@oxy.so/core 1.18.0 → 3.0.0

package/dist/esm/server/middleware.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1147 @@
+/**
+ * The Express and Socket.IO middleware `OxyServer` mounts
+ * (`server.middleware.auth()`, `.socket()`, `.service()`, `.requireScope()`),
+ * and the Ed25519 service-token and account-event verification they share.
+ *
+ * Node only; reachable solely from `@oxy.so/core/server`.
+ */
+import { jwtDecode } from 'jwt-decode';
+import { loadNodeCrypto } from '@oxy.so/protocol';
+import { logger } from '../logger/index.js';
+import { toOxyApiError } from '../OxyServices.errors.js';
+import { OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS } from '../utils/oxyServiceEnvironment.js';
+/** The SET `events` member Oxy uses for an account deletion. */
+export const OXY_ACCOUNT_DELETED_EVENT_URI = 'https://oxy.so/events/account.deleted';
+/** Why an account event token was refused. `message` never contains the token. */
+export class OxyAccountEventError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'OxyAccountEventError';
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Expected JWT audience for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
+ */
+const OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE = 'oxy-api';
+/**
+ * Expected JWT issuer for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
+ */
+export const OXY_JWT_ISSUER = 'oxy-auth';
+/**
+ * Sentinel error classes for service-token verification. Using classes (not
+ * message strings) makes the catch site below safe to extend: a new failure
+ * mode added later cannot silently fall through to the generic 500 branch.
+ */
+class ServiceTokenStructureError extends Error {
+    constructor(message = 'Service token has malformed structure') {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'ServiceTokenStructureError';
+    }
+}
+class ServiceTokenSignatureError extends Error {
+    constructor(message = 'Service token signature is invalid') {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'ServiceTokenSignatureError';
+    }
+}
+class ServiceTokenClaimError extends Error {
+    constructor(message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'ServiceTokenClaimError';
+    }
+}
+function isOxyServiceEnvironment(value) {
+    return (typeof value === 'string' &&
+        OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS.includes(value));
+}
+/** Build the middleware set for one server. See `OxyServer.middleware`. */
+export function createOxyMiddleware(host) {
+    /**
+     * Express.js authentication middleware
+     *
+     * Validates JWT tokens against the Oxy API and attaches user data to requests.
+     * Uses server-side session validation for security (not just JWT decode).
+     *
+     * **Design note — jwtDecode vs jwt.verify:**
+     * This middleware uses `jwtDecode()` (decode-only, NO signature check) for
+     * user tokens, because third-party apps mounting `server.middleware.auth()` do not hold
+     * the Oxy signing secret. **Every claim in a user token is therefore
+     * attacker-controlled and proves nothing on its own.** The identity comes
+     * from somewhere else entirely:
+     * - A user token MUST carry a `sessionId`. That session is validated
+     *   server-side on every request via `session.validate()`, and the user id
+     *   is read off the VALIDATED SESSION — never off the token. A token whose
+     *   `userId` claim disagrees with the session is refused
+     *   (`SESSION_USER_MISMATCH`); a token with no `sessionId` at all is
+     *   refused outright (`SESSION_REQUIRED`). There is no local-claims path.
+     * - Service tokens (type: 'service') ARE stateless, so they use Ed25519
+     *   verification against Oxy's public JWKS and are additionally checked
+     *   for `aud`, `iss`, `type`, time, attribution and scope claims. The
+     *   algorithm is pinned to EdDSA and never read from the token: an HS256,
+     *   `none` or any other JOSE header is refused before any key lookup.
+     * - The backend's own `authMiddleware` uses `jwt.verify()` because it has
+     *   direct access to `ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET`.
+     *
+     * **Why session-less user tokens are refused rather than trusted:**
+     * every user access token the Oxy API issues carries a `sessionId` (see
+     * `packages/api/src/utils/sessionUtils.ts`, `generateSessionTokens` — the
+     * only mint site for user tokens, including the OAuth code exchange). So
+     * refusing session-less user tokens costs nothing legitimate, while
+     * accepting them let anyone authenticate as anyone by hand-rolling a JWT
+     * with a `userId` claim and a garbage signature.
+     *
+     * **Why the claimed user id is cross-checked against the session:**
+     * `GET /session/validate/:sessionId` is UNAUTHENTICATED and does not bind
+     * the bearer token — it returns whoever owns the session id it was handed.
+     * Trusting the token's `userId` claim after a successful validation would
+     * therefore let a caller holding ANY live session id (their own, for
+     * instance) pair it with a forged `userId` and be trusted as that user.
+     * `authSocket()` has always cross-checked this; the HTTP middleware now
+     * does too.
+     *
+     * **Service-token delegation (X-Oxy-User-Id):**
+     * When a service token is accompanied by `X-Oxy-User-Id`, the SDK calls
+     * `verifyActingAs(appId, userId)` to confirm an explicit delegation
+     * grant exists before attaching `req.userId`. A missing/expired grant
+     * results in a 403 — there is no fail-open path.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * import { OxyServer } from '@oxy.so/core/server';
+     *
+     * const server = new OxyServer({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
+     *
+     * // Protect all routes under /protected
+     * app.use('/protected', server.middleware.auth());
+     *
+     * // Access user in route handler
+     * app.get('/protected/me', (req, res) => {
+     *   res.json({ userId: req.userId, user: req.user });
+     * });
+     *
+     * // Load full user profile from API
+     * app.use('/admin', server.middleware.auth({ loadUser: true }));
+     *
+     * // Optional auth - attach user if present, don't block if absent
+     * app.use('/public', server.middleware.auth({ optional: true }));
+     *
+     * // Require a specific scope on a service-token-protected route
+     * app.use('/internal/files', server.middleware.service(), server.middleware.requireScope('files:write'));
+     * ```
+     *
+     * @param options Optional configuration
+     * @returns Express middleware function
+     */
+    function auth(options = {}) {
+        const { debug = false, onError, onRefusal, loadUser = false, optional = false, serviceTokenJwksUrl = new URL('/.well-known/jwks.json', host.baseURL).toString(), expectedIssuer = OXY_JWT_ISSUER, expectedAudience = OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE, } = options;
+        /**
+         * Make a refusal observable to the HOST, without telling the client
+         * anything it is not already told.
+         *
+         * Called at the top of every branch that rejects a PRESENTED credential,
+         * including the ones `optional` then swallows — those are the expensive
+         * ones, because they leave no trace anywhere else. The response bodies
+         * below are untouched by design: what a client sees does not change.
+         *
+         * `warn`, not `debug`: a debug-gated reason is only there for whoever
+         * already suspects this middleware, and the failure mode this exists for
+         * is the one where nobody does. The volume is bounded by refusals, and a
+         * host drowning in them has a fault worth the lines.
+         */
+        const recordRefusal = (req, refusal) => {
+            const recorded = { ...refusal, optional };
+            req.oxyAuthRefusal = recorded;
+            logger.warn(`[oxy.auth] refused ${recorded.code}: ${recorded.reason}`, {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth',
+                code: recorded.code,
+                stage: recorded.stage,
+                reason: recorded.reason,
+                status: recorded.status,
+                // Says whether the client will see this status or the host's own
+                // generic answer — the difference that made the JWKS outage invisible.
+                optional: recorded.optional,
+                path: req.path,
+            });
+            if (onRefusal) {
+                try {
+                    onRefusal(recorded);
+                }
+                catch (observerError) {
+                    logger.warn('[oxy.auth] onRefusal observer threw', {
+                        component: 'auth',
+                        method: 'auth',
+                    }, observerError);
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        // Return an async middleware function
+        return async (req, res, next) => {
+            try {
+                // Extract token from Authorization header.
+                // Node/Express normalizes `Authorization` to a string; we guard
+                // against the (legal but unusual) string[] case anyway.
+                const rawAuthHeader = req.headers.authorization;
+                const authHeader = Array.isArray(rawAuthHeader) ? rawAuthHeader[0] : rawAuthHeader;
+                const token = authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? authHeader.substring(7) : null;
+                if (debug) {
+                    logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] ${req.method} ${req.path} | token: ${!!token}`, {
+                        component: 'auth',
+                        method: 'auth',
+                    });
+                }
+                if (!token) {
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
+                        message: 'Access token required',
+                        code: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+                // Decode token to extract claims
+                let decoded;
+                try {
+                    decoded = jwtDecode(token);
+                }
+                catch (decodeError) {
+                    recordRefusal(req, {
+                        code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
+                        stage: 'token',
+                        reason: 'Bearer credential is not a decodable JWT',
+                        status: 401,
+                    });
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Token decode failed', {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth',
+                        }, decodeError);
+                    }
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
+                        message: 'Invalid token format',
+                        code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+                // Handle service tokens (internal service-to-service auth)
+                // Service tokens are stateless JWTs with type: 'service' — requires signature verification
+                if (decoded.type === 'service') {
+                    // Verify JWT signature, then audience / issuer / type / appId claims.
+                    //
+                    // Signature verification uses Node crypto rather than
+                    // `jsonwebtoken` because this file also ships into RN/web bundles.
+                    // The middleware itself runs on Node hosts; `loadNodeCrypto` is
+                    // per-platform, so Metro never bundles a Node built-in reference.
+                    try {
+                        await verifyServiceTokenSignature(token, {
+                            jwksUrl: serviceTokenJwksUrl,
+                            cache: host.jwksCache,
+                        });
+                        verifyServiceTokenClaims(decoded, {
+                            audience: expectedAudience,
+                            issuer: expectedIssuer,
+                        });
+                    }
+                    catch (verifyError) {
+                        // Structure + signature + claim errors all map to 401. Anything
+                        // else (e.g. Node crypto failing to load on a misconfigured host)
+                        // genuinely IS a 500.
+                        if (verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenStructureError ||
+                            verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenSignatureError ||
+                            verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenClaimError) {
+                            const code = verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenClaimError
+                                ? 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS'
+                                : 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN';
+                            // The SDK's own message is the whole diagnostic value here —
+                            // "signing key is unknown" (rotated/unpublished kid), "key set
+                            // is unavailable" (JWKS empty, unreachable or malformed) and
+                            // "audience mismatch" are three different outages that answer
+                            // the client identically.
+                            recordRefusal(req, {
+                                code,
+                                stage: 'service-token',
+                                reason: `${verifyError.name}: ${verifyError.message}`,
+                                status: 401,
+                            });
+                            if (debug) {
+                                logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected', {
+                                    component: 'auth',
+                                    method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                                    reason: verifyError.name,
+                                    detail: verifyError.message,
+                                });
+                            }
+                            if (optional) {
+                                req.userId = null;
+                                req.user = null;
+                                return next();
+                            }
+                            const error = {
+                                error: code,
+                                message: verifyError.message,
+                                code,
+                                status: 401,
+                            };
+                            if (onError)
+                                return onError(error);
+                            return res.status(401).json(error);
+                        }
+                        logger.error('[oxy.auth] Unexpected error during service token verification', verifyError, {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                        });
+                        const error = {
+                            error: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
+                            message: 'Internal authentication error',
+                            code: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
+                            status: 500,
+                        };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(500).json(error);
+                    }
+                    // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+                    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+                    if (!Number.isInteger(decoded.exp) || decoded.exp <= now) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+                            stage: 'service-token',
+                            reason: Number.isInteger(decoded.exp)
+                                ? 'Service token expired'
+                                : 'Service token has no integer exp claim',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        if (optional) {
+                            req.userId = null;
+                            req.user = null;
+                            return next();
+                        }
+                        const error = { error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', message: 'Service token expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', status: 401 };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    if (decoded.nbf !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(decoded.nbf) || decoded.nbf > now)) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                            stage: 'service-token',
+                            reason: 'Service token is not yet valid (nbf)',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', message: 'Service token is not yet valid', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', status: 401 };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    // Validate required service token fields. All of them are
+                    // required, `ownerAccountId` included: an optional billing
+                    // principal is one fallback away from being resolved from the
+                    // delegated user, which is the exact confusion ADR 0007 forbids.
+                    const appId = decoded.appId;
+                    const credentialId = decoded.credentialId;
+                    const ownerAccountId = decoded.ownerAccountId;
+                    const environment = decoded.environment;
+                    if (!isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(appId) ||
+                        !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(decoded.appName) ||
+                        !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(credentialId) ||
+                        !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(ownerAccountId) ||
+                        !isOxyServiceEnvironment(environment)
+                        || !Array.isArray(decoded.scopes)
+                        || !decoded.scopes.every((scope) => typeof scope === 'string' && scope.length > 0 && scope === scope.trim())
+                        || new Set(decoded.scopes).size !== decoded.scopes.length) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN',
+                            stage: 'service-token',
+                            // Names the field rather than its value: an exact-match claim
+                            // failing on invisible whitespace reads as "present" in a log
+                            // that only says which claims were missing.
+                            reason: `Service token claims unusable (${[
+                                !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(appId) ? 'appId' : null,
+                                !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(decoded.appName) ? 'appName' : null,
+                                !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(credentialId) ? 'credentialId' : null,
+                                !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(ownerAccountId) ? 'ownerAccountId' : null,
+                                !isOxyServiceEnvironment(environment) ? 'environment' : null,
+                                !Array.isArray(decoded.scopes) ? 'scopes' : null,
+                            ].filter((field) => field !== null).join(', ') || 'scopes'})`,
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        if (optional) {
+                            req.userId = null;
+                            req.user = null;
+                            return next();
+                        }
+                        const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', message: 'Invalid service token: missing required claims', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', status: 401 };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    const tier = decoded.tier === 'internal' ? 'internal' : 'external';
+                    // Read delegated user ID from header
+                    const oxyUserIdRaw = req.headers['x-oxy-user-id'];
+                    const oxyUserId = isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(oxyUserIdRaw) ? oxyUserIdRaw : null;
+                    if (oxyUserIdRaw !== undefined && oxyUserId === null) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                            stage: 'service-token',
+                            reason: 'X-Oxy-User-Id is not an exact non-empty id',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        const error = {
+                            error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                            message: 'Delegated user id must be an exact non-empty id',
+                            code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                            status: 401,
+                        };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    // One of Oxy's own applications acts for a user without a grant:
+                    // inside the ecosystem that is trust, not consent. It still acts
+                    // with the USER's authority only — what that user may do is for the
+                    // receiving service to check.
+                    if (oxyUserId && tier === 'internal') {
+                        req.userId = oxyUserId;
+                        req.user = { id: oxyUserId };
+                        req.serviceActingAs = { userId: oxyUserId, scopes: [] };
+                    }
+                    else if (oxyUserId) {
+                        // C3: an EXTERNAL service may only act as a user when an explicit
+                        // ServiceActingAs grant exists for that (appId, userId) pair.
+                        // Without the grant we MUST refuse — silently attaching
+                        // `req.userId = oxyUserId` would let any service impersonate
+                        // any user simply by setting the header.
+                        const grant = await host.verifyActingAs(appId, oxyUserId);
+                        if (!grant || !grant.authorized) {
+                            logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected — no delegation grant', {
+                                component: 'auth',
+                                method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                                appId,
+                                attemptedUserId: oxyUserId,
+                            });
+                            // A verifier with no service credentials of its own cannot
+                            // reach the verify endpoint at all, so `null` here can mean
+                            // "no grant" OR "this host cannot ask". Both refuse, and both
+                            // are worth naming on the request.
+                            recordRefusal(req, {
+                                code: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
+                                stage: 'service-token',
+                                reason: `No delegation grant for app ${appId} acting as ${oxyUserId} (or this verifier could not reach the grant check)`,
+                                status: 403,
+                            });
+                            const error = {
+                                error: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
+                                message: 'Service not authorized to act as this user',
+                                code: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
+                                status: 403,
+                            };
+                            if (onError)
+                                return onError(error);
+                            return res.status(403).json(error);
+                        }
+                        // ATTRIBUTION ONLY. `req.userId` answers "on whose behalf", never
+                        // "who pays": the billing principal stays `req.serviceApp
+                        // .ownerAccountId`, which this branch does not touch. Read it
+                        // through `getOxyBillingPrincipal` (`@oxy.so/core/server`), whose
+                        // return type a user id cannot satisfy (ADR 0007).
+                        req.userId = oxyUserId;
+                        req.user = { id: oxyUserId };
+                        req.serviceActingAs = { userId: oxyUserId, scopes: grant.scopes };
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        // No X-Oxy-User-Id means the service is acting as itself.
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                    }
+                    req.accessToken = token;
+                    req.serviceApp = {
+                        appId,
+                        appName: decoded.appName,
+                        credentialId,
+                        ownerAccountId,
+                        scopes: Array.isArray(decoded.scopes) ? decoded.scopes : [],
+                        environment,
+                        tier,
+                    };
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] Service token OK app=${decoded.appName} delegateUser=${oxyUserId || '(none)'}`, {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                        });
+                    }
+                    return next();
+                }
+                // The CLAIMED user id. Never trusted as an identity — it is only ever
+                // compared against the id the validated session resolves to.
+                const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
+                if (!claimedUserId) {
+                    recordRefusal(req, {
+                        code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
+                        stage: 'token',
+                        reason: 'Token carries no usable user id claim',
+                        status: 401,
+                    });
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
+                        message: 'Token missing user ID',
+                        code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+                // Check token expiration locally first (fast path)
+                // Reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+                if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
+                    recordRefusal(req, {
+                        code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+                        stage: 'token',
+                        reason: 'User access token expired',
+                        status: 401,
+                    });
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+                        message: 'Token expired',
+                        code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+                // A server-validated session is MANDATORY for a user token. The JWT
+                // signature is not verified on this path, so a bare decoded token
+                // proves nothing: without the session round-trip a forged token could
+                // claim any user id. Mirrors `authSocket()`, which has always
+                // required this.
+                const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
+                if (!sessionId) {
+                    recordRefusal(req, {
+                        code: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
+                        stage: 'token',
+                        reason: 'User access token is not bound to a session',
+                        status: 401,
+                    });
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
+                        message: 'Access token is not bound to a session',
+                        code: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+                // Validate the token against the Oxy API. This proves the session is
+                // real and unrevoked, AND yields the identity it belongs to.
+                try {
+                    const validationResult = await host.validateSession(sessionId, {
+                        useHeaderValidation: true,
+                    });
+                    if (!validationResult || !validationResult.valid || !validationResult.user) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            stage: 'session',
+                            reason: 'Session is invalid, revoked or expired',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        if (optional) {
+                            req.userId = null;
+                            req.user = null;
+                            return next();
+                        }
+                        const error = {
+                            error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            message: 'Session invalid or expired',
+                            code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            status: 401
+                        };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    // The session — not the token — is the source of truth for identity.
+                    const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(validationResult.user);
+                    if (!validatedUserId) {
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            stage: 'session',
+                            reason: 'Session did not resolve to a usable identity',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        if (optional) {
+                            req.userId = null;
+                            req.user = null;
+                            return next();
+                        }
+                        const error = {
+                            error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            message: 'Session did not resolve to a usable identity',
+                            code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                            status: 401
+                        };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    if (validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
+                        // Session-id/claim confusion: the caller presented a live session
+                        // that belongs to somebody else. Worth a warning — it has no
+                        // benign cause. Ids only; never the token or the payload.
+                        logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Token rejected — claimed user does not own the session', {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth',
+                            claimedUserId,
+                            validatedUserId,
+                        });
+                        recordRefusal(req, {
+                            code: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
+                            stage: 'session',
+                            reason: 'Token user claim does not own the presented session',
+                            status: 401,
+                        });
+                        if (optional) {
+                            req.userId = null;
+                            req.user = null;
+                            return next();
+                        }
+                        const error = {
+                            error: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
+                            message: 'Token user does not match the session',
+                            code: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
+                            status: 401
+                        };
+                        if (onError)
+                            return onError(error);
+                        return res.status(401).json(error);
+                    }
+                    req.userId = validatedUserId;
+                    req.accessToken = token;
+                    req.sessionId = sessionId;
+                    // Session validation already returned the full user, so `loadUser`
+                    // costs no extra round-trip.
+                    req.user = loadUser ? validationResult.user : { id: validatedUserId };
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] OK user=${validatedUserId} session=${sessionId}`, {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth',
+                        });
+                    }
+                    return next();
+                }
+                catch (validationError) {
+                    recordRefusal(req, {
+                        code: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+                        stage: 'session',
+                        // Name and transport code only. The message of a failed
+                        // `validateSession` can carry the request URL, and that URL
+                        // contains the session id — which is a credential.
+                        reason: `Session validation call failed (${describeErrorSafely(validationError)})`,
+                        status: 401,
+                    });
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Session validation failed', {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'auth',
+                        }, validationError);
+                    }
+                    if (optional) {
+                        req.userId = null;
+                        req.user = null;
+                        return next();
+                    }
+                    const error = {
+                        error: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+                        message: 'Session validation failed',
+                        code: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+                        status: 401
+                    };
+                    if (onError)
+                        return onError(error);
+                    return res.status(401).json(error);
+                }
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                const handled = toOxyApiError(error);
+                const apiError = {
+                    message: handled.message || 'Authentication error',
+                    code: handled.code ?? 'AUTH_ERROR',
+                    status: handled.status ?? 500,
+                    details: handled.details,
+                };
+                if (debug) {
+                    logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Error', {
+                        component: 'auth',
+                        method: 'auth',
+                    }, apiError);
+                }
+                if (onError)
+                    return onError(apiError);
+                return res.status(apiError.status).json(apiError);
+            }
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Socket.IO authentication middleware factory
+     *
+     * Returns a middleware function for Socket.IO that validates JWT tokens
+     * from the handshake auth object and attaches user data to the socket.
+     *
+     * Uses `jwtDecode()` + API session validation (same rationale as `auth()`).
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * import { OxyServer } from '@oxy.so/core/server';
+     * import { Server } from 'socket.io';
+     *
+     * const server = new OxyServer({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
+     * const io = new Server(server);
+     *
+     * // Authenticate all socket connections
+     * io.use(server.middleware.socket());
+     *
+     * io.on('connection', (socket) => {
+     *   console.log('Authenticated user:', socket.data.userId);
+     * });
+     * ```
+     */
+    function socket(options = {}) {
+        const { debug = false } = options;
+        return async (socket, next) => {
+            try {
+                const token = socket.handshake?.auth?.token;
+                if (!token) {
+                    return next(new Error('Authentication required'));
+                }
+                let decoded;
+                try {
+                    decoded = jwtDecode(token);
+                }
+                catch (decodeError) {
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Token decode failed', {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'authSocket',
+                        }, decodeError);
+                    }
+                    return next(new Error('Invalid token'));
+                }
+                const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
+                if (!claimedUserId) {
+                    return next(new Error('Invalid token payload'));
+                }
+                // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+                if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
+                    return next(new Error('Token expired'));
+                }
+                // A server-validated session is mandatory. A bare decoded JWT proves
+                // nothing — the signature is not verified here, so without a session
+                // round-trip a forged token could claim any user id.
+                const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
+                if (!sessionId) {
+                    return next(new Error('Session required'));
+                }
+                let userId = claimedUserId;
+                try {
+                    const result = await host.validateSession(sessionId, {
+                        useHeaderValidation: true,
+                    });
+                    if (!result || !result.valid || !result.user) {
+                        return next(new Error('Session invalid'));
+                    }
+                    // The session is the source of truth. The client-claimed user id
+                    // must match the server-validated identity, otherwise a valid
+                    // session could be paired with a forged user id.
+                    const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(result.user);
+                    if (!validatedUserId || validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
+                        return next(new Error('Session user mismatch'));
+                    }
+                    userId = validatedUserId;
+                }
+                catch (validateErr) {
+                    if (debug) {
+                        logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Session validation failed', {
+                            component: 'auth',
+                            method: 'authSocket',
+                        }, validateErr);
+                    }
+                    return next(new Error('Session validation failed'));
+                }
+                // Attach user data to socket. We expose BOTH `socket.data.userId`
+                // (the official Socket.IO data slot) and `socket.user` because
+                // every consumer in this ecosystem (Mention, Allo, api/server.ts)
+                // reads from `socket.user.id`.
+                socket.data = socket.data || {};
+                socket.data.userId = userId;
+                socket.data.sessionId = sessionId;
+                socket.data.token = token;
+                socket.user = { id: userId, userId, sessionId };
+                if (debug) {
+                    logger.debug(`[oxy.authSocket] OK user=${userId}`, {
+                        component: 'auth',
+                        method: 'authSocket',
+                    });
+                }
+                next();
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                if (debug) {
+                    logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Error', {
+                        component: 'auth',
+                        method: 'authSocket',
+                    }, err);
+                }
+                next(new Error('Authentication error'));
+            }
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Express.js middleware that only allows service tokens.
+     * Use this for internal-only endpoints that should not be accessible
+     * to regular users or API key consumers.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * // Protect internal endpoints
+     * app.use('/internal', server.middleware.service());
+     *
+     * app.post('/internal/trigger', (req, res) => {
+     *   console.log('Service app:', req.serviceApp);
+     *   console.log('Acting on behalf of user:', req.userId);
+     * });
+     * ```
+     */
+    function service(options = {}) {
+        const innerAuth = auth({ ...options });
+        return async (req, res, next) => {
+            await innerAuth(req, res, () => {
+                if (!req.serviceApp) {
+                    return res.status(403).json({
+                        error: 'Service token required',
+                        message: 'This endpoint is only accessible to internal services',
+                        code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+                    });
+                }
+                next();
+            });
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Express.js middleware that enforces a specific service-token scope.
+     *
+     * Mount AFTER `auth()` / `serviceAuth()` — relies on `req.serviceApp` and
+     * (when delegation is in effect) `req.serviceActingAs.scopes`. App-only
+     * service requests require the app scope. Delegated user requests require
+     * BOTH the app scope and the per-user delegation scope.
+     *
+     * The intersection is the point, not a redundancy, because the two scope
+     * lists answer different questions and neither implies the other:
+     *
+     *   `serviceApp.scopes`      what the PLATFORM allows this application to do
+     *                            (credential ∩ application ceiling, at mint time)
+     *   `serviceActingAs.scopes` what THIS USER allowed it to do (`app_grants`)
+     *
+     * Requiring only the app scope would let an application do to a user
+     * something that user never consented to; requiring only the grant would let
+     * a user hand an application authority staff never gave it, so a revoked
+     * platform scope would keep working for every user who had already
+     * consented. Effective authority is the intersection, and this is where it
+     * is taken.
+     *
+     * Requests authenticated as a regular user (no service token) are rejected
+     * with 403 — scope-protected endpoints are service-to-service by design.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * app.use(
+     *   '/internal/files',
+     *   server.middleware.service(),
+     *   server.middleware.requireScope('files:write'),
+     * );
+     * ```
+     */
+    function requireScope(scope) {
+        if (typeof scope !== 'string' || scope.length === 0) {
+            throw new Error('requireScope: scope must be a non-empty string');
+        }
+        return (req, res, next) => {
+            const appScopes = req.serviceApp?.scopes ?? [];
+            const delegatedScopes = req.serviceActingAs?.scopes ?? [];
+            if (!req.serviceApp) {
+                res.status(403).json({
+                    error: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+                    message: 'Scope-protected endpoint requires a service token',
+                    code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+                    status: 403,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            // Oxy's own applications are trusted app to app; scopes are the
+            // external lane.
+            if (req.serviceApp.tier === 'internal') {
+                next();
+                return;
+            }
+            const appHasScope = appScopes.includes(scope);
+            const delegationHasScope = delegatedScopes.includes(scope);
+            const hasRequiredScope = req.serviceActingAs
+                ? appHasScope && delegationHasScope
+                : appHasScope;
+            if (hasRequiredScope) {
+                next();
+                return;
+            }
+            logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token missing required scope', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'requireScope',
+                appId: req.serviceApp.appId,
+                required: scope,
+            });
+            res.status(403).json({
+                error: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
+                message: `Required scope '${scope}' not granted`,
+                code: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
+                status: 403,
+            });
+        };
+    }
+    return { auth, socket, service, requireScope };
+}
+function isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(value) {
+    return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.trim() === value;
+}
+const JWKS_CACHE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+const JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS = 60 * 1000;
+const JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+const JWKS_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+const JWKS_MAX_KEYS = 20;
+export function parseJsonSegment(segment) {
+    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(segment))
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not base64url');
+    const bytes = Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url');
+    if (bytes.toString('base64url') !== segment)
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not canonical base64url');
+    try {
+        const value = JSON.parse(bytes.toString('utf8'));
+        if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
+            throw new Error('not an object');
+        return value;
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not a JSON object');
+    }
+}
+function parseServiceTokenJwks(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
+        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS is malformed');
+    const keys = value.keys;
+    if (!Array.isArray(keys) || keys.length === 0 || keys.length > JWKS_MAX_KEYS)
+        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS has an invalid key set');
+    const result = new Map();
+    for (const value of keys) {
+        if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
+            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains a malformed key');
+        const key = value;
+        if (key.kty !== 'OKP'
+            || key.crv !== 'Ed25519'
+            || typeof key.x !== 'string'
+            || key.x.length === 0
+            || key.use !== 'sig'
+            || key.alg !== 'EdDSA'
+            || typeof key.kid !== 'string'
+            || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(key.kid)
+            || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(key, 'd')
+            || result.has(key.kid))
+            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an unsupported or duplicate key');
+        const x = Buffer.from(key.x, 'base64url');
+        if (x.length !== 32 || x.toString('base64url') !== key.x) {
+            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an invalid Ed25519 key');
+        }
+        result.set(key.kid, key);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+async function refreshServiceTokenJwks(url, cache) {
+    if (cache.pending)
+        return cache.pending;
+    cache.lastAttemptAt = Date.now();
+    cache.pending = (async () => {
+        const controller = new AbortController();
+        const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS);
+        try {
+            const response = await fetch(url, {
+                method: 'GET',
+                headers: { accept: 'application/json' },
+                signal: controller.signal,
+                redirect: 'error',
+            });
+            if (!response.ok)
+                throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError(`Oxy JWKS returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
+            const source = await response.text();
+            if (Buffer.byteLength(source, 'utf8') > JWKS_MAX_BYTES)
+                throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS exceeds the size limit');
+            cache.keys = parseServiceTokenJwks(JSON.parse(source));
+            cache.expiresAt = Date.now() + JWKS_CACHE_MS;
+        }
+        finally {
+            clearTimeout(timeout);
+        }
+    })();
+    try {
+        await cache.pending;
+    }
+    finally {
+        cache.pending = undefined;
+    }
+}
+export async function resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(kid, url, cache) {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const cached = cache.keys.get(kid);
+    if (cached && cache.expiresAt > now)
+        return cached;
+    const mayRefresh = cache.expiresAt <= now || now - cache.lastAttemptAt >= JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS;
+    if (mayRefresh) {
+        try {
+            await refreshServiceTokenJwks(url, cache);
+        }
+        catch {
+            const stillValid = cache.keys.get(kid);
+            if (stillValid && cache.expiresAt > Date.now())
+                return stillValid;
+            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy service-token key set is unavailable');
+        }
+    }
+    const resolved = cache.keys.get(kid);
+    if (!resolved || cache.expiresAt <= Date.now())
+        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token signing key is unknown');
+    return resolved;
+}
+/**
+ * Ed25519 verification against Oxy's published JWKS (ADR 0012). The algorithm
+ * is pinned: the header must be exactly `{ alg: 'EdDSA', typ: 'JWT', kid }`,
+ * so HS256, `none` and every other header is refused before any key lookup.
+ */
+async function verifyServiceTokenSignature(token, options) {
+    const nodeCrypto = await loadNodeCrypto();
+    const parts = token.split('.');
+    if (parts.length !== 3) {
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError(`Service token must have 3 parts, got ${parts.length}`);
+    }
+    const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = parts;
+    if (!headerB64 || !payloadB64 || !signatureB64) {
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token has empty segment');
+    }
+    const header = parseJsonSegment(headerB64);
+    if (Object.keys(header).length !== 3
+        || header.alg !== 'EdDSA'
+        || header.typ !== 'JWT'
+        || typeof header.kid !== 'string'
+        || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(header.kid))
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token JOSE header is not supported');
+    const jwk = await resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(header.kid, options.jwksUrl, options.cache);
+    let publicKey;
+    try {
+        publicKey = nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: 'jwk' });
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token public key is invalid');
+    }
+    const signature = Buffer.from(signatureB64, 'base64url');
+    if (signature.toString('base64url') !== signatureB64 || signature.length !== 64)
+        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token signature is malformed');
+    if (!nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`), publicKey, signature))
+        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError();
+}
+/**
+ * Read a JWT claim that is only usable as a non-empty string.
+ *
+ * A decoded payload is attacker-controlled JSON: a claim the type declares as
+ * `string` can arrive as a number, an object, or `null`. Narrowing here keeps
+ * those values out of URL construction and identity comparison, so an
+ * unexpected shape becomes a 401 rather than a stringified surprise.
+ */
+/**
+ * A short, log-safe description of a thrown value: its class name and, when the
+ * transport attached one, its `code` (`ECONNREFUSED`, `ETIMEDOUT`, `ENOTFOUND`
+ * …). Never the message — a failed request's message can quote the URL it was
+ * made against, and a session-validation URL contains the session id.
+ */
+function describeErrorSafely(error) {
+    if (!(error instanceof Error))
+        return typeof error;
+    const code = error.code;
+    return typeof code === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9_]{1,40}$/.test(code)
+        ? `${error.name}: ${code}`
+        : error.name;
+}
+function readStringClaim(value) {
+    return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 ? value : null;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve the canonical user id from a validated session's user object.
+ *
+ * The API serializer emits `id`, but some upstream shapes carry the raw Mongo
+ * `_id` instead. We accept either, but only a non-empty string — anything else
+ * means the validated identity is unusable and the caller must reject.
+ */
+function getUserIdentityId(user) {
+    const candidate = user.id
+        ?? user._id;
+    return typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate.length > 0 ? candidate : null;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify that a decoded service-token payload carries the expected `aud`,
+ * `iss`, and `type` claims. Throws `ServiceTokenClaimError` on mismatch.
+ * This is the defence against the H4 vulnerability where a recovery / 2FA /
+ * access token signed by the same shared secret could be replayed as a
+ * service token because no claim binding existed.
+ */
+function verifyServiceTokenClaims(decoded, expected) {
+    if (decoded.type !== 'service') {
+        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token has unexpected type '${String(decoded.type)}'`);
+    }
+    if (decoded.iss !== expected.issuer) {
+        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token issuer mismatch: expected '${expected.issuer}', got '${String(decoded.iss)}'`);
+    }
+    const aud = decoded.aud;
+    if (Array.isArray(aud)) {
+        if (!aud.includes(expected.audience)) {
+            throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience does not include '${expected.audience}'`);
+        }
+    }
+    else if (aud !== expected.audience) {
+        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience mismatch: expected '${expected.audience}', got '${String(aud)}'`);
+    }
+}