@voxgig/sdkgen 4.19.1 → 4.21.0

package/project/.sdk/tm/clojure/feature/secrets/voxgig/sekreto/plugins/minivault.clj

@@ -0,0 +1,837 @@
+;; VENDORED: @voxgig/sekreto sdk-20260917-1242-0 (clojure/plugins/voxgig/sekreto/plugins/minivault.clj)
+;; Source: https://github.com/voxgig/sekreto @ 108c4a914bee7b6534c30d1c68c25cd1b9377696  [tag: sdk-20260917-1242-0]
+;; License: MIT (c) voxgig - see repository LICENSE. Do not edit: resync from upstream.
+;; The mini vault, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+;;
+;; A plugin rather than a built-in kind because it needs crypto, and a
+;; built-in kind reads at most a local file
+;; (docs/design/plugin-providers.md).
+;;
+;; THE KEY DECIDES WHAT THE VAULT HOLDS. A master key reads and writes
+;; every name and mints restricted keys. A restricted key reads the names
+;; it was granted and CANNOT DERIVE ANY OTHER - the restriction is the
+;; cryptography rather than a check this code performs. What that does and
+;; does not protect is set out in DOCS.md under "What the mini vault
+;; protects".
+;;
+;; `javax.crypto` carries all four primitives, so nothing here is
+;; hand-rolled (AGENTS.md rule 3).
+;;
+;; A port of typescript/plugins/minivault.ts, which is canonical.
+
+(ns voxgig.sekreto.plugins.minivault
+  (:require [voxgig.sekreto.core :as core]
+            [voxgig.sekreto.json :as json]
+            [voxgig.sekreto.provider :as provider]
+            [voxgig.sekreto.providers :as providers]
+            [voxgig.plugin.host :as host]
+            [voxgig.plugin.types :as plugintypes])
+  (:import [java.io ByteArrayOutputStream File]
+           [java.nio ByteBuffer]
+           [java.nio.charset StandardCharsets]
+           [java.nio.file FileAlreadyExistsException Files NoSuchFileException Path
+            StandardCopyOption StandardOpenOption]
+           [java.nio.file.attribute PosixFilePermissions]
+           [java.security GeneralSecurityException SecureRandom]
+           [java.util Arrays Base64]
+           [javax.crypto Cipher Mac SecretKeyFactory]
+           [javax.crypto.spec GCMParameterSpec PBEKeySpec SecretKeySpec]))
+
+;; --- the format ------------------------------------------------------
+;;
+;;   magic       4   'SKMV'
+;;   version     1   FORMAT
+;;   kdf         1   1 = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256
+;;   cipher      1   1 = AES-256-GCM
+;;   reserved    1   0
+;;   keycount    4   uint32
+;;   per key:
+;;     id        1 + bytes      the key id, PLAINTEXT
+;;     salt      1 + bytes
+;;     iters     4              PBKDF2 rounds for this key
+;;     ring      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the passphrase
+;;     meta      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's meta key
+;;   entrycount  4   uint32
+;;   per entry:
+;;     id        1 + bytes      the blinded lookup id
+;;     name      1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under the vault's name key
+;;     value     1 + iv, 4 + bytes    sealed under that secret's own key
+;;
+;; Integers are big-endian, and every length precedes its bytes. A file one
+;; port writes is read by every other; `test/fixture` pins that with a
+;; committed vault rather than with agreement.
+
+(def ^:private MAGIC "SKMV")
+(def ^:private FORMAT 1)
+(def ^:private KDF-PBKDF2 1)
+(def ^:private CIPHER-AESGCM 1)
+
+;; AES-256-GCM: 32-byte keys, 12-byte nonces, 16-byte tags.
+(def ^:private KEYLEN 32)
+(def ^:private IVLEN 12)
+(def ^:private TAGLEN 16)
+(def ^:private SALTLEN 16)
+
+(def ITERATIONS
+  "PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 rounds when a caller names none."
+  210000)
+
+(def MASTERKEY
+  "The key id a vault gets when a caller names none."
+  "master")
+
+;; Additional authenticated data. Every blob is bound to its PLACE in the
+;; file, so no ciphertext can be moved.
+(def ^:private AAD-RING "skmv1:ring:")
+(def ^:private AAD-META "skmv1:meta:")
+(def ^:private AAD-NAME "skmv1:name")
+(def ^:private AAD-SECRET "skmv1:secret:")
+
+;; Everything a master can reach is derived from the root key, so a
+;; rotation is one new random value rather than a re-wrap of each part.
+(def ^:private LABEL-NAMES "skmv1:names")
+(def ^:private LABEL-META "skmv1:meta")
+(def ^:private LABEL-ID "skmv1:id")
+
+(def ^:private IDMAX
+  ;; `small` writes a length in ONE byte. A longer id wrapped that byte and
+  ;; the writer then appended the whole thing, so every field after it
+  ;; shifted. Checked where an id is ACCEPTED, so the refusal names the id
+  ;; rather than the file.
+  255)
+
+(def VAULT-EXPORT
+  "The export key the vault API is published under, beside `provider`."
+  "vault")
+
+(def ^:private RANDOM (SecureRandom.))
+
+(defn- fail [text]
+  (throw (core/sekretoerror (str "sekreto: minivault: " text))))
+
+(defn- utf8 ^bytes [^String text]
+  (.getBytes text StandardCharsets/UTF_8))
+
+;; THE LOCK EVERY HANDLE ON ONE FILE SHARES.
+;;
+;; Each handle is its own map, so two handles on one path did not
+;; coordinate: both could finish `vaultload` before either saved, and the
+;; second rename then discarded the first one's change while reporting
+;; success. Keyed by the ABSOLUTE path, so two handles spelled
+;; differently still meet.
+;;
+;; A guarantee WITHIN one process, which is what DOCS.md promises and what
+;; the go port arranges the same way. Two processes still race, and the
+;; format's answer to that is the exclusive create and the atomic rename:
+;; a reader sees one whole vault or the other, never half of one.
+(defonce ^:private LOCKS (atom {}))
+
+(defn- lockfor [file]
+  (let [key (try (.getPath (.getCanonicalFile (File. ^String file)))
+                 (catch Exception _ file))]
+    (or (get @LOCKS key)
+        (get (swap! LOCKS (fn [held] (if (contains? held key)
+                                       held
+                                       (assoc held key (Object.)))))
+             key))))
+
+(defn- wantkey
+  "The key a caller asked for, or `MASTERKEY`: an EMPTY key is no key.
+
+  The canonical's `opts.key || MASTERKEY` answers for both nil and empty,
+  where clojure's `or` answers for nil alone - `\"\"` is truthy here. A
+  CLI reaches this with SEKRETO_VAULT_KEY set and empty, which is what an
+  unset shell variable expands to."
+  [value]
+  (if (or (nil? value) (= "" value)) MASTERKEY value))
+
+(defn- checkid [id what]
+  (when-not (and (string? id) (not= "" id))
+    (fail what))
+  (when (< IDMAX (alength (utf8 id)))
+    (fail (str "key id is longer than " IDMAX " bytes: " (subs id 0 (min 32 (count id))) "...")))
+  id)
+
+;; --- keys ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+(defn- hmac ^bytes [^bytes key ^String text]
+  (try
+    (let [mac (Mac/getInstance "HmacSHA256")]
+      (.init mac (SecretKeySpec. key "HmacSHA256"))
+      (.doFinal mac (utf8 text)))
+    (catch GeneralSecurityException err
+      (fail (str "hmac: " (.getMessage err))))))
+
+(defn- kek
+  "The key-encryption key a passphrase unwraps a ring with."
+  ^bytes [^String passphrase ^bytes salt ^long iters]
+  (try
+    (-> (SecretKeyFactory/getInstance "PBKDF2WithHmacSHA256")
+        (.generateSecret (PBEKeySpec. (.toCharArray passphrase) salt (int iters) (* KEYLEN 8)))
+        (.getEncoded))
+    (catch GeneralSecurityException err
+      (fail (str "pbkdf2: " (.getMessage err))))))
+
+(defn- secretkey
+  "The key one named secret's value is encrypted with.
+
+  DERIVED, never stored, for a master: it holds the root key and so reaches
+  every name, including ones written after it was made. A restricted key
+  holds the derived keys it was granted and nothing that produces another."
+  ^bytes [^bytes root ^String name]
+  (hmac root (str AAD-SECRET name)))
+
+(defn- entryid
+  "Where a secret lives in the file, derived from its own key so that
+  finding it needs no plaintext name."
+  ^bytes [^bytes key]
+  (hmac key LABEL-ID))
+
+(defn- randombytes ^bytes [^long len]
+  (let [out (byte-array len)]
+    (.nextBytes RANDOM out)
+    out))
+
+;; --- sealing ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+(defn- seal
+  "A nonce and the ciphertext with its tag appended."
+  [^bytes key ^bytes plain ^String aad]
+  (try
+    (let [iv (randombytes IVLEN)
+          cipher (Cipher/getInstance "AES/GCM/NoPadding")]
+      (.init cipher Cipher/ENCRYPT_MODE (SecretKeySpec. key "AES")
+             (GCMParameterSpec. (* TAGLEN 8) iv))
+      (.updateAAD cipher (utf8 aad))
+      {:iv iv :blob (.doFinal cipher plain)})
+    (catch GeneralSecurityException err
+      (fail (str "cannot seal: " (.getMessage err))))))
+
+(defn- unseal
+  "The plaintext, or a refusal. A GCM tag that fails to verify is the only
+  evidence there is, and it cannot tell a wrong passphrase from a damaged
+  file, so `what` names the attempt and the message admits both."
+  ^bytes [^bytes key sealed ^String aad ^String what]
+  (let [^bytes blob (:blob sealed)
+        ^bytes iv (:iv sealed)]
+    (when (or (< (alength blob) TAGLEN) (not= IVLEN (alength iv)))
+      (fail (str what ": truncated")))
+
+    ;; The WHOLE round-trip is guarded, not only the tag check: a nonce of
+    ;; the wrong length makes `init` itself raise, and a damaged file
+    ;; reaching a caller as a raw GeneralSecurityException is a refusal
+    ;; nobody can act on.
+    (try
+      (let [cipher (Cipher/getInstance "AES/GCM/NoPadding")]
+        (.init cipher Cipher/DECRYPT_MODE (SecretKeySpec. key "AES")
+               (GCMParameterSpec. (* TAGLEN 8) iv))
+        (.updateAAD cipher (utf8 aad))
+        (.doFinal cipher blob))
+      (catch Exception _ (fail what)))))
+
+(defn- jsonof [^bytes plain what]
+  (let [parsed (json/parse (String. plain StandardCharsets/UTF_8))]
+    (if (map? parsed) parsed (fail (str "unreadable " what)))))
+
+(defn- b64 [^bytes bytes]
+  (.encodeToString (Base64/getEncoder) bytes))
+
+(defn- unb64 ^bytes [text what]
+  (when-not (string? text)
+    (fail (str "missing " what)))
+  (try
+    (.decode (Base64/getDecoder) ^String text)
+    (catch IllegalArgumentException _ (fail (str "missing " what)))))
+
+;; --- the file --------------------------------------------------------
+
+(defn- reader
+  "A cursor, so that every length check is in one place: a truncated vault
+  is refused rather than read as a short one."
+  [^bytes bytes]
+  (let [at (atom 0)]
+    (letfn [(take! [^long len]
+              (when (or (neg? len) (< (alength bytes) (+ @at len)))
+                (fail "the vault file is truncated"))
+              (let [out (Arrays/copyOfRange bytes (int @at) (int (+ @at len)))]
+                (swap! at + len)
+                out))
+            (u8 [] (bit-and (aget ^bytes (take! 1) 0) 0xff))
+            (u32 []
+              ;; A length over Integer/MAX_VALUE cannot address an array,
+              ;; and reading it as a negative int is what turned a damaged
+              ;; file into a crash instead of a refusal.
+              (let [value (bit-and (.getInt (ByteBuffer/wrap (take! 4))) 0xffffffff)]
+                (when (< Integer/MAX_VALUE value)
+                  (fail "the vault file is truncated"))
+                value))]
+      {:take take! :u8 u8 :u32 u32
+       :small (fn [] (take! (u8)))
+       :large (fn [] (take! (u32)))
+       :magic (fn [] (String. ^bytes (take! 4) StandardCharsets/ISO_8859_1))
+       :sealed (fn [] {:iv (take! (u8)) :blob (take! (u32))})
+       :done? (fn [] (= @at (alength bytes)))})))
+
+(defn- readfile [^bytes bytes]
+  (let [read (reader bytes)
+        u8 (:u8 read)
+        u32 (:u32 read)
+        small (:small read)
+        sealed (:sealed read)]
+
+    (when (not= MAGIC ((:magic read))) (fail "not a vault file"))
+
+    (let [version (u8)]
+      (when (not= FORMAT version) (fail (str "unsupported format version: " version))))
+
+    (let [kdf (u8) cipher (u8)]
+      (when (or (not= KDF-PBKDF2 kdf) (not= CIPHER-AESGCM cipher))
+        (fail (str "unsupported kdf or cipher: " kdf "/" cipher))))
+    (u8)
+
+    (let [keys (vec (repeatedly (u32)
+                                #(let [id (String. ^bytes (small) StandardCharsets/UTF_8)
+                                       salt (small)
+                                       iters (u32)]
+                                   {:id id :salt salt :iters iters
+                                    :ring (sealed) :meta (sealed)})))
+          entries (vec (repeatedly (u32)
+                                   #(let [id (small)]
+                                      {:id id :name (sealed) :value (sealed)})))]
+      (when-not ((:done? read)) (fail "the vault file has trailing bytes"))
+      {:keys keys :entries entries})))
+
+(defn- bytecompare
+  "Unsigned, byte by byte, the way every other port sorts."
+  [^bytes left ^bytes right]
+  (let [len (min (alength left) (alength right))]
+    (loop [index 0]
+      (if (= index len)
+        (compare (alength left) (alength right))
+        (let [one (bit-and (aget left index) 0xff)
+              two (bit-and (aget right index) 0xff)]
+          (if (= one two) (recur (inc index)) (compare one two)))))))
+
+(defn- writefile ^bytes [vault]
+  (let [out (ByteArrayOutputStream.)]
+    (letfn [(raw [^bytes bytes] (.write out bytes 0 (alength bytes)))
+            (u8 [value] (.write out (int (bit-and value 0xff))))
+            (u32 [value] (raw (.array (.putInt (ByteBuffer/allocate 4) (int value)))))
+            (small [^bytes bytes] (u8 (alength bytes)) (raw bytes))
+            (large [^bytes bytes] (u32 (alength bytes)) (raw bytes))
+            (sealed [value] (small (:iv value)) (large (:blob value)))]
+
+      (raw (.getBytes ^String MAGIC StandardCharsets/ISO_8859_1))
+      (u8 FORMAT)
+      (u8 KDF-PBKDF2)
+      (u8 CIPHER-AESGCM)
+      (u8 0)
+
+      (u32 (count (:keys vault)))
+      (doseq [key (:keys vault)]
+        (small (utf8 (:id key)))
+        (small (:salt key))
+        (u32 (:iters key))
+        (sealed (:ring key))
+        (sealed (:meta key)))
+
+      ;; SORTED BY ID, which is a blinded value: the file therefore records
+      ;; nothing about the order secrets were written in.
+      (let [entries (sort-by :id bytecompare (:entries vault))]
+        (u32 (count entries))
+        (doseq [entry entries]
+          (small (:id entry))
+          (sealed (:name entry))
+          (sealed (:value entry))))
+
+      (.toByteArray out))))
+
+;; --- creating --------------------------------------------------------
+
+(defn- newvault [keyid passphrase iterations]
+  (let [root (randombytes KEYLEN)
+        salt (randombytes SALTLEN)
+        ring {"v" FORMAT "write" true "root" (b64 root)}
+        meta {"v" FORMAT "master" true "write" true "grants" []}]
+    {:keys [{:id keyid
+             :salt salt
+             :iters iterations
+             :ring (seal (kek passphrase salt iterations)
+                         (utf8 (json/stringify ring)) (str AAD-RING keyid))
+             :meta (seal (hmac root LABEL-META)
+                         (utf8 (json/stringify meta)) (str AAD-META keyid))}]
+     :entries []}))
+
+(defn- owneronly [^Path path]
+  (try
+    (Files/setPosixFilePermissions path (PosixFilePermissions/fromString "rw-------"))
+    (catch Exception _
+      ;; A filesystem with no POSIX permissions is not a reason to refuse a
+      ;; write that otherwise succeeded.
+      nil)))
+
+(defn- putnew
+  "Write a vault file that is not there yet, and REFUSE one that is.
+
+  Straight to the target with CREATE_NEW rather than through a temporary
+  and a rename. A rename REPLACES its destination, so two processes
+  creating the same vault both succeeded and the second discarded the
+  first one's secrets."
+  [^String file vault]
+  (let [path (Path/of file (into-array String []))]
+    (try
+      (Files/write path ^bytes (writefile vault)
+                   (into-array StandardOpenOption
+                               [StandardOpenOption/CREATE_NEW StandardOpenOption/WRITE]))
+      (owneronly path)
+      (catch FileAlreadyExistsException _
+        (fail (str "vault file already exists: " file)))
+      (catch java.io.IOException err
+        (fail (str "cannot write " file ": " (.getMessage err)))))))
+
+(defn- sameseal? [left right]
+  (and (Arrays/equals ^bytes (:iv left) ^bytes (:iv right))
+       (Arrays/equals ^bytes (:blob left) ^bytes (:blob right))))
+
+;; --- the handle ------------------------------------------------------
+
+(declare vaultbytes vaultload)
+
+(defn openvault
+  "Open a vault file as one key.
+
+  The handle is lazy. Nothing is read, and no passphrase is stretched,
+  until a call needs the file."
+  [options]
+  (let [opts (or options {})
+        file (:file opts)
+        passphrase (:passphrase opts)]
+    (when-not (and (string? file) (not= "" file)) (fail "a vault needs a file"))
+    (when-not (and (string? passphrase) (not= "" passphrase))
+      (fail "a vault needs a passphrase"))
+
+    {:file file
+     :key (checkid (wantkey (:key opts)) "a vault needs a key id")
+     :passphrase passphrase
+     :iterations (or (:iterations opts) ITERATIONS)
+     :create (true? (:create opts))
+     ;; THE DERIVED KEYS LIVE IN AN ATOM. A handle that caches what it
+     ;; derived and a handle that notices a revoked key are the same
+     ;; handle, and a map is a value here.
+     :opened (atom nil)}))
+
+(defn createvault
+  "Make a vault file and return a handle on its master key.
+
+  Refuses a file that is already there: a vault is created once, and
+  overwriting one discards every secret in it."
+  [options]
+  (let [opts (or options {})
+        file (:file opts)
+        passphrase (:passphrase opts)]
+    (when-not (and (string? file) (not= "" file)) (fail "a vault needs a file"))
+    (when-not (and (string? passphrase) (not= "" passphrase))
+      (fail "a vault needs a passphrase"))
+
+    (let [keyid (checkid (wantkey (:key opts)) "a vault needs a key id")]
+      ;; No existence check first: the check and the write would be two
+      ;; steps, and `putnew` refuses an existing file in ONE.
+      (putnew file (newvault keyid passphrase (or (:iterations opts) ITERATIONS)))
+      (openvault opts))))
+
+(defn- vaultbytes ^bytes [vault]
+  (let [^String file (:file vault)
+        path (Path/of file (into-array String []))]
+    (try
+      (Files/readAllBytes path)
+      (catch NoSuchFileException _
+        ;; A vault is configured deliberately, with a key. Its absence is a
+        ;; broken deployment and never "no secrets here": answering a miss
+        ;; would send the chain on to a weaker store.
+        (when-not (:create vault) (fail (str "no vault file: " file)))
+        (putnew file (newvault (:key vault) (:passphrase vault) (:iterations vault)))
+        (Files/readAllBytes path))
+      (catch java.io.IOException err
+        (fail (str "cannot read " file ": " (.getMessage err)))))))
+
+(defn- vaultload [vault]
+  (let [file (readfile (vaultbytes vault))
+        keyid (:key vault)
+        record (first (filter #(= keyid (:id %)) (:keys file)))]
+
+    (when (nil? record)
+      ;; REVOKED, or never there. Either way this handle is finished, and
+      ;; dropping what it derived is what stops the next call answering
+      ;; from memory.
+      (reset! (:opened vault) nil)
+      (fail (str "no such key: " keyid)))
+
+    (let [held @(:opened vault)]
+      ;; The file still holds this key, and holds the SAME ring: a key
+      ;; revoked and re-granted under another passphrase is a different key
+      ;; wearing the id, and re-deriving is what refuses it.
+      (if (and held (sameseal? (:ring held) (:ring record)))
+        [file held]
+        (do
+          (reset! (:opened vault) nil)
+          (let [plain (unseal (kek (:passphrase vault) (:salt record) (:iters record))
+                              (:ring record) (str AAD-RING keyid)
+                              (str "wrong passphrase for key " keyid ", or a damaged vault"))
+                ring (jsonof plain (str "key ring for " keyid))
+                grants (reduce-kv (fn [out name key]
+                                    (assoc out name (unb64 key "a granted key")))
+                                  {} (or (get ring "grants") {}))
+                root (get ring "root")
+                opened {:info {"key" keyid
+                               "master" (some? root)
+                               "write" (or (some? root) (true? (get ring "write")))
+                               "grants" (vec (sort (keys grants)))}
+                        :root (when root (unb64 root "the root key"))
+                        :grants grants
+                        :ring (:ring record)}]
+            (reset! (:opened vault) opened)
+            [file opened]))))))
+
+(defn- rootof ^bytes [opened what]
+  (or (:root opened)
+      (fail (str what " needs a master key, and " (get-in opened [:info "key"])
+                 " is restricted"))))
+
+(defn- keyfor
+  "The key for one name, or nil when this key cannot reach it."
+  ^bytes [opened name]
+  (if-let [root (:root opened)]
+    (secretkey root name)
+    (get (:grants opened) name)))
+
+(defn- findentry [file ^bytes key]
+  (when key
+    (let [id (entryid key)]
+      (first (filter #(Arrays/equals ^bytes (:id %) id) (:entries file))))))
+
+(defn- metaof [opened record]
+  (let [root (rootof opened "reading key metadata")
+        what (str "metadata for key " (:id record))]
+    (try
+      (jsonof (unseal (hmac root LABEL-META) (:meta record)
+                      (str AAD-META (:id record)) what)
+              what)
+      (catch clojure.lang.ExceptionInfo _
+        ;; A record written under a root key this one has replaced. The key
+        ;; is still in the file and still opens with its own passphrase, so
+        ;; it is reported rather than hidden - with what it can do unknown.
+        nil))))
+
+(defn- sealkey [^bytes root id phrase iters ring meta]
+  (let [salt (randombytes SALTLEN)]
+    {:id id
+     :salt salt
+     :iters iters
+     :ring (seal (kek phrase salt iters) (utf8 (json/stringify ring)) (str AAD-RING id))
+     :meta (seal (hmac root LABEL-META) (utf8 (json/stringify meta)) (str AAD-META id))}))
+
+(defn- writevault
+  "Read, change, and REPLACE - never edit in place.
+
+  THE TEMPORARY IS RANDOM AND EXCLUSIVE. `<vault>.<pid>.tmp` is a name
+  anyone can predict, so anyone who can write the vault's directory could
+  put a symlink there and have the next save truncate whatever it pointed
+  at."
+  [vault file]
+  (let [^String target (:file vault)
+        suffix (apply str (map #(format "%02x" (bit-and % 0xff)) (randombytes 8)))
+        temp (Path/of (str target "." suffix ".tmp") (into-array String []))]
+    (try
+      (Files/write temp ^bytes (writefile file)
+                   (into-array StandardOpenOption
+                               [StandardOpenOption/CREATE_NEW StandardOpenOption/WRITE]))
+      (owneronly temp)
+      (Files/move temp (Path/of target (into-array String []))
+                  (into-array StandardCopyOption [StandardCopyOption/REPLACE_EXISTING]))
+      (catch java.io.IOException err
+        (try (Files/deleteIfExists temp) (catch Exception _ nil))
+        (fail (str "cannot write " target ": " (.getMessage err)))))
+    nil))
+
+(defn vaultfile
+  "The file this handle reads."
+  [vault]
+  (:file vault))
+
+(defn vaultkey
+  "The key id this handle opens with."
+  [vault]
+  (:key vault))
+
+(defn vaultopen
+  "Derive the key and read the file NOW rather than at first use.
+
+  A COPY, so that what a caller is handed cannot become what this vault
+  believes: a map is a value here."
+  [vault]
+  (:info (second (vaultload vault))))
+
+(defn vaultclose
+  "Forget the derived keys. The next call opens again."
+  [vault]
+  (reset! (:opened vault) nil)
+  nil)
+
+(defn vaultlist
+  "The names this key can read, sorted."
+  [vault]
+  (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)]
+    (if-let [root (:root opened)]
+      (let [namekey (hmac root LABEL-NAMES)]
+        (vec (sort (map #(String. ^bytes (unseal namekey (:name %) AAD-NAME
+                                                 "a secret name is damaged")
+                                  StandardCharsets/UTF_8)
+                        (:entries file)))))
+      ;; A restricted key has no name key, so it reports the grants it can
+      ;; actually find: the vault never tells it what else is in there.
+      (vec (sort (filter #(some? (findentry file (get (:grants opened) %)))
+                         (get-in opened [:info "grants"])))))))
+
+(defn vaultget
+  "The value, or nil when the vault does not hold that name or this key was
+  not granted it."
+  [vault name]
+  (core/checkname name)
+  (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)
+        key (keyfor opened name)]
+    ;; OUTSIDE THE GRANT IS A MISS, deliberately. The vault answers as the
+    ;; key that opened it, so a name this key cannot read is a name this
+    ;; store does not hold for this caller.
+    (when key
+      (when-let [entry (findentry file key)]
+        (String. ^bytes (unseal key (:value entry) (str AAD-SECRET name)
+                                (str "the value of " name " is damaged"))
+                 StandardCharsets/UTF_8)))))
+
+(defn vaulthas?
+  "Does this key hold a value for `name`?"
+  [vault name]
+  (some? (vaultget vault name)))
+
+(defn vaultset
+  "Write a value. A master writes any name; a restricted key holding
+  `write` overwrites the names it was granted, and creates none."
+  [vault name value]
+  ;; Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+  ;; serializes here; see lockfor.
+  (locking (lockfor (:file vault))
+    (core/checkname name)
+    (when-not (string? value) (fail (str "a secret value must be text: " name)))
+
+    (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)]
+      (when-not (get-in opened [:info "write"])
+        (fail (str "key " (get-in opened [:info "key"]) " is read-only")))
+
+      (let [key (or (keyfor opened name)
+                    (fail (str "key " (get-in opened [:info "key"])
+                               " was not granted " name)))
+            sealedvalue (seal key (utf8 value) (str AAD-SECRET name))
+            id (entryid key)
+            found (findentry file key)
+            entries (if found
+                      (mapv #(if (Arrays/equals ^bytes (:id %) id)
+                               (assoc % :value sealedvalue) %)
+                            (:entries file))
+                      ;; A NEW NAME NEEDS THE NAME KEY, which only a master
+                      ;; holds. So a restricted key with `write` updates what
+                      ;; it was granted and cannot grow the vault.
+                      (let [root (rootof opened (str "creating the secret " name))]
+                        (conj (:entries file)
+                              {:id id
+                               :name (seal (hmac root LABEL-NAMES) (utf8 name) AAD-NAME)
+                               :value sealedvalue})))]
+        (writevault vault (assoc file :entries entries))))))
+
+(defn vaultremove
+  "Drop a name. Master only."
+  [vault name]
+  ;; Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+  ;; serializes here; see lockfor.
+  (locking (lockfor (:file vault))
+    (core/checkname name)
+    (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)
+          root (rootof opened "removing a secret")
+          wanted (entryid (secretkey root name))]
+      (when-not (some #(Arrays/equals ^bytes (:id %) wanted) (:entries file))
+        (fail (str "no such secret: " name)))
+      (writevault vault
+                  (assoc file :entries
+                         (vec (remove #(Arrays/equals ^bytes (:id %) wanted)
+                                      (:entries file))))))))
+
+(defn vaultkeys
+  "Every key in the file, with what it may do. Master only."
+  [vault]
+  (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)]
+    (rootof opened "listing the keys")
+    (mapv (fn [record]
+            (if-let [meta (metaof opened record)]
+              {"key" (:id record)
+               "master" (true? (get meta "master"))
+               "write" (true? (get meta "write"))
+               "grants" (vec (sort (or (get meta "grants") [])))}
+              {"key" (:id record) "master" false "write" false "grants" []}))
+          (:keys file))))
+
+(defn vaultgrant
+  "Mint a restricted key. Master only."
+  [vault spec]
+  ;; Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+  ;; serializes here; see lockfor.
+  (locking (lockfor (:file vault))
+    (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)
+          root (rootof opened "granting a key")
+          want (or spec {})
+          id (checkid (:key want) "a grant needs a key id")
+          phrase (:passphrase want)]
+
+      (when-not (and (string? phrase) (not= "" phrase)) (fail "a grant needs a passphrase"))
+      (when (some #(= id (:id %)) (:keys file)) (fail (str "key already exists: " id)))
+
+      (let [names (vec (sort (or (:names want) [])))
+            grants (reduce (fn [out name]
+                             (core/checkname name)
+                             (assoc out name (b64 (secretkey root name))))
+                           {} names)
+            write (true? (:write want))
+            record (sealkey root id phrase (or (:iterations want) (:iterations vault))
+                            {"v" FORMAT "write" write "grants" grants}
+                            {"v" FORMAT "master" false "write" write "grants" names})]
+        (writevault vault (assoc file :keys (conj (:keys file) record)))))))
+
+(defn vaultrevoke
+  "Drop a key. Master only.
+
+  Anyone who already copied the file keeps whatever that key could read, so
+  revoking bars future reads of the LIVE file and `vaultrotate` is what
+  takes a secret back."
+  [vault key]
+  ;; Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+  ;; serializes here; see lockfor.
+  (locking (lockfor (:file vault))
+    (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)]
+      (rootof opened "revoking a key")
+      (when (= key (get-in opened [:info "key"]))
+        (fail (str "a key cannot revoke itself: " key)))
+      (when-not (some #(= key (:id %)) (:keys file)) (fail (str "no such key: " key)))
+      (writevault vault (assoc file :keys (vec (remove #(= key (:id %)) (:keys file))))))))
+
+(defn vaultrotate
+  "A new root key, every value re-encrypted under it, and EVERY OTHER KEY
+  DROPPED. Master only.
+
+  The other keys go because they must: their rings are sealed under
+  passphrases this process does not have. Re-grant afterwards."
+  [vault]
+  ;; Every write on this file, from any handle in this process,
+  ;; serializes here; see lockfor.
+  (locking (lockfor (:file vault))
+    (let [[file opened] (vaultload vault)]
+      (rootof opened "rotating the vault")
+
+      ;; Read everything out under the old root before anything changes: once
+      ;; the root is replaced the old derived keys are unreachable.
+      (let [plain (mapv (fn [name] [name (vaultget vault name)]) (vaultlist vault))
+            root (randombytes KEYLEN)
+            namekey (hmac root LABEL-NAMES)
+            entries (mapv (fn [[name value]]
+                            (let [key (secretkey root name)]
+                              {:id (entryid key)
+                               :name (seal namekey (utf8 name) AAD-NAME)
+                               :value (seal key (utf8 value) (str AAD-SECRET name))}))
+                          plain)
+            iters (or (:iters (first (filter #(= (:key vault) (:id %)) (:keys file))))
+                      (:iterations vault))
+            record (sealkey root (:key vault) (:passphrase vault) iters
+                            {"v" FORMAT "write" true "root" (b64 root)}
+                            {"v" FORMAT "master" true "write" true "grants" []})]
+
+        ;; SAVE FIRST, adopt second. A handle holding the new root over a file
+        ;; that still holds the old one reads nothing and says the vault is
+        ;; damaged.
+        (writevault vault {:keys [record] :entries entries})
+
+        (reset! (:opened vault)
+                {:info {"key" (:key vault) "master" true "write" true "grants" []}
+                 :root root
+                 :grants {}
+                 :ring (:ring record)})
+        nil))))
+
+;; --- the provider ----------------------------------------------------
+
+(defrecord MiniVaultProvider [vault]
+  provider/Provider
+
+  (lookup [_ name] (vaultget vault name))
+
+  (describe [_] (str "minivault:" (:file vault))))
+
+(defn providerof
+  "Read a vault as one store in a chain.
+
+  The provider is the READ half and nothing more: a chain resolves secrets,
+  and writing one is a deliberate act with an API of its own."
+  [vault]
+  (->MiniVaultProvider vault))
+
+(defn minivaultprovider
+  "A vault provider from options, for a chain built by hand."
+  [options]
+  (providerof (openvault options)))
+
+(defn- vaultoptions [spec]
+  {:file (or (core/notempty (:file spec)) "")
+   :key (core/notempty (:vaultkey spec))
+   :passphrase (or (core/notempty (:passphrase spec)) "")
+   :iterations (:iterations spec)
+   :create (true? (:create spec))})
+
+(def minivault
+  "The `minivault` provider kind, as a voxgig/plugin definition.
+
+  Written out rather than built by `providerplugin`, because this
+  definition publishes TWO exports: `provider`, the read half every kind
+  publishes, and `vault`, the programmatic API."
+  {"name" "minivault"
+   "define" (fn [inst]
+              (let [built (try
+                            ;; `openvault` refuses bad configuration HERE,
+                            ;; so a mistyped chain fails at construction.
+                            ;; Reaching the FILE is not configuration: the
+                            ;; handle is lazy.
+                            (openvault (vaultoptions (host/inst-options inst)))
+                            (catch clojure.lang.ExceptionInfo err
+                              (if (core/sekretoerror? err)
+                                (plugintypes/fail providers/ERROR-CODE (ex-message err)
+                                                  {"ref" (host/inst-ref inst)
+                                                   "cause" (ex-message err)})
+                                (throw err))))]
+                (host/export! inst providers/PROVIDER-EXPORT (providerof built))
+                (host/export! inst VAULT-EXPORT built)))})
+
+(defn vaultof
+  "The vault behind a store in a chain, as its programmatic API.
+
+  With no store named, the unqualified alias answers: one vault in the
+  chain resolves whatever it is called, and two raise rather than picking
+  one."
+  ([secrets] (vaultof secrets nil))
+  ([secrets store]
+   (let [h (:host secrets)]
+     (if (nil? store)
+       (or (host/exports h (str "minivault/" VAULT-EXPORT))
+           (fail "no minivault store in this chain"))
+       ;; A NAMED STORE MUST EXIST, and the alias must not stand in for it.
+       ;; `host.exports` falls back to the alias when the exact ref misses,
+       ;; so asking for `minivault` in a chain whose only vault is named
+       ;; `app` used to hand back the `app` vault - and then write to it.
+       (let [ref (if (= "minivault" store) "minivault" (str "minivault$" store))]
+         (when (nil? (host/instance h ref))
+           (fail (str "no minivault store named " store " in this chain")))
+         (host/exports h (str ref "/" VAULT-EXPORT)))))))