@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.4 → 1.1.6

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import { ErasureRetentionMode, ResourceDataSubjectKind } from '../compliance/pri
 // operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the
 // organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field
 // patch the core UPDATE persists). See
-// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.
+// the 2026-08-01 routed-but-unimplemented operation sweep (#1275).
 //
 // GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to "role changes are UPDATE", and it exists for a reason
 // UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a
@@ -78,10 +78,40 @@ export const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {
  * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.
  */
 const isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({ currentObject, }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;
-const ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];
+/**
+ * REACTIVATE's notifications say the member "can now access organization resources again", which is true only when
+ * the membership came back ACTIVE. A service-provider membership whose relationship has ended, or whose person is no
+ * longer assigned, lands INACTIVE instead (#1597), and neither the person nor the organization's users may be told
+ * otherwise. Evaluated against the row as written.
+ */
+const isRestoredToActiveMembership = ({ currentObject, }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE;
+/**
+ * The recipient of a membership's own status notice: the member whose membership was suspended or
+ * reactivated (#1870).
+ *
+ * `USERS_CUSTOM` rather than `USER_SELF`, and the difference is the whole defect: `USER_SELF` is the
+ * INITIATOR — the administrator who pressed the button — so "your membership was suspended" landed in
+ * the administrator's inbox, and the scheduled reactivation sweep, which has no initiator, told nobody.
+ * `ORGANIZATION_USERS` cannot reach the member either: it keeps only ACTIVE memberships, and a suspended
+ * member is not one. The row the operation just wrote carries the member's `userId`, so that is the
+ * recipient. Same shape as the `users` account-status notices (#1807).
+ */
+const selectMembershipStatusSubject = ({ currentObject }) => currentObject?.userId ? [String(currentObject.userId)] : [];
+/**
+ * Sortable member fields.
+ *
+ * `role` and `joinedAt` were listed here and neither is a field (#1806): the membership carries
+ * `roles`, an ARRAY — which has no meaningful sort order on either adapter, so it is not offered —
+ * and it records when it was created, not a separate join instant. Both entries were passed to the
+ * repository verbatim and silently ignored. The factory now refuses a sort field that is not a field.
+ */
+const ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'createdAt'];
 const ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {
     status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),
-    role: z.string(),
+    // `roles` is an array, and a scalar filter on it matches array MEMBERSHIP on both adapters: MongoDB
+    // does so natively and the PostgreSQL filter compiler emits a jsonb containment (`roles @> '"x"'`).
+    // It was declared as `role`, a field no row has, so `?role=ORG_ADMIN` matched nothing (#1806).
+    roles: z.string().min(1).describe('Only return members holding this role.'),
 };
 /*
 Organization Members Resource Configuration Factory
@@ -195,7 +225,7 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS], // Org admins, or a firm's expert lent INVITE_MEMBERS (#1631)
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +
                     // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/
@@ -288,18 +318,17 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     // requestDto auto-derived from decorators
                     //
-                    // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed
-                    // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role
-                    // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the
-                    // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details
-                    // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong
-                    // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.
+                    // Ordinary UPDATE remains audited below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: editing member details
+                    // is MEDIUM risk for the UI, but changing roles still requires privilege evidence.
+                    // The registered UPDATE implementation also emits ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED after
+                    // a durable role change, with previous, requested and resulting roles. That specialized
+                    // event complements the automatic operation event; it is not an unimplemented producer.
                     //
-                    // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:
-                    // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but
-                    // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic
-                    // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before
-                    // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.
+                    // GRANT_OWNERSHIP is a separate named role-change path. Its UPDATE-like core behavior does
+                    // not inherit UPDATE's custom hooks: registration resolves the exact operation identity.
+                    // Its CRITICAL risk triggers RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED automatically, with changed
+                    // role sets carried by the roles field's audit-evidence marker. Queries covering ownership
+                    // repair must include that operation family, not only the specialized role-change event.
                     //
                     // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.
                     auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },
@@ -317,7 +346,7 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS], // Org admins; a firm's expert lent MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS, on its own relationship's experts only (#1631)
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
                     // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite
                     // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept
@@ -355,7 +384,8 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
          * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every
          * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is
          * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom
-         * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.
+         * implementation reads nothing from the payload but the justification — which it records, and
+         * never persists onto the row.
          *
          * ## Deliberate narrowness
          *
@@ -366,7 +396,11 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
          * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant
          *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`
          *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by
-         *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.
+         *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller. It lands on the
+         *   `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` row the grant emits post-commit (`eventData.justification`),
+         *   beside the before/after role sets. `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED`, which this CRITICAL verb
+         *   also emits, carries no request payload and so cannot hold it. Until #593 it was validated here
+         *   and discarded at the service boundary.
          *
          * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope
          * that has no usable administrator.
@@ -388,7 +422,7 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                     // of the stranded tenant.
                     admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,
                     requestDto: z.object({
-                        justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),
+                        justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000).describe('Why a platform administrator is making this member an owner of an organization they do not belong to. Required, and recorded on the audit trail with the role change.'),
                     }),
                     // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the
                     // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The
@@ -412,12 +446,12 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS], // Org admins; a firm's expert lent MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS, on its own relationship's experts only (#1631)
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
-                        suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),
-                        suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()
+                        suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500).describe('Why the member is suspended. Recorded on the audit trail, not on the membership.'),
+                        suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional().describe('When the suspension ends and the member is reactivated. Absent: suspended until someone reactivates them.'),
                     }),
                     // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying
                     // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only
@@ -428,8 +462,12 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
             ],
             userNotifications: [
                 {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
+                    // The suspended member. `alwaysDeliver`: a person who loses access to an organization has no
+                    // other way to learn why, whatever they chose for ordinary email notifications.
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USERS_CUSTOM,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    userIdsSelector: selectMembershipStatusSubject,
+                    alwaysDeliver: true,
                 },
                 {
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
@@ -442,15 +480,21 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members
+                    // Org admins only. NOT opened to MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS (#1631): a suspension is the client's bar against
+                    // one person, which the firm cannot lift (#1597) — a firm may suspend or remove its own expert, never undo the
+                    // client's suspension of them.
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
                         reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
+                            .describe('Why the member is being reactivated. Recorded with the audit event for the reactivation.')
                     }),
                     // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any
                     // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED
-                    // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.
+                    // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to. A service-provider
+                    // membership lands INACTIVE instead when its relationship has ended or its person is no
+                    // longer assigned (#1597, `resolveProviderMembershipReactivationStatus`).
                     enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,
                     // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the
                     // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every
@@ -463,12 +507,17 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
             ],
             userNotifications: [
                 {
-                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,
+                    // The reactivated member — reached on the scheduled sweep too, which runs with no initiator.
+                    target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USERS_CUSTOM,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    userIdsSelector: selectMembershipStatusSubject,
+                    alwaysDeliver: true,
+                    condition: isRestoredToActiveMembership,
                 },
                 {
                     target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,
                     channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,
+                    condition: isRestoredToActiveMembership,
                 }
             ]
         },
@@ -484,11 +533,12 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,
                     requestDto: z.object({
                         reason: z.string().max(500).optional()
+                            .describe('Why the invitation is being revoked. Recorded with the audit event for the removal; it is not kept on the membership, which is deleted.')
                     }),
                     tokenRevocation: ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,
                     // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`
@@ -530,7 +580,7 @@ export const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (r
                 {
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
-                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                    roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS],
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
                     resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,
                     requestDto: z.object({}),

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,GACzB,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,gDAAgD,CAAC;AACvF,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAA8C,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC5J,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,MAAM,gDAAgD,CAAC;AACtH,OAAO,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AACrF,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,+CAA+C,CAAC;AAExH,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,MAAM,8CAA8C,CAAC;AAC1G,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,8CAA8C,CAAC;AACxF,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,+BAA+B,GAChC,MAAM,6DAA6D,CAAC;AAIrE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAExD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAC;AACjG,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,qDAAqD,CAAC;AAChG,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AAEvH,mDAAmD;AACnD,4EAA4E;AAC5E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,+BAA+B;AAC/B,EAAE;AACF,iFAAiF;AACjF,gFAAgF;AAChF,wEAAwE;AACxE,oFAAoF;AACpF,oEAAoE;AACpE,4EAA4E;AAC5E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,EAAE;AACF,2FAA2F;AAC3F,2FAA2F;AAC3F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,uFAAuF;AACvF,6FAA6F;AAC7F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,sEAAsE;AACtE,+FAA+F;AAC/F,uFAAuF;AACvF,6FAA6F;AAC7F,uCAAuC;AACvC,kEAAkE;AAClE,EAAE;AACF,gGAAgG;AAChG,oGAAoG;AACpG,sEAAsE;AACtE,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,8BAMX;AAND,WAAY,8BAA8B;IACxC,qDAAmB,CAAA;IACnB,2DAAyB,CAAA;IACzB,mDAAiB,CAAA;IACjB,mDAAiB,CAAA;IACjB,oEAAkC,CAAA;AACpC,CAAC,EANW,8BAA8B,KAA9B,8BAA8B,QAMzC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+CAA+C,GAAG;IAC7D,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;KACxD;IACD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;CACU,CAAC;AAElC;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,CAAC,EAC7C,aAAa,GAGd,EAAW,EAAE,CACZ,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;AAE5D,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAExE,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG;IACzC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACxC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;CACjB,CAAC;AAaF;;EAEE;AACF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,8DAA8D,GAAG,CAAC,sBAA8C,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAI1K;IACA,UAAU,EAAE,wBAAwB;IACpC,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,oBAAoB;IACzD,uBAAuB,EAAE,kCAAkC,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC;IAClG,qBAAqB,EAAE,sBAAsB;IAC7C,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;IAEtB,0FAA0F;IAC1F,yFAAyF;IACzF,kFAAkF;IAClF,gEAAgE;IAChE,qFAAqF;IACrF,oFAAoF;IACpF,yFAAyF;IACzF,yFAAyF;IACzF,wEAAwE;IACxE,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAClB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QAC/C,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACxC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;KACzC;IAED;;OAEG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;IAE5E;;;;;;;;;;;OAWG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE;QACf,IAAI,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC,wBAAwB;KACpD;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE;IAEjE,cAAc,EAAE;QACd,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI;QAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI;QAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK;QAC3B,oEAAoE;QACpE,qBAAqB,CAAC,WAAW;KAClC;IAED,eAAe,EAAE,8BAA8B;IAE/C,uBAAuB,EAAE;QAEvB;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QAEH,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE;YAEnC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBAET,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBAEvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBAEf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;oBAE7C,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;iBAE/C,CAAC;SAEH;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;oBAClC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,iDAAiD;QACjD,gFAAgF;QAChF,uFAAuF;QACvF,yFAAyF;QACzF,wFAAwF;QACxF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,4FAA4F;QAC5F,mFAAmF;QACnF,+DAA+D;QAC/D,mFAAmF;QACnF,gFAAgF;QAChF,wEAAwE;QACxE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,6CAA6C;QAC7C,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBACnE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,+DAA+D;oBAC/D,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,6DAA6D;oBAC7D,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,SAAS,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;wBAClE,eAAe,EAAE,+BAA+B,CAAC,UAAU;wBAC3D,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;wBAChD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;wBACrB,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa;wBAC5B,gFAAgF;wBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;qBACjD;iBACF;aACF;YACD,gEAAgE;YAChE,8EAA8E;YAC9E,8EAA8E;YAC9E,2EAA2E;YAC3E,+EAA+E;YAC/E,4BAA4B;YAC5B,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;iBACjD;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,mCAAmC;oBACvE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,4CAA4C;oBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;oBAClC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;oBACzC,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI;oBAClB,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,wEAAwE;oBACxE,kEAAkE;oBAClE,sEAAsE;oBACtE,gBAAgB,EAAE;wBAChB,WAAW;wBACX;4BACE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ;4BACpB,eAAe,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa;4BAC/C,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ;4BAC1B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;yBAClC;qBACF;oBACD,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE;oBACjE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC;oBAChD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,8BAA8B,EAAE,EAAE;iBACnC;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,uCAAuC;oBAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,0CAA0C;oBAC1C,EAAE;oBACF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,wFAAwF;oBACxF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,EAAE;oBACF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,oEAAoE;oBACpE,EAAE;oBACF,+FAA+F;oBAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;iBAC9C;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBACnE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;oBAC1C,qEAAqE;oBACrE,mEAAmE;oBACnE,+DAA+D;oBAC/D,uCAAuC;oBACvC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBAC5D;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WAsCG;QACH,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE;YAChD,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,yFAAyF;oBACzF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;oBAC7C,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,kFAAkF;oBAClF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,0BAA0B;oBAC1B,uCAAuC,EAAE,IAAI;oBAC7C,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;qBAC3C,CAAC;oBACF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,4FAA4F;oBAC5F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,oDAAoD;iBACrD;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,qFAAqF;oBACrF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,4FAA4F;oBAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;YACxC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,iCAAiC;oBACpE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;wBAC5C,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;qBACvC,CAAC;oBACF,oFAAoF;oBACpF,uFAAuF;oBACvF,uFAAuF;oBACvF,iEAAiE;oBACjE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM;iBAC3D;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3C,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,oCAAoC;oBACvE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;qBACvC,CAAC;oBACF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,qEAAqE;oBACrE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC7D,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,sFAAsF;oBACtF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,qDAAqD;oBACrD,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;iBAC9C;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,yEAAyE;QACzE,0EAA0E;QAC1E,2EAA2E;QAC3E,sEAAsE;QACtE,2EAA2E;QAC3E,0EAA0E;QAC1E,sEAAsE;QACtE,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YACvC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;oBACjC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;qBACvC,CAAC;oBACF,eAAe,EACb,+CAA+C;oBACjD,uEAAuE;oBACvE,oEAAoE;oBACpE,mEAAmE;oBACnE,sEAAsE;oBACtE,iBAAiB,EAAE,2BAA2B;oBAC9C,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,kFAAkF;oBAClF,0CAA0C;oBAC1C,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBACnG;aACF;YACD,6EAA6E;YAC7E,uFAAuF;YACvF,qEAAqE;YACrE,6EAA6E;YAC7E,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,qBAAqB,EAAE,SAAS;iBACjC;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,qBAAqB,EAAE,OAAO;iBAC/B;aACF;SACF;QAED,iFAAiF;QACjF,gFAAgF;QAChF,2BAA2B;QAC3B,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YACvC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;oBACjC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;oBACzC,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBACxB,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,SAAS,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;wBAClE,eAAe,EAAE,+BAA+B,CAAC,UAAU;wBAC3D,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;wBAChD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;wBACrB,4BAA4B,EAAE,IAAI;wBAClC,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa;wBAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;qBACjD;oBACD,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBACnG;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;iBACjD;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACF,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Organization Members Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for organization member management.\n * Comprehensive member lifecycle and role management.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  OrganizationMemberStatus,\n} from './organization-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport {\n  CoreConsumableTokenTypes,\n  ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport type {\n  TokenRevocationConfig,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas';\nimport { ErasureRetentionMode, ResourceDataSubjectKind } from '../compliance/privacy/impersonalization.shared.schemas';\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization members.\n// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework\n// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary\n// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the\n// target organization instead.\n//\n// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):\n//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).\n//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.\n//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.\n//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.\n// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow\n// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.\n//\n// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here\n// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were\n// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through\n// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.\n// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the\n// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and\n// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,\n// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls\n// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT\n// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the\n// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field\n// patch the core UPDATE persists). See\n// `.claude/plans/routed-unimplemented-operations-fail-closed.md`.\n//\n// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to \"role changes are UPDATE\", and it exists for a reason\n// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a\n// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.\nexport enum OrganizationMembers_Operations {\n  SUSPEND = 'suspend',\n  REACTIVATE = 'reactivate',\n  REVOKE = 'revoke',\n  RESEND = 'resend',\n  GRANT_OWNERSHIP = 'grantOwnership',\n}\n\n/**\n * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.\n *\n * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter\n * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is\n * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no\n * invitation token to revoke.\n */\nexport const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {\n  tokenTypes: [\n    CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n  ],\n  relatedIdField: '_id',\n} satisfies TokenRevocationConfig;\n\n/**\n * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email\n * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate\n * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct\n * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.\n */\nconst isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'role', 'joinedAt'];\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),\n  role: z.string(),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationMembersCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT\n  // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY;\n\n/*\nOrganization Members Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n  OrganizationMembersCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM\n  //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit\n  //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the\n  //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).\n  // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org\n  //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the\n  //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.\n  // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an\n  //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.\n  systemAccessPolicy: {\n    exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.\n   */\n  portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject erasure RETAINS this row and scrubs the person's contact and professional details.\n *\n * The membership survives because it is the tenant's record of who belonged to it and under what\n * authority; what does not survive is `userEmail` and `userTitle`, the denormalized copies of the\n * person held here so a row can be read without resolving the user.\n *\n * `roles` is deliberately NOT scrubbed. It is this application's authorization vocabulary rather than\n * personal data — the field's own comment says so — and emptying it could leave a tenant with no\n * administrator, which the administrative-continuity floors would refuse, making an erasure fail closed\n * on a tenant. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.\n   */\n  retentionPolicy: {\n    mode: ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Erasing one of these rows revokes NO session. A membership is a record ABOUT a person's place in a\n *  tenant, not the person — their session ends through the `USERS` row, which is `SELF_PRINCIPAL`.\n   */\n  dataSubjectPolicy: { kind: ResourceDataSubjectKind.NO_PRINCIPAL },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n    // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n\n    /*\n\n     * Route-less retention plumbing — INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no API surface is added, and it\n\n     * must not be REPOSITORY_ONLY: the retention primitives resolve through `getServiceOperationPathDefault`,\n\n     * which matches only INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL. LIST is LOW (a read-shaped op may not claim the\n\n     * HIGH/CRITICAL band, which carries an audit-emission obligation); UPDATE_MANY is CRITICAL — it is the\n\n     * verb the impersonalize writer uses to stamp the retention markers.\n\n     */\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY]: {\n\n      variants: [{\n\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n\n        isDefault: true,\n\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n\n      }],\n\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:\n    //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity\n    //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`\n    //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the\n    //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`\n    //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and\n    //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed\n    //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the\n    //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.\n    //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,\n    //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.\n    // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.\n    // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;\n    // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can invite members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +\n          // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/\n          // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n        }\n      ],\n      // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the\n      // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`\n      // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built\n      // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the\n      // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to\n      // the main (non-admin) app.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can read member info\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list organization members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked\n          // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT\n          // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are\n          // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a\n          // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds\n          // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member\n          // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale\n          // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See\n          // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.\n          searchableFields: [\n            'userEmail',\n            {\n              localField: 'userId',\n              relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n              relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n              fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n            },\n          ],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          //\n          // Audited despite being below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: since PROMOTE / DEMOTE were removed\n          // (2026-08-01), **this operation IS the only org-member role-change path**, and a role\n          // change is an access-control decision whatever the verb's risk level says. MEDIUM is the\n          // right answer for the UI axis riskLevel primarily serves — updating a member's details\n          // does not deserve a danger-zone affordance or a typed confirmation — but it is the wrong\n          // answer for the evidence axis, and this flag is exactly that divergence.\n          //\n          // This also closes the follow-up left open by the routed-unimplemented-operations sweep:\n          // `CoreAuditableEventType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` is declared and classified but\n          // emitted by nothing, so org-member role changes produced no trail at all. The generic\n          // mechanism covers it — with `roles` marked as audit evidence, the row carries the before\n          // and after sets — rather than adding a sixth hand-rolled emission.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can remove members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite\n          // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept\n          // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every\n          // active-member removal token-coupled.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the\n     * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.\n     *\n     * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE\n     *\n     * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the\n     * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant\n     * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under\n     * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because\n     * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no\n     * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in\n     * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the\n     * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach\n     * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.\n     *\n     * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE\n     *\n     * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries\n     * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every\n     * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is\n     * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom\n     * implementation ignores the payload for anything but the justification.\n     *\n     * ## Deliberate narrowness\n     *\n     * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it\n     *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.\n     * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can\n     *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.\n     * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant\n     *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`\n     *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by\n     *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller.\n     *\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope\n     * that has no usable administrator.\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.\n     */\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY\n          // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves\n          // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only\n          // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member\n          // of the stranded tenant.\n          admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000),\n          }),\n          // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the\n          // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The\n          // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is\n          // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an\n          // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.\n        },\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a\n          // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a\n          // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can suspend members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n            suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying\n          // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only\n          // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also\n          // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can reactivate members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any\n          // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED\n          // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,\n          // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the\n          // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every\n          // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after\n          // they were reinstated. The risk level answers \"how alarming is the affordance\"; this\n          // answers \"is it evidence an auditor needs\", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact\n    // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept\n    // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by\n    // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:\n    // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock \"zero memberships\" against\n    // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`\n    // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n          }),\n          tokenRevocation:\n            ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,\n          // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`\n          // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the\n          // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete\n          // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.\n          customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,\n          // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed\n          // via DELETE, not \"revoked\". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's\n          // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the\n          // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED\n          // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        },\n      ],\n      // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):\n      //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — \"your invitation was revoked\";\n      //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.\n      // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          customNotificationRef: 'invitee',\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          customNotificationRef: 'admin',\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)\n    // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the\n    // membership is `INVITED`.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n          // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement\n          // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/organizations/organization-members.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,GACzB,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,gDAAgD,CAAC;AACvF,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAA8C,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAC5J,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,kCAAkC,EAAE,MAAM,gDAAgD,CAAC;AACtH,OAAO,EAAE,4BAA4B,EAAE,MAAM,uCAAuC,CAAC;AACrF,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,2BAA2B,EAAE,MAAM,+CAA+C,CAAC;AAExH,OAAO,EAAE,0CAA0C,EAAE,MAAM,8CAA8C,CAAC;AAC1G,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,8CAA8C,CAAC;AACxF,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,+BAA+B,GAChC,MAAM,6DAA6D,CAAC;AAIrE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAExD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAC;AACjG,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,qDAAqD,CAAC;AAChG,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,wDAAwD,CAAC;AAEvH,mDAAmD;AACnD,4EAA4E;AAC5E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,+BAA+B;AAC/B,EAAE;AACF,iFAAiF;AACjF,gFAAgF;AAChF,wEAAwE;AACxE,oFAAoF;AACpF,oEAAoE;AACpE,4EAA4E;AAC5E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,EAAE;AACF,2FAA2F;AAC3F,2FAA2F;AAC3F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,uFAAuF;AACvF,6FAA6F;AAC7F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,6FAA6F;AAC7F,sEAAsE;AACtE,+FAA+F;AAC/F,uFAAuF;AACvF,6FAA6F;AAC7F,uCAAuC;AACvC,mEAAmE;AACnE,EAAE;AACF,gGAAgG;AAChG,oGAAoG;AACpG,sEAAsE;AACtE,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,8BAMX;AAND,WAAY,8BAA8B;IACxC,qDAAmB,CAAA;IACnB,2DAAyB,CAAA;IACzB,mDAAiB,CAAA;IACjB,mDAAiB,CAAA;IACjB,oEAAkC,CAAA;AACpC,CAAC,EANW,8BAA8B,KAA9B,8BAA8B,QAMzC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,+CAA+C,GAAG;IAC7D,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;KACxD;IACD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;CACU,CAAC;AAElC;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,qCAAqC,GAAG,CAAC,EAC7C,aAAa,GAGd,EAAW,EAAE,CACZ,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;AAE5D;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,CAAC,EACpC,aAAa,GAGd,EAAW,EAAE,CACZ,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;AAE3D;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAA8D,EAAY,EAAE,CAChI,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;AAE9D;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAEjE,MAAM,kCAAkC,GAAG;IACzC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACxC,oGAAoG;IACpG,oGAAoG;IACpG,+FAA+F;IAC/F,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,wCAAwC,CAAC;CAC5E,CAAC;AAaF;;EAEE;AACF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,8DAA8D,GAAG,CAAC,sBAA8C,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,0CAA0C,CAI1K;IACA,UAAU,EAAE,wBAAwB;IACpC,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,oBAAoB;IACzD,uBAAuB,EAAE,kCAAkC,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,oBAAoB,CAAC;IAClG,qBAAqB,EAAE,sBAAsB;IAC7C,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;IAEtB,0FAA0F;IAC1F,yFAAyF;IACzF,kFAAkF;IAClF,gEAAgE;IAChE,qFAAqF;IACrF,oFAAoF;IACpF,yFAAyF;IACzF,yFAAyF;IACzF,wEAAwE;IACxE,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAClB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QAC/C,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACxC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,IAAI,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;QACtC,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;KACzC;IAED;;OAEG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,yBAAyB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;IAE5E;;;;;;;;;;;OAWG;IACH,eAAe,EAAE;QACf,IAAI,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC,wBAAwB;KACpD;IAED;;;OAGG;IACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,uBAAuB,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE;IAEjE,cAAc,EAAE;QACd,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI;QAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI;QAC1B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;QAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK;QAC3B,oEAAoE;QACpE,qBAAqB,CAAC,WAAW;KAClC;IAED,eAAe,EAAE,8BAA8B;IAE/C,uBAAuB,EAAE;QAEvB;;;;;;;;;;;;WAYG;QAEH,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE;YAEnC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBAET,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,aAAa;oBAEvD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBAEf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;oBAE7C,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;iBAE/C,CAAC;SAEH;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;YAC7B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;oBAClC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,iDAAiD;QACjD,gFAAgF;QAChF,uFAAuF;QACvF,yFAAyF;QACzF,wFAAwF;QACxF,2FAA2F;QAC3F,4FAA4F;QAC5F,mFAAmF;QACnF,+DAA+D;QAC/D,mFAAmF;QACnF,gFAAgF;QAChF,wEAAwE;QACxE,4EAA4E;QAC5E,6CAA6C;QAC7C,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,EAAE,6DAA6D;oBAC7I,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,+DAA+D;oBAC/D,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,6DAA6D;oBAC7D,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,SAAS,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;wBAClE,eAAe,EAAE,+BAA+B,CAAC,UAAU;wBAC3D,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;wBAChD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;wBACrB,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa;wBAC5B,gFAAgF;wBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;qBACjD;iBACF;aACF;YACD,gEAAgE;YAChE,8EAA8E;YAC9E,8EAA8E;YAC9E,2EAA2E;YAC3E,+EAA+E;YAC/E,4BAA4B;YAC5B,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;iBACjD;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,mCAAmC;oBACvE,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,4CAA4C;oBAChF,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;iBAC1C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;oBAClC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;oBACzC,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI;oBAClB,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,wEAAwE;oBACxE,kEAAkE;oBAClE,sEAAsE;oBACtE,gBAAgB,EAAE;wBAChB,WAAW;wBACX;4BACE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ;4BACpB,eAAe,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,aAAa;4BAC/C,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ;4BAC1B,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;yBAClC;qBACF;oBACD,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE;oBACjE,YAAY,EAAE,kCAAkC;oBAChD,UAAU,EAAE,gCAAgC;oBAC5C,8BAA8B,EAAE,EAAE;iBACnC;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,uCAAuC;oBAC1E,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,0CAA0C;oBAC1C,EAAE;oBACF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,mFAAmF;oBACnF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,EAAE;oBACF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,sFAAsF;oBACtF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,EAAE;oBACF,+FAA+F;oBAC/F,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;iBAC9C;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YAC9B,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,EAAE,+GAA+G;oBAC5M,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,IAAI;oBAC1C,qEAAqE;oBACrE,mEAAmE;oBACnE,+DAA+D;oBAC/D,uCAAuC;oBACvC,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBAC5D;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;WA2CG;QACH,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE;YAChD,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,yFAAyF;oBACzF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC;oBAC7C,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,kFAAkF;oBAClF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,0BAA0B;oBAC1B,uCAAuC,EAAE,IAAI;oBAC7C,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,uKAAuK,CAAC;qBAC7N,CAAC;oBACF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,4FAA4F;oBAC5F,yFAAyF;oBACzF,oDAAoD;iBACrD;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,qFAAqF;oBACrF,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,4FAA4F;oBAC5F,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;YACxC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,yCAAyC,CAAC,EAAE,+GAA+G;oBAC5M,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAC9C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,kFAAkF,CAAC;wBACzI,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,2GAA2G,CAAC;qBAC7J,CAAC;oBACF,oFAAoF;oBACpF,uFAAuF;oBACvF,uFAAuF;oBACvF,iEAAiE;oBACjE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM;iBAC3D;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,6FAA6F;oBAC7F,gFAAgF;oBAChF,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,YAAY;oBAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,eAAe,EAAE,6BAA6B;oBAC9C,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI;iBACpB;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;iBAC3C;aACF;SACF;QAED,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE;YAC3C,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,+GAA+G;oBAC/G,+GAA+G;oBAC/G,+BAA+B;oBAC/B,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;oBACjC,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;6BACnC,QAAQ,CAAC,0FAA0F,CAAC;qBACxG,CAAC;oBACF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,wFAAwF;oBACxF,0EAA0E;oBAC1E,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CACtC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC7D,0FAA0F;oBAC1F,uFAAuF;oBACvF,yFAAyF;oBACzF,sFAAsF;oBACtF,2FAA2F;oBAC3F,qDAAqD;oBACrD,cAAc,EAAE,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;iBAC9C;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,6FAA6F;oBAC7F,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,YAAY;oBAC/C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,eAAe,EAAE,6BAA6B;oBAC9C,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI;oBACnB,SAAS,EAAE,4BAA4B;iBACxC;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,kBAAkB;oBACrD,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,SAAS,EAAE,4BAA4B;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QAED,yEAAyE;QACzE,0EAA0E;QAC1E,2EAA2E;QAC3E,sEAAsE;QACtE,2EAA2E;QAC3E,0EAA0E;QAC1E,sEAAsE;QACtE,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YACvC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;oBAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM;oBAC5C,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;wBACnB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE;6BACnC,QAAQ,CAAC,yIAAyI,CAAC;qBACvJ,CAAC;oBACF,eAAe,EACb,+CAA+C;oBACjD,uEAAuE;oBACvE,oEAAoE;oBACpE,mEAAmE;oBACnE,sEAAsE;oBACtE,iBAAiB,EAAE,2BAA2B;oBAC9C,2EAA2E;oBAC3E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,kFAAkF;oBAClF,0CAA0C;oBAC1C,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBACnG;aACF;YACD,6EAA6E;YAC7E,uFAAuF;YACvF,qEAAqE;YACrE,6EAA6E;YAC7E,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,qBAAqB,EAAE,SAAS;iBACjC;gBACD;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,qBAAqB,EAAE,OAAO;iBAC/B;aACF;SACF;QAED,iFAAiF;QACjF,gFAAgF;QAChF,2BAA2B;QAC3B,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;YACvC,QAAQ,EAAE;gBACR;oBACE,WAAW,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ;oBAClD,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;oBACf,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC;oBAC9E,SAAS,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,GAAG;oBACzC,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM;oBACnD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBACxB,eAAe,EAAE;wBACf,SAAS,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC,8BAA8B;wBAClE,eAAe,EAAE,+BAA+B,CAAC,UAAU;wBAC3D,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;wBAChD,cAAc,EAAE,KAAK;wBACrB,4BAA4B,EAAE,IAAI;wBAClC,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa;wBAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;qBACjD;oBACD,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,+EAA+E;oBAC/E,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO;iBACnG;aACF;YACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;gBACjB;oBACE,MAAM,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS;oBAC5C,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAK;oBAC1C,mBAAmB,EAAE,WAAW;oBAChC,SAAS,EAAE,qCAAqC;iBACjD;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACF,CAAC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Organization Members Shared Resource Configuration\n *\n * Resource configuration for organization member management.\n * Comprehensive member lifecycle and role management.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport {\n  OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  OrganizationMemberStatus,\n} from './organization-members.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceOperation } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationRiskLevel, ResourcePrimaryScope, ResourceRelationship, DefaultDeleteResponseSchema } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreResourceType, coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier } from '../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';\nimport { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../resources/resources.shared.schemas';\nimport { CoreUserNotificationTarget, CoreUserNotificationChannel } from '../notifications/notifications.shared.schemas';\n\nimport { createResourceConfiguration_Initialization } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.factory';\nimport { ResourceSystemAccessMode } from '../resources/resources-config.shared.schemas';\nimport {\n  CoreConsumableTokenTypes,\n  ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport type {\n  TokenRevocationConfig,\n} from '../security/authentications/consumable-token.shared.schemas';\nimport { DurationUnit } from '@wildo-ai/zod-decorators';\n\nimport { CORE_APP_ROLES, CORE_ORG_ROLES } from '../security/authorizations/roles.shared.schemas';\nimport { DataPortabilityProvenance } from '../compliance/privacy/subject-export.shared.schemas';\nimport { ErasureRetentionMode, ResourceDataSubjectKind } from '../compliance/privacy/impersonalization.shared.schemas';\n\n// Custom operations enum for organization members.\n// NOTE: cross-organization member transfer is intentionally NOT a framework\n// capability — moving a member between organizations is a tenant-boundary\n// crossing the framework does not sanction. Re-invite the identity in the\n// target organization instead.\n//\n// A membership row IS the invitation (there is no separate invitation resource):\n//   - CREATE      = invite (creates an `INVITED` row + mints the accept token).\n//   - REVOKE      = inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership.\n//   - RESEND      = re-mint + re-send the accept token for an `INVITED` membership.\n//   - SUSPEND/REACTIVATE = lifecycle of an ACTIVE/SUSPENDED member.\n// Invitee-side accept/reject is the tokenized `/auth/acceptInvitation` flow\n// (auth controller + `Auth_Invitation` screen), NOT a resource operation.\n//\n// ROLE CHANGES ARE `UPDATE`, NOT A DEDICATED VERB. `PROMOTE` / `DEMOTE` were declared here\n// as `ORG_ADMIN`-gated `riskLevel: HIGH` operations taking `{ newRole, reason }`, and were\n// removed on 2026-08-01: they were ROUTED but never implemented, so the request fell through\n// to the generic core UPDATE, which persists only fields the resource schema declares.\n// `newRole` is not one, so every call answered **HTTP 200 having changed nothing** — and the\n// dangerous direction is DEMOTE: an admin demotes a compromised account, is told 200 OK, and\n// the account keeps its privileges. Re-declaring an explicit role-change verb is legitimate,\n// but only WITH a custom implementation that writes `roles` and calls\n// `assertRequestedRolesWithinCallerCeiling` — a custom implementation is addressed by an EXACT\n// operation path, so it does NOT inherit the UPDATE variant's ceiling gate. Follow the\n// organization-units MOVE/ARCHIVE pattern (a `prefixCoreOperations` hook returning the field\n// patch the core UPDATE persists). See\n// the 2026-08-01 routed-but-unimplemented operation sweep (#1275).\n//\n// GRANT_OWNERSHIP is the ONE exception to \"role changes are UPDATE\", and it exists for a reason\n// UPDATE structurally cannot serve: it is the only operation on this resource a caller who is NOT a\n// member of the organization may perform. See its config entry below.\nexport enum OrganizationMembers_Operations {\n  SUSPEND = 'suspend',\n  REACTIVATE = 'reactivate',\n  REVOKE = 'revoke',\n  RESEND = 'resend',\n  GRANT_OWNERSHIP = 'grantOwnership',\n}\n\n/**\n * One semantic definition for invalidating an organization invitation.\n *\n * REVOKE attaches it declaratively, so HTTP and trusted service callers enter\n * the same transactional revocation pipeline. Ordinary DELETE is\n * intentionally excluded: it removes a non-INVITED membership, which has no\n * invitation token to revoke.\n */\nexport const ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION = {\n  tokenTypes: [\n    CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n  ],\n  relatedIdField: '_id',\n} satisfies TokenRevocationConfig;\n\n/**\n * One predicate owns both invitation-token generation and invitation-email\n * dispatch. Keeping the two declarative side effects on the same named gate\n * prevents the polymorphic CREATE operation from drifting: an ACTIVE direct\n * add must produce neither an accept token nor an invitation email.\n */\nconst isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED;\n\n/**\n * REACTIVATE's notifications say the member \"can now access organization resources again\", which is true only when\n * the membership came back ACTIVE. A service-provider membership whose relationship has ended, or whose person is no\n * longer assigned, lands INACTIVE instead (#1597), and neither the person nor the organization's users may be told\n * otherwise. Evaluated against the row as written.\n */\nconst isRestoredToActiveMembership = ({\n  currentObject,\n}: {\n  currentObject: Record<string, unknown>;\n}): boolean =>\n  currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE;\n\n/**\n * The recipient of a membership's own status notice: the member whose membership was suspended or\n * reactivated (#1870).\n *\n * `USERS_CUSTOM` rather than `USER_SELF`, and the difference is the whole defect: `USER_SELF` is the\n * INITIATOR — the administrator who pressed the button — so \"your membership was suspended\" landed in\n * the administrator's inbox, and the scheduled reactivation sweep, which has no initiator, told nobody.\n * `ORGANIZATION_USERS` cannot reach the member either: it keeps only ACTIVE memberships, and a suspended\n * member is not one. The row the operation just wrote carries the member's `userId`, so that is the\n * recipient. Same shape as the `users` account-status notices (#1807).\n */\nconst selectMembershipStatusSubject = ({ currentObject }: { currentObject: { userId?: unknown } | null | undefined }): string[] =>\n  currentObject?.userId ? [String(currentObject.userId)] : [];\n\n/**\n * Sortable member fields.\n *\n * `role` and `joinedAt` were listed here and neither is a field (#1806): the membership carries\n * `roles`, an ARRAY — which has no meaningful sort order on either adapter, so it is not offered —\n * and it records when it was created, not a separate join instant. Both entries were passed to the\n * repository verbatim and silently ignored. The factory now refuses a sort field that is not a field.\n */\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS = ['status', 'createdAt'];\n\nconst ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS = {\n  status: z.enum(OrganizationMemberStatus),\n  // `roles` is an array, and a scalar filter on it matches array MEMBERSHIP on both adapters: MongoDB\n  // does so natively and the PostgreSQL filter compiler emits a jsonb containment (`roles @> '\"x\"'`).\n  // It was declared as `role`, a field no row has, so `?role=ORG_ADMIN` matched nothing (#1806).\n  roles: z.string().min(1).describe('Only return members holding this role.'),\n};\n\ntype OrganizationMembersCoreOperations =\n  | CoreResourceOperation.READ\n  | CoreResourceOperation.LIST\n  | CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH\n  | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE\n  | CoreResourceOperation.COUNT\n  // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n  | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY;\n\n/*\nOrganization Members Resource Configuration Factory\n*/\nexport const organizationMembersResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory = (resourcesRelationships: ResourceRelationship[]) => createResourceConfiguration_Initialization<\n  typeof OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n  OrganizationMembersCoreOperations,\n  typeof OrganizationMemberSchema\n>({\n  mainSchema: OrganizationMemberSchema,\n  resourceIdentifier: CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS,\n  resourceFieldIdentifier: coreResourceShared_FieldIdentifier[CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS],\n  resourceRelationships: resourcesRelationships,\n  isSystemResource: true,\n\n  // create: invitation-accept was the historical opt-in; now the org-admin INVITE, SSO/SCIM\n  //   JIT, and org-auto-create-on-registration all create members in-process with explicit\n  //   `userId` + `organizationId` FKs on a request-context-less EC (stripped by the\n  //   client-shaped CREATE DTO, re-attached by `createAsSystem`).\n  // read/list: the invitee's own pending-invitation inbox reads INVITED rows cross-org\n  //   BEFORE the invitee is a scoped member — authorized by `userId`-ownership at the\n  //   entry point (`listMyPendingInvitations`/`loadOwnedPendingInvitation`), not org role.\n  // update: invitation ACCEPTANCE flips INVITED → ACTIVE in-process; the invitee is not an\n  //   org admin, so the status flip goes through the trusted system path.\n  systemAccessPolicy: {\n    exportSubject: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    create: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    read: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    list: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n    update: ResourceSystemAccessMode.ALLOWED,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject-export disclosure. The subject's OWN membership rows (org, roles, title) — not other members' data.\n   */\n  portabilityPolicy: { defaultProvenance: DataPortabilityProvenance.OBSERVED },\n\n  /**\n   * Subject erasure RETAINS this row and scrubs the person's contact and professional details.\n *\n * The membership survives because it is the tenant's record of who belonged to it and under what\n * authority; what does not survive is `userEmail` and `userTitle`, the denormalized copies of the\n * person held here so a row can be read without resolving the user.\n *\n * `roles` is deliberately NOT scrubbed. It is this application's authorization vocabulary rather than\n * personal data — the field's own comment says so — and emptying it could leave a tenant with no\n * administrator, which the administrative-continuity floors would refuse, making an erasure fail closed\n * on a tenant. Keeping it means that interaction never arises.\n   */\n  retentionPolicy: {\n    mode: ErasureRetentionMode.RETAIN_AND_IMPERSONALIZE,\n  },\n\n  /**\n   * Erasing one of these rows revokes NO session. A membership is a record ABOUT a person's place in a\n *  tenant, not the person — their session ends through the `USERS` row, which is `SELF_PRINCIPAL`.\n   */\n  dataSubjectPolicy: { kind: ResourceDataSubjectKind.NO_PRINCIPAL },\n\n  coreOperations: [\n    CoreResourceOperation.READ,\n    CoreResourceOperation.LIST,\n    CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH,\n    CoreResourceOperation.CREATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n    CoreResourceOperation.COUNT,\n    // Route-less; `retentionPolicy` requires READ + LIST + UPDATE_MANY.\n    CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY,\n  ],\n\n  customOperation: OrganizationMembers_Operations,\n\n  operationsConfiguration: {\n\n    /*\n\n     * Route-less retention plumbing — INTERNAL_CALL registers no route, so no API surface is added, and it\n\n     * must not be REPOSITORY_ONLY: the retention primitives resolve through `getServiceOperationPathDefault`,\n\n     * which matches only INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL. LIST is LOW (a read-shaped op may not claim the\n\n     * HIGH/CRITICAL band, which carries an audit-emission obligation); UPDATE_MANY is CRITICAL — it is the\n\n     * verb the impersonalize writer uses to stamp the retention markers.\n\n     */\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE_MANY]: {\n\n      variants: [{\n\n        variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,\n\n        isDefault: true,\n\n        roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n\n        riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n\n      }],\n\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.COUNT]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // CREATE is POLYMORPHIC — two intents on one op:\n    //  • INVITE (BRANCH B): the org admin supplies `userEmail` (the strict identity\n    //    anchor); the CREATE prefix find-or-creates the `User` by it (`PENDING_INVITATION`\n    //    if new) and FORCES `status: INVITED`. A single-use accept token is minted AFTER the\n    //    row is created (relatedId = the membership `_id`, STABLE across `INVITED → ACTIVE`\n    //    so the emailed link never orphans); the pipeline injects it into the invite email and\n    //    the dispatcher builds the accept link (`emailLinkPath → /invitation?token=…`, consumed\n    //    by `/auth/acceptInvitation`). No `grantedRoles`: the accept handler reads the\n    //    membership's own `roles` when it flips the row to ACTIVE.\n    //  • DIRECT-ADD (BRANCH A): the caller supplies `userId` (founder org-owner grant,\n    //    SSO-JIT, SCIM) and the row persists `ACTIVE` — there is nothing to accept.\n    // Token generation and notification dispatch share one named predicate.\n    // The INVITE branch mints one accept token and sends one post-commit email;\n    // the ACTIVE direct-add branch does neither.\n    [CoreResourceOperation.CREATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS], // Org admins, or a firm's expert lent INVITE_MEMBERS (#1631)\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators (userEmail + roles +\n          // organizationUnitsMembership + userTitle; userId/status/invitedByUserId/\n          // invitedAt are server-injected via `.excludeFromCreate()`).\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            // Mint the accept token for real invites only — never for an ACTIVE direct-add.\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n        }\n      ],\n      // Deliver the invite email to the INVITEE (`userEmail`) via the\n      // email-by-address path — the invitee may be a brand-new `PENDING_INVITATION`\n      // user with no session. Carries the `acceptUrl` (`/invitation?token=…`) built\n      // from the token minted above. `target: USER_SELF` is retained only so the\n      // derived template ref stays `…create.user-self` and the accept link routes to\n      // the main (non-admin) app.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.READ]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can read member info\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.LIST]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER], // Org members can list organization members\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.SEARCH]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_MEMBER],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          isSearchable: true,\n          // `userEmail` is a denormalized, immutable own-field (mirror of the linked\n          // user's email, captured at membership creation). First/last name are NOT\n          // denormalized onto the member row — they live on `USER_PROFILES` and are\n          // mutable there — so they are searched RELATIONALLY: the framework runs a\n          // secondary match on `USER_PROFILES` (its own searchable fields) and folds\n          // the matching `userId`s into an `$in` on this row's `userId`. The member\n          // query stays org-scoped, so this is tenant-safe; names are never stale\n          // because they are read live from the profile at search time. See\n          // SearchableRelationDescriptor in resources-config.shared.schemas.ts.\n          searchableFields: [\n            'userEmail',\n            {\n              localField: 'userId',\n              relatedResource: CoreResourceType.USER_PROFILES,\n              relatedJoinField: 'userId',\n              fields: ['firstName', 'lastName'],\n            },\n          ],\n          searchableOptions: { caseSensitive: false, fullMatchOnly: false },\n          filterFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_FILTER_FIELDS,\n          sortFields: ORGANIZATION_MEMBERS_SORT_FIELDS,\n          maxPaginatedResultPerPageLimit: 50,\n        }\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN], // Org admins can update member details\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          // requestDto auto-derived from decorators\n          //\n          // Ordinary UPDATE remains audited below the HIGH/CRITICAL floor: editing member details\n          // is MEDIUM risk for the UI, but changing roles still requires privilege evidence.\n          // The registered UPDATE implementation also emits ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED after\n          // a durable role change, with previous, requested and resulting roles. That specialized\n          // event complements the automatic operation event; it is not an unimplemented producer.\n          //\n          // GRANT_OWNERSHIP is a separate named role-change path. Its UPDATE-like core behavior does\n          // not inherit UPDATE's custom hooks: registration resolves the exact operation identity.\n          // Its CRITICAL risk triggers RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED automatically, with changed\n          // role sets carried by the roles field's audit-evidence marker. Queries covering ownership\n          // repair must include that operation family, not only the specialized role-change event.\n          //\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant/revocation.\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [CoreResourceOperation.DELETE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS], // Org admins; a firm's expert lent MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS, on its own relationship's experts only (#1631)\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,\n          // Accepted/non-pending members use ordinary DELETE. A pending invite\n          // is cancelled through REVOKE, which atomically revokes its accept\n          // token. Keeping the vocabularies disjoint avoids making every\n          // active-member removal token-coupled.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status !== OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    /**\n     * The higher-tier repair door for the organization-owner floor — the second half of the\n     * industry pattern described in `.claude/rules/administrative-continuity-floors.md`.\n     *\n     * ## Why this cannot be UPDATE\n     *\n     * The floor refuses to let the last `ORG_OWNER` be removed, demoted or deactivated. That is the\n     * correct tenant-tier answer, but on its own it converts every mistake that DID strand a tenant\n     * — a direct database edit, a restore from a mid-erasure backup, an acknowledged erasure under\n     * GDPR Art. 17, a seed that authored no owner — into a permanent lockout, because\n     * `validateParentScopeAccess` denies a non-member on ORGANIZATIONS scope and there is no\n     * `APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN` bypass. Both denials are pinned in\n     * `cross-tenant-super-admin-reach.mongo.integration.test.ts`. So no tenant member can grant the\n     * role (they would need the authority they just lost) and no platform administrator can reach\n     * the row at all. GitHub solves this with an Enterprise owner one tier up; this is that tier.\n     *\n     * ## Why it is a distinct verb rather than a flag on UPDATE\n     *\n     * `admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration` relaxes the SCOPE check for the variant that carries\n     * it. Putting it on generic UPDATE would open every field of every membership row in every\n     * tenant to a cross-tenant caller. The whole safety argument is that the opened surface is\n     * exactly one field with one direction, so it is authored as its own operation whose custom\n     * implementation reads nothing from the payload but the justification — which it records, and\n     * never persists onto the row.\n     *\n     * ## Deliberate narrowness\n     *\n     * - **Promotes an EXISTING member** (Microsoft Loop's rule). It cannot mint a membership, so it\n     *   never creates an identity inside a tenant nobody owns.\n     * - **Additive only.** It adds the owner-conferring role; it cannot remove roles, so it can\n     *   never be used to demote and is not a second path through the floor.\n     * - **`justification` is required**, not optional. This is a break-glass action against a tenant\n     *   the operator is not a member of; the audit row is worth nothing without the why. `AC-2(7)`\n     *   asks for privileged assignment to be monitored — the trail IS the control here, since by\n     *   construction no authorization check downstream can second-guess the caller. It lands on the\n     *   `ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_ROLE_CHANGED` row the grant emits post-commit (`eventData.justification`),\n     *   beside the before/after role sets. `RESOURCE_OPERATION_PERFORMED`, which this CRITICAL verb\n     *   also emits, carries no request payload and so cannot hold it. Until #593 it was validated here\n     *   and discarded at the service boundary.\n     *\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.ADMINISTRATIVE_CONTINUITY — restore administrability of a scope\n     * that has no usable administrator.\n     * assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE — evidence of privilege grant.\n     */\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.GRANT_OWNERSHIP]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Platform tier only. This is the role set the operation-roles gate checks INDEPENDENTLY\n          // of the scope admission below: a caller holding this key at ORGANIZATIONS scope resolves\n          // it against the organization role table, which does not contain it, and is denied there.\n          roles: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          // THE cross-tenant admission. Without it the operation is unreachable by the only\n          // principal it exists for, because a platform administrator is by definition not a member\n          // of the stranded tenant.\n          admitsCrossTenantPlatformAdministration: true,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            justification: z.string().min(1).max(1000).describe('Why a platform administrator is making this member an owner of an organization they do not belong to. Required, and recorded on the audit trail with the role change.'),\n          }),\n          // No `auditableEvent` declaration: CRITICAL is inside `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so the\n          // event emits on the risk level alone and `auditBelowRiskFloor` would be inert here. The\n          // before/after role sets ride along because `roles` carries `.isAuditEvidence()` — which is\n          // what makes the trail answer the question that matters about this door: WHO was made an\n          // owner of a tenant, by a caller who was not in it.\n        },\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The tenant learns that its ownership changed from outside. An operator repairing a\n          // stranded tenant is legitimate; an operator quietly granting themselves an ally inside a\n          // customer's tenant is not, and the difference is only visible to the tenant if it is told.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        },\n      ],\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.SUSPEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS], // Org admins; a firm's expert lent MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS, on its own relationship's experts only (#1631)\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.CRITICAL,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            suspensionReason: z.string().min(1).max(500).describe('Why the member is suspended. Recorded on the audit trail, not on the membership.'),\n            suspensionEndDate: z.date().optional().describe('When the suspension ends and the member is reactivated. Absent: suspended until someone reactivates them.'),\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (ACTIVE → SUSPENDED, carrying\n          // `suspensionEndDate` onto the row's `scheduledReactivationAt`). SUSPEND is legal only\n          // from ACTIVE: an INVITED row has not accepted yet — cancel it with REVOKE, which also\n          // revokes the accept token — and an INACTIVE one is already out.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.ACTIVE,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The suspended member. `alwaysDeliver`: a person who loses access to an organization has no\n          // other way to learn why, whatever they chose for ordinary email notifications.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USERS_CUSTOM,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          userIdsSelector: selectMembershipStatusSubject,\n          alwaysDeliver: true,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REACTIVATE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          // Org admins only. NOT opened to MANAGE_RELATIONSHIP_EXPERTS (#1631): a suspension is the client's bar against\n          // one person, which the firm cannot lift (#1597) — a firm may suspend or remove its own expert, never undo the\n          // client's suspension of them.\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n              .describe('Why the member is being reactivated. Recorded with the audit event for the reactivation.')\n          }),\n          // Implemented by the shared status-transition factory (SUSPENDED → ACTIVE, clearing any\n          // pending `scheduledReactivationAt`). Legal only from SUSPENDED: reactivating an INVITED\n          // row would skip acceptance and grant a membership nobody agreed to. A service-provider\n          // membership lands INACTIVE instead when its relationship has ended or its person is no\n          // longer assigned (#1597, `resolveProviderMembershipReactivationStatus`).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) =>\n            currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.SUSPENDED,\n          // MEDIUM sits below `AUTOMATIC_AUDIT_RISK_FLOOR`, so without this the RESTORE half of the\n          // pair would go untrailed while SUSPEND (CRITICAL) is recorded — a trail showing every\n          // suspension and none of the lifts, which reads as a member still suspended a year after\n          // they were reinstated. The risk level answers \"how alarming is the affordance\"; this\n          // answers \"is it evidence an auditor needs\", and for the inverse of a CRITICAL verb it is.\n          // assurance-control: WILDO.ACCESS.PRIVILEGE_EVIDENCE\n          auditableEvent: { auditBelowRiskFloor: true },\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          // The reactivated member — reached on the scheduled sweep too, which runs with no initiator.\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USERS_CUSTOM,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          userIdsSelector: selectMembershipStatusSubject,\n          alwaysDeliver: true,\n          condition: isRestoredToActiveMembership,\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.ORGANIZATION_USERS,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          condition: isRestoredToActiveMembership,\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // REVOKE — inviter/admin cancels a still-`INVITED` membership. The exact\n    // custom implementation DELETES the row and atomically revokes its accept\n    // token. The paired PENDING_INVITATION user is retained here and reaped by\n    // deferred hygiene only after it is old and still has no memberships:\n    // point-operation cleanup cannot predicate-lock \"zero memberships\" against\n    // a concurrent invitation insert under Mongo snapshot isolation. `reason`\n    // is captured in the audit payload, not persisted on the deleted row.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.REVOKE]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.DELETE,\n          requestDto: z.object({\n            reason: z.string().max(500).optional()\n              .describe('Why the invitation is being revoked. Recorded with the audit event for the removal; it is not kept on the membership, which is deleted.')\n          }),\n          tokenRevocation:\n            ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION_TOKEN_REVOCATION,\n          // REVOKE has an exact API custom registration; `resourceOperationLike`\n          // selects DELETE persistence/DTO semantics but does not inherit the\n          // core DELETE custom implementation. Its real return is the delete\n          // envelope, declared explicitly so output validation matches runtime.\n          customResponseDto: DefaultDeleteResponseSchema,\n          // Only a still-pending invite can be revoked — an ACTIVE member is removed\n          // via DELETE, not \"revoked\". Gates the roster action (paired with the preset's\n          // `WHEN_AVAILABLE`, the button shows only on INVITED rows) AND fail-closes the\n          // backend (`services-registry-handler` throws SERVICE_RESOURCE_OPERATION_DISABLED\n          // → 403 if invoked on a non-INVITED row).\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        },\n      ],\n      // Two emails (distinct templates, disambiguated by `customNotificationRef`):\n      //  • the INVITEE (`recipientEmailField: 'userEmail'`) — \"your invitation was revoked\";\n      //  • the ADMIN/initiator (`USER_SELF`) — confirmation of the action.\n      // Both USER_SELF+EMAIL, so each MUST carry a unique `customNotificationRef`.\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          customNotificationRef: 'invitee',\n        },\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          customNotificationRef: 'admin',\n        }\n      ]\n    },\n\n    // RESEND — re-mint the accept token (revoking any prior one for this membership)\n    // and re-send the invite email with the fresh accept link. Only valid while the\n    // membership is `INVITED`.\n    [OrganizationMembers_Operations.RESEND]: {\n      variants: [\n        {\n          variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,\n          isDefault: true,\n          roles: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_INVITE_MEMBERS],\n          riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,\n          resourceOperationLike: CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE,\n          requestDto: z.object({}),\n          tokenGeneration: {\n            tokenType: CoreConsumableTokenTypes.ORGANIZATION_MEMBER_INVITATION,\n            consumptionMode: ConsumableToken_ConsumptionMode.SINGLE_USE,\n            expiresIn: { value: 7, unit: DurationUnit.DAYS },\n            relatedIdField: '_id',\n            revokeExistingForSameRelated: true,\n            emailLinkPath: '/invitation',\n            condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n          },\n          // Resend is meaningful only while the invite is pending. Same dual enforcement\n          // as REVOKE: hides the roster action on non-INVITED rows and 403s server-side.\n          enabledCondition: ({ currentObject }) => currentObject.status === OrganizationMemberStatus.INVITED,\n        }\n      ],\n      userNotifications: [\n        {\n          target: CoreUserNotificationTarget.USER_SELF,\n          channel: CoreUserNotificationChannel.EMAIL,\n          recipientEmailField: 'userEmail',\n          condition: isPendingOrganizationMemberInvitation,\n        }\n      ]\n    }\n  },\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ export declare enum OrganizationMemberStatus {
 }
 export declare const OrganizationMemberSchema: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodObject<{
     _id: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>;
-    userId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>;
+    userId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>>>;
     userEmail: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodEmail>>>>>>;
     organizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodString>>>>;
     roles: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodArray<z.ZodUnion<readonly [z.ZodEnum<typeof CORE_ORG_ROLES>, z.ZodString]>>>>>>;
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ export declare const OrganizationMemberSchema: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators"
     userTitle: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>;
     invitedByUserId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>;
     invitedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDate>>>>;
+    serviceProviderRelationshipId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>>;
+    providerOrganizationId: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>>>;
+    providerOrganizationName: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>>>;
     instanceLabel: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>>;
     createdAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;
     updatedAt: import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<import("@wildo-ai/zod-decorators").DecoratedPrimitiveZodType<z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDefault<z.ZodDate>>>>>;

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA;;;;GAIG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAkB,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAC;AAQjG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,oBAAY,wBAAwB;IAClC,OAAO,YAAY;IACnB,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB,SAAS,cAAc;CACxB;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAiLnC,CAAC;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"organization-members.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA;;;;GAIG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAExB,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAkB,MAAM,iDAAiD,CAAC;AAQjG;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,oBAAY,wBAAwB;IAClC,OAAO,YAAY;IACnB,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,QAAQ,aAAa;IACrB,SAAS,cAAc;CACxB;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAuNnC,CAAC;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/organizations/organization-members.shared.schemas.js

@@ -53,7 +53,15 @@ export const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({
      *     the strict-DTO strip.
      * `.excludeFromUpdate()` keeps the member↔user binding immutable.
      */
-    userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    // `labelFallbackField` names the readable copy this row already carries, for when the reference
+    // cannot be resolved. `userEmail` below is `.isHidden({ display: true })` on the stated grounds
+    // that "the user-facing email is surfaced by resolving the `userId` reference" — and for an
+    // INVITED person that resolution has nothing to build a label from, because there is no
+    // `USER_PROFILE` yet. Measured 2026-09-19 on the member directory: three of four rows rendered
+    // `6aaba6b3a2d3b6b0ad61f33e`, the fourth (a real user) rendered their name. The copy was on the
+    // row the whole time; nothing was reaching for it.
+    userId: z.string().min(1).isDBIndexed().isForeignKey().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate()
+        .foreignKeyUI({ display: { labelFallbackField: 'userEmail' } }),
     /**
      * The linked user's email — DUAL ROLE:
      *
@@ -183,6 +191,36 @@ export const OrganizationMemberSchema = z.object({
      * expiry-reap CRON batch.
      */
     invitedAt: z.date().optional().isDBIndexed().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
+    /**
+     * Present ⇒ this is a PROVIDER membership: held by an expert of a service firm through the client
+     * organization's `SERVICE_PROVIDER_RELATIONSHIPS` row with this id, not by one of the organization's
+     * own members (#1597). Test it with `isServiceProviderMembership`, never by hand.
+     *
+     * It changes what the row means everywhere the framework reads memberships: it confers authority ONLY
+     * while the relationship passes the execution-context live filter; its `roles` are owned by the
+     * relationship (generic UPDATE refuses them); it never counts toward the owner floor and cannot receive
+     * ownership; it grants no user type; it is not part of the client's SCIM directory.
+     *
+     * System-written only — by the firm's assignment verb, which also re-points it when a row left by an
+     * earlier relationship is reactivated. Indexed: "who serves under this relationship" is a query by it.
+     * Not a foreign key edge on purpose: the live filter reads the relationship by id, and a navigable edge
+     * would add nested routes onto a membership nobody needs to reach that way.
+     */
+    serviceProviderRelationshipId: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()
+        .excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate().isAuditEvidence(),
+    /**
+     * The firm whose expert holds this provider membership. A plain id: it names another tenant. The live
+     * filter requires the member to hold an ACTIVE, ordinary membership there, in an organization that
+     * still confers authority.
+     */
+    providerOrganizationId: z.string().min(1).optional().isDBIndexed().isSummaryField()
+        .excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate().isAuditEvidence(),
+    /**
+     * The firm's name as its relationship recorded it — what a client's directory shows as "via {Firm}".
+     * A snapshot copied from the relationship at assignment, because a client can never read the firm's
+     * organization row (#1597).
+     */
+    providerOrganizationName: z.string().max(200).optional().isSummaryField().excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     /**
      * Computed instance label — the linked user's name, forwarded live from
      * `USER_PROFILES`. A junction row has no inherent name; its identity is the