@oxy.so/core 1.0.0

package/dist/esm/mixins/OxyServices.identity.js

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+import { signMessage } from '@oxy.so/protocol';
+import { KeyManager } from '../crypto/keyManager.js';
+import { SignatureService } from '../crypto/signatureService.js';
+import { RecoveryPhraseService } from '../crypto/recoveryPhrase.js';
+import { isWeb } from '../utils/platform.js';
+import { logger } from '../logger/index.js';
+import { CACHE_TIMES } from './mixinHelpers.js';
+/**
+ * Registrable apex the Oxy DID method is anchored on. A user's DID is
+ * `did:web:<OXY_IDENTITY_APEX>:u:<userId>`, anchored on the stable account id
+ * (NOT the keypair).
+ */
+const OXY_IDENTITY_APEX = 'oxy.so';
+/**
+ * Derive a user's Oxy DID from their stable account id.
+ * `did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`.
+ */
+export function buildUserDid(userId) {
+    return `did:web:${OXY_IDENTITY_APEX}:u:${userId}`;
+}
+export function OxyServicesIdentityMixin(Base) {
+    return class extends Base {
+        constructor(...args) {
+            super(...args);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Resolve the W3C DID document for any user. The API derives it on demand
+         * from the account's `authMethods` + `publicKey` — there is no stored
+         * document. Public (no auth required); short-TTL cached.
+         *
+         * @param userId - The account's Mongo `_id`. URL-encoded into the path.
+         */
+        async resolveDid(userId) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', `/u/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/did.json`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * The current user's DID (`did:web:oxy.so:u:<userId>`), derived locally from
+         * the access token's user id. Throws if no user is authenticated.
+         */
+        getMyDid() {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot derive DID.');
+            }
+            return buildUserDid(userId);
+        }
+        /** Resolve the current user's DID document. Requires an authenticated session. */
+        async getMyDidDocument() {
+            const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+            if (!userId) {
+                throw new Error('No authenticated user — cannot resolve DID document.');
+            }
+            return this.resolveDid(userId);
+        }
+        /**
+         * List the current user's linked authentication methods plus their DID.
+         * Each `identity` method carries a `verificationMethodId` linking it to its
+         * DID verification-method fragment.
+         */
+        async listAuthMethods() {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', '/auth/methods', undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Link the on-device cryptographic identity to the current account,
+         * upgrading it from custodial to self-sovereign. Signs a proof of private
+         * key ownership and posts it to `POST /auth/link`.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY: requires a stored identity (throws if `KeyManager` has no key
+         * or no user is authenticated). The signed payload is
+         * `JSON.stringify({ action: 'link_identity', userId, timestamp })` — the
+         * exact bytes the server reconstructs and verifies.
+         */
+        async linkIdentityKey() {
+            try {
+                const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+                if (!userId) {
+                    throw new Error('No authenticated user — sign in before linking an identity key.');
+                }
+                const publicKey = await KeyManager.getPublicKey();
+                if (!publicKey) {
+                    throw new Error('No identity found on this device. Create or import an identity first.');
+                }
+                const timestamp = Date.now();
+                // The signed message MUST match the server's reconstruction byte-for-byte:
+                // JSON.stringify with this exact key order (action, userId, timestamp).
+                const message = JSON.stringify({ action: 'link_identity', userId, timestamp });
+                const signature = await SignatureService.sign(message);
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', '/auth/link', { type: 'identity', publicKey, signature, timestamp }, { cache: false });
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(userId);
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Unlink an authentication method from the current account. The server
+         * refuses to remove the last remaining method (the account would become
+         * inaccessible). Unlinking `identity` downgrades the account to custodial.
+         *
+         * @param type - The auth-method type to remove.
+         */
+        async unlinkAuthMethod(type) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('DELETE', `/auth/link/${encodeURIComponent(type)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(this.getCurrentUserId());
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Remove ONE passkey (WebAuthn credential) from the current account.
+         *
+         * Passkeys are per-credential, so unlike {@link unlinkAuthMethod} (which
+         * removes an auth method by type) this targets a specific credential id.
+         * The server refuses to remove the last remaining auth method (the account
+         * would become inaccessible) and deletes the stored `WebauthnCredential`.
+         *
+         * @param credentialId - The passkey's public credential id
+         *   (`AuthMethodEntry.credentialId`).
+         */
+        async removePasskey(credentialId) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('DELETE', `/auth/link/webauthn/${encodeURIComponent(credentialId)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(this.getCurrentUserId());
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Rotate the account's identity key: derive a brand-new keypair, prove
+         * control of the CURRENT key, and have the server ATOMICALLY replace the old
+         * key with the new one.
+         *
+         * The rotation is an atomic REPLACE on the server (never remove-then-add), so
+         * it never passes through a zero-auth-method state and is independent of the
+         * unlink guards. Because control of the current key is PROVEN (from
+         * SecureStore in `'device'` mode, or a recovery-phrase re-derivation in
+         * `'phrase'` mode), even the LAST remaining credential can be replaced.
+         *
+         * Ordering (safety-critical): the new key is persisted on-device ONLY AFTER
+         * the server confirms the swap. Persisting earlier would clobber the local
+         * key while the server still trusts the old one, locking the device out.
+         *
+         * Ambiguous-network-failure guard: if the `complete` response is lost
+         * (request sent, no reply), the swap may already have applied server-side.
+         * Before surfacing the error we reconcile against the derived DID document —
+         * if it already advertises the new key, the rotation is treated as done.
+         *
+         * NOTE: the UI is responsible for showing `newPhrase` to the user. For a
+         * "show-phrase-first" flow, derive the identity up front via
+         * {@link RecoveryPhraseService.derivePendingIdentity}, display it, then pass
+         * it back as `options.pendingIdentity` so the SAME identity is committed.
+         *
+         * @throws when no user is authenticated, when `proof: 'phrase'` is given
+         *   without a `phrase`, when `proof: 'device'` runs with no on-device key,
+         *   or when the rotation does not complete.
+         */
+        async rotateKey(options) {
+            try {
+                const userId = this.getCurrentUserId();
+                if (!userId) {
+                    throw new Error('No authenticated user — sign in before rotating your key.');
+                }
+                // 1. The NEW identity (in memory only). The UI may pre-derive + pre-show
+                //    it and pass it back here so the phrase shown === the phrase committed.
+                const pending = options.pendingIdentity ?? (await RecoveryPhraseService.derivePendingIdentity());
+                const newPublicKey = pending.publicKey;
+                // 2. Resolve the OLD signing capability from the chosen proof mode.
+                let oldPublicKey;
+                let signWithOldKey;
+                if (options.proof === 'phrase') {
+                    const phrase = options.phrase?.trim();
+                    if (!phrase) {
+                        throw new Error('A recovery phrase is required for phrase-proof rotation.');
+                    }
+                    const oldPrivateKey = await RecoveryPhraseService.derivePrivateKeyFromPhrase(phrase);
+                    oldPublicKey = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(oldPrivateKey);
+                    signWithOldKey = (message) => signMessage(message, oldPrivateKey);
+                }
+                else {
+                    const currentPublicKey = await KeyManager.getPublicKey();
+                    if (!currentPublicKey) {
+                        throw new Error('No on-device identity found. Use the recovery-phrase option to rotate your key.');
+                    }
+                    oldPublicKey = currentPublicKey;
+                    signWithOldKey = (message) => SignatureService.sign(message);
+                }
+                // 3. Request a single-use rotate_key challenge (bearer).
+                const { challenge } = await this.makeRequest('POST', '/auth/rotate/challenge', undefined, { cache: false });
+                // 4. Sign the rotation proofs. The OLD key proves control of the key being
+                //    replaced; the NEW key proves possession of the key being rotated in
+                //    (so the server never accepts a re-encoding of a key the caller does
+                //    not control). Both signed byte strings MUST match the server's
+                //    reconstruction exactly (this key order). The old key is canonicalized
+                //    so legacy compressed encodings in Mongo still verify.
+                const timestamp = Date.now();
+                const canonicalOldPublicKey = KeyManager.canonicalPublicKey(oldPublicKey);
+                const message = JSON.stringify({
+                    action: 'rotate_key',
+                    userId,
+                    oldPublicKey: canonicalOldPublicKey,
+                    newPublicKey,
+                    challenge,
+                    timestamp,
+                });
+                const signature = await signWithOldKey(message);
+                const newKeyMessage = JSON.stringify({
+                    action: 'rotate_key_new',
+                    userId,
+                    newPublicKey,
+                    challenge,
+                    timestamp,
+                });
+                const newKeyProof = await signMessage(newKeyMessage, pending.privateKey);
+                // 5. Complete the rotation. On an AMBIGUOUS failure, reconcile against the
+                //    DID before deciding the rotation failed.
+                let applied = false;
+                try {
+                    const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', '/auth/rotate/complete', {
+                        newPublicKey,
+                        challenge,
+                        signature,
+                        newKeyProof,
+                        timestamp,
+                        ...(options.signOutEverywhere ? { signOutEverywhere: true } : {}),
+                    }, { cache: false });
+                    applied = result.success && result.publicKey.toLowerCase() === newPublicKey.toLowerCase();
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    const reconciled = await this._rotationAlreadyApplied(userId, newPublicKey);
+                    if (!reconciled) {
+                        throw error;
+                    }
+                    applied = true;
+                }
+                if (!applied) {
+                    throw new Error('Key rotation did not complete — your previous key is unchanged.');
+                }
+                // 6. ONLY after the server confirms the swap, persist the new key locally,
+                //    overwriting the old one. `importKeyPair({ overwrite: true })` uses the
+                //    atomic persist path (backs the previous key up first). Native-only —
+                //    on web the key never lived in SecureStore, so there is nothing to
+                //    persist locally.
+                //
+                //    If this local write fails the server key is ALREADY the new one, so
+                //    we must NOT throw and swallow the phrase — the caller needs it to
+                //    re-import the now-live key. Surface the result with
+                //    `localPersistFailed: true` (mirrors the pendingIdentity
+                //    show-phrase-first path, where the caller already holds the phrase).
+                let localPersistFailed = false;
+                if (!isWeb()) {
+                    try {
+                        await KeyManager.importKeyPair(pending.privateKey, { overwrite: true });
+                    }
+                    catch (persistError) {
+                        localPersistFailed = true;
+                        logger.warn('Key rotated on the server but persisting the new key on-device failed; returning the new phrase so it can be re-imported.', { component: 'OxyServices.identity', method: 'rotateKey' }, persistError);
+                    }
+                }
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(userId);
+                return localPersistFailed
+                    ? { newPublicKey, newPhrase: pending.phrase, words: pending.words, localPersistFailed: true }
+                    : { newPublicKey, newPhrase: pending.phrase, words: pending.words };
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Reconciliation probe for the rotation ambiguous-failure guard: fetch the
+         * account's derived DID document (uncached) and report whether it already
+         * advertises `newPublicKey` as a verification method — i.e. whether the swap
+         * already landed server-side. A failed probe returns `false` (unconfirmed),
+         * so the caller surfaces the original network error.
+         *
+         * Uses the DID document rather than `GET /auth/methods` because the latter
+         * intentionally does NOT expose raw public keys, whereas the DID's
+         * `verificationMethod[].publicKeyHex` is derived live from the account's
+         * current key — so it reflects a completed rotation immediately.
+         *
+         * Internal helper (leading underscore); public rather than `private` for the
+         * same TS4094 reason as {@link _invalidateIdentityCaches}.
+         */
+        async _rotationAlreadyApplied(userId, newPublicKey) {
+            return this.makeRequest('GET', `/u/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/did.json`, undefined, { cache: false })
+                .then((doc) => doc.verificationMethod.some((vm) => 'publicKeyHex' in vm &&
+                typeof vm.publicKeyHex === 'string' &&
+                vm.publicKeyHex.toLowerCase() === newPublicKey.toLowerCase()))
+                .catch(() => false);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sign a record with the on-device identity key, WITHOUT publishing it.
+         * The subject is the current user's DID. NATIVE-ONLY (requires a stored
+         * key). Use {@link publishRecord} to sign and store in one step.
+         *
+         * @param type - The record category.
+         * @param record - The arbitrary record payload to attest to.
+         */
+        async signRecord(type, record) {
+            const subject = this.getMyDid();
+            return SignatureService.signRecord(type, subject, record);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sign a record and publish it to the append-only record store
+         * (`POST /identity/records`). NATIVE-ONLY (requires a stored key).
+         *
+         * @param type - The record category.
+         * @param record - The arbitrary record payload to attest to.
+         */
+        async publishRecord(type, record) {
+            try {
+                const envelope = await this.signRecord(type, record);
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', '/identity/records', envelope, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Fetch a user's most recent signed record of a given type. Public (no auth
+         * required); short-TTL cached.
+         *
+         * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`.
+         * @param type - The record category to fetch.
+         */
+        async getRecord(userId, type) {
+            try {
+                const res = await this.makeRequest('GET', `/identity/records/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/${encodeURIComponent(type)}`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+                return res.record;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Ask the server to verify a user's stored record: it recomputes the
+         * canonical signing input, checks the signature, and asserts the signing key
+         * is a current verification method on the subject's DID.
+         *
+         * @param userId - The subject account's Mongo `_id`.
+         * @param type - The record category to verify.
+         */
+        async verifyRecord(userId, type) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', `/identity/records/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/${encodeURIComponent(type)}/verify`, undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Download the current user's signed, open-format data-export bundle
+         * (`GET /users/me/export`) — the "credible exit" snapshot. Always carries an
+         * Oxy provenance `attestation`; carries an optional client `proof` when the
+         * account holds its own key.
+         */
+        async exportMyData() {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', '/users/me/export', undefined, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Start verifying ownership of a domain. Returns the instructions: publish
+         * EITHER the DNS-TXT record OR the `/.well-known/oxy-domain` file, then call
+         * {@link verifyDomain}.
+         *
+         * @param domain - The domain to claim (e.g. `nate.com`).
+         */
+        async requestDomainVerification(domain) {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', '/identity/domains', { domain }, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Complete domain verification: the server checks the DNS-TXT record or
+         * well-known file and, on success, attaches the domain to the account
+         * (surfaced in the DID's `alsoKnownAs` and the user's `verifiedDomains`).
+         *
+         * @param domain - The domain previously requested via
+         *   {@link requestDomainVerification}.
+         */
+        async verifyDomain(domain) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('POST', `/identity/domains/${encodeURIComponent(domain)}/verify`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(this.getCurrentUserId());
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /** List the current user's verified domains. */
+        async listDomains() {
+            try {
+                const res = await this.makeRequest('GET', '/identity/domains', undefined, { cache: true, cacheTTL: CACHE_TIMES.SHORT });
+                return res.domains ?? [];
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Remove a verified domain from the current account.
+         * @param domain - The verified domain to remove.
+         */
+        async removeDomain(domain) {
+            try {
+                const result = await this.makeRequest('DELETE', `/identity/domains/${encodeURIComponent(domain)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                this._invalidateIdentityCaches(this.getCurrentUserId());
+                return result;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Bust the cached reads that an identity mutation invalidates: the current
+         * user (`/users/me*`), the linked auth-methods list, the verified-domains
+         * list, and the user's derived DID document (which embeds auth methods +
+         * verified domains, so it goes stale on link/unlink/domain changes).
+         *
+         * Internal helper (leading underscore); not part of the supported public
+         * surface. Public rather than `private` because mixins compose into an
+         * exported anonymous class, where TypeScript cannot represent a private
+         * member in the emitted declaration file (TS4094).
+         */
+        _invalidateIdentityCaches(userId) {
+            this.clearCacheByPrefix('GET:/users/me');
+            this.clearCacheEntry('GET:/auth/methods');
+            this.clearCacheEntry('GET:/identity/domains');
+            if (userId) {
+                this.clearCacheEntry(`GET:/u/${encodeURIComponent(userId)}/did.json`);
+            }
+        }
+    };
+}

package/dist/esm/mixins/OxyServices.identityBackup.js

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+import { KeyManager, IdentityAlreadyExistsError } from '../crypto/keyManager.js';
+import { RecoveryPhraseService, BACKUP_KDF_ENCRYPTION_INFO } from '../crypto/recoveryPhrase.js';
+import { encryptAead, decryptAead } from '../crypto/aead.js';
+/** Envelope/KDF version — bump only on a breaking scheme change. */
+const BACKUP_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;
+/** The AEAD the backup is sealed with. Pinned so a mismatched decryptor fails loudly. */
+const BACKUP_ALGORITHM = 'xchacha20poly1305';
+/**
+ * Length (hex chars) of the public-key HINT stored/echoed with a backup — enough
+ * to let the owner recognise WHICH identity a backup belongs to, but only a
+ * prefix (the full key is public anyway; a prefix keeps the record minimal).
+ */
+const PUBLIC_KEY_HINT_LENGTH = 16;
+/** Encode bytes as lowercase hex (cross-platform, no Buffer dependency). */
+function toHex(bytes) {
+    let out = '';
+    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += 1) {
+        out += bytes[i].toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/** Decode a lowercase/uppercase hex string to bytes. Throws on malformed input. */
+function fromHex(hex) {
+    if (hex.length % 2 !== 0 || /[^0-9a-fA-F]/.test(hex)) {
+        throw new Error('Malformed hex in encrypted backup envelope.');
+    }
+    const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+    for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i += 1) {
+        out[i] = Number.parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * The AEAD associated data binds the ciphertext to its `{version, publicKeyHint}`
+ * context: the exact bytes must be reproduced at decrypt time, so a mismatched
+ * version or hint (e.g. an envelope re-stamped by a tamperer) fails the
+ * Poly1305 check. Deterministic: both sides build the SAME object literal, so
+ * `JSON.stringify` yields identical bytes.
+ */
+function buildBackupAad(version, publicKeyHint) {
+    return new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({ version, publicKeyHint }));
+}
+export function OxyServicesIdentityBackupMixin(Base) {
+    return class extends Base {
+        constructor(...args) {
+            super(...args);
+        }
+        /**
+         * Derive the backup key material from the recovery phrase, encrypt the
+         * identity's `{privateKey, publicKey, createdAt}` with it, and upload the
+         * ciphertext + raw `lookupId` (`POST /identity/backup`, bearer). The server
+         * stores only `sha256(lookupId)` + the ciphertext. Idempotent per user: a
+         * re-upload REPLACES the prior backup (upsert by user id).
+         *
+         * The identity is derived from the PHRASE (not read from SecureStore), so
+         * this works cross-platform and does not require an on-device key.
+         *
+         * @param phrase - The identity's BIP-39 recovery phrase.
+         * @returns The post-write backup status (`{ exists: true, publicKeyHint, createdAt }`).
+         */
+        async createEncryptedBackup(phrase) {
+            try {
+                const { backupKey, lookupId } = await RecoveryPhraseService.deriveBackupMaterial(phrase);
+                const privateKey = await RecoveryPhraseService.derivePrivateKeyFromPhrase(phrase);
+                const publicKey = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(privateKey);
+                const createdAt = new Date().toISOString();
+                const publicKeyHint = publicKey.slice(0, PUBLIC_KEY_HINT_LENGTH);
+                const payload = { privateKey, publicKey, createdAt };
+                const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload));
+                const aad = buildBackupAad(BACKUP_ENVELOPE_VERSION, publicKeyHint);
+                const { nonce, ciphertext } = encryptAead(backupKey, plaintext, aad);
+                const body = {
+                    version: BACKUP_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
+                    algorithm: BACKUP_ALGORITHM,
+                    kdfInfo: BACKUP_KDF_ENCRYPTION_INFO,
+                    nonce: toHex(nonce),
+                    ciphertext: toHex(ciphertext),
+                    publicKeyHint,
+                    createdAt,
+                    lookupId,
+                };
+                return await this.makeRequest('POST', '/identity/backup', body, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Whether the authenticated user has a stored encrypted backup, plus the
+         * non-sensitive hint + timestamp when one exists (`GET /identity/backup/status`,
+         * bearer). Returns no ciphertext and no locator.
+         */
+        async getBackupStatus() {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('GET', '/identity/backup/status', undefined, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Delete the authenticated user's stored backup (`DELETE /identity/backup`,
+         * bearer). Idempotent — deleting a non-existent backup still succeeds.
+         */
+        async deleteBackup() {
+            try {
+                return await this.makeRequest('DELETE', '/identity/backup', undefined, { cache: false });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Restore an identity from its encrypted off-device backup using ONLY the
+         * recovery phrase: re-derive `{backupKey, lookupId}`, fetch the envelope by
+         * `lookupId` (`GET /identity/backup/:lookupId`, PUBLIC — the 256-bit locator
+         * is the protection), decrypt + authenticate locally, then persist the key.
+         *
+         * NATIVE-ONLY persistence: `KeyManager.importKeyPair` throws on web. It also
+         * refuses to clobber a DIFFERENT existing on-device identity unless
+         * `overwrite: true` — the {@link import('../crypto/keyManager').IdentityAlreadyExistsError}
+         * propagates to the caller (never swallowed) so the UI can confirm before
+         * overwriting.
+         *
+         * @param phrase - The identity's BIP-39 recovery phrase.
+         * @param options.overwrite - Replace a different existing on-device identity.
+         * @returns The restored identity's public key.
+         * @throws if the phrase is invalid, no backup exists (404), the ciphertext
+         *   fails authentication (tamper), or an existing identity blocks the import.
+         */
+        async restoreFromEncryptedBackup(phrase, options) {
+            try {
+                const { backupKey, lookupId } = await RecoveryPhraseService.deriveBackupMaterial(phrase);
+                const envelope = await this.makeRequest('GET', `/identity/backup/${encodeURIComponent(lookupId)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                if (envelope.algorithm !== BACKUP_ALGORITHM) {
+                    throw new Error(`Unsupported backup algorithm: ${envelope.algorithm}`);
+                }
+                const aad = buildBackupAad(envelope.version, envelope.publicKeyHint);
+                const plaintext = decryptAead(backupKey, fromHex(envelope.nonce), fromHex(envelope.ciphertext), aad);
+                const payload = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext));
+                if (!payload.privateKey || !payload.publicKey) {
+                    throw new Error('Backup payload is missing key material');
+                }
+                const derivedFromPhrase = await RecoveryPhraseService.derivePublicKeyFromPhrase(phrase);
+                const derivedFromPrivate = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(payload.privateKey);
+                const phrasePk = derivedFromPhrase.toLowerCase();
+                const payloadPk = payload.publicKey.toLowerCase();
+                const privatePk = derivedFromPrivate.toLowerCase();
+                if (phrasePk !== payloadPk || privatePk !== payloadPk) {
+                    throw new Error('Backup payload does not match the recovery phrase');
+                }
+                // Persist the recovered key. Native-only; refuses to clobber a different
+                // identity unless overwrite — the IdentityAlreadyExistsError propagates.
+                return await KeyManager.importKeyPair(payload.privateKey, {
+                    overwrite: options?.overwrite === true,
+                });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                // Preserve the typed "an identity already exists" signal so the caller
+                // can prompt for overwrite. `handleError` would flatten it to a generic
+                // Error and lose that discrimination.
+                if (error instanceof IdentityAlreadyExistsError) {
+                    throw error;
+                }
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+    };
+}