@oxy.so/core 1.0.0

package/src/mixins/OxyServices.utility.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1370 @@
+/**
+ * Utility Methods Mixin
+ *
+ * Provides utility methods including link metadata fetching
+ * and Express.js authentication middleware
+ */
+import { jwtDecode } from 'jwt-decode';
+import type { JsonWebKey } from 'node:crypto';
+import type { LinkPreview } from '@oxy.so/contracts';
+import type { ApiError, User } from '../models/interfaces';
+import type { OxyServicesBase } from '../OxyServices.base';
+import { loadNodeCrypto } from '@oxy.so/protocol';
+import { buildUrl } from '../utils/apiUtils';
+import { logger } from '../logger';
+import { CACHE_TIMES } from './mixinHelpers';
+import { OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS, type OxyServiceEnvironment } from '../utils/oxyServiceEnvironment';
+
+interface JwtPayload {
+  exp?: number;
+  userId?: string;
+  id?: string;
+  sessionId?: string;
+  type?: string;
+  appId?: string;
+  credentialId?: string;
+  ownerAccountId?: string;
+  appName?: string;
+  scopes?: string[];
+  aud?: string | string[];
+  iss?: string;
+  environment?: string;
+  nbf?: number;
+  [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Result from the service-acting-as verification endpoint.
+ * Confirms that a given service app holds an active delegation grant for
+ * the supplied user, along with the explicit scope list the grant covers.
+ *
+ * The API side stores this as an ordinary `app_grants` row — the SAME revocable
+ * record the OAuth consent screen writes and the "Connected apps" UI lists and
+ * deletes — whose `scopes` name `acting-as:offline`. There is deliberately no
+ * separate delegation table: a second store would be a second revocation
+ * surface, and a user who disconnects an application in "Connected apps" means
+ * it, so one revoke has to end everything.
+ *
+ * `scopes` is what THAT USER consented to, not what the application may do in
+ * general. `requireScope` intersects it with the token's own app-wide scopes for
+ * a delegated request, and the intersection is the effective authority.
+ *
+ * The SDK never inspects the grant directly — it round-trips through
+ * `GET /internal/service-acting-as/verify?appId=...&userId=...` so the
+ * authoritative store stays server-side.
+ */
+export interface ServiceActingAsVerification {
+  authorized: boolean;
+  scopes: string[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Service app metadata attached to requests authenticated with service tokens.
+ *
+ * Every field comes from the token's SIGNED payload and is populated only after
+ * the signature, `iss`/`aud`/`type` binding and expiry all pass — so a verifier
+ * holding this object can name the responsible principals without a lookup of
+ * its own. Together with `credentialId` and `ownerAccountId` it is the canonical
+ * attribution tuple of ADR 0007 minus the delegated user.
+ *
+ * `scopes` are the EFFECTIVE scopes: the credential's own scopes intersected
+ * with the owning application's grant at mint time (the API's `intersectScopes`
+ * is the single authority for that intersection — nothing re-intersects here).
+ * Route-level checks narrow further via `requireScope()`.
+ *
+ * A delegated end user is NOT a field of this type, and must never become one.
+ * It lives in `req.serviceActingAs` / `req.userId`, is authorised per request,
+ * and is attribution only.
+ */
+export interface ServiceApp {
+  appId: string;
+  appName: string;
+  scopes: string[];
+  /** The credentialId of the specific service credential that minted this token. */
+  credentialId: string;
+  /**
+   * The Oxy account that owns `appId` and is financially responsible for it.
+   * The BILLING principal — never a user id, and never the delegated
+   * `X-Oxy-User-Id` (ADR 0007).
+   */
+  ownerAccountId: string;
+  /** Test/live isolation (F2.0): which `ApplicationCredential.environment` minted this token. */
+  environment: OxyServiceEnvironment;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Expected JWT audience for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
+ */
+const OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE = 'oxy-api';
+/**
+ * Expected JWT issuer for tokens issued by the Oxy auth service.
+ */
+const OXY_JWT_ISSUER = 'oxy-auth';
+
+/**
+ * Sentinel error classes for service-token verification. Using classes (not
+ * message strings) makes the catch site below safe to extend: a new failure
+ * mode added later cannot silently fall through to the generic 500 branch.
+ */
+class ServiceTokenStructureError extends Error {
+  constructor(message = 'Service token has malformed structure') {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'ServiceTokenStructureError';
+  }
+}
+
+class ServiceTokenSignatureError extends Error {
+  constructor(message = 'Service token signature is invalid') {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'ServiceTokenSignatureError';
+  }
+}
+
+class ServiceTokenConfigurationError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'ServiceTokenConfigurationError';
+  }
+}
+
+class ServiceTokenClaimError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'ServiceTokenClaimError';
+  }
+}
+
+function isOxyServiceEnvironment(value: unknown): value is OxyServiceEnvironment {
+  return (
+    typeof value === 'string' &&
+    (OXY_SERVICE_ENVIRONMENTS as readonly string[]).includes(value)
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Options for oxyClient.auth() middleware
+ */
+interface AuthMiddlewareOptions {
+  /** Enable debug logging (default: false) */
+  debug?: boolean;
+  /** Custom error handler - receives error object, can return response */
+  onError?: (error: ApiError) => unknown;
+  /** Load full user profile from API (default: false for performance) */
+  loadUser?: boolean;
+  /** Optional auth - attach user if token present but don't block (default: false) */
+  optional?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Public JWKS endpoint used for Ed25519 service-token verification. Defaults
+   * to `/.well-known/jwks.json` on this Oxy client's configured API origin.
+   */
+  serviceTokenJwksUrl?: string;
+  /**
+   * @deprecated Oxy-API-only transition for pre-cutover HS256 service tokens.
+   * External services omit this option and verify Ed25519 tokens through the
+   * public JWKS. Never distribute `ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET`: a host holding it can
+   * mint user access tokens as well as verify legacy service tokens.
+   */
+  jwtSecret?: string;
+  /**
+   * Expected JWT issuer. Defaults to `'oxy-auth'`. Override only if you run
+   * a private fork of the Oxy auth server under a different `iss` claim.
+   */
+  expectedIssuer?: string;
+  /**
+   * Expected JWT audience. Defaults to `'oxy-api'`. Override only if your
+   * private fork mints tokens for a different audience.
+   */
+  expectedAudience?: string;
+}
+
+export function OxyServicesUtilityMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBase>(Base: T) {
+  return class extends Base {
+    /**
+     * In-memory cache for service-acting-as verification.
+     * Negative results are cached for 1min to avoid hammering the verify
+     * endpoint when a service is misconfigured; positive grants are cached
+     * for 5min to amortize the round-trip without holding stale grants too long.
+     * @internal
+     */
+    _serviceActingAsCache = new Map<string, { result: ServiceActingAsVerification | null; expiresAt: number }>();
+    /** @internal Per-client public-key cache; never contains private material. */
+    _serviceTokenJwksCache: ServiceTokenJwksCache = { keys: new Map(), expiresAt: 0, lastAttemptAt: 0 };
+
+    // TypeScript's mixin pattern requires `(...args: any[])` here — the
+    // constructor signature is a structural shape check the compiler enforces.
+    // Matches every other mixin in this package; do not change without a
+    // monorepo-wide refactor of the mixin pipeline.
+    constructor(...args: any[]) {
+      super(...(args as [any]));
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Verify that a service app holds an active delegation grant authorising
+     * it to act on behalf of `userId`. Returns the grant (with allowed scopes)
+     * on success or `null` if no valid grant exists. Negative answers are
+     * cached briefly to protect the verify endpoint from misconfigured callers.
+     *
+     * Implemented as a per-instance Map keyed by `appId:userId`. Cached
+     * positive grants live for 5 minutes (acceptable staleness window for an
+     * impersonation grant); revocations propagate within that window.
+     *
+     * @internal Used by the auth() middleware — not part of the public API
+     */
+    async verifyServiceActingAs(
+      appId: string,
+      userId: string,
+    ): Promise<ServiceActingAsVerification | null> {
+      const cacheKey = `${appId}:${userId}`;
+      const now = Date.now();
+
+      const cached = this._serviceActingAsCache.get(cacheKey);
+      if (cached && cached.expiresAt > now) {
+        return cached.result;
+      }
+
+      try {
+        // The verify endpoint is service-to-service and admits only a
+        // platform-TRUSTED calling application, so this call must carry the
+        // VERIFIER's own service token. Sent explicitly rather than through
+        // `makeServiceRequest`, which would drop `retry: false` and the timeout
+        // — and those two are not incidental: this runs inside request-handling
+        // middleware, so an inner retry loop multiplies the latency of every
+        // delegated request by the number of attempts.
+        //
+        // A verifier with no service credentials configured throws here and
+        // lands in the catch below, which is the correct outcome. A host that
+        // cannot prove who it is has no business being told which users have
+        // delegated to which applications, and the 60s negative cache stops a
+        // misconfigured deployment from turning every request into a round trip.
+        const serviceToken = await (this as unknown as OxyAuthInstance).getServiceToken();
+
+        const result = await this.makeRequest<ServiceActingAsVerification>(
+          'GET',
+          '/internal/service-acting-as/verify',
+          { appId, userId },
+          {
+            cache: false,
+            retry: false,
+            timeout: 5000,
+            headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${serviceToken}` },
+          },
+        );
+
+        const authorized = Boolean(result && result.authorized);
+        const verified: ServiceActingAsVerification | null = authorized
+          ? { authorized: true, scopes: Array.isArray(result.scopes) ? result.scopes : [] }
+          : null;
+
+        this._serviceActingAsCache.set(cacheKey, {
+          result: verified,
+          expiresAt: now + 5 * 60 * 1000,
+        });
+
+        return verified;
+      } catch (error) {
+        logger.warn('[oxy.auth] verifyServiceActingAs lookup failed — caching negative result', {
+          component: 'auth',
+          method: 'verifyServiceActingAs',
+          appId,
+          userId,
+        }, error);
+        // Negative cache prevents a runaway loop if the verify endpoint is
+        // down, while still letting a real grant become visible within 60s.
+        this._serviceActingAsCache.set(cacheKey, {
+          result: null,
+          expiresAt: now + 1 * 60 * 1000,
+        });
+        return null;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Fetch link metadata
+     */
+    async fetchLinkMetadata(url: string): Promise<{
+      url: string;
+      title: string;
+      description: string;
+      image?: string;
+    }> {
+      try {
+        const path = buildUrl('/links/preview', { url, wait: 1 });
+        const preview = await this.makeRequest<LinkPreview>('GET', path, undefined, { cache: false });
+        return {
+          url: preview.url,
+          title: preview.title?.trim() || preview.url.replace(/^https?:\/\//, '').replace(/\/$/, ''),
+          description: preview.description?.trim() || 'Link',
+          image: preview.image,
+        };
+      } catch (error) {
+        throw this.handleError(error);
+      }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Express.js authentication middleware
+     *
+     * Validates JWT tokens against the Oxy API and attaches user data to requests.
+     * Uses server-side session validation for security (not just JWT decode).
+     *
+     * **Design note — jwtDecode vs jwt.verify:**
+     * This middleware uses `jwtDecode()` (decode-only, NO signature check) for
+     * user tokens, because third-party apps mounting `oxy.auth()` do not hold
+     * the Oxy signing secret. **Every claim in a user token is therefore
+     * attacker-controlled and proves nothing on its own.** The identity comes
+     * from somewhere else entirely:
+     * - A user token MUST carry a `sessionId`. That session is validated
+     *   server-side on every request via `validateSession()`, and the user id
+     *   is read off the VALIDATED SESSION — never off the token. A token whose
+     *   `userId` claim disagrees with the session is refused
+     *   (`SESSION_USER_MISMATCH`); a token with no `sessionId` at all is
+     *   refused outright (`SESSION_REQUIRED`). There is no local-claims path.
+     * - Service tokens (type: 'service') ARE stateless, so they use Ed25519
+     *   verification against Oxy's public JWKS and are additionally checked
+     *   for `aud`, `iss`, `type`, time, attribution and scope claims. The
+     *   `jwtSecret` path exists only for Oxy API's bounded HS256 transition.
+     * - The backend's own `authMiddleware` uses `jwt.verify()` because it has
+     *   direct access to `ACCESS_TOKEN_SECRET`.
+     *
+     * **Why session-less user tokens are refused rather than trusted:**
+     * every user access token the Oxy API issues carries a `sessionId` (see
+     * `packages/api/src/utils/sessionUtils.ts`, `generateSessionTokens` — the
+     * only mint site for user tokens, including the OAuth code exchange). So
+     * refusing session-less user tokens costs nothing legitimate, while
+     * accepting them let anyone authenticate as anyone by hand-rolling a JWT
+     * with a `userId` claim and a garbage signature.
+     *
+     * **Why the claimed user id is cross-checked against the session:**
+     * `GET /session/validate/:sessionId` is UNAUTHENTICATED and does not bind
+     * the bearer token — it returns whoever owns the session id it was handed.
+     * Trusting the token's `userId` claim after a successful validation would
+     * therefore let a caller holding ANY live session id (their own, for
+     * instance) pair it with a forged `userId` and be trusted as that user.
+     * `authSocket()` has always cross-checked this; the HTTP middleware now
+     * does too.
+     *
+     * **Service-token delegation (X-Oxy-User-Id):**
+     * When a service token is accompanied by `X-Oxy-User-Id`, the SDK calls
+     * `verifyServiceActingAs(appId, userId)` to confirm an explicit delegation
+     * grant exists before attaching `req.userId`. A missing/expired grant
+     * results in a 403 — there is no fail-open path.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * import { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
+     *
+     * const oxy = new OxyServices({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
+     *
+     * // Protect all routes under /protected
+     * app.use('/protected', oxy.auth());
+     *
+     * // Access user in route handler
+     * app.get('/protected/me', (req, res) => {
+     *   res.json({ userId: req.userId, user: req.user });
+     * });
+     *
+     * // Load full user profile from API
+     * app.use('/admin', oxy.auth({ loadUser: true }));
+     *
+     * // Optional auth - attach user if present, don't block if absent
+     * app.use('/public', oxy.auth({ optional: true }));
+     *
+     * // Require a specific scope on a service-token-protected route
+     * app.use('/internal/files', oxy.serviceAuth(), oxy.requireScope('files:write'));
+     * ```
+     *
+     * @param options Optional configuration
+     * @returns Express middleware function
+     */
+    auth(options: AuthMiddlewareOptions = {}) {
+      const {
+        debug = false,
+        onError,
+        loadUser = false,
+        optional = false,
+        jwtSecret,
+        serviceTokenJwksUrl = new URL('/.well-known/jwks.json', this.getBaseURL()).toString(),
+        expectedIssuer = OXY_JWT_ISSUER,
+        expectedAudience = OXY_JWT_AUDIENCE,
+      } = options;
+      // Cross-mixin method access: typed as a structural subset of the
+      // composed OxyServices we know we have at runtime.
+      const oxyInstance = this as unknown as OxyAuthInstance;
+
+      // Return an async middleware function
+      return async (req: AuthReq, res: AuthRes, next: AuthNext) => {
+        try {
+          // Extract token from Authorization header.
+          // Node/Express normalizes `Authorization` to a string; we guard
+          // against the (legal but unusual) string[] case anyway.
+          const rawAuthHeader = req.headers.authorization;
+          const authHeader = Array.isArray(rawAuthHeader) ? rawAuthHeader[0] : rawAuthHeader;
+          const token = authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? authHeader.substring(7) : null;
+
+          if (debug) {
+            logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] ${req.method} ${req.path} | token: ${!!token}`, {
+              component: 'auth',
+              method: 'auth',
+            });
+          }
+
+          if (!token) {
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
+              message: 'Access token required',
+              code: 'MISSING_TOKEN',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+
+          // Decode token to extract claims
+          let decoded: JwtPayload;
+          try {
+            decoded = jwtDecode<JwtPayload>(token);
+          } catch (decodeError) {
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Token decode failed', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth',
+              }, decodeError);
+            }
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
+              message: 'Invalid token format',
+              code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+
+          // Handle service tokens (internal service-to-service auth)
+          // Service tokens are stateless JWTs with type: 'service' — requires signature verification
+          if (decoded.type === 'service') {
+            // Verify JWT signature, then audience / issuer / type / appId claims.
+            //
+            // Signature verification uses Node crypto rather than
+            // `jsonwebtoken` because this file also ships into RN/web bundles.
+            // The middleware itself runs on Node hosts; `loadNodeCrypto` is
+            // per-platform, so Metro never bundles a Node built-in reference.
+            try {
+              await verifyServiceTokenSignature(token, {
+                legacySecret: jwtSecret,
+                jwksUrl: serviceTokenJwksUrl,
+                cache: this._serviceTokenJwksCache,
+              });
+              verifyServiceTokenClaims(decoded, {
+                audience: expectedAudience,
+                issuer: expectedIssuer,
+              });
+            } catch (verifyError) {
+              // Structure + signature + claim errors all map to 401. Anything
+              // else (e.g. Node crypto failing to load on a misconfigured host)
+              // genuinely IS a 500.
+              if (
+                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenConfigurationError
+              ) {
+                if (optional) {
+                  req.userId = null;
+                  req.user = null;
+                  return next();
+                }
+                const error = {
+                  error: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED',
+                  message: verifyError.message,
+                  code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED',
+                  status: 403,
+                };
+                if (onError) return onError(error);
+                return res.status(403).json(error);
+              }
+              if (
+                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenStructureError ||
+                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenSignatureError ||
+                verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenClaimError
+              ) {
+                if (debug) {
+                  logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected', {
+                    component: 'auth',
+                    method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                    reason: verifyError.name,
+                    detail: verifyError.message,
+                  });
+                }
+                if (optional) {
+                  req.userId = null;
+                  req.user = null;
+                  return next();
+                }
+                const code = verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenSignatureError
+                  ? 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN'
+                  : verifyError instanceof ServiceTokenStructureError
+                    ? 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN'
+                    : 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS';
+                const error = {
+                  error: code,
+                  message: verifyError.message,
+                  code,
+                  status: 401,
+                };
+                if (onError) return onError(error);
+                return res.status(401).json(error);
+              }
+
+              logger.error('[oxy.auth] Unexpected error during service token verification', verifyError, {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+              });
+              const error = {
+                error: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
+                message: 'Internal authentication error',
+                code: 'AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR',
+                status: 500,
+              };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(500).json(error);
+            }
+
+            // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+            const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+            if (!Number.isInteger(decoded.exp) || (decoded.exp as number) <= now) {
+              if (optional) {
+                req.userId = null;
+                req.user = null;
+                return next();
+              }
+              const error = { error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', message: 'Service token expired', code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED', status: 401 };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+            if (decoded.nbf !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(decoded.nbf) || decoded.nbf > now)) {
+              const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', message: 'Service token is not yet valid', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS', status: 401 };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            // Validate required service token fields. All of them are
+            // required, `ownerAccountId` included: an optional billing
+            // principal is one fallback away from being resolved from the
+            // delegated user, which is the exact confusion ADR 0007 forbids.
+            const appId = decoded.appId;
+            const credentialId = decoded.credentialId;
+            const ownerAccountId = decoded.ownerAccountId;
+            const environment = decoded.environment;
+            if (
+              !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(appId) ||
+              !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(decoded.appName) ||
+              !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(credentialId) ||
+              !isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(ownerAccountId) ||
+              !isOxyServiceEnvironment(environment)
+              || !Array.isArray(decoded.scopes)
+              || !decoded.scopes.every((scope) => typeof scope === 'string' && scope.length > 0 && scope === scope.trim())
+              || new Set(decoded.scopes).size !== decoded.scopes.length
+            ) {
+              if (optional) {
+                req.userId = null;
+                req.user = null;
+                return next();
+              }
+              const error = { error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', message: 'Invalid service token: missing required claims', code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN', status: 401 };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            // Read delegated user ID from header
+            const oxyUserIdRaw = req.headers['x-oxy-user-id'];
+            const oxyUserId = isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(oxyUserIdRaw) ? oxyUserIdRaw : null;
+            if (oxyUserIdRaw !== undefined && oxyUserId === null) {
+              const error = {
+                error: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                message: 'Delegated user id must be an exact non-empty id',
+                code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN_CLAIMS',
+                status: 401,
+              };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            // C3: a service may only act as a user when an explicit
+            // ServiceActingAs grant exists for that (appId, userId) pair.
+            // Without the grant we MUST refuse — silently attaching
+            // `req.userId = oxyUserId` would let any service impersonate
+            // any user simply by setting the header.
+            if (oxyUserId) {
+              const grant = await oxyInstance.verifyServiceActingAs(appId, oxyUserId);
+              if (!grant || !grant.authorized) {
+                logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token rejected — no delegation grant', {
+                  component: 'auth',
+                  method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+                  appId,
+                  attemptedUserId: oxyUserId,
+                });
+                const error = {
+                  error: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
+                  message: 'Service not authorized to act as this user',
+                  code: 'SERVICE_ACTING_AS_UNAUTHORIZED',
+                  status: 403,
+                };
+                if (onError) return onError(error);
+                return res.status(403).json(error);
+              }
+
+              // ATTRIBUTION ONLY. `req.userId` answers "on whose behalf", never
+              // "who pays": the billing principal stays `req.serviceApp
+              // .ownerAccountId`, which this branch does not touch. Read it
+              // through `getOxyBillingPrincipal` (`@oxy.so/core/server`), whose
+              // return type a user id cannot satisfy (ADR 0007).
+              req.userId = oxyUserId;
+              req.user = { id: oxyUserId } as User;
+              req.serviceActingAs = { userId: oxyUserId, scopes: grant.scopes };
+            } else {
+              // No X-Oxy-User-Id means the service is acting as itself.
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+            }
+
+            req.accessToken = token;
+            req.serviceApp = {
+              appId,
+              appName: decoded.appName,
+              credentialId,
+              ownerAccountId,
+              scopes: Array.isArray(decoded.scopes) ? decoded.scopes : [],
+              environment,
+            };
+
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] Service token OK app=${decoded.appName} delegateUser=${oxyUserId || '(none)'}`, {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth.serviceToken',
+              });
+            }
+
+            return next();
+          }
+
+          // The CLAIMED user id. Never trusted as an identity — it is only ever
+          // compared against the id the validated session resolves to.
+          const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
+          if (!claimedUserId) {
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
+              message: 'Token missing user ID',
+              code: 'INVALID_TOKEN_PAYLOAD',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+
+          // Check token expiration locally first (fast path)
+          // Reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+          if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+              message: 'Token expired',
+              code: 'TOKEN_EXPIRED',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+
+          // A server-validated session is MANDATORY for a user token. The JWT
+          // signature is not verified on this path, so a bare decoded token
+          // proves nothing: without the session round-trip a forged token could
+          // claim any user id. Mirrors `authSocket()`, which has always
+          // required this.
+          const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
+          if (!sessionId) {
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
+              message: 'Access token is not bound to a session',
+              code: 'SESSION_REQUIRED',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+
+          // Validate the token against the Oxy API. This proves the session is
+          // real and unrevoked, AND yields the identity it belongs to.
+          try {
+            const validationResult = await oxyInstance.validateSession(sessionId, {
+              useHeaderValidation: true,
+            });
+
+            if (!validationResult || !validationResult.valid || !validationResult.user) {
+              if (optional) {
+                req.userId = null;
+                req.user = null;
+                return next();
+              }
+
+              const error = {
+                error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                message: 'Session invalid or expired',
+                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                status: 401
+              };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            // The session — not the token — is the source of truth for identity.
+            const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(validationResult.user);
+            if (!validatedUserId) {
+              if (optional) {
+                req.userId = null;
+                req.user = null;
+                return next();
+              }
+
+              const error = {
+                error: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                message: 'Session did not resolve to a usable identity',
+                code: 'INVALID_SESSION',
+                status: 401
+              };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            if (validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
+              // Session-id/claim confusion: the caller presented a live session
+              // that belongs to somebody else. Worth a warning — it has no
+              // benign cause. Ids only; never the token or the payload.
+              logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Token rejected — claimed user does not own the session', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth',
+                claimedUserId,
+                validatedUserId,
+              });
+
+              if (optional) {
+                req.userId = null;
+                req.user = null;
+                return next();
+              }
+
+              const error = {
+                error: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
+                message: 'Token user does not match the session',
+                code: 'SESSION_USER_MISMATCH',
+                status: 401
+              };
+              if (onError) return onError(error);
+              return res.status(401).json(error);
+            }
+
+            req.userId = validatedUserId;
+            req.accessToken = token;
+            req.sessionId = sessionId;
+            // Session validation already returned the full user, so `loadUser`
+            // costs no extra round-trip.
+            req.user = loadUser ? validationResult.user : ({ id: validatedUserId } as User);
+
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug(`[oxy.auth] OK user=${validatedUserId} session=${sessionId}`, {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth',
+              });
+            }
+
+            return next();
+          } catch (validationError) {
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Session validation failed', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'auth',
+              }, validationError);
+            }
+
+            if (optional) {
+              req.userId = null;
+              req.user = null;
+              return next();
+            }
+
+            const error = {
+              error: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+              message: 'Session validation failed',
+              code: 'SESSION_VALIDATION_ERROR',
+              status: 401
+            };
+            if (onError) return onError(error);
+            return res.status(401).json(error);
+          }
+        } catch (error) {
+          const handled = oxyInstance.handleError(error) as Error & {
+            code?: string;
+            status?: number;
+            details?: Record<string, unknown>;
+          };
+          const apiError: ApiError = {
+            message: handled.message || 'Authentication error',
+            code: handled.code ?? 'AUTH_ERROR',
+            status: handled.status ?? 500,
+            details: handled.details,
+          };
+
+          if (debug) {
+            logger.debug('[oxy.auth] Error', {
+              component: 'auth',
+              method: 'auth',
+            }, apiError);
+          }
+
+          if (onError) return onError(apiError);
+          return res.status(apiError.status).json(apiError);
+        }
+      };
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Socket.IO authentication middleware factory
+     *
+     * Returns a middleware function for Socket.IO that validates JWT tokens
+     * from the handshake auth object and attaches user data to the socket.
+     *
+     * Uses `jwtDecode()` + API session validation (same rationale as `auth()`).
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * import { OxyServices } from '@oxy.so/core';
+     * import { Server } from 'socket.io';
+     *
+     * const oxy = new OxyServices({ baseURL: 'https://api.oxy.so' });
+     * const io = new Server(server);
+     *
+     * // Authenticate all socket connections
+     * io.use(oxy.authSocket());
+     *
+     * io.on('connection', (socket) => {
+     *   console.log('Authenticated user:', socket.data.userId);
+     * });
+     * ```
+     */
+    authSocket(options: { debug?: boolean } = {}) {
+      const { debug = false } = options;
+      // Cross-mixin method access typed via the same structural subset.
+      const oxyInstance = this as unknown as OxyAuthInstance;
+
+      return async (socket: SocketLike, next: (err?: Error) => void) => {
+        try {
+          const token = socket.handshake?.auth?.token;
+
+          if (!token) {
+            return next(new Error('Authentication required'));
+          }
+
+          let decoded: JwtPayload;
+          try {
+            decoded = jwtDecode<JwtPayload>(token);
+          } catch (decodeError) {
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Token decode failed', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'authSocket',
+              }, decodeError);
+            }
+            return next(new Error('Invalid token'));
+          }
+
+          const claimedUserId = readStringClaim(decoded.userId) ?? readStringClaim(decoded.id);
+          if (!claimedUserId) {
+            return next(new Error('Invalid token payload'));
+          }
+
+          // Check expiration — reject tokens at exact expiry second (use <=)
+          if (decoded.exp && decoded.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) {
+            return next(new Error('Token expired'));
+          }
+
+          // A server-validated session is mandatory. A bare decoded JWT proves
+          // nothing — the signature is not verified here, so without a session
+          // round-trip a forged token could claim any user id.
+          const sessionId = readStringClaim(decoded.sessionId);
+          if (!sessionId) {
+            return next(new Error('Session required'));
+          }
+
+          let userId = claimedUserId;
+          try {
+            const result = await oxyInstance.validateSession(sessionId, {
+              useHeaderValidation: true,
+            });
+            if (!result || !result.valid || !result.user) {
+              return next(new Error('Session invalid'));
+            }
+
+            // The session is the source of truth. The client-claimed user id
+            // must match the server-validated identity, otherwise a valid
+            // session could be paired with a forged user id.
+            const validatedUserId = getUserIdentityId(result.user);
+            if (!validatedUserId || validatedUserId !== claimedUserId) {
+              return next(new Error('Session user mismatch'));
+            }
+
+            userId = validatedUserId;
+          } catch (validateErr) {
+            if (debug) {
+              logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Session validation failed', {
+                component: 'auth',
+                method: 'authSocket',
+              }, validateErr);
+            }
+            return next(new Error('Session validation failed'));
+          }
+
+          // Attach user data to socket. We expose BOTH `socket.data.userId`
+          // (the official Socket.IO data slot) and `socket.user` because
+          // every consumer in this ecosystem (Mention, Allo, api/server.ts)
+          // reads from `socket.user.id`.
+          socket.data = socket.data || {};
+          socket.data.userId = userId;
+          socket.data.sessionId = sessionId;
+          socket.data.token = token;
+
+          socket.user = { id: userId, userId, sessionId };
+
+          if (debug) {
+            logger.debug(`[oxy.authSocket] OK user=${userId}`, {
+              component: 'auth',
+              method: 'authSocket',
+            });
+          }
+
+          next();
+        } catch (err) {
+          if (debug) {
+            logger.debug('[oxy.authSocket] Error', {
+              component: 'auth',
+              method: 'authSocket',
+            }, err);
+          }
+          next(new Error('Authentication error'));
+        }
+      };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Express.js middleware that only allows service tokens.
+     * Use this for internal-only endpoints that should not be accessible
+     * to regular users or API key consumers.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * // Protect internal endpoints
+     * app.use('/internal', oxy.serviceAuth());
+     *
+     * app.post('/internal/trigger', (req, res) => {
+     *   console.log('Service app:', req.serviceApp);
+     *   console.log('Acting on behalf of user:', req.userId);
+     * });
+     * ```
+     */
+    serviceAuth(options: {
+      debug?: boolean;
+      /** @deprecated Oxy-API-only HS256 transition; external verifiers use JWKS. */
+      jwtSecret?: string;
+      serviceTokenJwksUrl?: string;
+      expectedIssuer?: string;
+      expectedAudience?: string;
+    } = {}) {
+      const innerAuth = this.auth({ ...options });
+
+      return async (req: AuthReq, res: AuthRes, next: AuthNext) => {
+        await innerAuth(req, res, () => {
+          if (!req.serviceApp) {
+            return res.status(403).json({
+              error: 'Service token required',
+              message: 'This endpoint is only accessible to internal services',
+              code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+            });
+          }
+          next();
+        });
+      };
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Express.js middleware that enforces a specific service-token scope.
+     *
+     * Mount AFTER `auth()` / `serviceAuth()` — relies on `req.serviceApp` and
+     * (when delegation is in effect) `req.serviceActingAs.scopes`. App-only
+     * service requests require the app scope. Delegated user requests require
+     * BOTH the app scope and the per-user delegation scope.
+     *
+     * The intersection is the point, not a redundancy, because the two scope
+     * lists answer different questions and neither implies the other:
+     *
+     *   `serviceApp.scopes`      what the PLATFORM allows this application to do
+     *                            (credential ∩ application ceiling, at mint time)
+     *   `serviceActingAs.scopes` what THIS USER allowed it to do (`app_grants`)
+     *
+     * Requiring only the app scope would let an application do to a user
+     * something that user never consented to; requiring only the grant would let
+     * a user hand an application authority staff never gave it, so a revoked
+     * platform scope would keep working for every user who had already
+     * consented. Effective authority is the intersection, and this is where it
+     * is taken.
+     *
+     * Requests authenticated as a regular user (no service token) are rejected
+     * with 403 — scope-protected endpoints are service-to-service by design.
+     *
+     * @example
+     * ```typescript
+     * app.use(
+     *   '/internal/files',
+     *   oxy.serviceAuth(),
+     *   oxy.requireScope('files:write'),
+     * );
+     * ```
+     */
+    requireScope(scope: string) {
+      if (typeof scope !== 'string' || scope.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error('requireScope: scope must be a non-empty string');
+      }
+
+      return (req: AuthReq, res: AuthRes, next: AuthNext): void => {
+        const appScopes = req.serviceApp?.scopes ?? [];
+        const delegatedScopes = req.serviceActingAs?.scopes ?? [];
+
+        if (!req.serviceApp) {
+          res.status(403).json({
+            error: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+            message: 'Scope-protected endpoint requires a service token',
+            code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_REQUIRED',
+            status: 403,
+          });
+          return;
+        }
+
+        const appHasScope = appScopes.includes(scope);
+        const delegationHasScope = delegatedScopes.includes(scope);
+        const hasRequiredScope = req.serviceActingAs
+          ? appHasScope && delegationHasScope
+          : appHasScope;
+
+        if (hasRequiredScope) {
+          next();
+          return;
+        }
+
+        logger.warn('[oxy.auth] Service token missing required scope', {
+          component: 'auth',
+          method: 'requireScope',
+          appId: req.serviceApp.appId,
+          required: scope,
+        });
+        res.status(403).json({
+          error: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
+          message: `Required scope '${scope}' not granted`,
+          code: 'INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE',
+          status: 403,
+        });
+      };
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Service token verification helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+interface ServiceTokenPublicJwk {
+  readonly kty: 'OKP';
+  readonly crv: 'Ed25519';
+  readonly x: string;
+  readonly use: 'sig';
+  readonly alg: 'EdDSA';
+  readonly kid: string;
+}
+
+function isExactNonEmptyServiceClaim(value: unknown): value is string {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.trim() === value;
+}
+
+interface ServiceTokenJwksCache {
+  keys: Map<string, ServiceTokenPublicJwk>;
+  expiresAt: number;
+  lastAttemptAt: number;
+  pending?: Promise<void>;
+}
+
+const JWKS_CACHE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+const JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS = 60 * 1000;
+const JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+const JWKS_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
+const JWKS_MAX_KEYS = 20;
+
+function parseJsonSegment(segment: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(segment)) throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not base64url');
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(segment, 'base64url');
+  if (bytes.toString('base64url') !== segment) throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not canonical base64url');
+  try {
+    const value = JSON.parse(bytes.toString('utf8')) as unknown;
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new Error('not an object');
+    return value as Record<string, unknown>;
+  } catch {
+    throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token segment is not a JSON object');
+  }
+}
+
+function parseServiceTokenJwks(value: unknown): Map<string, ServiceTokenPublicJwk> {
+  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS is malformed');
+  const keys = (value as { keys?: unknown }).keys;
+  if (!Array.isArray(keys) || keys.length === 0 || keys.length > JWKS_MAX_KEYS) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS has an invalid key set');
+  const result = new Map<string, ServiceTokenPublicJwk>();
+  for (const value of keys) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains a malformed key');
+    const key = value as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (
+      key.kty !== 'OKP'
+      || key.crv !== 'Ed25519'
+      || typeof key.x !== 'string'
+      || key.x.length === 0
+      || key.use !== 'sig'
+      || key.alg !== 'EdDSA'
+      || typeof key.kid !== 'string'
+      || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(key.kid)
+      || Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(key, 'd')
+      || result.has(key.kid)
+    ) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an unsupported or duplicate key');
+    const x = Buffer.from(key.x, 'base64url');
+    if (x.length !== 32 || x.toString('base64url') !== key.x) {
+      throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS contains an invalid Ed25519 key');
+    }
+    result.set(key.kid, key as unknown as ServiceTokenPublicJwk);
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+async function refreshServiceTokenJwks(url: string, cache: ServiceTokenJwksCache): Promise<void> {
+  if (cache.pending) return cache.pending;
+  cache.lastAttemptAt = Date.now();
+  cache.pending = (async () => {
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), JWKS_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(url, {
+        method: 'GET',
+        headers: { accept: 'application/json' },
+        signal: controller.signal,
+        redirect: 'error',
+      });
+      if (!response.ok) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError(`Oxy JWKS returned HTTP ${response.status}`);
+      const source = await response.text();
+      if (Buffer.byteLength(source, 'utf8') > JWKS_MAX_BYTES) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy JWKS exceeds the size limit');
+      cache.keys = parseServiceTokenJwks(JSON.parse(source) as unknown);
+      cache.expiresAt = Date.now() + JWKS_CACHE_MS;
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(timeout);
+    }
+  })();
+  try {
+    await cache.pending;
+  } finally {
+    cache.pending = undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+async function resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(
+  kid: string,
+  url: string,
+  cache: ServiceTokenJwksCache,
+): Promise<ServiceTokenPublicJwk> {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const cached = cache.keys.get(kid);
+  if (cached && cache.expiresAt > now) return cached;
+  const mayRefresh = cache.expiresAt <= now || now - cache.lastAttemptAt >= JWKS_UNKNOWN_KID_REFRESH_MS;
+  if (mayRefresh) {
+    try {
+      await refreshServiceTokenJwks(url, cache);
+    } catch {
+      const stillValid = cache.keys.get(kid);
+      if (stillValid && cache.expiresAt > Date.now()) return stillValid;
+      throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Oxy service-token key set is unavailable');
+    }
+  }
+  const resolved = cache.keys.get(kid);
+  if (!resolved || cache.expiresAt <= Date.now()) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token signing key is unknown');
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/** Ed25519/JWKS verification with an Oxy-API-only HS256 transition. */
+async function verifyServiceTokenSignature(
+  token: string,
+  options: { legacySecret?: string; jwksUrl: string; cache: ServiceTokenJwksCache },
+): Promise<void> {
+  const nodeCrypto = await loadNodeCrypto();
+  const parts = token.split('.');
+  if (parts.length !== 3) {
+    throw new ServiceTokenStructureError(`Service token must have 3 parts, got ${parts.length}`);
+  }
+  const [headerB64, payloadB64, signatureB64] = parts;
+  if (!headerB64 || !payloadB64 || !signatureB64) {
+    throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token has empty segment');
+  }
+  const header = parseJsonSegment(headerB64);
+  if (header.alg === 'HS256') {
+    if (!options.legacySecret) throw new ServiceTokenConfigurationError('Legacy service token verification is not configured');
+    const expectedSig = nodeCrypto.createHmac('sha256', options.legacySecret)
+      .update(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`)
+      .digest('base64url');
+    const sigBuf = Buffer.from(signatureB64);
+    const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expectedSig);
+    if (sigBuf.length !== expectedBuf.length || !nodeCrypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expectedBuf)) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (
+    Object.keys(header).length !== 3
+    || header.alg !== 'EdDSA'
+    || header.typ !== 'JWT'
+    || typeof header.kid !== 'string'
+    || !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$/.test(header.kid)
+  ) throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token JOSE header is not supported');
+  const jwk = await resolveServiceTokenPublicKey(header.kid, options.jwksUrl, options.cache);
+  let publicKey: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof nodeCrypto.createPublicKey>>;
+  try {
+    publicKey = nodeCrypto.createPublicKey({ key: jwk as unknown as JsonWebKey, format: 'jwk' });
+  } catch {
+    throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError('Service token public key is invalid');
+  }
+  const signature = Buffer.from(signatureB64, 'base64url');
+  if (signature.toString('base64url') !== signatureB64 || signature.length !== 64) throw new ServiceTokenStructureError('Service token signature is malformed');
+  if (!nodeCrypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`), publicKey, signature)) throw new ServiceTokenSignatureError();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a JWT claim that is only usable as a non-empty string.
+ *
+ * A decoded payload is attacker-controlled JSON: a claim the type declares as
+ * `string` can arrive as a number, an object, or `null`. Narrowing here keeps
+ * those values out of URL construction and identity comparison, so an
+ * unexpected shape becomes a 401 rather than a stringified surprise.
+ */
+function readStringClaim(value: unknown): string | null {
+  return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 ? value : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the canonical user id from a validated session's user object.
+ *
+ * The API serializer emits `id`, but some upstream shapes carry the raw Mongo
+ * `_id` instead. We accept either, but only a non-empty string — anything else
+ * means the validated identity is unusable and the caller must reject.
+ */
+function getUserIdentityId(user: User): string | null {
+  const candidate = (user as { id?: unknown; _id?: unknown }).id
+    ?? (user as { id?: unknown; _id?: unknown })._id;
+  return typeof candidate === 'string' && candidate.length > 0 ? candidate : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify that a decoded service-token payload carries the expected `aud`,
+ * `iss`, and `type` claims. Throws `ServiceTokenClaimError` on mismatch.
+ * This is the defence against the H4 vulnerability where a recovery / 2FA /
+ * access token signed by the same shared secret could be replayed as a
+ * service token because no claim binding existed.
+ */
+function verifyServiceTokenClaims(
+  decoded: JwtPayload,
+  expected: { audience: string; issuer: string },
+): void {
+  if (decoded.type !== 'service') {
+    throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token has unexpected type '${String(decoded.type)}'`);
+  }
+  if (decoded.iss !== expected.issuer) {
+    throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token issuer mismatch: expected '${expected.issuer}', got '${String(decoded.iss)}'`);
+  }
+  const aud = decoded.aud;
+  if (Array.isArray(aud)) {
+    if (!aud.includes(expected.audience)) {
+      throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience does not include '${expected.audience}'`);
+    }
+  } else if (aud !== expected.audience) {
+    throw new ServiceTokenClaimError(`Service token audience mismatch: expected '${expected.audience}', got '${String(aud)}'`);
+  }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Local request/response/socket typing
+//
+// Express's types are an optional peer (we don't want to take a hard dep on
+// `@types/express` from a platform-agnostic SDK). The structural subset below
+// captures everything this middleware actually touches, so consumers get type
+// checking without us coupling to Express's full surface.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+interface AuthReq {
+  method?: string;
+  path?: string;
+  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
+  query?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  userId?: string | null;
+  user?: User | null;
+  accessToken?: string;
+  sessionId?: string | null;
+  serviceApp?: ServiceApp;
+  serviceActingAs?: { userId: string; scopes: string[] };
+}
+
+interface AuthRes {
+  status(code: number): AuthRes;
+  json(body: unknown): unknown;
+}
+
+type AuthNext = (err?: unknown) => void;
+
+interface SocketLike {
+  handshake?: { auth?: { token?: string } };
+  data?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  user?: { id: string; userId: string; sessionId?: string | null };
+}
+
+interface OxyAuthInstance {
+  verifyServiceActingAs(appId: string, userId: string): Promise<ServiceActingAsVerification | null>;
+  getServiceToken(apiKey?: string, apiSecret?: string): Promise<string>;
+  validateSession(
+    sessionId: string,
+    options?: { deviceFingerprint?: string; useHeaderValidation?: boolean },
+  ): Promise<{
+    valid: boolean;
+    user?: User;
+    [key: string]: unknown;
+  } | null>;
+  handleError(error: unknown): Error;
+}