@scriptc/runtime 0.0.0 → 0.0.2

package/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c

@@ -0,0 +1,4311 @@
+/*
+ *  TLS server-side functions
+ *
+ *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "debug_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+    return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
+                                 ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
+                                 psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *info,
+                                        size_t ilen)
+{
+    if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id);
+
+    if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen);
+    ssl->cli_id_len = ilen;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+                                   mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
+                                   mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
+                                   void *p_cookie)
+{
+    conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write;
+    conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check;
+    conf->p_cookie       = p_cookie;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf)
+{
+    if (conf->f_psk != NULL) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) {
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        const unsigned char *buf,
+                                        size_t len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+        /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
+        if (len    != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
+            buf[0] !=     ssl->verify_data_len ||
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
+                              ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+    {
+        if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic
+ * curves (TLS 1.2) extension.
+ *
+ * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a
+ * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446):
+ *      enum {
+ *          secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
+ *          x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
+ *          ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
+ *          ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
+ *          ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
+ *          ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ *          (0xFFFF)
+ *      } NamedGroup;
+ *      struct {
+ *          NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
+ *      } NamedGroupList;
+ *
+ * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains
+ * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422):
+ * enum {
+ *      deprecated(1..22),
+ *      secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
+ *      x25519(29), x448(30),
+ *      reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ *      deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02),
+ *      (0xFFFF)
+ *  } NamedCurve;
+ * struct {
+ *      NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1>
+ *  } NamedCurveList;
+ *
+ * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible
+ * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both
+ * share the same extension identifier.
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                                          size_t len)
+{
+    size_t list_size, our_size;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    uint16_t *curves_tls_id;
+
+    if (len < 2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0);
+    if (list_size + 2 != len ||
+        list_size % 2 != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */
+    if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
+     * and leave room for a final 0 */
+    our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
+    if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) {
+        our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;
+    }
+
+    if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size,
+                                        sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id;
+
+    p = buf + 2;
+    while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) {
+        uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) !=
+            MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+            *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id;
+            our_size--;
+        }
+
+        list_size -= 2;
+        p += 2;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             size_t len)
+{
+    size_t list_size;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+
+    if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    list_size = buf[0];
+
+    p = buf + 1;
+    while (list_size > 0) {
+        if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
+            p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+            defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED)
+            ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&                             \
+            defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                             p[0]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0]));
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        list_size--;
+        p++;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *buf,
+                                  size_t len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1)
+#else
+    if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+             &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+             MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) {
+        psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+        psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret);
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+            ssl,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+#else
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                              buf, len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret);
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
+    ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                                             size_t len)
+{
+    if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                             const unsigned char *buf,
+                             size_t len)
+{
+    size_t peer_cid_len;
+
+    /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
+    if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     *   struct {
+     *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+     *   } ConnectionId;
+     */
+
+    if (len < 1) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    peer_cid_len = *buf++;
+    len--;
+
+    if (len != peer_cid_len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */
+    if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+        /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default
+         * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+    ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated"));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          const unsigned char *buf,
+                                          size_t len)
+{
+    if (len != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ((void) buf);
+
+    if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) {
+        ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     const unsigned char *buf,
+                                     size_t len)
+{
+    if (len != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ((void) buf);
+
+    if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) {
+        ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char *buf,
+                                        size_t len)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session session;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session);
+
+    if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL ||
+        ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
+    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len));
+
+    if (len == 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+    /*
+     * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
+     */
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session,
+                                         buf, len)) != 0) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);
+
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic"));
+        } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired"));
+        } else {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret);
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
+     * inform them we're accepting the ticket  (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
+     */
+    session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+    memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len);
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate);
+    memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+
+    /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket"));
+
+    ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
+
+    /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */
+    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  const unsigned char *buf,
+                                  size_t len)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+    size_t i, j;
+    size_t profile_length;
+    uint16_t mki_length;
+    /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */
+    const size_t size_of_lengths = 3;
+
+    /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
+    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) ||
+        (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1
+     * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+     *
+     * struct {
+     *   SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+     *   opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+     * } UseSRTPData;
+
+     * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes)
+     *                  and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte)
+     * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length
+     * and one of srtp_mki length
+     */
+    if (len < size_of_lengths) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+
+    /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */
+    profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
+    buf += 2;
+
+    /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */
+    if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths ||
+        profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    /*
+     * parse the extension list values are defined in
+     * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
+     */
+    for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) {
+        uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1];
+        client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value);
+
+        if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s",
+                                      mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+                                          client_protection)));
+        } else {
+            continue;
+        }
+        /* check if suggested profile is in our list */
+        for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) {
+            if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) {
+                ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s",
+                                          mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+                                              client_protection)));
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */
+    mki_length = *buf;
+    buf++;
+
+    if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ||
+        mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */
+    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED &&
+        mki_length > 0) {
+        ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length;
+
+        memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length);
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki",  ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+                              ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len);
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+/*
+ * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/*
+ * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+                               uint16_t *curves_tls_id)
+{
+    uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id;
+
+    while (*curr_tls_id != 0) {
+        curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id);
+        if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) {
+            return 0;
+        }
+        curr_tls_id++;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite,
+ * return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                         const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info)
+{
+    mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    psa_algorithm_t pk_alg =
+        mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+    psa_key_usage_t pk_usage =
+        mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info);
+#else
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
+        mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    uint32_t flags;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) {
+        list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
+    } else
+#endif
+    list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
+
+    int pk_alg_is_none = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE);
+#else
+    pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    if (pk_alg_is_none) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate"));
+
+    if (list == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate"));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+        flags = 0;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
+                              cur->cert);
+
+        int key_type_matches = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+        key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL ||
+                             ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL ||
+                             mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) &&
+                            mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage));
+#else
+        key_type_matches = (
+            mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage));
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+#else
+        key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+        if (!key_type_matches) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type"));
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
+         * keyUsage or other extensions.
+         *
+         * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for
+         * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing
+         * and decrypting with the same RSA key.
+         */
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2,
+                                         &flags) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: "
+                                      "(extended) key usage extension"));
+            continue;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+        if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA &&
+            ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk,
+                                ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve"));
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* If we get there, we got a winner */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */
+    if (cur != NULL) {
+        ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur;
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate",
+                              ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/*
+ * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc
+ * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
+                                 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type;
+#endif
+
+    suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id);
+    if (suite_info == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
+                              (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name));
+
+    if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version ||
+        suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
+        (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake "
+                                  "not configured or ext missing"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) &&
+        (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL ||
+         ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
+                                  "no common elliptic curve"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+    /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
+     * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) &&
+        ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+    /*
+     * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
+     * certificate/key of a particular type:
+     * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or
+     * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't
+     * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list.
+     */
+    if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
+                                  "no suitable certificate"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
+     * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
+    sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info);
+    if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
+        mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+            ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
+                                  "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+    *ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during
+   ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is
+   not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret, got_common_suite;
+    size_t i, j;
+    size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset;
+    size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len;
+#endif
+    unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
+#endif
+    int handshake_failure = 0;
+    const int *ciphersuites;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+    /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present,
+     * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed
+     * signature-hash pairs. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello"));
+
+    /*
+     * Fetch the expected ClientHello handshake message. Do not ask
+     * mbedtls_ssl_read_record() to update the handshake digest, because the
+     * ClientHello may already have been read in ssl_tls13_process_client_hello()
+     * or as a post-handshake message (renegotiation). In those cases we need
+     * to update the digest ourselves, and it is simpler to do so
+     * unconditionally than to track whether it is needed.
+     */
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record ", ret);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+        /*
+         * In the case of an alert message corresponding to the termination of
+         * a previous connection, `ssl_parse_record_header()` and then
+         * `mbedtls_ssl_read_record()` may return
+         * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD because of a non zero epoch.
+         *
+         * Historically, the library has returned
+         * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE in this situation.
+         * The sample program dtls_server.c relies on this behavior
+         * (see
+         * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/d5e35a376bee23fad0b17f2e3e94a32ce4017c64/programs/ssl/dtls_server.c#L295),
+         * and user applications may rely on it as well.
+         *
+         * For compatibility, map MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
+         * to MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE here.
+         *
+         * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD does not appear to be
+         * used to detect a specific error condition, so this mapping
+         * should not remove any meaningful distinction.
+         */
+        if ((ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+            && (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE)
+#endif
+            ) {
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mapping UNEXPECTED_RECORD to UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE"));
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+            }
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Update the handshake checksum.
+     *
+     * Note that the checksum must be updated before parsing the extensions
+     * because ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext() may decrypt the ticket in place
+     * and therefore modify the ClientHello message. This occurs when using
+     * the Mbed TLS ssl_ticket.c implementation.
+     */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    buf = ssl->in_msg;
+    msg_len = ssl->in_hslen;
+
+    /*
+     * Handshake layer:
+     *     0  .   0   handshake type
+     *     1  .   3   handshake length
+     *     4  .   5   DTLS only: message sequence number
+     *     6  .   8   DTLS only: fragment offset
+     *     9  .  11   DTLS only: fragment length
+     */
+    if ((ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) ||
+        (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+    msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+    /*
+     * ClientHello layout:
+     *     0  .   1   protocol version
+     *     2  .  33   random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time)
+     *    34  .  34   session id length (1 byte)
+     *    35  . 34+x  session id, where x = session id length from byte 34
+     *   35+x . 35+x  DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
+     *   36+x .  ..   DTLS only: cookie
+     *    ..  .  ..   ciphersuite list length (2 bytes)
+     *    ..  .  ..   ciphersuite list
+     *    ..  .  ..   compression alg. list length (1 byte)
+     *    ..  .  ..   compression alg. list
+     *    ..  .  ..   extensions length (2 bytes, optional)
+     *    ..  .  ..   extensions (optional)
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
+     * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
+     * read at least up to session id length without worrying.
+     */
+    if (msg_len < 38) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check and save the protocol version
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2);
+
+    ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf,
+                                                                               ssl->conf->transport);
+    ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
+    ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint;
+
+    if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Save client random (inc. Unix time)
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32);
+
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the session ID length and save session ID
+     */
+    sess_len = buf[34];
+
+    if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) ||
+        sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) { /* 2 for cipherlist length field */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len);
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
+    memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0,
+           sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id));
+    memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35,
+           ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the cookie length and content
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len;
+        cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset];
+
+        if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie",
+                              buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+        if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+            && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
+#endif
+            ) {
+            if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+                                          buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len,
+                                          ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed"));
+                ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1;
+            } else {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed"));
+                ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0;
+            }
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+        {
+            /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */
+            if (cookie_len != 0) {
+                /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+            }
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped"));
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later)
+         */
+        ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len;
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+    ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len;
+
+    ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset);
+
+    if (ciph_len < 2 ||
+        ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */
+        (ciph_len % 2) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
+                          buf + ciph_offset + 2,  ciph_len);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the compression algorithm's length.
+     * The list contents are ignored because implementing
+     * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only
+     * option supported by Mbed TLS.
+     */
+    comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len;
+
+    comp_len = buf[comp_offset];
+
+    if (comp_len < 1 ||
+        comp_len > 16 ||
+        comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression",
+                          buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len);
+
+    /*
+     * Check the extension length
+     */
+    ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len;
+    if (msg_len > ext_offset) {
+        if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset);
+
+        if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+    } else {
+        ext_len = 0;
+    }
+
+    ext = buf + ext_offset + 2;
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len);
+
+    while (ext_len != 0) {
+        unsigned int ext_id;
+        unsigned int ext_size;
+        if (ext_len < 4) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+        ext_id   = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0);
+        ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2);
+
+        if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                           MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+        switch (ext_id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension"));
+                ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4,
+                                                        ext + 4 + ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension"));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+                renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
+#endif
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension"));
+
+                ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1;
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+                defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+                defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported point formats extension"));
+                ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT;
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found max fragment length extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found extended master secret extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension"));
+                /*
+                 * If the Mbed TLS ssl_ticket.c implementation is used, the
+                 * ticket is decrypted in place. This modifies the ClientHello
+                 * message in the input buffer.
+                 */
+                ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension"));
+
+                ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4,
+                                                 ext + 4 + ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+            case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension"));
+
+                ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+                break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)",
+                                          ext_id));
+        }
+
+        ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
+        ext += 4 + ext_size;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+
+    /*
+     * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client
+     * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations.
+     */
+    if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) {
+        uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
+        const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA,
+                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1),
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA,
+                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1),
+#endif
+            MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE
+        };
+
+        MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0])
+                              <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE,
+                              "default_sig_algs is too big");
+
+        memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs));
+    }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
+     */
+    for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) {
+        if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO "));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+            if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
+                                          "during renegotiation"));
+                mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                               MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            }
+#endif
+            ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Renegotiation security checks
+     */
+    if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+        ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+             ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+             renegotiation_info_seen == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+               ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+               ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+               renegotiation_info_seen == 1) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)"));
+        handshake_failure = 1;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+    if (handshake_failure == 1) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions)
+     */
+    if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL;
+    ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Search for a matching ciphersuite
+     * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions
+     * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension
+     * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.)
+     */
+    got_common_suite = 0;
+    ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
+    ciphersuite_info = NULL;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) {
+        for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) {
+            for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) {
+                if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                got_common_suite = 1;
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
+                                                 &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
+                    goto have_ciphersuite;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) {
+            for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) {
+                if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                got_common_suite = 1;
+
+                if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
+                                                 &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) {
+                    return ret;
+                }
+
+                if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
+                    goto have_ciphersuite;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (got_common_suite) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, "
+                                  "but none of them usable"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+have_ciphersuite:
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name));
+
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i];
+    ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)                         && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+    if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
+        unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+            ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u",
+                                  sig_hash));
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
+                                  "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg));
+    }
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                              unsigned char *buf,
+                              size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    size_t ext_len;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if
+     * the client hasn't offered it. */
+    if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
+     * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
+    if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension"));
+
+    /*
+     *   struct {
+     *      opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+     *   } ConnectionId;
+     */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+    ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
+    memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len);
+
+    *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM)
+static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           unsigned char *buf,
+                                           size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
+     * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
+     * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
+     * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
+     */
+    suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+        ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+    if (suite == NULL) {
+        ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED;
+    } else {
+        mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode =
+            mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite(
+                ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac,
+                suite);
+
+        if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) {
+            ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      unsigned char *buf,
+                                      size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret "
+                              "extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                         unsigned char *buf,
+                                         size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+
+    *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                        unsigned char *buf,
+                                        size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+        *p++ = 0x00;
+        *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF;
+        *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF;
+
+        memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
+        p += ssl->verify_data_len;
+        memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
+        p += ssl->verify_data_len;
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+    {
+        *p++ = 0x00;
+        *p++ = 0x01;
+        *p++ = 0x00;
+    }
+
+    *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                              unsigned char *buf,
+                                              size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 1;
+
+    *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;
+
+    *olen = 5;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                                  unsigned char *buf,
+                                                  size_t *olen)
+{
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    ((void) ssl);
+
+    if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts &
+         MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) {
+        *olen = 0;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 2;
+
+    *p++ = 1;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+    *olen = 6;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                      unsigned char *buf,
+                                      size_t *olen)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = buf;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+    size_t kkpp_len;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    /* Skip costly computation if not needed */
+    if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
+        MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+
+    if (end - p < 4) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+    ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                          p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len,
+                                          MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+        psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#else
+    ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                          p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len,
+                                          ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+
+    *olen = kkpp_len + 4;
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   unsigned char *buf,
+                                   size_t *olen)
+{
+    size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0;
+    uint16_t profile_value = 0;
+    const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+    *olen = 0;
+
+    if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+        (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension"));
+
+    if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) {
+        mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+    }
+
+    /* The extension total size is 9 bytes :
+     * - 2 bytes for the extension tag
+     * - 2 bytes for the total size
+     * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length
+     * - 2 bytes for the protection profile
+     * - 1 byte for the mki length
+     * +  the actual mki length
+     * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */
+    if ((size_t) (end - buf) < mki_len + 9) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* extension */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0);
+    /*
+     * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes)
+     *              and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki  )
+     */
+    ext_len = 5 + mki_len;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, buf, 2);
+
+    /* protection profile length: 2 */
+    buf[4] = 0x00;
+    buf[5] = 0x02;
+    profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
+        ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
+    if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, buf, 6);
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile"));
+        return;
+    }
+
+    buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF;
+    memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len);
+
+    *olen = 9 + mki_len;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
+    unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request"));
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *   ProtocolVersion server_version;
+     *   opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
+     * } HelloVerifyRequest;
+     */
+
+    /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated
+     * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2);
+    p += 2;
+
+    /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */
+    if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Skip length byte until we know the length */
+    cookie_len_byte = p++;
+
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+                                         &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
+                                         ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char) (p - (cookie_len_byte + 1));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte);
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg);
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT);
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+        (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp;
+    mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+    /* Resume is 0  by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
+     * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */
+    if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) {
+        return;
+    }
+    if (session->id_len == 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+    if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL) {
+        return;
+    }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+    if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+        return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp);
+
+    ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache,
+                                 session->id,
+                                 session->id_len,
+                                 &session_tmp);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) {
+        /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
+    /* Move semantics */
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session);
+    *session = session_tmp;
+    memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp));
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache"));
+    ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
+
+exit:
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp);
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    mbedtls_time_t t;
+#endif
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
+    unsigned char *buf, *p;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+        ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated"));
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));
+
+        return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+    /*
+     *     0  .   0   handshake type
+     *     1  .   3   handshake length
+     *     4  .   5   protocol version
+     *     6  .   9   UNIX time()
+     *    10  .  37   random bytes
+     */
+    buf = ssl->out_msg;
+    p = buf + 4;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version);
+    p += 2;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
+                              buf[4], buf[5]));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    t = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0);
+    p += 4;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
+                              (long long) t));
+#else
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    p += 4;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+    p += 20;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+    /*
+     * RFC 8446
+     * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's
+     * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in
+     * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random
+     * value specially in their ServerHello.
+     */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) {
+        static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] =
+        { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 };
+
+        MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(
+            sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8,
+            "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size");
+
+        memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string,
+               sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string));
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) {
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+    p += 8;
+
+    memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32);
+
+    ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl);
+
+    if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) {
+        /*
+         * New session, create a new session id,
+         * unless we're about to issue a session ticket
+         */
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+        ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+        if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
+            ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
+            memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32);
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+        {
+            ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
+            if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+                                        n)) != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        }
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * Resuming a session
+         */
+        n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     *    38  .  38     session id length
+     *    39  . 38+n    session id
+     *   39+n . 40+n    chosen ciphersuite
+     *   41+n . 41+n    chosen compression alg.
+     *   42+n . 43+n    extensions length
+     *   44+n . 43+n+m  extensions
+     */
+    *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+    memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+    p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3,   "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n);
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed",
+                              ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no"));
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0);
+    p += 2;
+    *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
+                              mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)));
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
+                              (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL));
+
+    /*
+     *  First write extensions, then the total length
+     */
+    ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+    ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+    ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM)
+    ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+    ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+    ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite =
+        mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+    if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) {
+        ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+        ext_len += olen;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+    unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4;
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen))
+        != 0) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+    ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+    ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                              ext_len));
+
+    if (ext_len > 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+        p += 2 + ext_len;
+    }
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = (size_t) (p - buf);
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
+    size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
+    unsigned char *buf, *p;
+    const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+    const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
+    int authmode;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) {
+        authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
+    } else
+#endif
+    authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) ||
+        authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     *     0  .   0   handshake type
+     *     1  .   3   handshake length
+     *     4  .   4   cert type count
+     *     5  .. m-1  cert types
+     *     m  .. m+1  sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
+     *    m+1 .. n-1  SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
+     *     n  .. n+1  length of all DNs
+     *    n+2 .. n+3  length of DN 1
+     *    n+4 .. ...  Distinguished Name #1
+     *    ... .. ...  length of DN 2, etc.
+     */
+    buf = ssl->out_msg;
+    p = buf + 4;
+
+    /*
+     * Supported certificate types
+     *
+     *     ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+     *     enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType;
+     */
+    ct_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+    p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+    p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+
+    p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++;
+    p += ct_len;
+
+    sa_len = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
+     *
+     *     SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+     *
+     *     struct {
+     *           HashAlgorithm hash;
+     *           SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+     *     } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+     *
+     *     enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm;
+     *     enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm;
+     */
+    const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl);
+    if (sig_alg == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+    }
+
+    for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) {
+        unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg);
+
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the
+         * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the
+         * partial list including that element. */
+        sa_len += 2;
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len);
+
+    }
+
+    /* Fill in list length. */
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0);
+    sa_len += 2;
+    p += sa_len;
+
+    /*
+     * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+     * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+     */
+    p += 2;
+
+    total_dn_size = 0;
+
+    if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list ==  MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) {
+        /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned
+         *       via a CA callback (configured through
+         *       `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
+         *       CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+        if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) {
+            crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints;
+        } else
+#endif
+        if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) {
+            crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints;
+        } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
+            crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+        } else
+#endif
+        crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+
+        while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) {
+            /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length
+             * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */
+            dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len;
+
+            if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short"));
+                break;
+            }
+
+            MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0);
+            p += 2;
+            memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size);
+            p += dn_size;
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size);
+
+            total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size);
+            crt = crt->next;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = (size_t) (p - buf);
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len);
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request"));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED))
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_pk_context *pk;
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
+    psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
+    size_t key_len;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+    uint16_t tls_id = 0;
+    psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+    mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+    mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+    pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+
+    if (pk == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
+
+    switch (pk_type) {
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+            if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+            }
+
+            /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in
+             * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */
+            status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes);
+            if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+                ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+                goto exit;
+            }
+            ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes);
+            ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+            if (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
+                /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK
+                 * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need
+                 * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with
+                 * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type
+                 * and bits that we just got above. */
+                key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+                psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+                psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+                psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes,
+                                 PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type));
+                psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+                status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len);
+                if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+                    ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+                    goto exit;
+                }
+                status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len,
+                                        &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+                if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+                    ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+                    goto exit;
+                }
+
+                /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty
+                 * to clear it exit. */
+                ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0;
+
+                ret = 0;
+                break;
+            }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+            /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS)
+             * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags
+             * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */
+            ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id;
+            ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1;
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+        case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+            key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+            grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
+            if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+            }
+            tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id);
+            if (tls_id == 0) {
+                /* This elliptic curve is not supported */
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+            }
+
+            /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will
+               be, so there is no need to check the return value here */
+            mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type,
+                                                       &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+            ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+
+            key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+            psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+            psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+            psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes,
+                             PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type));
+            psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+            ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(key, &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf));
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+                break;
+            }
+
+            status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len,
+                                    &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+                ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+                mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+                break;
+            }
+
+            mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+            ret = 0;
+            break;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+        default:
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes);
+    mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+    if (private_key == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                       mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)),
+                                       MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                          size_t *signature_len)
+{
+    /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
+     * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
+     * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
+     * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
+     * ssl->out_msglen. */
+    unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2;
+    size_t sig_max_len = (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+                          - sig_start);
+    int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl,
+                                        sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len);
+    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
+        mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
+          defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
+
+/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including
+ * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the
+ * signature and sending the message. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           size_t *signature_len)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+    unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+    (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+    (void) signature_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+    size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#else
+    size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+    ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */
+
+    /*
+     *
+     * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite.
+     *
+     */
+
+    /*
+     * - ECJPAKE key exchanges
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+        unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+                               ssl->out_msglen;
+        size_t output_offset = 0;
+        size_t output_len = 0;
+
+        /*
+         * The first 3 bytes are:
+         * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+         * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+         *
+         * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its
+         * TLS ID here
+         */
+        uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(
+            MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
+        if (tls_id == 0) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+        }
+        *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1);
+        output_offset += 3;
+
+        ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+                                              out_p + output_offset,
+                                              end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len,
+                                              MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+            psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        output_offset += output_len;
+        ssl->out_msglen += output_offset;
+#else
+        size_t len = 0;
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
+            &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+            ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len,
+            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        ssl->out_msglen += len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support
+     * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature,
+     * we use empty support identity hints here.
+     **/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)   || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     * - DHE key exchanges
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        size_t len = 0;
+
+        if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Ephemeral DH parameters:
+         *
+         * struct {
+         *     opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
+         *     opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
+         *     opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
+         * } ServerDHParams;
+         */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                         &ssl->conf->dhm_P,
+                                         &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params(
+                 &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                 (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx),
+                 ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len,
+                 ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+        dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+#endif
+
+        ssl->out_msglen += len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G);
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     * - ECDHE key exchanges
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        /*
+         * Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
+         *
+         * struct {
+         *     ECParameters curve_params;
+         *     ECPoint      public;
+         * } ServerECDHParams;
+         */
+        uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id;
+        const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl);
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        size_t len = 0;
+
+        /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
+        if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) {
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+        }
+        for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) {
+            for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id;
+                 *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) {
+                if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) {
+                    goto curve_matching_done;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+curve_matching_done:
+        if (*curr_tls_id == 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s",
+                                  mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id)));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+        psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+        uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+        const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2),
+                                      // data length(1)
+        const size_t data_length_size = 1;
+        psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+        size_t ec_bits = 0;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."));
+
+        /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id,
+                                                       &key_type,
+                                                       &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse."));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        }
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits;
+
+        key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+        psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+        psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+        psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type);
+        psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+        /*
+         * ECParameters curve_params
+         *
+         * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve
+         */
+        *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+
+        /*
+         * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
+         */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0);
+        p += 2;
+
+        /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+        status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes,
+                                  &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * ECPoint  public
+         *
+         * First byte is data length.
+         * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location.
+         */
+
+        /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+         * Make one byte space for the length.
+         */
+        unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size;
+
+        size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+                                              - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg));
+
+        status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+                                       &len);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret);
+            (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Store the length of the exported public key. */
+        *p = (uint8_t) len;
+
+        /* Determine full message length. */
+        len += header_size;
+#else
+        mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id =
+            mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id);
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                      curr_grp_id)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(
+                 &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len,
+                 ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+                 MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen,
+                 ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+        dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+#endif
+
+        ssl->out_msglen += len;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */
+
+    /*
+     *
+     * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the
+     *         exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here.
+     *
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        if (dig_signed == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed);
+        size_t hashlen = 0;
+        unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+        int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+        /*
+         * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
+         *      For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
+         *      to choose appropriate hash.
+         */
+
+        mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
+            mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+
+        unsigned char sig_hash =
+            (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+                ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg));
+
+        mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash);
+
+        /*    For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
+         *    (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */
+        if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            /* (... because we choose a cipher suite
+             *      only if there is a matching hash.) */
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg));
+
+        /*
+         * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
+         */
+        if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen,
+                                                         dig_signed,
+                                                         dig_signed_len,
+                                                         md_alg);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
+        } else {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen);
+
+        /*
+         * 2.3: Compute and add the signature
+         */
+        /*
+         * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through
+         * a prefix to the signature.
+         *
+         * struct {
+         *    HashAlgorithm hash;
+         *    SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+         * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+         *
+         * struct {
+         *    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
+         *    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
+         * } DigitallySigned;
+         *
+         */
+
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg);
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+        if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) {
+            ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl,
+                                                mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
+                                                md_alg, hash, hashlen);
+            switch (ret) {
+                case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
+                    /* act as if f_async_sign was null */
+                    break;
+                case 0:
+                    ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+                    return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len);
+                case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
+                    ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+                    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
+                default:
+                    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret);
+                    return ret;
+            }
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+        }
+
+        /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
+         * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
+         * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
+         * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
+         * ssl->out_msglen. */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl),
+                                   md_alg, hash, hashlen,
+                                   ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2,
+                                   out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2,
+                                   signature_len,
+                                   ssl->conf->f_rng,
+                                   ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
+ * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
+ * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state
+ * machine. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t signature_len = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
+    /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange
+     * is not needed. */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters
+         * from certificate at this point. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) {
+            ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */
+
+        /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use
+         * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+    /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing
+     * signature operation, resume signing. */
+    if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation"));
+        ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
+    } else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
+          defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
+    {
+        /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */
+        ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen
+         * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message,
+         * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be
+         * preserved. */
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange (pending)"));
+        } else {
+            ssl->out_msglen = 0;
+        }
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    /* If there is a signature, write its length.
+     * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature
+     * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+    if (signature_len != 0) {
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(signature_len);
+        ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(signature_len);
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature",
+                              ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+                              signature_len);
+
+        /* Skip over the already-written signature */
+        ssl->out_msglen += signature_len;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+    /* Add header and send. */
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange"));
+    return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done"));
+
+    ssl->out_msglen  = 4;
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+    if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+        (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                       \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
+                                      const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    size_t n;
+
+    /*
+     * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
+     */
+    if (*p + 2 > end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0);
+    *p += 2;
+
+    if (*p + n > end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    *p += n;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                           \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                  unsigned char *peer_pms,
+                                  size_t *peer_pmslen,
+                                  size_t peer_pmssize)
+{
+    int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl,
+                                        peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize);
+    if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
+        mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
+    }
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret);
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                     const unsigned char *p,
+                                     const unsigned char *end,
+                                     unsigned char *peer_pms,
+                                     size_t *peer_pmslen,
+                                     size_t peer_pmssize)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl);
+    if (own_cert == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no local certificate"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+    }
+    mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk;
+    mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+    size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+    /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing
+     * decryption operation, resume signing. */
+    if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation"));
+        return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl,
+                                      peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize);
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+    /*
+     * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
+     */
+    if (p + 2 > end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) ||
+        *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (p + len != end) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Decrypt the premaster secret
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+    if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) {
+        ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl,
+                                               mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
+                                               p, len);
+        switch (ret) {
+            case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
+                /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */
+                break;
+            case 0:
+                ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+                return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl,
+                                              peer_pms,
+                                              peer_pmslen,
+                                              peer_pmssize);
+            case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
+                ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
+            default:
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret);
+                return ret;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len,
+                             peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize,
+                             ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   const unsigned char *p,
+                                   const unsigned char *end,
+                                   size_t pms_offset)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
+    unsigned char ver[2];
+    unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
+    size_t peer_pmslen;
+    mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff;
+
+    /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
+     * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
+     * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
+     * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0.
+     * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This
+     * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory,
+     * even if it's an unsigned char). */
+    peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
+    peer_pmslen = 0;
+
+    ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end,
+                                    peer_pms,
+                                    &peer_pmslen,
+                                    sizeof(peer_pms));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        return ret;
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport,
+                              ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version);
+
+    /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
+     * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
+     * attacks. */
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret);
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48));
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0]));
+    diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1]));
+
+    /*
+     * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
+     * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
+     * bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
+     * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must
+     * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was
+     * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret,
+     * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not.
+     */
+    ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms));
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal
+         * anything about the RSA decryption. */
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+    if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset ||
+        sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
+
+    /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
+     * data-dependent branches. */
+    mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
+                                         const unsigned char *end)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    uint16_t n;
+
+    if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Receive client pre-shared key identity name
+     */
+    if (end - *p < 2) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0);
+    *p += 2;
+
+    if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) {
+        if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
+         * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
+        if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
+            mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n);
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+    }
+
+    *p += n;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+    unsigned char *p, *end;
+
+    ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \
+    (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED))
+    if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
+         ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) &&
+        (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) {
+        /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous
+         * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the
+         * record. */
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record"));
+    } else
+#endif
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+    end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
+
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (p != end) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                           ssl->handshake->premaster,
+                                           MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
+                                           &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) ||                     \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) ||                   \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||                      \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+        ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++);
+        size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p);
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key."));
+
+        /*
+         * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data)
+         */
+        if (buf_len < 2) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      buf_len));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+                                      " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      data_len, buf_len));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
+        if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+                                      " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+                                      data_len,
+                                      sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+        memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len);
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len;
+
+        /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+        status = psa_raw_key_agreement(
+            PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+            handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster),
+            &handshake->pmslen);
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret);
+            if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) {
+                (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            }
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) {
+            status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+
+            if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+                ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret);
+                return ret;
+            }
+        }
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#else
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                            p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                            &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                            ssl->handshake->premaster,
+                                            MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
+                                            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+          MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (p != end) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+                                                    (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+                                                    key_exchange)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+        if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+            /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to
+             * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip
+             * directly to resuming this operation. */
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed"));
+            /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
+             * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */
+            p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2;
+        } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+                                                    (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+                                                    key_exchange)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if (p != end) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+        unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+        size_t pms_len;
+
+        /* Write length only when we know the actual value */
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+                                           pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len,
+                                           ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0);
+        pms += 2 + pms_len;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+#else
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+                                                    (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+                                                    key_exchange)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+        size_t ecpoint_len;
+
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
+        if (p >= end) {
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        ecpoint_len = *(p++);
+        if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) {
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account
+           the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits.
+           The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any
+           possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+        if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+            psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+            handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        }
+#else
+        MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX,
+                              "peer key buffer too small");
+#endif
+
+        memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len);
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
+        p += ecpoint_len;
+
+        /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+         * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+         * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+         * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+         * - the PSK itself
+         */
+        unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+        const unsigned char * const psm_end =
+            psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+        /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+        const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+        size_t zlen = 0;
+
+        /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+        status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
+                                       handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+                                       psm + zlen_size,
+                                       psm_end - (psm + zlen_size),
+                                       &zlen);
+
+        destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+        handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+        if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+        } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status);
+        }
+
+        /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+        MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0);
+        psm += zlen_size + zlen;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                                            p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+                               MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);
+
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+                                                    (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+                                                    key_exchange)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) {
+        if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+    if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+        if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+                 &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p),
+                 MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) {
+            psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+            psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#else
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                             p, (size_t) (end - p));
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret);
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+                                            ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+                                            ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+        if (ret != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+    {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+    return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    size_t i, sig_len;
+    unsigned char hash[48];
+    unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
+    size_t hashlen;
+    mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+    mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+    mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));
+
+    if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+        mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+    /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(ssl);
+
+    /* Process the message contents */
+    if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
+        ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+    peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+        /* Should never happen */
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+    peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+    /*
+     *  struct {
+     *     SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
+     *     opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
+     *  } DigitallySigned;
+     */
+    if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Hash
+     */
+    md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]);
+
+    if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
+                                  " for verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
+    if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) {
+        hash_start += 16;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
+    hashlen = 0;
+
+    i++;
+
+    /*
+     * Signature
+     */
+    if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i]))
+        == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
+                                  " for verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
+     */
+    if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+    }
+
+    i++;
+
+    if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i);
+    i += 2;
+
+    if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Calculate hash and verify signature */
+    {
+        size_t dummy_hlen;
+        ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen);
+        if (0 != ret) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret);
+            return ret;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk,
+                                 md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
+                                 ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+    if (0 != ret) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify"));
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t tlen = 0;
+    uint32_t lifetime = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket"));
+
+    ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+    ssl->out_msg[0]  = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+
+    /*
+     * struct {
+     *     uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
+     *     opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
+     * } NewSessionTicket;
+     *
+     * 4  .  7   ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified)
+     * 8  .  9   ticket_len (n)
+     * 10 .  9+n ticket content
+     */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+    ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time();
+#endif
+    if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket,
+                                         ssl->session_negotiate,
+                                         ssl->out_msg + 10,
+                                         ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
+                                         &tlen, &lifetime)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret);
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4);
+    MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8);
+    ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen;
+
+    /*
+     * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and
+     * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state.
+     */
+    ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+
+    if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket"));
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+/*
+ * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state));
+
+    switch (ssl->state) {
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO);
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  <==   ClientHello
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+#endif
+
+        /*
+         *  ==>   ServerHello
+         *        Certificate
+         *      ( ServerKeyExchange  )
+         *      ( CertificateRequest )
+         *        ServerHelloDone
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+            ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+            ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+            ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+            ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  <== ( Certificate/Alert  )
+         *        ClientKeyExchange
+         *      ( CertificateVerify  )
+         *        ChangeCipherSpec
+         *        Finished
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+            ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+            ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        /*
+         *  ==> ( NewSessionTicket )
+         *        ChangeCipherSpec
+         *        Finished
+         */
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+            if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
+                ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+            } else
+#endif
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done"));
+            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP);
+            break;
+
+        case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+            mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state));
+            return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order)
+{
+    conf->respect_cli_pref = order;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */