@oxy.so/core 1.18.0 → 3.0.0

package/dist/esm/mixins/OxyServices.utility.js

@@ -1,1397 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Utility Methods Mixin
- *
- * Provides utility methods including Express.js authentication middleware.
- */
-import { jwtDecode } from 'jwt-decode';
-import { loadNodeCrypto } from '@oxy.so/protocol';
-import { logger } from '../logger/index.js';
-import { OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS } from '../utils/oxyServiceEnvironment.js';
-/** The SET `events` member Oxy uses for an account deletion. */
-export const OXY_ACCOUNT_DELETED_EVENT_URI = 'https://oxy.so/events/account.deleted';
-/** Why an account event token was refused. `message` never contains the token. */
-export class OxyAccountEventError extends Error {
-    constructor(message) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = 'OxyAccountEventError';
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Expected JWT audience for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
- */
-const OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE = 'oxy-api';
-/**
- * Expected JWT issuer for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
- */
-const OXY_JWT_ISSUER = 'oxy-auth';
-/**
- * Sentinel error classes for service-token verification. Using classes (not
- * message strings) makes the catch site below safe to extend: a new failure
- * mode added later cannot silently fall through to the generic 500 branch.
- */
-class ServiceTokenStructureError extends Error {
-    constructor(message = 'Service token has malformed structure') {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = 'ServiceTokenStructureError';
-    }
-}
-class ServiceTokenSignatureError extends Error {
-    constructor(message = 'Service token signature is invalid') {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = 'ServiceTokenSignatureError';
-    }
-}
-class ServiceTokenConfigurationError extends Error {
-    constructor(message) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = 'ServiceTokenConfigurationError';
-    }
-}
-class ServiceTokenClaimError extends Error {
-    constructor(message) {
-        super(message);
-        this.name = 'ServiceTokenClaimError';
-    }
-}
-function isOxyServiceEnvironment(value) {
-    return (typeof value === 'string' &&
-        OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS.includes(value));
-}
-export function OxyServicesUtilityMixin(Base) {
-    return class extends Base {
-        // TypeScript's mixin pattern requires `(...args: any[])` here — the
-        // constructor signature is a structural shape check the compiler enforces.
-        // Matches every other mixin in this package; do not change without a
-        // monorepo-wide refactor of the mixin pipeline.
-        constructor(...args) {
-            super(...args);
-            /**
-             * In-memory cache for service-acting-as verification.
-             * Negative results are cached for 1min to avoid hammering the verify
-             * endpoint when a service is misconfigured; positive grants are cached
-             * for 5min to amortize the round-trip without holding stale grants too long.
-             * @internal
-             */
-            this._serviceActingAsCache = new Map();
-            /** @internal Per-client public-key cache; never contains private material. */
-            this._serviceTokenJwksCache = { keys: new Map(), expiresAt: 0, lastAttemptAt: 0 };
-        }
-        /**
-         * Verify that a service app holds an active delegation grant authorising
-         * it to act on behalf of `userId`. Returns the grant (with allowed scopes)
-         * on success or `null` if no valid grant exists. Negative answers are
-         * cached briefly to protect the verify endpoint from misconfigured callers.
-         *
-         * Implemented as a per-instance Map keyed by `appId:userId`. Cached
-         * positive grants live for 5 minutes (acceptable staleness window for an
-         * impersonation grant); revocations propagate within that window.
-         *
-         * @internal Used by the auth() middleware — not part of the public API
-         */
-        async verifyServiceActingAs(appId, userId) {
-            const cacheKey = `${appId}:${userId}`;
-            const now = Date.now();
-            const cached = this._serviceActingAsCache.get(cacheKey);
-            if (cached && cached.expiresAt > now) {
-                return cached.result;
-            }
-            try {
-                // The verify endpoint is service-to-service and admits only a
-                // platform-TRUSTED calling application, so this call must carry the
-                // VERIFIER's own service token. Sent explicitly rather than through
-                // `makeServiceRequest`, which would drop `retry: false` and the timeout
-                // — and those two are not incidental: this runs inside request-handling
-                // middleware, so an inner retry loop multiplies the latency of every
-                // delegated request by the number of attempts.
-                //
-                // A verifier with no service credentials configured throws here and
-                // lands in the catch below, which is the correct outcome. A host that
-                // cannot prove who it is has no business being told which users have
-                // delegated to which applications, and the 60s negative cache stops a
-                // misconfigured deployment from turning every request into a round trip.
-                const serviceToken = await this.getServiceToken();
-                const result = await this.makeRequest('GET', '/internal/service-acting-as/verify', { appId, userId }, {
-                    cache: false,
-                    retry: false,
-                    timeout: 5000,
-                    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${serviceToken}` },
-                });
-                const authorized = Boolean(result && result.authorized);
-                const verified = authorized
-                    ? { authorized: true, scopes: Array.isArray(result.scopes) ? result.scopes : [] }
-                    : null;
-                this._serviceActingAsCache.set(cacheKey, {
-                    result: verified,
-                    expiresAt: now + 5 * 60 * 1000,
-                });
-                return verified;
-            }
-            catch (error) {
-                logger.warn('[oxy.auth] verifyServiceActingAs lookup failed — caching negative result', {
-                    component: 'auth',
-                    method: 'verifyServiceActingAs',
-                    appId,
-                    userId,
-                }, error);
-                // Negative cache prevents a runaway loop if the verify endpoint is
-                // down, while still letting a real grant become visible within 60s.
-                this._serviceActingAsCache.set(cacheKey, {
-                    result: null,
-                    expiresAt: now + 1 * 60 * 1000,
-                });
-                return null;
-            }
-        }
-        /**
-         * Verify an account event token from Oxy — the body of an account-event
-         * webhook, or an entry's `token` from `listAccountEvents` — and return the
-         * event. Throws {@link OxyAccountEventError} unless the token is an
-         * EdDSA-signed `secevent+jwt` from Oxy's published key set, issued by
-         * `oxy-auth`, addressed to this application, carrying exactly one known
-         * event. A service token (`typ: JWT`) is refused here, as this token is
-         * refused as a service token.
-         *
-         * Node only (it needs `node:crypto`). The caller must still be idempotent on
-         * `eventId`: Oxy delivers at least once, by push and by pull.
-         */
-        async verifyAccountEvent(token, options = {}) {
-            if (typeof token !== 'string' || token.length === 0 || token.length > 16 * 1024) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token is missing or oversized');
-            }
-            const parts = token.split('.');
-            if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token is not a compact JWS');
-            }
-            const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = parts;
-            let header;
-            let payload;
-            try {
-                header = parseJsonSegment(headerB64);
-                payload = parseJsonSegment(payloadB64);
-            }
-            catch {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token is malformed');
-            }
-            if (Object.keys(header).length !== 3
-                || header.alg !== 'EdDSA'
-                || header.typ !== 'secevent+jwt'
-                || typeof header.kid !== 'string'
-                || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(header.kid)) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token header is not supported');
-            }
-            const nodeCrypto = await loadNodeCrypto();
-            let jwk;
-            try {
-                jwk = await resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(header.kid, options.jwksUrl ?? new URL('/.well-known/jwks.json', this.getBaseURL()).toString(), this._serviceTokenJwksCache);
-            }
-            catch (error) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError(error instanceof Error ? error.message.replace('Service token', 'Account event') : 'Signing key is unavailable');
-            }
-            const signature = Buffer.from(signatureB64, 'base64url');
-            if (signature.toString('base64url') !== signatureB64 || signature.length !== 64) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token signature is malformed');
-            }
-            let verified = false;
-            try {
-                const publicKey = nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: 'jwk' });
-                verified = nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`), publicKey, signature);
-            }
-            catch {
-                verified = false;
-            }
-            if (!verified)
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token signature is invalid');
-            if (payload.iss !== OXY_JWT_ISSUER) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token issuer is not Oxy');
-            }
-            const audience = options.audience ?? await this._configuredServiceAppId();
-            if (typeof payload.aud !== 'string' || payload.aud !== audience) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token is addressed to another application');
-            }
-            if (typeof payload.jti !== 'string' || payload.jti.length === 0 || payload.jti.length > 128) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token has no event id');
-            }
-            if (typeof payload.iat !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(payload.iat)) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token has no issue time');
-            }
-            const events = payload.events;
-            if (typeof events !== 'object' || events === null || Array.isArray(events)) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token carries no events');
-            }
-            const entries = Object.entries(events);
-            const deleted = events[OXY_ACCOUNT_DELETED_EVENT_URI];
-            if (entries.length !== 1 || typeof deleted !== 'object' || deleted === null || Array.isArray(deleted)) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event token carries an unknown event');
-            }
-            const body = deleted;
-            if (typeof body.userId !== 'string' || body.userId.length === 0 || body.userId.length > 128) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event names no account');
-            }
-            if (typeof body.occurredAt !== 'string' || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(body.occurredAt))) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event has no occurrence time');
-            }
-            if (body.username !== undefined && body.username !== null && typeof body.username !== 'string') {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('Account event username is malformed');
-            }
-            return {
-                eventId: payload.jti,
-                type: 'account.deleted',
-                userId: body.userId,
-                username: typeof body.username === 'string' ? body.username : null,
-                occurredAt: body.occurredAt,
-                retained: body.retained === true,
-                applicationId: payload.aud,
-                issuedAt: payload.iat,
-            };
-        }
-        /**
-         * One page of account events addressed to this application, oldest first,
-         * from Oxy's pull feed — the reconciliation path behind the webhook. Needs
-         * the service credential (`configureServiceAuth`). Verify each entry's
-         * `token` with {@link verifyAccountEvent} before acting on it.
-         */
-        async listAccountEvents(options = {}) {
-            const serviceToken = await this.getServiceToken();
-            const query = {};
-            if (options.after)
-                query.after = options.after;
-            if (options.limit !== undefined)
-                query.limit = String(options.limit);
-            return this.makeRequest('GET', '/account-events', query, {
-                cache: false,
-                headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${serviceToken}` },
-            });
-        }
-        /** @internal The `appId` claim of this client's own service token. */
-        async _configuredServiceAppId() {
-            const serviceToken = await this.getServiceToken();
-            const appId = jwtDecode(serviceToken).appId;
-            if (typeof appId !== 'string' || appId.length === 0) {
-                throw new OxyAccountEventError('No audience given and the service credential names no application');
-            }
-            return appId;
-        }
-        /**
-         * Express.js authentication middleware
-         *
-         * Validates JWT tokens against the Oxy API and attaches user data to requests.
-         * Uses server-side session validation for security (not just JWT decode).
-         *
-         * **Design note — jwtDecode vs jwt.verify:**
-         * This middleware uses `jwtDecode()` (decode-only, NO signature check) for
-         * user tokens, because third-party apps mounting `oxy.auth()` do not hold
-         * the Oxy signing secret. **Every claim in a user token is therefore
-         * attacker-controlled and proves nothing on its own.** The identity comes
-         * from somewhere else entirely:
-         * - A user token MUST carry a `sessionId`. That session is validated
-         *   server-side on every request via `validateSession()`, and the user id
-         *   is read off the VALIDATED SESSION — never off the token. A token whose
-         *   `userId` claim disagrees with the session is refused
-         *   (`SESSION_USER_MISMATCH`); a token with no `sessionId` at all is
-         *   refused outright (`SESSION_REQUIRED`). There is no local-claims path.
-         * - Service tokens (type: 'service') ARE stateless, so they use Ed25519
-         *   verification against Oxy's public JWKS and are additionally checked
-         *   for `aud`, `iss`, `type`, time, attribution and scope claims. The
-         *   `jwtSecret` path exists only for Oxy API's bounded HS256 transition.
-         * - The backend's own `authMiddleware` uses `jwt.verify()` because it has
-         *   direct access to `ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET`.
-         *
-         * **Why session-less user tokens are refused rather than trusted:**
-         * every user access token the Oxy API issues carries a `sessionId` (see
-         * `packages/api/src/utils/sessionUtils.ts`, `generateSessionTokens` — the
-         * only mint site for user tokens, including the OAuth code exchange). So
-         * refusing session-less user tokens costs nothing legitimate, while
-         * accepting them let anyone authenticate as anyone by hand-rolling a JWT
-         * with a `userId` claim and a garbage signature.
-         *
-         * **Why the claimed user id is cross-checked against the session:**
-         * `GET /session/validate/:sessionId` is UNAUTHENTICATED and does not bind
-         * the bearer token — it returns whoever owns the session id it was handed.
-         * Trusting the token's `userId` claim after a successful validation would
-         * therefore let a caller holding ANY live session id (their own, for
-         * instance) pair it with a forged `userId` and be trusted as that user.
-         * `authSocket()` has always cross-checked this; the HTTP middleware now
-         * does too.
-         *
-         * **Service-token delegation (X-Oxy-User-Id):**
-         * When a service token is accompanied by `X-Oxy-User-Id`, the SDK calls
-         * `verifyServiceActingAs(appId, userId)` to confirm an explicit delegation
-         * grant exists before attaching `req.userId`. A missing/expired grant
-         * results in a 403 — there is no fail-open path.
-         *
-         * @example
-         * ```typescript
-         * import { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
-         *
-         * const oxy = new OxyServices({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
-         *
-         * // Protect all routes under /protected
-         * app.use('/protected', oxy.auth());
-         *
-         * // Access user in route handler
-         * app.get('/protected/me', (req, res) => {
-         *   res.json({ userId: req.userId, user: req.user });
-         * });
-         *
-         * // Load full user profile from API
-         * app.use('/admin', oxy.auth({ loadUser: true }));
-         *
-         * // Optional auth - attach user if present, don't block if absent
-         * app.use('/public', oxy.auth({ optional: true }));
-         *
-         * // Require a specific scope on a service-token-protected route
-         * app.use('/internal/files', oxy.serviceAuth(), oxy.requireScope('files:write'));
-         * ```
-         *
-         * @param options Optional configuration
-         * @returns Express middleware function
-         */
-        auth(options = {}) {
-            const { debug = false, onError, onRefusal, loadUser = false, optional = false, jwtSecret, serviceTokenJwksUrl = new URL('/.well-known/jwks.json', this.getBaseURL()).toString(), expectedIssuer = OXY_JWT_ISSUER, expectedAudience = OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE, } = options;
-            // Cross-mixin method access: typed as a structural subset of the
-            // composed OxyServices we know we have at runtime.
-            const oxyInstance = this;
-            /**
-             * Make a refusal observable to the HOST, without telling the client
-             * anything it is not already told.
-             *
-             * Called at the top of every branch that rejects a PRESENTED credential,
-             * including the ones `optional` then swallows — those are the expensive
-             * ones, because they leave no trace anywhere else. The response bodies
-             * below are untouched by design: what a client sees does not change.
-             *
-             * `warn`, not `debug`: a debug-gated reason is only there for whoever
-             * already suspects this middleware, and the failure mode this exists for
-             * is the one where nobody does. The volume is bounded by refusals, and a
-             * host drowning in them has a fault worth the lines.
-             */
-            const recordRefusal = (req, refusal) => {
-                const recorded = { ...refusal, optional };
-                req.oxyAuthRefusal = recorded;
-                logger.warn(`[oxy.auth] refused ${recorded.code}: ${recorded.reason}`, {
-                    component: 'auth',
-                    method: 'auth',
-                    code: recorded.code,
-                    stage: recorded.stage,
-                    reason: recorded.reason,
-                    status: recorded.status,
-                    // Says whether the client will see this status or the host's own
-                    // generic answer — the difference that made the JWKS outage invisible.
-                    optional: recorded.optional,
-                    path: req.path,
-                });
-                if (onRefusal) {
-                    try {
-                        onRefusal(recorded);
-                    }
-                    catch (observerError) {
-                        logger.warn('[oxy.auth] onRefusal observer threw', {
-                            component: 'auth',
-                            method: 'auth',
-                        }, observerError);
-                    }
-                }
-            };
-            // Return an async middleware function
-            return async (req, res, next) => {
-                try {
-                    // Extract token from Authorization header.
-                    // Node/Express normalizes `Authorization` to a string; we guard
-                    // against the (legal but unusual) string[] case anyway.
-                    const rawAuthHeader = req.headers.authorization;
-                    const authHeader = Array.isArray(rawAuthHeader) ? rawAuthHeader[0] : rawAuthHeader;
-                    const token = authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? authHeader.substring(7) : null;
-                    if (debug) {
-                        logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] ${req.method} ${req.path} | token: ${!!token}`, {
-                            component: 'auth',
-                            method: 'auth',
-                        });
-                    }
-                    if (!token) {
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
-                            message: 'Access token required',
-                            code: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                    // Decode token to extract claims
-                    let decoded;
-                    try {
-                        decoded = jwtDecode(token);
-                    }
-                    catch (decodeError) {
-                        recordRefusal(req, {
-                            code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
-                            stage: 'token',
-                            reason: 'Bearer credential is not a decodable JWT',
-                            status: 401,
-                        });
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Token decode failed', {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth',
-                            }, decodeError);
-                        }
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
-                            message: 'Invalid token format',
-                            code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                    // Handle service tokens (internal service-to-service auth)
-                    // Service tokens are stateless JWTs with type: 'service' — requires signature verification
-                    if (decoded.type === 'service') {
-                        // Verify JWT signature, then audience / issuer / type / appId claims.
-                        //
-                        // Signature verification uses Node crypto rather than
-                        // `jsonwebtoken` because this file also ships into RN/web bundles.
-                        // The middleware itself runs on Node hosts; `loadNodeCrypto` is
-                        // per-platform, so Metro never bundles a Node built-in reference.
-                        try {
-                            await verifyServiceTokenSignature(token, {
-                                legacySecret: jwtSecret,
-                                jwksUrl: serviceTokenJwksUrl,
-                                cache: this._serviceTokenJwksCache,
-                            });
-                            verifyServiceTokenClaims(decoded, {
-                                audience: expectedAudience,
-                                issuer: expectedIssuer,
-                            });
-                        }
-                        catch (verifyError) {
-                            // Structure + signature + claim errors all map to 401. Anything
-                            // else (e.g. Node crypto failing to load on a misconfigured host)
-                            // genuinely IS a 500.
-                            if (verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenConfigurationError) {
-                                recordRefusal(req, {
-                                    code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED',
-                                    stage: 'service-token',
-                                    reason: verifyError.message,
-                                    status: 403,
-                                });
-                                if (optional) {
-                                    req.userId = null;
-                                    req.user = null;
-                                    return next();
-                                }
-                                const error = {
-                                    error: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED',
-                                    message: verifyError.message,
-                                    code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED',
-                                    status: 403,
-                                };
-                                if (onError)
-                                    return onError(error);
-                                return res.status(403).json(error);
-                            }
-                            if (verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenStructureError ||
-                                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenSignatureError ||
-                                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenClaimError) {
-                                const code = verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenClaimError
-                                    ? 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS'
-                                    : 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN';
-                                // The SDK's own message is the whole diagnostic value here —
-                                // "signing key is unknown" (rotated/unpublished kid), "key set
-                                // is unavailable" (JWKS empty, unreachable or malformed) and
-                                // "audience mismatch" are three different outages that answer
-                                // the client identically.
-                                recordRefusal(req, {
-                                    code,
-                                    stage: 'service-token',
-                                    reason: `${verifyError.name}: ${verifyError.message}`,
-                                    status: 401,
-                                });
-                                if (debug) {
-                                    logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected', {
-                                        component: 'auth',
-                                        method: 'auth.serviceToken',
-                                        reason: verifyError.name,
-                                        detail: verifyError.message,
-                                    });
-                                }
-                                if (optional) {
-                                    req.userId = null;
-                                    req.user = null;
-                                    return next();
-                                }
-                                const error = {
-                                    error: code,
-                                    message: verifyError.message,
-                                    code,
-                                    status: 401,
-                                };
-                                if (onError)
-                                    return onError(error);
-                                return res.status(401).json(error);
-                            }
-                            logger.error('[oxy.auth] Unexpected error during service token verification', verifyError, {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth.serviceToken',
-                            });
-                            const error = {
-                                error: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
-                                message: 'Internal authentication error',
-                                code: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
-                                status: 500,
-                            };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(500).json(error);
-                        }
-                        // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
-                        const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-                        if (!Number.isInteger(decoded.exp) || decoded.exp <= now) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
-                                stage: 'service-token',
-                                reason: Number.isInteger(decoded.exp)
-                                    ? 'Service token expired'
-                                    : 'Service token has no integer exp claim',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            if (optional) {
-                                req.userId = null;
-                                req.user = null;
-                                return next();
-                            }
-                            const error = { error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', message: 'Service token expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', status: 401 };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        if (decoded.nbf !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(decoded.nbf) || decoded.nbf > now)) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
-                                stage: 'service-token',
-                                reason: 'Service token is not yet valid (nbf)',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', message: 'Service token is not yet valid', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', status: 401 };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        // Validate required service token fields. All of them are
-                        // required, `ownerAccountId` included: an optional billing
-                        // principal is one fallback away from being resolved from the
-                        // delegated user, which is the exact confusion ADR 0007 forbids.
-                        const appId = decoded.appId;
-                        const credentialId = decoded.credentialId;
-                        const ownerAccountId = decoded.ownerAccountId;
-                        const environment = decoded.environment;
-                        if (!isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(appId) ||
-                            !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(decoded.appName) ||
-                            !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(credentialId) ||
-                            !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(ownerAccountId) ||
-                            !isOxyServiceEnvironment(environment)
-                            || !Array.isArray(decoded.scopes)
-                            || !decoded.scopes.every((scope) => typeof scope === 'string' && scope.length > 0 && scope === scope.trim())
-                            || new Set(decoded.scopes).size !== decoded.scopes.length) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN',
-                                stage: 'service-token',
-                                // Names the field rather than its value: an exact-match claim
-                                // failing on invisible whitespace reads as "present" in a log
-                                // that only says which claims were missing.
-                                reason: `Service token claims unusable (${[
-                                    !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(appId) ? 'appId' : null,
-                                    !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(decoded.appName) ? 'appName' : null,
-                                    !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(credentialId) ? 'credentialId' : null,
-                                    !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(ownerAccountId) ? 'ownerAccountId' : null,
-                                    !isOxyServiceEnvironment(environment) ? 'environment' : null,
-                                    !Array.isArray(decoded.scopes) ? 'scopes' : null,
-                                ].filter((field) => field !== null).join(', ') || 'scopes'})`,
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            if (optional) {
-                                req.userId = null;
-                                req.user = null;
-                                return next();
-                            }
-                            const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', message: 'Invalid service token: missing required claims', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', status: 401 };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        const tier = decoded.tier === 'internal' ? 'internal' : 'external';
-                        // Read delegated user ID from header
-                        const oxyUserIdRaw = req.headers['x-oxy-user-id'];
-                        const oxyUserId = isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(oxyUserIdRaw) ? oxyUserIdRaw : null;
-                        if (oxyUserIdRaw !== undefined && oxyUserId === null) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
-                                stage: 'service-token',
-                                reason: 'X-Oxy-User-Id is not an exact non-empty id',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            const error = {
-                                error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
-                                message: 'Delegated user id must be an exact non-empty id',
-                                code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
-                                status: 401,
-                            };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        // One of Oxy's own applications acts for a user without a grant:
-                        // inside the ecosystem that is trust, not consent. It still acts
-                        // with the USER's authority only — what that user may do is for the
-                        // receiving service to check.
-                        if (oxyUserId && tier === 'internal') {
-                            req.userId = oxyUserId;
-                            req.user = { id: oxyUserId };
-                            req.serviceActingAs = { userId: oxyUserId, scopes: [] };
-                        }
-                        else if (oxyUserId) {
-                            // C3: an EXTERNAL service may only act as a user when an explicit
-                            // ServiceActingAs grant exists for that (appId, userId) pair.
-                            // Without the grant we MUST refuse — silently attaching
-                            // `req.userId = oxyUserId` would let any service impersonate
-                            // any user simply by setting the header.
-                            const grant = await oxyInstance.verifyServiceActingAs(appId, oxyUserId);
-                            if (!grant || !grant.authorized) {
-                                logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected — no delegation grant', {
-                                    component: 'auth',
-                                    method: 'auth.serviceToken',
-                                    appId,
-                                    attemptedUserId: oxyUserId,
-                                });
-                                // A verifier with no service credentials of its own cannot
-                                // reach the verify endpoint at all, so `null` here can mean
-                                // "no grant" OR "this host cannot ask". Both refuse, and both
-                                // are worth naming on the request.
-                                recordRefusal(req, {
-                                    code: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
-                                    stage: 'service-token',
-                                    reason: `No delegation grant for app ${appId} acting as ${oxyUserId} (or this verifier could not reach the grant check)`,
-                                    status: 403,
-                                });
-                                const error = {
-                                    error: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
-                                    message: 'Service not authorized to act as this user',
-                                    code: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
-                                    status: 403,
-                                };
-                                if (onError)
-                                    return onError(error);
-                                return res.status(403).json(error);
-                            }
-                            // ATTRIBUTION ONLY. `req.userId` answers "on whose behalf", never
-                            // "who pays": the billing principal stays `req.serviceApp
-                            // .ownerAccountId`, which this branch does not touch. Read it
-                            // through `getOxyBillingPrincipal` (`@oxy.so/core/server`), whose
-                            // return type a user id cannot satisfy (ADR 0007).
-                            req.userId = oxyUserId;
-                            req.user = { id: oxyUserId };
-                            req.serviceActingAs = { userId: oxyUserId, scopes: grant.scopes };
-                        }
-                        else {
-                            // No X-Oxy-User-Id means the service is acting as itself.
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                        }
-                        req.accessToken = token;
-                        req.serviceApp = {
-                            appId,
-                            appName: decoded.appName,
-                            credentialId,
-                            ownerAccountId,
-                            scopes: Array.isArray(decoded.scopes) ? decoded.scopes : [],
-                            environment,
-                            tier,
-                        };
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] Service token OK app=${decoded.appName} delegateUser=${oxyUserId || '(none)'}`, {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth.serviceToken',
-                            });
-                        }
-                        return next();
-                    }
-                    // The CLAIMED user id. Never trusted as an identity — it is only ever
-                    // compared against the id the validated session resolves to.
-                    const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
-                    if (!claimedUserId) {
-                        recordRefusal(req, {
-                            code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
-                            stage: 'token',
-                            reason: 'Token carries no usable user id claim',
-                            status: 401,
-                        });
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
-                            message: 'Token missing user ID',
-                            code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                    // Check token expiration locally first (fast path)
-                    // Reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
-                    if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
-                        recordRefusal(req, {
-                            code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
-                            stage: 'token',
-                            reason: 'User access token expired',
-                            status: 401,
-                        });
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
-                            message: 'Token expired',
-                            code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                    // A server-validated session is MANDATORY for a user token. The JWT
-                    // signature is not verified on this path, so a bare decoded token
-                    // proves nothing: without the session round-trip a forged token could
-                    // claim any user id. Mirrors `authSocket()`, which has always
-                    // required this.
-                    const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
-                    if (!sessionId) {
-                        recordRefusal(req, {
-                            code: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
-                            stage: 'token',
-                            reason: 'User access token is not bound to a session',
-                            status: 401,
-                        });
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
-                            message: 'Access token is not bound to a session',
-                            code: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                    // Validate the token against the Oxy API. This proves the session is
-                    // real and unrevoked, AND yields the identity it belongs to.
-                    try {
-                        const validationResult = await oxyInstance.validateSession(sessionId, {
-                            useHeaderValidation: true,
-                        });
-                        if (!validationResult || !validationResult.valid || !validationResult.user) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                stage: 'session',
-                                reason: 'Session is invalid, revoked or expired',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            if (optional) {
-                                req.userId = null;
-                                req.user = null;
-                                return next();
-                            }
-                            const error = {
-                                error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                message: 'Session invalid or expired',
-                                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                status: 401
-                            };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        // The session — not the token — is the source of truth for identity.
-                        const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(validationResult.user);
-                        if (!validatedUserId) {
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                stage: 'session',
-                                reason: 'Session did not resolve to a usable identity',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            if (optional) {
-                                req.userId = null;
-                                req.user = null;
-                                return next();
-                            }
-                            const error = {
-                                error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                message: 'Session did not resolve to a usable identity',
-                                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
-                                status: 401
-                            };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        if (validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
-                            // Session-id/claim confusion: the caller presented a live session
-                            // that belongs to somebody else. Worth a warning — it has no
-                            // benign cause. Ids only; never the token or the payload.
-                            logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Token rejected — claimed user does not own the session', {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth',
-                                claimedUserId,
-                                validatedUserId,
-                            });
-                            recordRefusal(req, {
-                                code: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
-                                stage: 'session',
-                                reason: 'Token user claim does not own the presented session',
-                                status: 401,
-                            });
-                            if (optional) {
-                                req.userId = null;
-                                req.user = null;
-                                return next();
-                            }
-                            const error = {
-                                error: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
-                                message: 'Token user does not match the session',
-                                code: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
-                                status: 401
-                            };
-                            if (onError)
-                                return onError(error);
-                            return res.status(401).json(error);
-                        }
-                        req.userId = validatedUserId;
-                        req.accessToken = token;
-                        req.sessionId = sessionId;
-                        // Session validation already returned the full user, so `loadUser`
-                        // costs no extra round-trip.
-                        req.user = loadUser ? validationResult.user : { id: validatedUserId };
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] OK user=${validatedUserId} session=${sessionId}`, {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth',
-                            });
-                        }
-                        return next();
-                    }
-                    catch (validationError) {
-                        recordRefusal(req, {
-                            code: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
-                            stage: 'session',
-                            // Name and transport code only. The message of a failed
-                            // `validateSession` can carry the request URL, and that URL
-                            // contains the session id — which is a credential.
-                            reason: `Session validation call failed (${describeErrorSafely(validationError)})`,
-                            status: 401,
-                        });
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Session validation failed', {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'auth',
-                            }, validationError);
-                        }
-                        if (optional) {
-                            req.userId = null;
-                            req.user = null;
-                            return next();
-                        }
-                        const error = {
-                            error: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
-                            message: 'Session validation failed',
-                            code: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
-                            status: 401
-                        };
-                        if (onError)
-                            return onError(error);
-                        return res.status(401).json(error);
-                    }
-                }
-                catch (error) {
-                    const handled = oxyInstance.handleError(error);
-                    const apiError = {
-                        message: handled.message || 'Authentication error',
-                        code: handled.code ?? 'AUTH_ERROR',
-                        status: handled.status ?? 500,
-                        details: handled.details,
-                    };
-                    if (debug) {
-                        logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Error', {
-                            component: 'auth',
-                            method: 'auth',
-                        }, apiError);
-                    }
-                    if (onError)
-                        return onError(apiError);
-                    return res.status(apiError.status).json(apiError);
-                }
-            };
-        }
-        /**
-         * Socket.IO authentication middleware factory
-         *
-         * Returns a middleware function for Socket.IO that validates JWT tokens
-         * from the handshake auth object and attaches user data to the socket.
-         *
-         * Uses `jwtDecode()` + API session validation (same rationale as `auth()`).
-         *
-         * @example
-         * ```typescript
-         * import { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
-         * import { Server } from 'socket.io';
-         *
-         * const oxy = new OxyServices({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
-         * const io = new Server(server);
-         *
-         * // Authenticate all socket connections
-         * io.use(oxy.authSocket());
-         *
-         * io.on('connection', (socket) => {
-         *   console.log('Authenticated user:', socket.data.userId);
-         * });
-         * ```
-         */
-        authSocket(options = {}) {
-            const { debug = false } = options;
-            // Cross-mixin method access typed via the same structural subset.
-            const oxyInstance = this;
-            return async (socket, next) => {
-                try {
-                    const token = socket.handshake?.auth?.token;
-                    if (!token) {
-                        return next(new Error('Authentication required'));
-                    }
-                    let decoded;
-                    try {
-                        decoded = jwtDecode(token);
-                    }
-                    catch (decodeError) {
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Token decode failed', {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'authSocket',
-                            }, decodeError);
-                        }
-                        return next(new Error('Invalid token'));
-                    }
-                    const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
-                    if (!claimedUserId) {
-                        return next(new Error('Invalid token payload'));
-                    }
-                    // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
-                    if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
-                        return next(new Error('Token expired'));
-                    }
-                    // A server-validated session is mandatory. A bare decoded JWT proves
-                    // nothing — the signature is not verified here, so without a session
-                    // round-trip a forged token could claim any user id.
-                    const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
-                    if (!sessionId) {
-                        return next(new Error('Session required'));
-                    }
-                    let userId = claimedUserId;
-                    try {
-                        const result = await oxyInstance.validateSession(sessionId, {
-                            useHeaderValidation: true,
-                        });
-                        if (!result || !result.valid || !result.user) {
-                            return next(new Error('Session invalid'));
-                        }
-                        // The session is the source of truth. The client-claimed user id
-                        // must match the server-validated identity, otherwise a valid
-                        // session could be paired with a forged user id.
-                        const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(result.user);
-                        if (!validatedUserId || validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
-                            return next(new Error('Session user mismatch'));
-                        }
-                        userId = validatedUserId;
-                    }
-                    catch (validateErr) {
-                        if (debug) {
-                            logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Session validation failed', {
-                                component: 'auth',
-                                method: 'authSocket',
-                            }, validateErr);
-                        }
-                        return next(new Error('Session validation failed'));
-                    }
-                    // Attach user data to socket. We expose BOTH `socket.data.userId`
-                    // (the official Socket.IO data slot) and `socket.user` because
-                    // every consumer in this ecosystem (Mention, Allo, api/server.ts)
-                    // reads from `socket.user.id`.
-                    socket.data = socket.data || {};
-                    socket.data.userId = userId;
-                    socket.data.sessionId = sessionId;
-                    socket.data.token = token;
-                    socket.user = { id: userId, userId, sessionId };
-                    if (debug) {
-                        logger.debug(`[oxy.authSocket] OK user=${userId}`, {
-                            component: 'auth',
-                            method: 'authSocket',
-                        });
-                    }
-                    next();
-                }
-                catch (err) {
-                    if (debug) {
-                        logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Error', {
-                            component: 'auth',
-                            method: 'authSocket',
-                        }, err);
-                    }
-                    next(new Error('Authentication error'));
-                }
-            };
-        }
-        /**
-         * Express.js middleware that only allows service tokens.
-         * Use this for internal-only endpoints that should not be accessible
-         * to regular users or API key consumers.
-         *
-         * @example
-         * ```typescript
-         * // Protect internal endpoints
-         * app.use('/internal', oxy.serviceAuth());
-         *
-         * app.post('/internal/trigger', (req, res) => {
-         *   console.log('Service app:', req.serviceApp);
-         *   console.log('Acting on behalf of user:', req.userId);
-         * });
-         * ```
-         */
-        serviceAuth(options = {}) {
-            const innerAuth = this.auth({ ...options });
-            return async (req, res, next) => {
-                await innerAuth(req, res, () => {
-                    if (!req.serviceApp) {
-                        return res.status(403).json({
-                            error: 'Service token required',
-                            message: 'This endpoint is only accessible to internal services',
-                            code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
-                        });
-                    }
-                    next();
-                });
-            };
-        }
-        /**
-         * Express.js middleware that enforces a specific service-token scope.
-         *
-         * Mount AFTER `auth()` / `serviceAuth()` — relies on `req.serviceApp` and
-         * (when delegation is in effect) `req.serviceActingAs.scopes`. App-only
-         * service requests require the app scope. Delegated user requests require
-         * BOTH the app scope and the per-user delegation scope.
-         *
-         * The intersection is the point, not a redundancy, because the two scope
-         * lists answer different questions and neither implies the other:
-         *
-         *   `serviceApp.scopes`      what the PLATFORM allows this application to do
-         *                            (credential ∩ application ceiling, at mint time)
-         *   `serviceActingAs.scopes` what THIS USER allowed it to do (`app_grants`)
-         *
-         * Requiring only the app scope would let an application do to a user
-         * something that user never consented to; requiring only the grant would let
-         * a user hand an application authority staff never gave it, so a revoked
-         * platform scope would keep working for every user who had already
-         * consented. Effective authority is the intersection, and this is where it
-         * is taken.
-         *
-         * Requests authenticated as a regular user (no service token) are rejected
-         * with 403 — scope-protected endpoints are service-to-service by design.
-         *
-         * @example
-         * ```typescript
-         * app.use(
-         *   '/internal/files',
-         *   oxy.serviceAuth(),
-         *   oxy.requireScope('files:write'),
-         * );
-         * ```
-         */
-        requireScope(scope) {
-            if (typeof scope !== 'string' || scope.length === 0) {
-                throw new Error('requireScope: scope must be a non-empty string');
-            }
-            return (req, res, next) => {
-                const appScopes = req.serviceApp?.scopes ?? [];
-                const delegatedScopes = req.serviceActingAs?.scopes ?? [];
-                if (!req.serviceApp) {
-                    res.status(403).json({
-                        error: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
-                        message: 'Scope-protected endpoint requires a service token',
-                        code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
-                        status: 403,
-                    });
-                    return;
-                }
-                // Oxy's own applications are trusted app to app; scopes are the
-                // external lane.
-                if (req.serviceApp.tier === 'internal') {
-                    next();
-                    return;
-                }
-                const appHasScope = appScopes.includes(scope);
-                const delegationHasScope = delegatedScopes.includes(scope);
-                const hasRequiredScope = req.serviceActingAs
-                    ? appHasScope && delegationHasScope
-                    : appHasScope;
-                if (hasRequiredScope) {
-                    next();
-                    return;
-                }
-                logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token missing required scope', {
-                    component: 'auth',
-                    method: 'requireScope',
-                    appId: req.serviceApp.appId,
-                    required: scope,
-                });
-                res.status(403).json({
-                    error: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
-                    message: `Required scope '${scope}' not granted`,
-                    code: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
-                    status: 403,
-                });
-            };
-        }
-    };
-}
-function isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.trim() === value;
-}
-const JWKS_CACHE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
-const JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS = 60 * 1000;
-const JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
-const JWKS_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
-const JWKS_MAX_KEYS = 20;
-function parseJsonSegment(segment) {
-    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(segment))
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not base64url');
-    const bytes = Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url');
-    if (bytes.toString('base64url') !== segment)
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not canonical base64url');
-    try {
-        const value = JSON.parse(bytes.toString('utf8'));
-        if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
-            throw new Error('not an object');
-        return value;
-    }
-    catch {
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not a JSON object');
-    }
-}
-function parseServiceTokenJwks(value) {
-    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
-        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS is malformed');
-    const keys = value.keys;
-    if (!Array.isArray(keys) || keys.length === 0 || keys.length > JWKS_MAX_KEYS)
-        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS has an invalid key set');
-    const result = new Map();
-    for (const value of keys) {
-        if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value))
-            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains a malformed key');
-        const key = value;
-        if (key.kty !== 'OKP'
-            || key.crv !== 'Ed25519'
-            || typeof key.x !== 'string'
-            || key.x.length === 0
-            || key.use !== 'sig'
-            || key.alg !== 'EdDSA'
-            || typeof key.kid !== 'string'
-            || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(key.kid)
-            || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(key, 'd')
-            || result.has(key.kid))
-            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an unsupported or duplicate key');
-        const x = Buffer.from(key.x, 'base64url');
-        if (x.length !== 32 || x.toString('base64url') !== key.x) {
-            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an invalid Ed25519 key');
-        }
-        result.set(key.kid, key);
-    }
-    return result;
-}
-async function refreshServiceTokenJwks(url, cache) {
-    if (cache.pending)
-        return cache.pending;
-    cache.lastAttemptAt = Date.now();
-    cache.pending = (async () => {
-        const controller = new AbortController();
-        const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS);
-        try {
-            const response = await fetch(url, {
-                method: 'GET',
-                headers: { accept: 'application/json' },
-                signal: controller.signal,
-                redirect: 'error',
-            });
-            if (!response.ok)
-                throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError(`Oxy JWKS returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
-            const source = await response.text();
-            if (Buffer.byteLength(source, 'utf8') > JWKS_MAX_BYTES)
-                throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS exceeds the size limit');
-            cache.keys = parseServiceTokenJwks(JSON.parse(source));
-            cache.expiresAt = Date.now() + JWKS_CACHE_MS;
-        }
-        finally {
-            clearTimeout(timeout);
-        }
-    })();
-    try {
-        await cache.pending;
-    }
-    finally {
-        cache.pending = undefined;
-    }
-}
-async function resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(kid, url, cache) {
-    const now = Date.now();
-    const cached = cache.keys.get(kid);
-    if (cached && cache.expiresAt > now)
-        return cached;
-    const mayRefresh = cache.expiresAt <= now || now - cache.lastAttemptAt >= JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS;
-    if (mayRefresh) {
-        try {
-            await refreshServiceTokenJwks(url, cache);
-        }
-        catch {
-            const stillValid = cache.keys.get(kid);
-            if (stillValid && cache.expiresAt > Date.now())
-                return stillValid;
-            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy service-token key set is unavailable');
-        }
-    }
-    const resolved = cache.keys.get(kid);
-    if (!resolved || cache.expiresAt <= Date.now())
-        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token signing key is unknown');
-    return resolved;
-}
-/** Ed25519/JWKS verification with an Oxy-API-only HS256 transition. */
-async function verifyServiceTokenSignature(token, options) {
-    const nodeCrypto = await loadNodeCrypto();
-    const parts = token.split('.');
-    if (parts.length !== 3) {
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError(`Service token must have 3 parts, got ${parts.length}`);
-    }
-    const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = parts;
-    if (!headerB64 || !payloadB64 || !signatureB64) {
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token has empty segment');
-    }
-    const header = parseJsonSegment(headerB64);
-    if (header.alg === 'HS256') {
-        if (!options.legacySecret)
-            throw new ServiceTokenConfigurationError('Legacy service token verification is not configured');
-        const expectedSig = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', options.legacySecret)
-            .update(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`)
-            .digest('base64url');
-        const sigBuf = Buffer.from(signatureB64);
-        const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expectedSig);
-        if (sigBuf.length !== expectedBuf.length || !nodeCrypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expectedBuf))
-            throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError();
-        return;
-    }
-    if (Object.keys(header).length !== 3
-        || header.alg !== 'EdDSA'
-        || header.typ !== 'JWT'
-        || typeof header.kid !== 'string'
-        || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(header.kid))
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token JOSE header is not supported');
-    const jwk = await resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(header.kid, options.jwksUrl, options.cache);
-    let publicKey;
-    try {
-        publicKey = nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: 'jwk' });
-    }
-    catch {
-        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token public key is invalid');
-    }
-    const signature = Buffer.from(signatureB64, 'base64url');
-    if (signature.toString('base64url') !== signatureB64 || signature.length !== 64)
-        throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token signature is malformed');
-    if (!nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`), publicKey, signature))
-        throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError();
-}
-/**
- * Read a JWT claim that is only usable as a non-empty string.
- *
- * A decoded payload is attacker-controlled JSON: a claim the type declares as
- * `string` can arrive as a number, an object, or `null`. Narrowing here keeps
- * those values out of URL construction and identity comparison, so an
- * unexpected shape becomes a 401 rather than a stringified surprise.
- */
-/**
- * A short, log-safe description of a thrown value: its class name and, when the
- * transport attached one, its `code` (`ECONNREFUSED`, `ETIMEDOUT`, `ENOTFOUND`
- * …). Never the message — a failed request's message can quote the URL it was
- * made against, and a session-validation URL contains the session id.
- */
-function describeErrorSafely(error) {
-    if (!(error instanceof Error))
-        return typeof error;
-    const code = error.code;
-    return typeof code === 'string' && /^[A-Za-z0-9_]{1,40}$/.test(code)
-        ? `${error.name}: ${code}`
-        : error.name;
-}
-function readStringClaim(value) {
-    return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 ? value : null;
-}
-/**
- * Resolve the canonical user id from a validated session's user object.
- *
- * The API serializer emits `id`, but some upstream shapes carry the raw Mongo
- * `_id` instead. We accept either, but only a non-empty string — anything else
- * means the validated identity is unusable and the caller must reject.
- */
-function getUserIdentityId(user) {
-    const candidate = user.id
-        ?? user._id;
-    return typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate.length > 0 ? candidate : null;
-}
-/**
- * Verify that a decoded service-token payload carries the expected `aud`,
- * `iss`, and `type` claims. Throws `ServiceTokenClaimError` on mismatch.
- * This is the defence against the H4 vulnerability where a recovery / 2FA /
- * access token signed by the same shared secret could be replayed as a
- * service token because no claim binding existed.
- */
-function verifyServiceTokenClaims(decoded, expected) {
-    if (decoded.type !== 'service') {
-        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token has unexpected type '${String(decoded.type)}'`);
-    }
-    if (decoded.iss !== expected.issuer) {
-        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token issuer mismatch: expected '${expected.issuer}', got '${String(decoded.iss)}'`);
-    }
-    const aud = decoded.aud;
-    if (Array.isArray(aud)) {
-        if (!aud.includes(expected.audience)) {
-            throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience does not include '${expected.audience}'`);
-        }
-    }
-    else if (aud !== expected.audience) {
-        throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience mismatch: expected '${expected.audience}', got '${String(aud)}'`);
-    }
-}