@wildo-ai/saas-models 1.1.4 → 1.1.6

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"siem-export-config.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAKxB,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc;;;;;CAKjB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;CAKlB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB;;;;;;CAMpB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB;;;;CAIrB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBA4DrC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9E,eAAO,MAAM,sCAAsC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAMjD,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"siem-export-config.shared.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAMxB,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc;;;;;CAKjB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe;;;;;CAKlB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB;;;;;;CAMpB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB;;;;CAIrB,CAAC;AAEX,eAAO,MAAM,0BAA0B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAgMrC,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9E,eAAO,MAAM,sCAAsC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;kBAMjD,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.js

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2D
  */
 import { z } from 'zod';
+import { SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema } from '../../../compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas.js';
 import { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../../requests/header-keys.shared.js';
 import { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas.js';
 import { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas.js';
@@ -93,20 +94,148 @@ export const SiemExportConfigBaseSchema = z.object({
             SIEMEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE,
             SIEMEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT,
             SIEMEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS,
-        ]),
-        severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO),
-        specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
+        ]).describe("The event categories exported to this destination."),
+        severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO).describe("The least severe event exported. Less severe events are not sent."),
+        specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe("An optional allow-list of event types, matched exactly: no substring or wildcard matching."),
     }),
+    /*
+     * Three knobs, and the two that were removed are the reason to read this.
+     *
+     * `retryAttempts`, `retryBackoffSeconds` and `timeoutSeconds` are honoured — the delivery worker
+     * reads all three (`siem-webhook-delivery.backend.service`, at the retry ceiling, the exponential
+     * backoff and the request deadline).
+     *
+     * `batchSize` and `batchWindowSeconds` are honoured TOO, as of #1379 — but they were not always,
+     * and the history is the reason to read this rather than trivia. They spent months appearing in
+     * the delivery service only as fields of its parameter TYPE: declared, passed, never consulted.
+     * That is the shape which makes an inert knob hardest to see, because it has a "reader" that
+     * decides nothing. The worker posted ONE event per HTTP request whatever they said, and the
+     * customer documentation warned an operator not to size a receiver or a billing estimate on
+     * either — a warning being what you write when the control is missing.
+     *
+     * They were deleted in `be001548` rather than kept as a disclosed "reserved" knob, on the
+     * principle that a receiver sized on `batchSize: 100` is sized wrong and a documented warning is
+     * not a control. They are back now because the control exists: a durable collector groups pending
+     * events per destination and sends them as one request, so the two numbers decide how many events
+     * a request may carry and how long a partly-filled one waits.
+     *
+     * The pairing that matters: `batchSize: 1` — the DEFAULT — means no batching at all, the window is
+     * never consulted, and the wire is byte-for-byte what it was before any of this existed.
+     */
     delivery: z.object({
-        batchSize: z.number().min(1).max(100).default(1),
-        batchWindowSeconds: z.number().min(0).max(60).default(0),
-        retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3),
-        retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30),
-        timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10),
+        /**
+         * The MOST events one HTTP request may carry. `1` — the default — is one request per event,
+         * which is what this destination gets until its operator asks for anything else.
+         *
+         * The number means what it says: the collector claims at most this many pending events for one
+         * request and sends no more, so a receiver sized on `batchSize: 50` receives at most fifty. A
+         * burst larger than this becomes several requests of this size rather than one oversized body.
+         *
+         * Capped at 100 because the body is the sum of its events and collector endpoints commonly
+         * refuse a payload around a megabyte: a hundred CEF lines sits comfortably under that, where a
+         * thousand would not. Raising the cap is a decision about the receiver, not about this engine.
+         *
+         * At `1` the delivery path is byte-for-byte what it was before batching existed — the event is
+         * sent alone, framed as itself, and {@link batchWindowSeconds} is never consulted.
+         */
+        batchSize: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(1).describe("The most events one request may carry, up to 100. `1`, the default, sends one request per event."),
+        /**
+         * How long a partly-filled batch waits for company before it is sent anyway.
+         *
+         * ONLY consulted when {@link batchSize} is greater than 1 — at the default of 1 there is no
+         * batch to fill, so a lone event is never held. That is the pairing to know: this field cannot
+         * delay anything on a destination that has not opted into batching.
+         *
+         * It bounds how stale an exported security event may be, which is why the ceiling is a minute
+         * rather than the five that the retry backoff allows. A SOC's detection latency is the thing
+         * being spent here.
+         */
+        batchWindowSeconds: z.preprocess(
+        /*
+         * A stored value BELOW the floor is LEGACY, and is normalised to the default rather than
+         * refused. Measured 2026-09-21 on the dogfood application: 17 of 17 rows carry
+         * `batchWindowSeconds: 0`, and so do wonder-crm's and the platform's.
+         *
+         * They were written by the seed's `delivery: {}` under the PRE-`be001548` schema, whose
+         * default for this field was 0 — back when nothing read it. Re-adding the field in #1379 with
+         * a floor of 1 made every one of those rows unreadable: `transformOutput` re-validates stored
+         * data against the CURRENT schema, so every read of every organization's SIEM export config
+         * threw, which is `loadSiemExportConfig` — the per-organization audit routing lookup.
+         *
+         * **The floor cannot simply be widened to 0, and the reason is in the collector**: "A window
+         * of 0 would make the flush job race the append's own transaction; the window is floored at 1
+         * second by the schema". `.min(1)` is load-bearing, so 0 is not a value this contract may
+         * hold — which is exactly why coercing it is honest rather than lax. It cannot be WRITTEN
+         * either: a create or update carrying 0 still fails the inner schema, because preprocess only
+         * substitutes the value that reaches it and the floor below still judges everything else.
+         *
+         * Neither of the framework's two repair mechanisms can reach these rows, which is why the
+         * normalisation lives here. A seed version bump does not: `AFTER_CREATE` "fires once and
+         * cannot reach backwards", and the lazy backfill is "first access creates the row, never
+         * re-applied". A SQL data migration would cover the three PostgreSQL surfaces and leave every
+         * Mongo-backed application broken.
+         *
+         * Matched on EXACTLY 0, never `< 1`. The first version of this coercion took anything below
+         * the floor, and a probe immediately showed it accepting `-3` as 5 — a coercion that had
+         * quietly become permission, which is the shape this repository forbids under "never present
+         * suppression as repair". A negative, a fraction and anything above the ceiling are still
+         * refused outright; 0 alone is the value the old schema actually wrote.
+         *
+         * The residual, stated rather than hidden: read and write share this schema, so an operator
+         * who TYPES 0 gets 5 instead of a validation error. That is the cost of the trade, and it is
+         * the right way round against every read of every organization's export config throwing.
+         *
+         * Mapped to `undefined` rather than to a literal so `.default(5)` stays the single source of
+         * the value. Removable once no deployment can hold a pre-#1379 row.
+         */
+        (value) => (value === 0 ? undefined : value), z.number().int().min(1).max(60).default(5)).describe("How long, in seconds, a partly filled batch waits before it is sent anyway. Used only when `batchSize` is above 1."),
+        retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3).describe("How many times a failed delivery is retried."),
+        retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30).describe("The base delay before a retry, in seconds. Retries back off exponentially from it."),
+        timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10).describe("How long one delivery request may take, in seconds."),
     }),
     customHeaders: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),
-    includeRawEventData: z.boolean().default(true),
-    includeDeviceContext: z.boolean().default(true),
+    /**
+     * What this destination may RECEIVE — the per-destination half of the audit-export projection
+     * (#1380). The vocabulary, the floor and the resolution live in
+     * `compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas`; this field is only where a
+     * tenant declares its own narrowing.
+     *
+     * **`.optional()` on purpose, and the absent case is FULL disclosure.** Two destinations on one
+     * tenant can hold different agreements, so the declaration belongs here rather than on the
+     * application — but every row that exists today has none, and reading an absent declaration as
+     * "disclose nothing" would silently strip live feeds down to the floor. An operator narrows
+     * deliberately; the framework does not narrow on their behalf. See `FULL_AUDIT_EXPORT_PROJECTION`
+     * for why that fail-OPEN is right in this one place.
+     *
+     * This is NOT the revival of `includeRawEventData` / `includeDeviceContext` below. Those were two
+     * booleans beside the retry policy that nothing read; this resolves against a contract that is
+     * total over the envelope AND total over the event vocabulary, is applied once at the ENQUEUE
+     * SEAM — before the event is signed and queued, so all four wire formats carry it identically and
+     * no producer can reach the queue around it — and cannot trim the floor.
+     */
+    exportProjection: SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema.optional(),
+    /*
+     * `includeRawEventData` and `includeDeviceContext` were REMOVED here, and neither was ever read.
+     *
+     * Both defaulted `true`, both rendered as switches on the SIEM pane with a description underneath,
+     * and the complete set of mentions was: this declaration, the display and edit templates, the
+     * specification, the customer documentation, the i18n labels — and FOUR test files, where each
+     * appears as a field of a config FIXTURE rather than as a behaviour under assertion. The envelope
+     * builders in `compliance/audit-trails` contain no `includeRaw`, no `rawEvent` and no
+     * `deviceContext` at all: what an exported event carries is decided by the projection contract,
+     * the same shape for every sink.
+     *
+     * They are worth naming apart from the other dead switches on these panes, because these two had
+     * `booleanUI({ showDescription: true })` — so an operator got a switch, a label AND a sentence
+     * explaining what it did, for a flag that did nothing. Being the best-presented control on the
+     * page is not evidence of being one.
+     *
+     * Removing them is not a loss of the capability they named. Choosing what an export carries is a
+     * real feature with a design — a projection the application declares — and it would be built on
+     * the envelope contract, not on two booleans beside the retry policy.
+     *
+     * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.
+     */
     createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
     updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),
 });

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/siem/siem-export-config.shared.schemas.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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Only the\n * ORGANIZATION variant drives delivery today: the sole SIEM producer\n * (`AuditEventDispatcherBackendService`) fans out per authenticated tenant (org) and reads\n * this config via `loadSiemExportConfig(ec, ORGANIZATION, orgId)`. An app super-admin CAN\n * create/enable `APPLICATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG` (it has its own custom-impl +\n * APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN roles), but NO producer emits app-scoped deliveries, so an enabled\n * app config silently delivers nothing. The APP variant is RESERVED / DORMANT until an\n * app-scoped producer is built — see `AuditEventDispatcherBackendService.\n * dispatchToOrganizationAuditSinks` for the rationale + the wiring it would need. (When\n * that producer lands, or if this trap is hardened sooner, the app config surface should\n * be gated/hidden until delivery actually works.)\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2D\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../../requests/header-keys.shared';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const SIEMAuthMethod = {\n  BEARER_TOKEN: 'bearer_token',\n  API_KEY_HEADER: 'api_key_header',\n  HMAC_SHA256: 'hmac_sha256',\n  NONE: 'none',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The wire formats a tenant's SIEM export can request.\n *\n * `OCSF` is the JSON-native security schema the category has standardised on (ITU ratification track\n * to June 2026), and it is a PEER of the two text formats rather than a replacement: CEF and LEEF stay\n * for tenants whose SIEM wants them. The difference that matters is representational — a\n * security-audit envelope maps onto an OCSF CLASS natively, where CEF can only force it into a\n * `csN` custom-string slot.\n */\nexport const SIEMEventFormat = {\n  JSON_STRUCTURED: 'json_structured',\n  CEF: 'cef',\n  LEEF: 'leef',\n  OCSF: 'ocsf',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMEventCategory = {\n  AUTHENTICATION: 'authentication',\n  AUTHORIZATION: 'authorization',\n  USER_LIFECYCLE: 'user_lifecycle',\n  ORG_MANAGEMENT: 'org_management',\n  DATA_ACCESS: 'data_access',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMFilterSeverity = {\n  INFO: 'info',\n  WARNING: 'warning',\n  CRITICAL: 'critical',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SiemExportConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  // Destination for exported audit events. The empty string is the DISABLED /\n  // not-yet-configured state (paired with `enabled: false`) and is the default\n  // for a freshly-seeded config — so the union MUST admit `''`. A bare\n  // `z.url().default('')` is self-contradictory: `z.url()` rejects `''`, so the\n  // default value fails output re-validation and every unconfigured row 500s on\n  // READ (`transformOutput`). Accept a real URL OR the empty sentinel.\n  webhookUrl: z.url().or(z.literal('')).default(''),\n\n  authMethod: z.enum(SIEMAuthMethod).default(SIEMAuthMethod.NONE),\n  /**\n   * User-provided secret used to authenticate outbound webhook deliveries to the\n   * customer's SIEM endpoint (bearer token, API-key value, etc.).\n   *\n   * `.isWriteOnlySecret()` gives this the framework's write-then-masked-secret\n   * contract: it stays in the CREATE/UPDATE request DTO (the operator supplies\n   * and rotates it) and in the response DTO (so the UI renders a masked\n   * placeholder), but the framework redacts it to `••••••••` at the client\n   * boundary and treats a round-tripped `••••••••` on write as \"keep the existing\n   * secret\". The real value is retained for backend internal reads only — the\n   * webhook dispatcher reads it via `readAsSystem` to sign deliveries. Do NOT use\n   * `.isBackendOnly()` here: that strips the field from every client DTO, dropping\n   * the operator's typed value before it is stored and leaving the presets a field\n   * they cannot resolve.\n   */\n  authCredential: z.string().optional().isWriteOnlySecret(),\n  authHeaderName: z.string().default(WildoHeaderKeys.API_KEY),\n\n  eventFormat: z.enum(SIEMEventFormat).default(SIEMEventFormat.JSON_STRUCTURED),\n\n  eventFilter: z.object({\n    categories: z.array(z.enum(SIEMEventCategory)).default([\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE,\n      SIEMEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT,\n      SIEMEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS,\n    ]),\n    severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO),\n    specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  }),\n\n  delivery: z.object({\n    batchSize: z.number().min(1).max(100).default(1),\n    batchWindowSeconds: z.number().min(0).max(60).default(0),\n    retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3),\n    retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30),\n    timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10),\n  }),\n\n  customHeaders: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n  includeRawEventData: z.boolean().default(true),\n  includeDeviceContext: z.boolean().default(true),\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SiemExportConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SiemExportConfigBaseSchema>;\n\nexport const siemExportConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'siemExportConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'siemExportConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SiemExportConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}
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Only the\n * ORGANIZATION variant drives delivery today: the sole SIEM producer\n * (`AuditEventDispatcherBackendService`) fans out per authenticated tenant (org) and reads\n * this config via `loadSiemExportConfig(ec, ORGANIZATION, orgId)`. An app super-admin CAN\n * create/enable `APPLICATION_SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG` (it has its own custom-impl +\n * APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN roles), but NO producer emits app-scoped deliveries, so an enabled\n * app config silently delivers nothing. The APP variant is RESERVED / DORMANT until an\n * app-scoped producer is built — see `AuditEventDispatcherBackendService.\n * dispatchToOrganizationAuditSinks` for the rationale + the wiring it would need. (When\n * that producer lands, or if this trap is hardened sooner, the app config surface should\n * be gated/hidden until delivery actually works.)\n *\n * @see auth-data-model-audit.md §2D\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema } from '../../../compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas';\nimport { WildoHeaderKeys } from '../../../requests/header-keys.shared';\nimport { AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS } from '../authentication.shared.schemas';\nimport { declarePolymorphicSchemas } from '../../../resources/utils/resource-polymorphism.schemas';\n\nexport const SIEMAuthMethod = {\n  BEARER_TOKEN: 'bearer_token',\n  API_KEY_HEADER: 'api_key_header',\n  HMAC_SHA256: 'hmac_sha256',\n  NONE: 'none',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * The wire formats a tenant's SIEM export can request.\n *\n * `OCSF` is the JSON-native security schema the category has standardised on (ITU ratification track\n * to June 2026), and it is a PEER of the two text formats rather than a replacement: CEF and LEEF stay\n * for tenants whose SIEM wants them. The difference that matters is representational — a\n * security-audit envelope maps onto an OCSF CLASS natively, where CEF can only force it into a\n * `csN` custom-string slot.\n */\nexport const SIEMEventFormat = {\n  JSON_STRUCTURED: 'json_structured',\n  CEF: 'cef',\n  LEEF: 'leef',\n  OCSF: 'ocsf',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMEventCategory = {\n  AUTHENTICATION: 'authentication',\n  AUTHORIZATION: 'authorization',\n  USER_LIFECYCLE: 'user_lifecycle',\n  ORG_MANAGEMENT: 'org_management',\n  DATA_ACCESS: 'data_access',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SIEMFilterSeverity = {\n  INFO: 'info',\n  WARNING: 'warning',\n  CRITICAL: 'critical',\n} as const;\n\nexport const SiemExportConfigBaseSchema = z.object({\n  _id: z.string().min(1).isPrimaryKey().isSummaryField(),\n\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false).isSummaryField(),\n\n  // Destination for exported audit events. The empty string is the DISABLED /\n  // not-yet-configured state (paired with `enabled: false`) and is the default\n  // for a freshly-seeded config — so the union MUST admit `''`. A bare\n  // `z.url().default('')` is self-contradictory: `z.url()` rejects `''`, so the\n  // default value fails output re-validation and every unconfigured row 500s on\n  // READ (`transformOutput`). Accept a real URL OR the empty sentinel.\n  webhookUrl: z.url().or(z.literal('')).default(''),\n\n  authMethod: z.enum(SIEMAuthMethod).default(SIEMAuthMethod.NONE),\n  /**\n   * User-provided secret used to authenticate outbound webhook deliveries to the\n   * customer's SIEM endpoint (bearer token, API-key value, etc.).\n   *\n   * `.isWriteOnlySecret()` gives this the framework's write-then-masked-secret\n   * contract: it stays in the CREATE/UPDATE request DTO (the operator supplies\n   * and rotates it) and in the response DTO (so the UI renders a masked\n   * placeholder), but the framework redacts it to `••••••••` at the client\n   * boundary and treats a round-tripped `••••••••` on write as \"keep the existing\n   * secret\". The real value is retained for backend internal reads only — the\n   * webhook dispatcher reads it via `readAsSystem` to sign deliveries. Do NOT use\n   * `.isBackendOnly()` here: that strips the field from every client DTO, dropping\n   * the operator's typed value before it is stored and leaving the presets a field\n   * they cannot resolve.\n   */\n  authCredential: z.string().optional().isWriteOnlySecret(),\n  authHeaderName: z.string().default(WildoHeaderKeys.API_KEY),\n\n  eventFormat: z.enum(SIEMEventFormat).default(SIEMEventFormat.JSON_STRUCTURED),\n\n  eventFilter: z.object({\n    categories: z.array(z.enum(SIEMEventCategory)).default([\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHENTICATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.AUTHORIZATION,\n      SIEMEventCategory.USER_LIFECYCLE,\n      SIEMEventCategory.ORG_MANAGEMENT,\n      SIEMEventCategory.DATA_ACCESS,\n    ]).describe(\"The event categories exported to this destination.\"),\n    severityMinimum: z.enum(SIEMFilterSeverity).default(SIEMFilterSeverity.INFO).describe(\"The least severe event exported. Less severe events are not sent.\"),\n    specificEventTypes: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe(\"An optional allow-list of event types, matched exactly: no substring or wildcard matching.\"),\n  }),\n\n  /*\n   * Three knobs, and the two that were removed are the reason to read this.\n   *\n   * `retryAttempts`, `retryBackoffSeconds` and `timeoutSeconds` are honoured — the delivery worker\n   * reads all three (`siem-webhook-delivery.backend.service`, at the retry ceiling, the exponential\n   * backoff and the request deadline).\n   *\n   * `batchSize` and `batchWindowSeconds` are honoured TOO, as of #1379 — but they were not always,\n   * and the history is the reason to read this rather than trivia. They spent months appearing in\n   * the delivery service only as fields of its parameter TYPE: declared, passed, never consulted.\n   * That is the shape which makes an inert knob hardest to see, because it has a \"reader\" that\n   * decides nothing. The worker posted ONE event per HTTP request whatever they said, and the\n   * customer documentation warned an operator not to size a receiver or a billing estimate on\n   * either — a warning being what you write when the control is missing.\n   *\n   * They were deleted in `be001548` rather than kept as a disclosed \"reserved\" knob, on the\n   * principle that a receiver sized on `batchSize: 100` is sized wrong and a documented warning is\n   * not a control. They are back now because the control exists: a durable collector groups pending\n   * events per destination and sends them as one request, so the two numbers decide how many events\n   * a request may carry and how long a partly-filled one waits.\n   *\n   * The pairing that matters: `batchSize: 1` — the DEFAULT — means no batching at all, the window is\n   * never consulted, and the wire is byte-for-byte what it was before any of this existed.\n   */\n  delivery: z.object({\n    /**\n     * The MOST events one HTTP request may carry. `1` — the default — is one request per event,\n     * which is what this destination gets until its operator asks for anything else.\n     *\n     * The number means what it says: the collector claims at most this many pending events for one\n     * request and sends no more, so a receiver sized on `batchSize: 50` receives at most fifty. A\n     * burst larger than this becomes several requests of this size rather than one oversized body.\n     *\n     * Capped at 100 because the body is the sum of its events and collector endpoints commonly\n     * refuse a payload around a megabyte: a hundred CEF lines sits comfortably under that, where a\n     * thousand would not. Raising the cap is a decision about the receiver, not about this engine.\n     *\n     * At `1` the delivery path is byte-for-byte what it was before batching existed — the event is\n     * sent alone, framed as itself, and {@link batchWindowSeconds} is never consulted.\n     */\n    batchSize: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(1).describe(\"The most events one request may carry, up to 100. `1`, the default, sends one request per event.\"),\n    /**\n     * How long a partly-filled batch waits for company before it is sent anyway.\n     *\n     * ONLY consulted when {@link batchSize} is greater than 1 — at the default of 1 there is no\n     * batch to fill, so a lone event is never held. That is the pairing to know: this field cannot\n     * delay anything on a destination that has not opted into batching.\n     *\n     * It bounds how stale an exported security event may be, which is why the ceiling is a minute\n     * rather than the five that the retry backoff allows. A SOC's detection latency is the thing\n     * being spent here.\n     */\n    batchWindowSeconds: z.preprocess(\n      /*\n       * A stored value BELOW the floor is LEGACY, and is normalised to the default rather than\n       * refused. Measured 2026-09-21 on the dogfood application: 17 of 17 rows carry\n       * `batchWindowSeconds: 0`, and so do wonder-crm's and the platform's.\n       *\n       * They were written by the seed's `delivery: {}` under the PRE-`be001548` schema, whose\n       * default for this field was 0 — back when nothing read it. Re-adding the field in #1379 with\n       * a floor of 1 made every one of those rows unreadable: `transformOutput` re-validates stored\n       * data against the CURRENT schema, so every read of every organization's SIEM export config\n       * threw, which is `loadSiemExportConfig` — the per-organization audit routing lookup.\n       *\n       * **The floor cannot simply be widened to 0, and the reason is in the collector**: \"A window\n       * of 0 would make the flush job race the append's own transaction; the window is floored at 1\n       * second by the schema\". `.min(1)` is load-bearing, so 0 is not a value this contract may\n       * hold — which is exactly why coercing it is honest rather than lax. It cannot be WRITTEN\n       * either: a create or update carrying 0 still fails the inner schema, because preprocess only\n       * substitutes the value that reaches it and the floor below still judges everything else.\n       *\n       * Neither of the framework's two repair mechanisms can reach these rows, which is why the\n       * normalisation lives here. A seed version bump does not: `AFTER_CREATE` \"fires once and\n       * cannot reach backwards\", and the lazy backfill is \"first access creates the row, never\n       * re-applied\". A SQL data migration would cover the three PostgreSQL surfaces and leave every\n       * Mongo-backed application broken.\n       *\n       * Matched on EXACTLY 0, never `< 1`. The first version of this coercion took anything below\n       * the floor, and a probe immediately showed it accepting `-3` as 5 — a coercion that had\n       * quietly become permission, which is the shape this repository forbids under \"never present\n       * suppression as repair\". A negative, a fraction and anything above the ceiling are still\n       * refused outright; 0 alone is the value the old schema actually wrote.\n       *\n       * The residual, stated rather than hidden: read and write share this schema, so an operator\n       * who TYPES 0 gets 5 instead of a validation error. That is the cost of the trade, and it is\n       * the right way round against every read of every organization's export config throwing.\n       *\n       * Mapped to `undefined` rather than to a literal so `.default(5)` stays the single source of\n       * the value. Removable once no deployment can hold a pre-#1379 row.\n       */\n      (value) => (value === 0 ? undefined : value),\n      z.number().int().min(1).max(60).default(5),\n    ).describe(\"How long, in seconds, a partly filled batch waits before it is sent anyway. Used only when `batchSize` is above 1.\"),\n    retryAttempts: z.number().min(0).max(5).default(3).describe(\"How many times a failed delivery is retried.\"),\n    retryBackoffSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(300).default(30).describe(\"The base delay before a retry, in seconds. Retries back off exponentially from it.\"),\n    timeoutSeconds: z.number().min(1).max(60).default(10).describe(\"How long one delivery request may take, in seconds.\"),\n  }),\n\n  customHeaders: z.record(z.string(), z.string()).optional(),\n\n  /**\n   * What this destination may RECEIVE — the per-destination half of the audit-export projection\n   * (#1380). The vocabulary, the floor and the resolution live in\n   * `compliance/audit-trails/audit-export-projection.shared.schemas`; this field is only where a\n   * tenant declares its own narrowing.\n   *\n   * **`.optional()` on purpose, and the absent case is FULL disclosure.** Two destinations on one\n   * tenant can hold different agreements, so the declaration belongs here rather than on the\n   * application — but every row that exists today has none, and reading an absent declaration as\n   * \"disclose nothing\" would silently strip live feeds down to the floor. An operator narrows\n   * deliberately; the framework does not narrow on their behalf. See `FULL_AUDIT_EXPORT_PROJECTION`\n   * for why that fail-OPEN is right in this one place.\n   *\n   * This is NOT the revival of `includeRawEventData` / `includeDeviceContext` below. Those were two\n   * booleans beside the retry policy that nothing read; this resolves against a contract that is\n   * total over the envelope AND total over the event vocabulary, is applied once at the ENQUEUE\n   * SEAM — before the event is signed and queued, so all four wire formats carry it identically and\n   * no producer can reach the queue around it — and cannot trim the floor.\n   */\n  exportProjection: SiemExportProjectionDeclarationSchema.optional(),\n\n  /*\n   * `includeRawEventData` and `includeDeviceContext` were REMOVED here, and neither was ever read.\n   *\n   * Both defaulted `true`, both rendered as switches on the SIEM pane with a description underneath,\n   * and the complete set of mentions was: this declaration, the display and edit templates, the\n   * specification, the customer documentation, the i18n labels — and FOUR test files, where each\n   * appears as a field of a config FIXTURE rather than as a behaviour under assertion. The envelope\n   * builders in `compliance/audit-trails` contain no `includeRaw`, no `rawEvent` and no\n   * `deviceContext` at all: what an exported event carries is decided by the projection contract,\n   * the same shape for every sink.\n   *\n   * They are worth naming apart from the other dead switches on these panes, because these two had\n   * `booleanUI({ showDescription: true })` — so an operator got a switch, a label AND a sentence\n   * explaining what it did, for a flag that did nothing. Being the best-presented control on the\n   * page is not evidence of being one.\n   *\n   * Removing them is not a loss of the capability they named. Choosing what an export carries is a\n   * real feature with a design — a projection the application declares — and it would be built on\n   * the envelope contract, not on two booleans beside the retry policy.\n   *\n   * Absence is pinned in `authentication-knobs-have-readers.test.ts`.\n   */\n\n  createdAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n  updatedAt: z.date().default(() => new Date()).excludeFromCreate().excludeFromUpdate(),\n});\n\nexport type SiemExportConfigBase = z.infer<typeof SiemExportConfigBaseSchema>;\n\nexport const siemExportConfigPolymorphicDeclaration = declarePolymorphicSchemas({\n  baseResourceType: 'siemExportConfig',\n  baseFieldIdentifier: 'siemExportConfigId',\n  baseEnumKey: 'SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG',\n  baseSchema: SiemExportConfigBaseSchema,\n  variants: AUTH_SCOPE_VARIANTS,\n});\n"]}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  */
 import { z } from 'zod';
 import { CoreResourceOperation } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.core.definitions';
+import { ResourceOperationVariantType } from '../../../resources/resources.shared.schemas';
 export declare enum SsoConfig_Operations {
     CLAIM_DOMAIN = "claimDomain",
     VERIFY_DOMAIN = "verifyDomain",
@@ -66,5 +67,30 @@ export declare const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto: z.ZodObject<{
 export type SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto>;
 export type SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto>;
 export type SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponse = z.infer<typeof SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto>;
+/**
+ * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and
+ * by the `socialCredentialOverrides` secret-preservation custom-impl registered on that write.
+ *
+ * A custom implementation is keyed by `(resource, operation, variantType)`, so the two restating the
+ * value by hand is the drift this removes: the dispatch silently stops finding the PREFIX, and every
+ * save wipes the per-override `clientSecret` and signedJwt ids. Same shape, and the same reason, as
+ * `SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` (#953).
+ *
+ * `UPDATE` is `API_CALL`: the administrator's edit door. It was `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — which
+ * made an SSO policy something only a backend service could change, and the comment there said only
+ * that no public surface had been BUILT, never that one would be wrong. Three public PUTs already
+ * mutate this row (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain`, #424) under the same roles, and
+ * SIEM export config — a scope-level security record holding sealed credentials — has carried this
+ * door since #953. Field-level protection is variant-agnostic: `.isWriteOnlySecret()` and
+ * `.isBackendOnly()` hold identically on either path.
+ *
+ * The route-less state was not merely a missing feature. `pickInlineFieldWriteOperation`'s pins record
+ * what it cost: with no addressable literal `update`, the frontend's update resolution fell through to
+ * whatever custom verb borrowed UPDATE semantics, so every writable field on the SSO settings pane
+ * rendered as a live control bound to `claimDomain`.
+ */
+export declare const SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE: Readonly<{
+    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL;
+}>;
 export declare const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories: Record<string, import("../../..").ResourceConfiguration_InitializationFactory<typeof SsoConfig_Operations, CoreResourceOperation.READ | CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE | CoreResourceOperation.DELETE | CoreResourceOperation.CREATE | CoreResourceOperation.LIST, any>>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAoB,MAAM,sDAAsD,CAAC;AAsB/G,oBAAY,oBAAoB;IAC9B,YAAY,gBAAgB;IAC5B,aAAa,iBAAiB;IAC9B,aAAa,iBAAiB;CAC/B;AAkCD,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;;iBAE1C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;IAG3C,2EAA2E;;IAE3E,qDAAqD;;kBAErD,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;;;;;;;;IAI5C;;;;OAIG;;kBAEH,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;IAE5C,iFAAiF;;kBAEjF,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAI/F,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,wQAsPzC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../../src/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACxB,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAoB,MAAM,sDAAsD,CAAC;AAC/G,OAAO,EAEL,4BAA4B,EAC7B,MAAM,6CAA6C,CAAC;AAkBrD,oBAAY,oBAAoB;IAC9B,YAAY,gBAAgB;IAC5B,aAAa,iBAAiB;IAC9B,aAAa,iBAAiB;CAC/B;AAmCD,eAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;;iBAE1C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;iBAE3C,CAAC;AAEH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC;;;;;;;;IAG3C,2EAA2E;;IAE3E,qDAAqD;;kBAErD,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;;;;;;;;IAI5C;;;;OAIG;;kBAEH,CAAC;AAEH,eAAO,MAAM,iCAAiC;;IAE5C,iFAAiF;;kBAEjF,CAAC;AAEH,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/F,MAAM,MAAM,8BAA8B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC;AAE/F;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;IAGnD,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CACvE,CAEA,CAAC;AAIF,eAAO,MAAM,6BAA6B,wQA0PzC,CAAC"}

package/dist/esm/security/authentications/sso/sso-config.shared.resources-config.schemas.js

@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ const SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN = /^(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1,63}(?<!-)(\.(?!-)[A-Za-z0-9-]{1
 const SsoConfig_DomainSelector = z.string()
     .min(4)
     .max(253)
-    .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. "customer.com".');
+    .regex(SSO_DOMAIN_PATTERN, 'Provide a DNS hostname with at least two labels, e.g. "customer.com".')
+    .describe("The email domain, as a DNS hostname with at least two labels, such as `customer.com`.");
 /*
  * ── `z.object`, NOT `z.strictObject` — and that is a CONTRACT, not a relaxation ────────────────
  *
@@ -77,29 +78,54 @@ export const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainRequestDto = z.object({
  * SCIM token mint uses for its one-time plaintext.
  */
 export const SsoConfig_ClaimDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
-    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain that was claimed."),
+    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe("The domain's verification status after the claim: `pending` until the DNS record is checked."),
     /** The DNS name the TXT record goes on: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`. */
-    dnsName: z.string(),
+    dnsName: z.string().describe("Where to publish the TXT record: `_wildo-verification.<domain>`."),
     /** The exact TXT value to publish. Revealed once. */
-    dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral(),
+    dnsRecordValue: z.string().isEphemeral().describe("The exact TXT value to publish, returned only in this response. Claiming the domain again issues a new value and invalidates this one."),
 });
 export const SsoConfig_VerifyDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
-    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus),
-    dnsName: z.string(),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain that was checked."),
+    status: z.enum(DomainVerificationStatus).describe("The result of this check: `verified` when a TXT record at `dnsName` matched the claim's value, otherwise `failed`."),
+    dnsName: z.string().describe("The DNS name that was queried for the TXT record."),
     /**
      * Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check is diagnosable without a second tool.
      * These are public DNS records of a domain the caller is claiming to own — echoing them discloses
      * nothing the caller could not resolve themselves.
      */
-    dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()),
+    dnsRecordsFound: z.array(z.string()).describe("Every TXT record found at `dnsName`, so a failed check can be diagnosed."),
 });
 export const SsoConfig_RevokeDomainResponseDto = z.strictObject({
-    domain: z.string(),
+    domain: z.string().describe("The domain whose claim was removed."),
     /** True once the domain holds no claim, no status and no nonce in this scope. */
-    revoked: z.boolean(),
+    revoked: z.boolean().describe("`true` once the domain holds no claim, verification status or pending value in this scope."),
 });
+/**
+ * The variant type the SSO-config UPDATE runs on — the one named source read by this configuration and
+ * by the `socialCredentialOverrides` secret-preservation custom-impl registered on that write.
+ *
+ * A custom implementation is keyed by `(resource, operation, variantType)`, so the two restating the
+ * value by hand is the drift this removes: the dispatch silently stops finding the PREFIX, and every
+ * save wipes the per-override `clientSecret` and signedJwt ids. Same shape, and the same reason, as
+ * `SIEM_EXPORT_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` (#953).
+ *
+ * `UPDATE` is `API_CALL`: the administrator's edit door. It was `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — which
+ * made an SSO policy something only a backend service could change, and the comment there said only
+ * that no public surface had been BUILT, never that one would be wrong. Three public PUTs already
+ * mutate this row (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain`, #424) under the same roles, and
+ * SIEM export config — a scope-level security record holding sealed credentials — has carried this
+ * door since #953. Field-level protection is variant-agnostic: `.isWriteOnlySecret()` and
+ * `.isBackendOnly()` hold identically on either path.
+ *
+ * The route-less state was not merely a missing feature. `pickInlineFieldWriteOperation`'s pins record
+ * what it cost: with no addressable literal `update`, the frontend's update resolution fell through to
+ * whatever custom verb borrowed UPDATE semantics, so every writable field on the SSO settings pane
+ * rendered as a live control bound to `claimDomain`.
+ */
+export const SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE = {
+    [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
+};
 // ── Polymorphic Factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurations(ssoConfigPolymorphicDeclaration, {
     isSystemResource: true,
@@ -136,7 +162,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.LOW,
@@ -197,34 +223,38 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.MEDIUM,
                 }],
         },
-        // Internal-only (INTERNAL_CALL, NO HTTP route): admin policy edits reach this
-        // through the config service path — `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`
-        // dispatches the write via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's EC,
-        // preserving admin audit attribution. The comment here used to say the path was
-        // "correct-but-dormant" because `DomainVerificationBackendService` had no public operation
-        // wired to it, and warned against "simplifying" the variant on the theory that nothing calls
-        // it. That warning was right and is now moot: the domain workflow it was holding the door
-        // open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below), and
-        // `initiateDomainVerification` / `verifyDomainOwnership` still reach this INTERNAL_CALL path
-        // for callers that hold no operation.
+        // The administrator's edit door, and the only write path for this policy row. Two kinds of
+        // caller reach it and both resolve the SAME default: an admin editing the settings pane, over
+        // the HTTP route this variant now carries; and a backend caller holding no operation —
+        // `AuthOrganizationConfigurationService.saveSSOConfig`, `initiateDomainVerification`,
+        // `verifyDomainOwnership` — dispatching via `ServicesRegistryHandler.update` with the ADMIN's
+        // EC, preserving admin audit attribution. `getServiceOperationPathDefault` honours API_CALL
+        // exactly as it honoured INTERNAL_CALL, so nothing on the service path changes.
+        //
+        // It WAS `INTERNAL_CALL` — route-less — and the comment here recorded only that no public
+        // surface had been built, never an argument that one would be wrong. See
+        // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE` for why it moved, and for what the missing route cost the
+        // settings pane. An earlier note warned against "simplifying" the variant on the theory that
+        // nothing called it; that warning was right and is moot — the domain workflow it was holding
+        // the door open for exists (`claimDomain` / `verifyDomain` / `revokeDomain` below).
         // Must NOT be REPOSITORY_ONLY: `.update()` resolves the op via
         // `getServiceOperationPathDefault`, which honours INTERNAL_CALL / API_CALL but NOT
         // REPOSITORY_ONLY — a repository-only UPDATE throws
         // `RESOURCES_REGISTRY_OPERATION_PATH_NOT_FOUND` (INTERNAL / critical) on any admin
         // domain edit (and, post lazy-create fix, `loadSSOConfig` always materialises a row,
-        // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). No public HTTP update surface
-        // (future supported edits flow through this internal service path). The
-        // `socialCredentialOverrides` write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl
-        // (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) is keyed on this variant and MOVES IN LOCKSTEP —
-        // the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, so a REPOSITORY_ONLY drift on
-        // either side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save.
+        // so `saveSSOConfig` reliably hits THIS update branch). The variant type is read from
+        // `SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE`, which the `socialCredentialOverrides`
+        // write-only-secret-preservation custom-impl (`createSsoConfigUpdateFactories`) reads too, so
+        // they move together — the custom-impl dispatch key encodes variantType, and a drift on either
+        // side silently drops the PREFIX and wipes per-override secrets on every save. Hard-code a
+        // variant type here instead and that lockstep is a comment again.
         // Same fix as the CREATE above + the SCIM-tokens READ/UPDATE. Admin tier / HIGH.
         [CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE]: {
             variants: [{
-                    variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.INTERNAL_CALL,
+                    variantType: SSO_CONFIG_WRITE_VARIANT_TYPE[CoreResourceOperation.UPDATE],
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     riskLevel: ResourceOperationRiskLevel.HIGH,
@@ -296,7 +326,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // HIGH, not CRITICAL: a claim grants NOTHING. It records `pending` and mints a nonce, and
@@ -312,7 +342,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // CRITICAL: this is the transition that hands a tenant SSO routing control over EVERY
@@ -329,7 +359,7 @@ export const ssoConfigPolymorphicFactories = createPolymorphicResourceConfigurat
                     variantType: ResourceOperationVariantType.API_CALL,
                     isDefault: true,
                     polymorphicRole: {
-                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN],
+                        [CoreResourceType.ORGANIZATIONS]: [CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_ADMIN, CORE_ORG_ROLES.ORG_DELEGATED_MANAGE_SSO_SCIM],
                         [CoreResourceType.APPLICATION]: [CORE_APP_ROLES.APP_ADMIN_SUPER_ADMIN],
                     },
                     // CRITICAL for the same reason as VERIFY, from the other side: revocation is what makes a