@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.4 → 1.1.6

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sDAAsD,CAAC;AAC/G,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AACjH,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,oDAAoD,CAAC;AAC9F,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAC3F,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAExG,wEAAwE;AACxE,EAAE;AACF,4FAA4F;AAC5F,kGAAkG;AAClG,8FAA8F;AAC9F,EAAE;AACF,mGAAmG;AACnG,qFAAqF;AACrF,iEAAiE;AACjE,kEAAkE;AAClE,kEAAkE;AAElE,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,oBAIX;AAJD,WAAY,oBAAoB;IAC9B,oDAA4B,CAAA;IAC5B,sDAA8B,CAAA;IAC9B,sDAA8B,CAAA;AAChC,CAAC,EAJW,oBAAoB,KAApB,oBAAoB,QAI/B;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,mEAAmE,CAAC;AAE/F,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;KACxC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;KACN,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;KACR,KAAK,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,uEAAuE,CAAC,CAAC;AAEtG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACtD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACvD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACvD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC7D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACxC,2EAA2E;IAC3E,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IACnB,qDAAqD;IACrD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE;CACzC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC9D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAClB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACxC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IACnB;;;;OAIG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CACrC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC9D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IAClB,iFAAiF;IACjF,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;CACrB,CAAC,CAAC;AAMH,wEAAwE;AAExE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,uCAAuC,CAClF,+BAA+B,EAC/B;IACE,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;IACtB,eAAe,EAAE,oBAAoB;IACrC,6EAA6E;IAC7E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,qEAAqE;IACrE,oEAAoE;IACpE,2EAA2E;IAC3E,gFAAgF;IAChF,8EAA8E;IAC9E,iBAAiB;IACjB,EAAE;IACF,+FAA+F;IAC/F,0FAA0F;IAC1F,4FAA4F;IAC5F,8FAA8F;IAC9F,cAAc;IACd,6FAA6F;IAC7F,8FAA8F;IAC9F,sFAAsF;IACtF,uFAAuF;IACvF,wFAAwF;IACxF,sFAAsF;IACtF,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAClB,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACxC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;KACvC;IACD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAClK,uBAAuB,EAAE;QACvB,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,4EAA4E;QAC5E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,uEAAuE;QACvE,6EAA6E;QAC7E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,+EAA+E;QAC/E,wDAAwD;QACxD,0EAA0E;QAC1E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,sEAAsE;QACtE,2EAA2E;QAC3E,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBACvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,yFAAyF;QACzF,sEAAsE;QACtE,6FAA6F;QAC7F,4EAA4E;QAC5E,uFAAuF;QACvF,4FAA4F;QAC5F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,yFAAyF;QACzF,EAAE;QACF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,oFAAoF;QACpF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,0EAA0E;QAC1E,EAAE;QACF,8FAA8F;QAC9F,0FAA0F;QAC1F,2FAA2F;QAC3F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,iCAAiC;QACjC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBACvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;iBAC7C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,8EAA8E;QAC9E,yFAAyF;QACzF,iFAAiF;QACjF,gFAAgF;QAChF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,0FAA0F;QAC1F,+EAA+E;QAC/E,6FAA6F;QAC7F,sCAAsC;QACtC,+DAA+D;QAC/D,mFAAmF;QACnF,oDAAoD;QACpD,mFAAmF;QACnF,qFAAqF;QACrF,sFAAsF;QACtF,wEAAwE;QACxE,yEAAyE;QACzE,sFAAsF;QACtF,kFAAkF;QAClF,sFAAsF;QACtF,iFAAiF;QACjF,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBACvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,yEAAyE;QACzE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,+EAA+E;QAC/E,6EAA6E;QAC7E,qEAAqE;QACrE,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,eAAe;oBACzD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA2CG;QACH,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE;YACnC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;oBAC1C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;oBAC3C,iBAAiB,EAAE,gCAAgC;iBACpD,CAAC;SACH;QAED,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;YACpC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,sFAAsF;oBACtF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,oBAAoB;oBACpB,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,iBAAiB,EAAE,iCAAiC;iBACrD,CAAC;SACH;QAED,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;YACpC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,gFAAgF;oBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,iBAAiB,EAAE,iCAAiC;iBACrD,CAAC;SACH;KACF;CACF,CACF,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSO Config Resource Configuration — Polymorphic\n *\n * Produces 2 factory functions (ORG + APP) via the polymorphic factory.\n * Spread into the registry factory map:\n *   ...ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DomainVerificationStatus, ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration } from './sso-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// ── Domain-ownership operations ──────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// Enterprise domain routing sends every `@customer.com` sign-in to that customer's identity\n// provider. Reaching the VERIFIED state used to require an out-of-band database write, which made\n// enterprise onboarding a support ticket forever (#424). These three operations are the door.\n//\n// They are entity-level operations on a resource that is a ONE-to-ONE COMPOSITION under its scope,\n// so the URL builder omits the id segment and the scope in the path selects the row:\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/claim-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/verify-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/revoke-domain\n\nexport enum SsoConfig_Operations {\n  CLAIM_DOMAIN = 'claimDomain',\n  VERIFY_DOMAIN = 'verifyDomain',\n  REVOKE_DOMAIN = 'revokeDomain',\n}\n\n/**\n * A DNS hostname, syntactically. Two labels minimum — a single label is not a domain anyone can\n * publish a TXT record under, and accepting one would mint a challenge that can never be answered.\n *\n * Case is NOT normalised here. The backend lowercases before every read and every write, because\n * that is where the stored map keys are decided; doing it in two places would make the request\n * contract look like the authority when it is not.\n */\nconst SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-))+$/;\n\nconst SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()\n  .min(4)\n  .max(253)\n  .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. \"customer.com\".');\n\n/*\n * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────\n *\n * These three shipped as `strictObject` and every claim answered **400 `unrecognized_keys:\n * [\"domains\"]`**, measured over HTTP on 2026-09-09. The framework MERGES a PREFIX hook's returned\n * patch into the request payload and re-parses the result against THIS schema — so the `domains`\n * block the planner just computed arrived at a schema that knows only `domain`, and a strict schema\n * refuses what it does not recognise. A prefix that contributes a persisted field is therefore\n * structurally incompatible with a strict request DTO; every sibling lifecycle verb in the engine\n * (`organizations.requestDeletion`, `activate`, `restore`) uses `z.object` for exactly this reason.\n *\n * `z.object` STRIPS the unrecognised key instead of refusing it, which on its own would turn the\n * 400 into the quieter defect — 200 having persisted nothing. What closes that half is\n * `authoritativeFields: ['domains']` on each custom-implementation registration, which re-attaches\n * the hook's value after the strip and makes a caller-supplied `domains` be overwritten rather than\n * honoured. The two halves are one decision; neither works alone.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\n/**\n * The claim response is the ONLY disclosure of the challenge nonce.\n *\n * `domainVerificationTokens` is `.isBackendOnly()`, so no READ of the config ever returns it — an\n * operator who loses this response claims again, which mints a new nonce and invalidates the old\n * one. `.isEphemeral()` marks `dnsRecordValue` as a revealed-once secret, the same contract the\n * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),\n  /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */\n  dnsName: z.string(),\n  /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */\n  dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral(),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),\n  dnsName: z.string(),\n  /**\n   * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.\n   * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses\n   * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.\n   */\n  dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string(),\n  /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */\n  revoked: z.boolean(),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto>;\n\n// ── Polymorphic Factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    customOperation: SsoConfig_Operations,\n    // The auth runtime loads the org SSO config via `readAsSystem` during login,\n    // before the user's roles/membership are established (READ). When the row is\n    // absent — a provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org that bypassed the\n    // `afterCreate` default-seed — that same userless login path lazily\n    // materialises the disabled-default row via `createAsSystem` (CREATE); see\n    // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.loadSSOConfig`. Both are system-context\n    // (the logging-in user is not the config's admin owner), so the resource opts\n    // BOTH verbs in.\n    //\n    // `list` is the DOMAIN-EXCLUSIVITY probe and nothing else (#424). At most one scope may hold a\n    // domain VERIFIED, or a `@customer.com` sign-in routes non-deterministically to whichever\n    // config the lookup happens to reach first. Answering \"does another scope already hold this\n    // domain\" is unavoidably a cross-scope read, and the two candidates that avoid this grant are\n    // both worse:\n    //   - `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.getAllOrganizationIds()` enumerates an IN-MEMORY\n    //     CACHE of scopes whose config has been loaded, so it under-reports on a cold process. An\n    //     exclusivity check built on it answers \"nobody else holds it\" from an incomplete\n    //     population — the negative-result failure that produces a confident wrong answer;\n    //   - reaching the repository directly bypasses the `systemAccessPolicy` opt-in AND the\n    //     `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*` audit event, which is a bigger grant wearing a smaller name.\n    systemAccessPolicy: {\n      read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    },\n    coreOperations: [CoreResourceOperation.READ, CoreResourceOperation.LIST, CoreResourceOperation.CREATE, CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE, CoreResourceOperation.DELETE],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the per-scope config row is\n      // materialised by the framework default-seed (repository tier) OR — when that\n      // was bypassed (provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org) — lazily by the\n      // userless login path via `createAsSystem` (`systemAccessPolicy.create` opts\n      // it in). Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `createAsSystem` resolves CREATE via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but\n      // NOT REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only CREATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical, and\n      // self-alerting on mere construction) on every login for a config-less org.\n      // No public HTTP create surface (config is seeded/bootstrapped, never\n      // self-serve). Same fix as the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the ONE caller is the domain-exclusivity\n      // probe described on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above, reached through\n      // `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`. It must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY for the same reason the\n      // CREATE and UPDATE below are not: `listAsSystem` resolves the verb through\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL and rejects\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY. There is deliberately no API_CALL variant — one tenant enumerating every\n      // other tenant's SSO policy is the opposite of what this resource is for, and the probe that\n      // needs the enumeration answers a single yes/no question and returns no row to a caller.\n      //\n      // Admin tier / MEDIUM — and MEDIUM rather than HIGH is a correction, not a downgrade. This\n      // shipped at HIGH and was the FIRST read-shaped HIGH operation in the catalogue, which broke\n      // the measurement `resource-operation-audit-emission.backend.test.ts` calls \"the one the whole\n      // design rests on\": `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` is deliberately not emitted for a read, and\n      // `FIELD_ACCESS` fires only on a disclosed marked field — so a read declared inside\n      // `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR` promises evidence that CANNOT exist on either axis, and the\n      // most dangerous read in the catalogue would be the one leaving no trace.\n      //\n      // The crossing is nonetheless recorded, on the axis that can carry it: the probe reaches this\n      // verb through `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`, which emits its own `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*`\n      // event — that is precisely why the comment on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above refuses the\n      // repository shortcut. So the declaration moves to where the evidence actually is instead of\n      // claiming a row nothing writes.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): admin policy edits reach this\n      // through the config service path — `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`\n      // dispatches the write via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's EC,\n      // preserving admin audit attribution. The comment here used to say the path was\n      // \"correct-but-dormant\" because `DomainVerificationBackendService` had no public operation\n      // wired to it, and warned against \"simplifying\" the variant on the theory that nothing calls\n      // it. That warning was right and is now moot: the domain workflow it was holding the door\n      // open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below), and\n      // `initiateDomainVerification` / `verifyDomainOwnership` still reach this INTERNAL_CALL path\n      // for callers that hold no operation.\n      // Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `.update()` resolves the op via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but NOT\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only UPDATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical) on any admin\n      // domain edit (and, post lazy-create fix, `loadSSOConfig` always materialises a row,\n      // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). No public HTTP update surface\n      // (future supported edits flow through this internal service path). The\n      // `socialCredentialOverrides` write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl\n      // (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) is keyed on this variant and MOVES IN LOCKSTEP —\n      // the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, so a REPOSITORY_ONLY drift on\n      // either side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save.\n      // Same fix as the CREATE above + the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope SSO-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. This deletes the whole row; domain mutation is not currently a\n      // public operation. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      /*\n       * ─── The three domain-ownership doors (#424) ────────────────────────────────────────────\n       *\n       * ## Why the tenant's own admin, and NOT a platform operator\n       *\n       * None of the three declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and that is a\n       * decision rather than an omission. A platform operator crossing into a tenant is justified\n       * when the tenant CANNOT act for itself — `organizationMembers.grantOwnership` repairs a\n       * tenant with no owner. Domain ownership is the opposite shape: the party who must prove it\n       * is the party who controls the DNS, and the operator controls neither the DNS nor the\n       * business relationship. A crossing here would let a platform administrator hand one tenant\n       * routing control over every sign-in at a domain, with the tenant's own admins unable to see\n       * why. The ambient reach `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` forbids is\n       * exactly this.\n       *\n       * ## Why each is UPDATE-like\n       *\n       * All three mutate `domains` on the scope's single config row, so they borrow UPDATE and get\n       * a PUT that carries a body. The domain travels in the BODY, never in the URL: a domain name\n       * is a customer identity, and a GET would write it into every access log between the operator\n       * and the server.\n       *\n       * ## Where the work happens\n       *\n       * Each is implemented as a PREFIX that returns the new `domains` object, which the core\n       * UPDATE persists — the organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE shape. Deliberately NOT `OVERRIDE_ALL`:\n       * that mode returns before the framework's post-operation lane and would therefore emit NO\n       * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` audit event, which is the one control that makes a\n       * privileged configuration change with cross-tenant reach accountable. See\n       * `sso-config-domain-verification.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`.\n       *\n       * ## What the trail carries\n       *\n       * All three sit at or above `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so no `auditableEvent` declaration\n       * is needed. `domains.verifiedDomains`, `domains.ssoEnabledDomains` and\n       * `domains.domainVerificationStatus` are `.isAuditEvidence()`, so the row carries the\n       * before/after of the claimed set and the status map — i.e. WHICH domain moved, and to what.\n       * `domains.domainVerificationTokens` is not marked and must never be: it is the challenge\n       * nonce, and the ledger it would land in cannot be scrubbed.\n       *\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — a verified domain decides which\n       * identity provider authenticates every principal at that domain.\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — the domain-ownership trail.\n       */\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and\n          // every routing reader gates on `verified`. The step that confers authority is VERIFY.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.VERIFY_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY\n          // person who signs in with an address at the domain — including people who are not that\n          // tenant's members.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.REVOKE_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a\n          // domain claimable by a different scope, so it is the hinge of every hand-over.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sDAAsD,CAAC;AAC/G,OAAO,EACL,0BAA0B,EAC1B,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,EAAE,uCAAuC,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AACjH,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,oDAAoD,CAAC;AAC9F,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,2CAA2C,CAAC;AAC3F,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,+BAA+B,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAExG,wEAAwE;AACxE,EAAE;AACF,4FAA4F;AAC5F,kGAAkG;AAClG,8FAA8F;AAC9F,EAAE;AACF,mGAAmG;AACnG,qFAAqF;AACrF,iEAAiE;AACjE,kEAAkE;AAClE,kEAAkE;AAElE,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,oBAIX;AAJD,WAAY,oBAAoB;IAC9B,oDAA4B,CAAA;IAC5B,sDAA8B,CAAA;IAC9B,sDAA8B,CAAA;AAChC,CAAC,EAJW,oBAAoB,KAApB,oBAAoB,QAI/B;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,mEAAmE,CAAC;AAE/F,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;KACxC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;KACN,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;KACR,KAAK,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,uEAAuE,CAAC;KAClG,QAAQ,CAAC,uFAAuF,CAAC,CAAC;AAErG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACtD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACvD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACvD,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC7D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC;IAC3D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,8FAA8F,CAAC;IACjJ,2EAA2E;IAC3E,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,kEAAkE,CAAC;IAChG,qDAAqD;IACrD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,wIAAwI,CAAC;CAC5L,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC9D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC;IAC3D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,oHAAoH,CAAC;IACvK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mDAAmD,CAAC;IACjF;;;;OAIG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,0EAA0E,CAAC;CAC1H,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iCAAiC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAC9D,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,qCAAqC,CAAC;IAClE,iFAAiF;IACjF,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,4FAA4F,CAAC;CAC5H,CAAC,CAAC;AAMH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAIrC;IACH,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;CACtE,CAAC;AAEF,wEAAwE;AAExE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,uCAAuC,CAClF,+BAA+B,EAC/B;IACE,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;IACtB,eAAe,EAAE,oBAAoB;IACrC,6EAA6E;IAC7E,6EAA6E;IAC7E,qEAAqE;IACrE,oEAAoE;IACpE,2EAA2E;IAC3E,gFAAgF;IAChF,8EAA8E;IAC9E,iBAAiB;IACjB,EAAE;IACF,+FAA+F;IAC/F,0FAA0F;IAC1F,4FAA4F;IAC5F,8FAA8F;IAC9F,cAAc;IACd,6FAA6F;IAC7F,8FAA8F;IAC9F,sFAAsF;IACtF,uFAAuF;IACvF,wFAAwF;IACxF,sFAAsF;IACtF,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAClB,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACxC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;KACvC;IACD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAClK,uBAAuB,EAAE;QACvB,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;wBAC1G,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,4EAA4E;QAC5E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,uEAAuE;QACvE,6EAA6E;QAC7E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,+EAA+E;QAC/E,wDAAwD;QACxD,0EAA0E;QAC1E,4EAA4E;QAC5E,sEAAsE;QACtE,2EAA2E;QAC3E,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBACvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,yFAAyF;QACzF,sEAAsE;QACtE,6FAA6F;QAC7F,4EAA4E;QAC5E,uFAAuF;QACvF,4FAA4F;QAC5F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,yFAAyF;QACzF,EAAE;QACF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,oFAAoF;QACpF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,0EAA0E;QAC1E,EAAE;QACF,8FAA8F;QAC9F,0FAA0F;QAC1F,2FAA2F;QAC3F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,iCAAiC;QACjC,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBACvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;iBAC7C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,2FAA2F;QAC3F,8FAA8F;QAC9F,uFAAuF;QACvF,sFAAsF;QACtF,8FAA8F;QAC9F,4FAA4F;QAC5F,gFAAgF;QAChF,EAAE;QACF,0FAA0F;QAC1F,yEAAyE;QACzE,4FAA4F;QAC5F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,6FAA6F;QAC7F,oFAAoF;QACpF,+DAA+D;QAC/D,mFAAmF;QACnF,oDAAoD;QACpD,mFAAmF;QACnF,qFAAqF;QACrF,sFAAsF;QACtF,yEAAyE;QACzE,8FAA8F;QAC9F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,2FAA2F;QAC3F,kEAAkE;QAClE,iFAAiF;QACjF,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,6BAA6B,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;oBACxE,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;wBAC1G,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QACD,yEAAyE;QACzE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,8EAA8E;QAC9E,+EAA+E;QAC/E,6EAA6E;QAC7E,qEAAqE;QACrE,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,eAAe;oBACzD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;wBAC5D,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;iBAC3C,CAAC;SACH;QAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA2CG;QACH,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE;YACnC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;wBAC1G,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;oBAC1C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,+BAA+B;oBAC3C,iBAAiB,EAAE,gCAAgC;iBACpD,CAAC;SACH;QAED,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;YACpC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;wBAC1G,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,sFAAsF;oBACtF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,oBAAoB;oBACpB,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,iBAAiB,EAAE,iCAAiC;iBACrD,CAAC;SACH;QAED,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE;YACpC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBACT,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,6BAA6B,CAAC;wBAC1G,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;qBACvE;oBACD,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,gFAAgF;oBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,iBAAiB,EAAE,iCAAiC;iBACrD,CAAC;SACH;KACF;CACF,CACF,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSO Config Resource Configuration — Polymorphic\n *\n * Produces 2 factory functions (ORG + APP) via the polymorphic factory.\n * Spread into the registry factory map:\n *   ...ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation, CoreResourceType } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport {\n  ResourceOperationRiskLevel,\n  ResourceOperationVariantType,\n} from '../../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../../../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport { CORE_ORG_ROLES, CORE_APP_ROLES } from '../../authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DomainVerificationStatus, ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration } from './sso-config.shared.schemas';\n\n// ── Domain-ownership operations ──────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// Enterprise domain routing sends every `@customer.com` sign-in to that customer's identity\n// provider. Reaching the VERIFIED state used to require an out-of-band database write, which made\n// enterprise onboarding a support ticket forever (#424). These three operations are the door.\n//\n// They are entity-level operations on a resource that is a ONE-to-ONE COMPOSITION under its scope,\n// so the URL builder omits the id segment and the scope in the path selects the row:\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/claim-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/verify-domain\n//   PUT /organizations/{organizationId}/sso-configs/revoke-domain\n\nexport enum SsoConfig_Operations {\n  CLAIM_DOMAIN = 'claimDomain',\n  VERIFY_DOMAIN = 'verifyDomain',\n  REVOKE_DOMAIN = 'revokeDomain',\n}\n\n/**\n * A DNS hostname, syntactically. Two labels minimum — a single label is not a domain anyone can\n * publish a TXT record under, and accepting one would mint a challenge that can never be answered.\n *\n * Case is NOT normalised here. The backend lowercases before every read and every write, because\n * that is where the stored map keys are decided; doing it in two places would make the request\n * contract look like the authority when it is not.\n */\nconst SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-))+$/;\n\nconst SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()\n  .min(4)\n  .max(253)\n  .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. \"customer.com\".')\n  .describe(\"The email domain, as a DNS hostname with at least two labels, such as `customer.com`.\");\n\n/*\n * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────\n *\n * These three shipped as `strictObject` and every claim answered **400 `unrecognized_keys:\n * [\"domains\"]`**, measured over HTTP on 2026-09-09. The framework MERGES a PREFIX hook's returned\n * patch into the request payload and re-parses the result against THIS schema — so the `domains`\n * block the planner just computed arrived at a schema that knows only `domain`, and a strict schema\n * refuses what it does not recognise. A prefix that contributes a persisted field is therefore\n * structurally incompatible with a strict request DTO; every sibling lifecycle verb in the engine\n * (`organizations.requestDeletion`, `activate`, `restore`) uses `z.object` for exactly this reason.\n *\n * `z.object` STRIPS the unrecognised key instead of refusing it, which on its own would turn the\n * 400 into the quieter defect — 200 having persisted nothing. What closes that half is\n * `authoritativeFields: ['domains']` on each custom-implementation registration, which re-attaches\n * the hook's value after the strip and makes a caller-supplied `domains` be overwritten rather than\n * honoured. The two halves are one decision; neither works alone.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({\n  domain: SsoConfig_DomainSelector,\n});\n\n/**\n * The claim response is the ONLY disclosure of the challenge nonce.\n *\n * `domainVerificationTokens` is `.isBackendOnly()`, so no READ of the config ever returns it — an\n * operator who loses this response claims again, which mints a new nonce and invalidates the old\n * one. `.isEphemeral()` marks `dnsRecordValue` as a revealed-once secret, the same contract the\n * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.\n */\nexport const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain that was claimed.\"),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe(\"The domain's verification status after the claim: `pending` until the DNS record is checked.\"),\n  /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */\n  dnsName: z.string().describe(\"Where to publish the TXT record: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`.\"),\n  /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */\n  dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral().describe(\"The exact TXT value to publish, returned only in this response. Claiming the domain again issues a new value and invalidates this one.\"),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain that was checked.\"),\n  status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe(\"The result of this check: `verified` when a TXT record at `dnsName` matched the claim's value, otherwise `failed`.\"),\n  dnsName: z.string().describe(\"The DNS name that was queried for the TXT record.\"),\n  /**\n   * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.\n   * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses\n   * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.\n   */\n  dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()).describe(\"Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check can be diagnosed.\"),\n});\n\nexport const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({\n  domain: z.string().describe(\"The domain whose claim was removed.\"),\n  /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */\n  revoked: z.boolean().describe(\"`true` once the domain holds no claim, verification status or pending value in this scope.\"),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto>;\nexport type SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto>;\n\n/**\n * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and\n * by the `socialCredentialOverrides` secret-preservation custom-impl registered on that write.\n *\n * A custom implementation is keyed by `(resource, operation, variantType)`, so the two restating the\n * value by hand is the drift this removes: the dispatch silently stops finding the PREFIX, and every\n * save wipes the per-override `clientSecret` and signedJwt ids. Same shape, and the same reason, as\n * `SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` (#953).\n *\n * `UPDATE` is `API_CALL`: the administrator's edit door. It was `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — which\n * made an SSO policy something only a backend service could change, and the comment there said only\n * that no public surface had been BUILT, never that one would be wrong. Three public PUTs already\n * mutate this row (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain`, #424) under the same roles, and\n * SIEM export config — a scope-level security record holding sealed credentials — has carried this\n * door since #953. Field-level protection is variant-agnostic: `.isWriteOnlySecret()` and\n * `.isBackendOnly()` hold identically on either path.\n *\n * The route-less state was not merely a missing feature. `pickInlineFieldWriteOperation`'s pins record\n * what it cost: with no addressable literal `update`, the frontend's update resolution fell through to\n * whatever custom verb borrowed UPDATE semantics, so every writable field on the SSO settings pane\n * rendered as a live control bound to `claimDomain`.\n */\nexport const SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE: Readonly<{\n  // Exact members, not the enum: a variant is a union DISCRIMINATED by `variantType`, so a value typed\n  // as the whole enum matches no member of it.\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL;\n}> = {\n  [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n};\n\n// ── Polymorphic Factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(\n  ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration,\n  {\n    isSystemResource: true,\n    customOperation: SsoConfig_Operations,\n    // The auth runtime loads the org SSO config via `readAsSystem` during login,\n    // before the user's roles/membership are established (READ). When the row is\n    // absent — a provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org that bypassed the\n    // `afterCreate` default-seed — that same userless login path lazily\n    // materialises the disabled-default row via `createAsSystem` (CREATE); see\n    // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.loadSSOConfig`. Both are system-context\n    // (the logging-in user is not the config's admin owner), so the resource opts\n    // BOTH verbs in.\n    //\n    // `list` is the DOMAIN-EXCLUSIVITY probe and nothing else (#424). At most one scope may hold a\n    // domain VERIFIED, or a `@customer.com` sign-in routes non-deterministically to whichever\n    // config the lookup happens to reach first. Answering \"does another scope already hold this\n    // domain\" is unavoidably a cross-scope read, and the two candidates that avoid this grant are\n    // both worse:\n    //   - `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.getAllOrganizationIds()` enumerates an IN-MEMORY\n    //     CACHE of scopes whose config has been loaded, so it under-reports on a cold process. An\n    //     exclusivity check built on it answers \"nobody else holds it\" from an incomplete\n    //     population — the negative-result failure that produces a confident wrong answer;\n    //   - reaching the repository directly bypasses the `systemAccessPolicy` opt-in AND the\n    //     `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*` audit event, which is a bigger grant wearing a smaller name.\n    systemAccessPolicy: {\n      read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n      list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    },\n    coreOperations: [CoreResourceOperation.READ, CoreResourceOperation.LIST, CoreResourceOperation.CREATE, CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE, CoreResourceOperation.DELETE],\n    operationsConfiguration: {\n      [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the per-scope config row is\n      // materialised by the framework default-seed (repository tier) OR — when that\n      // was bypassed (provisioned / migrated / pre-seed org) — lazily by the\n      // userless login path via `createAsSystem` (`systemAccessPolicy.create` opts\n      // it in). Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `createAsSystem` resolves CREATE via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but\n      // NOT REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only CREATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical, and\n      // self-alerting on mere construction) on every login for a config-less org.\n      // No public HTTP create surface (config is seeded/bootstrapped, never\n      // self-serve). Same fix as the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): the ONE caller is the domain-exclusivity\n      // probe described on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above, reached through\n      // `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`. It must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY for the same reason the\n      // CREATE and UPDATE below are not: `listAsSystem` resolves the verb through\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL and rejects\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY. There is deliberately no API_CALL variant — one tenant enumerating every\n      // other tenant's SSO policy is the opposite of what this resource is for, and the probe that\n      // needs the enumeration answers a single yes/no question and returns no row to a caller.\n      //\n      // Admin tier / MEDIUM — and MEDIUM rather than HIGH is a correction, not a downgrade. This\n      // shipped at HIGH and was the FIRST read-shaped HIGH operation in the catalogue, which broke\n      // the measurement `resource-operation-audit-emission.backend.test.ts` calls \"the one the whole\n      // design rests on\": `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` is deliberately not emitted for a read, and\n      // `FIELD_ACCESS` fires only on a disclosed marked field — so a read declared inside\n      // `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR` promises evidence that CANNOT exist on either axis, and the\n      // most dangerous read in the catalogue would be the one leaving no trace.\n      //\n      // The crossing is nonetheless recorded, on the axis that can carry it: the probe reaches this\n      // verb through `SystemAccessService.listAsSystem`, which emits its own `SYSTEM_CONTEXT_*`\n      // event — that is precisely why the comment on `systemAccessPolicy.list` above refuses the\n      // repository shortcut. So the declaration moves to where the evidence actually is instead of\n      // claiming a row nothing writes.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n        }],\n      },\n      // The administrator's edit door, and the only write path for this policy row. Two kinds of\n      // caller reach it and both resolve the SAME default: an admin editing the settings pane, over\n      // the HTTP route this variant now carries; and a backend caller holding no operation —\n      // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`, `initiateDomainVerification`,\n      // `verifyDomainOwnership` — dispatching via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's\n      // EC, preserving admin audit attribution. `getServiceOperationPathDefault` honours API_CALL\n      // exactly as it honoured INTERNAL_CALL, so nothing on the service path changes.\n      //\n      // It WAS `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — and the comment here recorded only that no public\n      // surface had been built, never an argument that one would be wrong. See\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` for why it moved, and for what the missing route cost the\n      // settings pane. An earlier note warned against \"simplifying\" the variant on the theory that\n      // nothing called it; that warning was right and is moot — the domain workflow it was holding\n      // the door open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below).\n      // Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `.update()` resolves the op via\n      // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but NOT\n      // REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only UPDATE throws\n      // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical) on any admin\n      // domain edit (and, post lazy-create fix, `loadSSOConfig` always materialises a row,\n      // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). The variant type is read from\n      // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE`, which the `socialCredentialOverrides`\n      // write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) reads too, so\n      // they move together — the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, and a drift on either\n      // side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save. Hard-code a\n      // variant type here instead and that lockstep is a comment again.\n      // Same fix as the CREATE above + the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE[CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE],\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n      // Internal-only (REPOSITORY_ONLY, no HTTP route): powers the composition\n      // onParentDelete cascade so this one-per-scope SSO-config row is physically\n      // removed when its owning org/app is deleted. Without a DELETE op the cascade\n      // (deleteChildrenImmediate) throws ErrorType.CONFIGURATION on any scope with a\n      // config row. This deletes the whole row; domain mutation is not currently a\n      // public operation. Admin tier (ORG_ADMIN / APP super-admin) / HIGH.\n      [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.REPOSITORY_ONLY,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      /*\n       * ─── The three domain-ownership doors (#424) ────────────────────────────────────────────\n       *\n       * ## Why the tenant's own admin, and NOT a platform operator\n       *\n       * None of the three declares `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration`, and that is a\n       * decision rather than an omission. A platform operator crossing into a tenant is justified\n       * when the tenant CANNOT act for itself — `organizationMembers.grantOwnership` repairs a\n       * tenant with no owner. Domain ownership is the opposite shape: the party who must prove it\n       * is the party who controls the DNS, and the operator controls neither the DNS nor the\n       * business relationship. A crossing here would let a platform administrator hand one tenant\n       * routing control over every sign-in at a domain, with the tenant's own admins unable to see\n       * why. The ambient reach `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md` forbids is\n       * exactly this.\n       *\n       * ## Why each is UPDATE-like\n       *\n       * All three mutate `domains` on the scope's single config row, so they borrow UPDATE and get\n       * a PUT that carries a body. The domain travels in the BODY, never in the URL: a domain name\n       * is a customer identity, and a GET would write it into every access log between the operator\n       * and the server.\n       *\n       * ## Where the work happens\n       *\n       * Each is implemented as a PREFIX that returns the new `domains` object, which the core\n       * UPDATE persists — the organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE shape. Deliberately NOT `OVERRIDE_ALL`:\n       * that mode returns before the framework's post-operation lane and would therefore emit NO\n       * `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED` audit event, which is the one control that makes a\n       * privileged configuration change with cross-tenant reach accountable. See\n       * `sso-config-domain-verification.custom-impl.backend.service.ts`.\n       *\n       * ## What the trail carries\n       *\n       * All three sit at or above `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so no `auditableEvent` declaration\n       * is needed. `domains.verifiedDomains`, `domains.ssoEnabledDomains` and\n       * `domains.domainVerificationStatus` are `.isAuditEvidence()`, so the row carries the\n       * before/after of the claimed set and the status map — i.e. WHICH domain moved, and to what.\n       * `domains.domainVerificationTokens` is not marked and must never be: it is the challenge\n       * nonce, and the ledger it would land in cannot be scrubbed.\n       *\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — a verified domain decides which\n       * identity provider authenticates every principal at that domain.\n       * assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — the domain-ownership trail.\n       */\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and\n          // every routing reader gates on `verified`. The step that confers authority is VERIFY.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.VERIFY_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY\n          // person who signs in with an address at the domain — including people who are not that\n          // tenant's members.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n\n      [SsoConfig_Operations.REVOKE_DOMAIN]: {\n        variants: [{\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          polymorphicRole: {\n            [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],\n            [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          },\n          // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a\n          // domain claimable by a different scope, so it is the hinge of every hand-over.\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto,\n          customResponseDto: SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto,\n        }],\n      },\n    },\n  },\n);\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ export declare const SsoConfigBaseSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     domains: z.ZodObject<{
         verifiedDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>>;
         ssoEnabledDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>>;
-        domainHinting: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        allowExternalDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>>;
         domainVerificationStatus: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodEnum<{
             readonly PENDING: "pending";
             readonly VERIFIED: "verified";
@@ -35,26 +33,8 @@ export declare const SsoConfigBaseSchema: z.ZodObject<{
         }>>>>;
         domainVerificationTokens: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodString>>>;
     }, z.core.$strip>;
-    provisioning: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        autoCreateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        autoUpdateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        autoDeactivateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        defaultRole: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-        requiredAttributes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
-        syncFrequencyHours: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-    }, z.core.$strip>>;
     sessionSettings: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        ssoSessionDurationMinutes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-        requireReauthForSensitive: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
         singleLogoutEnabled: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        maxConcurrentSessions: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-    }, z.core.$strip>>;
-    auditConfig: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        logAllSSOEvents: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        logProviderSwitching: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        logRoleMapping: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        complianceReporting: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        retentionDays: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
     }, z.core.$strip>>;
     emergencyAccess: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
         enabled: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
@@ -117,8 +97,6 @@ export declare const ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration: import("../../..").Polymor
     domains: z.ZodObject<{
         verifiedDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>>;
         ssoEnabledDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>>;
-        domainHinting: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        allowExternalDomains: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>>;
         domainVerificationStatus: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodEnum<{
             readonly PENDING: "pending";
             readonly VERIFIED: "verified";
@@ -127,26 +105,8 @@ export declare const ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration: import("../../..").Polymor
         }>>>>;
         domainVerificationTokens: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodRecord<z.ZodString, z.ZodString>>>;
     }, z.core.$strip>;
-    provisioning: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        autoCreateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        autoUpdateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        autoDeactivateUsers: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        defaultRole: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-        requiredAttributes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodString>>;
-        syncFrequencyHours: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-    }, z.core.$strip>>;
     sessionSettings: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        ssoSessionDurationMinutes: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-        requireReauthForSensitive: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
         singleLogoutEnabled: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        maxConcurrentSessions: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
-    }, z.core.$strip>>;
-    auditConfig: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
-        logAllSSOEvents: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        logProviderSwitching: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        logRoleMapping: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        complianceReporting: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;
-        retentionDays: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
     }, z.core.$strip>>;
     emergencyAccess: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
         enabled: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodBoolean>;

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAIxB,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;CAK3B,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAoO9B,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;AAEhE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC9C,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7C,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;CACtE,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAKvB;AAED,gGAAgG;AAChG,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAC9B,OAAO,EAAE;IACP,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7C,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;CACtE,GAAG,SAAS,EACb,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GACb,OAAO,CAGT;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAM1C,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAIxB,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;CAK3B,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAiT9B,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC;AAEhE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC9C,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7C,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;CACtE,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,CAKvB;AAED,gGAAgG;AAChG,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAC9B,OAAO,EAAE;IACP,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC7C,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;CACtE,GAAG,SAAS,EACb,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GACb,OAAO,CAGT;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAM1C,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.js

@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
     // accounts and exclude THAT from policies. The reading that a role is the wrong unit is this
     // repository's, not a quotation.
     enforcement: z.object({
-        requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),
-        allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true),
-        graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3),
-    }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),
+        requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField().describe("Whether members whose email domain is SSO-enabled must sign in through single sign-on."),
+        allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true).describe("While SSO is required, whether a password sign-in is still accepted within the grace allowance. `false` refuses every password sign-in except a break-glass account's."),
+        graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3).describe("How many password sign-ins each member may still make after SSO becomes required, from 0 to 10. 0 allows none."),
+    }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence().describe("Whether and how strictly single sign-on is required."),
     // NOT marked, deliberately: this block carries `domainVerificationTokens`, which is
     // `.isBackendOnly()` — a SECRET. `.isAuditEvidence()` on a parent object records the WHOLE object
     // before/after, so marking `domains` would copy live verification tokens into audit rows that
     // replicate to the immutable ledger and to every configured SIEM sink. The security-relevant
-    // sub-fields (`ssoEnabledDomains`, `allowExternalDomains`) are marked individually instead, which
-    // keeps the secret out by construction rather than by reviewer vigilance.
+    // sub-fields (`ssoEnabledDomains`, and `domainVerificationStatus` below) are marked individually
+    // instead, which keeps the secret out by construction rather than by reviewer vigilance.
     //
     // Read this before marking any other container: a block is safe to mark WHOLESALE only when no
     // descendant is `.isBackendOnly()` or personal data.
@@ -84,10 +84,22 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * is a schema change plus a data migration for a field whose every reader now goes through the
          * helper. The name is no longer what a new reader reaches.
          */
-        verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),
-        ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),
-        domainHinting: z.boolean().default(true),
-        allowExternalDomains: z.boolean().default(false).isAuditEvidence(),
+        verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe("Every domain this scope has claimed, verified or not. Whether a domain is verified is `domainVerificationStatus`, not membership of this list."),
+        ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe("The verified domains whose members are routed to this scope's identity provider at sign-in."),
+        /*
+         * `domainHinting` and `allowExternalDomains` were REMOVED here, and both were read by nothing.
+         *
+         * `domainHinting` promised the sign-in form would route a person to their IdP from their email
+         * domain — a real and common feature, and one this engine implements from `ssoEnabledDomains`
+         * plus the verification map, never from this flag. Turning it off changed no routing.
+         *
+         * `allowExternalDomains` carried `.isAuditEvidence()` and read as an admission control on who
+         * may join through SSO. Nothing consulted it, so an operator who left it `false` — the default —
+         * believed they had closed a door that was never fitted. What actually restricts admission is
+         * the connection's `allowedDomains`, and on the SCIM lane the verified-domain projection.
+         *
+         * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.
+         */
         /**
          * The half of the join that decides routing authority — and therefore the audit evidence.
          *
@@ -101,7 +113,7 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * distinguish "a tenant claimed a domain" from "a tenant gained SSO routing control over every
          * address at it".
          */
-        domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence(),
+        domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence().describe("The verification status of each claimed domain, keyed by domain."),
         /**
          * The DNS-TXT challenge nonce per claimed domain. `.isBackendOnly()` — never leaves the backend
          * through a resource READ, and never enters the audit trail (see the block comment above).
@@ -110,33 +122,96 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * as an `.isEphemeral()` field, because the operator cannot publish a record they cannot see.
          * A lost token is recovered by claiming again, which mints a new one — there is no re-read.
          */
-        domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly(),
-    }),
-    provisioning: z.object({
-        autoCreateUsers: z.boolean().default(true),
-        autoUpdateUsers: z.boolean().default(true),
-        autoDeactivateUsers: z.boolean().default(false),
-        defaultRole: z.string().optional(),
-        requiredAttributes: z.array(z.string()).default(['email']),
-        syncFrequencyHours: z.number().min(1).max(168).default(24),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('The DNS TXT challenge value for each claimed domain, keyed by domain. Never returned by a read: the value is shown once, in the claim response, and claiming again issues a new one. An update keeps the stored values whatever it sends.'),
+    }).describe("The domains this scope has claimed and verified, and which of them use single sign-on. Changed only by the claim, verify and revoke domain operations: an update may repeat it unchanged, and any other change is refused."),
+    /*
+     * `provisioning` was REMOVED here, and the reason is that it decided NOTHING.
+     *
+     * It declared six fields — `autoCreateUsers`, `autoUpdateUsers`, `autoDeactivateUsers`,
+     * `defaultRole`, `requiredAttributes`, `syncFrequencyHours` — carried `.isAuditEvidence()`, was
+     * written by the default seed, was rendered as a section of the SSO settings pane, and had ZERO
+     * production readers. An administrator set "create users automatically" there and nothing
+     * anywhere consulted it.
+     *
+     * ## What actually decides, and why there are two of them rather than three
+     *
+     * Just-in-time provisioning on an INTERACTIVE sign-in reads the CONNECTION, not this row:
+     * `SsoConnectionSchema.{autoCreateUsers, defaultRole, roleMapping, groupMapping}`,
+     * assembled once per connection by `oauth2-connection-resolver` and `saml-authentication` and
+     * carried into `provisionEnterpriseUser`. Per connection is the right grain — two IdPs bound to
+     * one tenant may legitimately differ.
+     *
+     * A DIRECTORY PUSH reads `ScimProvisioningConfigBaseSchema`, resolved by
+     * `scim.backend.controller._getProvisioningConfig`. Per organization is the right grain — there
+     * is one directory relationship.
+     *
+     * Those two are NOT duplicates of each other. They are different planes (a person signing in
+     * versus a directory pushing), on different code paths, and an organization can run either
+     * without the other. This block was the duplicate: a third grain, org-wide and inert, whose own
+     * documentation described it as "SSO JIT provisioning" — the one thing it did not do.
+     *
+     * ## What is NOT lost
+     *
+     * `autoCreateUsers` / `defaultRole` exist per connection; `autoDeactivateUsers` exists on the SCIM
+     * config. `autoUpdateUsers`, `requiredAttributes` and `syncFrequencyHours` existed ONLY here and
+     * were never implemented anywhere — removing them removes an advertised capability that was never
+     * present, which is the honest state. Wanting any of them back is a feature with a design, not a
+     * field to re-add. `syncFrequencyHours` in particular was already removed once for exactly this
+     * reason on the org-TYPE side (#1224); this is its twin.
+     *
+     * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.
+     */
+    /**
+     * Federated logout, and the ONLY thing this block still decides.
+     *
+     * `saml-metadata.backend.service` reads it as `spConfig.singleLogoutEnabled` and advertises — or
+     * withholds — the SP's SLO endpoint in the published metadata; `saml-authentication` honours the
+     * opt-out in both directions, terminating the local session on an SP-initiated logout and
+     * answering an IdP-initiated one with a graceful no-op LogoutResponse.
+     *
+     * ## Its three former neighbours were removed, and none of them was implemented
+     *
+     * - `requireReauthForSensitive` — nothing anywhere asks a session to re-authenticate for a
+     *   "sensitive" operation, and nothing classified one. Step-up authentication is a real mechanism
+     *   in this engine and it is not reached from here.
+     * - `ssoSessionDurationMinutes` — the ONLY mention outside the seed was a comment in
+     *   `saml-authentication` asserting the app session "expires on its own `ssoSessionDurationMinutes`".
+     *   It does not: session lifetime comes from the token issuer's own configuration. A comment is
+     *   not an implementation, and one that names a field makes the field look wired.
+     * - `maxConcurrentSessions` — a SECOND source of truth for a setting that already has a live one.
+     *   `userTypes.<type>.auth.maxConcurrentSessions` is what the token issuer enforces (pinned in
+     *   `auth-token-issuer.rotation-concurrency.redis.test.ts`); the copy here was read by nothing, so
+     *   an operator could set two different limits and neither the lower nor the later would win.
+     */
     sessionSettings: z.object({
-        ssoSessionDurationMinutes: z.number().min(15).max(1440).default(480),
-        requireReauthForSensitive: z.boolean().default(true),
-        singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true),
-        maxConcurrentSessions: z.number().min(1).max(50).default(5),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
-    // Marked because this block governs the AUDIT TRAIL ITSELF — disabling `logAllSSOEvents` or
-    // shortening `retentionDays` is the classic pre-incident tampering move, and it must not be the
-    // one change the trail cannot evidence.
-    // assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — this block governs the audit trail itself.
-    auditConfig: z.object({
-        logAllSSOEvents: z.boolean().default(true),
-        logProviderSwitching: z.boolean().default(true),
-        logRoleMapping: z.boolean().default(true),
-        complianceReporting: z.boolean().default(false),
-        retentionDays: z.number().min(1).max(2555).default(365),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe("Whether signing out through the identity provider also ends the session here, and the reverse. `false` withholds the logout endpoint from the service-provider metadata."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Session behaviour for single sign-on."),
+    /*
+     * `auditConfig` was REMOVED here — all five fields, and the assurance marker that stood over them.
+     *
+     * It declared `logAllSSOEvents`, `logProviderSwitching`, `logRoleMapping`, `complianceReporting`
+     * and `retentionDays`, and carried
+     * `assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — this block governs the audit trail itself`.
+     * Its own comment argued the marker: "disabling `logAllSSOEvents` or shortening `retentionDays` is
+     * the classic pre-incident tampering move, and it must not be the one change the trail cannot
+     * evidence."
+     *
+     * Every word of that is a good argument about a block that governed NOTHING. Zero production
+     * readers: the declaration, the default seed, a specification example and the display template
+     * were the complete set of mentions. No SSO event consults `logAllSSOEvents` before emitting, and
+     * no retention job consults `retentionDays` — which made the marker the worse half of the defect,
+     * because a control marker is a CLAIM, and `compliance-is-derived-from-the-product.md` names a
+     * marker whose truth nothing checks as the thing to remove rather than the thing to keep.
+     *
+     * Audit-trail behaviour is not configurable per SSO policy and was never meant to be: emission is
+     * decided by the operation's own risk level against `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, and RETENTION by
+     * `ApplicationRetentionSchedule` over `DataRetentionClass` — application-level, derived, and total
+     * over that vocabulary. `retentionDays` here was a second, inert answer to a question already
+     * answered there.
+     *
+     * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.
+     */
     /**
      * Break-glass: the named accounts that may still sign in with a password when the identity
      * provider cannot be reached.
@@ -175,7 +250,7 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      */
     emergencyAccess: z.object({
         /** Off switch. `true` with an empty list grants nothing — the list is what confers the bypass. */
-        enabled: z.boolean().default(true),
+        enabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe("Whether the break-glass accounts may use their bypass. Enabled with an empty list grants nothing."),
         /**
          * The email addresses that may bypass SSO enforcement. An authority LIST: adding an entry grants
          * a standing password path into a tenant that has otherwise required SSO.
@@ -184,13 +259,13 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
          * stored apart from any individual, and a validation drill every 90 days; none of that is
          * enforceable from here, and all of it is what makes this list safe to have.
          */
-        breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]).describe("The email addresses that may still sign in with a password when SSO is required, for when the identity provider cannot be reached. Each one is a standing way in with a password alone, so keep the list short and review it; every use is audited at critical severity."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Break-glass: named accounts exempt from the SSO requirement."),
     oauth2ProviderRestrictions: z.object({
-        allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
-        blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),
-        requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false),
-    }).isAuditEvidence(),
+        allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe("When not empty, the only social sign-in providers members may use."),
+        blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe("Social sign-in providers members may not use. This wins over `allowedProviders`."),
+        requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false).describe("Whether every social sign-in provider is refused, leaving only enterprise single sign-on."),
+    }).isAuditEvidence().describe("Which social sign-in providers (Google, GitHub and so on) this scope's members may use."),
     /**
      * Per-scope social provider credential overrides (P3).
      *
@@ -225,12 +300,14 @@ export const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
      * @see sso-config.custom-impl — prefixCoreOperations UPDATE handler
      */
     socialCredentialOverrides: z.array(z.object({
-        providerRef: z.string().min(1),
-        clientId: z.string().min(1),
-        clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret(),
-        signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),
-        signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),
-    })).default([]).refine((arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length, { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' }),
+        providerRef: z.string().min(1).describe("The social provider these credentials are for. Each provider may appear once."),
+        clientId: z.string().min(1).describe("The client id of this scope's own app registered at the provider."),
+        clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret().describe("The client secret of that app. Write-only: reads return a mask, and sending the mask back keeps the stored value."),
+        signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the id of the private key that signs it. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\'s own value is used.'),
+        signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()
+            .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the developer team id that owns the signing key. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\'s own value is used.'),
+    })).default([]).refine((arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length, { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' }).describe("This scope's own OAuth app credentials for social providers, replacing the application's. Endpoints, scopes and profile mapping still come from the provider."),
     createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
 });

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AACvE,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AAEnG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;IACtC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;IAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU;IACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;CACV,CAAC;AAEX,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1C,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;IAEtD,gGAAgG;IAChG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,iGAAiG;IACjG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,gGAAgG;IAChG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,oFAAoF;IACpF,EAAE;IACF,iGAAiG;IACjG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,+FAA+F;IAC/F,aAAa;IACb,EAAE;IACF,mGAAmG;IACnG,oCAAoC;IACpC,EAAE;IACF,gGAAgG;IAChG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,2FAA2F;IAC3F,EAAE;IACF,gGAAgG;IAChG,gGAAgG;IAChG,4FAA4F;IAC5F,kGAAkG;IAClG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,kGAAkG;IAClG,8DAA8D;IAC9D,EAAE;IACF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,0GAA0G;IAC1G,kGAAkG;IAClG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,iCAAiC;IACjC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACpB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;QACvD,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAChD,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;KACzD,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAErC,oFAAoF;IACpF,kGAAkG;IAClG,8FAA8F;IAC9F,6FAA6F;IAC7F,kGAAkG;IAClG,0EAA0E;IAC1E,EAAE;IACF,+FAA+F;IAC/F,qDAAqD;IACrD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;QAClE,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;QACpE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QACxC,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;QAClE;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;QAC9G;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;KACvF,CAAC;IAEF,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAC1C,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAC/C,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;QAClC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;QAC1D,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;KAC3D,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAEpB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACxB,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;QACpE,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QACpD,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;KAC5D,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAEpB,4FAA4F;IAC5F,gGAAgG;IAChG,wCAAwC;IACxC,iGAAiG;IACjG,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACpB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAC1C,oBAAoB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAC/C,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QACzC,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;QAC/C,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;KACxD,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAEpB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAmCG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACxB,kGAAkG;QAClG,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAClC;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;KACnD,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAEpB,0BAA0B,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACnC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;KACrD,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE;IAEpB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgCG;IACH,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QAC1C,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3B,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE;QACnD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;QACrD,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;KACvD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CACpB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EACjE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,CAClE;IAED,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE;IACrF,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE;CACtF,CAAC,CAAC;AAIH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAG1B;IACX,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACvD,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAC5C,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAC/D,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,gGAAgG;AAChG,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAC9B,OAGa,EACb,MAAc;IAEd,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;WACnD,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzF,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC;IACvE,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW;IAC7B,mBAAmB,EAAE,aAAa;IAClC,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY;IACzB,UAAU,EAAE,mBAAmB;IAC/B,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB;CAC9B,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSO Config Schema (Shared) — Polymorphic\n *\n * SSO enforcement, domain verification, provider restrictions, provisioning,\n * session settings, emergency access. Policy/settings layer only —\n * provider connections are a separate resource (SsoConnection).\n * Scope FK (organizationId / applicationId) is injected by the polymorphism engine.\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2A\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const DomainVerificationStatus = {\n  PENDING: 'pending',\n  VERIFIED: 'verified',\n  FAILED: 'failed',\n  EXPIRED: 'expired',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  // ── `.isAuditEvidence()` on the authentication-authority blocks ──────────────────────────────\n  // Every block below decides WHO may authenticate into this tenant and with what standing, so a\n  // change to one is an authorization change even though no role is named: weakening `requireSSO`,\n  // re-enabling `allowPasswordFallback`, granting a `defaultRole` on auto-provision, or adding a\n  // break-glass account each widen access tenant-wide. The generic resource-operation audit event\n  // records the changed field NAMES for free; the marker is what makes the before/after VALUES\n  // survive, and without values \"someone changed the SSO enforcement\" proves nothing.\n  //\n  // These are configuration flags, domains and role names — NOT personal data — so recording their\n  // values does not conflict with the Art. 5(1)(c) / Art. 17 minimisation reasoning that keeps\n  // user-identifying fields unmarked (audit rows replicate to an immutable ledger that cannot be\n  // scrubbed).\n  //\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — SSO enforcement decides how principals are\n  // permitted to authenticate at all.\n  //\n  // `enforceForAdmins` was REMOVED here (#481). It said \"this tenant's SSO requirement also binds\n  // its administrators\", defaulted `true`, and was read by nothing — so an operator who set it\n  // `false` believed their administrators had a way in when the IdP broke, and they did not.\n  //\n  // It was not reimplemented, because a ROLE is the wrong unit for an authentication bypass. Role\n  // membership changes, and a standing exemption for \"whoever is an admin\" means compromising one\n  // administrator and promoting an account silently grants an SSO bypass to the promoted one.\n  // Microsoft Entra's emergency-access guidance is explicit about the alternative — exclude a small\n  // NAMED set through a dedicated group, never a role — and that is what `emergencyAccess` below\n  // now does. Google Workspace does take the role-shaped route for its super administrators; it was\n  // considered and rejected here for the escalation path above.\n  //\n  // spec-cite: Microsoft Entra ID — \"Manage emergency access admin accounts\"\n  // (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access),\n  // \"Conditional Access considerations\": create a dedicated security group for the emergency access\n  // accounts and exclude THAT from policies. The reading that a role is the wrong unit is this\n  // repository's, not a quotation.\n  enforcement: z.object({\n    requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n    allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true),\n    graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3),\n  }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  // NOT marked, deliberately: this block carries `domainVerificationTokens`, which is\n  // `.isBackendOnly()` — a SECRET. `.isAuditEvidence()` on a parent object records the WHOLE object\n  // before/after, so marking `domains` would copy live verification tokens into audit rows that\n  // replicate to the immutable ledger and to every configured SIEM sink. The security-relevant\n  // sub-fields (`ssoEnabledDomains`, `allowExternalDomains`) are marked individually instead, which\n  // keeps the secret out by construction rather than by reviewer vigilance.\n  //\n  // Read this before marking any other container: a block is safe to mark WHOLESALE only when no\n  // descendant is `.isBackendOnly()` or personal data.\n  domains: z.object({\n    /**\n     * Every domain this organization has CLAIMED — verified and unverified alike.\n     *\n     * ⚠️ The name asserts more than the field holds. `initiateDomainVerification` pushes a domain\n     * here at CLAIM time with `domainVerificationStatus[domain] = 'pending'`, so membership means\n     * \"somebody asked\", never \"we checked\". The real answer is the join with that map, and\n     * `resolveVerifiedDomains` below is the only place it should be computed (#457).\n     *\n     * **Do not read this array directly.** A reader that does gets pending, failed and expired\n     * domains under a name that says otherwise — which `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService\n     * .getDomains` did, returning them as `verified`, with no consumer to notice.\n     *\n     * The field was NOT renamed to `claimedDomains`, and that is a decision rather than an\n     * omission: it is persisted on every SSO config row of both dogfood applications, so the rename\n     * is a schema change plus a data migration for a field whose every reader now goes through the\n     * helper. The name is no longer what a new reader reaches.\n     */\n    verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n    ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence(),\n    domainHinting: z.boolean().default(true),\n    allowExternalDomains: z.boolean().default(false).isAuditEvidence(),\n    /**\n     * The half of the join that decides routing authority — and therefore the audit evidence.\n     *\n     * Marked individually rather than through the containing `domains` block, for the reason that\n     * block's own comment gives: a whole-object mark would copy `domainVerificationTokens` into the\n     * immutable ledger. This map holds domain names and one of four statuses — no secret, no\n     * personal data — and it is the only field that answers the question an auditor asks about a\n     * domain workflow: WHICH domain became verified, and when did it stop being verified.\n     *\n     * Without it the trail records `domains` as a changed field name and nothing more, which cannot\n     * distinguish \"a tenant claimed a domain\" from \"a tenant gained SSO routing control over every\n     * address at it\".\n     */\n    domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence(),\n    /**\n     * The DNS-TXT challenge nonce per claimed domain. `.isBackendOnly()` — never leaves the backend\n     * through a resource READ, and never enters the audit trail (see the block comment above).\n     *\n     * The one place its value is disclosed is the response to `claimDomain`, which returns it once\n     * as an `.isEphemeral()` field, because the operator cannot publish a record they cannot see.\n     * A lost token is recovered by claiming again, which mints a new one — there is no re-read.\n     */\n    domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly(),\n  }),\n\n  provisioning: z.object({\n    autoCreateUsers: z.boolean().default(true),\n    autoUpdateUsers: z.boolean().default(true),\n    autoDeactivateUsers: z.boolean().default(false),\n    defaultRole: z.string().optional(),\n    requiredAttributes: z.array(z.string()).default(['email']),\n    syncFrequencyHours: z.number().min(1).max(168).default(24),\n  }).isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  sessionSettings: z.object({\n    ssoSessionDurationMinutes: z.number().min(15).max(1440).default(480),\n    requireReauthForSensitive: z.boolean().default(true),\n    singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true),\n    maxConcurrentSessions: z.number().min(1).max(50).default(5),\n  }).isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  // Marked because this block governs the AUDIT TRAIL ITSELF — disabling `logAllSSOEvents` or\n  // shortening `retentionDays` is the classic pre-incident tampering move, and it must not be the\n  // one change the trail cannot evidence.\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — this block governs the audit trail itself.\n  auditConfig: z.object({\n    logAllSSOEvents: z.boolean().default(true),\n    logProviderSwitching: z.boolean().default(true),\n    logRoleMapping: z.boolean().default(true),\n    complianceReporting: z.boolean().default(false),\n    retentionDays: z.number().min(1).max(2555).default(365),\n  }).isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  /**\n   * Break-glass: the named accounts that may still sign in with a password when the identity\n   * provider cannot be reached.\n   *\n   * Every field here is READ at runtime. It carried three more — `requireApproval`,\n   * `maxDurationHours` and `auditLevel` — and all three were removed with `enforceForAdmins` (#481,\n   * #423) rather than implemented, for reasons worth keeping:\n   *\n   * - **`requireApproval` cannot exist on this path.** Break-glass is the door for the case where\n   *   nobody can act; an approval step means the approver may be locked out too, which is the\n   *   deadlock the door exists to break. Entra's guidance asks for monitoring and a post-mortem\n   *   after each use, never for prior approval.\n   * - **`maxDurationHours`** describes a bounded break-glass SESSION, which is a real control and\n   *   is not built. A field that names a control nobody enforces is exactly what this issue was\n   *   about, so it is absent until the session cap exists.\n   * - **`auditLevel`** could not change anything: `EMERGENCY_ACCESS_USED` is CRITICAL in\n   *   `SECURITY_AUDIT_EVENT_ENVELOPE`, and a per-tenant knob that lowers the severity of a\n   *   privileged-access record is not a setting a tenant should have.\n   *\n   * ## What a listed account gets, and what it does not\n   *\n   * A listed account is exempt from the SSO enforcement refusal — including grace exhaustion — and\n   * nothing else. It authenticates with the same password, against the same lockout counters and\n   * the same rate limits, and every use emits `EMERGENCY_ACCESS_USED` at CRITICAL.\n   *\n   * ## Why the whole TENANT keeps a password field when this list is non-empty\n   *\n   * The sign-in surface must not depend on the account, or the offered methods become an oracle for\n   * \"is this address a break-glass account\". So `requiresEnterpriseSsoOnly` answers false for the\n   * whole tenant while this list is non-empty: everyone at the domain sees a password field, and\n   * everyone not on the list is refused AFTER presenting a correct credential. The cost is a\n   * password field that only two accounts can use; the alternative discloses who they are.\n   *\n   * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — the authenticated bypass of this tenant's\n   * own authentication requirement.\n   */\n  emergencyAccess: z.object({\n    /** Off switch. `true` with an empty list grants nothing — the list is what confers the bypass. */\n    enabled: z.boolean().default(true),\n    /**\n     * The email addresses that may bypass SSO enforcement. An authority LIST: adding an entry grants\n     * a standing password path into a tenant that has otherwise required SSO.\n     *\n     * Keep it SMALL and keep it reviewed. Entra asks for at least two (redundancy), credentials\n     * stored apart from any individual, and a validation drill every 90 days; none of that is\n     * enforceable from here, and all of it is what makes this list safe to have.\n     */\n    breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]),\n  }).isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  oauth2ProviderRestrictions: z.object({\n    allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n    blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n    requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false),\n  }).isAuditEvidence(),\n\n  /**\n   * Per-scope social provider credential overrides (P3).\n   *\n   * By default, social providers (Google, GitHub, Apple, etc.) use platform-level\n   * OAuth2 credentials from AppConfiguration. This array lets an org/app override\n   * those with their own registered OAuth2 app at the identity provider.\n   *\n   * Only `clientId` + `clientSecret` are needed for most providers — the OAuth2\n   * endpoints, scopes, and profile mapping still come from the provider catalog.\n   *\n   * `signedJwtKeyId` / `signedJwtTeamId` are required only for providers that use\n   * signed-JWT client secrets (e.g. Apple Sign-In, where the \"client secret\" is a\n   * short-lived JWT signed with a private key). These correspond to the Apple\n   * Developer Team ID and Key ID that are bound to the private key.\n   * When omitted, the app-level values from the secrets store are used.\n   *\n   * Secret handling (two distinct contracts, on purpose):\n   * - `clientSecret` is `.isWriteOnlySecret()` — the operator sets/rotates it, so it\n   *   stays writable AND stays in the response DTO where the framework redacts it to\n   *   `••••••••` at the client boundary. Internal reads (`resolveSocialConnection`\n   *   via `readAsSystem`) keep the real value.\n   * - `signedJwtKeyId` / `signedJwtTeamId` are `.isBackendOnly()` — never sent to the\n   *   frontend at all (stripped from every client DTO).\n   *\n   * Because these secrets live inside an ARRAY, neither the central write-only-secret\n   * sentinel-strip NOR a whole-array `$set` preserves them on save: the repository\n   * replaces the entire array with no deep merge. The UPDATE custom-impl therefore\n   * matches each incoming override to the stored record by `providerRef` and\n   * re-injects any secret that arrived absent or as the `••••••••` mask.\n   *\n   * @see oauth2-connection-resolver — resolveSocialConnection() steps 5b/5c\n   * @see sso-config.custom-impl — prefixCoreOperations UPDATE handler\n   */\n  socialCredentialOverrides: z.array(z.object({\n    providerRef: z.string().min(1),\n    clientId: z.string().min(1),\n    clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret(),\n    signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),\n    signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly(),\n  })).default([]).refine(\n    (arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length,\n    { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' },\n  ),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SsoConfigBaseSchema>;\n\n/**\n * The domains this organization has actually VERIFIED — the join `verifiedDomains` does not carry.\n *\n * ## Why this exists rather than five correct joins\n *\n * The stored list holds CLAIMED domains, so safety depends on every reader filtering it by\n * `domainVerificationStatus`. Measured 2026-09-08, **five** reader sites did that by hand — the SCIM\n * controller, the SCIM virtual field, the domain-verification service, and the domain-to-org lookup\n * TWICE — and a sixth, `getDomains`, did not. It returned the raw list under the name `verified`.\n *\n * That is `.claude/rules/invariant-call-site-enumeration.md`'s exact shape: an invariant hand-applied\n * at N sites, where the next site is the one that forgets. It had already happened; it was harmless\n * only because that reader had no consumer — and claiming a domain is now reachable by tenants\n * through `SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN` (#424), so the margin that made it harmless is gone.\n *\n * So the join is computed ONCE, here, beside the field it corrects. A new reader that reaches for\n * the verified set finds this; one that reaches for the raw array finds the warning on the field.\n *\n * Takes the shape structurally rather than `SsoConfigBase` so a caller holding a partial config, a\n * DTO or a lean document can use it — the three existing shapes at the call sites — without the\n * helper forcing a cast at every one of them.\n */\nexport function resolveVerifiedDomains(domains: {\n  readonly verifiedDomains?: readonly string[];\n  readonly domainVerificationStatus?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n} | undefined): string[] {\n  const status = domains?.domainVerificationStatus ?? {};\n  return (domains?.verifiedDomains ?? []).filter(\n    domain => status[domain] === DomainVerificationStatus.VERIFIED,\n  );\n}\n\n/** Whether ONE domain is verified for this organization. The single-domain form of the join. */\nexport function isDomainVerified(\n  domains: {\n    readonly verifiedDomains?: readonly string[];\n    readonly domainVerificationStatus?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  } | undefined,\n  domain: string,\n): boolean {\n  return (domains?.verifiedDomains ?? []).includes(domain)\n    && domains?.domainVerificationStatus?.[domain] === DomainVerificationStatus.VERIFIED;\n}\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'ssoConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'ssoConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SSO_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SsoConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AACvE,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AAEnG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG;IACtC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;IAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,UAAU;IACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;CACV,CAAC;AAEX,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1C,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE;IAEtD,gGAAgG;IAChG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,iGAAiG;IACjG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,gGAAgG;IAChG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,oFAAoF;IACpF,EAAE;IACF,iGAAiG;IACjG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,+FAA+F;IAC/F,aAAa;IACb,EAAE;IACF,mGAAmG;IACnG,oCAAoC;IACpC,EAAE;IACF,gGAAgG;IAChG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,2FAA2F;IAC3F,EAAE;IACF,gGAAgG;IAChG,gGAAgG;IAChG,4FAA4F;IAC5F,kGAAkG;IAClG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,kGAAkG;IAClG,8DAA8D;IAC9D,EAAE;IACF,2EAA2E;IAC3E,0GAA0G;IAC1G,kGAAkG;IAClG,6FAA6F;IAC7F,iCAAiC;IACjC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACpB,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,wFAAwF,CAAC;QAC1J,qBAAqB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,wKAAwK,CAAC;QACnO,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,gHAAgH,CAAC;KACpL,CAAC,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,sDAAsD,CAAC;IAEtG,oFAAoF;IACpF,kGAAkG;IAClG,8FAA8F;IAC9F,6FAA6F;IAC7F,iGAAiG;IACjG,yFAAyF;IACzF,EAAE;IACF,+FAA+F;IAC/F,qDAAqD;IACrD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAgBG;QACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,gJAAgJ,CAAC;QAC7N,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,6FAA6F,CAAC;QAC5K;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAaG;QACH;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QACH,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,kEAAkE,CAAC;QAC3L;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;aACnF,QAAQ,CAAC,2OAA2O,CAAC;KACzP,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,4NAA4N,CAAC;IAEzO;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAoCG;IAEH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAqBG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACxB,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,0KAA0K,CAAC;KACpO,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;IAEtE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAwBG;IAEH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAmCG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACxB,kGAAkG;QAClG,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mGAAmG,CAAC;QAChJ;;;;;;;WAOG;QACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,0QAA0Q,CAAC;KACxU,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,8DAA8D,CAAC;IAE7F,0BAA0B,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACnC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC;QAChI,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,kFAAkF,CAAC;QAC9I,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,2FAA2F,CAAC;KAC3J,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,yFAAyF,CAAC;IAExH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAgCG;IACH,yBAAyB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QAC1C,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,+EAA+E,CAAC;QACxH,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mEAAmE,CAAC;QACzG,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mHAAmH,CAAC;QACjL,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;aAClD,QAAQ,CAAC,gPAAgP,CAAC;QAC7P,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;aACnD,QAAQ,CAAC,wPAAwP,CAAC;KACtQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CACpB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EACjE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,oDAAoD,EAAE,CAClE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,+JAA+J,CAAC;IAE3K,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE;IACrF,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE;CACtF,CAAC,CAAC;AAIH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CAAC,OAG1B;IACX,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACvD,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAC5C,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAC/D,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED,gGAAgG;AAChG,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAC9B,OAGa,EACb,MAAc;IAEd,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;WACnD,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;AACzF,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+BAA+B,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC;IACvE,gBAAgB,EAAE,WAAW;IAC7B,mBAAmB,EAAE,aAAa;IAClC,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY;IACzB,UAAU,EAAE,mBAAmB;IAC/B,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB;CAC9B,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * SSO Config Schema (Shared) — Polymorphic\n *\n * SSO enforcement, domain verification, provider restrictions, provisioning,\n * session settings, emergency access. Policy/settings layer only —\n * provider connections are a separate resource (SsoConnection).\n * Scope FK (organizationId / applicationId) is injected by the polymorphism engine.\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2A\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const DomainVerificationStatus = {\n  PENDING: 'pending',\n  VERIFIED: 'verified',\n  FAILED: 'failed',\n  EXPIRED: 'expired',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SsoConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  // ── `.isAuditEvidence()` on the authentication-authority blocks ──────────────────────────────\n  // Every block below decides WHO may authenticate into this tenant and with what standing, so a\n  // change to one is an authorization change even though no role is named: weakening `requireSSO`,\n  // re-enabling `allowPasswordFallback`, granting a `defaultRole` on auto-provision, or adding a\n  // break-glass account each widen access tenant-wide. The generic resource-operation audit event\n  // records the changed field NAMES for free; the marker is what makes the before/after VALUES\n  // survive, and without values \"someone changed the SSO enforcement\" proves nothing.\n  //\n  // These are configuration flags, domains and role names — NOT personal data — so recording their\n  // values does not conflict with the Art. 5(1)(c) / Art. 17 minimisation reasoning that keeps\n  // user-identifying fields unmarked (audit rows replicate to an immutable ledger that cannot be\n  // scrubbed).\n  //\n  // assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — SSO enforcement decides how principals are\n  // permitted to authenticate at all.\n  //\n  // `enforceForAdmins` was REMOVED here (#481). It said \"this tenant's SSO requirement also binds\n  // its administrators\", defaulted `true`, and was read by nothing — so an operator who set it\n  // `false` believed their administrators had a way in when the IdP broke, and they did not.\n  //\n  // It was not reimplemented, because a ROLE is the wrong unit for an authentication bypass. Role\n  // membership changes, and a standing exemption for \"whoever is an admin\" means compromising one\n  // administrator and promoting an account silently grants an SSO bypass to the promoted one.\n  // Microsoft Entra's emergency-access guidance is explicit about the alternative — exclude a small\n  // NAMED set through a dedicated group, never a role — and that is what `emergencyAccess` below\n  // now does. Google Workspace does take the role-shaped route for its super administrators; it was\n  // considered and rejected here for the escalation path above.\n  //\n  // spec-cite: Microsoft Entra ID — \"Manage emergency access admin accounts\"\n  // (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/security-emergency-access),\n  // \"Conditional Access considerations\": create a dedicated security group for the emergency access\n  // accounts and exclude THAT from policies. The reading that a role is the wrong unit is this\n  // repository's, not a quotation.\n  enforcement: z.object({\n    requireSSO: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField().describe(\"Whether members whose email domain is SSO-enabled must sign in through single sign-on.\"),\n    allowPasswordFallback: z.boolean().default(true).describe(\"While SSO is required, whether a password sign-in is still accepted within the grace allowance. `false` refuses every password sign-in except a break-glass account's.\"),\n    graceLoginAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(10).default(3).describe(\"How many password sign-ins each member may still make after SSO becomes required, from 0 to 10. 0 allows none.\"),\n  }).isSummaryField().isAuditEvidence().describe(\"Whether and how strictly single sign-on is required.\"),\n\n  // NOT marked, deliberately: this block carries `domainVerificationTokens`, which is\n  // `.isBackendOnly()` — a SECRET. `.isAuditEvidence()` on a parent object records the WHOLE object\n  // before/after, so marking `domains` would copy live verification tokens into audit rows that\n  // replicate to the immutable ledger and to every configured SIEM sink. The security-relevant\n  // sub-fields (`ssoEnabledDomains`, and `domainVerificationStatus` below) are marked individually\n  // instead, which keeps the secret out by construction rather than by reviewer vigilance.\n  //\n  // Read this before marking any other container: a block is safe to mark WHOLESALE only when no\n  // descendant is `.isBackendOnly()` or personal data.\n  domains: z.object({\n    /**\n     * Every domain this organization has CLAIMED — verified and unverified alike.\n     *\n     * ⚠️ The name asserts more than the field holds. `initiateDomainVerification` pushes a domain\n     * here at CLAIM time with `domainVerificationStatus[domain] = 'pending'`, so membership means\n     * \"somebody asked\", never \"we checked\". The real answer is the join with that map, and\n     * `resolveVerifiedDomains` below is the only place it should be computed (#457).\n     *\n     * **Do not read this array directly.** A reader that does gets pending, failed and expired\n     * domains under a name that says otherwise — which `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService\n     * .getDomains` did, returning them as `verified`, with no consumer to notice.\n     *\n     * The field was NOT renamed to `claimedDomains`, and that is a decision rather than an\n     * omission: it is persisted on every SSO config row of both dogfood applications, so the rename\n     * is a schema change plus a data migration for a field whose every reader now goes through the\n     * helper. The name is no longer what a new reader reaches.\n     */\n    verifiedDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"Every domain this scope has claimed, verified or not. Whether a domain is verified is `domainVerificationStatus`, not membership of this list.\"),\n    ssoEnabledDomains: z.array(z.string()).default([]).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"The verified domains whose members are routed to this scope's identity provider at sign-in.\"),\n    /*\n     * `domainHinting` and `allowExternalDomains` were REMOVED here, and both were read by nothing.\n     *\n     * `domainHinting` promised the sign-in form would route a person to their IdP from their email\n     * domain — a real and common feature, and one this engine implements from `ssoEnabledDomains`\n     * plus the verification map, never from this flag. Turning it off changed no routing.\n     *\n     * `allowExternalDomains` carried `.isAuditEvidence()` and read as an admission control on who\n     * may join through SSO. Nothing consulted it, so an operator who left it `false` — the default —\n     * believed they had closed a door that was never fitted. What actually restricts admission is\n     * the connection's `allowedDomains`, and on the SCIM lane the verified-domain projection.\n     *\n     * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n     */\n    /**\n     * The half of the join that decides routing authority — and therefore the audit evidence.\n     *\n     * Marked individually rather than through the containing `domains` block, for the reason that\n     * block's own comment gives: a whole-object mark would copy `domainVerificationTokens` into the\n     * immutable ledger. This map holds domain names and one of four statuses — no secret, no\n     * personal data — and it is the only field that answers the question an auditor asks about a\n     * domain workflow: WHICH domain became verified, and when did it stop being verified.\n     *\n     * Without it the trail records `domains` as a changed field name and nothing more, which cannot\n     * distinguish \"a tenant claimed a domain\" from \"a tenant gained SSO routing control over every\n     * address at it\".\n     */\n    domainVerificationStatus: z.record(z.string(), z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus)).default({}).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"The verification status of each claimed domain, keyed by domain.\"),\n    /**\n     * The DNS-TXT challenge nonce per claimed domain. `.isBackendOnly()` — never leaves the backend\n     * through a resource READ, and never enters the audit trail (see the block comment above).\n     *\n     * The one place its value is disclosed is the response to `claimDomain`, which returns it once\n     * as an `.isEphemeral()` field, because the operator cannot publish a record they cannot see.\n     * A lost token is recovered by claiming again, which mints a new one — there is no re-read.\n     */\n    domainVerificationTokens: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).default({}).isBackendOnly()\n      .describe('The DNS TXT challenge value for each claimed domain, keyed by domain. Never returned by a read: the value is shown once, in the claim response, and claiming again issues a new one. An update keeps the stored values whatever it sends.'),\n  }).describe(\"The domains this scope has claimed and verified, and which of them use single sign-on. Changed only by the claim, verify and revoke domain operations: an update may repeat it unchanged, and any other change is refused.\"),\n\n  /*\n   * `provisioning` was REMOVED here, and the reason is that it decided NOTHING.\n   *\n   * It declared six fields — `autoCreateUsers`, `autoUpdateUsers`, `autoDeactivateUsers`,\n   * `defaultRole`, `requiredAttributes`, `syncFrequencyHours` — carried `.isAuditEvidence()`, was\n   * written by the default seed, was rendered as a section of the SSO settings pane, and had ZERO\n   * production readers. An administrator set \"create users automatically\" there and nothing\n   * anywhere consulted it.\n   *\n   * ## What actually decides, and why there are two of them rather than three\n   *\n   * Just-in-time provisioning on an INTERACTIVE sign-in reads the CONNECTION, not this row:\n   * `SsoConnectionSchema.{autoCreateUsers, defaultRole, roleMapping, groupMapping}`,\n   * assembled once per connection by `oauth2-connection-resolver` and `saml-authentication` and\n   * carried into `provisionEnterpriseUser`. Per connection is the right grain — two IdPs bound to\n   * one tenant may legitimately differ.\n   *\n   * A DIRECTORY PUSH reads `ScimProvisioningConfigBaseSchema`, resolved by\n   * `scim.backend.controller._getProvisioningConfig`. Per organization is the right grain — there\n   * is one directory relationship.\n   *\n   * Those two are NOT duplicates of each other. They are different planes (a person signing in\n   * versus a directory pushing), on different code paths, and an organization can run either\n   * without the other. This block was the duplicate: a third grain, org-wide and inert, whose own\n   * documentation described it as \"SSO JIT provisioning\" — the one thing it did not do.\n   *\n   * ## What is NOT lost\n   *\n   * `autoCreateUsers` / `defaultRole` exist per connection; `autoDeactivateUsers` exists on the SCIM\n   * config. `autoUpdateUsers`, `requiredAttributes` and `syncFrequencyHours` existed ONLY here and\n   * were never implemented anywhere — removing them removes an advertised capability that was never\n   * present, which is the honest state. Wanting any of them back is a feature with a design, not a\n   * field to re-add. `syncFrequencyHours` in particular was already removed once for exactly this\n   * reason on the org-TYPE side (#1224); this is its twin.\n   *\n   * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n   */\n\n  /**\n   * Federated logout, and the ONLY thing this block still decides.\n   *\n   * `saml-metadata.backend.service` reads it as `spConfig.singleLogoutEnabled` and advertises — or\n   * withholds — the SP's SLO endpoint in the published metadata; `saml-authentication` honours the\n   * opt-out in both directions, terminating the local session on an SP-initiated logout and\n   * answering an IdP-initiated one with a graceful no-op LogoutResponse.\n   *\n   * ## Its three former neighbours were removed, and none of them was implemented\n   *\n   * - `requireReauthForSensitive` — nothing anywhere asks a session to re-authenticate for a\n   *   \"sensitive\" operation, and nothing classified one. Step-up authentication is a real mechanism\n   *   in this engine and it is not reached from here.\n   * - `ssoSessionDurationMinutes` — the ONLY mention outside the seed was a comment in\n   *   `saml-authentication` asserting the app session \"expires on its own `ssoSessionDurationMinutes`\".\n   *   It does not: session lifetime comes from the token issuer's own configuration. A comment is\n   *   not an implementation, and one that names a field makes the field look wired.\n   * - `maxConcurrentSessions` — a SECOND source of truth for a setting that already has a live one.\n   *   `userTypes.<type>.auth.maxConcurrentSessions` is what the token issuer enforces (pinned in\n   *   `auth-token-issuer.rotation-concurrency.redis.test.ts`); the copy here was read by nothing, so\n   *   an operator could set two different limits and neither the lower nor the later would win.\n   */\n  sessionSettings: z.object({\n    singleLogoutEnabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe(\"Whether signing out through the identity provider also ends the session here, and the reverse. `false` withholds the logout endpoint from the service-provider metadata.\"),\n  }).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"Session behaviour for single sign-on.\"),\n\n  /*\n   * `auditConfig` was REMOVED here — all five fields, and the assurance marker that stood over them.\n   *\n   * It declared `logAllSSOEvents`, `logProviderSwitching`, `logRoleMapping`, `complianceReporting`\n   * and `retentionDays`, and carried\n   * `assurance-control: WILDO.AUDIT.EVIDENCE_INTEGRITY — this block governs the audit trail itself`.\n   * Its own comment argued the marker: \"disabling `logAllSSOEvents` or shortening `retentionDays` is\n   * the classic pre-incident tampering move, and it must not be the one change the trail cannot\n   * evidence.\"\n   *\n   * Every word of that is a good argument about a block that governed NOTHING. Zero production\n   * readers: the declaration, the default seed, a specification example and the display template\n   * were the complete set of mentions. No SSO event consults `logAllSSOEvents` before emitting, and\n   * no retention job consults `retentionDays` — which made the marker the worse half of the defect,\n   * because a control marker is a CLAIM, and `compliance-is-derived-from-the-product.md` names a\n   * marker whose truth nothing checks as the thing to remove rather than the thing to keep.\n   *\n   * Audit-trail behaviour is not configurable per SSO policy and was never meant to be: emission is\n   * decided by the operation's own risk level against `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, and RETENTION by\n   * `ApplicationRetentionSchedule` over `DataRetentionClass` — application-level, derived, and total\n   * over that vocabulary. `retentionDays` here was a second, inert answer to a question already\n   * answered there.\n   *\n   * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n   */\n\n  /**\n   * Break-glass: the named accounts that may still sign in with a password when the identity\n   * provider cannot be reached.\n   *\n   * Every field here is READ at runtime. It carried three more — `requireApproval`,\n   * `maxDurationHours` and `auditLevel` — and all three were removed with `enforceForAdmins` (#481,\n   * #423) rather than implemented, for reasons worth keeping:\n   *\n   * - **`requireApproval` cannot exist on this path.** Break-glass is the door for the case where\n   *   nobody can act; an approval step means the approver may be locked out too, which is the\n   *   deadlock the door exists to break. Entra's guidance asks for monitoring and a post-mortem\n   *   after each use, never for prior approval.\n   * - **`maxDurationHours`** describes a bounded break-glass SESSION, which is a real control and\n   *   is not built. A field that names a control nobody enforces is exactly what this issue was\n   *   about, so it is absent until the session cap exists.\n   * - **`auditLevel`** could not change anything: `EMERGENCY_ACCESS_USED` is CRITICAL in\n   *   `SECURITY_AUDIT_EVENT_ENVELOPE`, and a per-tenant knob that lowers the severity of a\n   *   privileged-access record is not a setting a tenant should have.\n   *\n   * ## What a listed account gets, and what it does not\n   *\n   * A listed account is exempt from the SSO enforcement refusal — including grace exhaustion — and\n   * nothing else. It authenticates with the same password, against the same lockout counters and\n   * the same rate limits, and every use emits `EMERGENCY_ACCESS_USED` at CRITICAL.\n   *\n   * ## Why the whole TENANT keeps a password field when this list is non-empty\n   *\n   * The sign-in surface must not depend on the account, or the offered methods become an oracle for\n   * \"is this address a break-glass account\". So `requiresEnterpriseSsoOnly` answers false for the\n   * whole tenant while this list is non-empty: everyone at the domain sees a password field, and\n   * everyone not on the list is refused AFTER presenting a correct credential. The cost is a\n   * password field that only two accounts can use; the alternative discloses who they are.\n   *\n   * assurance-control: WILDO.IDENTITY.SESSION_ASSURANCE — the authenticated bypass of this tenant's\n   * own authentication requirement.\n   */\n  emergencyAccess: z.object({\n    /** Off switch. `true` with an empty list grants nothing — the list is what confers the bypass. */\n    enabled: z.boolean().default(true).describe(\"Whether the break-glass accounts may use their bypass. Enabled with an empty list grants nothing.\"),\n    /**\n     * The email addresses that may bypass SSO enforcement. An authority LIST: adding an entry grants\n     * a standing password path into a tenant that has otherwise required SSO.\n     *\n     * Keep it SMALL and keep it reviewed. Entra asks for at least two (redundancy), credentials\n     * stored apart from any individual, and a validation drill every 90 days; none of that is\n     * enforceable from here, and all of it is what makes this list safe to have.\n     */\n    breakGlassAccounts: z.array(z.email()).default([]).describe(\"The email addresses that may still sign in with a password when SSO is required, for when the identity provider cannot be reached. Each one is a standing way in with a password alone, so keep the list short and review it; every use is audited at critical severity.\"),\n  }).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"Break-glass: named accounts exempt from the SSO requirement.\"),\n\n  oauth2ProviderRestrictions: z.object({\n    allowedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe(\"When not empty, the only social sign-in providers members may use.\"),\n    blockedProviders: z.array(z.string()).default([]).describe(\"Social sign-in providers members may not use. This wins over `allowedProviders`.\"),\n    requireEnterpriseSSOOnly: z.boolean().default(false).describe(\"Whether every social sign-in provider is refused, leaving only enterprise single sign-on.\"),\n  }).isAuditEvidence().describe(\"Which social sign-in providers (Google, GitHub and so on) this scope's members may use.\"),\n\n  /**\n   * Per-scope social provider credential overrides (P3).\n   *\n   * By default, social providers (Google, GitHub, Apple, etc.) use platform-level\n   * OAuth2 credentials from AppConfiguration. This array lets an org/app override\n   * those with their own registered OAuth2 app at the identity provider.\n   *\n   * Only `clientId` + `clientSecret` are needed for most providers — the OAuth2\n   * endpoints, scopes, and profile mapping still come from the provider catalog.\n   *\n   * `signedJwtKeyId` / `signedJwtTeamId` are required only for providers that use\n   * signed-JWT client secrets (e.g. Apple Sign-In, where the \"client secret\" is a\n   * short-lived JWT signed with a private key). These correspond to the Apple\n   * Developer Team ID and Key ID that are bound to the private key.\n   * When omitted, the app-level values from the secrets store are used.\n   *\n   * Secret handling (two distinct contracts, on purpose):\n   * - `clientSecret` is `.isWriteOnlySecret()` — the operator sets/rotates it, so it\n   *   stays writable AND stays in the response DTO where the framework redacts it to\n   *   `••••••••` at the client boundary. Internal reads (`resolveSocialConnection`\n   *   via `readAsSystem`) keep the real value.\n   * - `signedJwtKeyId` / `signedJwtTeamId` are `.isBackendOnly()` — never sent to the\n   *   frontend at all (stripped from every client DTO).\n   *\n   * Because these secrets live inside an ARRAY, neither the central write-only-secret\n   * sentinel-strip NOR a whole-array `$set` preserves them on save: the repository\n   * replaces the entire array with no deep merge. The UPDATE custom-impl therefore\n   * matches each incoming override to the stored record by `providerRef` and\n   * re-injects any secret that arrived absent or as the `••••••••` mask.\n   *\n   * @see oauth2-connection-resolver — resolveSocialConnection() steps 5b/5c\n   * @see sso-config.custom-impl — prefixCoreOperations UPDATE handler\n   */\n  socialCredentialOverrides: z.array(z.object({\n    providerRef: z.string().min(1).describe(\"The social provider these credentials are for. Each provider may appear once.\"),\n    clientId: z.string().min(1).describe(\"The client id of this scope's own app registered at the provider.\"),\n    clientSecret: z.string().min(1).isWriteOnlySecret().describe(\"The client secret of that app. Write-only: reads return a mask, and sending the mask back keeps the stored value.\"),\n    signedJwtKeyId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()\n      .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the id of the private key that signs it. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\\'s own value is used.'),\n    signedJwtTeamId: z.string().optional().isBackendOnly()\n      .describe('For a provider whose client secret is a signed JWT, such as Sign in with Apple: the developer team id that owns the signing key. Write-only: never returned by a read, and kept when an update omits it. Absent: the application\\'s own value is used.'),\n  })).default([]).refine(\n    (arr) => new Set(arr.map(o => o.providerRef)).size === arr.length,\n    { message: 'Duplicate providerRef in socialCredentialOverrides' },\n  ).describe(\"This scope's own OAuth app credentials for social providers, replacing the application's. Endpoints, scopes and profile mapping still come from the provider.\"),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SsoConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SsoConfigBaseSchema>;\n\n/**\n * The domains this organization has actually VERIFIED — the join `verifiedDomains` does not carry.\n *\n * ## Why this exists rather than five correct joins\n *\n * The stored list holds CLAIMED domains, so safety depends on every reader filtering it by\n * `domainVerificationStatus`. Measured 2026-09-08, **five** reader sites did that by hand — the SCIM\n * controller, the SCIM virtual field, the domain-verification service, and the domain-to-org lookup\n * TWICE — and a sixth, `getDomains`, did not. It returned the raw list under the name `verified`.\n *\n * That is `.claude/rules/invariant-call-site-enumeration.md`'s exact shape: an invariant hand-applied\n * at N sites, where the next site is the one that forgets. It had already happened; it was harmless\n * only because that reader had no consumer — and claiming a domain is now reachable by tenants\n * through `SsoConfig_Operations.CLAIM_DOMAIN` (#424), so the margin that made it harmless is gone.\n *\n * So the join is computed ONCE, here, beside the field it corrects. A new reader that reaches for\n * the verified set finds this; one that reaches for the raw array finds the warning on the field.\n *\n * Takes the shape structurally rather than `SsoConfigBase` so a caller holding a partial config, a\n * DTO or a lean document can use it — the three existing shapes at the call sites — without the\n * helper forcing a cast at every one of them.\n */\nexport function resolveVerifiedDomains(domains: {\n  readonly verifiedDomains?: readonly string[];\n  readonly domainVerificationStatus?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n} | undefined): string[] {\n  const status = domains?.domainVerificationStatus ?? {};\n  return (domains?.verifiedDomains ?? []).filter(\n    domain => status[domain] === DomainVerificationStatus.VERIFIED,\n  );\n}\n\n/** Whether ONE domain is verified for this organization. The single-domain form of the join. */\nexport function isDomainVerified(\n  domains: {\n    readonly verifiedDomains?: readonly string[];\n    readonly domainVerificationStatus?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;\n  } | undefined,\n  domain: string,\n): boolean {\n  return (domains?.verifiedDomains ?? []).includes(domain)\n    && domains?.domainVerificationStatus?.[domain] === DomainVerificationStatus.VERIFIED;\n}\n\nexport const ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'ssoConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'ssoConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SSO_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SsoConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}