  127. package/tui/widgets.py +1575 -111
  128. package/SECURITY.md +0 -88
  129. package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +0 -100
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ def _load_trust_store() -> dict:
173
173
  if not os.path.exists(path):
174
174
  return {}
175
175
  try:
176
- with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
176
+ with open(path, encoding="utf-8-sig") as f:
177
177
  data = json.load(f)
178
178
  except (OSError, ValueError):
179
179
  return {}
package/credentials.py CHANGED
@@ -1,180 +1,308 @@
1
- import json
2
- import os
3
-
4
- # #24. Resolved at IMPORT time, exactly like its four siblings --
5
- # config.DB_PATH / OUTPUT_DIR / WORKSPACE_DIR and logging_setup's log
6
- # file are all `os.environ.get(NAME, default)` evaluated once -- so a
7
- # test can still redirect it by monkeypatching the attribute, and a
8
- # user can point it anywhere with AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE before launch.
9
- # The default stays CWD-relative on purpose: for a repo-local tool,
10
- # per-checkout state is what you want, and repo-relative would share
11
- # one key file across every clone on the machine.
12
- LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE = os.environ.get("AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE", "providers.json")
13
-
14
-
15
- def no_providers_message() -> str:
16
- """The error for "the file itself is not there" (#24).
17
-
18
- ONE wording, used by both raisers -- api_initialization (the one
19
- every user actually meets) and load_credentials below -- so the two
20
- cannot drift apart the way their old messages already had.
21
-
22
- Batch 35: the LOCATION clause is conditional now, because the path is
23
- no longer always cwd-relative. AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE has always accepted
24
- an absolute path, and the npm launcher sets one when the working
25
- directory has no providers.json of its own. Naming os.getcwd()
26
- unconditionally then reported a directory the code never looked in and
27
- sent the user to create the file in the wrong place -- the exact class
28
- of defect #24 was filed about, reintroduced by a path it did not
29
- anticipate. An absolute path is already the whole answer and needs no
30
- second location.
31
- """
32
- if os.path.isabs(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
33
- found = f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found."
34
- else:
35
- found = (
36
- f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found in "
37
- f"{os.getcwd()!r}."
38
- )
39
- return (
40
- f"{found} Copy providers.json.example to "
41
- f"{LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} and add your API key."
42
- )
43
-
44
-
45
- def unknown_provider_message(provider_name: str, providers: dict) -> str:
46
- """The error for "the file is there, this provider is not in it" (#24).
47
-
48
- Names the configured set exactly like /model's refusal does, so the
49
- typo is answered where it was made rather than two layers later.
50
- """
51
- configured = ", ".join(sorted(providers)) or "none"
52
- return (
53
- f"Unknown provider: {provider_name}. Configured: {configured} "
54
- f"(file: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE})."
55
- )
56
-
57
-
58
- def load_provider_data() -> dict:
59
- if not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
60
- return {}
61
- with open(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, "r", encoding="utf-8") as file:
62
- return json.load(file)
63
-
64
-
65
- # 0600 -- owner read/write, nobody else. This file holds every LLM
66
- # provider's API key in cleartext, and a bare open(path, "w") left its
67
- # protection to the process umask: 0644 under the common default, i.e.
68
- # readable by every other account on the machine (#19).
69
- #
70
- # The blast radius of a credential file is not the file; it is the paid
71
- # API account behind it. Every comparable tool treats one as 0600
72
- # (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.ssh/id_*), and OpenSSH
73
- # goes further and REFUSES a group-readable private key.
74
- _SECRET_FILE_MODE = 0o600
75
-
76
-
77
- def _write_secret_json(path: str, data: dict) -> None:
78
- """Write JSON to a file created 0600, never world-readable even briefly.
79
-
80
- os.open with the mode, NOT open() followed by os.chmod. A post-write
81
- chmod leaves a window in which the key is on disk with the umask's
82
- permissions -- short, but it is exactly the window an attacker with
83
- local read access is waiting for, and closing it costs one line.
84
-
85
- WINDOWS: POSIX mode bits do not apply, and os.open's mode argument
86
- only controls the read-only flag there. This is a no-op on Windows
87
- rather than a wrong-op; the file's protection comes from the ACL on
88
- the user profile directory instead. The tests skip accordingly, and
89
- the CI container is where the assertion actually runs.
90
- """
91
- fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC,
92
- _SECRET_FILE_MODE)
93
- with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as file:
94
- json.dump(data, file, indent=2)
95
-
96
-
97
- def _write_provider_data(provider_data: dict) -> None:
98
- _write_secret_json(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, provider_data)
99
-
100
-
101
- def save_credentials(
102
- provider_name: str,
103
- api_key: str,
104
- api_url: str = "",
105
- is_v1_compatible: bool = True,
106
- supports_stream_usage: bool = False,
107
- ) -> None:
108
- provider_data = load_provider_data()
109
-
110
- if provider_name in provider_data:
111
- provider_data[provider_name]["API_KEY"] = api_key
112
- if api_url:
113
- provider_data[provider_name]["API_URL"] = api_url
114
- provider_data[provider_name]["is_v1_compatible"] = is_v1_compatible
115
- provider_data[provider_name]["supports_stream_usage"] = supports_stream_usage
116
- else:
117
- provider_data[provider_name] = {
118
- "API_KEY": api_key,
119
- "API_URL": api_url,
120
- "is_v1_compatible": is_v1_compatible,
121
- "supports_stream_usage": supports_stream_usage,
122
- }
123
-
124
- _write_provider_data(provider_data)
125
-
126
-
127
- def load_credentials(provider_name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
128
- provider_data = load_provider_data()
129
- # #24. The two failure modes say different things now -- "the file is
130
- # not there" is a setup problem with a one-line remedy; "the provider
131
- # is not in it" is a typo. Same builders api_initialization uses.
132
- if not provider_data and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
133
- raise ValueError(no_providers_message())
134
- if provider_name not in provider_data:
135
- raise ValueError(unknown_provider_message(provider_name, provider_data))
136
-
137
- entry = provider_data[provider_name]
138
- return entry["API_KEY"], entry.get("API_URL", "")
139
-
140
-
141
- def missing_key_message(provider_name: str) -> str:
142
- """The one wording for "configured, but with an empty API_KEY".
143
-
144
- Extracted in batch 44 for the reason no_providers_message() was: /model
145
- carried its own copy, naming providers.json literally where this file
146
- names LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, so the same fact read differently at launch
147
- and at a switch -- while tui/app.py's comment beside the launch render
148
- already claimed they were "the same fact at both moments". WARN-only at
149
- both call sites: a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint legitimately takes
150
- no key, and refusing would block a real configuration.
151
- """
152
- return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} "
153
- f"— calls will fail unless it is a local endpoint that "
154
- f"needs none.")
155
-
156
-
157
- def provider_startup_issues(provider_name: str) -> list:
158
- """What launch should say about the provider setup, before either
159
- shell starts (#138).
160
-
161
- The same three checks /model performs on a switch -- file present,
162
- provider configured, key non-empty -- applied at the moment the user
163
- chose the provider, instead of at the first model call, which is a
164
- dead end away from the mistake that caused it. WARN-ONLY, never a
165
- refusal: an OpenAI-compatible endpoint running locally legitimately
166
- takes no key (the reason /model warns there too), and refusing would
167
- block a real configuration.
168
-
169
- Empty list means healthy and says NOTHING -- silence is the healthy
170
- case's whole UX. Plain sentences, no prefix: rendering is the
171
- shell's (CLI prints, TUI write_error), so one wording reaches both.
172
- """
173
- providers = load_provider_data()
174
- if not providers and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
175
- return [no_providers_message()]
176
- if provider_name not in providers:
177
- return [unknown_provider_message(provider_name, providers)]
178
- if not providers[provider_name].get("API_KEY"):
179
- return [missing_key_message(provider_name)]
180
- return []
1
+ import json
2
+ import os
3
+
4
+ # A root module importing a root module: no new edge, and json_store.py's
5
+ # docstring names `credentials` among the things already imported from
6
+ # everywhere for that reason.
7
+ from json_store import write_json_atomic
8
+
9
+ # #24. Resolved at IMPORT time, exactly like its four siblings --
10
+ # config.DB_PATH / OUTPUT_DIR / WORKSPACE_DIR and logging_setup's log
11
+ # file are all `os.environ.get(NAME, default)` evaluated once -- so a
12
+ # test can still redirect it by monkeypatching the attribute, and a
13
+ # user can point it anywhere with AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE before launch.
14
+ # The default stays CWD-relative on purpose: for a repo-local tool,
15
+ # per-checkout state is what you want, and repo-relative would share
16
+ # one key file across every clone on the machine.
17
+ LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE = os.environ.get("AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE", "providers.json")
18
+
19
+
20
+ def no_providers_message() -> str:
21
+ """The error for "the file itself is not there" (#24).
22
+
23
+ ONE wording, used by both raisers -- api_initialization (the one
24
+ every user actually meets) and load_credentials below -- so the two
25
+ cannot drift apart the way their old messages already had.
26
+
27
+ Batch 35: the LOCATION clause is conditional now, because the path is
28
+ no longer always cwd-relative. AGENT_PROVIDERS_FILE has always accepted
29
+ an absolute path, and the npm launcher sets one when the working
30
+ directory has no providers.json of its own. Naming os.getcwd()
31
+ unconditionally then reported a directory the code never looked in and
32
+ sent the user to create the file in the wrong place -- the exact class
33
+ of defect #24 was filed about, reintroduced by a path it did not
34
+ anticipate. An absolute path is already the whole answer and needs no
35
+ second location.
36
+ """
37
+ if os.path.isabs(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
38
+ found = f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found."
39
+ else:
40
+ found = (
41
+ f"No providers configured: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} was not found in "
42
+ f"{os.getcwd()!r}."
43
+ )
44
+ return (
45
+ f"{found} Copy providers.json.example to "
46
+ f"{LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} and add your API key."
47
+ )
48
+
49
+
50
+ def unknown_provider_message(provider_name: str, providers: dict) -> str:
51
+ """The error for "the file is there, this provider is not in it" (#24).
52
+
53
+ Names the configured set exactly like /model's refusal does, so the
54
+ typo is answered where it was made rather than two layers later.
55
+ """
56
+ configured = ", ".join(sorted(providers)) or "none"
57
+ return (
58
+ f"Unknown provider: {provider_name}. Configured: {configured} "
59
+ f"(file: {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE})."
60
+ )
61
+
62
+
63
+ # ROADMAP_v3 §79 (HD5). Providers connected for THIS PROCESS ONLY, never
64
+ # written anywhere. A shared hosted demo runs every visitor in one container
65
+ # as one Unix user, so a key in a file is a key one bug away from the next
66
+ # visitor; a key in this dict lives as long as the session's process does.
67
+ # Entries here win over the file's, and the file is never told about them.
68
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS: dict = {}
69
+
70
+
71
+ def set_session_provider(provider_name: str, entry: dict) -> None:
72
+ """Connect a provider for this process without writing it to disk (HD5).
73
+
74
+ A COPY is stored, so the caller's dict cannot change it afterwards.
75
+ """
76
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS[provider_name] = dict(entry)
77
+
78
+
79
+ def clear_session_providers() -> None:
80
+ _SESSION_PROVIDERS.clear()
81
+
82
+
83
+ def _load_file_data() -> dict:
84
+ if not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
85
+ return {}
86
+ with open(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, encoding="utf-8") as file:
87
+ return json.load(file)
88
+
89
+
90
+ def load_provider_data() -> dict:
91
+ """Every configured provider: the file's entries, with any connected for
92
+ this session only laid over them (HD5).
93
+
94
+ Callers get fresh dicts each time, so mutating the answer changes
95
+ neither the file nor the session's entries. `save_credentials` reads the
96
+ FILE alone, which is what keeps a session-only key from being written
97
+ back by the next save of some other provider.
98
+ """
99
+ data = _load_file_data()
100
+ for name, entry in _SESSION_PROVIDERS.items():
101
+ data[name] = dict(entry)
102
+ return data
103
+
104
+
105
+ # 0600 -- owner read/write, nobody else. This file holds every LLM
106
+ # provider's API key in cleartext, and a bare open(path, "w") left its
107
+ # protection to the process umask: 0644 under the common default, i.e.
108
+ # readable by every other account on the machine (#19).
109
+ #
110
+ # The blast radius of a credential file is not the file; it is the paid
111
+ # API account behind it. Every comparable tool treats one as 0600
112
+ # (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.ssh/id_*), and OpenSSH
113
+ # goes further and REFUSES a group-readable private key.
114
+ _SECRET_FILE_MODE = 0o600
115
+
116
+
117
+ def _write_secret_json(path: str, data: dict) -> None:
118
+ """Write JSON to a file created 0600, never world-readable even briefly,
119
+ and never half-written.
120
+
121
+ 0600 AT CREATION, NOT open() followed by os.chmod. A post-write chmod
122
+ leaves a window in which the key is on disk with the umask's
123
+ permissions -- short, but it is exactly the window an attacker with
124
+ local read access is waiting for, and closing it costs one line.
125
+ `write_json_atomic` applies the mode to the TEMP file, which is the
126
+ same property: `os.replace` carries it across, and the key is never on
127
+ disk under the umask's permissions at any point.
128
+
129
+ WINDOWS: POSIX mode bits do not apply, and the mode argument only
130
+ controls the read-only flag there. This is a no-op on Windows rather
131
+ than a wrong-op; the file's protection comes from the ACL on the user
132
+ profile directory instead. The tests skip accordingly, and the CI
133
+ container is where the assertion actually runs.
134
+
135
+ ATOMIC SINCE BATCH 108, and this was the older half of the same defect.
136
+ It wrote `O_TRUNC` straight over the live file, so a crash, a full disk
137
+ or a kill between the truncate and the flush destroyed every stored
138
+ provider key at once -- and unlike the secrets store, this file ships
139
+ in use for every user who has ever saved a credential. `json_store.py`
140
+ was extracted to delete exactly this pattern and says so; the two files
141
+ holding credentials were the last two stores in the project still
142
+ carrying a private copy of it.
143
+ """
144
+ write_json_atomic(path, data, mode=_SECRET_FILE_MODE, indent=2)
145
+
146
+
147
+ def _write_provider_data(provider_data: dict) -> None:
148
+ _write_secret_json(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, provider_data)
149
+
150
+
151
+ def save_credentials(
152
+ provider_name: str,
153
+ api_key: str,
154
+ api_url: str = "",
155
+ is_v1_compatible: bool = True,
156
+ supports_stream_usage: bool = False,
157
+ ) -> None:
158
+ # The FILE, never the merged view: a session-only entry (HD5) read here
159
+ # would be written to disk by this save.
160
+ provider_data = _load_file_data()
161
+
162
+ if provider_name in provider_data:
163
+ provider_data[provider_name]["API_KEY"] = api_key
164
+ if api_url:
165
+ provider_data[provider_name]["API_URL"] = api_url
166
+ provider_data[provider_name]["is_v1_compatible"] = is_v1_compatible
167
+ provider_data[provider_name]["supports_stream_usage"] = supports_stream_usage
168
+ else:
169
+ provider_data[provider_name] = {
170
+ "API_KEY": api_key,
171
+ "API_URL": api_url,
172
+ "is_v1_compatible": is_v1_compatible,
173
+ "supports_stream_usage": supports_stream_usage,
174
+ }
175
+
176
+ _write_provider_data(provider_data)
177
+
178
+
179
+ def forget_key(provider_name: str) -> "str | None":
180
+ """Remove `provider_name`'s key; say where it was (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG13).
181
+
182
+ `/disconnect`'s one writer. A session-only entry (HD5) is dropped whole,
183
+ since it exists only to carry the key, and the file is not touched --
184
+ a shared deployment never writes it. Otherwise the file entry's
185
+ `API_KEY` is blanked and EVERY OTHER FIELD STAYS: the URL, the two
186
+ flags, `echoes_reasoning`, `accepts_images` -- exactly what
187
+ `save_credentials` keeps when a key is replaced, so a later `/connect`
188
+ comes back to the same entry. Returns "session", "file", or None when
189
+ there was no key to forget.
190
+ """
191
+ if _SESSION_PROVIDERS.pop(provider_name, None) is not None:
192
+ return "session"
193
+ provider_data = _load_file_data()
194
+ entry = provider_data.get(provider_name)
195
+ if not entry or not entry.get("API_KEY"):
196
+ return None
197
+ entry["API_KEY"] = ""
198
+ _write_provider_data(provider_data)
199
+ return "file"
200
+
201
+
202
+ def load_credentials(provider_name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
203
+ provider_data = load_provider_data()
204
+ # #24. The two failure modes say different things now -- "the file is
205
+ # not there" is a setup problem with a one-line remedy; "the provider
206
+ # is not in it" is a typo. Same builders api_initialization uses.
207
+ if not provider_data and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
208
+ raise ValueError(no_providers_message())
209
+ if provider_name not in provider_data:
210
+ raise ValueError(unknown_provider_message(provider_name, provider_data))
211
+
212
+ entry = provider_data[provider_name]
213
+ return entry["API_KEY"], entry.get("API_URL", "")
214
+
215
+
216
+ def missing_key_message(provider_name: str) -> str:
217
+ """The one wording for "configured, but with an empty API_KEY".
218
+
219
+ Extracted in batch 44 for the reason no_providers_message() was: /model
220
+ carried its own copy, naming providers.json literally where this file
221
+ names LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE, so the same fact read differently at launch
222
+ and at a switch -- while tui/app.py's comment beside the launch render
223
+ already claimed they were "the same fact at both moments". WARN-only at
224
+ both call sites: a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint legitimately takes
225
+ no key, and refusing would block a real configuration.
226
+ """
227
+ return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE} "
228
+ f"— calls will fail unless it is a local endpoint that "
229
+ f"needs none.")
230
+
231
+
232
+ def empty_key_refusal(provider_name: str) -> str:
233
+ """What a SEND says when a provider that cannot go keyless has no key.
234
+
235
+ missing_key_message is the launch and /model WARNING, and its "unless it
236
+ is a local endpoint" is true there. This is the refusal at the moment a
237
+ client would be built, for a provider with no local-endpoint case at all
238
+ (batch 234: ANTHROPIC). anthropic 0.116.0 refused an empty key itself
239
+ with a TypeError naming the problem; 2.x builds `Authorization: Bearer `,
240
+ httpx2 refuses that header before anything is sent, and the SDK reports
241
+ it as "Connection error." -- which core/provider_errors.py rightly
242
+ treats as transient, so it was retried as a network blip.
243
+ """
244
+ return (f"{provider_name} has no API_KEY in {LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE}, and its "
245
+ f"SDK cannot send a request without one. Add the key there, or "
246
+ f"with /connect {provider_name.lower()} in the TUI.")
247
+
248
+
249
+ def missing_credential_message(provider_name: str,
250
+ entry: dict) -> "str | None":
251
+ """What to say when `provider_name` has nothing to authenticate with, or
252
+ None when it has something. The ONE test, for launch and for every
253
+ command that switches a provider.
254
+
255
+ A key for every provider but one. The ChatGPT plan's entry holds no key
256
+ BY DESIGN (ROADMAP_v3 §83, CG20) and its credential is the sign-in in
257
+ `chatgpt_auth.json`, so testing the key said "calls will fail" -- in
258
+ red, at launch and after each `/model CHATGPT` -- about a plan that was
259
+ signed in and answering (batch 189, the owner's live check). Three call
260
+ sites each tested the key on their own, which is why one fix here rather
261
+ than three there.
262
+
263
+ On a hosted deployment the plan has no credential at all (CG1): the
264
+ answer there is why, never "/connect chatgpt signs in", which that
265
+ deployment refuses (batch 195). Signed in or not -- a token file
266
+ carried onto one still cannot reach the plan (core/client.py).
267
+ """
268
+ if provider_name == "CHATGPT":
269
+ # Imported here: core.chatgpt_auth imports this module.
270
+ from core import chatgpt_auth
271
+ from security import hosted
272
+
273
+ if hosted.is_hosted():
274
+ return chatgpt_auth.LOCAL_ONLY
275
+ if chatgpt_auth.status().signed_in:
276
+ return None
277
+ return ("The ChatGPT plan is not signed in, so CHATGPT cannot answer. "
278
+ "/connect chatgpt signs in.")
279
+ if entry.get("API_KEY"):
280
+ return None
281
+ return missing_key_message(provider_name)
282
+
283
+
284
+ def provider_startup_issues(provider_name: str) -> list:
285
+ """What launch should say about the provider setup, before either
286
+ shell starts (#138).
287
+
288
+ The same three checks /model performs on a switch -- file present,
289
+ provider configured, a credential present (a key, or for the ChatGPT
290
+ plan its sign-in: `missing_credential_message`) -- applied at the moment the user
291
+ chose the provider, instead of at the first model call, which is a
292
+ dead end away from the mistake that caused it. WARN-ONLY, never a
293
+ refusal: an OpenAI-compatible endpoint running locally legitimately
294
+ takes no key (the reason /model warns there too), and refusing would
295
+ block a real configuration.
296
+
297
+ Empty list means healthy and says NOTHING -- silence is the healthy
298
+ case's whole UX. Plain sentences, no prefix: rendering is the
299
+ shell's (CLI prints, TUI write_error), so one wording reaches both.
300
+ """
301
+ providers = load_provider_data()
302
+ if not providers and not os.path.exists(LLM_PROVIDERS_FILE):
303
+ return [no_providers_message()]
304
+ if provider_name not in providers:
305
+ return [unknown_provider_message(provider_name, providers)]
306
+ message = missing_credential_message(provider_name,
307
+ providers[provider_name])
308
+ return [message] if message else []
package/database.py CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ table schema.
9
9
 
10
10
  import logging
11
11
 
12
- from sqlmodel import create_engine, SQLModel
12
+ from sqlmodel import SQLModel, create_engine
13
13
 
14
14
  import config
15
15
 
@@ -23,6 +23,87 @@ engine = create_engine(
23
23
  connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
24
24
  )
25
25
 
26
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27
+ # ---- Concurrent writers (ROADMAP_v2 §47 slice 8) --------------------------
28
+ # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29
+ #
30
+ # `check_same_thread: False` has always been here, because the TUI drains the
31
+ # loop on a worker thread while the UI thread reads. What was never true
32
+ # until NA9 is that two writers could be in flight at once: one agent ran at
33
+ # a time, so the pool handed out one connection that mattered and SQLite's
34
+ # single-writer rule cost nothing.
35
+ #
36
+ # MEASURED, at the real engine against a real database, because this is the
37
+ # one hazard in the slice it would have been easiest to assume. Each shape is
38
+ # N threads creating a subagent thread and writing 200 messages to it, which
39
+ # is a child run's shape:
40
+ #
41
+ # writers journal=delete journal=WAL
42
+ # 3 0 errors, 2.94s 0 errors, 1.31s
43
+ # 8 1 "database is 0 errors, 3.21s
44
+ # locked", 6.78s
45
+ # 16 -- 1 "database is locked", 6.00s
46
+ #
47
+ # So at SUBAGENT_MAX_PARALLEL = 3 the shipped configuration does NOT lock,
48
+ # and WAL is enabled anyway for the two things the table shows: it removes
49
+ # the failure at 8, which is where a raised ceiling lands, and it is a little
50
+ # over twice as fast at 3, which is the configuration everyone runs. A
51
+ # concurrency ceiling that is a tunable constant invites being tuned, and the
52
+ # failure it walks into is a lost message rather than a slow one.
53
+ #
54
+ # THE BUSY TIMEOUT WAS ALREADY 5000ms and this does not change it. Measured
55
+ # too, via `PRAGMA busy_timeout`: SQLAlchemy's pysqlite dialect passes
56
+ # `timeout=5.0` to sqlite3.connect by default. It is restated here rather
57
+ # than left implicit because it is load-bearing for the numbers above, and a
58
+ # default nobody wrote down is a number that can change under us.
59
+ #
60
+ # ON CONNECT rather than once at import: `journal_mode` is persistent in the
61
+ # file but the pool opens connections over the life of the process and a
62
+ # fresh database file arrives with none of this, so the reliable place to
63
+ # state it is every connection. Contained and logged for the reason
64
+ # everything at this layer is: WAL needs shared memory, which some network
65
+ # filesystems do not provide, and a harness that refuses to start because it
66
+ # could not make its journal faster would be a self-inflicted outage.
67
+
68
+
69
+ def _apply_sqlite_pragmas(dbapi_connection, _record) -> None:
70
+ """WAL and an explicit busy timeout, per connection. See above."""
71
+ try:
72
+ cursor = dbapi_connection.cursor()
73
+ try:
74
+ cursor.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
75
+ cursor.execute("PRAGMA busy_timeout=5000")
76
+ finally:
77
+ cursor.close()
78
+ except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 -- a slower journal is not an outage
79
+ logger.warning(
80
+ "Could not set journal_mode=WAL on this database; continuing on "
81
+ "whatever journal it has. Concurrent subagent writes may "
82
+ "contend. This is expected on filesystems without shared "
83
+ "memory support.", exc_info=True)
84
+
85
+
86
+ # Imported here rather than at the top so the listener registration reads as
87
+ # one unit with the reasoning above it.
88
+ from sqlalchemy import event as _sqlalchemy_event # noqa: E402
89
+ from sqlalchemy.engine import Engine as _SqlAlchemyEngine # noqa: E402
90
+
91
+ # ONLY ON A REAL ENGINE, and the condition is named rather than caught.
92
+ #
93
+ # The suite's root conftest stubs `sqlmodel` into sys.modules before
94
+ # collection, so `create_engine` above returns a plain namespace there and
95
+ # `listens_for` raises InvalidRequestError on it -- at import, which is a
96
+ # collection error for every test that touches storage. An `except` around
97
+ # the registration would fix that and would also swallow a genuine
98
+ # misregistration in production, silently, leaving the journal on `delete`
99
+ # with nothing said. An isinstance check cannot: a real engine always
100
+ # passes it, so a production failure still raises.
101
+ #
102
+ # Same seam `ensure_columns` already uses one function down, for the same
103
+ # stated reason -- a boundary that only works in production is not a seam.
104
+ if isinstance(engine, _SqlAlchemyEngine):
105
+ _sqlalchemy_event.listens_for(engine, "connect")(_apply_sqlite_pragmas)
106
+
26
107
 
27
108
  def create_db_and_tables() -> None:
28
109
  """Creates any table that doesn't exist yet. Safe to call every startup.