@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.2 → 0.6.0-pre.21

package/dist/chunk-VN45YLWM.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/lifecycle.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slots.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/classify/write.ts","../src/kernel/schema.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/record-codec.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealing.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/deterministic.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/envelope-body.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/broker/proof.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Per-record CEK lifecycle helpers for the WRITE path.\n *\n * These are the collection-coupled CEK operations, lifted off `Collection`\n * behind narrow deps so the kernel file delegates instead of carrying the\n * crypto inline:\n *\n *   - {@link resolveStableCek} — the stable-CEK rule: an update or history\n *     snapshot reuses the record's existing CEK so a single CEK delete kills\n *     the whole version chain; a genuine insert (or legacy record being\n *     migrated) mints a fresh one.\n *   - {@link rewrapBodyToDek} — move a record body's wrapping from one DEK to\n *     another (tier elevate/demote, bundle re-key) WITHOUT changing the body\n *     key: unwrap the CEK under the source DEK, re-encrypt the body under the\n *     same CEK, re-wrap the CEK under the destination DEK. History-chain\n *     identity is preserved because the body key never changes.\n *\n * Both are pure functions over their deps — the `cekCache` ownership stays on\n * the collection (its lifetime is tied to `load()`), so callers cache the\n * returned key themselves.\n */\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, generateDEK, wrapCek, unwrapCek, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport type { Lru } from '../../cache/index.js'\n\n/** Dependencies {@link resolveStableCek} needs from its collection. */\nexport interface StableCekDeps {\n  /** The collection's per-record CEK cache (`null` → no caching). */\n  readonly cache: Lru<string, EnclaveKey> | null\n  /** Read the record's live envelope (to recover an existing `_cek`). */\n  getLive(id: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n  /** The DEK the CEK is wrapped under (the collection DEK on the normal path). */\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the stable CEK for a record on the write path. Caches the resolved\n * key under `id` so an update + its history snapshot share one CEK.\n */\nexport async function resolveStableCek(deps: StableCekDeps, id: string): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const cached = deps.cache?.get(id)\n  if (cached) return cached\n\n  const live = await deps.getLive(id)\n  if (live?._cek !== undefined) {\n    const cek = await unwrapCek(live._cek, await deps.getDEK())\n    deps.cache?.set(id, cek, 1)\n    return cek\n  }\n\n  const fresh = await generateDEK()\n  deps.cache?.set(id, fresh, 1)\n  return fresh\n}\n\n/** Re-wrapped body bytes + the (optional) CEK to cache. */\nexport interface RewrappedBody {\n  readonly _iv: string\n  readonly _data: string\n  /** Present iff the source envelope carried a CEK (per-record-key record). */\n  readonly _cek?: string\n  /** The body key when one exists, so the caller can cache it; `null` for a legacy record. */\n  readonly cek: EnclaveKey | null\n}\n\n/**\n * Move a record body from `fromDek` to `toDek`.\n *\n * - Per-record-key record (`_cek` present): unwrap the CEK under `fromDek`,\n *   re-encrypt the body under the SAME CEK, re-wrap the CEK under `toDek`. The\n *   body key is unchanged → history-chain identity preserved.\n * - Legacy record (no `_cek`): decrypt under `fromDek`, re-encrypt under `toDek`\n *   directly — byte-for-byte the pre-CEK behaviour.\n */\nexport async function rewrapBodyToDek(\n  envelope: Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_iv' | '_data' | '_cek'>,\n  fromDek: EnclaveKey,\n  toDek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<RewrappedBody> {\n  if (envelope._cek !== undefined) {\n    const cek = await unwrapCek(envelope._cek, fromDek)\n    const plaintext = await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, cek)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(plaintext, cek)\n    return { _iv: iv, _data: data, _cek: await wrapCek(cek, toDek), cek }\n  }\n  const plaintext = await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, fromDek)\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(plaintext, toDek)\n  return { _iv: iv, _data: data, cek: null }\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge an ALREADY-rewrapped {@link RewrappedBody} into `envelope`, keeping\n * every field but the re-keyed body (`_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`) unchanged.\n *\n * Body-field access (`_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`) is sanctioned inside the enclave;\n * this lets callers outside it get back a ready-to-store envelope without\n * reading those fields themselves. Takes a body the caller has ALREADY\n * computed (vs. {@link rewrapEnvelope}, which also runs `rewrapBodyToDek`)\n * so a caller building a SECOND envelope from the same rewrap — a tier\n * move's live write AND its pre-move `_history` snapshot, #728 — pays the\n * unwrap/decrypt/encrypt/wrap crypto once, not twice.\n */\nexport function applyRewrappedBody(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, body: RewrappedBody): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  const next: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    ...envelope,\n    _iv: body._iv,\n    _data: body._data,\n    ...(body._cek !== undefined ? { _cek: body._cek } : {}),\n  }\n  if (body._cek === undefined && envelope._cek !== undefined) {\n    delete (next as { _cek?: string })._cek\n  }\n  return next\n}\n\n/**\n * Move a FULL stored envelope from `fromDek` to `toDek`, preserving every\n * field other than the re-keyed body (`_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`) unchanged.\n * Mirrors the spread-merge idiom `with-audit/tiers/index.ts`'s\n * `elevate()`/`demote()` use to apply `rewrapBodyToDek`'s result to the live\n * envelope, generalized to any envelope shape (history callers don't bump\n * `_v`/`_ts`/`_tier` the way a tier move does).\n */\nexport async function rewrapEnvelope(\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  fromDek: EnclaveKey,\n  toDek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n  return applyRewrappedBody(envelope, await rewrapBodyToDek(envelope, fromDek, toDek))\n}\n\n/**\n * Is `envelope` ALREADY wrapped under `dek` (a per-record CEK wrapped under\n * `dek`, or — legacy, no `_cek` — the body itself decryptable under `dek`)?\n *\n * A toDek-first idempotency check for retry-safe rewrap loops (#712 crash\n * atomicity, `with-commit/history/history.ts`'s `rewrapHistory`): a crash\n * mid-rewrap can strand some entries already moved to `toDek` while others\n * remain under `fromDek`. Calling this with `toDek` before attempting the\n * `fromDek` rewrap lets the caller skip an already-migrated entry instead of\n * re-wrapping it (a re-wrap would be a correctness no-op but doubles as an\n * unnecessary write) — and, more importantly, tells a retry loop that this\n * entry needs no `fromDek` unwrap attempt at all, so a crash that landed some\n * entries under `toDek` doesn't wedge on those already-moved entries.\n *\n * AES-KW (CEK unwrap) and AES-GCM (direct decrypt) are both authenticated —\n * unwrap/decrypt under the wrong key throws, never silently returns garbage\n * — so a caught error here reliably means \"not wrapped under `dek`\", not a\n * corrupt envelope (a genuinely corrupt envelope also throws under the\n * correct key, but callers that reach this helper only do so as a\n * best-effort probe before their own decisive fromDek attempt, which still\n * surfaces real corruption).\n *\n * Body-field access (`_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`) is sanctioned inside the enclave —\n * this is the sanctioned door so callers outside it (history.ts) never read\n * those fields themselves, preserving the check-architecture body-access\n * ratchet.\n */\nexport async function isRewrappedUnder(\n  envelope: Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_iv' | '_data' | '_cek'>,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  try {\n    if (envelope._cek !== undefined) {\n      await unwrapCek(envelope._cek, dek)\n    } else {\n      await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, dek)\n    }\n    return true\n  } catch {\n    return false\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Sealed-slot sub-step — the \"seal these declared fields into their own\n * `iv:data` slots\" mechanism, extracted byte-parity from `RecordCodec`\n * (#629 Task 1; see `.superpowers/sdd/seam-map-classified-blobs.md` §2).\n *\n * This is the ONE genuinely separable sub-step `RecordCodec.encryptRecord`/\n * `decryptRecord` perform (the digest-only `_vdig`/`_bidx` mechanism is NOT\n * separable the same way — it needs write-history `prev` context, see the\n * seam map's separability verdict). `sealFields`/`unsealFields` are the\n * natural shape of a `via` `encodeAtRest`/`decodeAtRest` hook for a \"seal\n * this field\" via-feature, and `makeSealedSlotCapability`/\n * `makeReservedEnvelopes` (below) are the `ViaCryptoCtx` capability\n * factories built on top of them.\n *\n * The capability factories live here (rather than a sibling\n * `kernel/via-crypto.ts`) so they can call `deriveSealedFieldKey`/\n * `deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek`/`encrypt`/`decrypt` directly — this file IS\n * kernel enclave code (C3), so it is exempt from `enclave-barrel-only` the\n * same way `record-codec.ts`/`sealing.ts` are. A file outside\n * `kernel/enclave/**` would have had to go through the enclave barrel\n * (`kernel/enclave/index.ts`), which does not (yet) export these symbols.\n */\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { dualReadSealedSlot } from './sealed-slot.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, SealedHandle, type EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../errors.js'\nimport type { SealedSlotRef, ViaCryptoCtx } from '../../via/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Key material for one collection's sealed-field derivation. `cek`, when\n * supplied, is preferred (record-scoped); `getDEK` is the fallback (and,\n * for legacy/no-CEK collections, the only key) — mirrors the dual-read\n * `RecordCodec` has always done.\n */\nexport interface SealKeyMaterial {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly cek?: EnclaveKey\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\nexport interface SealFieldsResult {\n  readonly openRecord: Record<string, unknown>\n  readonly sealed: Record<string, string> | undefined\n}\n\n/** Seal one field's value to an `iv:data` slot under its derived per-field key. */\nasync function sealOneFieldWithDek(\n  field: string,\n  value: unknown,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial,\n): Promise<SealedSlotRef> {\n  const fieldKey = keyMaterial.cek !== undefined\n    ? await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(keyMaterial.cek, keyMaterial.collection, field)\n    : await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, keyMaterial.collection, field)\n  return encrypt(JSON.stringify(value), fieldKey)\n}\n\n/**\n * Seal one field's value on demand — fetches the DEK itself. A singular\n * counterpart to {@link sealFields} for callers that seal one field at a\n * time rather than a whole record. Not exported — `makeSealedSlotCapability`\n * is the only caller (#629 Task 11: knip-flagged unused export, dropped;\n * intra-module use only).\n */\nasync function sealOneField(\n  field: string,\n  value: unknown,\n  keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial,\n): Promise<SealedSlotRef> {\n  const dek = await keyMaterial.getDEK()\n  return sealOneFieldWithDek(field, value, dek, keyMaterial)\n}\n\n/**\n * Peel declared `sensitiveFields` out of `record` BEFORE building `_data`,\n * sealing each into its own `iv:data` slot. Extracted byte-parity from\n * `RecordCodec.encryptRecord` step 2 (pre-#629 `record-codec.ts:261-288`).\n * Returns `record` untouched (and `sealed: undefined`) when no declared\n * field is present with a defined value — the envelope stays byte-identical\n * to legacy output, exactly as before.\n */\nexport async function sealFields(\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n  sensitiveFields: ReadonlySet<string>,\n  keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial,\n): Promise<SealFieldsResult> {\n  const dek = await keyMaterial.getDEK()\n  const open: Record<string, unknown> = { ...record }\n  const slots: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const field of sensitiveFields) {\n    if (!(field in record)) continue\n    const value = record[field]\n    if (value === undefined) continue\n    const { iv, data } = await sealOneFieldWithDek(field, value, dek, keyMaterial)\n    slots[field] = `${iv}:${data}`\n    delete open[field]\n  }\n  if (Object.keys(slots).length === 0) return { openRecord: record, sealed: undefined }\n  return { openRecord: open, sealed: slots }\n}\n\n/**\n * Unseal one `_sealed[field]` slot to its plaintext value: dual-read (try\n * the CEK-derived key, fall back to the DEK-derived key for legacy\n * records), AES-GCM-decrypt the `iv:data` blob, and JSON-parse the result.\n * Extracted byte-parity from `RecordCodec.unsealField`\n * (pre-#629 `record-codec.ts:485-493`).\n */\nexport async function unsealOneField(field: string, blob: string, keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial): Promise<unknown> {\n  const dek = await keyMaterial.getDEK()\n  return JSON.parse(await dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, keyMaterial.collection, keyMaterial.cek, dek))\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a non-leaking {@link SealedHandle} producer over sealed key\n * material: each call captures only the ciphertext `blob` and a closure to\n * {@link unsealOneField} — the plaintext is never stored on the handle, and\n * (crucially) the DEK is fetched lazily on `reveal()`, never at handle-\n * construction time. Extracted byte-parity from\n * `RecordCodec.makeSealedHandle` (pre-#629 `record-codec.ts:552-554`).\n */\nexport function makeHandleProducer(keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial): (field: string, blob: string) => SealedHandle<unknown> {\n  return (field, blob) => new SealedHandle(() => unsealOneField(field, blob, keyMaterial))\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore every `[field]: blob` entry in `sealed` onto `record` (mutated in\n * place, matching the original's mutate-then-return shape): eagerly unseal\n * to plaintext (`opts.asHandles` falsy) or wrap each in a\n * {@link SealedHandle} (`opts.asHandles: true`) so the plaintext is never\n * materialised. Extracted byte-parity from `RecordCodec.decryptRecord`'s\n * sealed-handle block (pre-#629 `record-codec.ts:615-623`).\n */\nexport async function unsealFields(\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n  sealed: Record<string, string>,\n  keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial,\n  opts?: { asHandles?: boolean },\n): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const makeHandle = opts?.asHandles === true ? makeHandleProducer(keyMaterial) : undefined\n  for (const [field, blob] of Object.entries(sealed)) {\n    record[field] = makeHandle !== undefined ? makeHandle(field, blob) : await unsealOneField(field, blob, keyMaterial)\n  }\n  return record\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// ViaCryptoCtx capability factories (#629 Task 1, second commit)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** What {@link makeSealedSlotCapability} needs — a subset of `RecordCodecContext`. */\nexport interface SealedSlotCapabilityCtx {\n  readonly name: string\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a `ViaCryptoCtx.sealedSlots` capability pre-bound to one\n * `(collection, recordId)`. The key material (`cek`/DEK resolver) is closed\n * over and never placed on the returned object — `Object.keys`/\n * `Object.values` of the capability expose only the three methods, never a\n * key (zero-knowledge: capabilities never expose keys).\n *\n * `delete(field)` is **advisory and capability-instance-local, not real\n * erasure** — it has no store to reach and never will by itself: it just\n * adds `field` to a `Set` closed over by THIS ONE capability object, so a\n * later `unseal` call on that SAME object refuses. No I/O happens. A fresh\n * capability for the same record (e.g. `seal()`'d again, or a new\n * `makeSealedSlotCapability(...)` call) has an empty set and sees no\n * deletion at all — `seal()` on a given field also clears any prior mark\n * for it. Do not build production logic on `delete()` persisting anything.\n * The real erasure guarantee for a forgotten record is `vault.forget()`'s\n * unconditional `_writeTombstone` call, which replaces the whole live\n * envelope with a fresh, `_sealed`-free tombstone — `_sealed` disappears\n * from the store regardless of what any capability's `delete()` marked.\n * (#629 Task 10 traced this end-to-end; see task-10-report.md \"sealedSlots\n * .delete()\" section. Removing/changing this method's shape is a phase-E\n * decision, not implied by this comment.)\n */\nexport function makeSealedSlotCapability(\n  ctx: SealedSlotCapabilityCtx,\n  recordId: string,\n  cek?: EnclaveKey,\n): ViaCryptoCtx['sealedSlots'] {\n  const keyMaterial: SealKeyMaterial = {\n    collection: ctx.name,\n    ...(cek !== undefined ? { cek } : {}),\n    getDEK: () => ctx.getDEK(),\n  }\n  const deletedFields = new Set<string>()\n\n  return {\n    async seal(field, plaintext) {\n      const ref = await sealOneField(field, plaintext, keyMaterial)\n      deletedFields.delete(field)\n      return ref\n    },\n    async unseal(field, ref) {\n      if (deletedFields.has(field)) {\n        throw new ValidationError(`sealedSlots.unseal: field \"${field}\" on record \"${recordId}\" was deleted from this capability`)\n      }\n      return unsealOneField(field, `${ref.iv}:${ref.data}`, keyMaterial)\n    },\n    async delete(field) {\n      deletedFields.add(field)\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/** Resolve the DEK for an arbitrary (possibly synthetic, e.g. `_dict_en`) collection name. */\nexport type ReservedEnvelopeDekResolver = (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/**\n * Build a `ViaCryptoCtx.reservedEnvelopes` capability: a whole-envelope\n * encrypt/decrypt door scoped to collection names under a declared prefix\n * (e.g. `_dict_`) — the shape `via/i18n/dictionary.ts`'s\n * `DictionaryHandle` needs (seam map Part 3): build JSON → encrypt under a\n * DEK → wrap in an `EncryptedEnvelope`; decrypt → JSON text. No per-record\n * CEK — reserved envelopes are whole-DEK-encrypted, same as the dictionary\n * grandfather.\n *\n * `reservedEnvelopes(prefix)` throws `ValidationError` immediately when\n * `prefix` is not in `declaredPrefixes`; each `encrypt`/`decrypt` call\n * throws `ValidationError` when its `collection` argument does not start\n * with `prefix`.\n */\nexport function makeReservedEnvelopes(\n  dekResolver: ReservedEnvelopeDekResolver,\n  declaredPrefixes: readonly string[],\n): ViaCryptoCtx['reservedEnvelopes'] {\n  const declared = new Set(declaredPrefixes)\n\n  return (prefix: string) => {\n    if (!declared.has(prefix)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`reservedEnvelopes: prefix \"${prefix}\" is not declared by this binding's reservedPrefixes`)\n    }\n\n    const assertPrefixed = (collection: string, method: 'encrypt' | 'decrypt'): void => {\n      if (!collection.startsWith(prefix)) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `reservedEnvelopes('${prefix}').${method}: collection \"${collection}\" does not start with \"${prefix}\"`,\n        )\n      }\n    }\n\n    const encryptForPrefix = async (collection: string, json: string, v: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> => {\n      assertPrefixed(collection, 'encrypt')\n      const dek = await dekResolver(collection)\n      const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek)\n      return {\n        _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n        _v: v,\n        _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n        _iv: iv,\n        _data: data,\n      }\n    }\n\n    const decryptForPrefix = async (collection: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string> => {\n      assertPrefixed(collection, 'decrypt')\n      const dek = await dekResolver(collection)\n      return decrypt(env._iv, env._data, dek)\n    }\n\n    return { encrypt: encryptForPrefix, decrypt: decryptForPrefix }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Digest-only write engine (C6 rotate branch + notLastN ring, spec §2/§4).\n * Called ONLY by RecordCodec.encryptRecord — both live inside the enclave.\n * @module\n */\nimport { generateSalt, bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { pbkdf2VerifyDigest, VDIG_ITERATIONS } from './digest.js'\nimport { normalizeForVerify } from './normalize.js'\nimport { blindedEqual } from './compare.js'\nimport { sealVdigPayload, openVdigPayload, type VdigPayload, type VdigDigestEntry } from './vdig.js'\nimport { ClassifiedRotationError, TamperedError } from '../../errors.js'\nimport type { VdigFieldPolicy } from '../../types.js'\n\nexport async function mintVdigSlot(\n  rawValue: string,\n  policy: VdigFieldPolicy,\n  prevBlob: string | undefined,\n  cek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  recordId: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const normalized = normalizeForVerify(policy.normalize, rawValue)\n\n  let prev: VdigPayload | null = null\n  if (prevBlob !== undefined) {\n    try {\n      prev = await openVdigPayload(prevBlob, cek, collection, recordId, field)\n    } catch {\n      // Any failure opening a prior _vdig slot (auth-tag mismatch, malformed\n      // JSON, wrong AAD) is a tamper/false condition — normalize to\n      // TamperedError so the write path never sees a distinct error shape.\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    if (!Number.isInteger(prev.iter) || prev.iter < 1) {\n      // A corrupted/tampered iter count would silently weaken (or break)\n      // the reuse-check PBKDF2 pass — floor/validate before trusting it.\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  // notLastN reuse refusal: candidate vs cur + every ring entry, each a full\n  // PBKDF2 at the payload's own iteration count (n × 600K is the documented\n  // write-time cost ceiling, cap 8 — spec Q4).\n  if (prev !== null && policy.notLastN > 0) {\n    const history: readonly VdigDigestEntry[] = [prev.cur, ...(prev.ring ?? [])]\n    for (const entry of history) {\n      const digest = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, base64ToBuffer(entry.salt), prev.iter)\n      if (await blindedEqual(digest, base64ToBuffer(entry.hash))) {\n        throw new ClassifiedRotationError(collection, field, 'password was used recently')\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const salt = generateSalt()\n  const hash = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, salt, VDIG_ITERATIONS)\n  const ring = prev !== null && policy.notLastN > 0\n    ? [...(prev.ring ?? []), { salt: prev.cur.salt, hash: prev.cur.hash }].slice(-policy.notLastN)\n    : undefined\n\n  const payload: VdigPayload = {\n    v: 1,\n    alg: 'PBKDF2-SHA256',\n    iter: VDIG_ITERATIONS,\n    cur: { salt: bufferToBase64(salt), hash: bufferToBase64(hash), at: new Date().toISOString() },\n    ...(ring !== undefined && ring.length > 0 ? { ring } : {}),\n  }\n  return sealVdigPayload(payload, cek, collection, recordId, field)\n}\n","/**\n * Standard Schema v1 integration.\n *\n * This file is the entry point for **schema validation**. Any\n * validator that implements the [Standard Schema v1\n * protocol](https://standardschema.dev) — Zod, Valibot, ArkType, Effect\n * Schema, etc. — can be attached to a `Collection` or `defineNoydbStore`\n * and will:\n *\n *   1. Validate the record BEFORE encryption on `put()` — bad data is\n *      rejected at the store boundary with a rich issue list.\n *   2. Validate the record AFTER decryption on `get()`/`list()`/`query()`\n *      — stored data that has drifted from the current schema throws\n *      loudly instead of silently propagating garbage to the UI.\n *\n * ## Why vendor the types?\n *\n * Standard Schema is a protocol, not a library. The spec is <200 lines of\n * TypeScript and has no runtime. There's an official `@standard-schema/spec`\n * types package on npm, but pulling it in would add a dependency edge\n * purely for type definitions. Vendoring the minimal surface keeps\n * `@noy-db/core` at **zero runtime dependencies** and gives us freedom to\n * evolve the helpers without a version-lock on the spec package.\n *\n * If the spec changes in a breaking way (unlikely — it's frozen at v1),\n * we update this file and bump our minor.\n *\n * ## Why not just run `schema.parse(value)` directly?\n *\n * Because then we'd be locked to whichever validator happens to have\n * `.parse`. Standard Schema's `'~standard'.validate` contract is the same\n * across every implementation and includes a structured issues list,\n * which is much more useful than a thrown error for programmatic error\n * handling (e.g., rendering field-level messages in a Vue component).\n */\n\nimport { SchemaValidationError } from './errors.js'\n\n/**\n * The Standard Schema v1 protocol. A schema is any object that exposes a\n * `'~standard'` property with `version: 1` and a `validate` function.\n *\n * The type parameters are:\n *   - `Input`  — the type accepted by `validate` (what the user passes in)\n *   - `Output` — the type produced by `validate` (what we store/return,\n *                may differ from Input if the schema transforms or coerces)\n *\n * In most cases `Input === Output`, but validators that transform\n * (Zod's `.transform`, Valibot's `transform`, etc.) can narrow or widen.\n *\n * We intentionally keep the `types` field `readonly` and optional — the\n * spec marks it as optional because it's only used for inference, and\n * not every implementation bothers populating it at runtime.\n */\nexport interface StandardSchemaV1<Input = unknown, Output = Input> {\n  readonly '~standard': {\n    readonly version: 1\n    readonly vendor: string\n    readonly validate: (\n      value: unknown,\n    ) =>\n      | StandardSchemaV1SyncResult<Output>\n      | Promise<StandardSchemaV1SyncResult<Output>>\n    readonly types?:\n      | {\n          readonly input: Input\n          readonly output: Output\n        }\n      | undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The result of a single call to `schema['~standard'].validate`. Either\n * `{ value }` on success or `{ issues }` on failure — never both.\n *\n * The spec allows `issues` to be undefined on success (and some\n * validators leave it that way), so consumers should discriminate on\n * `issues?.length` rather than on truthiness of `value`.\n */\nexport type StandardSchemaV1SyncResult<Output> =\n  | { readonly value: Output; readonly issues?: undefined }\n  | {\n      readonly value?: undefined\n      readonly issues: readonly StandardSchemaV1Issue[]\n    }\n\n/**\n * A single validation issue. The `message` is always present; the `path`\n * is optional and points at the offending field when the schema tracks\n * it (virtually every validator does for object types).\n *\n * The path is deliberately permissive — both a plain `PropertyKey` and a\n * `{ key }` wrapper are allowed so validators that wrap path segments in\n * objects (Zod does this in some modes) don't need special handling.\n */\nexport interface StandardSchemaV1Issue {\n  readonly message: string\n  readonly path?:\n    | ReadonlyArray<PropertyKey | { readonly key: PropertyKey }>\n    | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Infer the output type of a Standard Schema. Consumers use this to\n * pull the type out of a schema instance when they want to declare a\n * Collection<T> or defineNoydbStore<T> with `T` derived from the schema.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * const InvoiceSchema = z.object({ id: z.string(), amount: z.number() })\n * type Invoice = InferOutput<typeof InvoiceSchema>\n * ```\n */\nexport type InferOutput<T extends StandardSchemaV1> =\n  T extends StandardSchemaV1<unknown, infer O> ? O : never\n\n/**\n * Validate an input value against a schema. Throws\n * `SchemaValidationError` if the schema rejects, with the rich issue\n * list attached. Otherwise returns the (possibly transformed) output\n * value.\n *\n * The `context` string is included in the thrown error's message so the\n * caller knows where the failure happened (e.g. `\"put(inv-001)\"`) without\n * every caller having to wrap the throw in a try/catch.\n *\n * This function is ALWAYS async because some validators (notably Effect\n * Schema and Zod's `.refine` with async predicates) can return a\n * Promise. We `await` the result unconditionally to normalize the\n * contract — the extra microtask is free compared to the cost of an\n * encrypt/decrypt round-trip.\n */\nexport async function validateSchemaInput<Output>(\n  schema: StandardSchemaV1<unknown, Output>,\n  value: unknown,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<Output> {\n  const result = await schema['~standard'].validate(value)\n  if (result.issues !== undefined && result.issues.length > 0) {\n    throw new SchemaValidationError(\n      `Schema validation failed on ${context}: ${summarizeIssues(result.issues)}`,\n      result.issues,\n      'input',\n    )\n  }\n  // Safe: the spec guarantees `value` is present when `issues` is absent.\n  return result.value as Output\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate an already-stored value coming OUT of the collection. This\n * is a distinct helper from `validateSchemaInput` because the error\n * semantics differ: an output-validation failure means the data in\n * storage has drifted from the current schema (an unexpected state),\n * whereas an input-validation failure means the user passed bad data\n * (an expected state for a UI that isn't guarding its inputs).\n *\n * We still throw — silently returning bad data would be worse — but\n * the error carries `direction: 'output'` so upstream code (and a\n * potential migrate hook) can distinguish the two cases.\n */\nexport async function validateSchemaOutput<Output>(\n  schema: StandardSchemaV1<unknown, Output>,\n  value: unknown,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<Output> {\n  const result = await schema['~standard'].validate(value)\n  if (result.issues !== undefined && result.issues.length > 0) {\n    throw new SchemaValidationError(\n      `Stored data for ${context} does not match the current schema — ` +\n        `schema drift? ${summarizeIssues(result.issues)}`,\n      result.issues,\n      'output',\n    )\n  }\n  return result.value as Output\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce a short human-readable summary of an issue list for the\n * thrown error's message. The full issue array is still attached to the\n * error as a property — this is only for the `.message` string that\n * shows up in console.error / stack traces.\n *\n * Format: `field: message; field2: message2` (up to 3 issues, then `…`).\n * Issues without a path are shown as `root: message`.\n */\nfunction summarizeIssues(\n  issues: readonly StandardSchemaV1Issue[],\n): string {\n  const shown = issues.slice(0, 3).map((issue) => {\n    const pathStr = formatPath(issue.path)\n    return `${pathStr}: ${issue.message}`\n  })\n  const suffix = issues.length > 3 ? ` (+${issues.length - 3} more)` : ''\n  return shown.join('; ') + suffix\n}\n\nfunction formatPath(\n  path: StandardSchemaV1Issue['path'],\n): string {\n  if (!path || path.length === 0) return 'root'\n  return path\n    .map((segment) =>\n      typeof segment === 'object' && segment !== null\n        ? String(segment.key)\n        : String(segment),\n    )\n    .join('.')\n}\n","/**\n * RecordCodec — the per-record envelope build + encrypt/decrypt + per-record-CEK\n * + sealed-field crypto.\n *\n * `Collection` holds one `RecordCodec` instance and delegates the crypto write\n * path (`encryptRecord` / `encryptJsonString` / `buildDebugEnvelope`), the read\n * path (`decryptRecord` / `decryptJsonString` / `resolveEnvelopeCek`), and the\n * sealed-field helpers (`unsealField` / `makeSealedHandle` / `toCacheRecord` /\n * `classifySealedShred`) to it. The codec receives every `this.*` dependency\n * it needs via {@link RecordCodecContext}.\n *\n * The crux is `cekCache`: it is the SAME `Lru` reference `Collection` owns (not\n * a copy). `resolveEnvelopeCek` reads/writes it, and tier methods +\n * `vault.invalidateRecordCaches` keep mutating that same object — a copy would\n * silently break the \"single CEK delete kills the version chain\" invariant.\n *\n * Internal service — not exported as a `@noy-db/hub/*` subpath.\n */\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, encryptDeterministic, deriveDeterministicKey, wrapCek, unwrapCek, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, type EncryptedEnvelope, type CrdtMode, type CrdtState, type CrdtStrategy, type VdigFieldPolicy, type SealedHandle } from '../../types.js'\nimport { isTombstone, isDeleteMarker } from './tombstone.js'\nimport { parseSealedSlot } from './sealed-slot.js'\nimport { sealFields, unsealOneField, unsealFields, makeHandleProducer, makeSealedSlotCapability, makeReservedEnvelopes, type SealKeyMaterial } from './sealed-slots.js'\nimport { DebugReservedFieldError, ClassifiedConfigError, ValidationError } from '../../errors.js'\nimport { mintVdigSlot } from '../classify/write.js'\nimport { mintBidxTag } from '../classify/bidx.js'\nimport { normalizeForVerify } from '../classify/normalize.js'\nimport { validateSchemaOutput, type StandardSchemaV1 } from '../../schema.js'\nimport type { Lru } from '../../cache/index.js'\nimport type { ViaCryptoCtx, SealedSlotRef } from '../../via/index.js'\nimport type { ViaPipeline } from '../../via/pipeline.js'\n\n/**\n * One classified per-slot verdict from {@link RecordCodec.classifySealedShred}.\n * `shreddable` — CEK-only, tombstone makes it undecryptable. `dekResidue` —\n * collection-DEK-keyed, survives in synced/backup copies. The third class is\n * BOTH: a `_bidx` blind-index tag is live-dropped by the tombstone yet retained\n * under the surviving DEK in any pre-forget backup (honest dual accounting).\n */\nexport type SealedShredSlot = {\n  readonly field: string\n  readonly class: 'shreddable' | 'dekResidue' | 'live-shreddable+dekResidue-in-backups'\n}\n\n/** Everything the moving crypto methods touched on `this.*`, as a flat context. */\nexport interface RecordCodecContext<T> {\n  /** Collection name — the crypto AAD scope and schema-error context. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /** Actor id stamped on `_by` (the collection's keyring.userId). */\n  readonly actor: string\n  /** False on plaintext collections — selects the no-ciphertext envelope branch. */\n  readonly storeCiphertext: boolean\n  /** keyring.debugPlaintext — debug-inline envelope on user collections. */\n  readonly debugPlaintext: boolean\n  /** Emit `_source`/`_sourceTs` provenance fields when a source is supplied. */\n  readonly provenance: boolean\n  /** Declared `sensitive` fields → sealed into `_sealed[field]`. */\n  readonly sensitiveFields: ReadonlySet<string>\n  /** Declared deterministic-index fields, or null. */\n  readonly deterministicFields: ReadonlySet<string> | null\n  /** Digest-only classified fields → verify policy (stage 2). Null when none. */\n  readonly vdigFields: ReadonlyMap<string, VdigFieldPolicy> | null\n  /**\n   * C-A / R10 config-drift signal: the persisted `x-classified` marker's\n   * declared digest-only field set (empty when the collection carries no\n   * marker). Lazy, memoized (O(1) per handle after the first call). The R10\n   * superset guard refuses whenever a field in this set is absent from\n   * `vdigFields`. Consulted once per handle on any encrypted write path — the\n   * cross-session, prev-free signal a fully-naive create has no `prev` for.\n   * Undefined on codecs with no store access (direct-construction tests).\n   */\n  classifiedMarkerDigestOnly?(): Promise<readonly string[]>\n  /** CRDT mode (decrypt resolves CrdtState→snapshot when set). */\n  readonly crdtMode: CrdtMode | undefined\n  /** CRDT strategy seam (resolveCrdtSnapshot). */\n  readonly crdtStrategy: CrdtStrategy\n  /** Output-schema validator, or undefined. */\n  readonly schema: StandardSchemaV1<unknown, T> | undefined\n  /**\n   * Resolve a collection's DEK. Called with no argument for `this.name`'s\n   * own DEK (every ordinary codec use); `viaCryptoCtx`'s `reservedEnvelopes`\n   * door passes an explicit OTHER collection name (e.g. a reserved\n   * `_dict_status` collection) so a binding's at-rest hook can address a\n   * different collection's DEK without ever holding the resolver itself.\n   */\n  getDEK(collection?: string): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  /**\n   * The collection's per-record CEK cache (SHARED reference, not a copy).\n   * Ownership/lifetime stays on Collection; codec reads+writes it in\n   * resolveEnvelopeCek exactly as the inline code did. `null` → no caching.\n   */\n  readonly cekCache: Lru<string, EnclaveKey> | null\n  /**\n   * Compiled Via pipeline (money, i18n, …), or undefined for a collection\n   * with none declared. `encryptRecord`/`decryptRecord` consult\n   * `via?.hasAtRestHooks` at the sealed-slot sub-step to choose between a\n   * binding's `encodeAtRest`/`decodeAtRest` hooks and today's inline path.\n   * The zero-via fast path (`via` undefined, or no binding declares an\n   * at-rest hook) stays byte/behavior-identical (#629 Task 3).\n   *\n   * Mutable (not `readonly`, #638 Task 3): `Collection.via` can be\n   * reassigned post-construction (the taint overlay, `via/graph-wiring.ts#\n   * applyTaintOverlay`) — `RecordCodec.setVia` below keeps this in sync so\n   * at-rest hooks read the LIVE pipeline, not a stale construction-time\n   * snapshot.\n   */\n  via: ViaPipeline | undefined\n}\n\nexport class RecordCodec<T> {\n  constructor(private readonly ctx: RecordCodecContext<T>) {}\n\n  /**\n   * @internal Update the live Via pipeline this codec's at-rest hooks read\n   * (#638 Task 3) — called by `via/graph-wiring.ts#applyTaintOverlay` right\n   * after it reassigns `Collection.via`, so `hasAtRestHooks`/`encodeAtRest`/\n   * `decodeAtRest` see the newly-added `taint` binding instead of the\n   * pipeline snapshot captured when this codec was constructed.\n   */\n  setVia(via: ViaPipeline | undefined): void {\n    this.ctx.via = via\n  }\n\n  /** Sealed-slot key material for this codec's collection, for a given per-record CEK (or none). */\n  private sealKeyMaterial(cek: EnclaveKey | undefined): SealKeyMaterial {\n    return {\n      collection: this.ctx.name,\n      ...(cek !== undefined ? { cek } : {}),\n      getDEK: () => this.ctx.getDEK(),\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build the `ViaCryptoCtx` handed to a binding's `encodeAtRest`/\n   * `decodeAtRest` hook: `sealedSlots` pre-bound to `(this.ctx.name,\n   * recordId)` — always threading `cek` when the caller has one, so the\n   * capability's record-binding stays cryptographic rather than degrading\n   * to collection-scope. `reservedEnvelopes`'s DEK resolver forwards its\n   * `collection` argument straight to `this.ctx.getDEK` (#629 Task 4) — it\n   * resolves the RESERVED collection's own DEK (e.g. `_dict_status`), never\n   * `this.ctx.name`'s, matching `Vault.getDEK`'s per-collection-name\n   * resolution (the same resolver `DictionaryHandle` used pre-cutover).\n   */\n  private viaCryptoCtx(recordId: string, cek: EnclaveKey | undefined): ViaCryptoCtx {\n    const declaredPrefixes = this.ctx.via?.bindings.flatMap((b) => b.reservedPrefixes ?? []) ?? []\n    return {\n      sealedSlots: makeSealedSlotCapability(this.ctx, recordId, cek),\n      reservedEnvelopes: makeReservedEnvelopes((collection) => this.ctx.getDEK(collection), declaredPrefixes),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // Low-level literal builders\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Assemble a canonical ciphertext body envelope literal from already-computed\n   * parts. Pure, no crypto. Each call stamps its own `_ts` — provenance carries\n   * a SEPARATE timestamp (computed by the caller), so the two never share one.\n   */\n  static buildEnvelope(p: {\n    version: number\n    iv: string\n    data: string\n    by?: string\n    cek?: string\n    provenance?: { source: string; sourceTs: string } | undefined\n    extra?: Partial<Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_tier' | '_det' | '_sealed'>>\n  }): EncryptedEnvelope {\n    return {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      _v: p.version,\n      _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n      _iv: p.iv,\n      _data: p.data,\n      ...(p.by !== undefined ? { _by: p.by } : {}),\n      ...(p.cek !== undefined ? { _cek: p.cek } : {}),\n      ...(p.provenance !== undefined ? { _source: p.provenance.source, _sourceTs: p.provenance.sourceTs } : {}),\n      ...(p.extra ?? {}),\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Plaintext (`_iv:''`) body envelope — the `!storeCiphertext` shape. */\n  static buildPlaintextEnvelope(p: {\n    version: number\n    data: string\n    by?: string\n    provenance?: { source: string; sourceTs: string } | undefined\n  }): EncryptedEnvelope {\n    return {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      _v: p.version,\n      _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n      _iv: '',\n      _data: p.data,\n      ...(p.by !== undefined ? { _by: p.by } : {}),\n      ...(p.provenance !== undefined ? { _source: p.provenance.source, _sourceTs: p.provenance.sourceTs } : {}),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // Write path\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Build a debug-plaintext envelope: the record's own fields inlined as\n   * top-level keys beside the reserved `_`-metadata, with `_debug: 1` and an\n   * empty `_data`. Lets native store tooling read the record without\n   * unwrapping. Only reached for user collections under `debugPlaintext`\n   * (see {@link encryptRecord}). Rejects `_`-prefixed record fields, which\n   * would collide with the reserved metadata namespace.\n   */\n  buildDebugEnvelope(record: T, version: number, source?: string, sourceTs?: string): EncryptedEnvelope {\n    const rec = record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>\n    for (const key of Object.keys(rec)) {\n      if (key.startsWith('_')) throw new DebugReservedFieldError(this.ctx.name, key)\n    }\n    return {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      _v: version,\n      _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n      _iv: '',\n      _data: '',\n      _by: this.ctx.actor,\n      _debug: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      ...(this.ctx.provenance && source !== undefined ? { _source: source, _sourceTs: sourceTs ?? new Date().toISOString() } : {}),\n      ...rec,\n    } as unknown as EncryptedEnvelope\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Encrypt a JSON body into an envelope.\n   *\n   * When `cek` is supplied (per-record CEK collections), the body is\n   * encrypted under the CEK and the CEK is AES-KW-wrapped under the\n   * collection DEK and stamped on `_cek`. When `cek` is omitted, the legacy\n   * path encrypts the body directly under the collection DEK — byte-identical\n   * to pre-CEK behaviour, so non-adopting collections pay nothing.\n   */\n  async encryptJsonString(\n    json: string,\n    version: number,\n    cek?: EnclaveKey,\n    source?: string,\n    sourceTs?: string,\n  ): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const by = this.ctx.actor\n    const provenance = this.ctx.provenance && source !== undefined\n      ? { source, sourceTs: sourceTs ?? new Date().toISOString() }\n      : undefined\n\n    if (!this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      return RecordCodec.buildPlaintextEnvelope({ version, data: json, by, provenance })\n    }\n\n    const dek = await this.ctx.getDEK()\n\n    if (cek !== undefined) {\n      const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, cek)\n      const wrapped = await wrapCek(cek, dek)\n      return RecordCodec.buildEnvelope({ version, iv, data, by, cek: wrapped, provenance })\n    }\n\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek)\n    return RecordCodec.buildEnvelope({ version, iv, data, by, provenance })\n  }\n\n  async encryptRecord(\n    record: T,\n    version: number,\n    cek?: EnclaveKey,\n    source?: string,\n    sourceTs?: string,\n    vdig?: { readonly id: string; readonly prev: EncryptedEnvelope | null },\n    id?: string,\n  ): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    // Debug-plaintext: write user-collection records with their fields inlined\n    // beside the envelope metadata so native store tools read them directly.\n    // Internal (`_`-prefixed) collections keep the classic shape — some store\n    // `_`-prefixed fields that the inline layout would collide with.\n    if (!this.ctx.storeCiphertext && this.ctx.debugPlaintext && !this.ctx.name.startsWith('_')) {\n      return this.buildDebugEnvelope(record, version, source, sourceTs)\n    }\n\n    // ── C-A / R10 config-drift guard (superset) ────────────────────────\n    // A handle may write a classified collection only if its DECLARED\n    // digest-only set is a SUPERSET of the collection's stored/marked\n    // classified set. Any classified field this handle does NOT declare is a\n    // field it cannot maintain: the `_vdig` loop below iterates only declared\n    // fields, so an undeclared classified field is neither stripped nor tagged —\n    // its value would be serialized into `_data` as DEK-recoverable plaintext\n    // (the C-A leak), or its stored tag silently dropped. Fail loud.\n    //\n    // This subsumes the old naive-only guard (a fully-naive handle has an empty\n    // declared set, so ANY stored classified field violates the superset) AND\n    // closes the partial-handle door (declares Y, not X, over a record carrying\n    // `_vdig[X]`/`_bidx[X]`): the narrow `vdigFields === null || size === 0`\n    // gate skipped that entire case. The stored/marked set is the union of:\n    //   1. the persisted `x-classified` marker's declared digest-only set\n    //      (cross-session, prev-free — the only signal a fully-naive create has);\n    //   2. the keys the target `prev` already carries in `_vdig`/`_bidx` (the\n    //      overwrite arm; a classified-declaring handle DOES pass `prev`).\n    // Only encrypted collections can be classified, so plaintext collections skip.\n    if (this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      const declared = this.ctx.vdigFields\n      const storedClassified = new Set<string>()\n      if (vdig?.prev?._vdig) for (const k of Object.keys(vdig.prev._vdig)) storedClassified.add(k)\n      if (vdig?.prev?._bidx) for (const k of Object.keys(vdig.prev._bidx)) storedClassified.add(k)\n      if (this.ctx.classifiedMarkerDigestOnly !== undefined) {\n        for (const k of await this.ctx.classifiedMarkerDigestOnly()) storedClassified.add(k)\n      }\n      let undeclared: string | undefined\n      for (const field of storedClassified) {\n        if (declared === null || !declared.has(field)) { undeclared = field; break }\n      }\n      if (undeclared !== undefined) {\n        throw new ClassifiedConfigError(\n          this.ctx.name,\n          `this collection has classified digest-only field \"${undeclared}\" but this handle does not declare it — ` +\n          'refusing to write (would drop its tag or serialize the secret as plaintext)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Structural group-encryption: peel declared sensitive fields out\n    // of the record BEFORE building `_data`, sealing each into its own\n    // `_sealed[field]` slot under a per-field key. Default-off — with no\n    // sensitive fields the open record is unchanged and no `_sealed` is\n    // emitted, so the envelope stays byte-identical to legacy output.\n    // A collection whose via pipeline declares at-rest hooks (#629 Task 3)\n    // seals through THOSE instead — the inline `sensitiveFields` path and\n    // the hook path are mutually exclusive per collection, gated on\n    // `hasAtRestHooks` (the inline path now serves only the plain\n    // `sensitive: [...]` collection option; since #629, `classifiedFields`-\n    // declared fields seal through their own via-binding hook, and since\n    // #638 so does any field the taint graph seals — `via/classified/\n    // binding.ts` and `kernel/via/taint-binding.ts`, respectively). The\n    // zero-via fast path (no `via`, or a pipeline with no at-rest hooks,\n    // e.g. money-only) always takes the `else if` branch, unchanged.\n    let openRecord = record\n    let sealed: Record<string, string> | undefined\n    if (this.ctx.storeCiphertext && this.ctx.via?.hasAtRestHooks) {\n      if (id === undefined) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `RecordCodec.encryptRecord: collection \"${this.ctx.name}\" has via at-rest hooks but this write ` +\n          'path supplied no record id (needed to scope the sealed-slot capability) — caller bug.',\n        )\n      }\n      const src = record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>\n      const result = await this.ctx.via.encodeAtRest(src, this.viaCryptoCtx(id, cek))\n      openRecord = result.record as unknown as T\n      if (result.sealed !== undefined) {\n        sealed = {}\n        for (const [field, ref] of Object.entries(result.sealed)) sealed[field] = `${ref.iv}:${ref.data}`\n      }\n    } else if (this.ctx.storeCiphertext && this.ctx.sensitiveFields.size > 0) {\n      const src = record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>\n      const result = await sealFields(src, this.ctx.sensitiveFields, this.sealKeyMaterial(cek))\n      if (result.sealed !== undefined) {\n        sealed = result.sealed\n        openRecord = result.openRecord as unknown as T\n      }\n    }\n\n    // ── Digest-only classified fields (stage 2, C6) ────────────────────\n    // Per field, exactly one of: carry-forward (absent) / rotate (string) /\n    // clear (null) / loud error (anything else). Runs on a CLONE so the\n    // caller's record object is never mutated.\n    let vdigOut: Record<string, string> | undefined\n    let bidxOutMap: Record<string, string> | undefined\n    if (this.ctx.vdigFields !== null && this.ctx.vdigFields.size > 0 && this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      if (vdig === undefined) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `RecordCodec.encryptRecord: collection \"${this.ctx.name}\" declares digest-only classified ` +\n          `fields but this write path supplied no { id, prev } context — it would silently destroy _vdig (C6). Caller bug.`,\n        )\n      }\n      if (cek === undefined) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `RecordCodec.encryptRecord: digest-only fields require a per-record CEK (R1 invariant) — ` +\n          `collection \"${this.ctx.name}\" wrote without one. Caller bug.`,\n        )\n      }\n      const open: Record<string, unknown> = { ...(openRecord as unknown as Record<string, unknown>) }\n      const out: Record<string, string> = {}\n      // _bidx (blind-index equality tags) rides the SAME iteration as _vdig,\n      // so the structural invariant _bidx[field] ⇒ _vdig[field] holds by\n      // construction: a tag is only ever written where the _vdig slot is\n      // written/carried. DEK is fetched lazily — only an equatable rotate needs it.\n      const bidxOut: Record<string, string> = {}\n      let bidxDek: EnclaveKey | undefined\n      for (const [field, policy] of this.ctx.vdigFields) {\n        const value = open[field]\n        const prevBlob = vdig.prev?._vdig?.[field]\n        if (vdig.prev?._sealed?.[field] !== undefined) {\n          // R6 transition evidence: never silently delete recoverable\n          // plaintext. Checked BEFORE the value-type dispatch so the\n          // carry-forward (absent) and clear (null) branches refuse too —\n          // both would otherwise drop the `_sealed` slot from the new\n          // envelope, silently destroying the recoverable ciphertext.\n          throw new ClassifiedConfigError(\n            this.ctx.name,\n            `field \"${field}\" carries a recoverable _sealed slot from a previous storage form — ` +\n            `recoverable ↔ digest-only transitions are refused (R6); migrate explicitly`,\n          )\n        }\n        if (value === undefined) {\n          // 1. carry-forward: verbatim bytes (CEK version-stable, AAD _v-free;\n          //    byte-identity keeps the ledger payload hash deterministic).\n          // I-3 monotonic carry: whenever the _vdig slot is carried, ALSO copy\n          // prev._bidx[field] verbatim — regardless of THIS handle's equatable\n          // knob. An unrelated put by a handle with equatable removed must not\n          // drop another handle's tag (anti-flip-flop). If prev has no tag,\n          // there is nothing to mint from (no plaintext) → stays uncovered.\n          if (prevBlob !== undefined) {\n            out[field] = prevBlob\n            const prevTag = vdig.prev?._bidx?.[field]\n            if (prevTag !== undefined) bidxOut[field] = prevTag\n          }\n          continue\n        }\n        if (value === null) {\n          // 3. clear: the defined deletion short of forget().\n          delete open[field]\n          continue\n        }\n        if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n          // 4. caller bug, fail-loud.\n          throw new ValidationError(\n            `digest-only classified field \"${field}\" in \"${this.ctx.name}\" must be a string (rotate) or null (clear), got ${typeof value}`,\n          )\n        }\n        // 2. rotate: validate ran in the stage-1 write seam; digest + ring here.\n        out[field] = await mintVdigSlot(value, policy, prevBlob, cek, this.ctx.name, vdig.id, field)\n        // _bidx branch 2: if this handle is equatable, mint a fresh tag through\n        // the SAME normalization pipeline mintVdigSlot uses (normalizeForVerify)\n        // — the tag provably equals computeBidxTarget for this value. If the\n        // knob is OFF, emit nothing: the stale prev tag points at the now-\n        // superseded value (carrying it would be wrong) and minting is disallowed\n        // (knob off) → the tag is dropped. Confirm-by-verify keeps this sound.\n        if (policy.equatable === true) {\n          if (bidxDek === undefined) bidxDek = await this.ctx.getDEK()\n          const normalized = normalizeForVerify(policy.normalize, value)\n          bidxOut[field] = await mintBidxTag(normalized, bidxDek, this.ctx.name, field)\n        }\n        delete open[field] // strip from _data — digest-only never persists plaintext\n      }\n      openRecord = open as unknown as T\n      if (Object.keys(out).length > 0) vdigOut = out\n      if (Object.keys(bidxOut).length > 0) bidxOutMap = bidxOut\n    }\n\n    const base = await this.encryptJsonString(JSON.stringify(openRecord), version, cek, source, sourceTs)\n    const withSealed = sealed ? { ...base, _sealed: sealed } : base\n    const withVdig = vdigOut ? { ...withSealed, _vdig: vdigOut } : withSealed\n    const withBidx = bidxOutMap ? { ...withVdig, _bidx: bidxOutMap } : withVdig\n    if (!this.ctx.deterministicFields || !this.ctx.storeCiphertext) return withBidx\n\n    // compute deterministic-ciphertext slots for every\n    // declared field. Non-primitive values are JSON-stringified so\n    // objects/arrays still dedupe on structural equality. Sealed fields are\n    // excluded — they live only in `_sealed`, never the `_det` index.\n    // L-1: `_det` encrypts under a dedicated HKDF-derived key (salt\n    // `noydb-det`), never the raw DEK — the DEK's randomized-IV `_data`\n    // regime and `_det`'s deterministic-IV regime must not share a key.\n    const dek = await this.ctx.getDEK()\n    const detKey = await deriveDeterministicKey(dek)\n    const rec = record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>\n    const det: Record<string, string> = {}\n    for (const field of this.ctx.deterministicFields) {\n      if (this.ctx.sensitiveFields.has(field)) continue\n      if (this.ctx.vdigFields?.has(field)) continue // I5: digest-only never equality-correlatable\n      const value = rec[field]\n      if (value === undefined || value === null) continue\n      const plaintext = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)\n      const { iv, data } = await encryptDeterministic(plaintext, detKey, `${this.ctx.name}/${field}`)\n      det[field] = `${iv}:${data}`\n    }\n    if (Object.keys(det).length === 0) return withBidx\n    return { ...withBidx, _det: det }\n  }\n\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n  // Read path\n  // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve the per-record CEK for a stored envelope, or `undefined` for a\n   * legacy (`_cek`-absent) envelope. Unwraps `_cek` under the collection DEK and\n   * memoises it in the CEK cache under `id` (when supplied) so repeated reads of\n   * the same record skip the unwrap. Shared by the body-decrypt path\n   * ({@link decryptJsonString}) and the sealed-field path ({@link decryptRecord}\n   * / {@link toCacheRecord}) so both agree on the record's key.\n   */\n  async resolveEnvelopeCek(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, id?: string): Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined> {\n    if (envelope._cek === undefined) return undefined\n    const cached = id !== undefined ? this.ctx.cekCache?.get(id) : undefined\n    if (cached !== undefined) return cached\n    const dek = await this.ctx.getDEK()\n    const cek = await unwrapCek(envelope._cek, dek)\n    if (id !== undefined) this.ctx.cekCache?.set(id, cek, 1)\n    return cek\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Low-level: decrypt an envelope and return the raw JSON string.\n   *\n   * `_cek` presence is the format discriminant (NOT `this.perRecordCek`),\n   * so a mixed vault — and a recipient that never opted into\n   * `perRecordKeys` — decrypts both legacy and CEK records:\n   *  - `_cek` present → unwrap the CEK under the collection DEK, decrypt the\n   *    body under the CEK (cache the unwrapped CEK so repeated reads skip it).\n   *  - `_cek` absent → legacy path, body decrypts directly under the\n   *    collection DEK.\n   *\n   * The optional `id` lets reads populate the CEK cache; it is omitted by\n   * callers (history, conflict merge) that have only the envelope.\n   */\n  async decryptJsonString(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, id?: string): Promise<string | null> {\n    // RISK #1 (forget cascade): a shred tombstone carries `_data: ''` and no\n    // `_cek`. Decrypting it would call `decrypt('', '', dek)` → AES-GCM\n    // OperationError → TamperedError. Return null so every read callsite\n    // treats it as \"absent / skip\", matching how get()/list already drop\n    // tombstones. Legacy plaintext collections (`!this.storeCiphertext`) legitimately\n    // have empty `_iv`/`_data`, so `isTombstone` is false for them — preserved.\n    if (isTombstone(envelope, this.ctx.storeCiphertext) || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) return null\n    if (!this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      // Debug-plaintext layout: record fields were inlined as top-level keys\n      // (see buildDebugEnvelope). Reconstruct the record from the non-`_`\n      // keys. Self-describing via `_debug`, so a classic plaintext reader\n      // handles debug-written envelopes too.\n      if (envelope._debug !== undefined) {\n        const rec: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(envelope)) {\n          if (!key.startsWith('_')) rec[key] = value\n        }\n        return JSON.stringify(rec)\n      }\n      // #598: a real record never serializes to '' (JSON.stringify's floor is\n      // '{}'), so an empty `_data` here is the sync engine's shape-only\n      // tombstone (`isTombstoneShape` in team/sync.ts) landing on an\n      // unencrypted collection, where the encryption-gated `isTombstone()`\n      // check above doesn't fire. Treat it the same as an encrypted\n      // tombstone: null, not a `JSON.parse('')` crash.\n      return envelope._data === '' ? null : envelope._data\n    }\n    const cek = await this.resolveEnvelopeCek(envelope, id)\n    if (cek !== undefined) return decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, cek)\n    const dek = await this.ctx.getDEK()\n    return decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, dek)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Unseal a single `_sealed[field]` slot to its plaintext value: derive the\n   * per-field key off the collection DEK, AES-GCM-decrypt the `iv:data` blob,\n   * and JSON-parse the result. Shared by both the inline-decrypt path and a\n   * {@link Sealed} handle's `reveal()` — so the on-demand reveal and the eager\n   * materialisation always agree byte-for-byte.\n   */\n  async unsealField(field: string, blob: string, cek?: EnclaveKey): Promise<unknown> {\n    // Dual-read. Current writes seal under a key derived from the record's\n    // per-record CEK; legacy records (even ones whose body is\n    // CEK-encrypted) are sealed under the collection-DEK key. Try the CEK key\n    // first; on its AES-GCM auth failure, fall back to the DEK key. Without this\n    // fallback every legacy `_sealed` record would throw TamperedError (data loss).\n    return unsealOneField(field, blob, this.sealKeyMaterial(cek))\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build the `ViaCryptoCtx` for forget()'s per-ref via-erase fold (#629\n   * Task 10) — resolves the live envelope's CEK exactly like\n   * `decryptRecord` does, then delegates to the same capability factory\n   * `encodeAtRest`/`decodeAtRest` use.\n   */\n  async eraseCryptoCtx(id: string, live: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<ViaCryptoCtx> {\n    return this.viaCryptoCtx(id, await this.resolveEnvelopeCek(live, id))\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Classify a live envelope's `_sealed` slots for crypto-shred completeness.\n   * `forget()` drops `_cek`/`_sealed` but\n   * RETAINS the collection DEK, so only a slot keyed off the per-record CEK is\n   * genuinely shredded by the tombstone; a legacy slot keyed off the\n   * collection DEK survives in any synced/backup copy.\n   *\n   * Mirrors {@link unsealField}'s dual-read split: try the CEK-derived key per\n   * slot — success → `shreddable`, AES-GCM auth failure → `dekResidue`. With no\n   * `_cek` (pure legacy collection-DEK sealing) ALL slots are residue.\n   */\n  async classifySealedShred(\n    live: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  ): Promise<{ readonly slots: readonly SealedShredSlot[] }> {\n    const slots: SealedShredSlot[] = []\n    // Verify-digest slots are CEK-only by construction (I3): dropping `_cek`\n    // makes every `_vdig[field]` permanently undecryptable — shreddable\n    // unconditionally, no vdig-dekResidue class (spec §2 forget()). Same\n    // honesty caveats as #306 D5 for synced/backup copies of the ciphertext.\n    // A `_vdig` field ALSO carrying a `_bidx` tag is the third category: the\n    // tombstone drops it from the live store, but a pre-forget backup retains\n    // the blind-index tag under the surviving collection DEK — live-shreddable\n    // yet dekResidue-in-backups. `_bidx[field] ⇒ _vdig[field]` (I4), so we\n    // decide per vdig field and emit exactly one slot each (count-preserving).\n    if (live._vdig !== undefined && live._cek !== undefined) {\n      for (const field of Object.keys(live._vdig)) {\n        slots.push({\n          field,\n          class: live._bidx?.[field] !== undefined\n            ? 'live-shreddable+dekResidue-in-backups'\n            : 'shreddable',\n        })\n      }\n    }\n    const sealed = live._sealed\n    if (sealed === undefined) return { slots }\n    const cek = await this.resolveEnvelopeCek(live)\n    for (const [field, blob] of Object.entries(sealed)) {\n      if (cek === undefined) { slots.push({ field, class: 'dekResidue' }); continue }\n      const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob)\n      try {\n        await decrypt(iv, data, await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, this.ctx.name, field))\n        slots.push({ field, class: 'shreddable' })\n      } catch {\n        slots.push({ field, class: 'dekResidue' })\n      }\n    }\n    return { slots }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build a non-leaking {@link Sealed} handle over a sealed field's ciphertext.\n   * The handle captures only the ciphertext `blob` and a closure to\n   * {@link unsealField}; the plaintext is never stored on it — so the handle\n   * may sit in the working-set cache (or be logged/serialised) without\n   * exposing the value, which decrypts only on `reveal()`.\n   */\n  makeSealedHandle(field: string, blob: string, cek?: EnclaveKey): SealedHandle<unknown> {\n    return makeHandleProducer(this.sealKeyMaterial(cek))(field, blob)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Replace every field the just-written envelope actually sealed with a\n   * {@link Sealed} handle, leaving every other field as its plaintext value.\n   * Used to populate the cache on the write path without ever materialising\n   * sealed plaintext into it. Returns `record` untouched when nothing was\n   * sealed. Keys off `envelope._sealed` itself (#642 fix) — NOT\n   * `this.ctx.sensitiveFields`, which only names the inline `sensitive:[...]`/\n   * classified-recoverable field set: a collection whose sealing comes\n   * entirely from the `taint` via-binding (a derivation/MV output or rollup\n   * target folded sealed from a classified SOURCE collection, #642) declares\n   * no local `sensitiveFields` at all, so that stale gate skipped this\n   * conversion and left a just-written taint-sealed field as cached\n   * plaintext — read back correctly ONLY after a cold cache miss (`get()`'s\n   * own `decodeAtRest` call, unaffected by this gate) forced a fresh decrypt.\n   */\n  async toCacheRecord(record: T, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, id?: string): Promise<T> {\n    const sealed = envelope._sealed\n    if (sealed === undefined || !this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      return record\n    }\n    const cek = await this.resolveEnvelopeCek(envelope, id)\n    const clone = { ...(record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>) }\n    for (const [field, blob] of Object.entries(sealed)) {\n      clone[field] = this.makeSealedHandle(field, blob, cek)\n    }\n    return clone as unknown as T\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Apply `_sealed`-slot post-processing to an ALREADY-DECRYPTED `record`:\n   * restore each `_sealed[field]` blob inline (`sealedAsHandles` falsy) or\n   * as an opaque {@link Sealed} handle (`sealedAsHandles: true`), routing\n   * through a via pipeline's `decodeAtRest` hook when one is declared.\n   * Extracted byte-parity from `decryptRecord`'s inline block (#635) so a\n   * caller that resolves its OWN per-record CEK under a DIFFERENT DEK than\n   * this codec's `this.ctx.getDEK()` — namely the tier>0 `getAtTier` leg in\n   * `with-audit/tiers/index.ts`, whose `_cek` is wrapped under the TIER DEK,\n   * not the collection DEK `decryptRecord`/`resolveEnvelopeCek` always\n   * unwrap under — can still get correct sealed-slot handling without\n   * routing its whole read through `decryptRecord` (which would resolve the\n   * wrong DEK for it).\n   *\n   * Zero-knowledge: takes only the already-resolved per-record `cek` (or\n   * `undefined` for a legacy/no-CEK record) — the same shape `makeSealedHandle`\n   * already takes above. Never the keyring, never a raw DEK: the legacy\n   * fallback key stays fully internal to `sealKeyMaterial`/`viaCryptoCtx`,\n   * which close over THIS codec's own `getDEK` (permanently bound to\n   * `this.ctx.name`'s tier-0 DEK at construction) — so even when called from\n   * a tier>0 context, the legacy-fallback key resolution is correct: sealed\n   * fields are always sealed under the CEK or the collection's tier-0 DEK,\n   * never a tier DEK (tier writes don't seal fields; `_sealed` reaches a\n   * tiered envelope only via a tier-0 write later elevated).\n   */\n  async applySealedSlots(\n    record: T,\n    sealed: Record<string, string>,\n    cek: EnclaveKey | undefined,\n    opts: { id?: string; sealedAsHandles?: boolean } = {},\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    if (this.ctx.via?.hasAtRestHooks) {\n      if (opts.id === undefined) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `RecordCodec.decryptRecord: collection \"${this.ctx.name}\" has via at-rest hooks but this read ` +\n          'path supplied no record id (needed to scope the sealed-slot capability) — caller bug.',\n        )\n      }\n      const sealedRefs: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> = {}\n      for (const [field, blob] of Object.entries(sealed)) {\n        const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob)\n        sealedRefs[field] = { iv, data }\n      }\n      return await this.ctx.via.decodeAtRest(\n        record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,\n        sealedRefs,\n        this.viaCryptoCtx(opts.id, cek),\n        { asHandles: opts.sealedAsHandles === true },\n      ) as unknown as T\n    }\n    return await unsealFields(\n      record as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,\n      sealed,\n      this.sealKeyMaterial(cek),\n      { asHandles: opts.sealedAsHandles === true },\n    ) as unknown as T\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt an envelope under an EXPLICIT `dek` instead of this codec's own\n   * `ctx.getDEK()` / cekCache resolution — for a from-tier>0 pre-move decode\n   * (`with-audit/tiers/index.ts`'s `putAtTier`/`elevate`/`demote` sites,\n   * #722 whole-branch review). Mirrors the manual unwrap-then-decrypt\n   * `getAtTier`'s own tier>0 leg performs there (same primitives, same\n   * `applySealedSlots` extraction point #635 built for exactly this caller).\n   *\n   * `decryptRecord` is tier-UNAWARE: `resolveEnvelopeCek` reads the cekCache\n   * or falls back to `ctx.getDEK()` — this codec's DEFAULT (tier-0/\n   * collection) DEK — never the envelope's OWN tier. That only happens to\n   * decrypt a from-tier>0 envelope correctly when some other call in the\n   * SAME op already primed the cekCache with this record's CEK (true for an\n   * ordinary put()-then-elevate(0→1); NOT true for a `putAtTier`-origin\n   * envelope, whose body is encrypted directly under its tier DEK with no\n   * `_cek` ever minted, or a non-`perRecordKeys` collection, which has no\n   * `_cek` at all) — those throw `TamperedError`. Decrypting under the\n   * caller-resolved `dek` is correct regardless of cache state or\n   * `perRecordKeys`.\n   *\n   * No CRDT resolution, no schema validation — same scope as `getAtTier`'s\n   * tier>0 branch (the established precedent for a tier-aware read), which\n   * skips both for the same reason: a tier>0 read is an internal/derived-\n   * output-recompute path, not the public per-record read surface schema\n   * validation guards.\n   */\n  async decryptRecordAtDek(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, dek: EnclaveKey, id?: string): Promise<T | null> {\n    if (isTombstone(envelope, this.ctx.storeCiphertext) || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) return null\n    let plaintext: string\n    let cek: EnclaveKey | undefined\n    if (envelope._cek !== undefined) {\n      cek = await unwrapCek(envelope._cek, dek)\n      plaintext = await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, cek)\n    } else {\n      plaintext = await decrypt(envelope._iv, envelope._data, dek)\n    }\n    let record = JSON.parse(plaintext) as T\n    if (envelope._sealed !== undefined && this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      record = await this.applySealedSlots(record, envelope._sealed, cek, { ...(id !== undefined ? { id } : {}), sealedAsHandles: true })\n    }\n    return record\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Decrypt an envelope into a record of type `T`.\n   *\n   * When a schema is attached, the decrypted value is validated before\n   * being returned. A divergence between the stored bytes and the\n   * current schema throws `SchemaValidationError` with\n   * `direction: 'output'` — silently returning drifted data would\n   * propagate garbage into the UI and break the whole point of having\n   * a schema.\n   *\n   * `skipValidation` exists for history reads: when calling\n   * `getVersion()` the caller is explicitly asking for an old snapshot\n   * that may predate a schema change, so validating it would be a\n   * false positive. Every non-history read leaves this flag `false`.\n   */\n  async decryptRecord(\n    envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    opts: { skipValidation?: boolean; id?: string; sealedAsHandles?: boolean } = {},\n  ): Promise<T | null> {\n    const json = await this.decryptJsonString(envelope, opts.id)\n    // Tombstone (shredded record) → null, propagated from decryptJsonString.\n    // Callers skip null exactly as they already skip a tombstone envelope.\n    if (json === null) return null\n    let parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(json)\n\n    // CRDT resolution: if this collection is in CRDT mode, the\n    // stored JSON is a CrdtState, not T directly. Resolve to the snapshot.\n    if (this.ctx.crdtMode && parsed !== null && typeof parsed === 'object' && '_crdt' in parsed) {\n      parsed = this.ctx.crdtStrategy.resolveCrdtSnapshot(parsed as CrdtState)\n    }\n\n    let record = parsed as T\n\n    // Structural group-encryption + sealed access gate.\n    // Each `_sealed[field]` slot is restored under its own per-field key.\n    // `sealedAsHandles: false` (default — internal callers that compute on\n    // real values) inline-decrypts to the plaintext value; `true` (the\n    // public / cache path) yields an opaque {@link Sealed} handle so the\n    // plaintext is never materialised into the working-set cache. A\n    // collection whose via pipeline declares at-rest hooks (#629 Task 3)\n    // decodes through THOSE instead of the inline dual-read below — the\n    // zero-via fast path (no `via`, or a pipeline with no at-rest hooks)\n    // always takes the `else` branch, unchanged.\n    if (envelope._sealed !== undefined && this.ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n      const sealedCek = await this.resolveEnvelopeCek(envelope, opts.id)\n      record = await this.applySealedSlots(record, envelope._sealed, sealedCek, {\n        ...(opts.id !== undefined ? { id: opts.id } : {}),\n        ...(opts.sealedAsHandles !== undefined ? { sealedAsHandles: opts.sealedAsHandles } : {}),\n      })\n    }\n\n    // Skip output validation when sealed fields are returned as handles:\n    // the record carries opaque `Sealed` handles in place of the declared\n    // values, so a whole-record schema check would false-positive on them.\n    // (The values were validated on input/write; the open fields are\n    // unchanged from the validated body.) The inline-value path below still\n    // validates fully.\n    const sealedAsHandles = opts.sealedAsHandles === true && envelope._sealed !== undefined\n    if (this.ctx.schema !== undefined && !opts.skipValidation && !sealedAsHandles) {\n      // Context string deliberately avoids leaking the record id — the\n      // envelope only carries the version, not the id (the id lives in\n      // the adapter-side key). `<collection>@v<n>` is enough for the\n      // developer to find the offending record.\n      record = await validateSchemaOutput(\n        this.ctx.schema,\n        record,\n        `${this.ctx.name}@v${envelope._v}`,\n      )\n    }\n\n    return record\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Record-scoped CEK sealing — grantor side.\n *\n * The **grantor** holds the collection DEK and seals ONE record's CEK to an\n * `at-*` host so that host — and only that host — can decrypt exactly that\n * record, with no access to the vault DEK and no ability to read any other\n * record. This is the counterpart to the host-side `openSealedRecord`\n * (`@noy-db/hub/sealed-record`), which holds no DEK.\n *\n * These functions are the orchestration behind `vault.sealRecordToHost` /\n * `vault.revokeSealedRecord` / `vault.rotateRecordCek`, lifted off `Vault`\n * behind a narrow {@link SealingContext} so the kernel file delegates. They\n * live in `record-keys/` (the vault-side CEK policy layer), NOT in\n * `sealed-record/`, so the host-side subpath stays DEK-free — the wire\n * *types* they share are spine-owned (`kernel/types.ts`), not imported from\n * `sealed-record/` directly.\n */\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, generateDEK, wrapCek, unwrapCek, bufferToBase64, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport {\n  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n  type EncryptedEnvelope,\n  type NoydbStore,\n  type RecipientSealer,\n  type SealedCekBinding,\n  type SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope,\n} from '../../types.js'\nimport { dualReadSealedSlot } from './sealed-slot.js'\nimport { openVdigPayload, sealVdigPayload } from '../classify/vdig.js'\nimport { RecordCekNotFoundError, ValidationError } from '../../errors.js'\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n/** The `_sealed_cek` delivery namespace (one envelope per `collection/id/pid`). */\nexport const SEALED_CEK_NS = '_sealed_cek'\n\n/** What the grantor functions need from their `Vault`. */\nexport interface SealingContext {\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault id (the adapter's first coordinate). */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** Resolve the DEK a record's CEK is wrapped under. */\n  getDEK(collection: string): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  /** Actor id stamped on `_by` (empty string → omit). */\n  readonly actor: string\n  /** Evict the per-record CEK cache + decrypted-record cache after a rotation. */\n  invalidateRecordCaches(collection: string, id: string): Promise<void>\n}\n\n/**\n * Seal a record's CEK to a host. See `vault.sealRecordToHost` for the contract.\n * Returns `{ pid, envelopeKey }`.\n */\nexport async function sealRecordToHost(\n  ctx: SealingContext,\n  collection: string,\n  id: string,\n  hostSealer: RecipientSealer,\n  opts: { expiresAt: string },\n): Promise<{ pid: string; envelopeKey: string }> {\n  // Guard separators: the `_sealed_cek` id is `collection/id/pid`, so a `/` in\n  // any component would make the prefix-delete in rotateRecordCek() (which\n  // matches `${collection}/${id}/`) ambiguous and could over- or under-match.\n  if (collection.includes('/')) throw new ValidationError(`sealRecordToHost: collection \"${collection}\" must not contain \"/\"`)\n  if (id.includes('/')) throw new ValidationError(`sealRecordToHost: id \"${id}\" must not contain \"/\"`)\n  // M-4: reject a malformed/empty expiry at seal time. `Date.parse('')` (and any\n  // non-ISO string) is NaN, and the open-time check `NaN <= now` is `false` — so\n  // a malformed expiry would silently mint an ETERNAL grant. A *past* (but valid)\n  // timestamp is still allowed: it seals, then fails closed at open time.\n  if (Number.isNaN(Date.parse(opts.expiresAt))) {\n    throw new ValidationError(`sealRecordToHost: expiresAt \"${opts.expiresAt}\" is not a valid ISO 8601 timestamp`)\n  }\n\n  const live = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n  if (!live || live._cek === undefined) {\n    throw new RecordCekNotFoundError(collection, id)\n  }\n\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK(collection)\n  const cek = await unwrapCek(live._cek, dek)\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const cekB64 = bufferToBase64(rawCek)\n\n  const hint = await hostSealer.publishRecipientHint()\n  if (hint.pid.includes('/')) throw new ValidationError(`sealRecordToHost: recipient pid \"${hint.pid}\" must not contain \"/\"`)\n\n  const binding: SealedCekBinding = {\n    collection,\n    id,\n    cek: cekB64,\n    expiresAt: opts.expiresAt,\n  }\n  const sealed = await hostSealer.sealForRecipient(\n    new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(binding)),\n    hint,\n  )\n\n  const delivery: SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope = {\n    v: 1,\n    _noydb_sealed_cek: 1,\n    pid: hint.pid,\n    payload: bufferToBase64(sealed),\n    expiresAt: opts.expiresAt,\n  }\n\n  const envelopeKey = `${collection}/${id}/${hint.pid}`\n  const prior = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, SEALED_CEK_NS, envelopeKey)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary, exactly\n    // like the managed-secret `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope.\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(delivery),\n    ...(ctx.actor ? { _by: ctx.actor } : {}),\n  }\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, SEALED_CEK_NS, envelopeKey, env)\n\n  return { pid: hint.pid, envelopeKey }\n}\n\n/**\n * Revoke one sealed-CEK grant.\n *\n * **Default (`{ hard: false }`) is SOFT** — it only deletes the delivery\n * envelope from the store. A host that already fetched (or cached the unsealed\n * CEK from) that envelope KEEPS decrypt capability for the record; soft revoke\n * is a \"stop new fetches\" control, not a cryptographic cutoff.\n *\n * **`{ hard: true }`** additionally rotates the record's CEK (via\n * {@link rotateRecordCek}): the live body is re-encrypted under a fresh CEK and\n * EVERY sealed-CEK delivery envelope for the record (all pids) is deleted, so\n * any previously-sealed CEK fails the AES-GCM auth tag on the rotated body —\n * future opens are cryptographically denied. (PRE-rotation history versions,\n * which keep their old `_cek`, remain openable — same semantics as\n * `rotateRecordCek`.)\n */\nexport async function revokeSealedRecord(\n  ctx: SealingContext,\n  collection: string,\n  id: string,\n  pid: string,\n  opts?: { hard?: boolean },\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (opts?.hard === true) {\n    // Hard revocation supersedes the single-pid soft delete: rotateRecordCek\n    // re-keys the record and drops every delivery envelope for it.\n    await rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id)\n    return\n  }\n  await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, SEALED_CEK_NS, `${collection}/${id}/${pid}`)\n}\n\n/**\n * HARD-rotate a record's CEK: re-encrypt the live body under a fresh CEK, evict\n * caches, and delete EVERY sealed-CEK delivery envelope for the record. See\n * `vault.rotateRecordCek` for why this bypasses `Collection.put` (no guards, no\n * history bump — a key rotation must not re-encrypt prior history under the new\n * CEK).\n */\nexport async function rotateRecordCek(\n  ctx: SealingContext,\n  collection: string,\n  id: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const live = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n  if (!live || live._cek === undefined) {\n    throw new RecordCekNotFoundError(collection, id)\n  }\n\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK(collection)\n  const oldCek = await unwrapCek(live._cek, dek)\n  const json = await decrypt(live._iv, live._data, oldCek)\n\n  const newCek = await generateDEK()\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, newCek)\n\n  // Sealed fields are keyed off the per-record CEK, so a rotation\n  // must RE-ENCRYPT each `_sealed[field]` under the new CEK (carrying the old\n  // slots forward would orphan them — the old CEK is gone after this rotate).\n  // Dual-read the old slot: try the old-CEK-derived key, fall\n  // back to the collection-DEK key (legacy), then re-seal under newCek.\n  let sealedOut: Record<string, string> | undefined\n  if (live._sealed !== undefined) {\n    const out: Record<string, string> = {}\n    for (const [field, slot] of Object.entries(live._sealed)) {\n      const plaintext = await dualReadSealedSlot(slot, field, collection, oldCek, dek)\n      const resealed = await encrypt(plaintext, await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(newCek, collection, field))\n      out[field] = `${resealed.iv}:${resealed.data}`\n    }\n    sealedOut = out\n  }\n\n  // Verify-digest slots are keyed off the per-record CEK too (I3: CEK-only,\n  // no DEK fallback → single read, not a dual-read). Rotation must re-seal\n  // each `_vdig[field]` under the new CEK with the SAME reconstructed AAD, or\n  // the correct password would false-reject forever (C3).\n  let vdigOut: Record<string, string> | undefined\n  if (live._vdig !== undefined) {\n    const out: Record<string, string> = {}\n    for (const [field, blob] of Object.entries(live._vdig)) {\n      const payload = await openVdigPayload(blob, oldCek, collection, id, field)\n      out[field] = await sealVdigPayload(payload, newCek, collection, id, field)\n    }\n    vdigOut = out\n  }\n\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: live._v + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: iv,\n    _data: data,\n    _cek: await wrapCek(newCek, dek),\n    ...(ctx.actor ? { _by: ctx.actor } : {}),\n    ...(live._tier !== undefined ? { _tier: live._tier } : {}),\n    ...(live._det !== undefined ? { _det: live._det } : {}),\n    // `_bidx` (equality-index tag) is DEK-rooted and CEK-independent, so it is\n    // carried forward VERBATIM — not recomputed — unlike `_vdig`/`_sealed`\n    // below, which are CEK-bound and must be re-sealed under the new CEK.\n    // Dropping this line would silently orphan the equality index on rotation\n    // (the #306 Slice-A data-loss bug, replayed on the index).\n    ...(live._bidx !== undefined ? { _bidx: live._bidx } : {}),\n    // Re-encrypt sealed (`sensitive`) fields under the new CEK. Sealed\n    // keys derive off the per-record CEK, so the rotated record's old CEK is\n    // destroyed here — carrying the old `_sealed` slots forward verbatim would\n    // orphan them (unreadable under the new CEK). `sealedOut` holds the slots\n    // dual-read from the old CEK (or the legacy DEK) and re-sealed under newCek.\n    ...(sealedOut !== undefined ? { _sealed: sealedOut } : {}),\n    ...(vdigOut !== undefined ? { _vdig: vdigOut } : {}),\n  }\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, collection, id, env)\n\n  // Evict BOTH caches synchronously so no read returns the stale old-CEK record.\n  await ctx.invalidateRecordCaches(collection, id)\n\n  // Delete every sealed-CEK delivery envelope for this record — all pids.\n  const prefix = `${collection}/${id}/`\n  const keys = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, SEALED_CEK_NS)\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (key.startsWith(prefix)) {\n      await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, SEALED_CEK_NS, key)\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Deterministic-index lookups (`findByDet` / `queryByDet`).\n *\n * A collection that declares `deterministicFields` stamps a deterministic\n * AES-GCM ciphertext for each such field on the envelope's `_det` slot at write\n * time (the encrypt side lives in {@link RecordCodec.encryptRecord}). These\n * helpers are the READ side: recompute the deterministic ciphertext for a query\n * value and scan the adapter for envelopes whose `_det[field]` matches — no\n * record bodies are decrypted during the scan, which is the whole point of a\n * deterministic index.\n *\n * Both functions take a small {@link DeterministicContext} (the exact `this.*`\n * the moving methods touched) instead of `this`, mirroring the `record-keys/`\n * siblings. Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline code they replaced.\n * Elevated records (_tier > 0) are skipped: invisible to tier-0 scans (#691).\n *\n * Internal service — not exported as a `@noy-db/hub/*` subpath.\n */\nimport { encryptDeterministic, deriveDeterministicKey, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../types.js'\nimport type { RecordCodec } from './record-codec.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving deterministic-index methods touched on `this.*`. */\nexport interface DeterministicContext<T> {\n  /** Collection name — the deterministic-encryption AAD scope. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /** Vault namespace the records live under. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The ciphertext store (scanned envelope-by-envelope). */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Declared deterministic-index fields, or null when the feature is off. */\n  readonly deterministicFields: ReadonlySet<string> | null\n  /** False on plaintext collections — det lookups are encrypted-only. */\n  readonly storeCiphertext: boolean\n  /** The collection DEK resolver. */\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  /** The record codec — decrypts a matched envelope to T. */\n  readonly codec: RecordCodec<T>\n}\n\n/**\n * Recompute the deterministic ciphertext targets for a query value.\n *\n * L-1: _det migrated to a dedicated HKDF key (salt noydb-det); dual-query\n * keeps pre-migration envelopes findable — they self-heal to the new key on\n * their next write. Index 0 is the current (derived-key) target, index 1 the\n * legacy raw-DEK target. Both are derived once per query call, not per\n * envelope, so the extra derivation is a fixed cost.\n */\nasync function detTargets<T>(ctx: DeterministicContext<T>, field: string, value: unknown): Promise<[string, string]> {\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n  const detKey = await deriveDeterministicKey(dek)\n  const plaintext = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)\n  const context = `${ctx.name}/${field}`\n  const [current, legacy] = await Promise.all([\n    encryptDeterministic(plaintext, detKey, context),\n    encryptDeterministic(plaintext, dek, context),\n  ])\n  return [`${current.iv}:${current.data}`, `${legacy.iv}:${legacy.data}`]\n}\n\nfunction assertDetField<T>(ctx: DeterministicContext<T>, field: string, method: string): void {\n  if (!ctx.deterministicFields || !ctx.deterministicFields.has(field)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": field \"${field}\" is not declared in deterministicFields`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (!ctx.storeCiphertext) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": ${method} is only meaningful on encrypted collections`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Find the first record whose deterministic field matches the given plaintext.\n * Returns `null` when no match exists.\n *\n * Reads every envelope via the adapter and compares the stored `_det[field]` to\n * a freshly computed deterministic ciphertext — no record bodies are decrypted\n * during the search.\n *\n * Throws when the field is not declared in `deterministicFields`, so a typo\n * fails loudly at the call site rather than silently returning null forever.\n */\nexport async function findByDet<T>(ctx: DeterministicContext<T>, field: string, value: unknown): Promise<T | null> {\n  assertDetField(ctx, field, 'findByDet')\n  const [target, legacyTarget] = await detTargets(ctx, field, value)\n\n  const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, ctx.name)\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)\n    // #691: an elevated record's _det slot is tier-independent (#662 carries\n    // it), so it MATCHES — but its key material is tier-wrapped. Skip it\n    // explicitly: invisible to tier-0 det scans regardless of cekCache state\n    // (a catch-based fix would still leak plaintext, audit-free, in the\n    // session that performed the elevate).\n    if (!env || !env._det || (env._tier ?? 0) > 0) continue\n    if (env._det[field] === target || env._det[field] === legacyTarget) {\n      return ctx.codec.decryptRecord(env, { id })\n    }\n  }\n  return null\n}\n\n/**\n * Return every record whose deterministic field matches. Same semantics as\n * {@link findByDet} but without the short-circuit.\n */\nexport async function queryByDet<T>(ctx: DeterministicContext<T>, field: string, value: unknown): Promise<T[]> {\n  assertDetField(ctx, field, 'queryByDet')\n  const [target, legacyTarget] = await detTargets(ctx, field, value)\n\n  const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, ctx.name)\n  const matches: T[] = []\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)\n    // #691: skip elevated — see findByDet above\n    if (!env || !env._det || (env._tier ?? 0) > 0) continue\n    if (env._det[field] === target || env._det[field] === legacyTarget) {\n      const rec = await ctx.codec.decryptRecord(env, { id })\n      if (rec !== null) matches.push(rec) // skip tombstone (defensive)\n    }\n  }\n  return matches\n}\n","/**\n * Enclave body helpers — the C1 protected-body access contract.\n *\n * `EncryptedEnvelope` splits into a protocol header (family-owned; `_noydb`,\n * `_v`, `_ts`, `_by`, `_source`, `_sourceTs`, `_tier`, `_elevatedBy`) and a\n * protected body (enclave-owned; `_iv`, `_data`, `_cek`, `_det`, `_sealed`,\n * `_debug`). The four helpers below are the ONLY sanctioned way for code\n * outside `kernel/enclave/**` to read or construct the protected body —\n * later migration batches move the ~121 direct `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_sealed`\n * access sites in `with-*` services onto these.\n *\n * Each helper reproduces an EXISTING behavior byte-for-byte (see the\n * per-function doc for its oracle call site) — this file introduces no new\n * crypto or semantics, only a narrower door onto what already runs.\n */\nimport { encrypt, decrypt, generateDEK, wrapCek, unwrapCek, type EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\n\n/**\n * Open an envelope's protected body to its JSON text.\n *\n * Mirrors the dominant direct-decrypt call-site shape (e.g.\n * `with-audit/consent/consent.ts`'s `decryptEntry`):\n *  - `opts.encrypted === false` (default `true`) → plaintext collection;\n *    returns `env._data` as-is, `key` untouched.\n *  - `env._cek` present → per-record-key envelope (mirrors\n *    `record-codec.ts`'s `resolveEnvelopeCek`): unwrap the CEK under `key`\n *    (the collection DEK), decrypt the body under the unwrapped CEK.\n *  - `env._cek` absent → legacy path, decrypt the body directly under `key`.\n */\nexport async function openEnvelopeJson(\n  env: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  key: EnclaveKey,\n  opts?: { encrypted?: boolean },\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (opts?.encrypted === false) return env._data\n  if (env._cek !== undefined) {\n    const cek = await unwrapCek(env._cek, key)\n    return decrypt(env._iv, env._data, cek)\n  }\n  return decrypt(env._iv, env._data, key)\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce the protected-body fields (`_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`) for an envelope a\n * caller is assembling.\n *\n *  - `opts.encrypted === false` (default `true`) → plaintext collection;\n *    emits `{ _iv: '', _data: json }` (today's `buildPlaintextEnvelope`\n *    shape), `key` untouched.\n *  - `opts.perRecordKey === true` → mints a fresh per-record CEK, encrypts\n *    the body under it, and AES-KW-wraps the CEK under `key` (mirrors\n *    `encryptJsonString`'s `cek !== undefined` branch, except the CEK is\n *    generated here rather than supplied by the caller).\n *  - otherwise → legacy path, body encrypted directly under `key`.\n */\nexport async function writeEnvelopeBody(\n  json: string,\n  key: EnclaveKey,\n  opts?: { encrypted?: boolean; perRecordKey?: boolean },\n): Promise<Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_iv' | '_data' | '_cek'>> {\n  if (opts?.encrypted === false) return { _iv: '', _data: json }\n\n  if (opts?.perRecordKey === true) {\n    const cek = await generateDEK()\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, cek)\n    const wrapped = await wrapCek(cek, key)\n    return { _iv: iv, _data: data, _cek: wrapped }\n  }\n\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, key)\n  return { _iv: iv, _data: data }\n}\n\n/**\n * Approximate protected-body payload size for KPI/telemetry (#807's\n * period-scoped pull download counters): `_data` + `_iv` string length —\n * ≈ ciphertext bytes for base64 payloads, exact for plaintext (`_iv: ''`)\n * collections. A measuring door, not a crypto one: callers get a size\n * without touching the protected fields directly.\n */\nexport function envelopeBodySize(env: EncryptedEnvelope): number {\n  return env._data.length + env._iv.length\n}\n\n/**\n * Discriminant: does this envelope carry a per-record key?\n *\n * Replaces raw `envelope._cek !== undefined` checks scattered across\n * services — `_cek` presence is the format discriminant (see\n * `record-codec.ts`'s `resolveEnvelopeCek` doc).\n */\nexport function hasPerRecordKey(env: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return env._cek !== undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical body string for the ledger hash chain — the exact bytes\n * `with-commit/history/ledger/hash.ts`'s `envelopePayloadHash` derives from\n * `_data` + `_sealed` + `_vdig` + `_bidx` before hashing:\n *  - no `_sealed`, no `_vdig`, no `_bidx` → `_data` alone (back-compat: every\n *    pre-existing ledger entry and non-sealed backup hashes byte-identically).\n *  - any map present → canonical JSON of `{ _data, _sealed?, _vdig?, _bidx? }`\n *    with sorted keys at every level, each map bound ONLY when present, so\n *    the result is independent of the maps' field-insertion / store-\n *    serialization order. `_bidx` is always the LAST segment, so a legacy\n *    `_vdig`-only / `_bidx`-absent envelope hashes byte-identically to its\n *    stage-2 value.\n *\n * Deliberately reimplements the two-key-object canonicalization inline\n * rather than importing `with-commit/history/ledger/entry.ts`'s general\n * `canonicalJson` — `kernel/enclave/**` may import only spine types (C3),\n * never a `with-*` service. For this fixed `{ _data: string; _sealed:\n * Record<string, string> }` shape the two produce byte-identical output\n * (verified against that exact call site's oracle expression in\n * `envelope-body.test.ts`).\n */\nexport function envelopeBodyForHash(env: EncryptedEnvelope): string {\n  // Conditional widen (stage 2): bind `_vdig` exactly the way `_sealed` is\n  // bound — only when present. No existing envelope carries `_vdig`, so this\n  // ships with no flag-day PROVIDED it lands in the same slice as the first\n  // `_vdig` writer (it does — Tasks 7/8/11 are one branch). This binding is\n  // the temporal-rollback detector completing C1: AAD stops cross-record/\n  // cross-field splices; the ledger hash catches same-slot rollbacks.\n  //\n  // Conditional widen (slice 2b, SM #5): bind `_bidx` the same way, appended\n  // LAST (after `_vdig`) so a `_bidx`-absent envelope keeps its stage-2\n  // byte-identical hash.\n  if (env._sealed === undefined && env._vdig === undefined && env._bidx === undefined) return env._data\n  const mapPart = (key: '_sealed' | '_vdig' | '_bidx', map: Record<string, string>): string => {\n    const parts = Object.keys(map).sort().map(\n      (k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${JSON.stringify(map[k])}`,\n    )\n    return `${JSON.stringify(key)}:{${parts.join(',')}}`\n  }\n  const segments = [`\"_data\":${JSON.stringify(env._data)}`]\n  if (env._sealed !== undefined) segments.push(mapPart('_sealed', env._sealed))\n  if (env._vdig !== undefined) segments.push(mapPart('_vdig', env._vdig))\n  if (env._bidx !== undefined) segments.push(mapPart('_bidx', env._bidx))\n  return `{${segments.join(',')}}`\n}\n","/**\n * Credential-broker proof crypto (#479, credential-broker spec §3).\n *\n * The `_broker` seed (32 random bytes, decrypted from `_broker/<brokerId>` by\n * the party layer) is never transmitted. Instead, a **proof key** is\n * HKDF-derived from it, domain-separated per `(vaultId, brokerId)`, and the\n * derived bits are registered with the broker host once at enrol. Steady\n * state, the client re-derives the same key from the seed and signs a\n * **canonical** string binding the request's identity/context, so the broker\n * can verify a fresh HMAC on every mint without ever holding the seed itself.\n *\n * ## Derivation (spec §3, follow verbatim)\n *\n * ```\n * hkdf      = importKey('raw', seed, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n * proofBits = deriveBits({ name:'HKDF', hash:'SHA-256',\n *                          salt: utf8(BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN),\n *                          info: utf8(JSON.stringify([BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN, vaultId, brokerId])) },\n *                        hkdf, 256)\n * proofKey  = importKey('raw', proofBits, { name:'HMAC', hash:'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n * proof     = base64(sign('HMAC', proofKey, utf8(canonical)))\n * ```\n *\n * `BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN` is both the HKDF salt and the first `info` array\n * element (the injective-JSON-array convention `deriveClassifyIndexKey`\n * established — see `classify/bidx.ts`). `BROKER_PROOF_VERSION` is the\n * separate MAC version tag, the first element of the `canonical` array.\n *\n * ## Canonical (spec §2 step 3)\n *\n * `JSON.stringify([BROKER_PROOF_VERSION, vaultId, endpointOrigin, brokerId,\n * profile ?? '', instancePid ?? '', challenge, expiresAt])` — every binding\n * field folded into ONE MAC input:\n *  - `vaultId` (V1), `challenge` (V3), `expiresAt` (V4) — verbatim strings,\n *    never reparsed/reformatted (F8): a byte-identical ISO string is\n *    required, so e.g. `Z` vs `+00:00` for the same instant fails.\n *  - `profile ?? ''` (F1) — a proof captured at one profile cannot be\n *    replayed at another.\n *  - `endpointOrigin` (F4) — a proof cannot be relayed to a different broker\n *    endpoint reusing the same `brokerId`.\n *  - `instancePid ?? ''` (F7) — an EMPTY STRING `instancePid` is forbidden in\n *    both {@link computeBrokerProof} and {@link verifyBrokerProof}: absent\n *    (the field omitted) and `''` must stay distinguishable, or `?? ''`\n *    would alias \"no instance\" onto a real registered instance.\n *\n * ## Verify order (spec §3, non-negotiable, F2/F6)\n *\n * {@link verifyBrokerProof} MUST, in this exact order: (1) burn the challenge\n * via `consumeChallenge` FIRST and short-circuit `false` before any MAC work\n * (F2 — burn-on-presentation, not burn-on-success); (2) recompute the\n * canonical and compare with `crypto.subtle.verify('HMAC', …)` — portable,\n * constant-time, never a manual byte compare or Node `timingSafeEqual` (F6);\n * (3) assert `now < expiresAt` — the client clock is never trusted, so this\n * check only matters once the MAC (which covers `expiresAt`) has verified.\n *\n * ## Zeroing (F5)\n *\n * `seed` and the transient HKDF output are raw, durable secret material —\n * the `recovery.ts:276-307` `try{}finally{secret.fill(0)}` discipline, not\n * the ephemeral-CEK happy-path zeroing elsewhere. {@link computeBrokerProof}\n * zeroes the `seed` argument in a `finally` on every path including a throw;\n * {@link deriveBrokerProofKey} zeroes its own transient HKDF-output bytes the\n * same way. {@link deriveBrokerProofBits} does not zero `seed` — it exists\n * so the party layer can register the raw bits at one-time enrol (the value\n * that must survive the call to be base64-encoded and POSTed).\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { base64ToBuffer, bufferToBase64 } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../errors.js'\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n/** HKDF salt domain for the broker proof key — also the first `info` array element. */\nexport const BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN = 'noydb-broker-proof'\n\n/** MAC version tag — the first element of the `canonical` array signed/verified. */\nexport const BROKER_PROOF_VERSION = 'noydb-broker-proof-v1'\n\n/** Default challenge TTL (spec §2 step 2: \"TTL ≤ 60 s\"). */\nconst DEFAULT_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 60_000\n\n/** The canonical-binding fields a client supplies alongside `vaultId`/`brokerId` (spec §2 step 3). */\nexport interface BrokerProofCanonicalParts {\n  readonly endpointOrigin: string\n  readonly profile?: string | undefined\n  readonly instancePid?: string | undefined\n  readonly challenge: string\n  readonly expiresAt: string\n}\n\n/** A freshly-minted, server-random single-use challenge (spec §2 step 2). */\nexport interface IssuedChallenge {\n  readonly challenge: string\n  readonly expiresAt: string\n}\n\n/** Arguments the broker host passes to verify a submitted proof (spec §3). */\nexport interface VerifyBrokerProofArgs {\n  /**\n   * Atomically test-and-delete the challenge, returning whether it was still\n   * fresh (unconsumed and unexpired-from-the-store's-perspective). MUST burn\n   * on presentation, not on successful verification (F2).\n   */\n  readonly consumeChallenge: (challenge: string) => Promise<boolean>\n  /** The registered proof key's raw bytes, already KMS-unwrapped by the host (§7). */\n  readonly registeredProofKey: Uint8Array\n  readonly vaultId: string\n  readonly endpointOrigin: string\n  readonly brokerId: string\n  readonly profile?: string | undefined\n  readonly instancePid?: string | undefined\n  readonly challenge: string\n  readonly expiresAt: string\n  /** base64(HMAC-SHA-256(proofKey, canonical)), as submitted by the client. */\n  readonly proof: string\n}\n\n/** Build the canonical MAC input verbatim — never reparses/reformats a field (F8). */\nfunction buildCanonical(vaultId: string, brokerId: string, parts: BrokerProofCanonicalParts): string {\n  return JSON.stringify([\n    BROKER_PROOF_VERSION,\n    vaultId,\n    parts.endpointOrigin,\n    brokerId,\n    parts.profile ?? '',\n    parts.instancePid ?? '',\n    parts.challenge,\n    parts.expiresAt,\n  ])\n}\n\n/**\n * The HKDF step: derive the 256-bit proof bits from the `_broker` seed,\n * domain-separated per `(vaultId, brokerId)`. Returns the raw bits — the\n * value registered with the broker host once at enrol (spec §2 step 2/3).\n * Does not mutate or zero `seed`; the caller owns the seed's lifecycle.\n */\nexport async function deriveBrokerProofBits(\n  seed: Uint8Array,\n  vaultId: string,\n  brokerId: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', seed as BufferSource, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN)\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN, vaultId, brokerId]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256)\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the steady-state, non-extractable `['sign']` HMAC proof key from\n * the `_broker` seed. Zeroes the transient HKDF-output bytes in a `finally`\n * once the key has been imported (F5) — the raw bits never leave this\n * function in usable form after import.\n */\nexport async function deriveBrokerProofKey(\n  seed: Uint8Array,\n  vaultId: string,\n  brokerId: string,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const proofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(seed, vaultId, brokerId)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.importKey('raw', proofBits as BufferSource, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n  } finally {\n    proofBits.fill(0)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose derive + sign for the client: re-derive the proof key from the\n * seed and sign the canonical over `canonicalParts` (spec §2 step 3).\n *\n * Rejects an empty-string `instancePid` (F7 — absent is fine, `''` is not).\n * Zeroes the `seed` argument in a `finally` on EVERY path including a throw\n * (F5, durable-secret discipline) — the transient HKDF bits are zeroed one\n * layer down, inside {@link deriveBrokerProofKey}.\n */\nexport async function computeBrokerProof(\n  seed: Uint8Array,\n  vaultId: string,\n  brokerId: string,\n  canonicalParts: BrokerProofCanonicalParts,\n): Promise<string> {\n  try {\n    if (canonicalParts.instancePid === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError(\n        \"computeBrokerProof: instancePid must not be an empty string — omit the field entirely for \" +\n          \"'no instance' (F7); '' would alias onto a registered instance.\",\n      )\n    }\n    const canonical = buildCanonical(vaultId, brokerId, canonicalParts)\n    const key = await deriveBrokerProofKey(seed, vaultId, brokerId)\n    const mac = await subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(canonical) as BufferSource)\n    return bufferToBase64(new Uint8Array(mac))\n  } finally {\n    seed.fill(0)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Host-side nonce mint: 32 random bytes, base64-encoded, plus an ISO\n * `expiresAt` at most `ttlMs` (default 60 s) in the future. The caller\n * (the broker host) persists both returned strings **verbatim** and MACs\n * those exact bytes on verify — never a reparsed/reformatted copy (F8).\n */\nexport function issueChallenge(opts?: { ttlMs?: number }): IssuedChallenge {\n  const ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS\n  const bytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  return {\n    challenge: bufferToBase64(bytes),\n    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + ttlMs).toISOString(),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a submitted broker proof. Order is NON-NEGOTIABLE (spec §3):\n *\n * 1. `await consumeChallenge(challenge)` FIRST — burn-and-check-fresh; a\n *    not-fresh (already-consumed or unknown) challenge short-circuits to\n *    `false` before any MAC work (F2).\n * 2. Empty-string `instancePid` is rejected (F7), then the canonical is\n *    recomputed over the verbatim `endpointOrigin`/`brokerId`/`profile`/\n *    `instancePid`/`challenge`/`expiresAt` and compared via\n *    `crypto.subtle.verify('HMAC', …)` — portable, constant-time, never a\n *    manual compare or Node `timingSafeEqual` (F6).\n * 3. `now < expiresAt` — the client clock is never trusted; `expiresAt`\n *    rides inside the already-verified MAC (F4/F8).\n */\nexport async function verifyBrokerProof(args: VerifyBrokerProofArgs): Promise<boolean> {\n  const fresh = await args.consumeChallenge(args.challenge)\n  if (!fresh) return false\n\n  if (args.instancePid === '') return false\n\n  const canonical = buildCanonical(args.vaultId, args.brokerId, {\n    endpointOrigin: args.endpointOrigin,\n    profile: args.profile,\n    instancePid: args.instancePid,\n    challenge: args.challenge,\n    expiresAt: args.expiresAt,\n  })\n  const key = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    args.registeredProofKey as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['verify'],\n  )\n  const ok = await subtle.verify(\n    'HMAC',\n    key,\n    base64ToBuffer(args.proof) as BufferSource,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(canonical) as BufferSource,\n  )\n  if (!ok) return false\n\n  return Date.now() < 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