@oneuptime/common 12.0.6 → 12.0.7

package/Tests/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunnerSsrf.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+import VMRunner from "../../../../Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner";
+import ReturnResult from "../../../../Types/IsolatedVM/ReturnResult";
+import { describe, expect, jest, test } from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * GHSA-v5xh-rw9h-77fv fixed the API workflow components, but the Custom
+ * JavaScript component hands user-authored code the HOST process's axios
+ * (VMRunner bridges it into the isolate as `_axiosRef`), and the component docs
+ * say "you can use axios module". That is the same SSRF with more capability:
+ * arbitrary method, headers and body, with the response marshalled back to the
+ * author. Guarding only the API components would have been theatre.
+ *
+ * These tests drive the REAL isolate, so they prove the guard from the position
+ * an attacker actually occupies - inside the sandbox - rather than by calling a
+ * helper directly. Nothing here needs a network: every assertion is that the
+ * request was refused before a socket was opened.
+ */
+
+jest.setTimeout(60000);
+
+async function runInSandbox(code: string): Promise<ReturnResult> {
+  return VMRunner.runCodeInSandbox({
+    code,
+    options: { timeout: 15000 },
+  });
+}
+
+/*
+ * The sandbox surfaces a rejected request as a thrown error. Either the promise
+ * rejects or the returned result carries the message - accept both, and assert
+ * on the SSRF wording so a mere "connection refused" cannot pass for a block.
+ */
+async function errorFromSandbox(code: string): Promise<string> {
+  try {
+    const result: ReturnResult = await runInSandbox(code);
+    return JSON.stringify(result.returnValue ?? result.logMessages ?? "");
+  } catch (err) {
+    return (err as Error).message || String(err);
+  }
+}
+
+const REFUSAL: RegExp =
+  /not allowed|private, loopback, or link-local|absolute http|could not be resolved/i;
+
+describe("VMRunner sandbox axios bridge — SSRF guard", () => {
+  const internalTargets: Array<[string, string]> = [
+    ["AWS metadata endpoint", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"],
+    [
+      "AWS metadata credentials path",
+      "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",
+    ],
+    ["GCP metadata by name", "http://metadata.google.internal/"],
+    ["loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/"],
+    ["localhost", "http://localhost:9200/_cluster/health"],
+    ["RFC-1918", "http://10.0.0.5/internal"],
+    ["IPv6 loopback", "http://[::1]:5432/"],
+    ["IPv4-mapped metadata endpoint", "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/"],
+  ];
+
+  test.each(internalTargets)(
+    "refuses axios.get to the %s",
+    async (_label: string, url: string) => {
+      const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+        `return await axios.get(${JSON.stringify(url)});`,
+      );
+      expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test.each(internalTargets)(
+    "refuses axios.post to the %s",
+    async (_label: string, url: string) => {
+      const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+        `return await axios.post(${JSON.stringify(url)}, { a: 1 });`,
+      );
+      expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("refuses axios.request, where the URL lives in the config", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.request({ method: 'get', url: 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/' });`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("refuses a target assembled from baseURL and a relative path", async () => {
+    // The positional url is harmless on its own; baseURL is where it goes.
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.get('/latest/meta-data/', { baseURL: 'http://169.254.169.254' });`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("refuses a baseURL-only request()", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.request({ method: 'get', baseURL: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080', url: '/admin' });`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test.each(["head", "options", "put", "patch", "delete"])(
+    "refuses axios.%s to an internal address",
+    async (method: string) => {
+      const call: string =
+        method === "put" || method === "patch"
+          ? `axios.${method}('http://169.254.169.254/', {})`
+          : `axios.${method}('http://169.254.169.254/')`;
+      const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(`return await ${call};`);
+      expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+    },
+  );
+
+  test("refuses a non-http scheme", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.get('file:///etc/passwd');`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("refuses a relative URL with no baseURL rather than guessing", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.get('/latest/meta-data/');`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * A proxy or a unix socket steers the connection somewhere the validated URL
+   * never named — /var/run/docker.sock being the memorable one — so the guard
+   * strips them rather than trusting the URL alone.
+   */
+  test("a proxy in the config cannot steer a public URL at an internal host", async () => {
+    /*
+     * A public IP literal (no DNS) with a 1ms timeout, so this settles offline
+     * and instantly. The point is only that the metadata endpoint named in
+     * `proxy` is never what gets dialled.
+     */
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `try { return await axios.get('http://8.8.8.8/', { timeout: 1, proxy: { host: '169.254.169.254', port: 80 } }); } catch (e) { return 'threw: ' + e.message; }`,
+    );
+    expect(message).not.toMatch(/169\.254\.169\.254/);
+  });
+
+  test("still lets an ordinary public URL past the guard", async () => {
+    /*
+     * 8.8.8.8 is never actually reached - the 1ms timeout sees to that. The
+     * assertion is that the failure is a TRANSPORT failure, not the SSRF guard,
+     * i.e. the block above is not simply refusing everything.
+     */
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `try { return await axios.get('http://8.8.8.8/', { timeout: 1 }); } catch (e) { return 'threw: ' + e.message; }`,
+    );
+    expect(message).not.toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+});
+
+/*
+ * The "is this already an absolute URL?" decision is what tells the guard
+ * whether to fold in baseURL before validating, so it has to be scheme
+ * case-insensitive and slash-tolerant — otherwise HTTP:// (uppercase) or a
+ * baseURL with stray slashes could be mis-classified and skip the check.
+ */
+describe("VMRunner sandbox axios bridge — URL absolutization", () => {
+  test("an uppercase scheme is still recognised as absolute and its host checked", async () => {
+    // HTTP:// (uppercase) must not slip past the loopback block.
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.get('HTTP://127.0.0.1:8080/admin');`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("a mixed-case scheme on a public host passes the guard, failing only at transport", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `try { return await axios.get('HtTpS://8.8.8.8/', { timeout: 1 }); } catch (e) { return 'threw: ' + e.message; }`,
+    );
+    expect(message).not.toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("stray slashes joining baseURL and a relative path do not evade the block", async () => {
+    // baseURL trailing slashes + a leading-slash relative path, internal host.
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `return await axios.get('//latest/meta-data/', { baseURL: 'http://169.254.169.254//' });`,
+    );
+    expect(message).toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+
+  test("a baseURL + relative path resolving to a public host clears the guard", async () => {
+    const message: string = await errorFromSandbox(
+      `try { return await axios.get('/path', { baseURL: 'http://8.8.8.8', timeout: 1 }); } catch (e) { return 'threw: ' + e.message; }`,
+    );
+    expect(message).not.toMatch(REFUSAL);
+  });
+});