@oxy.so/core 1.18.0 → 3.0.0

package/src/api/devices.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+/**
+ * `oxy.devices` — this user's devices, the sessions on them, their security
+ * activity, and device sign-in.
+ *
+ * Device sign-in is the client half of the zero-cookie device transport:
+ * {@link DevicesApi.mintToken} turns a first-party `deviceId` + `deviceSecret`
+ * into a fresh access token (the cold boot and the re-mint handler call it);
+ * {@link DevicesApi.registerBrowser}, {@link DevicesApi.requestJoinCode} and
+ * {@link DevicesApi.joinBrowser} are the browser bridge (ADR 0029 D2); and
+ * {@link DevicesApi.provisionBackgroundCredential} hands native background code
+ * its own non-rotating credential. The mint carries NO persistence or
+ * token-planting side effects: the cold boot / re-mint handler own those.
+ */
+import {
+  deviceBackgroundCredentialResponseSchema,
+  deviceJoinCodeResponseSchema,
+  deviceJoinResponseSchema,
+  deviceRegisterResponseSchema,
+  deviceTokenMintResponseSchema,
+  safeParseContract,
+  type DeviceBackgroundCredentialResponse,
+  type DeviceJoinCodeRequest,
+  type DeviceJoinCodeResponse,
+  type DeviceJoinRequest,
+  type DeviceJoinResponse,
+  type DeviceRegisterResponse,
+  type DeviceTokenMintResponse,
+} from '@oxy.so/contracts';
+import type { OxyContext } from '../client/context';
+import type {
+  DeviceLinkedSession,
+  DeviceLinkedSessionLogoutResponse,
+  SecurityActivity,
+  SecurityActivityResponse,
+  SecurityEventType,
+} from '../models/interfaces';
+import { logger } from '../logger';
+import { extractErrorStatus } from '../utils/errorUtils';
+
+/** One of the signed-in user's devices (`GET /devices`). */
+export interface UserDevice {
+  id: string;
+  deviceId: string;
+  name: string;
+  deviceName: string;
+  type: string;
+  deviceType: string;
+  /** ISO-8601. */
+  lastActive: string;
+  /** ISO-8601. */
+  createdAt: string;
+  isCurrent: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Security information for the signed-in account (`GET /devices/security`). */
+export interface SecurityInfo {
+  recoveryEmail: string | null;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * The server's `401 account_not_on_device` for a PINNED mint: the requested
+ * `accountId` is not (or is no longer) a live account of this device session.
+ *
+ * Distinguished from every other mint 401 because the remedy is different: the
+ * device secret is FINE — it is the identity binding that went stale (the
+ * account was signed out on this device, or revoked). An identity-bound caller
+ * must re-establish its session from the local key rather than drop/clear the
+ * device credential.
+ */
+export class AccountNotOnDeviceError extends Error {
+  override readonly name = 'AccountNotOnDeviceError';
+  /** HTTP status of the originating response; mirrors the ApiError shape. */
+  readonly status = 401;
+  constructor(readonly accountId: string, readonly cause?: unknown) {
+    super(
+      `account_not_on_device: ${accountId} is not a live account of this device session`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Structural (never `instanceof`) read of a normalized mint error: the thrown
+ * value may be a plain ApiError-shaped object or come from another realm.
+ */
+function isAccountNotOnDevice(error: unknown): boolean {
+  if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const { status, message } = error as { status?: unknown; message?: unknown };
+  if (status !== 401) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return typeof message === 'string' && message.includes('account_not_on_device');
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * The bridge calls share their transport rules with the mint: no bearer
+ * (`skipAuth`, so a 401 surfaces directly), one attempt, and never parked
+ * behind the request queue.
+ */
+async function bridgeRequest<T>(
+  ctx: OxyContext,
+  url: string,
+  body: object,
+  schema: Parameters<typeof safeParseContract<T>>[0],
+): Promise<T> {
+  const res = await ctx.request<unknown>('POST', url, body, {
+    cache: false,
+    skipAuth: true,
+    retry: false,
+    bypassQueue: true,
+  });
+  const parsed = safeParseContract(schema, res);
+  if (!parsed) {
+    throw new Error(`${url.slice(1)} returned an unexpected response shape`);
+  }
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+export class DevicesApi {
+  constructor(private readonly ctx: OxyContext) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Get all devices for the current user
+   * @returns Array of user devices
+   */
+  async list(): Promise<UserDevice[]> {
+    return this.ctx.request<UserDevice[]>('GET', '/devices', undefined, {
+      cache: false, // Don't cache device list - always get fresh data
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Remove a device
+   * @param deviceId - The device ID to remove
+   */
+  async remove(deviceId: string): Promise<void> {
+    await this.ctx.request('DELETE', `/devices/${deviceId}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Get device sessions for a given session ID
+   * Note: Not cached by default to ensure fresh data
+   * @param sessionId - The session ID
+   * @returns Array of device sessions
+   */
+  async sessions(sessionId: string): Promise<DeviceLinkedSession[]> {
+    // Cache disabled by default to ensure fresh session data
+    return this.ctx.request<DeviceLinkedSession[]>('GET', `/session/device/sessions/${sessionId}`, undefined, {
+      cache: false, // Don't cache sessions - always get fresh data
+      deduplicate: true, // Deduplicate concurrent requests for same sessionId
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Logout all device sessions
+   * @param sessionId - The session ID
+   * @param deviceId - Optional device ID to target
+   * @param excludeCurrent - Whether to exclude the current session
+   * @returns Logout result
+   */
+  async logoutAll(sessionId: string, deviceId?: string, excludeCurrent?: boolean): Promise<DeviceLinkedSessionLogoutResponse> {
+    const urlParams: Record<string, string> = {};
+    if (deviceId) urlParams.deviceId = deviceId;
+    if (excludeCurrent) urlParams.excludeCurrent = 'true';
+    return this.ctx.request<DeviceLinkedSessionLogoutResponse>('POST', `/session/device/logout-all/${sessionId}`, urlParams, { cache: false });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Update device name
+   * @param sessionId - The session ID
+   * @param deviceName - New device name
+   * @returns Updated device object
+   */
+  async rename(sessionId: string, deviceName: string): Promise<{ success: boolean; message: string; deviceName: string }> {
+    return this.ctx.request('PUT', `/session/device/name/${sessionId}`, { deviceName }, { cache: false });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Get security information
+   * @returns Security information object
+   */
+  async securityInfo(): Promise<SecurityInfo> {
+    return this.ctx.request<SecurityInfo>('GET', '/devices/security', undefined, {
+      cache: false,
+    });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Get user's security activity with pagination
+   * @param limit - Number of results (default: 50, max: 100)
+   * @param offset - Pagination offset (default: 0)
+   * @param eventType - Optional filter by event type
+   * @returns Security activity response with pagination
+   */
+  async securityActivity(
+    limit?: number,
+    offset?: number,
+    eventType?: SecurityEventType
+  ): Promise<SecurityActivityResponse> {
+    const params: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+    if (limit !== undefined) params.limit = limit;
+    if (offset !== undefined) params.offset = offset;
+    if (eventType) params.eventType = eventType;
+
+    // The API responds with the standard paginated envelope:
+    //   { data: SecurityActivity[], pagination: { total, limit, offset, hasMore } }
+    // SecurityActivityResponse is the flattened shape consumers expect.
+    const raw = await this.ctx.request<{
+      data: SecurityActivity[];
+      pagination: { total: number; limit: number; offset: number; hasMore: boolean };
+    }>('GET', '/security/activity', params, { cache: false });
+
+    const requestedLimit = typeof params.limit === 'number' ? params.limit : 0;
+    const requestedOffset = typeof params.offset === 'number' ? params.offset : 0;
+
+    return {
+      data: raw.data ?? [],
+      total: raw.pagination?.total ?? raw.data?.length ?? 0,
+      limit: raw.pagination?.limit ?? requestedLimit,
+      offset: raw.pagination?.offset ?? requestedOffset,
+      hasMore: raw.pagination?.hasMore ?? false,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Log private key exported event
+   * @param deviceId - Optional device ID for tracking
+   * @returns Promise that resolves when event is logged
+   */
+  async logPrivateKeyExported(deviceId?: string): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await this.ctx.request<{ success: boolean }>(
+        'POST',
+        '/security/activity/private-key-exported',
+        { deviceId },
+        { cache: false }
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      // Don't throw - logging failures shouldn't break user flow, but surface
+      // for monitoring via the shared logger sink.
+      logger.warn('[OxyServices] Failed to log private key exported event', { component: 'oxy.devices' }, error);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Log backup created event
+   * @param deviceId - Optional device ID for tracking
+   * @returns Promise that resolves when event is logged
+   */
+  async logBackupCreated(deviceId?: string): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await this.ctx.request<{ success: boolean }>(
+        'POST',
+        '/security/activity/backup-created',
+        { deviceId },
+        { cache: false }
+      );
+    } catch (error) {
+      // Don't throw - logging failures shouldn't break user flow, but surface
+      // for monitoring via the shared logger sink.
+      logger.warn('[OxyServices] Failed to log backup created event', { component: 'oxy.devices' }, error);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Zero-cookie mint. Present the first-party `deviceId` + `deviceSecret` to
+   * `POST /session/device/token` — NO bearer, NO cookies: possession of the
+   * secret IS the device-ownership proof. Returns a fresh short access token
+   * for the device's active account plus `nextDeviceSecret` (on mint, the same
+   * proven secret echoed back — rotation happens on sign-in, not mint) and
+   * the projected device-session `state`.
+   *
+   * `skipAuth`: this call carries no bearer, so a 401 must surface DIRECTLY —
+   * never trigger `HttpService`'s 401→refresh→retry dance. The cold boot / re-
+   * mint handler read the 401 body (`invalid_device_secret` vs
+   * `no_active_session`) to decide whether to drop the secret and fall back or
+   * resolve signed-out.
+   *
+   * `retry: false`: the mint is a single logical attempt. The proactive
+   * token-refresh scheduler and the reactive 401 lane already own backoff and
+   * re-arm, so `HttpService`'s inner retry loop here would only multiply the
+   * mint's latency on a slow/black-hole network (3 retries × 5s timeout ≈ 20s
+   * per lane) with no correctness benefit — it is the dominant term in the cold
+   * boot's worst-case time-to-route. A transient failure surfaces once and the
+   * scheduler/401 path retries it later.
+   *
+   * `options.accountId` PINS the mint to one account of the device instead of
+   * whichever account is currently active. It exists for identity-bound
+   * clients (Commons), whose authenticated user is fixed by a local
+   * cryptographic key and must never follow an account switch made by another
+   * app on the same device. The server never mutates `activeAccountId` for a
+   * pinned mint — the returned `state` still reports the device's true active
+   * account — and rejects a non-member/dead account with
+   * `401 account_not_on_device`, surfaced here as {@link AccountNotOnDeviceError}.
+   *
+   * @throws {AccountNotOnDeviceError} when a pinned mint's account is not on the device.
+   * @throws if the response does not match {@link deviceTokenMintResponseSchema}.
+   */
+  async mintToken(
+    deviceId: string,
+    deviceSecret: string,
+    options?: { accountId?: string },
+  ): Promise<DeviceTokenMintResponse> {
+    const accountId = options?.accountId;
+    try {
+      const res = await this.ctx.request<unknown>(
+        'POST',
+        '/session/device/token',
+        { deviceId, deviceSecret, ...(accountId ? { accountId } : {}) },
+        // `bypassQueue`: this mint is the control-plane call the auth lane
+        // depends on — it must run even when every RequestQueue slot is parked
+        // awaiting it, or the whole client deadlocks. See RequestOptions.bypassQueue.
+        { cache: false, skipAuth: true, retry: false, bypassQueue: true },
+      );
+      const parsed = safeParseContract(deviceTokenMintResponseSchema, res);
+      if (!parsed) {
+        throw new Error('session/device/token returned an unexpected response shape');
+      }
+      return parsed;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (accountId && isAccountNotOnDevice(error)) {
+        throw new AccountNotOnDeviceError(accountId, error);
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * `POST /session/device/register` — auth.oxy.so only. A new, empty browser
+   * device with a server-chosen id and auth.oxy.so's holder credential. No
+   * bearer: this runs before anyone is signed in.
+   *
+   * @throws if the response does not match {@link deviceRegisterResponseSchema}.
+   */
+  async registerBrowser(): Promise<DeviceRegisterResponse> {
+    return bridgeRequest(this.ctx, '/session/device/register', {}, deviceRegisterResponseSchema);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * `POST /session/device/join-code` — auth.oxy.so only (the bridge page).
+   * Proves the device with its holder secret and returns a one-use, ~60 s
+   * code for an OFFICIAL app, bound to its exact registered redirect URI and
+   * its PKCE S256 challenge. A rejected secret surfaces as a 401 whose message
+   * carries `invalid_device_secret`.
+   */
+  async requestJoinCode(request: DeviceJoinCodeRequest): Promise<DeviceJoinCodeResponse> {
+    return bridgeRequest(this.ctx, '/session/device/join-code', request, deviceJoinCodeResponseSchema);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * `POST /session/device/join` — the app's own origin. Redeems the bridge's
+   * code with the PKCE verifier this app holds, and returns this app's own
+   * holder credential for the browser's device. Persist it, then mint through
+   * {@link DevicesApi.mintToken} like any other holder.
+   */
+  async joinBrowser(request: DeviceJoinRequest): Promise<DeviceJoinResponse> {
+    return bridgeRequest(this.ctx, '/session/device/join', request, deviceJoinResponseSchema);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Provision a NON-rotating background credential for the caller's account on
+   * this device — the credential native background code (an Android widget
+   * worker, which runs with no JS runtime) presents to mint its own access
+   * tokens without any JS involvement.
+   *
+   * It exists precisely so background code never touches the device secret:
+   * `POST /session/device/token` ROTATES that secret on every mint (the
+   * presented one stays valid only for a short grace), so a worker minting
+   * from it would become a second writer of the value JS depends on and could
+   * silently sign the user out. The background credential is a separate,
+   * non-rotating value minted server-side, so the two lanes never contend.
+   *
+   * Bearer required and NO body: the server derives both the `deviceId` and
+   * the account from the validated bearer. This is the only way a background
+   * credential comes into existence, so background code can EXTEND a session
+   * the user established in-app but can never bootstrap one from nothing.
+   *
+   * Unlike the mint above this is NOT a control-plane call — it runs while a
+   * session is already live — so it takes the normal authenticated path: no
+   * `skipAuth` (a 401 should go through the ordinary re-mint lane) and no
+   * `bypassQueue` (nothing in the auth lane is parked awaiting it).
+   *
+   * There is deliberately no JS counterpart that MINTS from the returned
+   * credential: the native side owns that call, and a symmetric-looking JS
+   * method would be dead code plus a second implementation of the failure
+   * rules. The asymmetry is the design.
+   *
+   * **Call this from NATIVE only.** There is no background worker on web to
+   * consume the credential, and handing a browser origin a long-lived
+   * non-rotating secret to persist is strictly weaker than the rotating device
+   * secret it already holds. The 404 degrade below is also native-shaped: a
+   * browser attaches `Origin`, which a server predating this route answers
+   * `403 BAD_ORIGIN` from its router-wide same-site guard rather than 404, so
+   * the quiet degrade would not fire there. A native client sends no `Origin`
+   * and gets the 404. Gate the caller by platform; do not widen the degrade to
+   * 403, which would also swallow a genuine origin misconfiguration.
+   *
+   * That paragraph is LOAD-BEARING, not belt-and-braces: the route sits above
+   * oxy-api's router-wide origin guard (deliberately, so a native client with
+   * no `Origin` is not rejected). oxy-api additionally refuses callers that
+   * carry browser context signals (`Origin` or `Sec-Fetch-Site`) with
+   * `403 browser_not_allowed` — native HTTP clients send neither. Gate the
+   * caller by platform on the client as well; do not widen the 404 degrade to
+   * 403, which would also swallow a genuine origin misconfiguration.
+   *
+   * @returns the provisioned credential, or `null` when the endpoint is absent
+   * (404). The API deploy leads the SDK release, so a client on a newer SDK
+   * than the server degrades to "no background session" quietly instead of
+   * surfacing an error.
+   * @throws if the response does not match {@link deviceBackgroundCredentialResponseSchema}.
+   */
+  async provisionBackgroundCredential(): Promise<DeviceBackgroundCredentialResponse | null> {
+    try {
+      const res = await this.ctx.request<unknown>(
+        'POST',
+        '/session/device/background-credential',
+        undefined,
+        { cache: false },
+      );
+      const parsed = safeParseContract(deviceBackgroundCredentialResponseSchema, res);
+      if (!parsed) {
+        throw new Error(
+          'session/device/background-credential returned an unexpected response shape',
+        );
+      }
+      return parsed;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (extractErrorStatus(error) === 404) {
+        return null;
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+
+}