@scalebun/react-native 1.10.5 → 1.10.7

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/loadEd25519.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"use strict";
+
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
+  value: true
+});
+exports.loadEd25519 = loadEd25519;
+/**
+ * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/ed25519` dep.
+ *
+ * WHY ITS OWN FILE: Metro's dependency collector emits a dependency map one
+ * entry short for a module containing TWO OR MORE different-string inline
+ * `require()` calls, so the require indices desync and `_dependencyMap[N]`
+ * reads `undefined` ("Requiring unknown module 'undefined'"). Exactly ONE
+ * inline require per module avoids the miscount. `loadSha512` is a sibling file
+ * for the same reason — see `push/adapters/loadNotifee.ts`, which hit this first.
+ *
+ * The string must still be STATICALLY resolvable at bundle time; hosts that do
+ * not install it stub it via `withScaleBun`.
+ */
+
+/** The subset of the @noble/ed25519 surface this SDK uses. */
+
+function loadEd25519() {
+  try {
+    const mod = require('@noble/ed25519');
+    const ed = mod?.default ?? mod;
+    // Validate the API actually used, not mere truthiness: when the package
+    // is absent `withScaleBun` resolves it to an EMPTY STUB MODULE, which is
+    // a perfectly truthy object. A stub must read as "unavailable", because
+    // treating it as available would make every signed update fail with a
+    // crypto error instead of the actionable "no verifier" message.
+    if (typeof ed?.verifyAsync === 'function' || typeof ed?.verify === 'function') {
+      return ed;
+    }
+    return null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=loadEd25519.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/loadSha512.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+"use strict";
+
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
+  value: true
+});
+exports.loadSha512 = loadSha512;
+/**
+ * Isolated lazy loader for the OPTIONAL `@noble/hashes` SHA-512.
+ *
+ * Separate file from `loadEd25519` because Metro miscounts a module holding two
+ * different-string inline `require()` calls — see the comment there.
+ *
+ * ed25519 is defined in terms of SHA-512, and React Native has no native
+ * SHA-512, so @noble/ed25519 cannot verify anything until a hash provider is
+ * wired into it. Which property it expects differs by major version, so the
+ * wiring lives in `builtinVerifier`, not here; this module only obtains the
+ * function.
+ */
+
+function loadSha512() {
+  try {
+    // The `.js` SUFFIX IS REQUIRED, not stylistic. @noble/hashes v2 declares
+    // its exports map with extensions — `"./sha2.js"`, not `"./sha2"` — so
+    // the extensionless form misses the map entirely. Node still resolves it
+    // by falling back to file-based lookup, which is why it passes here,
+    // but Metro prints
+    //   "Attempted to import … not listed in the exports … Falling back to
+    //    file-based resolution"
+    // on every bundle, and that fallback is exactly what a stricter resolver
+    // (or a future Metro) drops. Caught while bundling a real Expo app.
+    const mod = require('@noble/hashes/sha2.js');
+    const sha512 = mod?.sha512 ?? mod?.default?.sha512;
+    // A stubbed module yields undefined here, which correctly reads as
+    // "unavailable" rather than throwing deep inside the curve code later.
+    return typeof sha512 === 'function' ? sha512 : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=loadSha512.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/crypto/nativeVerifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+"use strict";
+
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
+  value: true
+});
+exports._resetNativeVerifier = _resetNativeVerifier;
+exports.getNativeVerifier = getNativeVerifier;
+var _NativeScaleBunOta = _interopRequireDefault(require("../../../specs/NativeScaleBunOta"));
+var _internalLogger = require("../../../core/logger/internalLogger");
+var _builtinVerifier = require("./builtinVerifier");
+function _interopRequireDefault(e) { return e && e.__esModule ? e : { default: e }; }
+/**
+ * Native ed25519 verifier — platform crypto wrapped as a SignatureVerifier.
+ *
+ * WHY IT EXISTS. The built-in @noble verifier runs in JS, inside the very
+ * bundle it protects: an attacker who lands one malicious bundle can neuter a
+ * JS check for every update after it. Platform crypto (CryptoKit on iOS,
+ * Android's conscrypt on API 33+) sits outside the bundle's reach — and using
+ * it also drops the runtime dependency on the optional @noble peers wherever
+ * the OS provides ed25519.
+ *
+ * WHAT IT DOES NOT FIX, stated plainly: the ORCHESTRATION still lives in JS.
+ * A hostile bundle can skip calling any verifier and drive the native staging
+ * methods directly. Moving the crypto native shrinks the attack surface (no
+ * more tampering with a bundled crypto lib to flip a verdict) but the full
+ * close needs native-ENFORCED staging with a natively-pinned key — an
+ * architectural change tracked separately, not smuggled into this one.
+ *
+ * VERDICT CONTRACT (mirrors the spec): the native side resolves
+ * 'valid' | 'invalid' | 'unavailable'. 'invalid' is a definitive NO.
+ * 'unavailable' (Android < 33, malformed input, machinery failure) means this
+ * source cannot answer — the composed verifier below then delegates to the
+ * @noble builtin, and when that is absent too it THROWS, which the policy
+ * layer converts to a rejection. Every path that cannot verify refuses.
+ */
+
+const ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS = 64;
+
+/** bytes → lowercase hex (the native side takes clean hex only). */
+function bytesToHex(bytes) {
+  let out = '';
+  for (const b of bytes) out += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Strict lowercase-hex normalization; null when the value is not hex. */
+function normalizeHex(value, expectedChars) {
+  const clean = value.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (clean.length !== expectedChars || /[^0-9a-f]/.test(clean)) return null;
+  return clean;
+}
+let resolved;
+
+/**
+ * The native-first verifier, or null when the native module (or its
+ * verifyEd25519 method — an app running new JS against an old binary) is
+ * absent. Cached like the builtin: module availability does not change at
+ * runtime, and this is consulted on every update check.
+ */
+function getNativeVerifier() {
+  if (resolved !== undefined) return resolved;
+  const native = _NativeScaleBunOta.default;
+  if (!native || typeof native.verifyEd25519 !== 'function') {
+    // Old binary, Jest, web/SSR — not an error, just not this source.
+    resolved = null;
+    return null;
+  }
+  resolved = async ({
+    messageHex,
+    signature,
+    publicKey
+  }) => {
+    // All decoding and validation happens HERE, in one place, so both
+    // platforms' native code only ever sees clean fixed-length hex. The
+    // signature may arrive hex or base64 (the wire allows both) — reuse
+    // the builtin's decoder rather than growing a second, subtly
+    // different one.
+    const message = normalizeHex(messageHex, 64);
+    const key = normalizeHex(publicKey, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX_CHARS);
+    const sigBytes = (0, _builtinVerifier.decodeSignature)(signature);
+    if (!message || !key || !sigBytes) {
+      // Same messages-by-symptom philosophy as the builtin: a mistyped
+      // key must not present as "every update is a forgery".
+      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Signature inputs malformed (bundle hash, signature, or public key) — refusing to stage.');
+      return false;
+    }
+    let verdict;
+    try {
+      verdict = await native.verifyEd25519(message, bytesToHex(sigBytes), key);
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A rejected promise is machinery failure, not a forgery verdict.
+      _internalLogger.logger.warn(`[OTA] Native ed25519 verify failed to run: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+      verdict = 'unavailable';
+    }
+    if (verdict === 'valid') return true;
+    if (verdict === 'invalid') return false;
+
+    // 'unavailable' (Android < 33) — fall back to the JS verifier so those
+    // devices keep verifying rather than losing enforcement.
+    const builtin = (0, _builtinVerifier.getBuiltinVerifier)();
+    if (builtin) {
+      return builtin({
+        messageHex,
+        signature,
+        publicKey
+      });
+    }
+    // No source can verify. Throwing (rather than returning false) keeps
+    // the policy layer's outcome labels honest: this surfaces as machinery
+    // failure with an actionable message, not as "the bundle is forged".
+    throw new Error('ed25519 unavailable: this OS has no native implementation (Android < 13) and the ' + 'optional peers @noble/ed25519 + @noble/hashes are not installed.');
+  };
+  __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.debug('[OTA] Using native ed25519 verifier (platform crypto).');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Test seam — clears the cached resolution. */
+function _resetNativeVerifier() {
+  resolved = undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=nativeVerifier.js.map

package/lib/commonjs/features/ota/signature.js

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", {
 exports._resetSignatureWarnings = _resetSignatureWarnings;
 exports.verifyBundleSignature = verifyBundleSignature;
 var _internalLogger = require("../../core/logger/internalLogger");
+var _builtinVerifier = require("./crypto/builtinVerifier");
+var _nativeVerifier = require("./crypto/nativeVerifier");
 /**
  * Bundle signature verification (OTA-03).
  *
@@ -19,10 +21,17 @@ var _internalLogger = require("../../core/logger/internalLogger");
  * download and nothing else. On a platform whose entire purpose is remote code
  * delivery, that is the control that matters most.
  *
- * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. The SDK ships zero third-party runtime
- * dependencies, and React Native has no built-in ed25519. So verification is
- * delegated to a host-provided verifier when one is installed, and the SDK's job
- * is to decide — unambiguously — what happens when there is not one.
+ * WHY IT IS SHAPED LIKE THIS. React Native has no built-in ed25519, so the
+ * verification primitive has to come from somewhere. It is resolved in order:
+ * a host-supplied verifier, else the built-in one assembled from the OPTIONAL
+ * `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` peers, else nothing — and the SDK's job is
+ * to decide, unambiguously, what happens in that last case.
+ *
+ * The built-in path exists because requiring every adopter to hand-write a
+ * verifier put the most security-critical operation in the product in code the
+ * SDK could neither test nor audit, and made a routine dependency bump able to
+ * silently stop all updates. See `crypto/builtinVerifier.ts`. Signing stays
+ * opt-in, and apps that never adopt it carry no curve arithmetic.
  *
  * THE POLICY, which is the important part:
  *
@@ -52,10 +61,16 @@ let warnedNotConfigured = false;
  * different operational events and must not collapse into one.
  */
 async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
-  const publicKey = config?.publicKey;
+  const rawKey = config?.publicKey;
+
+  // Normalize to a list. A single non-empty string is the pre-rotation config
+  // shape and behaves exactly as before; an array pins several keys at once.
+  const keys = (Array.isArray(rawKey) ? rawKey : rawKey ? [rawKey] : []).filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0);
 
-  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce.
-  if (!publicKey) {
+  // Signing not adopted by this app — nothing to enforce. Parity note: a
+  // falsy single value (undefined, '') has always meant "not configured" and
+  // still does.
+  if (rawKey === undefined || rawKey === '' || rawKey === null) {
     if (!warnedNotConfigured) {
       warnedNotConfigured = true;
       _internalLogger.logger.warn('[OTA] No signing public key configured — bundles are accepted on SHA-256 ' + 'integrity alone. Configure `ota.publicSigningKey` to enforce authenticity.');
@@ -66,6 +81,19 @@ async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
     };
   }
 
+  // The host PROVIDED a key config that resolves to zero usable keys — an
+  // empty array, or an array of blank strings. That is a broken attempt to
+  // enable signing, not an absence of one, and the two must not collapse:
+  // treating `publicSigningKeys: []` as "not configured" would let a config
+  // mistake silently downgrade an app to unverified installs. Fail closed.
+  if (keys.length === 0) {
+    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Signing key config resolves to zero usable keys (empty array or blank ' + 'strings) — refusing to stage. Remove the config to disable signing, or pin ' + 'at least one real key.');
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'no_keys'
+    };
+  }
+
   // The app opted in, so a bundle without a signature is a refusal, not a pass.
   if (!signature) {
     _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle has no signature but a signing key is configured — refusing to stage.');
@@ -74,38 +102,70 @@ async function verifyBundleSignature(bundleSha256, signature, config) {
       reason: 'missing_signature'
     };
   }
-  if (typeof config?.verifier !== 'function') {
-    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Provide `ota.verifySignature` so signatures can be checked.');
+
+  // Resolution order, and the order matters:
+  //   1. A host-supplied verifier ALWAYS wins. A team with its own crypto
+  //      policy must be able to override whatever the SDK would otherwise pick.
+  //   2. Otherwise the NATIVE verifier (CryptoKit / Android 13+ platform
+  //      ed25519). Preferred over the JS one because it runs outside the
+  //      bundle it protects and needs no optional peers; on OS levels without
+  //      ed25519 it delegates to the builtin internally.
+  //   3. Otherwise the built-in @noble verifier, if the optional peers are
+  //      installed. This is the path that removes ~100 lines of hand-written
+  //      crypto plumbing from every app that adopts signing.
+  //   4. Otherwise reject, because a configured key is a request for
+  //      enforcement and quietly installing unverified code would turn a
+  //      security feature into a placebo.
+  const verifier = typeof config?.verifier === 'function' ? config.verifier : (0, _nativeVerifier.getNativeVerifier)() ?? (0, _builtinVerifier.getBuiltinVerifier)();
+  if (!verifier) {
+    _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] A signing key is configured but no signature verifier is available — ' + 'refusing to stage. Either install the optional peers ' + '`@noble/ed25519` and `@noble/hashes` (the SDK then verifies with no ' + 'further code), or provide your own `ota.verifySignature`.');
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'no_verifier'
     };
   }
-  try {
-    const valid = await config.verifier({
-      messageHex: bundleSha256,
-      signature,
-      publicKey
-    });
-    if (!valid) {
-      _internalLogger.logger.error('[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        reason: 'invalid_signature'
+
+  // Try every pinned key; any single match accepts. The verifier contract is
+  // unchanged (one key per call) so host-supplied verifiers keep working.
+  //
+  // Outcome labelling when nothing matched, and why it matters: if at least
+  // one verifier call RAN TO COMPLETION and said no, the bundle failed
+  // verification — 'invalid_signature'. Only when EVERY call threw is the
+  // machinery itself suspect — 'verifier_threw'. Collapsing those (e.g. by
+  // letting the last key's throw win) would point an investigation at the
+  // host's verifier when the actual event was a forged bundle, or vice versa.
+  let sawThrow = false;
+  let sawCompletion = false;
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    try {
+      const valid = await verifier({
+        messageHex: bundleSha256,
+        signature,
+        publicKey: key
+      });
+      sawCompletion = true;
+      if (valid) return {
+        ok: true,
+        reason: 'verified'
       };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification for this key,
+      // never as a pass — but the remaining keys still get their chance.
+      sawThrow = true;
+      _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
     }
-    return {
-      ok: true,
-      reason: 'verified'
-    };
-  } catch (err) {
-    // A throwing verifier is treated as a failed verification, never as a pass.
-    _internalLogger.logger.error(`[OTA] Signature verifier threw: ${err?.message ?? err}`);
+  }
+  if (sawThrow && !sawCompletion) {
     return {
       ok: false,
       reason: 'verifier_threw'
     };
   }
+  _internalLogger.logger.error(keys.length > 1 ? `[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID under all ${keys.length} pinned keys — refusing to stage.` : '[OTA] Bundle signature is INVALID — refusing to stage.');
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    reason: 'invalid_signature'
+  };
 }
 
 /** Test seam — resets the once-per-process "not configured" warning. */

package/lib/commonjs/metro/serializerCompose.js

@@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ function discoverArtifacts(packageRoot) {
   return out;
 }
 
+/** One-shot guard so an Expo build does not print the pass-through notice per bundle. */
+let warnedUnknownShape = false;
+
 /**
  * Build the composing serializer. `hostSerializer` is the app's own customSerializer, if any.
  */
@@ -94,6 +97,35 @@ function createComposingSerializer(artifacts, internals, hostSerializer) {
       const hostResult = await hostSerializer(entryPoint, preModules, graph, options);
       if (typeof hostResult === 'string') {
         code = hostResult;
+      } else if (hostResult && typeof hostResult.code !== 'string') {
+        /**
+         * A shape this wrapper does not understand — pass it back UNTOUCHED.
+         *
+         * Expo is the case that matters. `expo/metro-config` installs a
+         * serializer returning `{ artifacts: [...] }`, a multi-artifact
+         * shape with no top-level `code`. Reading `.code` off it yielded
+         * undefined, and returning `{ code: undefined, map }` made every
+         * `expo export:embed` die with:
+         *
+         *   Serializer did not return expected format. The project copy
+         *   of `expo/metro-config` may be out of date.
+         *
+         * — a message that sends you to upgrade Expo, which is not the
+         * problem. The result: `withScaleBun` broke PRODUCTION BUNDLING
+         * FOR EVERY EXPO APP, and the SDK's own marketing test app could
+         * not build. Found by bundling it.
+         *
+         * Passing it through costs ScaleBun's source-map composition on
+         * Expo (OTA stack traces stay mapped to the bundle rather than to
+         * original sources). That is a real loss and strictly better than
+         * a build that cannot run at all. Composing INTO an artifact
+         * array is the follow-up; it must not be guessed at here.
+         */
+        if (!warnedUnknownShape) {
+          warnedUnknownShape = true;
+          console.warn('[ScaleBun/metro] The host serializer returned a shape this SDK does not ' + 'compose (Expo returns { artifacts }). Passing it through unchanged — ' + 'the build is correct, but ScaleBun source-map composition is skipped.');
+        }
+        return hostResult;
       } else {
         code = hostResult.code;
         try {

package/lib/commonjs/public/ScaleBunFacade.js

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ var _debug = require("../debug");
 var _api = require("../features/replay/public/api");
 var _SDKBootstrapper = require("../bootstrap/SDKBootstrapper");
 var _EventTracker = require("../analytics/EventTracker");
+var _bridgeAdapter = require("../features/replay/bridge/adapters/bridgeAdapter");
 var _automaticEvents = require("../analytics/automaticEvents");
 var _eventLane = require("../analytics/eventLane");
 var _ConfigManager = require("../config/ConfigManager");
@@ -214,12 +215,17 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   /**
    * Boot the OTA orchestrator when the init config asks for it.
    *
-   * `publicSigningKey` is honoured here so signature enforcement is reachable
-   * from configuration alone. The SDK ships no ed25519 implementation, so a
-   * host that pins a key must also supply `ota.verifySignature`; pinning a key
-   * without a verifier is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
-   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather than
-   * letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
+   * `publicSigningKey` / `publicSigningKeys` are honoured here so signature
+   * enforcement is reachable from configuration alone. The list form exists
+   * for key ROTATION: a build pinning [old, new] keeps verifying while the
+   * server moves to the new key, so replacing a key never needs an emergency
+   * store release. Both fields merge (deduplicated) into one pinned set.
+   *
+   * Verification comes from `ota.verifySignature` when supplied, else the
+   * built-in @noble-based verifier (optional peers). Pinning keys with
+   * NEITHER available is fail-CLOSED by design (signature.ts) — an update
+   * that cannot be verified is not installed. We say that out loud rather
+   * than letting the app discover it as a silent no-update condition.
    */
   _maybeStartOta(rawConfig) {
     const ota = rawConfig?.ota;
@@ -231,15 +237,34 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
       const {
         otaOrchestrator
       } = require('../features/ota/OtaOrchestrator');
-      const publicKey = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawSingle = ota.publicSigningKey;
+      const rawList = ota.publicSigningKeys;
+      const publicKeys = Array.from(new Set([...(typeof rawSingle === 'string' && rawSingle ? [rawSingle] : []), ...(Array.isArray(rawList) ? rawList : [])].filter(k => typeof k === 'string' && k.trim().length > 0)));
+      // Signing was REQUESTED if a usable key exists, or the host passed a
+      // keys array at all — an empty one included. `publicSigningKeys: []`
+      // is a broken attempt to enable signing, and it must flow through to
+      // signature.ts's fail-closed handling, not silently disable signing.
+      const signingRequested = publicKeys.length > 0 || Array.isArray(rawList);
       const verifier = ota.verifySignature;
-      if (publicKey && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
-        _internalLogger.logger.warn('[ScaleBun] ota.publicSigningKey is set but ota.verifySignature is not a function. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until a verifier is supplied.');
+      if (signingRequested && typeof verifier !== 'function') {
+        // A host verifier is optional since the built-in one landed — the
+        // old unconditional warning here told every correctly-configured
+        // app that its updates would be rejected. Warn only when neither
+        // verifier can actually be resolved.
+        // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-var-requires
+        const {
+          getBuiltinVerifier
+        } = require('../features/ota/crypto/builtinVerifier');
+        if (!getBuiltinVerifier()) {
+          _internalLogger.logger.warn('[ScaleBun] A signing key is pinned but no signature verifier is available. ' + 'Signature checking is fail-closed: updates will be REJECTED until one exists. ' + 'Install the optional peers `@noble/ed25519` + `@noble/hashes` (no further ' + 'code needed), or supply `ota.verifySignature`.');
+        }
       }
       otaOrchestrator.init({
-        ...(publicKey ? {
+        ...(signingRequested ? {
           signature: {
-            publicKey,
+            // Single key stays a plain string — the shape every
+            // existing consumer and test already handles.
+            publicKey: publicKeys.length === 1 ? publicKeys[0] : publicKeys,
             verifier
           }
         } : {}),
@@ -313,6 +338,8 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
          * the whole time. The SDK knows the device; the integrator is guessing at it.
          * Everything outside the detected keys is still theirs.
          */
+        // Everything Platform.constants knows. On iOS that is neither the model nor the
+        // manufacturer, so the bridge completes it below once it answers.
         context: (0, _device.mergeDeviceContext)(rawConfig?.context),
         // Use the same foreground id as replay/journey capture. The
         // callback is resolved per event because the session subsystem
@@ -327,6 +354,19 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
       this._eventTracker.start();
       __DEV__ && _internalLogger.logger.info('[ScaleBun] Envelope event tracking started → /v1/batch.');
 
+      // Complete the device context from the native bridge.
+      //
+      // `Platform.constants` answers Android synchronously — model and manufacturer ride the
+      // first event. It answers NEITHER on iOS, so without this every iOS installation
+      // reported no device model at all: `nativeDeviceContext` existed for exactly this and
+      // had no caller, and the bridge's own answer was `UIDevice.current.model` — the string
+      // "iPhone", identical on every iPhone ever made.
+      //
+      // Fire-and-forget on purpose. The bridge is async and absent entirely on Expo Go or an
+      // older native binary; waiting on it would delay the first event, and failing on it
+      // would take analytics down over a nice-to-have field.
+      this._applyNativeDeviceContext(this._eventTracker);
+
       // Android: capture the Play Install Referrer once per install → feeds the
       // deterministic click_id path + a one-off install_referrer event (UTM/gclid).
       // Fire-and-forget; no-op off Android.
@@ -351,6 +391,24 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Fold the native bridge's device facts into the analytics context once it answers.
+   *
+   * Detected values never overwrite a populated one with an empty one — `nativeDeviceContext`
+   * drops absent keys and `applyDetectedContext` ignores an empty patch — so a bridge that
+   * cannot answer leaves whatever `Platform.constants` already found.
+   */
+  _applyNativeDeviceContext(tracker) {
+    Promise.resolve().then(() => _bridgeAdapter.bridgeAdapter.getDeviceInfo()).then(info => {
+      if (!info) return;
+      tracker.applyDetectedContext((0, _device.nativeDeviceContext)({
+        osVersion: info.osVersion,
+        deviceModel: info.deviceModel
+        // iOS ships no manufacturer over the bridge; it is a constant there and the
+        // static path already set it. Android's arrives via Platform.constants.
+      }));
+    }).catch(() => {/* bridge unavailable — the static context stands */});
+  }
   /**
    * Android-only: read the Play Install Referrer once per install and route it into
    * attribution. `scalebun_click_id` → the deterministic click path; the full
@@ -443,6 +501,45 @@ class ScaleBunFacade {
   }
 
   /** Convenience: emit a Phase 1 purchase event (revenue + currency + transaction_id). */
+  /**
+   * Declare which UI state the user is looking at, so taps are attributed to the surface they
+   * happened on rather than averaged across every variant of the screen.
+   *
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('filter-sheet', 'open');
+   *     ScaleBun.setUiState('checkout-step', 'payment');
+   *
+   * Call it when the state CHANGES — the value is read at tap time, so it only has to be right by
+   * the time the next tap lands. On React Native this is the ONLY source of UI state: unlike the web,
+   * there is no queryable accessibility tree that says a sheet is up, and guessing would produce a
+   * state key that is right on some apps and silently wrong on others.
+   *
+   * Names and values are identifiers, not content: they become query keys in the dashboard, so a
+   * person's name or a cart total does not belong in one. `;`, `:` and `|` are stripped and both
+   * halves are capped at 32 characters.
+   */
+  setUiState(name, value) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        setUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      setUiState(name, value);
+    } catch {/* no-throw: a state declaration must never break the host */}
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Stop reporting a UI state dimension — or, with no argument, all of them.
+   *
+   * Clear on screen unmount. A declaration left behind follows the user onto a surface where it means
+   * nothing, and every tap there is filed under a state that was not on screen.
+   */
+  clearUiState(name) {
+    try {
+      const {
+        clearUiState
+      } = require('../features/journey/uiState');
+      clearUiState(name);
+    } catch {/* no-throw */}
+  }
   trackPurchase(input) {
     (0, _crashSafe.noThrow)(() => this._eventTracker?.trackPurchase(input));
   }

package/lib/module/analytics/EventTracker.js

@@ -336,6 +336,28 @@ export class EventTracker {
     this.persistQueue();
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Fold in device facts that were not knowable at init.
+   *
+   * `Platform.constants` answers Android synchronously, so its model and manufacturer ride the
+   * very first event. iOS exposes neither there — only the native bridge knows, and the bridge is
+   * async and may not be installed at all. Without this the iOS half of every install reported no
+   * model whatsoever.
+   *
+   * `buildEnvelope` reads `cfg.context` per event, so applying it here reaches every event from
+   * the next one onward. Detected keys WIN over whatever the integrator configured, for the same
+   * reason `mergeDeviceContext` inverts the usual precedence: a measurement must not be
+   * overridable by a guess. Empty patches are ignored so a bridge that answered with nothing
+   * cannot blank a value the static path already found.
+   */
+  applyDetectedContext(patch) {
+    if (!patch || Object.keys(patch).length === 0) return;
+    this.cfg.context = {
+      ...(this.cfg.context ?? {}),
+      ...patch
+    };
+  }
+
   // ─── internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
   buildEnvelope(eventName, properties) {