@oxy.so/core 1.0.0

package/src/server/__tests__/serviceTokenAttribution.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical request attribution for service tokens (ADR 0007, issue #972 §2.2).
+ *
+ * Two claims are under test, and they are different claims:
+ *
+ *  1. A VERIFIED service token names the whole attribution tuple locally —
+ *     application, credential, owning account, environment and effective
+ *     scopes — so a verifier with no database can say who is responsible.
+ *  2. A delegated `X-Oxy-User-Id` can never become that responsible party. It
+ *     is visible exactly where delegation is meant to be visible
+ *     (`req.userId`, `getOxyDelegatedUserId`) and nowhere else.
+ *
+ * Everything runs through the REAL `oxy.auth()` middleware with a real HMAC
+ * signature, so the assertions are about the shipped lane rather than a
+ * hand-built request object. The one exception is deliberate and marked: the
+ * tampering cases plant fields on an already-authenticated request to prove the
+ * billing resolver does not read them.
+ */
+
+import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import { OxyServices } from '../../OxyServices';
+import {
+  getOxyBillingPrincipal,
+  getOxyDelegatedUserId,
+  getOxyRequestAttribution,
+  getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal,
+  getRequiredOxyUserId,
+} from '../auth';
+import type { Request } from 'express';
+
+const SERVICE_SECRET = 'attribution-suite-secret-not-production';
+const OWNER_ACCOUNT = 'account-owning-the-application';
+const DELEGATED_USER = 'end-user-the-service-acts-for';
+
+interface Claims {
+  [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+
+const b64url = (input: Buffer | string): string =>
+  (typeof input === 'string' ? Buffer.from(input, 'utf8') : input)
+    .toString('base64')
+    .replace(/\+/g, '-')
+    .replace(/\//g, '_')
+    .replace(/=+$/, '');
+
+/** Sign an HS256 JWT byte-identically to `POST /auth/service-token`. */
+function signServiceToken(claims: Claims = {}, secret = SERVICE_SECRET): string {
+  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const payload: Claims = {
+    iat: now,
+    exp: now + 3600,
+    type: 'service',
+    aud: 'oxy-api',
+    iss: 'oxy-auth',
+    appId: 'app-1',
+    appName: 'kaana',
+    credentialId: 'cred-1',
+    ownerAccountId: OWNER_ACCOUNT,
+    environment: 'production',
+    scopes: ['inference:invoke'],
+    ...claims,
+  };
+  const headerB64 = b64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'HS256', typ: 'JWT' }));
+  const payloadB64 = b64url(JSON.stringify(payload));
+  const signature = crypto
+    .createHmac('sha256', secret)
+    .update(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`)
+    .digest('base64')
+    .replace(/\+/g, '-')
+    .replace(/\//g, '_')
+    .replace(/=+$/, '');
+  return `${headerB64}.${payloadB64}.${signature}`;
+}
+
+interface MockReq {
+  method: string;
+  path: string;
+  headers: Record<string, string>;
+  query: Record<string, string>;
+  userId?: string | null;
+  user?: unknown;
+  serviceApp?: unknown;
+  serviceActingAs?: unknown;
+  accessToken?: string;
+}
+
+interface MockRes {
+  statusCode: number;
+  body: unknown;
+  headersSent: boolean;
+  status(code: number): MockRes;
+  json(body: unknown): MockRes;
+}
+
+const makeReq = (headers: Record<string, string> = {}): MockReq => ({
+  method: 'POST',
+  path: '/v1/responses',
+  headers,
+  query: {},
+});
+
+const makeRes = (): MockRes => ({
+  statusCode: 0,
+  body: undefined,
+  headersSent: false,
+  status(code: number) {
+    this.statusCode = code;
+    return this;
+  },
+  json(body: unknown) {
+    this.body = body;
+    this.headersSent = true;
+    return this;
+  },
+});
+
+/** Run `oxy.auth()` over a request and report what the middleware decided. */
+async function authenticate(
+  oxy: OxyServices,
+  headers: Record<string, string>,
+  options: Parameters<OxyServices['auth']>[0] = { jwtSecret: SERVICE_SECRET },
+): Promise<{ req: MockReq; res: MockRes; nextCalled: boolean }> {
+  const req = makeReq(headers);
+  const res = makeRes();
+  const next = jest.fn();
+  const middleware = oxy.auth(options);
+  await middleware(req as unknown as never, res as unknown as never, next as unknown as never);
+  return { req, res, nextCalled: next.mock.calls.length > 0 };
+}
+
+/** `MockReq` is the structural subset the resolvers read; Express's own shape is irrelevant here. */
+const asRequest = (req: MockReq): Request => req as unknown as Request;
+
+let oxy: OxyServices;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  oxy = new OxyServices({ baseURL: 'http://test.invalid' });
+});
+
+describe('a verified service token resolves the whole attribution tuple locally', () => {
+  it('names application, credential, owning account, environment and effective scopes', async () => {
+    const { req, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(true);
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req))).toEqual({
+      accountId: OWNER_ACCOUNT,
+      applicationId: 'app-1',
+      credentialId: 'cred-1',
+      environment: 'production',
+      scopes: ['inference:invoke'],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('reports the effective scopes verbatim — nothing re-intersects them here', async () => {
+    // The mint already intersected credential ∩ application via the API's
+    // `intersectScopes`. If this side narrowed again it would be a second
+    // authority, and the two could disagree.
+    const token = signServiceToken({ scopes: ['inference:invoke', 'inference:models:read'] });
+    const { req } = await authenticate(oxy, { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` });
+
+    expect(getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req)).scopes).toEqual([
+      'inference:invoke',
+      'inference:models:read',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('has no principal at all for an unauthenticated request', () => {
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(makeReq()))).toBeNull();
+    expect(() => getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(makeReq()))).toThrow(
+      'no verified Oxy service principal',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe('a delegated X-Oxy-User-Id is attribution, never the payer', () => {
+  it('leaves the billing account untouched while the delegated user stays visible', async () => {
+    jest
+      .spyOn(oxy, 'verifyServiceActingAs')
+      .mockResolvedValue({ authorized: true, scopes: ['user:read'] });
+
+    const { req, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+      'x-oxy-user-id': DELEGATED_USER,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(true);
+
+    // The assertion that matters: who pays does not move.
+    const principal = getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req));
+    expect(principal.accountId).toBe(OWNER_ACCOUNT);
+    expect(principal.accountId).not.toBe(DELEGATED_USER);
+
+    // The POSITIVE CONTROL. Without it, a resolver that simply returned a
+    // constant would pass the line above. The delegated id must be visible
+    // exactly where delegation is supposed to be visible.
+    expect(getOxyDelegatedUserId(asRequest(req))).toBe(DELEGATED_USER);
+    expect(getRequiredOxyUserId(asRequest(req))).toBe(DELEGATED_USER);
+    expect(getOxyRequestAttribution(asRequest(req))).toEqual({
+      accountId: OWNER_ACCOUNT,
+      applicationId: 'app-1',
+      credentialId: 'cred-1',
+      environment: 'production',
+      scopes: ['inference:invoke'],
+      delegatedUserId: DELEGATED_USER,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('resolves the SAME billing account with and without delegation', async () => {
+    jest
+      .spyOn(oxy, 'verifyServiceActingAs')
+      .mockResolvedValue({ authorized: true, scopes: ['user:read'] });
+
+    const withDelegation = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+      'x-oxy-user-id': DELEGATED_USER,
+    });
+    const withoutDelegation = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+    });
+
+    // Restated as ADR 0007 states it: removing `userId` from a request must not
+    // change what any account is charged.
+    expect(getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(withDelegation.req))).toEqual(
+      getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(withoutDelegation.req)),
+    );
+    expect(getOxyDelegatedUserId(asRequest(withoutDelegation.req))).toBeNull();
+    expect(withoutDelegation.req.userId).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a userId planted on an already-authenticated request', async () => {
+    const { req } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+    });
+
+    // Deliberate tampering AFTER authentication: this is the shape a downstream
+    // middleware bug takes. `getOxyBillingPrincipal` must read `serviceApp` and
+    // nothing else, so none of these can move the answer.
+    req.userId = DELEGATED_USER;
+    req.user = { id: DELEGATED_USER };
+    req.serviceActingAs = { userId: DELEGATED_USER, scopes: [] };
+
+    expect(getRequiredOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req)).accountId).toBe(OWNER_ACCOUNT);
+    // Control: the planted fields ARE readable through the user-identity
+    // accessor, so the assertion above is about the resolver's inputs and not
+    // about the fields being unset.
+    expect(getRequiredOxyUserId(asRequest(req))).toBe(DELEGATED_USER);
+  });
+
+  it('does not put the delegated user anywhere on the service principal', async () => {
+    jest
+      .spyOn(oxy, 'verifyServiceActingAs')
+      .mockResolvedValue({ authorized: true, scopes: ['user:read'] });
+
+    const { req } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+      'x-oxy-user-id': DELEGATED_USER,
+    });
+
+    // A field-name-agnostic sweep: no value of `req.serviceApp`, at any depth
+    // this object has, may equal the delegated id. A future field called
+    // `userId`/`subject`/`onBehalfOf` would fail here without anyone having to
+    // remember to extend the list above.
+    expect(JSON.stringify(req.serviceApp)).not.toContain(DELEGATED_USER);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('signature verification is mandatory before any claim is trusted', () => {
+  it('refuses a token signed with a different secret (401, no principal)', async () => {
+    const forged = signServiceToken({}, 'a-secret-the-issuer-never-used');
+    const { req, res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${forged}`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN' });
+    expect(req.serviceApp).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req))).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a token whose payload was edited after signing', async () => {
+    // The attack the claim set invites: take a real token and rewrite
+    // `ownerAccountId` to somebody else's account. The signature covers the
+    // payload, so the edit must not survive.
+    const token = signServiceToken();
+    const [headerB64, , signatureB64] = token.split('.');
+    const tamperedPayload = b64url(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
+        exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600,
+        type: 'service',
+        aud: 'oxy-api',
+        iss: 'oxy-auth',
+        appId: 'app-1',
+        appName: 'kaana',
+        credentialId: 'cred-1',
+        ownerAccountId: 'somebody-elses-account',
+        environment: 'production',
+        scopes: ['inference:invoke'],
+      }),
+    );
+    const { req, res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${headerB64}.${tamperedPayload}.${signatureB64}`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    expect(req.serviceApp).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses an UNSIGNED token (alg: none, empty signature segment)', async () => {
+    const headerB64 = b64url(JSON.stringify({ alg: 'none', typ: 'JWT' }));
+    const payloadB64 = b64url(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        type: 'service',
+        appId: 'app-1',
+        appName: 'kaana',
+        credentialId: 'cred-1',
+        ownerAccountId: OWNER_ACCOUNT,
+        environment: 'production',
+        exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600,
+        aud: 'oxy-api',
+        iss: 'oxy-auth',
+      }),
+    );
+    const { req, res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${headerB64}.${payloadB64}.`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    expect(req.serviceApp).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses every service token when no verification secret is configured', async () => {
+    // The secure default: without a secret the middleware CANNOT verify, so it
+    // must not fall back to reading the decoded claims.
+    const { req, res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(
+      oxy,
+      { authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}` },
+      {},
+    );
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ code: 'SERVICE_TOKEN_NOT_CONFIGURED' });
+    expect(req.serviceApp).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req))).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('attaches no principal on the OPTIONAL lane either', async () => {
+    // `optional: true` degrades to anonymous rather than 401 — the thing that
+    // must not happen is degrading to an UNVERIFIED principal.
+    const forged = signServiceToken({}, 'wrong-secret');
+    const { req, nextCalled } = await authenticate(
+      oxy,
+      { authorization: `Bearer ${forged}` },
+      { jwtSecret: SERVICE_SECRET, optional: true },
+    );
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(true);
+    expect(req.serviceApp).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(req.userId).toBeNull();
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req))).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('the owning account is a required claim', () => {
+  it.each([
+    ['absent', undefined],
+    ['empty', ''],
+    ['a number', 42],
+    ['null', null],
+  ])('refuses a signature-valid token whose ownerAccountId is %s', async (_label, value) => {
+    const token = signServiceToken({ ownerAccountId: value });
+    const { req, res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(false);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ code: 'INVALID_SERVICE_TOKEN' });
+    expect(getOxyBillingPrincipal(asRequest(req))).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('accepts the same token once the claim is present — the control', async () => {
+    const { res, nextCalled } = await authenticate(oxy, {
+      authorization: `Bearer ${signServiceToken()}`,
+    });
+
+    expect(nextCalled).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(0);
+  });
+});

package/src/server/__tests__/userInvalidation.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+import { OXY_USER_INVALIDATION_CHANNEL } from '@oxy.so/contracts';
+
+import {
+  createOxyUserInvalidationHandler,
+  publishOxyUserInvalidation,
+} from '../userInvalidation';
+// The key enumeration this subscriber sweeps is platform-neutral and shared
+// with the client mixins — see `utils/identityCacheSweep` and its own suite.
+import type { OxyIdentityCacheEvictor } from '../../utils/identityCacheSweep';
+
+function makePublisher() {
+  const calls: Array<{ channel: string; message: string }> = [];
+  return {
+    calls,
+    publish(channel: string, message: string) {
+      calls.push({ channel, message });
+      return Promise.resolve(1);
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function makeEvictor() {
+  const entries: string[] = [];
+  const prefixes: string[] = [];
+  const evictor: OxyIdentityCacheEvictor = {
+    clearCacheEntry: (key) => {
+      entries.push(key);
+    },
+    clearCacheByPrefix: (prefix) => {
+      prefixes.push(prefix);
+      return 0;
+    },
+  };
+  return { evictor, entries, prefixes };
+}
+
+describe('@oxy.so/core/server publishOxyUserInvalidation', () => {
+  it('publishes a profile change on the contract channel', () => {
+    const publisher = makePublisher();
+    const published = publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'profile');
+
+    expect(published).toBe(true);
+    expect(publisher.calls).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(publisher.calls[0].channel).toBe(OXY_USER_INVALIDATION_CHANNEL);
+
+    const payload = JSON.parse(publisher.calls[0].message);
+    expect(payload.userId).toBe('user-1');
+    expect(payload.reason).toBe('profile');
+    expect(typeof payload.at).toBe('number');
+  });
+
+  it('puts NOTHING on the wire for graph churn', () => {
+    // The whole point of the suppression: not a message subscribers discard,
+    // but no message at all. Bulk follow moves up to 200 edges per call.
+    const publisher = makePublisher();
+    const published = publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'graph');
+
+    expect(published).toBe(false);
+    expect(publisher.calls).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('publishes nothing for an empty user id', () => {
+    const publisher = makePublisher();
+    expect(publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, '', 'profile')).toBe(false);
+    expect(publisher.calls).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it('never throws when the client throws synchronously', () => {
+    const boom = new Error('redis down');
+    const publisher = {
+      publish() {
+        throw boom;
+      },
+    };
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+
+    expect(() => publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'profile', onError)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'profile', onError)).toBe(false);
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledWith(boom);
+  });
+
+  it('never surfaces a rejected publish as an unhandled rejection', async () => {
+    const boom = new Error('publish rejected');
+    const publisher = {
+      publish: () => Promise.reject(boom),
+    };
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+
+    // Returns true — the message was handed to the client; the failure is async.
+    expect(publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'profile', onError)).toBe(true);
+    await Promise.resolve();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledWith(boom);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates a client whose publish returns a non-promise', () => {
+    const calls: string[] = [];
+    const publisher = {
+      publish: (_channel: string, message: string) => {
+        calls.push(message);
+        return 1;
+      },
+    };
+    expect(publishOxyUserInvalidation(publisher, 'user-1', 'profile')).toBe(true);
+    expect(calls).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('@oxy.so/core/server createOxyUserInvalidationHandler', () => {
+  const validMessage = JSON.stringify({ userId: 'user-1', reason: 'profile', at: 1 });
+
+  it('sweeps the SDK identity cache for the invalidated user', () => {
+    const { evictor, entries, prefixes } = makeEvictor();
+    createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({ oxy: evictor })(validMessage);
+
+    expect(entries).toEqual(['GET:/users/user-1']);
+    expect(prefixes).toEqual([
+      'GET:/session/user/',
+      'GET:/users/me',
+      'GET:/auth/lookup/',
+      'GET:/profiles/username/',
+      'GET:/profiles/resolve',
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('hands the parsed event to app-specific eviction', () => {
+    const onInvalidate = jest.fn();
+    createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({ onInvalidate })(validMessage);
+
+    expect(onInvalidate).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ userId: 'user-1', reason: 'profile', at: 1 });
+  });
+
+  it('drops an unparseable message without throwing', () => {
+    const onInvalidate = jest.fn();
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+    const handle = createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({ onInvalidate, onError });
+
+    expect(() => handle('not json at all')).not.toThrow();
+    expect(onInvalidate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('drops a message that fails the contract schema', () => {
+    const onInvalidate = jest.fn();
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+    const handle = createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({ onInvalidate, onError });
+
+    handle(JSON.stringify({ userId: 'user-1', reason: 'graph', at: 1 }));
+    handle(JSON.stringify({ reason: 'profile', at: 1 }));
+
+    expect(onInvalidate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  it('never throws when app eviction throws', () => {
+    // The handler runs inside the Redis client's message dispatch. An escape
+    // there kills the subscription — silently and permanently — which is far
+    // worse than losing the one message that caused it.
+    const boom = new Error('app eviction failed');
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+    const handle = createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({
+      onInvalidate: () => {
+        throw boom;
+      },
+      onError,
+    });
+
+    expect(() => handle(validMessage)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledWith(boom, validMessage);
+  });
+
+  it('never throws when app eviction rejects', async () => {
+    const boom = new Error('async eviction failed');
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+    const handle = createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({
+      onInvalidate: () => Promise.reject(boom),
+      onError,
+    });
+
+    expect(() => handle(validMessage)).not.toThrow();
+    await Promise.resolve();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledWith(boom, validMessage);
+  });
+
+  it('still runs app eviction when the SDK sweep throws', () => {
+    const onInvalidate = jest.fn();
+    const onError = jest.fn();
+    const evictor: OxyIdentityCacheEvictor = {
+      clearCacheEntry: () => {
+        throw new Error('sweep failed');
+      },
+      clearCacheByPrefix: () => 0,
+    };
+
+    createOxyUserInvalidationHandler({ oxy: evictor, onInvalidate, onError })(validMessage);
+
+    expect(onInvalidate).toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('is a no-op with no options configured', () => {
+    expect(() => createOxyUserInvalidationHandler()(validMessage)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});

package/src/server/__tests__/verifySecret.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import { verifySecret } from '../verifySecret';
+
+describe('@oxy.so/core/server verifySecret', () => {
+  it('returns true for equal secrets', () => {
+    expect(verifySecret('s3cr3t-token', 's3cr3t-token')).toBe(true);
+    expect(verifySecret('a', 'a')).toBe(true);
+    const long = 'x'.repeat(256);
+    expect(verifySecret(long, long)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false for unequal same-length secrets', () => {
+    expect(verifySecret('s3cr3t-token', 's3cr3t-tokeN')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('abcd', 'abce')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false on length mismatch without throwing', () => {
+    expect(() => verifySecret('short', 'a-much-longer-secret')).not.toThrow();
+    expect(verifySecret('short', 'a-much-longer-secret')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('a-much-longer-secret', 'short')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('abc', 'abcd')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false for empty inputs', () => {
+    expect(verifySecret('', '')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('', 'x')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('x', '')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('returns false for non-string inputs without throwing', () => {
+    expect(() => verifySecret(undefined as unknown as string, 'x')).not.toThrow();
+    expect(verifySecret(undefined as unknown as string, 'x')).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret('x', null as unknown as string)).toBe(false);
+    expect(verifySecret(123 as unknown as string, 123 as unknown as string)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('handles multi-byte UTF-8 content correctly', () => {
+    expect(verifySecret('clé-secrète-🔐', 'clé-secrète-🔐')).toBe(true);
+    expect(verifySecret('clé-secrète-🔐', 'cle-secrete-🔐')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});