@voxgig/sdkgen 4.19.1 → 4.21.0

package/project/.sdk/tm/scala/feature/secrets/sekreto/plugins/Minivault.scala

@@ -0,0 +1,979 @@
+// VENDORED: @voxgig/sekreto sdk-20260917-1242-0 (scala/plugins/Minivault.scala)
+// Source: https://github.com/voxgig/sekreto @ 108c4a914bee7b6534c30d1c68c25cd1b9377696  [tag: sdk-20260917-1242-0]
+// License: MIT (c) voxgig - see repository LICENSE. Do not edit: resync from upstream.
+// The mini vault, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+//
+// A port of typescript/plugins/minivault.ts, which is canonical.
+//
+// PLUGIN CODE, not core: it needs crypto, which is the line the four
+// built-ins stay behind. See docs/design/plugin-providers.md.
+//
+// THE KEY DECIDES WHAT THE VAULT HOLDS. A master key reads and writes
+// every name and mints restricted keys. A restricted key reads the names
+// it was granted and CANNOT DERIVE ANY OTHER - the restriction is the
+// cryptography rather than a check this code performs. What that does and
+// does not protect is set out in DOCS.md under "What the mini vault
+// protects".
+//
+// `javax.crypto` carries all four primitives, so nothing here is
+// hand-rolled (AGENTS.md rule 3).
+
+package com.voxgig.sekreto.plugins
+
+import java.io.IOException
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
+import java.nio.file.FileAlreadyExistsException
+import java.nio.file.Files
+import java.nio.file.NoSuchFileException
+import java.nio.file.Path
+import java.nio.file.Paths
+import java.nio.file.StandardCopyOption
+import java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption
+import java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions
+import java.security.GeneralSecurityException
+import java.security.SecureRandom
+import java.util.Base64
+import javax.crypto.Cipher
+import javax.crypto.Mac
+import javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory
+import javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec
+import javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
+import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
+import scala.collection.immutable.ListMap
+import scala.util.control.NonFatal
+
+import voxgig.plugin.Definition
+import voxgig.plugin.Inst
+import voxgig.plugin.PluginError
+import voxgig.plugin.VOpaque
+import voxgig.plugin.VStr
+import com.voxgig.sekreto.*
+
+// --- the format ------------------------------------------------------
+//
+//   magic       4   'SKMV'
+//   version     1   FORMAT
+//   kdf         1   1 = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
+//   cipher      1   1 = AES-256-GCM
+//   reserved    1   0
+//   keycount    4   uint32
+//   per key:
+//     id        1 + bytes      the key id, PLAINTEXT
+//     salt      1 + bytes
+//     iters     4              PBKDF2 rounds for this key
+//     ring      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the passphrase
+//     meta      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's meta key
+//   entrycount  4   uint32
+//   per entry:
+//     id        1 + bytes      the blinded lookup id
+//     name      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's name key
+//     value     1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under that secret's own key
+//
+// Integers are big-endian, and every length precedes its bytes. A file one
+// port writes is read by every other; `test/fixture` pins that with a
+// committed vault rather than with agreement.
+
+private val MAGIC = "SKMV"
+private val FORMAT = 1
+private val KDF_PBKDF2 = 1
+private val CIPHER_AESGCM = 1
+
+/** AES-256-GCM: 32-byte keys, 12-byte nonces, 16-byte tags. */
+private val KEYLEN = 32
+private val IVLEN = 12
+private val TAGLEN = 16
+private val SALTLEN = 16
+
+/** PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 rounds when a caller names none. */
+val MINIVAULT_ITERATIONS = 210000
+
+/** The key id a vault gets when a caller names none. */
+val MASTERKEY = "master"
+
+// Additional authenticated data. Every blob is bound to its PLACE in the
+// file, so no ciphertext can be moved.
+private val AAD_RING = "skmv1:ring:"
+private val AAD_META = "skmv1:meta:"
+private val AAD_NAME = "skmv1:name"
+private val AAD_SECRET = "skmv1:secret:"
+
+// Everything a master can reach is derived from the root key, so a
+// rotation is one new random value rather than a re-wrap of each part.
+private val LABEL_NAMES = "skmv1:names"
+private val LABEL_META = "skmv1:meta"
+private val LABEL_ID = "skmv1:id"
+
+/** The largest key id the format can record.
+  *
+  * `small` writes a length in ONE byte. A longer id wrapped that byte and
+  * the writer then appended the whole thing, so every field after it
+  * shifted. Checked where an id is ACCEPTED, so the refusal names the id
+  * rather than the file.
+  */
+private val IDMAX = 255
+
+/** The export key the vault API is published under, beside `provider`. */
+val VAULT_EXPORT = "vault"
+
+private val MVRANDOM = SecureRandom()
+
+private def mvfail(text: String): Nothing =
+  throw SekretoError("sekreto: minivault: " + text)
+
+private def mvutf8(text: String): Array[Byte] = text.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)
+
+/** The key a caller asked for, or [[MASTERKEY]]: an EMPTY key is no key.
+  * The canonical's `opts.key || MASTERKEY` answers for both absent and
+  * empty, where `getOrElse` answers for absent alone - and a CLI reaches
+  * this with SEKRETO_VAULT_KEY set and empty, which is what an unset shell
+  * variable expands to.
+  */
+/** The lock every handle on one file shares.
+  *
+  * Each [[MiniVault]] is its own object, so two handles on one path did
+  * not coordinate: both could finish `load` before either saved, and the
+  * second rename then discarded the first one's change while reporting
+  * success. Keyed by the ABSOLUTE path, so two handles spelled
+  * differently still meet.
+  *
+  * A guarantee WITHIN one process, which is what DOCS.md promises and
+  * what the go port arranges the same way. Two processes still race, and
+  * the format's answer to that is the exclusive create and the atomic
+  * rename: a reader sees one whole vault or the other, never half of one.
+  */
+private val MVLOCKS = java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap[String, AnyRef]()
+
+private def mvlockfor(file: String): AnyRef =
+  val key =
+    try Paths.get(file).toAbsolutePath.normalize.toString
+    catch case _: RuntimeException => file
+
+  MVLOCKS.computeIfAbsent(key, _ => Object())
+
+private def mvwantkey(value: String): String =
+  if value.isEmpty then MASTERKEY else value
+
+private def mvcheckid(id: Option[String], what: String): String =
+  val text = id.getOrElse("")
+  if text.isEmpty then mvfail(what)
+  if mvutf8(text).length > IDMAX then
+    mvfail(s"key id is longer than $IDMAX bytes: ${text.take(32)}...")
+  text
+
+// --- keys ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+private def mvhmac(key: Array[Byte], text: String): Array[Byte] =
+  try
+    val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
+    mac.init(SecretKeySpec(key, "HmacSHA256"))
+    mac.doFinal(mvutf8(text))
+  catch case err: GeneralSecurityException => mvfail("hmac: " + err.getMessage)
+
+/** The key-encryption key a passphrase unwraps a ring with. */
+private def mvkek(passphrase: String, salt: Array[Byte], iters: Int): Array[Byte] =
+  try
+    SecretKeyFactory
+      .getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA256")
+      .generateSecret(PBEKeySpec(passphrase.toCharArray, salt, iters, KEYLEN * 8))
+      .getEncoded
+  catch case err: GeneralSecurityException => mvfail("pbkdf2: " + err.getMessage)
+
+/** The key one named secret's value is encrypted with.
+  *
+  * DERIVED, never stored, for a master: it holds the root key and so
+  * reaches every name, including ones written after it was made. A
+  * restricted key holds the derived keys it was granted and nothing that
+  * produces another.
+  */
+private def mvsecretkey(root: Array[Byte], name: String): Array[Byte] =
+  mvhmac(root, AAD_SECRET + name)
+
+/** Where a secret lives in the file, derived from its own key so that
+  * finding it needs no plaintext name.
+  */
+private def mventryid(key: Array[Byte]): Array[Byte] = mvhmac(key, LABEL_ID)
+
+private def mvrandom(len: Int): Array[Byte] =
+  val out = new Array[Byte](len)
+  MVRANDOM.nextBytes(out)
+  out
+
+// --- sealing ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** A nonce and the ciphertext with its tag appended. */
+private final case class Sealed(iv: Array[Byte], blob: Array[Byte]):
+  def same(other: Sealed): Boolean =
+    java.util.Arrays.equals(iv, other.iv) && java.util.Arrays.equals(blob, other.blob)
+
+private def mvseal(key: Array[Byte], plain: Array[Byte], aad: String): Sealed =
+  try
+    val iv = mvrandom(IVLEN)
+    val cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding")
+    cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"), GCMParameterSpec(TAGLEN * 8, iv))
+    cipher.updateAAD(mvutf8(aad))
+    Sealed(iv, cipher.doFinal(plain))
+  catch case err: GeneralSecurityException => mvfail("cannot seal: " + err.getMessage)
+
+/** The plaintext, or a refusal. A GCM tag that fails to verify is the only
+  * evidence there is, and it cannot tell a wrong passphrase from a damaged
+  * file, so `what` names the attempt and the message admits both.
+  */
+private def mvunseal(key: Array[Byte], sealed_ : Sealed, aad: String, what: String): Array[Byte] =
+  if sealed_.blob.length < TAGLEN || IVLEN != sealed_.iv.length then
+    mvfail(what + ": truncated")
+
+  // The WHOLE round-trip is guarded, not only the tag check: a nonce of the
+  // wrong length makes `init` itself raise, and a damaged file reaching a
+  // caller as a raw GeneralSecurityException is a refusal nobody can act
+  // on.
+  try
+    val cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding")
+    cipher.init(
+      Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,
+      SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"),
+      GCMParameterSpec(TAGLEN * 8, sealed_.iv),
+    )
+    cipher.updateAAD(mvutf8(aad))
+    cipher.doFinal(sealed_.blob)
+  catch case NonFatal(_) => mvfail(what)
+
+// THE JSON IS AN ENUM HERE and a plain map everywhere else. This port's
+// `Json` carries `Json.Obj` / `Json.Str` rather than `Any`, so a ring
+// crosses the boundary twice: `mvplain` on the way in, `mvtagged` on the
+// way out. The bytes are the same either way.
+private def mvjsonof(plain: Array[Byte], what: String): Map[String, Any] =
+  Json.parse(String(plain, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)) match
+    case Some(Json.Obj(value)) => value.map((key, one) => (key, mvplain(one))).toMap
+    case _                     => mvfail("unreadable " + what)
+
+private def mvplain(value: Json): Any = value match
+  case Json.Null       => null
+  case Json.Bool(one)  => one
+  case Json.Num(one)   => one
+  case Json.Str(one)   => one
+  case Json.Arr(items) => items.map(mvplain)
+  case Json.Obj(pairs) => pairs.map((key, one) => (key, mvplain(one))).toMap
+
+private def mvtagged(value: Any): Json = value match
+  case null              => Json.Null
+  case one: Boolean      => Json.Bool(one)
+  case one: Int          => Json.Num(one.toDouble)
+  case one: Double       => Json.Num(one)
+  case one: String       => Json.Str(one)
+  case one: List[?]      => Json.Arr(one.map(mvtagged))
+  case one: ListMap[?, ?] =>
+    Json.Obj(ListMap.from(one.map((key, item) => (key.toString, mvtagged(item)))))
+  case one: Map[?, ?] =>
+    Json.Obj(ListMap.from(one.map((key, item) => (key.toString, mvtagged(item)))))
+  case other => mvfail("cannot encode " + other)
+
+private def mvstringify(value: ListMap[String, Any]): String = Json.stringify(mvtagged(value))
+
+private def mvb64(bytes: Array[Byte]): String = Base64.getEncoder.encodeToString(bytes)
+
+private def mvunb64(text: Any, what: String): Array[Byte] = text match
+  case one: String =>
+    try Base64.getDecoder.decode(one)
+    catch case _: IllegalArgumentException => mvfail("missing " + what)
+  case _ => mvfail("missing " + what)
+
+// --- the file --------------------------------------------------------
+
+private final case class KeyRecord(
+    id: String,
+    salt: Array[Byte],
+    iters: Int,
+    ring: Sealed,
+    meta: Sealed,
+)
+
+private final case class EntryRecord(id: Array[Byte], name: Sealed, value: Sealed)
+
+private final case class VaultFile(keys: List[KeyRecord], entries: List[EntryRecord])
+
+/** A cursor, so that every length check is in one place: a truncated vault
+  * is refused rather than read as a short one.
+  */
+private final class MvReader(bytes: Array[Byte]):
+  private var at = 0
+
+  def take(len: Int): Array[Byte] =
+    if len < 0 || bytes.length < at + len then mvfail("the vault file is truncated")
+    val out = bytes.slice(at, at + len)
+    at += len
+    out
+
+  def u8: Int = take(1)(0) & 0xff
+
+  def u32: Int =
+    // A length over Int.MaxValue cannot address an array, and reading it as
+    // a negative int is what turned a damaged file into a crash instead of
+    // a refusal.
+    val value = ByteBuffer.wrap(take(4)).getInt.toLong & 0xffffffffL
+    if value > Int.MaxValue then mvfail("the vault file is truncated")
+    value.toInt
+
+  def small: Array[Byte] = take(u8)
+  def large: Array[Byte] = take(u32)
+  def magic: String = String(take(4), StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1)
+  def sealedvalue: Sealed = Sealed(small, large)
+  def done: Boolean = at == bytes.length
+
+private def mvreadfile(bytes: Array[Byte]): VaultFile =
+  val read = MvReader(bytes)
+
+  if MAGIC != read.magic then mvfail("not a vault file")
+
+  val version = read.u8
+  if FORMAT != version then mvfail(s"unsupported format version: $version")
+
+  val kdf = read.u8
+  val cipher = read.u8
+  if KDF_PBKDF2 != kdf || CIPHER_AESGCM != cipher then
+    mvfail(s"unsupported kdf or cipher: $kdf/$cipher")
+  read.u8
+
+  val keys = List.fill(read.u32):
+    KeyRecord(
+      String(read.small, StandardCharsets.UTF_8),
+      read.small,
+      read.u32,
+      read.sealedvalue,
+      read.sealedvalue,
+    )
+
+  val entries = List.fill(read.u32):
+    EntryRecord(read.small, read.sealedvalue, read.sealedvalue)
+
+  if !read.done then mvfail("the vault file has trailing bytes")
+
+  VaultFile(keys, entries)
+
+/** Unsigned, byte by byte, the way every other port sorts. */
+private def mvcompare(left: Array[Byte], right: Array[Byte]): Int =
+  var index = 0
+  var out = 0
+
+  while out == 0 && index < math.min(left.length, right.length) do
+    val one = left(index) & 0xff
+    val two = right(index) & 0xff
+    if one != two then out = if one < two then -1 else 1
+    index += 1
+
+  if out != 0 then out else left.length.compare(right.length)
+
+private def mvwritefile(vault: VaultFile): Array[Byte] =
+  val out = java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream()
+
+  def raw(bytes: Array[Byte]): Unit = out.write(bytes)
+  def u8(value: Int): Unit = out.write(value & 0xff)
+  def u32(value: Int): Unit = raw(ByteBuffer.allocate(4).putInt(value).array)
+  def small(bytes: Array[Byte]): Unit = { u8(bytes.length); raw(bytes) }
+  def large(bytes: Array[Byte]): Unit = { u32(bytes.length); raw(bytes) }
+  def sealedvalue(value: Sealed): Unit = { small(value.iv); large(value.blob) }
+
+  raw(MAGIC.getBytes(StandardCharsets.ISO_8859_1))
+  u8(FORMAT)
+  u8(KDF_PBKDF2)
+  u8(CIPHER_AESGCM)
+  u8(0)
+
+  u32(vault.keys.length)
+  for key <- vault.keys do
+    small(mvutf8(key.id))
+    small(key.salt)
+    u32(key.iters)
+    sealedvalue(key.ring)
+    sealedvalue(key.meta)
+
+  // SORTED BY ID, which is a blinded value: the file therefore records
+  // nothing about the order secrets were written in.
+  val entries = vault.entries.sortWith((left, right) => mvcompare(left.id, right.id) < 0)
+
+  u32(entries.length)
+  for entry <- entries do
+    small(entry.id)
+    sealedvalue(entry.name)
+    sealedvalue(entry.value)
+
+  out.toByteArray
+
+// --- what a key is ---------------------------------------------------
+
+/** What a key may do. `grants` is empty for a master key.
+  *
+  * A case class of `val` fields over an immutable list, so what a caller is
+  * handed cannot become what the vault believes: `info.write = true` does
+  * not compile.
+  */
+final case class VaultKeyInfo(
+    key: String,
+    master: Boolean,
+    write: Boolean,
+    grants: List[String],
+):
+  def show: String = s"$key/$master/$write/${grants.mkString("[", ", ", "]")}"
+
+/** What a caller asks for when minting a restricted key. */
+final case class GrantSpec(
+    key: String,
+    passphrase: String,
+    names: List[String] = Nil,
+    write: Boolean = false,
+    iterations: Option[Int] = None,
+)
+
+/** How a vault handle is configured. */
+final case class VaultOptions(
+    file: String,
+    passphrase: String,
+    key: String = MASTERKEY,
+    iterations: Int = MINIVAULT_ITERATIONS,
+    create: Boolean = false,
+)
+
+private final case class Opened(
+    info: VaultKeyInfo,
+    root: Option[Array[Byte]],
+    grants: Map[String, Array[Byte]],
+    ring: Sealed,
+)
+
+// --- creating --------------------------------------------------------
+
+private def mvnewvault(keyid: String, passphrase: String, iterations: Int): VaultFile =
+  val root = mvrandom(KEYLEN)
+  val salt = mvrandom(SALTLEN)
+
+  val ring = ListMap[String, Any]("v" -> FORMAT, "write" -> true, "root" -> mvb64(root))
+  val meta =
+    ListMap[String, Any]("v" -> FORMAT, "master" -> true, "write" -> true, "grants" -> List())
+
+  VaultFile(
+    List(
+      KeyRecord(
+        keyid,
+        salt,
+        iterations,
+        mvseal(mvkek(passphrase, salt, iterations), mvutf8(mvstringify(ring)), AAD_RING + keyid),
+        mvseal(mvhmac(root, LABEL_META), mvutf8(mvstringify(meta)), AAD_META + keyid),
+      ),
+    ),
+    Nil,
+  )
+
+private def mvowneronly(path: Path): Unit =
+  try Files.setPosixFilePermissions(path, PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rw-------"))
+  catch
+    // A filesystem with no POSIX permissions is not a reason to refuse a
+    // write that otherwise succeeded.
+    case _: IOException                   => ()
+    case _: UnsupportedOperationException  => ()
+
+/** Write a vault file that is not there yet, and REFUSE one that is.
+  *
+  * Straight to the target with CREATE_NEW rather than through a temporary
+  * and a rename. A rename REPLACES its destination, so two processes
+  * creating the same vault both succeeded and the second discarded the
+  * first one's secrets.
+  */
+private def mvputnew(file: String, vault: VaultFile): Unit =
+  val path = Path.of(file)
+  try
+    Files.write(path, mvwritefile(vault), StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW, StandardOpenOption.WRITE)
+    mvowneronly(path)
+  catch
+    case _: FileAlreadyExistsException => mvfail("vault file already exists: " + file)
+    case err: IOException              => mvfail(s"cannot write $file: ${err.getMessage}")
+
+/** A handle on one vault file, opened as ONE key.
+  *
+  * Every method answers as that key: `list` shows the names it may read,
+  * `get` answers for those and misses on the rest, and the master-only
+  * methods refuse for any other key. Nothing is read or derived until the
+  * first call that needs the file.
+  */
+final class MiniVault private[plugins] (options: VaultOptions):
+
+  if options.file.isEmpty then mvfail("a vault needs a file")
+  if options.passphrase.isEmpty then mvfail("a vault needs a passphrase")
+
+  private val thefile = options.file
+  private val thekey = mvcheckid(Some(mvwantkey(options.key)), "a vault needs a key id")
+  private val thephrase = options.passphrase
+  private val theiters = options.iterations
+  private val thecreate = options.create
+
+  private var opened: Option[Opened] = None
+
+  /** The file this handle reads. */
+  def file: String = thefile
+
+  /** The key id this handle opens with. */
+  def key: String = thekey
+
+  /** Derive the key and read the file NOW rather than at first use. */
+  def open: VaultKeyInfo = load._2.info
+
+  /** Forget the derived keys. The next call opens again. */
+  def close(): Unit = opened = None
+
+  /** The names this key can read, sorted. */
+  def list: List[String] =
+    val (vault, state) = load
+
+    state.root match
+      case Some(root) =>
+        val namekey = mvhmac(root, LABEL_NAMES)
+        vault.entries
+          .map(entry =>
+            String(
+              mvunseal(namekey, entry.name, AAD_NAME, "a secret name is damaged"),
+              StandardCharsets.UTF_8,
+            ),
+          )
+          .sorted
+
+      // A restricted key has no name key, so it reports the grants it can
+      // actually find: the vault never tells it what else is in there.
+      case None =>
+        state.info.grants.filter(name => findentry(vault, state.grants.get(name)).isDefined).sorted
+
+  def has(name: String): Boolean = get(name).isDefined
+
+  /** The value, or None when the vault does not hold that name or this key
+    * was not granted it.
+    */
+  def get(name: String): Option[String] =
+    checkname(name)
+    val (vault, state) = load
+
+    // OUTSIDE THE GRANT IS A MISS, deliberately. The vault answers as the
+    // key that opened it, so a name this key cannot read is a name this
+    // store does not hold for this caller.
+    keyfor(state, name).flatMap: key =>
+      findentry(vault, Some(key)).map: entry =>
+        String(
+          mvunseal(key, entry.value, AAD_SECRET + name, s"the value of $name is damaged"),
+          StandardCharsets.UTF_8,
+        )
+
+  /** Write a value. A master writes any name; a restricted key holding
+    * `write` overwrites the names it was granted, and creates none.
+    */
+  def set(name: String, value: String): Unit =
+    // Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    // serializes here; see mvlockfor.
+    mvlockfor(file).synchronized:
+      checkname(name)
+      val (vault, state) = load
+
+      if !state.info.write then mvfail(s"key ${state.info.key} is read-only")
+
+      val key = keyfor(state, name).getOrElse(
+        mvfail(s"key ${state.info.key} was not granted $name"),
+      )
+
+      val sealedvalue = mvseal(key, mvutf8(value), AAD_SECRET + name)
+      val id = mventryid(key)
+
+      val entries =
+        if vault.entries.exists(entry => java.util.Arrays.equals(entry.id, id)) then
+          vault.entries.map: entry =>
+            if java.util.Arrays.equals(entry.id, id) then entry.copy(value = sealedvalue) else entry
+        else
+          // A NEW NAME NEEDS THE NAME KEY, which only a master holds. So a
+          // restricted key with `write` updates what it was granted and cannot
+          // grow the vault.
+          val root = rootof(state, s"creating the secret $name")
+          vault.entries :+ EntryRecord(
+            id,
+            mvseal(mvhmac(root, LABEL_NAMES), mvutf8(name), AAD_NAME),
+            sealedvalue,
+          )
+
+      save(vault.copy(entries = entries))
+
+  /** Drop a name. Master only. */
+  def remove(name: String): Unit =
+    // Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    // serializes here; see mvlockfor.
+    mvlockfor(file).synchronized:
+      checkname(name)
+      val (vault, state) = load
+      val root = rootof(state, "removing a secret")
+
+      val wanted = mventryid(mvsecretkey(root, name))
+      if !vault.entries.exists(entry => java.util.Arrays.equals(entry.id, wanted)) then
+        mvfail(s"no such secret: $name")
+
+      save(
+        vault.copy(entries =
+          vault.entries.filterNot(entry => java.util.Arrays.equals(entry.id, wanted)),
+        ),
+      )
+
+  /** Every key in the file, with what it may do. Master only. */
+  def keys: List[VaultKeyInfo] =
+    val (vault, state) = load
+    rootof(state, "listing the keys")
+
+    vault.keys.map: record =>
+      metaof(state, record) match
+        case None => VaultKeyInfo(record.id, false, false, Nil)
+        case Some(meta) =>
+          val grants = meta.get("grants") match
+            case Some(items: List[?]) => items.map(_.toString).sorted
+            case _                    => Nil
+          VaultKeyInfo(
+            record.id,
+            meta.get("master").contains(true),
+            meta.get("write").contains(true),
+            grants,
+          )
+
+  /** Mint a restricted key. Master only. */
+  def grant(spec: GrantSpec): Unit =
+    // Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    // serializes here; see mvlockfor.
+    mvlockfor(file).synchronized:
+      val (vault, state) = load
+      val root = rootof(state, "granting a key")
+
+      val id = mvcheckid(Some(spec.key), "a grant needs a key id")
+      if spec.passphrase.isEmpty then mvfail("a grant needs a passphrase")
+      if vault.keys.exists(_.id == id) then mvfail(s"key already exists: $id")
+
+      val names = spec.names.sorted
+
+      // A ListMap built from the sorted names, for a ring whose JSON is the
+      // same text on every run. It is NOT an interop requirement - the ring
+      // is sealed under a fresh nonce, so its ciphertext differs per write
+      // whatever the key order is.
+      val grants = ListMap.from(names.map: name =>
+        checkname(name)
+        (name, mvb64(mvsecretkey(root, name))))
+
+      val record = sealkey(
+        root,
+        id,
+        spec.passphrase,
+        spec.iterations.getOrElse(theiters),
+        ListMap[String, Any]("v" -> FORMAT, "write" -> spec.write, "grants" -> grants),
+        ListMap[String, Any](
+          "v" -> FORMAT,
+          "master" -> false,
+          "write" -> spec.write,
+          "grants" -> names,
+        ),
+      )
+
+      save(vault.copy(keys = vault.keys :+ record))
+
+  /** Drop a key. Master only.
+    *
+    * Anyone who already copied the file keeps whatever that key could read,
+    * so revoking bars future reads of the LIVE file and `rotate` is what
+    * takes a secret back.
+    */
+  def revoke(key: String): Unit =
+    // Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    // serializes here; see mvlockfor.
+    mvlockfor(file).synchronized:
+      val (vault, state) = load
+      rootof(state, "revoking a key")
+
+      if key == state.info.key then mvfail(s"a key cannot revoke itself: $key")
+      if !vault.keys.exists(_.id == key) then mvfail(s"no such key: $key")
+
+      save(vault.copy(keys = vault.keys.filterNot(_.id == key)))
+
+  /** A new root key, every value re-encrypted under it, and EVERY OTHER KEY
+    * DROPPED. Master only.
+    *
+    * The other keys go because they must: their rings are sealed under
+    * passphrases this process does not have. Re-grant afterwards.
+    */
+  def rotate(): Unit =
+    // Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    // serializes here; see mvlockfor.
+    mvlockfor(file).synchronized:
+      val (vault, state) = load
+      rootof(state, "rotating the vault")
+
+      // Read everything out under the old root before anything changes: once
+      // the root is replaced the old derived keys are unreachable.
+      val plain = list.map(name => (name, get(name).getOrElse("")))
+
+      val root = mvrandom(KEYLEN)
+      val namekey = mvhmac(root, LABEL_NAMES)
+
+      val entries = plain.map: (name, value) =>
+        val key = mvsecretkey(root, name)
+        EntryRecord(
+          mventryid(key),
+          mvseal(namekey, mvutf8(name), AAD_NAME),
+          mvseal(key, mvutf8(value), AAD_SECRET + name),
+        )
+
+      val iters = vault.keys.find(_.id == thekey).map(_.iters).getOrElse(theiters)
+
+      val record = sealkey(
+        root,
+        thekey,
+        thephrase,
+        iters,
+        ListMap[String, Any]("v" -> FORMAT, "write" -> true, "root" -> mvb64(root)),
+        ListMap[String, Any]("v" -> FORMAT, "master" -> true, "write" -> true, "grants" -> List()),
+      )
+
+      // SAVE FIRST, adopt second. A handle holding the new root over a file
+      // that still holds the old one reads nothing and says the vault is
+      // damaged.
+      write(VaultFile(List(record), entries))
+
+      opened = Some(
+        Opened(VaultKeyInfo(thekey, true, true, Nil), Some(root), Map.empty, record.ring),
+      )
+
+  // --- the inside ----------------------------------------------------
+
+  private def bytes: Array[Byte] =
+    try Files.readAllBytes(Path.of(thefile))
+    catch
+      case _: NoSuchFileException =>
+        // A vault is configured deliberately, with a key. Its absence is a
+        // broken deployment and never "no secrets here": answering a miss
+        // would send the chain on to a weaker store.
+        if !thecreate then mvfail(s"no vault file: $thefile")
+        mvputnew(thefile, mvnewvault(thekey, thephrase, theiters))
+        try Files.readAllBytes(Path.of(thefile))
+        catch case err: IOException => mvfail(s"cannot read $thefile: ${err.getMessage}")
+      case err: IOException => mvfail(s"cannot read $thefile: ${err.getMessage}")
+
+  private def load: (VaultFile, Opened) =
+    val vault = mvreadfile(bytes)
+
+    val record = vault.keys.find(_.id == thekey).getOrElse:
+      // REVOKED, or never there. Either way this handle is finished, and
+      // dropping what it derived is what stops the next call answering from
+      // memory.
+      opened = None
+      mvfail(s"no such key: $thekey")
+
+    // The file still holds this key, and holds the SAME ring: a key revoked
+    // and re-granted under another passphrase is a different key wearing
+    // the id, and re-deriving is what refuses it.
+    opened match
+      case Some(held) if held.ring.same(record.ring) => (vault, held)
+      case _ =>
+        opened = None
+
+        val plain = mvunseal(
+          mvkek(thephrase, record.salt, record.iters),
+          record.ring,
+          AAD_RING + thekey,
+          s"wrong passphrase for key $thekey, or a damaged vault",
+        )
+
+        val ring = mvjsonof(plain, s"key ring for $thekey")
+
+        val grants = ring.get("grants") match
+          case Some(pairs: Map[?, ?]) =>
+            pairs.map((name, one) => (name.toString, mvunb64(one, "a granted key"))).toMap
+          case _ => Map.empty[String, Array[Byte]]
+
+        val root = ring.get("root")
+
+        val next = Opened(
+          VaultKeyInfo(
+            thekey,
+            root.isDefined,
+            root.isDefined || ring.get("write").contains(true),
+            grants.keys.toList.sorted,
+          ),
+          root.map(one => mvunb64(one, "the root key")),
+          grants,
+          record.ring,
+        )
+
+        opened = Some(next)
+        (vault, next)
+
+  private def rootof(state: Opened, what: String): Array[Byte] =
+    state.root.getOrElse(
+      mvfail(s"$what needs a master key, and ${state.info.key} is restricted"),
+    )
+
+  /** The key for one name, or None when this key cannot reach it. */
+  private def keyfor(state: Opened, name: String): Option[Array[Byte]] =
+    state.root match
+      case Some(root) => Some(mvsecretkey(root, name))
+      case None       => state.grants.get(name)
+
+  private def findentry(vault: VaultFile, key: Option[Array[Byte]]): Option[EntryRecord] =
+    key.flatMap: one =>
+      val id = mventryid(one)
+      vault.entries.find(entry => java.util.Arrays.equals(entry.id, id))
+
+  private def metaof(state: Opened, record: KeyRecord): Option[Map[String, Any]] =
+    val root = rootof(state, "reading key metadata")
+    val what = s"metadata for key ${record.id}"
+
+    try
+      Some(
+        mvjsonof(
+          mvunseal(mvhmac(root, LABEL_META), record.meta, AAD_META + record.id, what),
+          what,
+        ),
+      )
+    catch
+      // A record written under a root key this one has replaced. The key is
+      // still in the file and still opens with its own passphrase, so it is
+      // reported rather than hidden - with what it can do unknown.
+      case _: SekretoError => None
+
+  private def sealkey(
+      root: Array[Byte],
+      id: String,
+      phrase: String,
+      iters: Int,
+      ring: ListMap[String, Any],
+      meta: ListMap[String, Any],
+  ): KeyRecord =
+    val salt = mvrandom(SALTLEN)
+    KeyRecord(
+      id,
+      salt,
+      iters,
+      mvseal(mvkek(phrase, salt, iters), mvutf8(mvstringify(ring)), AAD_RING + id),
+      mvseal(mvhmac(root, LABEL_META), mvutf8(mvstringify(meta)), AAD_META + id),
+    )
+
+  private def save(vault: VaultFile): Unit = write(vault)
+
+  /** Read, change, and REPLACE - never edit in place.
+    *
+    * THE TEMPORARY IS RANDOM AND EXCLUSIVE. `<vault>.<pid>.tmp` is a name
+    * anyone can predict, so anyone who can write the vault's directory
+    * could put a symlink there and have the next save truncate whatever it
+    * pointed at.
+    */
+  private def write(vault: VaultFile): Unit =
+    val suffix = mvrandom(8).map(one => f"${one & 0xff}%02x").mkString
+    val temp = Path.of(s"$thefile.$suffix.tmp")
+
+    try
+      Files.write(temp, mvwritefile(vault), StandardOpenOption.CREATE_NEW,
+        StandardOpenOption.WRITE)
+      mvowneronly(temp)
+      Files.move(temp, Path.of(thefile), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING)
+    catch
+      case err: IOException =>
+        try Files.deleteIfExists(temp)
+        catch
+          // The vault is unchanged either way, and the write error is what
+          // the caller needs to be told about.
+          case _: IOException => ()
+        mvfail(s"cannot write $thefile: ${err.getMessage}")
+
+/** Open a vault file as one key.
+  *
+  * The handle is lazy. Nothing is read, and no passphrase is stretched,
+  * until a method needs the file.
+  */
+def openvault(options: VaultOptions): MiniVault = MiniVault(options)
+
+/** Make a vault file and return a handle on its master key.
+  *
+  * Refuses a file that is already there: a vault is created once, and
+  * overwriting one discards every secret in it.
+  */
+def createvault(options: VaultOptions): MiniVault =
+  if options.file.isEmpty then mvfail("a vault needs a file")
+  if options.passphrase.isEmpty then mvfail("a vault needs a passphrase")
+  val keyid = mvcheckid(Some(mvwantkey(options.key)), "a vault needs a key id")
+
+  // No existence check first: the check and the write would be two steps,
+  // and `mvputnew` refuses an existing file in ONE.
+  mvputnew(options.file, mvnewvault(keyid, options.passphrase, options.iterations))
+
+  MiniVault(options)
+
+// --- the provider ----------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Read a vault as one store in a chain.
+  *
+  * The provider is the READ half and nothing more: a chain resolves
+  * secrets, and writing one is a deliberate act with an API of its own.
+  */
+private final class MiniVaultProvider(vault: MiniVault) extends Provider:
+  def lookup(name: String): Option[String] = vault.get(name)
+  def describe(): String = "minivault:" + vault.file
+
+def providerof(vault: MiniVault): Provider = MiniVaultProvider(vault)
+
+/** A vault provider from options, for a chain built by hand. */
+def minivaultprovider(options: VaultOptions): Provider = providerof(openvault(options))
+
+/** The `minivault` provider kind, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+  *
+  * Written out rather than built by `providerplugin`, because this
+  * definition publishes TWO exports: `provider`, the read half every kind
+  * publishes, and `vault`, the programmatic API.
+  */
+val minivault: Definition =
+  val define: Inst => Unit = inst =>
+    val spec = specof(inst.options)
+
+    val vault =
+      try
+        // `openvault` refuses bad configuration HERE, so a mistyped chain
+        // fails at construction. Reaching the FILE is not configuration:
+        // the handle is lazy.
+        openvault(
+          VaultOptions(
+            file = spec.file.getOrElse(""),
+            passphrase = spec.passphrase.getOrElse(""),
+            key = mvwantkey(spec.vaultkey.getOrElse("")),
+            iterations = spec.iterations.getOrElse(MINIVAULT_ITERATIONS),
+            create = spec.create.contains(true),
+          ),
+        )
+      catch
+        case err: SekretoError =>
+          val text = Option(err.getMessage).getOrElse("")
+          throw PluginError(ERROR_CODE, text, Map("ref" -> VStr(inst.ref), "cause" -> VStr(text)))
+
+    inst.`export`(PROVIDER_EXPORT, VOpaque(providerof(vault)))
+    inst.`export`(VAULT_EXPORT, VOpaque(vault))
+
+  voxgig.plugin.Definition(name = "minivault", define = Some(define))
+
+/** The vault behind a store in a chain, as its programmatic API.
+  *
+  * With no store named, the unqualified alias answers: one vault in the
+  * chain resolves whatever it is called, and two raise rather than picking
+  * one.
+  */
+def vaultof(secrets: Sekreto, store: Option[String] = None): MiniVault =
+  store match
+    case None =>
+      secrets.host.exports("minivault/" + VAULT_EXPORT) match
+        case VOpaque(vault: MiniVault) => vault
+        case _                         => mvfail("no minivault store in this chain")
+
+    case Some(name) =>
+      // A NAMED STORE MUST EXIST, and the alias must not stand in for it.
+      // `host.exports` falls back to the alias when the exact ref misses,
+      // so asking for `minivault` in a chain whose only vault is named
+      // `app` used to hand back the `app` vault - and then write to it.
+      val eref = if "minivault" == name then "minivault" else "minivault$" + name
+
+      if secrets.host.instance(VStr(eref)).isEmpty then
+        mvfail(s"no minivault store named $name in this chain")
+
+      secrets.host.exports(eref + "/" + VAULT_EXPORT) match
+        case VOpaque(vault: MiniVault) => vault
+        case _ => mvfail(s"no minivault store named $name in this chain")