@voxgig/sdkgen 4.19.1 → 4.21.0

package/project/.sdk/tm/elixir/lib/projectname/feature/secrets/sekreto/plugins/minivault.ex

@@ -0,0 +1,1033 @@
+# VENDORED: @voxgig/sekreto sdk-20260917-1242-0 (elixir/plugins/minivault.ex)
+# Source: https://github.com/voxgig/sekreto @ 108c4a914bee7b6534c30d1c68c25cd1b9377696  [tag: sdk-20260917-1242-0]
+# License: MIT (c) voxgig - see repository LICENSE. Do not edit: resync from upstream.
+# The mini vault, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+#
+# A port of typescript/plugins/minivault.ts, which is canonical.
+#
+# A PLUGIN, not a built-in: it needs crypto, which is the line the four
+# built-ins stay behind. See docs/design/plugin-providers.md.
+#
+# THE KEY DECIDES WHAT THE VAULT HOLDS. A master key reads and writes
+# every name and mints restricted keys. A restricted key reads the names
+# it was granted and CANNOT DERIVE ANY OTHER - the restriction is the
+# cryptography rather than a check this code performs. What that does and
+# does not protect is set out in DOCS.md under "What the mini vault
+# protects".
+#
+# Erlang's `:crypto` carries all four primitives, so nothing here is
+# hand-rolled (AGENTS.md rule 3).
+
+defmodule Sekreto.Plugins.Minivault do
+  @moduledoc """
+  A mini vault: every secret a project owns, encrypted, in ONE FILE.
+
+  The format:
+
+      magic       4   'SKMV'
+      version     1   FORMAT
+      kdf         1   1 = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
+      cipher      1   1 = AES-256-GCM
+      reserved    1   0
+      keycount    4   uint32
+      per key:
+        id        1 + bytes      the key id, PLAINTEXT
+        salt      1 + bytes
+        iters     4              PBKDF2 rounds for this key
+        ring      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the passphrase
+        meta      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's meta key
+      entrycount  4   uint32
+      per entry:
+        id        1 + bytes      the blinded lookup id
+        name      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's name key
+        value     1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under that secret's own key
+
+  Integers are big-endian, and every length precedes its bytes. A file one
+  port writes is read by every other; `test/fixture` pins that with a
+  committed vault rather than with agreement.
+
+  THE HANDLE IS A PROCESS. Every other port keeps the derived keys in a
+  closure or a field and mutates them; a vault handle here is an Agent,
+  because a handle that caches what it derived and a handle that notices a
+  revoked key are the same handle, and elixir has no other way to be both.
+  """
+
+  alias Sekreto.Error
+  alias Sekreto.Json
+  alias Sekreto.Providers
+  alias Sekreto.ProviderSpec
+  alias Voxgig.Plugin.Types
+  alias Voxgig.Plugin.Host
+  alias Voxgig.Plugin.Inst
+
+  @magic "SKMV"
+  @format 1
+  @kdf_pbkdf2 1
+  @cipher_aesgcm 1
+
+  # AES-256-GCM: 32-byte keys, 12-byte nonces, 16-byte tags.
+  @keylen 32
+  @ivlen 12
+  @taglen 16
+  @saltlen 16
+
+  @doc "PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 rounds when a caller names none."
+  def iterations, do: 210_000
+
+  @doc "The key id a vault gets when a caller names none."
+  def masterkey, do: "master"
+
+  # Additional authenticated data. Every blob is bound to its PLACE in the
+  # file, so no ciphertext can be moved.
+  @aad_ring "skmv1:ring:"
+  @aad_meta "skmv1:meta:"
+  @aad_name "skmv1:name"
+  @aad_secret "skmv1:secret:"
+
+  # Everything a master can reach is derived from the root key, so a
+  # rotation is one new random value rather than a re-wrap of each part.
+  @label_names "skmv1:names"
+  @label_meta "skmv1:meta"
+  @label_id "skmv1:id"
+
+  # The largest key id the format can record.
+  #
+  # `small` writes a length in ONE byte. A longer id wrapped that byte and
+  # the writer then appended the whole thing, so every field after it
+  # shifted. Checked where an id is ACCEPTED, so the refusal names the id
+  # rather than the file.
+  @idmax 255
+
+  @doc "The export key the vault API is published under, beside `provider`."
+  def vault_export, do: "vault"
+
+  defp fail(text) do
+    raise Error, message: "sekreto: minivault: " <> text
+  end
+
+  # THE LOCK EVERY HANDLE ON ONE FILE SHARES.
+  #
+  # Each handle is its own map, so two of them on one path did not
+  # coordinate: both could finish `load` before either saved, and the
+  # second rename then discarded the first one's change while reporting
+  # success. Keyed by the ABSOLUTE path, so two handles spelled
+  # differently still meet.
+  #
+  # `:global.trans/2` rather than a mutex, because the BEAM has no shared
+  # memory to put one in: processes are the unit here, and this is OTP's
+  # own per-key lock over them. Given `[node()]` it is a lock within one
+  # node, which is what DOCS.md promises and what the go port arranges
+  # with a mutex. Two OS processes still race, and the format's answer to
+  # that is the exclusive create and the atomic rename: a reader sees one
+  # whole vault or the other, never half of one.
+  #
+  # It is RE-ENTRANT per process, so a mutating call that ever reached
+  # another would wait rather than deadlock; none of them does.
+  defp locked(file, body) do
+    key =
+      case File.cwd() do
+        {:ok, _} -> Path.expand(file)
+        _ -> file
+      end
+
+    :global.trans({{:sekreto_minivault, key}, self()}, body, [node()])
+  end
+
+  # The key a caller asked for, or `masterkey()`: an EMPTY key is no key.
+  # The canonical's `opts.key || MASTERKEY` answers for both nil and
+  # empty, where elixir's `||` answers for nil alone - `""` is truthy
+  # here. A CLI reaches this with SEKRETO_VAULT_KEY set and empty, which
+  # is what an unset shell variable expands to.
+  defp wantkey(nil), do: masterkey()
+  defp wantkey(""), do: masterkey()
+  defp wantkey(value), do: value
+
+  defp checkid(id, _what) when is_binary(id) and id != "" do
+    if byte_size(id) > @idmax do
+      fail("key id is longer than #{@idmax} bytes: #{String.slice(id, 0, 32)}...")
+    end
+
+    id
+  end
+
+  defp checkid(_id, what), do: fail(what)
+
+  # --- keys ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  defp hmac(key, text), do: :crypto.mac(:hmac, :sha256, key, text)
+
+  # The key-encryption key a passphrase unwraps a ring with.
+  defp kek(passphrase, salt, iters) do
+    :crypto.pbkdf2_hmac(:sha256, passphrase, salt, iters, @keylen)
+  end
+
+  # The key one named secret's value is encrypted with.
+  #
+  # DERIVED, never stored, for a master: it holds the root key and so
+  # reaches every name, including ones written after it was made. A
+  # restricted key holds the derived keys it was granted and nothing that
+  # produces another.
+  defp secretkey(root, name), do: hmac(root, @aad_secret <> name)
+
+  # Where a secret lives in the file, derived from its own key so that
+  # finding it needs no plaintext name.
+  defp entryid(key), do: hmac(key, @label_id)
+
+  defp random(len), do: :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(len)
+
+  # --- sealing ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+  defp seal(key, plain, aad) do
+    iv = random(@ivlen)
+
+    {body, tag} =
+      :crypto.crypto_one_time_aead(:aes_256_gcm, key, iv, plain, aad, @taglen, true)
+
+    %{"iv" => iv, "blob" => body <> tag}
+  end
+
+  # The plaintext, or a refusal. A GCM tag that fails to verify is the only
+  # evidence there is, and it cannot tell a wrong passphrase from a damaged
+  # file, so `what` names the attempt and the message admits both.
+  defp unseal(key, sealed, aad, what) do
+    blob = sealed["blob"]
+    iv = sealed["iv"]
+
+    if byte_size(blob) < @taglen or byte_size(iv) != @ivlen do
+      fail(what <> ": truncated")
+    end
+
+    bodylen = byte_size(blob) - @taglen
+    <<body::binary-size(bodylen), tag::binary>> = blob
+
+    # `crypto_one_time_aead` ANSWERS :error rather than raising when the
+    # tag does not verify, and raises on a nonce of the wrong length. Both
+    # are the same refusal to a caller.
+    try do
+      case :crypto.crypto_one_time_aead(:aes_256_gcm, key, iv, body, aad, tag, false) do
+        :error -> fail(what)
+        plain when is_binary(plain) -> plain
+      end
+    rescue
+      err in Error -> reraise err, __STACKTRACE__
+      _ -> fail(what)
+    end
+  end
+
+  # THE JSON IS TAGGED HERE and plain everywhere else. This port's Json
+  # carries `{:obj, pairs}` / `{:str, text}` rather than a bare map, so a
+  # ring crosses the boundary twice: `plainof` on the way in, `tagged` on
+  # the way out. The bytes are the same either way - the tag is this
+  # port's representation, not the format's.
+  defp jsonof(plain, what) do
+    case Json.parse(plain) do
+      {:ok, {:obj, pairs}} -> plainof({:obj, pairs})
+      _ -> fail("unreadable " <> what)
+    end
+  end
+
+  defp plainof({:obj, pairs}), do: Map.new(pairs, fn {key, value} -> {key, plainof(value)} end)
+  defp plainof({:arr, entries}), do: Enum.map(entries, &plainof/1)
+  defp plainof({:str, text}), do: text
+  defp plainof({:num, value}), do: value
+  defp plainof({:bool, value}), do: value
+  defp plainof(:null), do: nil
+  defp plainof(:none), do: nil
+
+  defp tagged(value) when is_map(value) do
+    {:obj, Enum.map(value, fn {key, one} -> {key, tagged(one)} end)}
+  end
+
+  defp tagged(value) when is_list(value), do: {:arr, Enum.map(value, &tagged/1)}
+  defp tagged(value) when is_binary(value), do: {:str, value}
+  defp tagged(value) when is_boolean(value), do: {:bool, value}
+  defp tagged(value) when is_number(value), do: {:num, value}
+  defp tagged(nil), do: :null
+
+  defp stringify(value), do: Json.stringify(tagged(value))
+
+  defp b64(bytes), do: Base.encode64(bytes)
+
+  defp unb64(text, what) when is_binary(text) do
+    case Base.decode64(text) do
+      {:ok, bytes} -> bytes
+      :error -> fail("missing " <> what)
+    end
+  end
+
+  defp unb64(_text, what), do: fail("missing " <> what)
+
+  # --- the file --------------------------------------------------------
+
+  # A cursor, so that every length check is in one place: a truncated vault
+  # is refused rather than read as a short one.
+  defp take(bytes, len) when byte_size(bytes) >= len do
+    <<out::binary-size(len), rest::binary>> = bytes
+    {out, rest}
+  end
+
+  defp take(_bytes, _len), do: fail("the vault file is truncated")
+
+  defp u8(bytes) do
+    {one, rest} = take(bytes, 1)
+    <<value>> = one
+    {value, rest}
+  end
+
+  defp u32(bytes) do
+    {four, rest} = take(bytes, 4)
+    <<value::unsigned-big-integer-size(32)>> = four
+    {value, rest}
+  end
+
+  defp small(bytes) do
+    {len, rest} = u8(bytes)
+    take(rest, len)
+  end
+
+  defp large(bytes) do
+    {len, rest} = u32(bytes)
+    take(rest, len)
+  end
+
+  defp sealed(bytes) do
+    {iv, rest} = small(bytes)
+    {blob, rest} = large(rest)
+    {%{"iv" => iv, "blob" => blob}, rest}
+  end
+
+  defp readfile(bytes) do
+    {magic, rest} = take(bytes, 4)
+    if magic != @magic, do: fail("not a vault file")
+
+    {version, rest} = u8(rest)
+    if version != @format, do: fail("unsupported format version: #{version}")
+
+    {kdf, rest} = u8(rest)
+    {cipher, rest} = u8(rest)
+
+    if kdf != @kdf_pbkdf2 or cipher != @cipher_aesgcm do
+      fail("unsupported kdf or cipher: #{kdf}/#{cipher}")
+    end
+
+    {_reserved, rest} = u8(rest)
+
+    {keycount, rest} = u32(rest)
+    {keys, rest} = readkeys(rest, keycount, [])
+
+    {entrycount, rest} = u32(rest)
+    {entries, rest} = readentries(rest, entrycount, [])
+
+    if rest != "", do: fail("the vault file has trailing bytes")
+
+    %{"keys" => keys, "entries" => entries}
+  end
+
+  defp readkeys(bytes, 0, out), do: {Enum.reverse(out), bytes}
+
+  defp readkeys(bytes, left, out) do
+    {id, rest} = small(bytes)
+    {salt, rest} = small(rest)
+    {iters, rest} = u32(rest)
+    {ring, rest} = sealed(rest)
+    {meta, rest} = sealed(rest)
+
+    readkeys(rest, left - 1, [
+      %{"id" => id, "salt" => salt, "iters" => iters, "ring" => ring, "meta" => meta} | out
+    ])
+  end
+
+  defp readentries(bytes, 0, out), do: {Enum.reverse(out), bytes}
+
+  defp readentries(bytes, left, out) do
+    {id, rest} = small(bytes)
+    {name, rest} = sealed(rest)
+    {value, rest} = sealed(rest)
+
+    readentries(rest, left - 1, [
+      %{"id" => id, "name" => name, "value" => value} | out
+    ])
+  end
+
+  defp putsmall(bytes), do: <<byte_size(bytes)::unsigned-big-integer-size(8)>> <> bytes
+  defp putlarge(bytes), do: <<byte_size(bytes)::unsigned-big-integer-size(32)>> <> bytes
+  defp putsealed(value), do: putsmall(value["iv"]) <> putlarge(value["blob"])
+  defp putu32(value), do: <<value::unsigned-big-integer-size(32)>>
+
+  defp writefile(vault) do
+    head =
+      @magic <>
+        <<@format::8, @kdf_pbkdf2::8, @cipher_aesgcm::8, 0::8>> <>
+        putu32(length(vault["keys"]))
+
+    keys =
+      Enum.map_join(vault["keys"], "", fn key ->
+        putsmall(key["id"]) <>
+          putsmall(key["salt"]) <>
+          putu32(key["iters"]) <>
+          putsealed(key["ring"]) <> putsealed(key["meta"])
+      end)
+
+    # SORTED BY ID, which is a blinded value: the file therefore records
+    # nothing about the order secrets were written in.
+    entries = Enum.sort_by(vault["entries"], & &1["id"], :asc)
+
+    body =
+      Enum.map_join(entries, "", fn entry ->
+        putsmall(entry["id"]) <> putsealed(entry["name"]) <> putsealed(entry["value"])
+      end)
+
+    head <> keys <> putu32(length(entries)) <> body
+  end
+
+  # --- creating --------------------------------------------------------
+
+  # A new vault: one master key, no secrets.
+  defp newvault(keyid, passphrase, iters) do
+    root = random(@keylen)
+    salt = random(@saltlen)
+
+    ring = %{"v" => @format, "write" => true, "root" => b64(root)}
+    meta = %{"v" => @format, "master" => true, "write" => true, "grants" => []}
+
+    %{
+      "keys" => [
+        %{
+          "id" => keyid,
+          "salt" => salt,
+          "iters" => iters,
+          "ring" =>
+            seal(kek(passphrase, salt, iters), stringify(ring), @aad_ring <> keyid),
+          "meta" => seal(hmac(root, @label_meta), stringify(meta), @aad_meta <> keyid)
+        }
+      ],
+      "entries" => []
+    }
+  end
+
+  # Write a vault file that is not there yet, and REFUSE one that is.
+  #
+  # `:exclusive` is O_CREAT|O_EXCL, rather than a temporary and a rename.
+  # A rename REPLACES its destination, so two processes creating the same
+  # vault both succeeded and the second discarded the first one's secrets.
+  defp putnew(file, vault) do
+    case File.open(file, [:write, :binary, :exclusive]) do
+      {:ok, handle} ->
+        IO.binwrite(handle, writefile(vault))
+        File.close(handle)
+        File.chmod(file, 0o600)
+        :ok
+
+      {:error, :eexist} ->
+        fail("vault file already exists: " <> file)
+
+      {:error, why} ->
+        fail("cannot write " <> file <> ": " <> to_string(:file.format_error(why)))
+    end
+  end
+
+  # --- the handle ------------------------------------------------------
+
+  @doc """
+  Open a vault file as one key.
+
+  The handle is lazy. Nothing is read, and no passphrase is stretched,
+  until a call needs the file.
+  """
+  def openvault(options) do
+    opts = options || %{}
+    file = opts["file"]
+    passphrase = opts["passphrase"]
+
+    if not is_binary(file) or file == "", do: fail("a vault needs a file")
+    if not is_binary(passphrase) or passphrase == "", do: fail("a vault needs a passphrase")
+
+    keyid = checkid(wantkey(opts["key"]), "a vault needs a key id")
+
+    {:ok, agent} = Agent.start_link(fn -> nil end)
+
+    %{
+      file: file,
+      key: keyid,
+      passphrase: passphrase,
+      iterations: opts["iterations"] || iterations(),
+      create: opts["create"] == true,
+      agent: agent
+    }
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  Make a vault file and return a handle on its master key.
+
+  Refuses a file that is already there: a vault is created once, and
+  overwriting one discards every secret in it.
+  """
+  def createvault(options) do
+    opts = options || %{}
+    file = opts["file"]
+    passphrase = opts["passphrase"]
+
+    if not is_binary(file) or file == "", do: fail("a vault needs a file")
+    if not is_binary(passphrase) or passphrase == "", do: fail("a vault needs a passphrase")
+
+    keyid = checkid(wantkey(opts["key"]), "a vault needs a key id")
+
+    # No existence check first: the check and the write would be two
+    # steps, and `putnew` refuses an existing file in ONE.
+    putnew(file, newvault(keyid, passphrase, opts["iterations"] || iterations()))
+
+    openvault(opts)
+  end
+
+  @doc "The file this handle reads."
+  def file(vault), do: vault.file
+
+  @doc "The key id this handle opens with."
+  def key(vault), do: vault.key
+
+  @doc """
+  Derive the key and read the file NOW rather than at first use.
+
+  A COPY, so that what a caller is handed cannot become what this vault
+  believes: `open(v) |> Map.put("write", true)` changes a map nobody reads.
+  """
+  def open(vault) do
+    {_file, opened} = load(vault)
+
+    %{
+      "key" => opened["info"]["key"],
+      "master" => opened["info"]["master"],
+      "write" => opened["info"]["write"],
+      "grants" => opened["info"]["grants"]
+    }
+  end
+
+  @doc "Forget the derived keys. The next call opens again."
+  def close(vault) do
+    Agent.update(vault.agent, fn _ -> nil end)
+    :ok
+  end
+
+  @doc "The names this key can read, sorted."
+  def list(vault) do
+    {file, opened} = load(vault)
+
+    if opened["root"] do
+      namekey = hmac(opened["root"], @label_names)
+
+      file["entries"]
+      |> Enum.map(&unseal(namekey, &1["name"], @aad_name, "a secret name is damaged"))
+      |> Enum.sort()
+    else
+      # A restricted key has no name key, so it reports the grants it can
+      # actually find: the vault never tells it what else is in there.
+      opened["info"]["grants"]
+      |> Enum.filter(&(nil != findentry(file, opened["grants"][&1])))
+      |> Enum.sort()
+    end
+  end
+
+  @doc "Does this key hold a value for `name`?"
+  def has?(vault, name), do: nil != get(vault, name)
+
+  @doc """
+  The value, or nil when the vault does not hold that name or this key was
+  not granted it.
+  """
+  def get(vault, name) do
+    Sekreto.checkname(name)
+    {file, opened} = load(vault)
+
+    case keyfor(opened, name) do
+      # OUTSIDE THE GRANT IS A MISS, deliberately. The vault answers as the
+      # key that opened it, so a name this key cannot read is a name this
+      # store does not hold for this caller.
+      nil ->
+        nil
+
+      key ->
+        case findentry(file, key) do
+          nil ->
+            nil
+
+          entry ->
+            unseal(key, entry["value"], @aad_secret <> name,
+              "the value of " <> name <> " is damaged")
+        end
+    end
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  Write a value. A master writes any name; a restricted key holding
+  `write` overwrites the names it was granted, and creates none.
+  """
+  def set(vault, name, value) do
+    # Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    # serializes here; see locked.
+    locked(vault.file, fn ->
+        Sekreto.checkname(name)
+        if not is_binary(value), do: fail("a secret value must be text: " <> name)
+
+        {file, opened} = load(vault)
+
+        if not opened["info"]["write"] do
+          fail("key " <> opened["info"]["key"] <> " is read-only")
+        end
+
+        key = keyfor(opened, name)
+
+        if nil == key do
+          fail("key " <> opened["info"]["key"] <> " was not granted " <> name)
+        end
+
+        sealedvalue = seal(key, value, @aad_secret <> name)
+        id = entryid(key)
+
+        entries =
+          if Enum.any?(file["entries"], &(&1["id"] == id)) do
+            Enum.map(file["entries"], fn entry ->
+              if entry["id"] == id, do: Map.put(entry, "value", sealedvalue), else: entry
+            end)
+          else
+            # A NEW NAME NEEDS THE NAME KEY, which only a master holds. So a
+            # restricted key with `write` updates what it was granted and
+            # cannot grow the vault.
+            root = rootof(opened, "creating the secret " <> name)
+
+            file["entries"] ++
+              [
+                %{
+                  "id" => id,
+                  "name" => seal(hmac(root, @label_names), name, @aad_name),
+                  "value" => sealedvalue
+                }
+              ]
+          end
+
+        save(vault, Map.put(file, "entries", entries))
+    end)
+  end
+
+  @doc "Drop a name. Master only."
+  def remove(vault, name) do
+    # Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    # serializes here; see locked.
+    locked(vault.file, fn ->
+        Sekreto.checkname(name)
+        {file, opened} = load(vault)
+        root = rootof(opened, "removing a secret")
+
+        wanted = entryid(secretkey(root, name))
+
+        if not Enum.any?(file["entries"], &(&1["id"] == wanted)) do
+          fail("no such secret: " <> name)
+        end
+
+        save(vault, Map.put(file, "entries", Enum.reject(file["entries"], &(&1["id"] == wanted))))
+    end)
+  end
+
+  @doc "Every key in the file, with what it may do. Master only."
+  def keys(vault) do
+    {file, opened} = load(vault)
+    rootof(opened, "listing the keys")
+
+    Enum.map(file["keys"], fn record ->
+      case metaof(opened, record) do
+        nil ->
+          %{"key" => record["id"], "master" => false, "write" => false, "grants" => []}
+
+        meta ->
+          %{
+            "key" => record["id"],
+            "master" => meta["master"] == true,
+            "write" => meta["write"] == true,
+            "grants" => Enum.sort(meta["grants"] || [])
+          }
+      end
+    end)
+  end
+
+  @doc "Mint a restricted key. Master only."
+  def grant(vault, spec) do
+    # Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    # serializes here; see locked.
+    locked(vault.file, fn ->
+        {file, opened} = load(vault)
+        root = rootof(opened, "granting a key")
+
+        want = spec || %{}
+        id = checkid(want["key"], "a grant needs a key id")
+        phrase = want["passphrase"]
+
+        if not is_binary(phrase) or phrase == "", do: fail("a grant needs a passphrase")
+        if Enum.any?(file["keys"], &(&1["id"] == id)), do: fail("key already exists: " <> id)
+
+        names = Enum.sort(want["names"] || [])
+
+        grants =
+          Enum.reduce(names, %{}, fn name, out ->
+            Sekreto.checkname(name)
+            Map.put(out, name, b64(secretkey(root, name)))
+          end)
+
+        write = want["write"] == true
+
+        record =
+          sealkey(root, id, phrase, want["iterations"] || vault.iterations,
+            %{"v" => @format, "write" => write, "grants" => grants},
+            %{"v" => @format, "master" => false, "write" => write, "grants" => names})
+
+        save(vault, Map.put(file, "keys", file["keys"] ++ [record]))
+    end)
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  Drop a key. Master only.
+
+  Anyone who already copied the file keeps whatever that key could read,
+  so revoking bars future reads of the LIVE file and `rotate` is what
+  takes a secret back.
+  """
+  def revoke(vault, key) do
+    # Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    # serializes here; see locked.
+    locked(vault.file, fn ->
+        {file, opened} = load(vault)
+        rootof(opened, "revoking a key")
+
+        if key == opened["info"]["key"], do: fail("a key cannot revoke itself: " <> key)
+        if not Enum.any?(file["keys"], &(&1["id"] == key)), do: fail("no such key: " <> key)
+
+        save(vault, Map.put(file, "keys", Enum.reject(file["keys"], &(&1["id"] == key))))
+    end)
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  A new root key, every value re-encrypted under it, and EVERY OTHER KEY
+  DROPPED. Master only.
+
+  The other keys go because they must: their rings are sealed under
+  passphrases this process does not have. Re-grant afterwards.
+  """
+  def rotate(vault) do
+    # Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+    # serializes here; see locked.
+    locked(vault.file, fn ->
+        {file, opened} = load(vault)
+        rootof(opened, "rotating the vault")
+
+        # Read everything out under the old root before anything changes: once
+        # the root is replaced the old derived keys are unreachable.
+        plain = Enum.map(list(vault), fn name -> {name, get(vault, name)} end)
+
+        root = random(@keylen)
+        namekey = hmac(root, @label_names)
+
+        entries =
+          Enum.map(plain, fn {name, value} ->
+            key = secretkey(root, name)
+
+            %{
+              "id" => entryid(key),
+              "name" => seal(namekey, name, @aad_name),
+              "value" => seal(key, value, @aad_secret <> name)
+            }
+          end)
+
+        iters =
+          case Enum.find(file["keys"], &(&1["id"] == vault.key)) do
+            nil -> vault.iterations
+            record -> record["iters"]
+          end
+
+        fresh =
+          sealkey(root, vault.key, vault.passphrase, iters,
+            %{"v" => @format, "write" => true, "root" => b64(root)},
+            %{"v" => @format, "master" => true, "write" => true, "grants" => []})
+
+        # SAVE FIRST, adopt second. A handle holding the new root over a file
+        # that still holds the old one reads nothing and says the vault is
+        # damaged.
+        :ok = write(vault, %{"keys" => [fresh], "entries" => entries})
+
+        Agent.update(vault.agent, fn _ ->
+          %{
+            "info" => %{
+              "key" => vault.key,
+              "master" => true,
+              "write" => true,
+              "grants" => []
+            },
+            "root" => root,
+            "grants" => %{},
+            "ring" => fresh["ring"]
+          }
+        end)
+
+        :ok
+    end)
+  end
+
+  # --- the inside ------------------------------------------------------
+
+  defp bytes(vault) do
+    case File.read(vault.file) do
+      {:ok, raw} ->
+        raw
+
+      {:error, :enoent} ->
+        # A vault is configured deliberately, with a key. Its absence is a
+        # broken deployment and never "no secrets here": answering a miss
+        # would send the chain on to a weaker store.
+        if not vault.create, do: fail("no vault file: " <> vault.file)
+
+        putnew(vault.file, newvault(vault.key, vault.passphrase, vault.iterations))
+        File.read!(vault.file)
+
+      {:error, why} ->
+        fail("cannot read " <> vault.file <> ": " <> to_string(:file.format_error(why)))
+    end
+  end
+
+  defp load(vault) do
+    file = readfile(bytes(vault))
+    record = Enum.find(file["keys"], &(&1["id"] == vault.key))
+
+    if nil == record do
+      # REVOKED, or never there. Either way this handle is finished, and
+      # dropping what it derived is what stops the next call answering from
+      # memory.
+      Agent.update(vault.agent, fn _ -> nil end)
+      fail("no such key: " <> vault.key)
+    end
+
+    held = Agent.get(vault.agent, & &1)
+
+    # The file still holds this key, and holds the SAME ring: a key revoked
+    # and re-granted under another passphrase is a different key wearing
+    # the id, and re-deriving is what refuses it.
+    if held && held["ring"] == record["ring"] do
+      {file, held}
+    else
+      Agent.update(vault.agent, fn _ -> nil end)
+
+      plain =
+        unseal(
+          kek(vault.passphrase, record["salt"], record["iters"]),
+          record["ring"],
+          @aad_ring <> vault.key,
+          "wrong passphrase for key " <> vault.key <> ", or a damaged vault"
+        )
+
+      ring = jsonof(plain, "key ring for " <> vault.key)
+
+      grants =
+        Enum.reduce(ring["grants"] || %{}, %{}, fn {name, key}, out ->
+          Map.put(out, name, unb64(key, "a granted key"))
+        end)
+
+      root = ring["root"]
+
+      opened = %{
+        "info" => %{
+          "key" => vault.key,
+          "master" => nil != root,
+          "write" => nil != root or ring["write"] == true,
+          "grants" => Enum.sort(Map.keys(grants))
+        },
+        "root" => if(nil == root, do: nil, else: unb64(root, "the root key")),
+        "grants" => grants,
+        "ring" => record["ring"]
+      }
+
+      Agent.update(vault.agent, fn _ -> opened end)
+      {file, opened}
+    end
+  end
+
+  defp rootof(opened, what) do
+    if nil == opened["root"] do
+      fail(what <> " needs a master key, and " <> opened["info"]["key"] <> " is restricted")
+    end
+
+    opened["root"]
+  end
+
+  # The key for one name, or nil when this key cannot reach it.
+  defp keyfor(opened, name) do
+    if opened["root"] do
+      secretkey(opened["root"], name)
+    else
+      opened["grants"][name]
+    end
+  end
+
+  defp findentry(_file, nil), do: nil
+
+  defp findentry(file, key) do
+    id = entryid(key)
+    Enum.find(file["entries"], &(&1["id"] == id))
+  end
+
+  defp metaof(opened, record) do
+    root = rootof(opened, "reading key metadata")
+    what = "metadata for key " <> record["id"]
+
+    jsonof(
+      unseal(hmac(root, @label_meta), record["meta"], @aad_meta <> record["id"], what),
+      what
+    )
+  rescue
+    # A record written under a root key this one has replaced. The key is
+    # still in the file and still opens with its own passphrase, so it is
+    # reported rather than hidden - with what it can do unknown.
+    Error -> nil
+  end
+
+  defp sealkey(root, id, phrase, iters, ring, meta) do
+    salt = random(@saltlen)
+
+    %{
+      "id" => id,
+      "salt" => salt,
+      "iters" => iters,
+      "ring" => seal(kek(phrase, salt, iters), stringify(ring), @aad_ring <> id),
+      "meta" => seal(hmac(root, @label_meta), stringify(meta), @aad_meta <> id)
+    }
+  end
+
+  defp save(vault, file) do
+    :ok = write(vault, file)
+    # The next call re-reads and re-checks the ring, which is what makes a
+    # revoked key stop answering.
+    :ok
+  end
+
+  # Read, change, and REPLACE - never edit in place.
+  #
+  # THE TEMPORARY IS RANDOM AND EXCLUSIVE. `<vault>.<pid>.tmp` is a name
+  # anyone can predict, so anyone who can write the vault's directory could
+  # put a symlink there and have the next save truncate whatever it pointed
+  # at.
+  defp write(vault, file) do
+    temp = vault.file <> "." <> Base.encode16(random(8), case: :lower) <> ".tmp"
+
+    case File.open(temp, [:write, :binary, :exclusive]) do
+      {:ok, handle} ->
+        IO.binwrite(handle, writefile(file))
+        File.close(handle)
+        File.chmod(temp, 0o600)
+
+        case File.rename(temp, vault.file) do
+          :ok ->
+            :ok
+
+          {:error, why} ->
+            File.rm(temp)
+            fail("cannot write " <> vault.file <> ": " <> to_string(:file.format_error(why)))
+        end
+
+      {:error, why} ->
+        fail("cannot write " <> vault.file <> ": " <> to_string(:file.format_error(why)))
+    end
+  end
+
+  # --- the provider ----------------------------------------------------
+
+  @doc """
+  Read a vault as one store in a chain.
+
+  The provider is the READ half and nothing more: a chain resolves
+  secrets, and writing one is a deliberate act with an API of its own.
+  """
+  def providerof(vault) do
+    %{
+      lookup: fn name -> get(vault, name) end,
+      describe: fn -> "minivault:" <> vault.file end
+    }
+  end
+
+  @doc "A vault provider from options, for a chain built by hand."
+  def minivaultprovider(options), do: providerof(openvault(options))
+
+  # The options arrive as a `ProviderSpec` STRUCT here, not as a map: this
+  # port types the chain rather than passing dictionaries around, so a
+  # field is read by name and a typo does not compile.
+  defp vaultoptions(%ProviderSpec{} = spec) do
+    %{
+      "file" => blankor(spec.file, ""),
+      "key" => blankor(spec.vaultkey, nil),
+      "passphrase" => blankor(spec.passphrase, ""),
+      "iterations" => spec.iterations,
+      "create" => spec.create == true
+    }
+  end
+
+  defp blankor(value, fallback) do
+    if is_binary(value) and value != "", do: value, else: fallback
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  The `minivault` provider kind, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+
+  Written out rather than built by `providerplugin`, because this
+  definition publishes TWO exports: `provider`, the read half every kind
+  publishes, and `vault`, the programmatic API.
+  """
+  def minivault do
+    %{
+      "name" => "minivault",
+      "define" => fn inst ->
+        options = vaultoptions(Inst.options(inst))
+
+        vault =
+          try do
+            # `openvault` refuses bad configuration HERE, so a mistyped
+            # chain fails at construction. Reaching the FILE is not
+            # configuration: the handle is lazy.
+            openvault(options)
+          rescue
+            err in Error ->
+              Types.fail(Providers.error_code(), Exception.message(err), %{
+                "ref" => Inst.ref(inst),
+                "cause" => Exception.message(err)
+              })
+          end
+
+        Inst.export(inst, Providers.provider_export(), providerof(vault))
+        Inst.export(inst, vault_export(), vault)
+      end
+    }
+  end
+
+  @doc """
+  The vault behind a store in a chain, as its programmatic API.
+
+  With no store named, the unqualified alias answers: one vault in the
+  chain resolves whatever it is called, and two raise rather than picking
+  one.
+  """
+  def vaultof(secrets), do: vaultof(secrets, nil)
+
+  def vaultof(secrets, nil) do
+    case Host.exports(secrets.host, "minivault/" <> vault_export()) do
+      nil -> fail("no minivault store in this chain")
+      found -> found
+    end
+  end
+
+  def vaultof(secrets, store) do
+    # A NAMED STORE MUST EXIST, and the alias must not stand in for it.
+    # `host.exports` falls back to the alias when the exact ref misses, so
+    # asking for `minivault` in a chain whose only vault is named `app`
+    # used to hand back the `app` vault - and then write to it.
+    ref = if store == "minivault", do: "minivault", else: "minivault$" <> store
+
+    if nil == Host.instance(secrets.host, ref) do
+      fail("no minivault store named " <> store <> " in this chain")
+    end
+
+    Host.exports(secrets.host, ref <> "/" <> vault_export())
+  end
+end