@yahyahammad/venastine 0.2.0 → 0.3.8
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.env.example +19 -14
- package/CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md +2002 -0
- package/NOTICE +1 -1
- package/README.md +233 -94
- package/agents/builtin/build.md +73 -0
- package/agents/builtin/general.md +80 -0
- package/agents/builtin/plan.md +23 -5
- package/agents/builtin/test.md +65 -0
- package/agents/builtin/writer.md +67 -0
- package/agents/manager.py +261 -195
- package/agents/subagent_tool.py +277 -43
- package/agents/tui_commands.py +7 -12
- package/bin/venastine.mjs +528 -382
- package/bin/venastine.py +71 -0
- package/cli_commands.py +835 -0
- package/config.py +95 -1198
- package/config.yaml +1090 -0
- package/config_edit.py +1301 -0
- package/config_schema.py +966 -0
- package/config_update.py +749 -0
- package/core/agent_activity.py +158 -20
- package/core/ansi.py +452 -0
- package/core/approval.py +27 -5
- package/core/call_view.py +364 -0
- package/core/cancel.py +121 -0
- package/core/chatgpt_auth.py +747 -0
- package/core/claims_view.py +107 -0
- package/core/client.py +1238 -82
- package/core/commands.py +454 -0
- package/core/compaction.py +830 -66
- package/core/config_loader.py +516 -97
- package/core/connect.py +686 -0
- package/core/events.py +68 -6
- package/core/file_mentions.py +280 -0
- package/core/interaction.py +87 -4
- package/core/line_pattern.py +128 -0
- package/core/loop.py +1516 -440
- package/core/memory.py +120 -8
- package/core/pipeline_models.py +23 -9
- package/core/provider_errors.py +234 -0
- package/core/reasoning/confidence_scoring.py +70 -54
- package/core/reasoning/json_retry.py +19 -1
- package/core/reasoning/orchestrator.py +232 -53
- package/core/reasoning/output_writer.py +90 -31
- package/core/reasoning/payload_validation.py +133 -7
- package/core/reasoning/pipeline_storage.py +427 -361
- package/core/reasoning/review.py +659 -615
- package/core/reasoning/scholar.py +38 -14
- package/core/reasoning/source_corpus.py +110 -4
- package/core/replay.py +158 -26
- package/core/session.py +36 -12
- package/core/session_view.py +259 -0
- package/core/session_wake.py +259 -0
- package/core/shell_sessions.py +1553 -0
- package/core/workspace_trust.py +1 -1
- package/credentials.py +308 -180
- package/database.py +82 -1
- package/{PRIVACY.md → docs/PRIVACY.md} +19 -7
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +108 -0
- package/docs/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +148 -0
- package/env_secrets.py +118 -77
- package/json_store.py +236 -16
- package/logging_setup.py +121 -11
- package/main.py +1671 -199
- package/mcp_client/client.py +257 -23
- package/mcp_client/config.py +484 -379
- package/mcp_client/registration.py +163 -2
- package/memories/manager.py +15 -0
- package/memories/tui_commands.py +7 -12
- package/package.json +234 -4
- package/project_init/config_files.py +4 -0
- package/project_init/generator.py +201 -37
- package/project_init/manifest.py +418 -406
- package/project_init/tui_commands.py +7 -4
- package/prompts/revalidate.md +1 -1
- package/prompts/revise.md +17 -15
- package/prompts/system_prompts.py +64 -10
- package/providers.json.example +94 -92
- package/pyproject.toml +51 -2
- package/requirements.txt +252 -29
- package/safety/policy_enforcement.py +353 -17
- package/security/askpass.py +419 -0
- package/security/capability.py +37 -7
- package/security/confine.py +484 -0
- package/security/hosted.py +182 -0
- package/security/permissions.py +54 -7
- package/security/posture.py +124 -12
- package/security/protected_paths.py +198 -6
- package/security/sandbox.py +3262 -139
- package/security/secrets.py +855 -0
- package/skills/tui_commands.py +3 -4
- package/storage.py +368 -35
- package/tools/base.py +465 -305
- package/tools/builtin/_math_common.py +306 -16
- package/tools/builtin/_net_common.py +267 -61
- package/tools/builtin/arxiv.py +681 -223
- package/tools/builtin/ask_user.py +231 -213
- package/tools/builtin/discrete_math.py +35 -4
- package/tools/builtin/fetch_url.py +239 -21
- package/tools/builtin/file_ops.py +341 -33
- package/tools/builtin/geometry.py +184 -148
- package/tools/builtin/get_time.py +2 -2
- package/tools/builtin/linear_algebra.py +66 -23
- package/tools/builtin/load_skill.py +10 -0
- package/tools/builtin/logic.py +171 -12
- package/tools/builtin/pin.py +46 -12
- package/tools/builtin/probability_stats.py +224 -228
- package/tools/builtin/project_docs.py +80 -21
- package/tools/builtin/remember.py +21 -4
- package/tools/builtin/shell.py +586 -67
- package/tools/builtin/shell_sessions.py +613 -0
- package/tools/builtin/symbolic_math.py +80 -10
- package/tools/builtin/todo.py +5 -3
- package/tools/builtin/web_search.py +329 -151
- package/tools/context.py +23 -0
- package/tools/isolation.py +387 -314
- package/tools/registry.py +347 -30
- package/tui/app.py +4645 -438
- package/tui/app.tcss +185 -2
- package/tui/commands.py +10 -154
- package/tui/diffs.py +286 -265
- package/tui/hosted_driver.py +102 -0
- package/tui/markdown.py +60 -10
- package/tui/meters.py +103 -7
- package/tui/screens.py +346 -92
- package/tui/themes.py +59 -19
- package/tui/widgets.py +1575 -111
- package/SECURITY.md +0 -88
- package/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +0 -100
package/config.py
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# {"provider_name": "OPENAI", "model": "gpt-5.1"},
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# {"provider_name": "GOOGLE", "model": "gemini-2.5-pro"},
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# ]
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# --- Sampling-parameter support (ROADMAP_v2 §16 prerequisite) ---
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# Models that reject temperature/top_p/top_k. Current Anthropic models
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# removed these parameters outright (any value returns HTTP 400); Sonnet 5
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# rejects non-default values. Steering is expected to happen through
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# prompting and MODEL_EFFORT_LEVELS instead.
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# queryable, see MODEL_EFFORT_LEVELS) there is nothing to ask. Same posture
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# incompleteness is safe here because the failure is a loud 400, not a
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# silent wrong answer.
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MODELS_REJECTING_SAMPLING_PARAMS = frozenset({
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"claude-fable-5",
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"claude-mythos-5",
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"claude-opus-5",
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"claude-opus-4-8",
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"claude-opus-4-7",
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"claude-sonnet-5",
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})
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# --- Critic-model routing (ROADMAP §11) ---
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# Route the critic/grounding passes (3a, 3b, 6c) to a different model than
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# the generator, so a model isn't checking its own output for errors.
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# None means every pass uses the same provider/model — no special routing.
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# Example to enable: {"provider_name": "OPENAI", "model": "gpt-5.1"}
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CRITIC_MODEL: dict | None = None
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# --- Embedder routing (ROADMAP_v2 §45, SQ2/SQ7) ---
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# The model that turns a claim and a source passage into vectors, so
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# `similarity_score` is a cosine rather than a self-report. None -- the
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# default -- means the pipeline warns once at launch and falls back to the
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# grounding model's own number, under source_grounding.md's anchored
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# rubric.
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#
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# `config.py` ONLY, with no settings.json key, following CRITIC_MODEL and
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# ENSEMBLE_MODELS (E2): choosing a provider is a grant, and this one sends
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# claim text and fetched page text to whoever is named. `/embedder` writes
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# to the user-tier store in core/pipeline_models.py, which OUTRANKS this.
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# Example: {"provider_name": "OPENAI", "model": "text-embedding-3-small"}
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EMBEDDER_MODEL: dict | None = None
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# Asymmetric embedders score materially worse without their prefixes and
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# table rather than something inferred. Keyed by a substring of the model
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# slug, longest match wins; a model matching nothing gets no prefix, which
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# is correct for every symmetric embedder (OpenAI's, Cohere's, Voyage's).
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# provider. Incomplete on purpose: an unlisted asymmetric model scores
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# lower than it should, which is visible in the artifact as a low cosine
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# on a source that plainly matches -- and adding a row is the fix.
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# to publish a wrong number. Unrelated text sits near 0.1 on some models
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# and above 0.7 on others, so the same passage would score "irrelevant" on
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# Keyed by a substring of the model slug, longest match wins; anything
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# unlisted takes DEFAULT_SIMILARITY_CALIBRATION. The RAW cosine is always
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# recorded beside the calibrated score, so a bad row here is visible in
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# the artifact and fixable after the fact rather than baked in.
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SIMILARITY_CALIBRATION: dict[str, dict] = {
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"text-embedding-3": {"floor": 0.10, "ceiling": 0.65},
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"text-embedding-ada": {"floor": 0.70, "ceiling": 0.92},
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"e5-": {"floor": 0.70, "ceiling": 0.92},
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"multilingual-e5": {"floor": 0.70, "ceiling": 0.92},
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"bge-": {"floor": 0.55, "ceiling": 0.85},
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"gte-": {"floor": 0.55, "ceiling": 0.88},
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"nomic-embed": {"floor": 0.40, "ceiling": 0.80},
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"embed-english": {"floor": 0.25, "ceiling": 0.80},
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"voyage": {"floor": 0.35, "ceiling": 0.85},
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"gemini-embedding": {"floor": 0.35, "ceiling": 0.85},
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}
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DEFAULT_SIMILARITY_CALIBRATION = {"floor": 0.25, "ceiling": 0.85}
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EMBEDDER_PREFIXES: dict[str, dict] = {
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"e5-": {"query": "query: ", "passage": "passage: "},
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"multilingual-e5": {"query": "query: ", "passage": "passage: "},
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"bge-": {"query": "Represent this sentence for searching relevant passages: ",
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"passage": ""},
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"gte-": {"query": "", "passage": ""},
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"nomic-embed": {"query": "search_query: ", "passage": "search_document: "},
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"gemini-embedding": {"query_task_type": "RETRIEVAL_QUERY",
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"passage_task_type": "RETRIEVAL_DOCUMENT"},
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"text-embedding-004": {"query_task_type": "RETRIEVAL_QUERY",
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"passage_task_type": "RETRIEVAL_DOCUMENT"},
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}
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# --- Source authority: domain classes (ROADMAP_v2 §45, SQ4) ---
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# What a source is worth before anything is known about the specific page.
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# Two tables, deliberately: a CLASS carries the number, and a SUFFIX names
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# which class a host belongs to. A user who thinks preprints deserve more
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# membership. One combined {suffix: score} table would make the first of
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# those a find-and-replace across a hundred rows.
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# THE SIGNAL IS A RESTRICTED REGISTRY, NOT A FAMILIAR SUFFIX. `.gov`,
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# so do `gov.uk`, `ac.uk`, `gc.ca` and their equivalents worldwide, which
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# is why source_scoring derives the `<kind>.<cc>` forms rather than
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# enumerating them here. `.org` gates nothing at all and never has, so it
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# common version of this mistake.
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# INCOMPLETE ON PURPOSE, and safe when incomplete: an unlisted host takes
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# DEFAULT_DOMAIN_AUTHORITY, which is the generic-commercial number. The
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# failure mode is a good source scored ordinary, never a bad source scored
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DOMAIN_AUTHORITY_CLASSES: dict[str, float] = {
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"restricted_registry": 0.90, # .gov .mil .int .edu, gov.uk, ac.uk...
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"intergovernmental": 0.90, # WHO, UN, World Bank, OECD, EU
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"standards_body": 0.88, # IETF, W3C, ISO, NIST, IEC
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"peer_reviewed_publisher": 0.85,
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"established_news": 0.65,
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"preprint_server": 0.60, # not peer reviewed; §45 SQ5 refines this
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"reference_tertiary": 0.55, # encyclopaedias -- a pointer to a source
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"generic_org": 0.55, # an unrestricted registry, small bump
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"generic_commercial": 0.45,
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"blog_platform": 0.30,
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"forum_qa": 0.25,
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"social_media": 0.15,
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"content_farm": 0.10,
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}
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DEFAULT_DOMAIN_AUTHORITY = 0.45 # == generic_commercial, for an unknown host
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# host suffix -> class. Longest suffix wins, so `blogs.nature.com` can be
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DOMAIN_AUTHORITY_SUFFIXES: dict[str, str] = {
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# Restricted registries. The bare TLDs; the `<kind>.<cc>` second-level
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# forms are derived in source_scoring.py rather than listed.
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"gov": "restricted_registry",
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236
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"mil": "restricted_registry",
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237
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"int": "restricted_registry",
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238
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"edu": "restricted_registry",
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239
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-
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240
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# Intergovernmental bodies, whose hosts are ordinary .org/.int names.
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241
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"who.int": "intergovernmental",
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242
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"un.org": "intergovernmental",
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243
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"europa.eu": "intergovernmental",
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244
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"oecd.org": "intergovernmental",
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245
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"imf.org": "intergovernmental",
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246
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"worldbank.org": "intergovernmental",
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247
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"iaea.org": "intergovernmental",
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248
|
-
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249
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-
# Standards bodies.
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250
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-
"ietf.org": "standards_body",
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251
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"rfc-editor.org": "standards_body",
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252
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"w3.org": "standards_body",
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253
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"iso.org": "standards_body",
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254
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"iec.ch": "standards_body",
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255
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"ieee.org": "standards_body",
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256
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"unicode.org": "standards_body",
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257
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"ecma-international.org": "standards_body",
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258
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-
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259
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# Peer-reviewed publishers and indexes.
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260
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"nature.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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261
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"science.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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262
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"sciencemag.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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263
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"nejm.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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264
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"thelancet.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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265
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"bmj.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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266
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"cell.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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267
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"pnas.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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268
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"sciencedirect.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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269
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"springer.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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270
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"link.springer.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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271
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"onlinelibrary.wiley.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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272
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"wiley.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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273
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"tandfonline.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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274
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"sagepub.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
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275
|
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"acm.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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276
|
-
"aps.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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277
|
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"acs.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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278
|
-
"plos.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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279
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"frontiersin.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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280
|
-
"mdpi.com": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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281
|
-
"jstor.org": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
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282
|
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"pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov": "peer_reviewed_publisher",
|
|
283
|
-
|
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284
|
-
# Preprint servers and repositories -- not peer reviewed.
|
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285
|
-
"arxiv.org": "preprint_server",
|
|
286
|
-
"biorxiv.org": "preprint_server",
|
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287
|
-
"medrxiv.org": "preprint_server",
|
|
288
|
-
"chemrxiv.org": "preprint_server",
|
|
289
|
-
"ssrn.com": "preprint_server",
|
|
290
|
-
"papers.ssrn.com": "preprint_server",
|
|
291
|
-
"osf.io": "preprint_server",
|
|
292
|
-
"researchsquare.com": "preprint_server",
|
|
293
|
-
"semanticscholar.org": "preprint_server",
|
|
294
|
-
|
|
295
|
-
# News organisations with a correction policy and a masthead. An
|
|
296
|
-
# ALLOWLIST, because "news site" is not a property of a domain suffix
|
|
297
|
-
# and the alternative is scoring every .com that publishes articles.
|
|
298
|
-
"reuters.com": "established_news",
|
|
299
|
-
"apnews.com": "established_news",
|
|
300
|
-
"bbc.com": "established_news",
|
|
301
|
-
"bbc.co.uk": "established_news",
|
|
302
|
-
"ft.com": "established_news",
|
|
303
|
-
"economist.com": "established_news",
|
|
304
|
-
"nytimes.com": "established_news",
|
|
305
|
-
"washingtonpost.com": "established_news",
|
|
306
|
-
"wsj.com": "established_news",
|
|
307
|
-
"theguardian.com": "established_news",
|
|
308
|
-
"npr.org": "established_news",
|
|
309
|
-
"pbs.org": "established_news",
|
|
310
|
-
"bloomberg.com": "established_news",
|
|
311
|
-
"nikkei.com": "established_news",
|
|
312
|
-
"afp.com": "established_news",
|
|
313
|
-
"dw.com": "established_news",
|
|
314
|
-
|
|
315
|
-
# Tertiary references -- they summarise sources rather than being one.
|
|
316
|
-
"wikipedia.org": "reference_tertiary",
|
|
317
|
-
"wikimedia.org": "reference_tertiary",
|
|
318
|
-
"wiktionary.org": "reference_tertiary",
|
|
319
|
-
"britannica.com": "reference_tertiary",
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
"org": "generic_org",
|
|
322
|
-
|
|
323
|
-
# Blog and newsletter platforms: the host says nothing about the author.
|
|
324
|
-
"medium.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
325
|
-
"substack.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
326
|
-
"wordpress.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
327
|
-
"blogspot.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
328
|
-
"blogger.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
329
|
-
"tumblr.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
330
|
-
"wixsite.com": "blog_platform",
|
|
331
|
-
"ghost.io": "blog_platform",
|
|
332
|
-
|
|
333
|
-
# Forums and Q&A. Often correct, never attributable.
|
|
334
|
-
"reddit.com": "forum_qa",
|
|
335
|
-
"quora.com": "forum_qa",
|
|
336
|
-
"stackexchange.com": "forum_qa",
|
|
337
|
-
"stackoverflow.com": "forum_qa",
|
|
338
|
-
"news.ycombinator.com": "forum_qa",
|
|
339
|
-
"4chan.org": "content_farm",
|
|
340
|
-
|
|
341
|
-
# Social media. Speculation and unattributed claims travel here fastest,
|
|
342
|
-
# which is the whole reason a claim needs grounding elsewhere.
|
|
343
|
-
"x.com": "social_media",
|
|
344
|
-
"twitter.com": "social_media",
|
|
345
|
-
"facebook.com": "social_media",
|
|
346
|
-
"instagram.com": "social_media",
|
|
347
|
-
"tiktok.com": "social_media",
|
|
348
|
-
"threads.net": "social_media",
|
|
349
|
-
"linkedin.com": "social_media",
|
|
350
|
-
"mastodon.social": "social_media",
|
|
351
|
-
"bsky.app": "social_media",
|
|
352
|
-
"youtube.com": "social_media",
|
|
353
|
-
"vk.com": "social_media",
|
|
354
|
-
"weibo.com": "social_media",
|
|
355
|
-
"t.me": "social_media",
|
|
356
|
-
|
|
357
|
-
# Aggregators that republish without attribution, and image boards with
|
|
358
|
-
# no text to ground anything in. The measured case: a Pinterest pin
|
|
359
|
-
# scored similarity 1.0 on a Nobel Prize claim.
|
|
360
|
-
"pinterest.com": "content_farm",
|
|
361
|
-
"answers.com": "content_farm",
|
|
362
|
-
"ehow.com": "content_farm",
|
|
363
|
-
"scribd.com": "content_farm",
|
|
364
|
-
"coursehero.com": "content_farm",
|
|
365
|
-
"chegg.com": "content_farm",
|
|
366
|
-
}
|
|
367
|
-
|
|
368
|
-
# How far the model may move a computed authority, in either direction
|
|
369
|
-
# (§45, SQ4). Small on purpose: it is a correction for what a domain
|
|
370
|
-
# cannot see -- a primary source on an ordinary host, an opinion column on
|
|
371
|
-
# a masthead -- not a second opinion about the number. An adjustment
|
|
372
|
-
# arriving without a reason is discarded rather than clamped.
|
|
373
|
-
AUTHORITY_ADJUSTMENT_CAP = 0.15
|
|
374
|
-
|
|
375
|
-
# --- The sources/ artifact (ROADMAP_v2 §45, SQ8) ---
|
|
376
|
-
# Whether output/<run_id>/sources/ keeps the TEXT each cited page served,
|
|
377
|
-
# or only its hash, size and provenance.
|
|
378
|
-
#
|
|
379
|
-
# On by default, because it is what makes a similarity score reproducible
|
|
380
|
-
# after the run -- and the directory output_writer has created since §12
|
|
381
|
-
# was described by fetch_url.py's own comment for just as long. Everything
|
|
382
|
-
# written there has been through redact_output_text on entry to the
|
|
383
|
-
# corpus.
|
|
384
|
-
#
|
|
385
|
-
# It is new data at rest, so it has a switch and PRIVACY.md says what it
|
|
386
|
-
# holds. Turning it off costs the audit trail, not the scores: the corpus
|
|
387
|
-
# still exists in memory for the run that computes them.
|
|
388
|
-
PERSIST_SOURCE_TEXT = True
|
|
389
|
-
|
|
390
|
-
# --- Scholarly authority: OpenAlex (ROADMAP_v2 §45, SQ5/SQ9) ---
|
|
391
|
-
# OFF BY DEFAULT. This is the first network call in this harness made by
|
|
392
|
-
# something that is not a registered tool, so it bypasses the approval
|
|
393
|
-
# registry and granted_calls.json -- and an out-of-the-box run must make
|
|
394
|
-
# no call the user did not ask for. With it off, a paper takes its
|
|
395
|
-
# preprint-server or publisher domain class and nothing else.
|
|
396
|
-
SCHOLAR_LOOKUP = False
|
|
397
|
-
|
|
398
|
-
SCHOLAR_API_URL = "https://api.openalex.org"
|
|
399
|
-
SCHOLAR_TIMEOUT_S = 8.0
|
|
400
|
-
SCHOLAR_MAX_RETRIES = 2
|
|
401
|
-
SCHOLAR_CACHE_TTL_S = 900
|
|
402
|
-
|
|
403
|
-
# OpenAlex asks for a contact address to put a caller in its "polite pool"
|
|
404
|
-
# (higher rate limits). EMPTY BY DEFAULT AND NEVER DERIVED: an address is
|
|
405
|
-
# personal data, and sending one the user did not type -- from a git
|
|
406
|
-
# config, an environment variable, anywhere -- is not a rate-limit
|
|
407
|
-
# optimisation, it is an unasked-for disclosure.
|
|
408
|
-
SCHOLAR_MAILTO = ""
|
|
409
|
-
|
|
410
|
-
# How a paper's score is composed. Renormalised over whichever terms are
|
|
411
|
-
# actually available, so a paper too young to have a citation percentile
|
|
412
|
-
# is not scored as though it had a bad one.
|
|
413
|
-
SCHOLAR_VENUE_WEIGHT = 0.40
|
|
414
|
-
SCHOLAR_CITATION_WEIGHT = 0.40
|
|
415
|
-
SCHOLAR_AUTHOR_WEIGHT = 0.20
|
|
416
|
-
|
|
417
|
-
# Venue credit. A preprint scores lower than a comparable published paper
|
|
418
|
-
# -- generally, not strictly, which is why it is a weight and not a gate.
|
|
419
|
-
SCHOLAR_VENUE_CREDIT = {
|
|
420
|
-
"journal": 1.0,
|
|
421
|
-
"conference": 1.0,
|
|
422
|
-
"book series": 0.85,
|
|
423
|
-
"repository": 0.55, # arXiv, bioRxiv, institutional repositories
|
|
424
|
-
"unknown": 0.6,
|
|
425
|
-
}
|
|
426
|
-
|
|
427
|
-
# max h-index across a paper's authors, log-saturated. 60 is a full career
|
|
428
|
-
# at the top of most fields; the curve is deliberately flat above it,
|
|
429
|
-
# because the difference between 60 and 90 says more about field size and
|
|
430
|
-
# career length than about this paper.
|
|
431
|
-
SCHOLAR_H_SATURATION = 60
|
|
432
|
-
|
|
433
|
-
# Below this many works, a field-and-year cohort is too small for a
|
|
434
|
-
# percentile to mean anything and the window widens instead.
|
|
435
|
-
SCHOLAR_MIN_COHORT_SIZE = 200
|
|
436
|
-
|
|
437
|
-
# Below this age, citation counts are noise: 72% of computer-science
|
|
438
|
-
# preprints from 2024 have zero citations, so a three-week-old paper's
|
|
439
|
-
# zero says nothing at all. The term is DROPPED and the remaining weights
|
|
440
|
-
# renormalise, rather than being scored as low impact.
|
|
441
|
-
SCHOLAR_MIN_CITATION_AGE_DAYS = 60
|
|
442
|
-
|
|
443
|
-
# A retracted paper is not evidence, whatever its venue or citation count
|
|
444
|
-
# -- and a heavily cited retraction is the most dangerous shape there is.
|
|
445
|
-
SCHOLAR_RETRACTED_AUTHORITY = 0.05
|
|
446
|
-
|
|
447
|
-
# --- Reasoning effort (ROADMAP_v2 §16; default changed batch 25, #139) ---
|
|
448
|
-
# The default effort level requested when the user has not chosen one.
|
|
449
|
-
#
|
|
450
|
-
# This shipped as None -- "send nothing", the one universally safe value,
|
|
451
|
-
# because reasoning_effort is rejected by OpenAI-compatible NON-reasoning
|
|
452
|
-
# models. Batch 25 changed it to "high" by owner decision: the pipeline
|
|
453
|
-
# now consumes the setting (#139), so None meant the mode this project
|
|
454
|
-
# exists for ran at the provider's own default forever, invisibly. The
|
|
455
|
-
# risk the old note named is managed in MODEL_EFFORT_LEVELS rather than
|
|
456
|
-
# by silence: known non-reasoning models are listed there with an EMPTY
|
|
457
|
-
# level set, which effort_for() treats as authoritative and drops the
|
|
458
|
-
# level cleanly instead of sending a parameter that would 400.
|
|
459
|
-
DEFAULT_EFFORT: str | None = "high"
|
|
460
|
-
|
|
461
|
-
# Fallback effort levels for providers whose APIs expose no capability
|
|
462
|
-
# endpoint (every OpenAI-compatible provider, and Google). ANTHROPIC is NOT
|
|
463
|
-
# listed here on purpose: its Models API reports per-model effort support,
|
|
464
|
-
# so client.py queries it and new Anthropic models need no entry.
|
|
465
|
-
#
|
|
466
|
-
# An entry whose value is an EMPTY list means "this model takes no effort
|
|
467
|
-
# parameter at all" and is authoritative: effort_for() DROPS the requested
|
|
468
|
-
# level with a naming warning instead of sending it. That is the safety
|
|
469
|
-
# mechanism behind DEFAULT_EFFORT="high" -- without these entries, the
|
|
470
|
-
# fallback for an unknown model ASSUMES ["low","medium","high"] and the
|
|
471
|
-
# default high would reach gpt-4o-class endpoints as a 400 on every call.
|
|
472
|
-
# Incomplete on purpose (same posture as MODELS_REJECTING_SAMPLING_PARAMS):
|
|
473
|
-
# an unlisted non-reasoning endpoint still fails loud, and the fix is one
|
|
474
|
-
# line here or `--effort auto`.
|
|
475
|
-
MODEL_EFFORT_LEVELS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
|
|
476
|
-
"gpt-4o": [],
|
|
477
|
-
"gpt-4o-mini": [],
|
|
478
|
-
"gpt-4.1": [],
|
|
479
|
-
"gpt-4.1-mini": [],
|
|
480
|
-
"gpt-4.1-nano": [],
|
|
481
|
-
"gpt-3.5-turbo": [],
|
|
482
|
-
}
|
|
483
|
-
DEFAULT_EFFORT_LEVELS = ["low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max", "ultra"]
|
|
484
|
-
|
|
485
|
-
# Google expresses reasoning depth as an integer token budget rather than an
|
|
486
|
-
# enum, so a level has to be mapped to a number at the boundary. -1 is the
|
|
487
|
-
# SDK's "decide dynamically" sentinel.
|
|
488
|
-
GOOGLE_THINKING_BUDGETS = {
|
|
489
|
-
"low": 2_048,
|
|
490
|
-
"medium": 8_192,
|
|
491
|
-
"high": 16_384,
|
|
492
|
-
"xhigh": 24_576,
|
|
493
|
-
"ultra": 32_768,
|
|
494
|
-
"max": -1,
|
|
495
|
-
}
|
|
496
|
-
|
|
497
|
-
# --- Database ---
|
|
498
|
-
DB_PATH = os.environ.get("APP_DB_PATH", "app.db")
|
|
499
|
-
|
|
500
|
-
# --- Output artifacts ---
|
|
501
|
-
#
|
|
502
|
-
# BESIDE THE WORK, which since batch 44 means beside the WORKSPACE when one
|
|
503
|
-
# was named. "State is global, artifacts are local" is the distribution
|
|
504
|
-
# split, and the local half is only true if "local" tracks where the work
|
|
505
|
-
# is: with AGENT_WORKSPACE pointing at a project, a run launched from the
|
|
506
|
-
# harness checkout wrote its reports into the harness. Reading the env var
|
|
507
|
-
# rather than WORKSPACE_DIR below, and defaulting it to ".", so this stays
|
|
508
|
-
# one expression with no branch in it -- an unset AGENT_WORKSPACE gives
|
|
509
|
-
# ./output exactly as before, not ./workspace/output.
|
|
510
|
-
OUTPUT_DIR = os.environ.get(
|
|
511
|
-
"AGENT_OUTPUT_DIR",
|
|
512
|
-
os.path.join(os.environ.get("AGENT_WORKSPACE", "."), "output"))
|
|
513
|
-
|
|
514
|
-
# --- File-ops workspace (ROADMAP §6) ---
|
|
515
|
-
WORKSPACE_DIR = os.environ.get("AGENT_WORKSPACE", "./workspace")
|
|
516
|
-
|
|
517
|
-
# Whether AGENT_WORKSPACE was NAMED, as opposed to defaulted (batch 44).
|
|
518
|
-
#
|
|
519
|
-
# The presence of the variable, never its value: the default "./workspace"
|
|
520
|
-
# is a subdirectory of wherever you launched, so a value test would make
|
|
521
|
-
# `./workspace` the project for everyone who never set anything -- which
|
|
522
|
-
# is the whole population this must not disturb. main() reads this to
|
|
523
|
-
# decide the project path; the decision is there, because config.py holds
|
|
524
|
-
# plain values and this is one.
|
|
525
|
-
WORKSPACE_DIR_EXPLICIT = "AGENT_WORKSPACE" in os.environ
|
|
526
|
-
MAX_FILE_SIZE_BYTES = 25_000_000 # 25 MB — hard reject before opening
|
|
527
|
-
MAX_READ_LINES = 500 # max lines per read call
|
|
528
|
-
MAX_READ_CHARS = 50_000 # max chars per read call
|
|
529
|
-
|
|
530
|
-
# --- /init (ROADMAP_v2 §24) ---
|
|
531
|
-
INITIALIZER_AGENT = "initializer"
|
|
532
|
-
|
|
533
|
-
# Three bounds, each doing a different job (I7). /init is a tool-heavy loop
|
|
534
|
-
# over documentation that can run to hundreds of kilobytes -- this repo's own
|
|
535
|
-
# root markdown is 721KB, with DEVLOG.md alone at 226KB.
|
|
536
|
-
#
|
|
537
|
-
# INIT_READ_CHARS is well below MAX_READ_CHARS because of TECHNICAL_DEBT
|
|
538
|
-
# item 9 (now closed, batch 27): the billing meter re-counts the WHOLE
|
|
539
|
-
# prompt on every step, so each 50KB read is re-billed for every step that
|
|
540
|
-
# follows it. 20KB keeps a dozen reads affordable and still returns a
|
|
541
|
-
# useful span of a document per call. It stays even though the meter no
|
|
542
|
-
# longer caps anything by default -- it bounds per-read VOLUME, which is a
|
|
543
|
-
# different axis from spend and from the number of reads.
|
|
544
|
-
INIT_READ_CHARS = 20_000
|
|
545
|
-
# The number of reads, which neither budget nor read size bounds: a model
|
|
546
|
-
# can spend an unbounded number of small reads inside any ceiling.
|
|
547
|
-
INIT_MAX_STEPS = 12
|
|
548
|
-
|
|
549
|
-
# --- MCP teardown (ROADMAP_v2 §37 F6, #64) ---
|
|
550
|
-
# ONE shared wall-clock budget for the whole goodbye -- polite close,
|
|
551
|
-
# force-cancel, loop-thread join -- replacing three sequential 15-second
|
|
552
|
-
# waits whose worst case hung a quitting harness for ~45s, Ctrl+C
|
|
553
|
-
# included. Servers still alive when the budget expires are named in a
|
|
554
|
-
# WARNING; their child processes may outlive this session. The value
|
|
555
|
-
# lives with the other harness bounds and is re-exported by
|
|
556
|
-
# mcp_client/client.py beside its sibling timeouts.
|
|
557
|
-
TEARDOWN_BUDGET_S = 10.0
|
|
558
|
-
|
|
559
|
-
# --- Shell / sandbox (ROADMAP §7) ---
|
|
560
|
-
SHELL_BINARY = os.environ.get("AGENT_SHELL", "") # auto-detect if empty
|
|
561
|
-
ALLOW_INSECURE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK = False # explicitly enable subprocess fallback
|
|
562
|
-
AUTO_APPROVE_SANDBOX_FALLBACK = False # auto-approve fallback runs (no per-run prompt)
|
|
563
|
-
|
|
564
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §28 (G3). WHICH shell commands need a human to say yes.
|
|
565
|
-
#
|
|
566
|
-
# "always" every command is asked about, whatever it does.
|
|
567
|
-
# "tiered" the classifier decides -- see security/capability.py for the
|
|
568
|
-
# one rule, and security/sandbox.py:classify_command for how a
|
|
569
|
-
# command is measured against it.
|
|
570
|
-
# "never" nothing is ever asked about.
|
|
571
|
-
#
|
|
572
|
-
# This is the gate. Before §28 the gate was ToolApprovals.shell, and
|
|
573
|
-
# `_shell_approval_check` looked like a five-layer policy underneath it --
|
|
574
|
-
# but four of those layers could only ever return False on the shipped
|
|
575
|
-
# flags, so the whole thing was a pass-through for one boolean and the
|
|
576
|
-
# harness had exactly two settings: ask about everything, or ask about
|
|
577
|
-
# nothing. "tiered" is the rung that docstring already claimed existed.
|
|
578
|
-
#
|
|
579
|
-
# "never" is that second setting, preserved deliberately and now NAMED.
|
|
580
|
-
# It is the pre-§28 `ToolApprovals.shell = False` behaviour exactly: an
|
|
581
|
-
# inert command runs on the HOST with unrestricted arguments, so `cat
|
|
582
|
-
# ~/.aws/credentials` returns your keys to the model. You reach that by
|
|
583
|
-
# writing "never", not by switching off a field that reads like "stop
|
|
584
|
-
# nagging me" -- which is the actual fix for audit #157.
|
|
585
|
-
# The legal set lives with the code that ENFORCES it --
|
|
586
|
-
# security/capability.APPROVAL_MODES, which validate_mode() reads. A second
|
|
587
|
-
# copy here was read by nothing but a test asserting its literal, so the two
|
|
588
|
-
# could have disagreed and only the unenforced one would have been wrong.
|
|
589
|
-
SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE = "tiered"
|
|
590
|
-
SANDBOX_DOCKER_IMAGE = os.environ.get("AGENT_SANDBOX_IMAGE", "python:3.13-slim")
|
|
591
|
-
SANDBOX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120
|
|
592
|
-
SANDBOX_MEMORY_MB = 2048
|
|
593
|
-
SANDBOX_CPU_SECONDS = 30
|
|
594
|
-
SANDBOX_MAX_PIDS = 200
|
|
595
|
-
|
|
596
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
597
|
-
# --- Output redaction (#167/#49, batch 20) ----------------------------------
|
|
598
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
599
|
-
|
|
600
|
-
# The PERMANENT master switch for pattern-based redaction of what leaves a
|
|
601
|
-
# tool: vendor token substitution and credential-shape redaction, applied
|
|
602
|
-
# by check_output_policy() to every tool result and by param_digest() to
|
|
603
|
-
# what the shells display of an argument. On by default; a user whose
|
|
604
|
-
# workflow needs the model to see real values (debugging their own
|
|
605
|
-
# credentials, say) turns it off here, or per-run with
|
|
606
|
-
# VENASTINE_REDACT_OFF in the environment -- see redaction_enabled().
|
|
607
|
-
#
|
|
608
|
-
# DELIBERATELY NOT a settings.json key (decision recorded in DEVLOG,
|
|
609
|
-
# batch 20): project tier beats user tier there, so a cloned repo could
|
|
610
|
-
# ship `.venastine/settings.json` switching the scrubbing off behind a
|
|
611
|
-
# trust prompt nobody reads -- the exact shape G7 rejected
|
|
612
|
-
# shell_approval_mode for and R12 rejected research.granted_tools for.
|
|
613
|
-
# Permanent means editing this line.
|
|
614
|
-
#
|
|
615
|
-
# NEVER covers three things, whatever this is set to: check_input_policy's
|
|
616
|
-
# refusals (a denial is legible, not destructive); check_output_policy's
|
|
617
|
-
# depth-cap substitution (fail-closed structure bound -- making it optional
|
|
618
|
-
# would recreate the deterministic bypass its comment forbids); and
|
|
619
|
-
# logging_setup.py's formatter redaction (the second sink keeps its own
|
|
620
|
-
# guard).
|
|
621
|
-
REDACT_TOOL_OUTPUTS = True
|
|
622
|
-
|
|
623
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §31 (H9). The wall clock on a BUDGET_COMPUTE tool call --
|
|
624
|
-
# the six math tools, which are pure functions of their params and have
|
|
625
|
-
# nothing bounding them from the inside. dispatch runs them in a
|
|
626
|
-
# killable subprocess under this budget (tools/isolation.py).
|
|
627
|
-
#
|
|
628
|
-
# 15s is chosen against measurement, not taste. The slowest LEGITIMATE
|
|
629
|
-
# call found is `symbolic_math series order=1000` at 3.44s, so this is
|
|
630
|
-
# roughly 4x headroom; the runaways it exists for do not return at all.
|
|
631
|
-
# Ten passes each burning a full budget is 150s rather than forever,
|
|
632
|
-
# which is the trade being made.
|
|
633
|
-
#
|
|
634
|
-
# ONE number, not one per tool: there is no evidence any two math tools
|
|
635
|
-
# want different answers, and a per-tool budget makes each a judgement
|
|
636
|
-
# call at the registration site. It sits beside SANDBOX_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
|
|
637
|
-
# because that is the constant a reader would compare it against.
|
|
638
|
-
TOOL_COMPUTE_TIMEOUT_S = 20
|
|
639
|
-
|
|
640
|
-
# WARNING: commands matching these words get network access inside the
|
|
641
|
-
# sandbox. A compromised package or script can exfiltrate data or
|
|
642
|
-
# download payloads. Only add commands you trust.
|
|
643
|
-
NETWORK_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = [
|
|
644
|
-
"pip", "pip3", "curl", "wget", "git",
|
|
645
|
-
"npm", "yarn", "pnpm", "apt", "apt-get",
|
|
646
|
-
"yum", "dnf", "brew", "cargo",
|
|
647
|
-
]
|
|
648
|
-
|
|
649
|
-
# WARNING: inert commands run WITHOUT filesystem isolation — they can
|
|
650
|
-
# read files outside the workspace (e.g. cat /etc/passwd). They are
|
|
651
|
-
# read-only inspection commands; the risk is information disclosure,
|
|
652
|
-
# not modification.
|
|
653
|
-
INERT_COMMANDS = [
|
|
654
|
-
"ls", "cat", "pwd", "echo", "grep", "wc",
|
|
655
|
-
"head", "tail", "date", "whoami", "uname", "which",
|
|
656
|
-
"where", "type", "file", "stat", "du", "df", "tree",
|
|
657
|
-
"uniq", "diff", "md5sum", "sha256sum",
|
|
658
|
-
]
|
|
659
|
-
|
|
660
|
-
|
|
661
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §25 (R6). Ceiling on how many PRE-GRANTED tool calls one
|
|
662
|
-
# research run may make without being asked again. Counts granted calls
|
|
663
|
-
# only -- web_search, arxiv_search and every math tool are approval-free
|
|
664
|
-
# and never touch it, so this is not a cap on tool use.
|
|
665
|
-
#
|
|
666
|
-
# Pre-flight authorization trades a per-call decision for one up-front
|
|
667
|
-
# decision, and the thing it gives up is the natural bound on how many
|
|
668
|
-
# times the granted tool runs. Set generously: the ceiling exists to stop
|
|
669
|
-
# an injected loop spending the whole authorization unattended, not to
|
|
670
|
-
# ration ordinary work across ten passes.
|
|
671
|
-
MAX_GRANTED_TOOL_CALLS = 150
|
|
672
|
-
|
|
673
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §25 (R9). How long an attended research run waits for a human
|
|
674
|
-
# to answer one approval prompt before DENYING that call and carrying on.
|
|
675
|
-
#
|
|
676
|
-
# Denial is the safe direction, and continuing is the useful one: walking
|
|
677
|
-
# away from an attended run degrades it rather than wedging it, so nine
|
|
678
|
-
# completed passes are not lost to one unanswered question. Generous by
|
|
679
|
-
# default because the whole point of the mode is that someone is there.
|
|
680
|
-
ATTENDED_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_S = 600
|
|
681
|
-
|
|
682
|
-
|
|
683
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §20 (D9). Whether a finished research run gets a reviewer pass
|
|
684
|
-
# over its own output. Off by default: it is one more model call plus a
|
|
685
|
-
# re-synthesis whenever a correction is accepted, and it needs someone
|
|
686
|
-
# present to consent to anything it changes.
|
|
687
|
-
SUBAGENT_REVIEW = False
|
|
688
|
-
|
|
689
|
-
# §20 (V4). Ceiling on how many findings one review may put to the user.
|
|
690
|
-
# Consent fatigue is the failure mode a mutating review stage has and a
|
|
691
|
-
# read-only one does not: the fiftieth prompt gets answered differently
|
|
692
|
-
# from the first, and an injected "correction" only needs one reflexive
|
|
693
|
-
# yes. Findings past the cap are dropped and the drop is TRACED -- a
|
|
694
|
-
# silent truncation would read as "the reviewer found twelve things".
|
|
695
|
-
MAX_REVIEW_FINDINGS = 25
|
|
696
|
-
|
|
697
|
-
# §20 (V5). How many times one finding may be sent back for refinement.
|
|
698
|
-
# A human asks for each round, so this is not a runaway guard -- it bounds
|
|
699
|
-
# the case where the reviewer keeps producing a proposal that misses the
|
|
700
|
-
# same point, which is when the honest answer is to reject it.
|
|
701
|
-
MAX_REVIEW_REFINEMENTS = 3
|
|
702
|
-
|
|
703
|
-
|
|
704
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
705
|
-
# --- Compaction (ROADMAP_v2 §21) -------------------------------------------
|
|
706
|
-
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
707
|
-
#
|
|
708
|
-
# D27: these are DEFAULTS, not settings. Every value is a starting point
|
|
709
|
-
# chosen to be reasonable and explicitly not claimed to be right, and every
|
|
710
|
-
# one is overridable through the existing settings mechanism -- config.py
|
|
711
|
-
# default -> user ~/.config/venastine/settings.json -> trusted project
|
|
712
|
-
# .venastine/settings.json -> a per-invocation `/compact --strength N`.
|
|
713
|
-
# The architecture is what's locked; the numbers are expected to move once
|
|
714
|
-
# there are real long threads to look at.
|
|
715
|
-
|
|
716
|
-
# How much of the model's context window a thread may fill before
|
|
717
|
-
# compaction folds it. thresholds() multiplies this by context_limit(),
|
|
718
|
-
# so it is 850k on a 1M model and 170k on a 200k one.
|
|
719
|
-
#
|
|
720
|
-
# BATCH 44 REVERSED M1, AND THE REASON M1 GAVE HAS EXPIRED. M1 rejected a
|
|
721
|
-
# window-derived trigger because "a window-derived trigger sits at a size
|
|
722
|
-
# the thread can never reach in working order" -- and the arithmetic
|
|
723
|
-
# behind that was about MAX_TOKEN_BUDGET, then a default spend ceiling of
|
|
724
|
-
# 250k: the prompt is re-sent on every step of a tool-using turn, so a
|
|
725
|
-
# thread at 160k got one response and no tool calls before the cap ended
|
|
726
|
-
# the turn. Batch 27 DELETED that default ceiling. There is no cap for a
|
|
727
|
-
# large trigger to collide with any more, so the premise is gone and the
|
|
728
|
-
# flat 40k outlived it -- compacting a 1M-window thread at 4% of its
|
|
729
|
-
# window, spending a model call and losing fidelity to solve a problem
|
|
730
|
-
# the model did not have.
|
|
731
|
-
#
|
|
732
|
-
# THE COST OF THE REVERSAL, STATED. MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS and the provider
|
|
733
|
-
# query decide when every thread folds now, where under M1 a wrong entry
|
|
734
|
-
# only mistimed a research backstop. That is why core/model_windows.py
|
|
735
|
-
# exists (the user's own answer, outranking both) and why the fallback
|
|
736
|
-
# still WARNS. A fraction rather than `window - margin`: a fixed margin
|
|
737
|
-
# that is right for a 1M model leaves a 64k model no working room at all,
|
|
738
|
-
# and one that is right for 64k never fires on 1M.
|
|
739
|
-
COMPACTION_TRIGGER_FRACTION = 0.85
|
|
740
|
-
|
|
741
|
-
# The trigger used when NO MODEL IS IN SCOPE -- and the default
|
|
742
|
-
# settings.json's `compaction.trigger_tokens` overrides.
|
|
743
|
-
#
|
|
744
|
-
# One caller has no (provider, model) to derive a window from:
|
|
745
|
-
# compaction.pin_measurements, which computes #89's cap as
|
|
746
|
-
# PIN_MAX_TRIGGER_FRACTION x the trigger from a thread id alone. Left at
|
|
747
|
-
# 40_000 deliberately, so the pin cap is exactly what it was before batch
|
|
748
|
-
# 44 -- this batch changes when a thread compacts, not how much of one a
|
|
749
|
-
# single pin may freeze, and a cap that grew with the window would let one
|
|
750
|
-
# `pin` call freeze 425k tokens of a 1M-window thread.
|
|
751
|
-
COMPACTION_TRIGGER_TOKENS = 40_000
|
|
752
|
-
|
|
753
|
-
# Fires this many tokens BEFORE the trigger, so there is room to do
|
|
754
|
-
# something about it -- pin a message, wrap up a thought, run /compact at a
|
|
755
|
-
# natural break.
|
|
756
|
-
#
|
|
757
|
-
# STILL ABSOLUTE after batch 44, and that is a decision rather than an
|
|
758
|
-
# oversight. What this buys is a HUMAN'S REACTION TIME, measured in turns,
|
|
759
|
-
# and a turn does not get bigger because the window did: 8k is roughly a
|
|
760
|
-
# turn or two of notice on a 64k model and on a 1M one alike. As a
|
|
761
|
-
# fraction of the new trigger it would be 128k on a 1M model -- a warning
|
|
762
|
-
# that fires while the thread is at 72% and has nothing to worry about
|
|
763
|
-
# yet. §21 singles this out as the one value whose wrong setting
|
|
764
|
-
# is not self-correcting: too small and it is an alert with no time
|
|
765
|
-
# attached to it. Validated to be strictly less than the trigger.
|
|
766
|
-
COMPACTION_WARNING_MARGIN_TOKENS = 8_000
|
|
767
|
-
|
|
768
|
-
# The most recent tokens that always stay verbatim, never compacted.
|
|
769
|
-
#
|
|
770
|
-
# ABSOLUTE, like the warning margin above and for the same kind of reason:
|
|
771
|
-
# this is an amount of CONVERSATION to keep intact, not a share of a
|
|
772
|
-
# window. It is also the weaker of the two floors in practice -- M5 keeps
|
|
773
|
-
# whichever protects more, and the three-turn floor below almost always
|
|
774
|
-
# protects more than 4k on the long threads that reach the trigger at all.
|
|
775
|
-
# Left where it was so batch 44 changes when a thread folds and not what
|
|
776
|
-
# survives the fold.
|
|
777
|
-
COMPACTION_KEEP_RECENT_TOKENS = 4_000
|
|
778
|
-
|
|
779
|
-
# M5: a FLOOR in turns, on top of the token floor above, and the two
|
|
780
|
-
# compose -- whichever protects more wins, plus the current turn, which is
|
|
781
|
-
# never foldable at all. A single tool-heavy turn can consume the whole
|
|
782
|
-
# keep-token budget by itself, leaving the immediately preceding exchange
|
|
783
|
-
# summarized; a follow-up like "no, the other one" then has no referent.
|
|
784
|
-
COMPACTION_KEEP_RECENT_TURNS = 3
|
|
785
|
-
|
|
786
|
-
# #89 (batch 16). The most one `pin` call may protect, as a fraction of
|
|
787
|
-
# the trigger above. A pin is a PERMANENT FLOOR under the derived view:
|
|
788
|
-
# pinned rows re-enter it verbatim forever (M9), nothing folds them, and
|
|
789
|
-
# before this cap one ungated call with last_n=40 could put a thread
|
|
790
|
-
# permanently past the trigger with no unpin to undo it. 0.5 leaves room
|
|
791
|
-
# for a real working session while making "floor the trigger by yourself"
|
|
792
|
-
# structurally impossible. Enforced at the tool with a REFUSAL that states
|
|
793
|
-
# the cap and the current share -- never silently trimmed (M15's rule: a
|
|
794
|
-
# pin asked for more protection than allowed must not quietly deliver less).
|
|
795
|
-
PIN_MAX_TRIGGER_FRACTION = 0.5
|
|
796
|
-
|
|
797
|
-
# 1-5, mapping to the target compression ratios below.
|
|
798
|
-
COMPACTION_STRENGTH = 3
|
|
799
|
-
|
|
800
|
-
# Bounded corrective retries when the compactor misses its target ratio.
|
|
801
|
-
COMPACTION_MAX_RETRIES = 2
|
|
802
|
-
|
|
803
|
-
# §21: strength is an objectively measurable target, not a qualitative
|
|
804
|
-
# instruction. "Be more aggressive" behaves differently across models with
|
|
805
|
-
# different summarization tendencies and no amount of prompting fixes that;
|
|
806
|
-
# a ratio is checkable after the fact. Qualitative guidance still belongs
|
|
807
|
-
# in the compactor's prompt, shaping WHAT survives within the budget.
|
|
808
|
-
COMPACTION_TARGET_RATIOS = {1: 0.40, 2: 0.25, 3: 0.15, 4: 0.10, 5: 0.05}
|
|
809
|
-
|
|
810
|
-
# How far outside the target a summary may land before it is sent back.
|
|
811
|
-
# Under-shooting is not an error: a summary tighter than asked for has
|
|
812
|
-
# already done the job, and rejecting it would spend a second call to make
|
|
813
|
-
# the context bigger.
|
|
814
|
-
COMPACTION_RATIO_TOLERANCE = 0.5
|
|
815
|
-
|
|
816
|
-
# M2 as amended by batch 16 (#90, owner decision). Two strategies:
|
|
817
|
-
#
|
|
818
|
-
# "chain" summarizes the PREVIOUS SUMMARY plus whatever followed it.
|
|
819
|
-
# Constant cost per compaction forever -- the input never
|
|
820
|
-
# grows past summary-plus-tail -- at the price of loss that
|
|
821
|
-
# compounds over a long-lived thread (a summary of a summary
|
|
822
|
-
# of a ...).
|
|
823
|
-
# "rederive" summarizes the ORIGINAL messages every time, so exactly
|
|
824
|
-
# one summarization step always sits between an original
|
|
825
|
-
# message and what the model sees. Fidelity-optimal; input
|
|
826
|
-
# grows with the covered span.
|
|
827
|
-
#
|
|
828
|
-
# The DEFAULT is "chain", reversing M2's original choice -- an explicit
|
|
829
|
-
# owner decision recorded in DEVLOG (batch 16): rederive's whole-span
|
|
830
|
-
# input made every compaction the most expensive call of the turn, and
|
|
831
|
-
# cost compounds on exactly the threads that trigger most. Whatever is
|
|
832
|
-
# configured here, BOTH strategies fall back to chain automatically when
|
|
833
|
-
# a span outgrows one call (built at last, after three documents promised
|
|
834
|
-
# it for two sections), saying so in a WARNING -- and truncate the oldest
|
|
835
|
-
# material with a stated truncation when even chain cannot fit, because
|
|
836
|
-
# an oversized send is never the right failure direction.
|
|
837
|
-
COMPACTION_STRATEGY = "chain"
|
|
838
|
-
COMPACTION_STRATEGIES = ("rederive", "chain")
|
|
839
|
-
|
|
840
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §21b (M14). Ceiling on how many durable memories reach one
|
|
841
|
-
# prompt. Newest first, and the truncation is stated in the fragment the
|
|
842
|
-
# model reads rather than only in a log.
|
|
843
|
-
#
|
|
844
|
-
# Every in-scope memory would otherwise enter every turn forever, which is
|
|
845
|
-
# the unbounded context growth §21 exists to fight -- a memory feature that
|
|
846
|
-
# quietly reintroduces the problem compaction solves would be a poor trade.
|
|
847
|
-
# Recency is the ordering because it is the only staleness signal available
|
|
848
|
-
# without asking a model, and /forget is how a still-relevant old memory
|
|
849
|
-
# gets kept ahead of the cap.
|
|
850
|
-
MAX_INJECTED_MEMORIES = 50
|
|
851
|
-
|
|
852
|
-
# --- Catalog text (ROADMAP_v2 §32, A5) ---
|
|
853
|
-
#
|
|
854
|
-
# The cap on a skill's or an agent's `name` and `description` -- the
|
|
855
|
-
# two strings that go from a .md file straight into the system prompt
|
|
856
|
-
# of every run in a project, with no tool call and no further consent
|
|
857
|
-
# (#131).
|
|
858
|
-
#
|
|
859
|
-
# 300 is headroom rather than a squeeze: the longest description this
|
|
860
|
-
# project ships is `compactor` at 171 characters, and all eight are
|
|
861
|
-
# single-line. A project whose description does not fit in twice the
|
|
862
|
-
# length of ours is writing instructions, not a summary, which is
|
|
863
|
-
# exactly the thing the cap is for.
|
|
864
|
-
#
|
|
865
|
-
# THE NEWLINE COLLAPSE MATTERS MORE THAN THE NUMBER, and they are one
|
|
866
|
-
# constant because they are one rule -- see config_loader._catalog_text.
|
|
867
|
-
# Same posture as tools/builtin/arxiv.MAX_SUMMARY_CHARS (600) and
|
|
868
|
-
# web_search.MAX_SNIPPET_CHARS (300): model-facing text from a source
|
|
869
|
-
# this project did not write is bounded where it is produced.
|
|
870
|
-
MAX_CATALOG_TEXT_CHARS = 300
|
|
871
|
-
|
|
872
|
-
# The agent that does the summarizing. §21: this is the shape of an agent
|
|
873
|
-
# call -- a system prompt, a task, a judgment-based output -- so it runs
|
|
874
|
-
# through the same RunAgentLoop as everything else rather than needing its
|
|
875
|
-
# own LLM-calling path, and that is also what gives it real autonomy over
|
|
876
|
-
# WHAT to preserve. Mechanical truncation cannot exercise judgment at all.
|
|
877
|
-
COMPACTOR_AGENT = "compactor"
|
|
878
|
-
|
|
879
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §21c. How long a whole-thread summary may be, in characters.
|
|
880
|
-
#
|
|
881
|
-
# ABSOLUTE, not a COMPACTION_TARGET_RATIOS entry, and the difference is the
|
|
882
|
-
# consumer rather than the summarizer. A fold's summary REPLACES the span it
|
|
883
|
-
# came from, so scaling with that span is right: a bigger fold earns a bigger
|
|
884
|
-
# summary and the thread still shrinks. §21c's summary is injected as a prompt
|
|
885
|
-
# tier present on every turn of the REFERENCING thread, where nothing it
|
|
886
|
-
# replaces bounds it -- a 500KB thread at strength 3 would put 75KB into every
|
|
887
|
-
# call indefinitely.
|
|
888
|
-
#
|
|
889
|
-
# A thread whose rendered text already fits this is stored verbatim and costs
|
|
890
|
-
# no model call at all.
|
|
891
|
-
SUMMARY_TARGET_CHARS = 2_000
|
|
892
|
-
|
|
893
|
-
# §21c. How many referenced threads may be attached to one thread at once.
|
|
894
|
-
#
|
|
895
|
-
# Small on purpose, and the cap REFUSES rather than dropping the oldest: a
|
|
896
|
-
# reference is something a person chose by name, and silently discarding one
|
|
897
|
-
# to make room for another is exactly what §21b's "removal is by id, never by
|
|
898
|
-
# substring" rule exists to prevent. The count and the cap are stated in the
|
|
899
|
-
# fragment the model reads, per M14's no-silent-caps rule.
|
|
900
|
-
MAX_INJECTED_REFS = 3
|
|
901
|
-
|
|
902
|
-
# §23 slice 2. The todo list's vocabulary and its ceiling.
|
|
903
|
-
#
|
|
904
|
-
# A plain tuple rather than an Enum, for storage.py's THREAD_KIND_* reason: a
|
|
905
|
-
# list persisted under an older vocabulary reads back as data rather than
|
|
906
|
-
# raising, and the tool can then say which status it did not recognise.
|
|
907
|
-
TODO_STATUSES = ("pending", "in_progress", "completed")
|
|
908
|
-
|
|
909
|
-
# The list is injected into every turn's system prompt, so its length is a
|
|
910
|
-
# per-call cost for as long as the thread lives. REFUSES rather than
|
|
911
|
-
# truncating, MAX_INJECTED_REFS' rule: a checklist silently cut to 50 would
|
|
912
|
-
# have the model believe it had recorded work it has now forgotten, which is
|
|
913
|
-
# worse than being told to write a shorter list.
|
|
914
|
-
MAX_TODO_ITEMS = 50
|
|
915
|
-
|
|
916
|
-
# M6. A research pass is headless and unattended, and each one already
|
|
917
|
-
# returns a distillation, so routine compaction there would spend on a
|
|
918
|
-
# judgment call nobody is watching. Passes compact only when approaching
|
|
919
|
-
# the model's actual context window -- a safety net against a hard provider
|
|
920
|
-
# error mid-pipeline, not a working-set policy.
|
|
921
|
-
COMPACTION_PIPELINE_BACKSTOP_TOKENS = 20_000
|
|
922
|
-
|
|
923
|
-
# The backstop's source, the summarizer's input budget, and M1's remaining
|
|
924
|
-
# use for a window table.
|
|
925
|
-
#
|
|
926
|
-
# NOW A FALLBACK, NOT THE ONLY SOURCE. This said "deliberately NOT a
|
|
927
|
-
# per-provider API query", on the grounds that the roster of fifteen had no
|
|
928
|
-
# uniform endpoint and a query would need fifteen adapters to avoid a
|
|
929
|
-
# fallback constant they would all still need. The premise was measured
|
|
930
|
-
# against the PINNED SDKs and did not survive:
|
|
931
|
-
#
|
|
932
|
-
# anthropic 0.116.0 ModelInfo.max_input_tokens -- on the SAME object
|
|
933
|
-
# core/client.py already retrieves to read
|
|
934
|
-
# capabilities.effort. The answer was in hand and
|
|
935
|
-
# being dropped; reading it costs no extra call.
|
|
936
|
-
# google-genai 1.0.0 types.Model.input_token_limit, one field.
|
|
937
|
-
# openai 2.45.0 Model is declared extra="allow", so a provider's
|
|
938
|
-
# own field survives onto .model_extra. That makes
|
|
939
|
-
# the OpenAI-compatible side ONE alias reader --
|
|
940
|
-
# context_window (Groq), context_length (Together,
|
|
941
|
-
# OpenRouter, Cohere), max_context_length (Mistral)
|
|
942
|
-
# -- rather than thirteen adapters.
|
|
943
|
-
#
|
|
944
|
-
# So it is two attribute reads and one sniff, not fifteen adapters. The
|
|
945
|
-
# query lives in core/client.py:context_window_for, beside the effort query
|
|
946
|
-
# it mirrors; core/compaction.py:context_limit prefers it and falls back
|
|
947
|
-
# here. (The old note also corrected itself on a provider count from the
|
|
948
|
-
# dead APICredentials class -- audit #23. Fifteen is right; the count was
|
|
949
|
-
# never what was wrong with the argument.)
|
|
950
|
-
#
|
|
951
|
-
# THE CONCLUSION OUTLIVED THE PREMISE, which is why this table stays: OpenAI,
|
|
952
|
-
# DeepSeek and Perplexity answer /models with id/created/object/owned_by and
|
|
953
|
-
# nothing else, and Grok, Fireworks, Qwen and Z.AI publish no model-metadata
|
|
954
|
-
# endpoint at all. A fallback constant is still needed at the end of it.
|
|
955
|
-
#
|
|
956
|
-
# KEYS ARE STORED NORMALIZED -- no date suffix, no `vendor/` or `region.`
|
|
957
|
-
# prefix. core/compaction.py:_normalized reduces an incoming id to this form
|
|
958
|
-
# before looking it up, so a dated key here would be UNREACHABLE. That is
|
|
959
|
-
# also the bug this fixed: matching was exact, so `claude-sonnet-5-20260724`
|
|
960
|
-
# missed a million-token entry and silently took the default.
|
|
961
|
-
#
|
|
962
|
-
# AN INCOMPLETE ENTRY IS EXPENSIVE NOW. Under M1 it cost a mistimed
|
|
963
|
-
# research backstop and a mistimed summarizer input budget, because the
|
|
964
|
-
# working-set trigger was a flat number that never consulted this. Batch 44
|
|
965
|
-
# made that trigger a FRACTION of what context_limit() returns, so a wrong
|
|
966
|
-
# number here mistimes compaction on every thread -- too high and the
|
|
967
|
-
# thread never folds and the provider raises a hard context-limit error
|
|
968
|
-
# instead. core/model_windows.py is the user's answer to that, and /window
|
|
969
|
-
# is how they give it; this table is what answers before they do.
|
|
970
|
-
MODEL_CONTEXT_WINDOWS: dict[str, int] = {
|
|
971
|
-
# 1M IS THE ORDINARY WINDOW ON THESE, not a beta.
|
|
972
|
-
#
|
|
973
|
-
# This block used to carry the opposite claim -- that 1M was gated
|
|
974
|
-
# behind a `context-1m-2025-08-07` header this harness does not send,
|
|
975
|
-
# so an ordinary account got 200_000 and these entries "want to be
|
|
976
|
-
# 200_000". That was true of the Sonnet 4 era and was never true of
|
|
977
|
-
# the models listed here; checked against the current model reference
|
|
978
|
-
# in batch 44, the whole 4.6-and-later family is 1M and Haiku 4.5 is
|
|
979
|
-
# 200K. The values were right and the comment was stale, which is the
|
|
980
|
-
# dangerous combination now that the trigger reads them: a reader
|
|
981
|
-
# following the old note would have "corrected" five entries by a
|
|
982
|
-
# factor of five and compacted every Claude thread at a fifth of the
|
|
983
|
-
# window.
|
|
984
|
-
"claude-opus-5": 1_000_000,
|
|
985
|
-
"claude-sonnet-5": 1_000_000,
|
|
986
|
-
"claude-fable-5": 1_000_000,
|
|
987
|
-
"claude-opus-4-8": 1_000_000,
|
|
988
|
-
"claude-opus-4-7": 1_000_000,
|
|
989
|
-
"claude-opus-4-6": 1_000_000,
|
|
990
|
-
"claude-sonnet-4-6": 1_000_000,
|
|
991
|
-
# Dateless, per the normalization note above: this was keyed
|
|
992
|
-
# "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001" while its five siblings were dateless,
|
|
993
|
-
# which is the inconsistency that exposed the exact-match bug.
|
|
994
|
-
"claude-haiku-4-5": 200_000,
|
|
995
|
-
"gpt-5.1": 400_000,
|
|
996
|
-
"gemini-2.5-pro": 1_000_000,
|
|
997
|
-
# Alibaba markets "1M"; the documented input limit is 983,616, and
|
|
998
|
-
# drops to that figure specifically when thinking is enabled. The
|
|
999
|
-
# SMALLER number is the right one to record: this feeds the pipeline
|
|
1000
|
-
# compaction backstop (context_limit - COMPACTION_PIPELINE_BACKSTOP_
|
|
1001
|
-
# TOKENS), where erring low compacts slightly early and erring high
|
|
1002
|
-
# means a hard context-limit error from the provider mid-run.
|
|
1003
|
-
"qwen3.8-max-preview": 983_616,
|
|
1004
|
-
}
|
|
1005
|
-
# Logged at WARNING ONCE PER MODEL, per §21 -- a wrong-by-default window
|
|
1006
|
-
# means compaction and the backstop both fire at the wrong time in
|
|
1007
|
-
# whichever direction the guess is wrong, and silent guessing turns a
|
|
1008
|
-
# tuning problem into a mystery. Once per model rather than once per use,
|
|
1009
|
-
# because context_limit() is on should_compact()'s path and that runs at
|
|
1010
|
-
# the top of every step of every turn; the dedup set lives in
|
|
1011
|
-
# core/compaction.py. A long session therefore says this once and is then
|
|
1012
|
-
# silent, which is the trade -- the line is actionable exactly once, and
|
|
1013
|
-
# since batch 44 it names the action (/window, which remembers).
|
|
1014
|
-
#
|
|
1015
|
-
# 256_000 rather than 200_000 (batch 44): the floor a hosted agentic model
|
|
1016
|
-
# ships with today. Below that is essentially always a self-hosted
|
|
1017
|
-
# deployment, whose operator knows the number and can say it once with
|
|
1018
|
-
# /window -- which is the case this default cannot serve and does not try
|
|
1019
|
-
# to. Erring low here would compact every unknown model early forever to
|
|
1020
|
-
# protect the rarer case that has an owner who can answer.
|
|
1021
|
-
DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WINDOW = 256_000
|
|
1022
|
-
|
|
1023
|
-
|
|
1024
|
-
# APICredentials was here and is deleted (audit #23). It was dead -- nothing
|
|
1025
|
-
# constructed it, imported it or type-hinted against it -- and its guidance
|
|
1026
|
-
# contradicted the mechanism that is real: it told the reader to put the key
|
|
1027
|
-
# in an environment variable and write the VARIABLE'S NAME here, while
|
|
1028
|
-
# credentials.save_credentials stores the key value directly in
|
|
1029
|
-
# providers.json. Anyone following it ended up with the literal string
|
|
1030
|
-
# "MY_KEY_VAR" as their API key.
|
|
1031
|
-
#
|
|
1032
|
-
# Credentials flow through credentials.py (providers.json) and env_secrets.py
|
|
1033
|
-
# (.env) -- the deliberate two-mechanism split D19 describes, which
|
|
1034
|
-
# env_secrets.py documents at length on the other side. The provider roster
|
|
1035
|
-
# lives in providers.json.example, beside the file it describes.
|
|
1036
|
-
|
|
1037
|
-
|
|
1038
|
-
@dataclass
|
|
1039
|
-
class ToolPermissions:
|
|
1040
|
-
web_search: bool = True
|
|
1041
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §15/D24: fetch_url was registered and documented as working
|
|
1042
|
-
# but had no field here, so getattr(..., False) denied every call since
|
|
1043
|
-
# the tool was added. Allowed by default, matching web_search -- it is
|
|
1044
|
-
# already constrained by policy_enforcement's blocked-domain list and
|
|
1045
|
-
# its output goes through secret redaction like every other tool's.
|
|
1046
|
-
fetch_url: bool = True
|
|
1047
|
-
get_time: bool = True
|
|
1048
|
-
arxiv_search: bool = True
|
|
1049
|
-
symbolic_math: bool = True
|
|
1050
|
-
linear_algebra: bool = True
|
|
1051
|
-
probability_stats: bool = True
|
|
1052
|
-
discrete_math: bool = True
|
|
1053
|
-
logic: bool = True
|
|
1054
|
-
geometry: bool = True
|
|
1055
|
-
read: bool = False
|
|
1056
|
-
write: bool = False
|
|
1057
|
-
edit: bool = False
|
|
1058
|
-
shell: bool = False
|
|
1059
|
-
load_skill: bool = True
|
|
1060
|
-
# §18: spawning is allowed by default (model autonomy, D6) and needs no
|
|
1061
|
-
# approval -- the spawned run's own tools are each gated by policy,
|
|
1062
|
-
# intersection-capped by the parent's context (C6).
|
|
1063
|
-
spawn_subagent: bool = True
|
|
1064
|
-
# §21/D26. Thread-scoped, reversible (batch 16 gave that word a
|
|
1065
|
-
# mechanism: `unpin`), and it takes effect inside a conversation the
|
|
1066
|
-
# user is watching -- a wrong pin costs some context budget and nothing
|
|
1067
|
-
# else.
|
|
1068
|
-
pin: bool = True
|
|
1069
|
-
# §21/D26, restored by batch 16 (#89). D26's premise called a pin
|
|
1070
|
-
# reversible while nothing anywhere unpinned one; unpin is the other
|
|
1071
|
-
# half of making the premise true rather than aspirational. Same axis,
|
|
1072
|
-
# same gating posture, same reasons.
|
|
1073
|
-
unpin: bool = True
|
|
1074
|
-
# §21b. Allowed everywhere; whether it can actually RUN is decided
|
|
1075
|
-
# by the approval gate below plus §13's headless rule.
|
|
1076
|
-
remember: bool = True
|
|
1077
|
-
# §24 (I2). Allowed, unlike `read`, because it is confined to the
|
|
1078
|
-
# project directory by realpath and to documentation/manifest files by
|
|
1079
|
-
# an allowlist -- see tools/builtin/project_docs.py for what that
|
|
1080
|
-
# deliberately excludes and why the narrow set is load-bearing.
|
|
1081
|
-
read_project_doc: bool = True
|
|
1082
|
-
# §24 (I1). Allowed, unlike `write`, because it takes a document NAME
|
|
1083
|
-
# from a fixed allowlist rather than a path: the destination is derived,
|
|
1084
|
-
# so the tool cannot be aimed anywhere else. The gate is below.
|
|
1085
|
-
write_project_doc: bool = True
|
|
1086
|
-
# §23 slice 2. Allowed everywhere, and ungated below (J12): whether it
|
|
1087
|
-
# can actually reach a person is decided by whether the run has a
|
|
1088
|
-
# response channel, which the tool itself checks.
|
|
1089
|
-
ask_user: bool = True
|
|
1090
|
-
# §23 slice 2. Thread-scoped, reversible, and it asks nobody -- so it is
|
|
1091
|
-
# allowed and ungated for `pin`'s reasons (J9).
|
|
1092
|
-
todo_write: bool = True
|
|
1093
|
-
|
|
1094
|
-
@dataclass
|
|
1095
|
-
class ToolApprovals:
|
|
1096
|
-
web_search: bool = False
|
|
1097
|
-
# No approval: a tool with approval=True is unusable wherever there is
|
|
1098
|
-
# no permission_channel to answer the prompt (the CLI chat loop and
|
|
1099
|
-
# every research pass), so gating fetch_url would leave it denied in
|
|
1100
|
-
# exactly the places the grounding passes need it -- the same outcome
|
|
1101
|
-
# as the D24 bug, with a different error string. See DEVLOG §15.
|
|
1102
|
-
fetch_url: bool = False
|
|
1103
|
-
get_time: bool = False
|
|
1104
|
-
arxiv_search: bool = False
|
|
1105
|
-
symbolic_math: bool = False
|
|
1106
|
-
linear_algebra: bool = False
|
|
1107
|
-
probability_stats: bool = False
|
|
1108
|
-
discrete_math: bool = False
|
|
1109
|
-
logic: bool = False
|
|
1110
|
-
geometry: bool = False
|
|
1111
|
-
read: bool = False
|
|
1112
|
-
write: bool = False
|
|
1113
|
-
edit: bool = False
|
|
1114
|
-
# ROADMAP_v2 §28 (G3). False since §28, and False here does NOT mean
|
|
1115
|
-
# "never ask" -- SHELL_APPROVAL_MODE is the gate, and it ships
|
|
1116
|
-
# "tiered". This field is the RATCHET, and it still only tightens:
|
|
1117
|
-
# approval_needed() ORs the tool's own check with requires_approval(),
|
|
1118
|
-
# and requires_approval() reads this field, so setting it True forces
|
|
1119
|
-
# "always" whatever the mode says. An agent's approval_overrides
|
|
1120
|
-
# reaches the same OR and has the same one-way power (D14).
|
|
1121
|
-
#
|
|
1122
|
-
# It stays declared because D24 requires every registered tool to have
|
|
1123
|
-
# a field in both dataclasses, and because the ratchet needs somewhere
|
|
1124
|
-
# to live. Do not delete it and do not read it as the gate.
|
|
1125
|
-
shell: bool = False
|
|
1126
|
-
load_skill: bool = False
|
|
1127
|
-
# Approving a spawn is the §18 subagent sign-off: it authorises the
|
|
1128
|
-
# child's whole approval-gated tool set for the rest of the turn, so
|
|
1129
|
-
# delegation itself has to be the thing approved. Consequence, named
|
|
1130
|
-
# rather than discovered: the headless callability filter drops
|
|
1131
|
-
# spawn_subagent anywhere nothing can grant the approval -- CLI chat,
|
|
1132
|
-
# and any research run that is neither attended nor granting. The
|
|
1133
|
-
# once-per-run notice names it.
|
|
1134
|
-
#
|
|
1135
|
-
# §25 R4 declares it GRANT_NEVER (R13, on the ToolSpec): it can never
|
|
1136
|
-
# be PRE-granted, in a research run OR at §18's sign-off, because
|
|
1137
|
-
# approving a spawn hands the child a whole gated set and one
|
|
1138
|
-
# launch-time tick would compound into unbounded delegated authority
|
|
1139
|
-
# across ten unattended passes. #67 is why "or at the sign-off" is in
|
|
1140
|
-
# that sentence: R4's argument is ABOUT the sign-off, and the
|
|
1141
|
-
# exclusion had never reached it. An ATTENDED run can still approve a
|
|
1142
|
-
# spawn live,
|
|
1143
|
-
# which is a per-call human decision and exactly what the gate is for.
|
|
1144
|
-
# The child then runs headless with nothing granted, since
|
|
1145
|
-
# spawn_subagent forwards a grant only alongside a permission_channel.
|
|
1146
|
-
spawn_subagent: bool = True
|
|
1147
|
-
# §21/D26: pin does NOT require approval, and the asymmetry with
|
|
1148
|
-
# remember (§21b) is the decision. They differ on the axis that already
|
|
1149
|
-
# separates `read` from `write` -- pin is thread-scoped and reversible,
|
|
1150
|
-
# while remember writes something that outlives the thread and silently
|
|
1151
|
-
# shapes conversations the user has not started yet.
|
|
1152
|
-
#
|
|
1153
|
-
# Consequence, named rather than discovered: this is what lets pin work
|
|
1154
|
-
# on the CLI and inside a research pass, where an approval-gated tool
|
|
1155
|
-
# is not merely denied but not advertised at all (§13).
|
|
1156
|
-
pin: bool = False
|
|
1157
|
-
# §21/D26, batch 16 (#89). Ungated for pin's reasons, and now genuinely
|
|
1158
|
-
# symmetric: releasing protection costs context budget in a
|
|
1159
|
-
# conversation the user is watching, exactly like applying it.
|
|
1160
|
-
unpin: bool = False
|
|
1161
|
-
# §21b/D26, and the asymmetry with pin above IS the decision. A
|
|
1162
|
-
# memory outlives its thread and silently shapes conversations the
|
|
1163
|
-
# user has not started yet, so it is persistent and invisible at the
|
|
1164
|
-
# moment it matters -- the same axis that separates write from read.
|
|
1165
|
-
#
|
|
1166
|
-
# Consequence: unreachable on any headless path, which includes every
|
|
1167
|
-
# research pass. That is deliberate (§21's consequence 1) and is
|
|
1168
|
-
# reinforced by the tool's GRANT_NEVER policy (M17, carried by R13),
|
|
1169
|
-
# because a grant would otherwise route around it.
|
|
1170
|
-
remember: bool = True
|
|
1171
|
-
# §24 (I2): no approval. Reading the project's own documentation, at the
|
|
1172
|
-
# user's explicit request, on the files the manifest already listed to
|
|
1173
|
-
# them, is not an escalation -- and a gate here would mean a dozen
|
|
1174
|
-
# prompts for one /init, which is the shape of consent that gets clicked
|
|
1175
|
-
# through. The confinement in project_docs.py is the control.
|
|
1176
|
-
read_project_doc: bool = False
|
|
1177
|
-
# §24 (I1): gated, on the same axis that separates `read` from `write`.
|
|
1178
|
-
# This writes a file into the user's project that is then injected into
|
|
1179
|
-
# future prompts, and it invalidates the D17 trust hash as it goes.
|
|
1180
|
-
# /init supplies the approval itself, as the yes to a rendered diff --
|
|
1181
|
-
# so the gate is what makes "no silent overwrite" (§24 AC2) structural
|
|
1182
|
-
# rather than a promise the command makes about itself.
|
|
1183
|
-
write_project_doc: bool = True
|
|
1184
|
-
# §23 slice 2 (J12): UNGATED. Two reasons, and the second is the one
|
|
1185
|
-
# that decides it. Gating would mean approving a prompt in order to be
|
|
1186
|
-
# shown a prompt -- but worse, §13 does not merely deny a gated tool
|
|
1187
|
-
# where nothing can ask, it stops ADVERTISING it. Gated, this tool would
|
|
1188
|
-
# be invisible in every headless run; §24 AC2 requires it be visible,
|
|
1189
|
-
# called, and answered with a denial the model can work around. Asking
|
|
1190
|
-
# a person is not an action that needs authorising -- it is the least
|
|
1191
|
-
# unilateral thing a run can do.
|
|
1192
|
-
ask_user: bool = False
|
|
1193
|
-
# §23 slice 2 (J9): UNGATED, on the axis that already separates `pin`
|
|
1194
|
-
# from `remember`. A todo list is thread-scoped and reversible, and
|
|
1195
|
-
# rewriting it costs some prompt budget inside a conversation the user
|
|
1196
|
-
# can see. Gating it would also make it invisible in every research pass
|
|
1197
|
-
# (§13), which is where a checklist across ten passes helps most.
|
|
1198
|
-
todo_write: bool = False
|
|
1
|
+
"""config.py -- the harness's settings, as module attributes.
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
THE VALUES LIVE IN `config.yaml` NOW. This module is the compatibility layer
|
|
4
|
+
that publishes them: it reads the file once, through `config_schema.py`, and
|
|
5
|
+
binds each value as a plain module global, so `config.MAX_TOKENS` means what
|
|
6
|
+
it always meant to the 30 production modules and ~60 test files that read it.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
WHERE TO LOOK FOR WHAT:
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
* `config.yaml` the values, with a short note on what each DOES
|
|
11
|
+
* `CONFIG_ARCHITECTURE.md` why each value is what it is -- the whole
|
|
12
|
+
history, section by section, under the same
|
|
13
|
+
names. Read it before changing a number.
|
|
14
|
+
* `config_schema.py` the schema, the environment overrides, and the
|
|
15
|
+
argument for why the file has exactly one
|
|
16
|
+
location and no override variable
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
FOUR THINGS ABOUT THIS FILE ARE DELIBERATE.
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
1. THE GLOBALS ARE PLAIN AND MUTABLE, and are bound EAGERLY rather than
|
|
21
|
+
through a module `__getattr__`. Four access patterns in this codebase
|
|
22
|
+
depend on it and a lazy proxy breaks at least one of each:
|
|
23
|
+
`monkeypatch.setattr(config, ...)`, a bare `config.X = v` (an autouse
|
|
24
|
+
fixture in `tests/conftest.py` does this for every test in the suite),
|
|
25
|
+
`mocker.patch.dict(config.__dict__, {...})`, and
|
|
26
|
+
`getattr(config, "<NAME>", default)` -- which must raise `AttributeError`,
|
|
27
|
+
not `KeyError`, for a name that does not exist.
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
2. THE READ HAPPENS AT IMPORT, and so does the environment fold-in.
|
|
30
|
+
`security/posture.py` depends on it: `config` binding at import is what
|
|
31
|
+
makes `os.environ[...] = ...` unable to move the security posture, where
|
|
32
|
+
anything reading `os.environ` at CALL time would follow the mutation (UN1,
|
|
33
|
+
and batch 37's asymmetry). `tools/builtin/shell.py` validates the approval
|
|
34
|
+
mode at its own import, so the values must be final before it runs.
|
|
35
|
+
Nothing re-reads the file; an edit to `config.yaml` takes effect at the
|
|
36
|
+
next launch.
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
3. THERE IS STILL NO LOGIC HERE. No `if`, no function that decides anything,
|
|
39
|
+
no `os.environ` read -- those moved to `config_schema.py` rather than
|
|
40
|
+
arriving here. ARCHITECTURE.md §4.1's rule is unchanged in substance: a
|
|
41
|
+
function that reads these values and makes a decision belongs in whichever
|
|
42
|
+
file consumes the setting.
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
4. `ToolPermissions` / `ToolApprovals` ARE REAL DATACLASSES, rebuilt from the
|
|
45
|
+
schema with `config.yaml`'s booleans as their field defaults. Not the
|
|
46
|
+
pydantic models themselves, because the codebase depends on the shape:
|
|
47
|
+
`security/permissions.py` calls `config.ToolPermissions()` with no
|
|
48
|
+
arguments on every check, tests mutate an instance and then swap this
|
|
49
|
+
module's attribute for a factory returning it, and
|
|
50
|
+
`tests/test_docs_consistency.py` enumerates `vars(instance)` to check
|
|
51
|
+
README's approval table names every registered tool. The FIELD NAMES are
|
|
52
|
+
declared in `config_schema.py`, in Python, so D24's build-time check that
|
|
53
|
+
every registered tool has a field cannot be turned into a runtime surprise
|
|
54
|
+
by an omission in a data file.
|
|
55
|
+
"""
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
import config_schema
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
# Read, validate, apply the environment. Once, here, before anything else in
|
|
60
|
+
# the process has run. A missing file, an unknown key, a missing key, a
|
|
61
|
+
# duplicated key or a value of the wrong type raises `ValueError` naming the
|
|
62
|
+
# file and the key -- loudly, at startup, rather than as a wrong default
|
|
63
|
+
# three hours into a run.
|
|
64
|
+
#
|
|
65
|
+
# `force=True` IS LOAD-BEARING, and it is the one thing about this file that
|
|
66
|
+
# is not obvious. IMPORTING THIS MODULE is what "bind the configuration now"
|
|
67
|
+
# means, so this module -- not the schema's cache -- decides when the file is
|
|
68
|
+
# read. Without the flag, `config_schema`'s cache outlives a re-import of
|
|
69
|
+
# `config`, and re-importing `config` under a changed environment is a real
|
|
70
|
+
# technique in this repo rather than a hypothetical: `test_storage_e2e`'s
|
|
71
|
+
# `real_storage` fixture pops `sqlmodel`, `config`, `database` and `storage`
|
|
72
|
+
# out of `sys.modules`, sets `APP_DB_PATH` to a throwaway file, and imports
|
|
73
|
+
# them again to get real SQLite. `config_schema` is not in that list and
|
|
74
|
+
# cannot be -- the fixture predates it -- so a cached model would hand the
|
|
75
|
+
# fresh `config` the OLD `db_path` and point the engine at the developer's
|
|
76
|
+
# real `app.db`. That is how it was found: one test comparing a migrated
|
|
77
|
+
# column against a fresh one, reading a database that had accumulated
|
|
78
|
+
# migrations.
|
|
79
|
+
#
|
|
80
|
+
# The cache still does its job. `core/config_loader.py` reads five values off
|
|
81
|
+
# `config_schema.current()`, which returns whatever this import bound, so the
|
|
82
|
+
# two cannot disagree -- and a re-import replaces the cache rather than
|
|
83
|
+
# bypassing it.
|
|
84
|
+
_config = config_schema.load(force=True)
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
# Bind every value as a module global. `as_module_namespace` returns
|
|
87
|
+
# `{UPPER_CASE_NAME: value}` for every field in `config.yaml` except the two
|
|
88
|
+
# permission tables, plus the two values that have no key because they are
|
|
89
|
+
# derived from the environment rather than defaulted: OUTPUT_DIR (composed
|
|
90
|
+
# from AGENT_OUTPUT_DIR / AGENT_WORKSPACE) and WORKSPACE_DIR_EXPLICIT (the
|
|
91
|
+
# PRESENCE of AGENT_WORKSPACE, never its value).
|
|
92
|
+
globals().update(config_schema.as_module_namespace(_config))
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
ToolPermissions = config_schema.tool_permissions_dataclass()
|
|
95
|
+
ToolApprovals = config_schema.tool_approvals_dataclass()
|