@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.2 → 0.6.0-pre.21

package/dist/chunk-RKKORO4M.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-lookup/embeddings/cosine.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/descriptor.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/vector-set.ts","../src/with-lookup/embeddings/vec-id.ts","../src/with-lookup/search/collection-facade.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Cosine similarity in [-1,1]; 0 on zero-norm or length mismatch (no NaN). (L2) */\nexport function cosine(a: Float32Array | number[], b: Float32Array | number[]): number {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return 0\n  let dot = 0, na = 0, nb = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {\n    const x = a[i]!, y = b[i]!\n    dot += x * y; na += x * x; nb += y * y\n  }\n  if (na === 0 || nb === 0) return 0\n  return dot / (Math.sqrt(na) * Math.sqrt(nb))\n}\n","/** Per-collection embedding config (L2). The encode hook is host/remote — no bundled model. */\nimport { getAtPath } from '../../via/i18n/core.js'\n\nexport interface EmbeddingDescriptor {\n  readonly source: string | readonly string[]\n  readonly encode: (text: string) => Promise<Float32Array>\n  readonly dim: number\n  readonly model: string\n}\n\n/** Concatenate the record's source-field text (skips empties; supports nested/[]-wildcard paths). */\nexport function embeddingSourceText(record: Record<string, unknown>, source: string | readonly string[]): string {\n  const fields = typeof source === 'string' ? [source] : source\n  const parts: string[] = []\n  for (const f of fields) {\n    for (const leaf of getAtPath(record, f)) {\n      if (typeof leaf === 'string' && leaf !== '') parts.push(leaf)\n    }\n  }\n  return parts.join(' ')\n}\n","/** In-memory vector set for L2 semantic retrieval. Loaded once per session from\n *  decrypted _vec sidecars (injected loader), brute-force cosine kNN, model-guarded. */\nimport { cosine } from './cosine.js'\nimport { EmbeddingModelMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface StoredVector { readonly id: string; readonly vec: Float32Array; readonly model: string }\nexport interface VectorHit { readonly id: string; readonly score: number }\n\nexport class VectorSet {\n  private vectors: StoredVector[] | undefined\n  get loaded(): boolean { return this.vectors !== undefined }\n\n  async ensureLoaded(load: () => Promise<StoredVector[]>): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.vectors === undefined) this.vectors = await load()\n  }\n\n  markDirty(): void { this.vectors = undefined }\n\n  cosineTopK(query: Float32Array, k: number, opts: { minScore?: number; expectModel?: string } = {}): VectorHit[] {\n    const all = this.vectors ?? []\n    const minScore = opts.minScore ?? -Infinity\n    const hits: VectorHit[] = []\n    for (const v of all) {\n      if (opts.expectModel !== undefined && v.model !== opts.expectModel) {\n        throw new EmbeddingModelMismatchError(opts.expectModel, v.model)\n      }\n      const score = cosine(query, v.vec)\n      if (score >= minScore) hits.push({ id: v.id, score })\n    }\n    hits.sort((a, b) => b.score - a.score)\n    return hits.slice(0, k)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Collection-namespaced `_vec` side-car ids (#726).\n *\n * `_vec` embedding side-cars used to be keyed by the bare record id,\n * vault-wide — two collections sharing a record id shared one `_vec` row.\n * This was verified to be a clobber/crash bug, NOT a confidentiality leak:\n * every collection has its own DEK, and AES-GCM auth-tag verification means\n * decrypting a foreign collection's `_vec` row under the wrong DEK throws\n * `TamperedError` rather than returning wrong plaintext — no disclosure\n * mechanism exists. The real bug was id collision: a same-id write/forget in\n * one collection could clobber or delete the other collection's row, and a\n * collection whose `similarTo()` / cold semantic `retrieve()` encountered a\n * foreign same-id row crashed with an uncaught `TamperedError` (a DoS). The\n * store-collection bucket stays the literal `'_vec'`; the id becomes\n * composite: `${collection}/${recordId}`. Mirrors `encodeIdxId`\n * (`../indexing/persisted-indexes.js`).\n *\n * Decode is deliberately NOT split-on-`/`: the collection is always known\n * at the decode site (`ctx.name`), so `decodeVecId` strips that known\n * prefix — correct even when `recordId` itself contains `/`.\n *\n * Precondition: `collection` itself must not contain `/` — otherwise\n * `${collection}/${recordId}` is ambiguous (e.g. collection `'a'` would\n * misattribute collection `'a/b'`'s rows via prefix match in `isVecIdFor`).\n * Collection names are NOT currently restricted to a `/`-free charset by\n * `vault.collection()`, so `encodeVecId` enforces the precondition itself,\n * failing loud at the write boundary rather than silently misencoding.\n */\n\n/**\n * Encode the `_vec` side-car id for a (collection, recordId) pair.\n * Format: `<collection>/<recordId>` — no escaping; `recordId` may contain `/`.\n *\n * Throws if `collection` contains `/`: that would make the composite id\n * ambiguous against `isVecIdFor`'s prefix match (collection `'a'` would\n * appear to own collection `'a/b'`'s rows), reintroducing the clobber/crash\n * risk the namespacing fix exists to close.\n */\nexport function encodeVecId(collection: string, recordId: string): string {\n  if (collection.includes('/')) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `encodeVecId: collection name \"${collection}\" must not contain \"/\" — ` +\n        `it would make the \"${collection}/${recordId}\" _vec id ambiguous against another collection's rows.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return `${collection}/${recordId}`\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a `_vec` id back to the bare record id, given the KNOWN owning\n * collection — strips the `<collection>/` prefix rather than splitting on\n * `/`, so a `recordId` containing `/` round-trips correctly. Returns `null`\n * if `vecId` does not belong to `collection`.\n */\nexport function decodeVecId(collection: string, vecId: string): string | null {\n  const prefix = `${collection}/`\n  if (!vecId.startsWith(prefix)) return null\n  return vecId.slice(prefix.length)\n}\n\n/** Predicate form of {@link decodeVecId} — used to filter `list()` results. */\nexport function isVecIdFor(collection: string, vecId: string): boolean {\n  return vecId.startsWith(`${collection}/`)\n}\n","/**\n * Collection-level search / retrieval (`search` / `retrieve` / `similarTo` +\n * the lexical-index build/flush/warm machinery).\n *\n * This is the retrieval surface: a pure client-side lexical scan\n * (`search`), the persisted-or-in-memory inverted-index lifecycle\n * (`flushIndex` / `warmIndex` / `buildRetrievalDocs` + the dict-label / blob-\n * filename resolvers that feed it), and the lexical / semantic / hybrid\n * `retrieve` fan-out plus raw-vector kNN (`similarTo`). None of it touches the\n * write path — it reads the live eager cache and the encrypted `_vec` / `_ftindex`\n * side-cars.\n *\n * Every function takes a small {@link SearchContext} instead of `this`,\n * mirroring the `record-keys/` siblings.\n *\n * The `cache` is the SAME `Map` reference `Collection` owns (passed by\n * reference, never copied) so the index always builds over the live working\n * set. {@link buildPersistedIndexCallbacks} is special: it is invoked from the\n * `Collection` constructor *before* `this.codec` exists, so it takes a context\n * THUNK and resolves the context lazily at each callback invocation.\n *\n * Internal service — not exported as a `@noy-db/hub/*` subpath.\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { RecordCodec } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { stripI18nFilled, type I18nTextDescriptor } from '../../via/i18n/core.js'\nimport { isStaticDictDescriptor, type DictKeyDescriptor, type StaticDictDescriptor, type DictionaryHandle } from '../../via/i18n/dictionary.js'\nimport type { BlobSet } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-set.js'\nimport type { BlobFieldsConfig } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-compaction.js'\nimport type { Query } from '../../kernel/query/index.js'\nimport { embeddingSourceText, type VectorSet, type EmbeddingDescriptor, type StoredVector } from '../embeddings/index.js'\nimport { encodeVecId, decodeVecId, isVecIdFor } from '../embeddings/vec-id.js'\nimport { EmbeddingDimMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { liveRecordIsElevated } from '../../kernel/tier-visibility.js'\nimport { searchScan, fuseRetrieval, type SearchOptions, type SearchResult } from './index.js'\nimport type { IndexStore } from './index-store.js'\nimport type { PersistedIndexCallbacks } from './persisted-index-store.js'\nimport { extractSnippet } from './snippet.js'\nimport { buildStringFieldEntries, buildI18nFieldEntries, buildDictKeyFieldEntries, buildBlobFieldEntries } from './build-docs.js'\nimport type { IndexDoc, IndexHit } from './inverted-index.js'\nimport type { RetrieveOptions, RetrieveHit } from './retrieve-types.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving search/retrieval methods touched on `this.*`. */\nexport interface SearchContext<T> {\n  /** Collection name — error context + `_ftindex` row key. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /** Vault namespace the side-cars (`_vec`, `_ftindex`) live under. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** The record codec — decrypts the `_vec` / `_ftindex` side-car bodies. */\n  readonly codec: RecordCodec<T>\n  /** The eager working-set cache (SHARED `Map` reference, never copied). */\n  readonly cache: Map<string, { record: T; version: number }>\n  /** True in lazy mode — search/retrieve/warm require eager mode. */\n  readonly lazy: boolean\n  /** Declared text-index fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly textIndexes: readonly string[] | undefined\n  /** Declared i18n fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly i18nFields: Record<string, I18nTextDescriptor> | undefined\n  /** Declared dictionary-key fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly dictKeyFields: Record<string, DictKeyDescriptor | StaticDictDescriptor> | undefined\n  /** Declared blob fields, or undefined. */\n  readonly blobFields: BlobFieldsConfig | undefined\n  /** Dictionary handle resolver (dynamic dict-key labels), or undefined. */\n  readonly getDictionary: ((name: string) => Promise<DictionaryHandle>) | undefined\n  /** The lexical inverted-index store (in-memory or persisted), or undefined. */\n  readonly searchIndexStore: IndexStore | undefined\n  /** The vector set for semantic retrieval, or undefined. */\n  readonly vectorSet: VectorSet | undefined\n  /** The embeddings descriptor, or undefined. */\n  readonly embeddings: EmbeddingDescriptor | undefined\n  /** Hydrate the eager cache before reading it. */\n  ensureHydrated(): Promise<void>\n  /** Open the blob facade for a record (used to list indexed blob filenames). */\n  blob(id: string): BlobSet\n}\n\n/**\n * Client-side lexical scan over the live eager cache. Eager mode only;\n * nothing searchable is written to the store.\n */\nexport async function search<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, field: string, query: string, opts: SearchOptions = {}): Promise<SearchResult<T>[]> {\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": search() (scan mode) requires eager mode (prefetch: true). ` +\n        `A store-usable blind index for lazy / at-scale search is a separate gated opt-in (#308).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const entries: { id: string; record: T }[] = []\n  // Strip the internal densify marker from the user-facing records.\n  // Non-mutating: never touches the cached record object. The search index\n  // is built over the same (marker-free) record, which is fine — the marker\n  // is never a searchable field.\n  for (const [id, e] of ctx.cache) entries.push({ id, record: stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T })\n  return searchScan(entries, field, query, opts)\n}\n\n/** L1 — build IndexDoc[] for the configured text fields over the live cache. */\nexport function buildRetrievalDocs<T>(\n  ctx: SearchContext<T>,\n  labelMaps: Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>,\n  blobFilenames: Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>,\n  only?: readonly string[],\n): IndexDoc[] {\n  const docs: IndexDoc[] = []\n  for (const [id, e] of ctx.cache) {\n    const rec = stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>)\n    const fields = buildStringFieldEntries(rec, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only)\n    if (ctx.i18nFields) fields.push(...buildI18nFieldEntries(rec, ctx.i18nFields, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only))\n    if (ctx.dictKeyFields) fields.push(...buildDictKeyFieldEntries(rec, ctx.dictKeyFields, labelMaps, ctx.textIndexes ?? [], only))\n    const blobNames = blobFilenames.get(id)\n    if (blobNames) fields.push(...buildBlobFieldEntries(blobNames))\n    if (fields.length > 0) docs.push({ id, fields })\n  }\n  return docs\n}\n\n/** L1 — true iff any configured text index is also a blob field (gates ALL slot I/O). */\nexport function hasIndexedBlobFields<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, only?: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  if (!ctx.blobFields || !ctx.textIndexes) return false\n  const fields = only ? ctx.textIndexes.filter((f) => only.includes(f)) : ctx.textIndexes\n  return fields.some((f) => f in ctx.blobFields!)\n}\n\n/**\n * L1 — resolve `recordId -> (blobField -> filenames[])` by listing slots\n * for the configured blob fields of each cached record. Blob slot metadata is\n * NOT inline on the record: it lives in a separate `_blob_slots_*` collection,\n * so this costs ONE `blob(id).list()` (a `listSlots`) per record at build time\n * — the heaviest indexing source. Fully gated by {@link hasIndexedBlobFields};\n * non-blob (and blob-but-not-indexed) collections do ZERO slot I/O.\n */\nasync function resolveBlobFilenames<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, only?: readonly string[]): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>> {\n  const out = new Map<string, Map<string, string[]>>()\n  if (!hasIndexedBlobFields(ctx, only)) return out\n  const indexed = (only ? ctx.textIndexes!.filter((f) => only.includes(f)) : ctx.textIndexes!)\n    .filter((f) => f in ctx.blobFields!)\n  const indexedSet = new Set(indexed)\n  for (const id of ctx.cache.keys()) {\n    let slots\n    try {\n      slots = await ctx.blob(id).list()\n    } catch {\n      continue\n    }\n    let byField: Map<string, string[]> | undefined\n    for (const slot of slots) {\n      if (!indexedSet.has(slot.name) || !slot.filename) continue\n      if (!byField) { byField = new Map(); out.set(id, byField) }\n      const names = byField.get(slot.name)\n      if (names) names.push(slot.filename)\n      else byField.set(slot.name, [slot.filename])\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** L1 — field -> (key -> {locale->label}) for dictKey fields; static from table, dynamic via getDictionary().list(). */\nasync function resolveDictLabelMaps<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>> {\n  const maps = new Map<string, Map<string, Record<string, string>>>()\n  if (!ctx.dictKeyFields || !ctx.textIndexes) return maps\n  for (const field of ctx.textIndexes) {\n    const desc = ctx.dictKeyFields[field]\n    if (!desc) continue\n    const m = new Map<string, Record<string, string>>()\n    if (isStaticDictDescriptor(desc)) {\n      for (const [key, labels] of Object.entries(desc.table)) m.set(key, labels as Record<string, string>)\n    } else {\n      if (ctx.getDictionary) {\n        const handle = await ctx.getDictionary(desc.name)\n        for (const e of await handle.list()) m.set(e.key, e.labels)\n      }\n    }\n    maps.set(field, m)\n  }\n  return maps\n}\n\n/** L1.5 — force-persist the lexical index now (e.g. on save/idle). Persists only when textIndexPersist is enabled; a no-op otherwise. */\nexport async function flushIndex<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) return\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const labelMaps = await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.flush?.()\n}\n\n/** L2 — load + decrypt all _vec sidecars into StoredVector[] for the VectorSet. */\nfunction buildVectorLoad<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): () => Promise<StoredVector[]> {\n  return async () => {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_vec')\n    const out: StoredVector[] = []\n    for (const vecId of ids) {\n      // #726: _vec is a vault-wide bucket namespaced by collection prefix —\n      // skip rows belonging to other collections before touching this one's.\n      if (!isVecIdFor(ctx.name, vecId)) continue\n      const id = decodeVecId(ctx.name, vecId)!\n      // #721 defense-in-depth: a _vec row carries no _tier of its own; the purge\n      // on elevate is best-effort and cannot reach a legacy sidecar, so gate on\n      // the owning record's live tier. Envelope peek, no decryption.\n      if (await liveRecordIsElevated(ctx.adapter, ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)) continue\n      const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_vec', vecId)\n      if (!env) continue\n      // #726 fails-safe: a row can pass isVecIdFor's prefix filter yet still\n      // be undecryptable under THIS collection's DEK — a surviving legacy\n      // bare-id row whose record id happens to start with `<thisCollection>/`,\n      // or plain corruption. _vec sidecars are derived, re-derivable\n      // artifacts (embedOnWrite regenerates them on the record's next put()),\n      // so best-effort skip is correct: never let one poison row crash\n      // similarTo()/retrieve() for the whole collection.\n      let body: string | null\n      try {\n        body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString(env)\n      } catch {\n        continue\n      }\n      if (body === null) continue\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as { vec: number[]; model: string }\n      out.push({ id, vec: new Float32Array(parsed.vec), model: parsed.model })\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * L1.5 — build the PersistedIndexCallbacks bridge: crypto lives here\n * (collection has getDEK / encryptJsonString / decryptJsonString / adapter),\n * the index store itself is crypto-free.\n *\n * Fingerprint encoding: body-wrap approach — save(json, fp) stores\n * JSON.stringify({ fp, idx: json }) as the encrypted body so the standard\n * EncryptedEnvelope shape is never extended. load() decrypts and JSON.parses\n * the wrapper back out.\n *\n * Cache shape: ctx.cache stores { record, version } — currentFingerprint()\n * iterates over e.version.\n *\n * NOTE: this factory is invoked from the `Collection` constructor *before*\n * `this.codec` is assigned, so it takes a context THUNK and resolves the\n * context lazily inside each callback — by the time a callback actually runs,\n * the codec and cache are fully wired.\n */\nexport function buildPersistedIndexCallbacks<T>(provideCtx: () => SearchContext<T>): PersistedIndexCallbacks {\n  const FT = '_ftindex'\n  return {\n    load: async () => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name)\n      if (!env) return null\n      const body = await ctx.codec.decryptJsonString(env)\n      if (body === null) return null\n      try {\n        const wrapped = JSON.parse(body) as { fp: { count: number; maxVersion: number }; idx: string }\n        return { json: wrapped.idx, fingerprint: wrapped.fp }\n      } catch {\n        return null\n      }\n    },\n    save: async (json, fp, isStale) => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      const body = JSON.stringify({ fp, idx: json })\n      const env = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString(body, fp.count)\n      // #725 review: a purge (removePersisted) can land while the encrypt above was\n      // in flight — check right before the write and skip it rather than resurrect a\n      // purged/forgotten record's blob. PersistedIndexStore's own post-save epoch\n      // check is the backstop for every other ordering (incl. a purge landing during\n      // this very put).\n      if (isStale()) return\n      await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name, env)\n    },\n    remove: async () => { const ctx = provideCtx(); await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, FT, ctx.name) },\n    currentFingerprint: () => {\n      const ctx = provideCtx()\n      let maxVersion = 0\n      for (const e of ctx.cache.values()) if (e.version > maxVersion) maxVersion = e.version\n      return { count: ctx.cache.size, maxVersion }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/** L1 — pre-build the lexical index (e.g. on open) so the first retrieve() pays no build scan. */\nexport async function warmIndex<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) return\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": warmIndex() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const built = ctx.searchIndexStore.built\n  const labelMaps = built ? new Map() : await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = built ? new Map() : await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n}\n\n/** Retrieval. mode: 'lexical' (default) | 'semantic' (L2) | 'hybrid' (L3). */\nexport async function retrieve<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T> = {}): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  const hits =\n    opts.mode === 'semantic' ? await retrieveSemantic(ctx, query, opts)\n    : opts.mode === 'hybrid' ? await retrieveHybrid(ctx, query, opts)\n    : await retrieveLexical(ctx, query, opts)\n  return opts.within ? applyWithin(hits, opts.within) : hits\n}\n\n/** L3 — keep only hits whose id matches the structured query, re-rank 1-based. */\nfunction applyWithin<T>(hits: RetrieveHit<T>[], within: Query<T>): RetrieveHit<T>[] {\n  const ids = new Set(within._idArray())\n  return hits.filter(h => ids.has(h.id)).map((h, i) => ({ ...h, rank: i + 1 }))\n}\n\n/** L1 — client-side lexical retrieval; ranked { id, score, field, snippet, locale? }. */\nasync function retrieveLexical<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore) {\n    throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires a textIndexes config.`)\n  }\n  if (ctx.lazy) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`,\n    )\n  }\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  const built = ctx.searchIndexStore.built\n  const labelMaps = built ? new Map() : await resolveDictLabelMaps(ctx)\n  const blobFilenames = built ? new Map() : await resolveBlobFilenames(ctx)\n  const index = await ctx.searchIndexStore.ensureBuilt(() => buildRetrievalDocs(ctx, labelMaps, blobFilenames))\n  const hits = index.query(query, {\n    ...(opts.limit !== undefined ? { limit: opts.limit } : {}),\n    ...(opts.match ? { match: opts.match } : {}),\n    ...(opts.prefix ? { prefix: opts.prefix } : {}),\n    ...(opts.fields ? { fields: opts.fields } : {}),\n  })\n  const window = opts.snippetWindow ?? 80\n  return hits.map((h: IndexHit, i: number) => {\n    const base: RetrieveHit<T> = {\n      id: h.id,\n      score: h.score,\n      rank: i + 1,\n      field: h.field,\n      snippet: extractSnippet(h.text, h.offset, window),\n      ...(h.locale !== undefined ? { locale: h.locale } : {}),\n      ...(opts.includeRecord\n        ? (() => {\n            const e = ctx.cache.get(h.id)\n            return e ? { record: stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T } : {}\n          })()\n        : {}),\n    }\n    return base\n  })\n}\n\n/** L3 — hybrid: fuse lexical (L1) + semantic (L2) by RRF. Requires embeddings. */\nasync function retrieveHybrid<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) {\n    throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve({mode:'hybrid'}) requires an embeddings config.`)\n  }\n  const [lex, sem] = await Promise.all([\n    retrieveLexical(ctx, query, opts),\n    retrieveSemantic(ctx, query, opts),\n  ])\n  return fuseRetrieval([lex, sem], opts.limit !== undefined ? { limit: opts.limit } : {})\n}\n\n/** L2 — semantic branch of retrieve(): encode query → similarTo(). */\nasync function retrieveSemantic<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, query: string, opts: RetrieveOptions<T>): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve({mode:'semantic'}) requires an embeddings config.`)\n  if (ctx.lazy) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": retrieve() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`)\n  const qVec = await ctx.embeddings.encode(query)\n  return similarTo(ctx, qVec, {\n    ...(opts.limit !== undefined ? { k: opts.limit } : {}),\n    ...(opts.minScore !== undefined ? { minScore: opts.minScore } : {}),\n    ...(opts.includeRecord ? { includeRecord: true } : {}),\n  })\n}\n\n/** L2 — raw-vector kNN over the encrypted vector set (decrypted in the trusted tier).\n *  Snippet is '' for vector hits in v1 (semantic match isn't span-located). */\nexport async function similarTo<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, vector: Float32Array, opts: { k?: number; minScore?: number; includeRecord?: boolean } = {}): Promise<RetrieveHit<T>[]> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings || !ctx.vectorSet) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": similarTo() requires an embeddings config.`)\n  if (ctx.lazy) throw new Error(`Collection \"${ctx.name}\": similarTo() requires eager mode (prefetch: true).`)\n  await ctx.ensureHydrated()\n  await ctx.vectorSet.ensureLoaded(buildVectorLoad(ctx))\n  const hits = ctx.vectorSet.cosineTopK(vector, opts.k ?? 10, {\n    ...(opts.minScore !== undefined ? { minScore: opts.minScore } : {}),\n    expectModel: ctx.embeddings.model,\n  })\n  return hits.map((h, i) => {\n    const base: RetrieveHit<T> = { id: h.id, score: h.score, rank: i + 1, field: '(vector)', snippet: '' }\n    if (opts.includeRecord) { const e = ctx.cache.get(h.id); if (e) (base as { record?: T }).record = stripI18nFilled(e.record as Record<string, unknown>) as T }\n    return base\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * L2 — the embedding write-hook: derive a record's embedding vector at\n * write and persist it as the encrypted `_vec` side-car. Routed through the\n * search strategy so it runs only when `withSearch()` is opted in — computing\n * vectors that no gated `similarTo` / semantic `retrieve` could query would be\n * dead weight, so the compute is paired with the search capability. The caller\n * (`Collection.put`) only invokes this when `embeddings` is declared.\n */\nexport async function embedOnWrite<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>, id: string, record: T, version: number): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) return\n  const text = embeddingSourceText(record as Record<string, unknown>, ctx.embeddings.source)\n  const vec = await ctx.embeddings.encode(text)\n  if (vec.length !== ctx.embeddings.dim) throw new EmbeddingDimMismatchError('embeddings', ctx.embeddings.dim, vec.length)\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ vec: Array.from(vec), model: ctx.embeddings.model, dim: ctx.embeddings.dim })\n  const vecEnv = await ctx.codec.encryptJsonString(body, version)\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_vec', encodeVecId(ctx.name, id), vecEnv)\n  ctx.vectorSet?.markDirty()\n}\n\n/**\n * Force-re-derive every eligible tier-0 record's `_vec` sidecar once (#788).\n * Opt-in bulk repair for the #726 re-namespace: legacy bare-id rows are\n * unreachable to `buildVectorLoad` (it only recognises `<collection>/<id>`\n * keys) and otherwise self-heal only when a record is next `put()` — this\n * lets an adopter recover recall immediately instead of waiting on writes.\n *\n * **Skips elevated records** (`liveRecordIsElevated`) rather than refusing\n * the whole walk — the OPPOSITE of `_applyCutoverTransform`'s\n * `assertCutoverTierSafe` refuse-whole-batch precedent. An elevated record is\n * SUPPOSED to have no `_vec` (`syncTierSearch` purges it on elevate);\n * re-embedding one here would write searchable plaintext-derived data above\n * tier 0. Load-bearing: never write a `_vec` row for an elevated record.\n *\n * Tombstones, delete markers, and a raw `get` racing a delete between `list`\n * and `get` all decrypt to `null` (`decryptRecord` already folds\n * tombstone/delete-marker into that null) and are skipped the same way.\n * Unconditional re-derive, no already-migrated check — safe to re-run after\n * a partial failure (each id is independently idempotent).\n */\nexport async function rebuildEmbeddings<T>(ctx: SearchContext<T>): Promise<{ rebuilt: number; skipped: number }> {\n  if (!ctx.embeddings) return { rebuilt: 0, skipped: 0 }\n  const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, ctx.name)\n  let rebuilt = 0\n  let skipped = 0\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    if (await liveRecordIsElevated(ctx.adapter, ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)) { skipped++; continue }\n    const env = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, ctx.name, id)\n    if (!env) { skipped++; continue }\n    const decoded = await ctx.codec.decryptRecord(env, { id })\n    if (decoded === null) { skipped++; continue }\n    await embedOnWrite(ctx, id, decoded, env._v ?? 1)\n    rebuilt++\n  }\n  return { rebuilt, skipped }\n}\n\n/**\n * Sync the collection's SEARCH artifacts after a tier move (#721). Both the\n * lexical `_ftindex` blob and the `_vec/<id>` embedding are encrypted under\n * the tier-0 DEK and hold the record's derived plaintext (full field text /\n * a text-invertible vector), so leaving them means elevation never hid what\n * the record was searchable by — the `forget()` precedent, unapplied to\n * elevate. `null` → the record left tier 0: purge its `_vec` sidecar (mirrors\n * `Collection._purgeVector`), and invalidate the `_ftindex` blob (mirrors\n * `Collection._purgeSearchIndex`: deletes the persisted blob when persisted,\n * else drops the in-memory index) so the next `retrieve()` rebuilds from the\n * elevated-free `ctx.cache`. A record → it is tier-0 again: re-embed it via\n * {@link embedOnWrite}, then invalidate `_ftindex` so the rebuild includes it\n * again. No-op fast when the collection has neither a lexical index nor a\n * vector set.\n */\nexport async function syncTierSearch<T>(\n  ctx: SearchContext<T>,\n  id: string,\n  record: T | null,\n  version?: number,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ctx.searchIndexStore && !ctx.vectorSet) return\n  if (record === null) {\n    await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, '_vec', encodeVecId(ctx.name, id))\n    ctx.vectorSet?.markDirty()\n  } else {\n    await embedOnWrite(ctx, id, record, version ?? 1)\n  }\n  const store = ctx.searchIndexStore\n  if (store && 'removePersisted' in store) await (store as { removePersisted(): Promise<void> }).removePersisted()\n  else store?.markDirty()\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AACO,SAAS,OAAO,GAA4B,GAAoC;AACrF,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,MAAI,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK;AAC1B,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,GAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACxB,WAAO,IAAI;AAAG,UAAM,IAAI;AAAG,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE;AAC5C;;;ACCO,SAAS,oBAAoB,QAAiC,QAA4C;AAC/G,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI;AACvD,QAAM,QAAkB,CAAC;AACzB,aAAW,KAAK,QAAQ;AACtB,eAAW,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG;AACvC,UAAI,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,SAAS,GAAI,OAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB;;;ACZO,IAAM,YAAN,MAAgB;AAAA,EACb;AAAA,EACR,IAAI,SAAkB;AAAE,WAAO,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,EAAU;AAAA,EAE1D,MAAM,aAAa,MAAoD;AACrE,QAAI,KAAK,YAAY,OAAW,MAAK,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,EAC5D;AAAA,EAEA,YAAkB;AAAE,SAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EAAU;AAAA,EAE7C,WAAW,OAAqB,GAAW,OAAoD,CAAC,GAAgB;AAC9G,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7B,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAClC,UAAM,OAAoB,CAAC;AAC3B,eAAW,KAAK,KAAK;AACnB,UAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,aAAa;AAClE,cAAM,IAAI,4BAA4B,KAAK,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,MACjE;AACA,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG;AACjC,UAAI,SAAS,SAAU,MAAK,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IACtD;AACA,SAAK,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;AACrC,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EACxB;AACF;;;ACMO,SAAS,YAAY,YAAoB,UAA0B;AACxE,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AAC5B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,iCAAiC,UAAU,oDACnB,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,GAAG,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClC;AAQO,SAAS,YAAY,YAAoB,OAA8B;AAC5E,QAAM,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU;AAC5B,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACtC,SAAO,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC;AAGO,SAAS,WAAW,YAAoB,OAAwB;AACrE,SAAO,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AAC1C;;;ACmBA,eAAsB,OAAU,KAAuB,OAAe,OAAe,OAAsB,CAAC,GAA+B;AACzI,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAEzB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AACzB,QAAM,UAAuC,CAAC;AAK9C,aAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,MAAO,SAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAiC,EAAO,CAAC;AACvH,SAAO,WAAW,SAAS,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI;AAC/C;AAGO,SAAS,mBACd,KACA,WACA,eACA,MACY;AACZ,QAAM,OAAmB,CAAC;AAC1B,aAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO;AAC/B,UAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAiC;AAC/D,UAAM,SAAS,wBAAwB,KAAK,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI;AACvE,QAAI,IAAI,WAAY,QAAO,KAAK,GAAG,sBAAsB,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAC1G,QAAI,IAAI,cAAe,QAAO,KAAK,GAAG,yBAAyB,KAAK,IAAI,eAAe,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAC9H,UAAM,YAAY,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;AACtC,QAAI,UAAW,QAAO,KAAK,GAAG,sBAAsB,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9D,QAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGO,SAAS,qBAAwB,KAAuB,MAAmC;AAChG,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,YAAa,QAAO;AAChD,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI;AAC5E,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,UAAW;AAChD;AAUA,eAAe,qBAAwB,KAAuB,MAAuE;AACnI,QAAM,MAAM,oBAAI,IAAmC;AACnD,MAAI,CAAC,qBAAqB,KAAK,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC7C,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI,YAAa,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,aAC5E,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,UAAW;AACrC,QAAM,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAClC,aAAW,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACjC,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,cAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ;AACN;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI;AACJ,eAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,UAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,SAAU;AAClD,UAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AAAE,kBAAU,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAG,YAAI,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,MAAE;AAC1D,YAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AACnC,UAAI,MAAO,OAAM,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,UAC9B,SAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAe,qBAAwB,KAAkF;AACvH,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAiD;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,YAAa,QAAO;AACnD,aAAW,SAAS,IAAI,aAAa;AACnC,UAAM,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAM;AACX,UAAM,IAAI,oBAAI,IAAoC;AAClD,QAAI,uBAAuB,IAAI,GAAG;AAChC,iBAAW,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,EAAG,GAAE,IAAI,KAAK,MAAgC;AAAA,IACrG,OAAO;AACL,UAAI,IAAI,eAAe;AACrB,cAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI;AAChD,mBAAW,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,EAAG,GAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,MAC5D;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACnB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAsB,WAAc,KAAsC;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,iBAAkB;AAC3B,QAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AACzB,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,CAAC;AAC9F,QAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AACrC;AAGA,SAAS,gBAAmB,KAAsD;AAChF,SAAO,YAAY;AACjB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD,UAAM,MAAsB,CAAC;AAC7B,eAAW,SAAS,KAAK;AAGvB,UAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,EAAG;AAClC,YAAM,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AAItC,UAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,EAAG;AACtE,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC1D,UAAI,CAAC,IAAK;AAQV,UAAI;AACJ,UAAI;AACF,eAAO,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG;AAAA,MAC9C,QAAQ;AACN;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,SAAS,KAAM;AACnB,YAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,UAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IACzE;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAoBO,SAAS,6BAAgC,YAA6D;AAC3G,QAAM,KAAK;AACX,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,YAAY;AAChB,YAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AACvB,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;AACzD,UAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO;AACjB,YAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG;AAClD,UAAI,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AAC1B,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC/B,eAAO,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,MACtD,QAAQ;AACN,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY;AACjC,YAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AACvB,YAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAC7C,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAM5D,UAAI,QAAQ,EAAG;AACf,YAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAE,YAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AAAG,YAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAE;AAAA,IAClG,oBAAoB,MAAM;AACxB,YAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AACvB,UAAI,aAAa;AACjB,iBAAW,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,EAAG,KAAI,EAAE,UAAU,WAAY,cAAa,EAAE;AAC/E,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,IAC7C;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAGA,eAAsB,UAAa,KAAsC;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,iBAAkB;AAC3B,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AACzB,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,iBAAiB;AACnC,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AACpE,QAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AACxE,QAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,CAAC;AAChG;AAGA,eAAsB,SAAY,KAAuB,OAAe,OAA2B,CAAC,GAA8B;AAChI,QAAM,OACJ,KAAK,SAAS,aAAa,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAChE,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAC9D,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI;AAC1C,SAAO,KAAK,SAAS,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACxD;AAGA,SAAS,YAAe,MAAwB,QAAoC;AAClF,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACrC,SAAO,KAAK,OAAO,OAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;AAC9E;AAGA,eAAe,gBAAmB,KAAuB,OAAe,MAAqD;AAC3H,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,kBAAkB;AACzB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,8CAA8C;AAAA,EACvF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AACzB,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,iBAAiB;AACnC,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AACpE,QAAM,gBAAgB,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AACxE,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5G,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B,GAAI,KAAK,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD,GAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1C,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/C,CAAC;AACD,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,iBAAiB;AACrC,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAa,MAAc;AAC1C,UAAM,OAAuB;AAAA,MAC3B,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACN,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,MACT,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,MACT,SAAS,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAChD,GAAI,EAAE,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACrD,GAAI,KAAK,iBACJ,MAAM;AACL,cAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;AAC5B,eAAO,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAiC,EAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACtF,GAAG,IACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACP;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,eAAe,eAAkB,KAAuB,OAAe,MAAqD;AAC1H,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,YAAY;AACnB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,6DAA6D;AAAA,EACtG;AACA,QAAM,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IACnC,gBAAgB,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,iBAAiB,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AACxF;AAGA,eAAe,iBAAoB,KAAuB,OAAe,MAAqD;AAC5H,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,WAAY,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,+DAA+D;AAC3H,MAAI,IAAI,KAAM,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,qDAAqD;AAC1G,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK;AAC9C,SAAO,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IAC1B,GAAI,KAAK,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD,GAAI,KAAK,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjE,GAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,eAAe,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACtD,CAAC;AACH;AAIA,eAAsB,UAAa,KAAuB,QAAsB,OAAmE,CAAC,GAA8B;AAChL,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,UAAW,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,+CAA+C;AAC7H,MAAI,IAAI,KAAM,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,IAAI,IAAI,sDAAsD;AAC3G,QAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AACzB,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,aAAa,gBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC;AACrD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC1D,GAAI,KAAK,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjE,aAAa,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,EAC9B,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM;AACxB,UAAM,OAAuB,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,YAAY,SAAS,GAAG;AACrG,QAAI,KAAK,eAAe;AAAE,YAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE;AAAG,UAAI,EAAG,CAAC,KAAwB,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAiC;AAAA,IAAO;AAC5J,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC;AACH;AAUA,eAAsB,aAAgB,KAAuB,IAAY,QAAW,SAAgC;AAClH,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,WAAY;AACrB,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAoB,QAAmC,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AACzF,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI;AAC5C,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM;AACvH,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;AAC1G,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO;AAC9D,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1E,MAAI,WAAW,UAAU;AAC3B;AAsBA,eAAsB,kBAAqB,KAAsE;AAC/G,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,WAAY,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE;AACrD,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI;AACtD,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,QAAI,MAAM,qBAAqB,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG;AAAE;AAAW;AAAA,IAAS;AAC5F,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AACzD,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AAAE;AAAW;AAAA,IAAS;AAChC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC;AACzD,QAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAAE;AAAW;AAAA,IAAS;AAC5C,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;AAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ;AAC5B;AAiBA,eAAsB,eACpB,KACA,IACA,QACA,SACe;AACf,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,oBAAoB,CAAC,IAAI,UAAW;AAC7C,MAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AACnB,UAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;AACrE,QAAI,WAAW,UAAU;AAAA,EAC3B,OAAO;AACL,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AAClB,MAAI,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAO,OAAO,MAA+C,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAC1G,QAAO,UAAU;AACxB;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-TAGFGKHP.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Managed-secret mode — rubber-hose-resistant vaults.\n *\n * A vault mode where the secret is machine-generated and never\n * exposed to the user, sealed under a developer-provided\n * {@link SealingKeyProvider} (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential\n * Manager, libsecret, AWS KMS, …). The user has no secret to give\n * up to coercion — they can't reveal what they don't know.\n *\n * ## Components in this file\n *\n *   - {@link SealingKeyProvider} — the interface concrete providers\n *     implement. Provider implementations live OUTSIDE hub (per-\n *     platform packages).\n *   - {@link MemorySealingKeyProvider} — in-memory test provider; uses\n *     a deterministic per-instance \"key\" so two providers with\n *     different ids cannot unseal each other's outputs.\n *   - {@link RecipientHint} — public material a sender uses to seal\n *     plaintext for a specific recipient; published by\n *     {@link RecipientSealer.publishRecipientHint} and transported\n *     out-of-band to the sender before bundle writes.\n *   - {@link RecipientSealer} — interface for asymmetric/granted\n *     providers that support recipient-target sealing (RSA-OAEP,\n *     cloud-KMS asymmetric, etc.); distinct from self-only\n *     {@link SealingKeyProvider} (macOS Keychain, WebAuthn-PRF).\n *   - {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} — in-process reference\n *     implementation of both `RecipientSealer` and\n *     `SealingKeyProvider` using real WebCrypto RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM;\n *     safe for tests and same-process sender/recipient scenarios.\n *   - {@link loadSealedSecret} / {@link saveSealedSecret} —\n *     plaintext envelope storage at `_meta/sealed-secret`.\n *     Mirrors the `_meta/handle` and `_meta/public-envelope` AES-\n *     GCM-bypassed patterns. The sealing layer (provider's job)\n *     is the security boundary; hub doesn't have a key to encrypt\n *     with at this layer — that's the whole point of the design.\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} — orchestrates the \"generate +\n *     seal + persist on first open; unseal on reopen\" flow.\n *     Returns the plaintext secret string that the rest of the\n *     `createNoydb` keyring path consumes.\n *\n * Deferred to follow-ups:\n *   - Block `rotate-secret` policy gate under managed mode.\n *   - Mandatory strong-recovery enforcement.\n *   - Recovery flow under managed mode (generates fresh sealed phrase).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-secret mode\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * The contract concrete providers (per-platform key stores) implement\n * to seal and unseal a hub-generated random secret. The plaintext\n * secret NEVER leaves hub-controlled memory in unsealed form —\n * the provider receives the bytes, returns opaque sealed bytes, and\n * later reverses the operation. Hub treats the sealed bytes as\n * fully opaque.\n *\n * Implementations live OUTSIDE `@noy-db/hub` (separate packages\n * per the issue's \"Concrete providers (live outside hub)\" note):\n *\n * | Platform | Package (TBD) | Backing |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | macOS | `@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain` | Security.framework |\n * | Windows | `@noy-db/seal-wincred` | Credential Manager |\n * | Linux | `@noy-db/seal-libsecret` | libsecret / secret-service |\n * | Cloud / server | `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms` | AWS KMS Decrypt |\n */\nexport interface SealingKeyProvider {\n  /**\n   * Non-sensitive identifier disclosed in the persisted envelope.\n   * Surfaced to consumers via `loadSealedSecret().providerId` so\n   * a vault opened with the wrong provider class can detect the\n   * mismatch and surface a clear error. NOT secret — fine to log.\n   *\n   * Suggested format: `<family>:<scope>` — e.g. `macos-keychain:com.acme.app`,\n   * `aws-kms:arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc`. The hub never\n   * parses this; it's purely audit metadata.\n   */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /** Seal raw secret bytes. Output bytes are opaque to hub. */\n  seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n\n  /**\n   * Reverse {@link seal}. MUST throw on tamper, wrong-provider, or\n   * any other failure — hub treats a thrown error as \"this provider\n   * cannot unlock this vault\" and surfaces it to the caller.\n   */\n  unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory test provider. NOT secure — uses a deterministic\n * per-instance \"key\" (16-byte SHA-256 of `id`) XOR'd over the\n * secret plus a 4-byte provider-id fingerprint prefix. The XOR is\n * sufficient to make different `id` values produce mutually-unsealable\n * outputs (the contract tests for that), but offers ZERO real\n * confidentiality — never use outside tests.\n *\n * Replace with a real platform provider in production.\n */\nexport class MemorySealingKeyProvider implements SealingKeyProvider {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly fingerprint: Uint8Array\n  private readonly keyBytes: Uint8Array\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    // Deterministic 4-byte fingerprint of the provider id, prepended\n    // to every sealed output so we can detect \"wrong provider\" at\n    // unseal time without leaking anything sensitive about either\n    // provider's actual key material.\n    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(opts.id)\n    let h = 0\n    for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i++) {\n      h = (h * 31 + encoded[i]!) >>> 0\n    }\n    this.fingerprint = new Uint8Array([\n      (h >>> 24) & 0xff, (h >>> 16) & 0xff, (h >>> 8) & 0xff, h & 0xff,\n    ])\n    // Deterministic 16-byte \"key\" derived from the id by repeating\n    // the fingerprint with offsets. Good enough for the XOR-stream\n    // test cipher; never confuse this with real key derivation.\n    this.keyBytes = new Uint8Array(16)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {\n      this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4]! ^ (i * 17)\n    }\n  }\n\n  async seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const out = new Uint8Array(4 + secret.length)\n    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0)\n    for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {\n      out[4 + i] = secret[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (sealed.length < 4) {\n      throw new Error('MemorySealingKeyProvider: sealed input too short')\n    }\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealingKeyProvider(\"${this.id}\"): provider-id mismatch on unseal `\n          + '(sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const body = sealed.subarray(4)\n    const out = new Uint8Array(body.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < body.length; i++) {\n      out[i] = body[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. Published by\n * a recipient's RecipientSealer; transported to the sender out-of-band\n * (email, S3, in-app message). The sender obtains the hint, supplies it\n * to writePod's sealedCredentials.perUser[userId].hint, and the\n * hub seals each user's credential against it. Per foundation §11.4.\n */\nexport type RecipientHint = {\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Recipient's provider id; matches the SealedAutoUnlockEntry.pid they'll unseal under. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Algorithm the sender uses to produce the seal. Slice 1 ships RSA-OAEP-SHA256 only. */\n  readonly alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256'\n  /** Public material — alg-specific. For 'rsa-oaep-sha256': { publicKeyPem: string }. */\n  readonly material: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>\n}\n\n// Hoisted to kernel/types.ts (C3 — enclave self-containment: sealing.ts\n// consumes this as a spine-owned contract type). Re-exported here so existing\n// importers of this module are unaffected.\nexport type { RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * Shared RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-GCM seal in the canonical recipient-target\n * TLV wire format. Mints a fresh 32-byte CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts `plaintext`\n * under it, RSA-OAEP-SHA256-wraps the CEK to `publicKeyPem`, and packs:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * This is the single source of truth for the wire format — both\n * {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} and external sealers (e.g. `@noy-db/at-aws-kms`'s\n * asymmetric-KMS recipient sealer) call it so a blob sealed by one unseals\n * by the other. WebCrypto RSA-OAEP/SHA-256 here is wire-compatible with\n * AWS KMS `RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256` (both RSAES-OAEP, SHA-256 hash, MGF1-SHA256,\n * empty label).\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext: Uint8Array, publicKeyPem: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // Parse PEM → SPKI bytes.\n  const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  const spki = base64ToBytes(b64)\n  const recipientPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'spki', spki as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false, ['encrypt'],\n  )\n  // Mint fresh CEK + IV, AES-GCM encrypt plaintext.\n  const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt'])\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const ct = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, plaintext as BufferSource))\n  // RSA-OAEP-wrap the CEK bytes.\n  const wrapped = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, recipientPub, cekBytes as BufferSource))\n  cekBytes.fill(0)\n  if (wrapped.length !== 256) {\n    throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`)\n  }\n  // TLV layout.\n  const out = new Uint8Array(1 + 256 + 12 + ct.length)\n  out[0] = 0x01\n  out.set(wrapped, 1)\n  out.set(iv, 1 + 256)\n  out.set(ct, 1 + 256 + 12)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a {@link sealRsaOaepTlv} blob into its three segments without\n * decrypting. The `wrapped` CEK is RSA-OAEP-SHA256 ciphertext over a\n * 32-byte CEK — the unwrap step is pluggable: {@link MemoryRecipientSealer}\n * decrypts it with a local RSA private key; `@noy-db/at-aws-kms` hands it to\n * KMS `Decrypt`. After unwrapping, pass the CEK + `iv` + `ct` to\n * {@link aesGcmOpen}.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes: Uint8Array): { wrapped: Uint8Array; iv: Uint8Array; ct: Uint8Array } {\n  if (bytes.length < 1 + 256 + 12 + 16) {\n    throw new Error('parseRsaOaepTlv: sealed input too short')\n  }\n  if (bytes[0] !== 0x01) {\n    throw new Error(`parseRsaOaepTlv: unknown TLV version ${bytes[0]}`)\n  }\n  return {\n    wrapped: bytes.subarray(1, 1 + 256),\n    iv: bytes.subarray(1 + 256, 1 + 256 + 12),\n    ct: bytes.subarray(1 + 256 + 12),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-GCM-decrypt the `ct` segment of a {@link parseRsaOaepTlv} result under\n * the unwrapped 32-byte CEK and its `iv`. Throws on a bad tag (tamper) — the\n * same authenticated-decryption guarantee the TLV relies on.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, ct: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt'])\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, ct as BufferSource))\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference implementation of `RecipientSealer` + `SealingKeyProvider`.\n * Uses WebCrypto RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (2048-bit) to wrap a fresh 32-byte\n * AES-GCM CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts plaintext under it, and packs the\n * result into a self-describing TLV:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * Implements BOTH interfaces. `seal(plaintext)` (self-target) is just\n * `sealForRecipient(plaintext, this own hint)` — same TLV. Convenient\n * for tests where one provider plays both ends. Real cloud providers\n * (`at-aws-kms`, etc.) will pick their own internal layouts; the only\n * contract is round-trip identity.\n *\n * SAFE for production within its scope — the cryptography is real\n * (RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM via WebCrypto), but the keypair lives in-process\n * and is regenerated on every construction. Not suitable as a managed\n * keychain; use it for tests and for shipping bundles where the\n * recipient instance lives in the same process as the sender (rare).\n */\nexport class MemoryRecipientSealer implements SealingKeyProvider, RecipientSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keypair: Promise<CryptoKeyPair>\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keypair = crypto.subtle.generateKey(\n      { name: 'RSA-OAEP', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  }\n\n  async publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint> {\n    const { publicKey } = await this.keypair\n    const spki = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('spki', publicKey)\n    const pem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n      + bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(spki)).match(/.{1,64}/g)!.join('\\n')\n      + '\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n    return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256', material: { publicKeyPem: pem } }\n  }\n\n  async sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (hint.v !== 1) {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.v ${String(hint.v)} (expected 1)`)\n    }\n    if (hint.alg !== 'rsa-oaep-sha256') {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.alg '${String(hint.alg)}' (expected 'rsa-oaep-sha256')`)\n    }\n    const pem = hint.material['publicKeyPem']\n    if (typeof pem !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: hint.material.publicKeyPem missing or not a string')\n    }\n    return sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, pem)\n  }\n\n  async seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const hint = await this.publishRecipientHint()\n    return this.sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint)\n  }\n\n  async unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes)\n    const { privateKey } = await this.keypair\n    // Local RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwrap of the CEK — the pluggable step external\n    // sealers replace with KMS Decrypt.\n    const cekBytes = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, privateKey, wrapped as BufferSource))\n    const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct)\n    cekBytes.fill(0)\n    return pt\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Persisted envelope ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Reserved id for the managed-secret envelope under `_meta`. */\nexport const SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID = 'sealed-secret' as const\n\n/** Plaintext payload stored inside the `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope. */\nexport interface SealedSecret {\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  readonly providerId: string\n  /** Sealed bytes. Base64-encoded on the wire; decoded on load. */\n  readonly sealed: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format envelope persisted at `_meta/sealed-secret` for\n * managed-mode vaults. The provider produces raw sealed bytes via\n * {@link SealingKeyProvider.seal}; this wrapper carries the dispatch\n * metadata hub needs to pick the right provider on the unseal path.\n *\n * Stability boundary: once shipped, the wire format only grows by\n * adding optional fields. See the at-* sealing dimension foundation\n * doc, §11.9.1.\n *\n * v1 shape (this release): `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }`.\n *\n * Legacy shape (earlier releases): `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }`\n * — accepted on read for backwards compatibility; never produced on\n * write going forward.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /** Envelope schema version. v1 is the current shape. */\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Magic marker for forensics + legacy-shape detection. */\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  /** Matches the producing provider's `.id`. Dispatch key on unseal. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Sealed bytes from the provider, base64-encoded on the wire. */\n  readonly payload: string\n}\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(b64)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `_meta/sealed-secret` `_data` JSON string into the\n * in-memory {@link SealedSecret} representation. Accepts both:\n *\n *   1. v1 wire format `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }` —\n *      the current shape.\n *   2. Legacy wire format `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }` —\n *      read-only; never written\n *      going forward.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` for any input that doesn't match either shape,\n * so callers can fall back to \"no managed-mode envelope present.\"\n *\n * @internal — exported only for the migration safety-net test suite.\n */\nexport function parseSealedEnvelope(raw: unknown): SealedSecret | undefined {\n  if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined\n  const r = raw as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_sealed !== 1) return undefined\n\n  // v1 shape — preferred.\n  if (\n    r.v === 1\n    && typeof r.pid === 'string'\n    && typeof r.payload === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.pid,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.payload),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Legacy shape — earlier releases. Accept on read for compat.\n  if (\n    typeof r.providerId === 'string'\n    && typeof r.sealed === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.providerId,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.sealed),\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined\n}\n\nexport async function saveSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  payload: { readonly providerId: string; readonly sealed: Uint8Array },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: SealedEnvelope = {\n    v: 1,\n    _noydb_sealed: 1,\n    pid: payload.providerId,\n    payload: bytesToBase64(payload.sealed),\n  }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary.\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(persisted),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n\nexport async function loadSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<SealedSecret | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data))\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── createNoydb orchestration ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective plaintext secret string for a managed-mode\n * vault. Two paths:\n *\n *   1. **First open (no envelope persisted):** generate a 256-bit random\n *      via `crypto.getRandomValues`, base64-encode for use as a\n *      secret string, seal the underlying bytes under the\n *      provider, persist `_meta/sealed-secret`, return the\n *      base64 string.\n *\n *   2. **Reopen (envelope exists):** read + unseal + decode → return.\n *      A different provider whose `seal` output disagrees on the\n *      stored bytes throws here, surfaced as a clear error.\n *\n * The returned string is the same shape that `secret:` would take in\n * standard mode — the rest of the keyring path consumes it\n * unchanged.\n *\n * @internal — called from `createNoydb` / `getKeyringInternal`.\n */\nexport async function resolveManagedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  provider: SealingKeyProvider,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const existing = await loadSealedSecret(store, vault)\n  if (existing) {\n    if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Managed-mode vault \"${vault}\" was sealed under provider id `\n        + `\"${existing.providerId}\" but the current SealingKeyProvider is `\n        + `\"${provider.id}\". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled `\n        + 'the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear '\n        + '`_meta/sealed-secret` first.',\n      )\n    }\n    const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed)\n    return bytesToBase64(plaintext)\n  }\n\n  // First open: mint a 256-bit random, seal, persist.\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const sealed = await provider.seal(random)\n  await saveSealedSecret(store, vault, { providerId: provider.id, sealed })\n  return bytesToBase64(random)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAyGO,IAAM,2BAAN,MAA6D;AAAA,EACzD;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AAKf,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE;AAChD,QAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AACvC,UAAK,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAQ;AAAA,IACjC;AACA,SAAK,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,MAC/B,MAAM,KAAM;AAAA,MAAO,MAAM,KAAM;AAAA,MAAO,MAAM,IAAK;AAAA,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D,CAAC;AAID,SAAK,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE;AACjC,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAC3B,WAAK,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,IAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,QAAyC;AAClD,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK;AACtC,UAAI,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IAChD;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,QAAyC;AACpD,QAAI,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AACrB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kDAAkD;AAAA,IACpE;AACA,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG;AACrC,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,6BAA6B,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,QAEtC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9B,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AACtC,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IAC1C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AA2CA,eAAsB,eAAe,WAAuB,cAA2C;AAErG,QAAM,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,8BAA8B,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AAC7H,QAAM,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG;AAC9B,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,IAAQ;AAAA,IACR,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IAAO,CAAC,SAAS;AAAA,EACnB;AAEA,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,UAA0B,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AACxG,QAAM,KAAK,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACpD,QAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB,GAAG,KAAK,SAAyB,CAAC;AAElI,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,cAAc,QAAwB,CAAC;AACxH,WAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wDAAwD,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC1F;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM;AACnD,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACT,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC;AAClB,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACnB,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AACxB,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAA4E;AAC1G,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACpC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yCAAyC;AAAA,EAC3D;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAM;AACrB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wCAAwC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,EACpE;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAClC,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,IACxC,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,WAAW,UAAsB,IAAgB,IAAqC;AAC1G,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,UAA0B,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AACxG,SAAO,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB,GAAG,KAAK,EAAkB,CAAC;AACzH;AAyBO,IAAM,wBAAN,MAA2E;AAAA,EACvE;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AACf,SAAK,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAC3B,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,eAAe,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACpG;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,uBAA+C;AACnD,UAAM,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC5D,UAAM,MAAM,iCACR,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,EAAG,KAAK,IAAI,IAChE;AACJ,WAAO,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,mBAAmB,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACvF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,iBAAiB,WAAuB,MAA0C;AACtF,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAChB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8DAA8D,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,IAC7G;AACA,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAClC,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iEAAiE,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,gCAAgC;AAAA,IACnI;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,cAAc;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAC3B,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4FAA4F;AAAA,IAC9G;AACA,WAAO,eAAe,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,EACtC;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,WAA4C;AACrD,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB;AAC7C,WAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,OAAwC;AACnD,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,KAAK;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AAGlC,UAAM,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,YAAY,OAAuB,CAAC;AACtH,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAC5C,aAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAKO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAqCvC,SAAS,cAAc,OAA2B;AAChD,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAK,WAAU,OAAO,aAAa,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE;AAC9E,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,KAAyB;AAC9C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACxC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAK,KAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AACpE,SAAO;AACT;AAiBO,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAwC;AAC1E,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAM,QAAO;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO;AAGlC,MACE,EAAE,MAAM,KACL,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YACjB,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,UACxB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,MACd,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MACE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,UACvB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,MACd,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACA,SACe;AACf,QAAM,YAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,GAAG;AAAA,IACH,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,uBAAuB;AACrE,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA,IAE5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,yBAAyB,GAAG;AAC9D;AAEA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACmC;AACnC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,uBAAuB;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,oBAAoB,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAwBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,UACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,KAAK;AACpD,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,QAAI,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI;AACvC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,uBAAuB,KAAK,mCACtB,SAAS,UAAU,4CACnB,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,MAGnB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM;AACvD,WAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAChC;AAGA,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AACxC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM;AACzC,QAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM;AAC7B;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-TDJPS3T2.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-cargo/vault-diff.ts","../src/with-cargo/active.ts","../src/with-cargo/describe-extraction.ts","../src/with-cargo/adopt-partition.ts","../src/with-cargo/decrypt-partition.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Vault-level diff orchestrator.\n *\n * Compares a live `Vault`'s plaintext state against a candidate state\n * (another vault, a plain `{ collection: records[] }` map, or a vault\n * dump JSON) and returns a structured `VaultDiff` plan listing the\n * records that would be added, modified, or deleted to bring the live\n * vault into the candidate's shape.\n *\n * Builds on two existing record-level helpers:\n *\n *   1. `diff(a, b)` from `./history/diff.ts` — emits dot-pathed\n *      `DiffEntry[]` with `type: 'added' | 'removed' | 'changed'` for\n *      each changed field of two records. Used here for the\n *      `fieldDiffs` of every `modified` entry, and (with empty result)\n *      as the default deep-equal check.\n *\n *   2. `Vault.exportStream()` from `./vault.ts` — the canonical\n *      decrypt-and-stream-records iterator. Used to walk both sides\n *      when the candidate is itself a `Vault`. ACL-scoped: collections\n *      the caller can't read silently drop out, the same way every\n *      other plaintext-emitting export pipeline filters them.\n *\n * The new orchestration is the **vault-level** enumeration: bucket\n * each record id into added (only in candidate), deleted (only in\n * vault), or modified (in both with field changes); leave the\n * field-level granularity to the existing `diff()`.\n *\n * Use cases:\n *\n *   - Import preview (`@noy-db/as-*` `fromString` returns a plan\n *     whose body is a `VaultDiff`).\n *   - Backup verification (\"does this `.noydb` bundle from yesterday\n *     match the current vault?\").\n *   - Two-vault reconciliation (\"what's different between Office A\n *     and Office B before we sync?\").\n *   - Test assertions (golden-file testing with one-liner\n *     `expect(plan.summary).toEqual(...)`).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js'\nimport { diff as fieldDiff, type DiffEntry as FieldDiffEntry } from '../with-commit/history/diff.js'\n\n// ─── Public types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Per-record entry shape — added and deleted records carry only the record value. */\nexport interface VaultDiffEntry<T = unknown> {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly record: T\n  /**\n   * Unencrypted envelope metadata for the RECEIVER-side record.\n   * Populated only when `diffVault` is called with `{includeMetadata: true}`.\n   * Default: `undefined` (zero extra reads, no behavior change).\n   *\n   * Populated for `modified` (the CURRENT receiver state, before the candidate\n   * is applied) and `deleted` (the receiver envelope of the record being\n   * removed). `added` entries have no receiver envelope at diff time, so their\n   * `metadata` is always absent.\n   */\n  readonly metadata?: {\n    readonly version: number\n    readonly timestamp: string\n    readonly by?: string\n    readonly source?: string\n    readonly sourceTs?: string\n  }\n}\n\n/** Modified records carry both halves of the diff plus the field-level breakdown. */\nexport interface VaultDiffModifiedEntry<T = unknown> extends VaultDiffEntry<T> {\n  /** The record as it stands in the live vault. */\n  readonly before: T\n  /** Top-level keys whose values differ between `before` and `record`. */\n  readonly fieldsChanged: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Field-level diff entries from `diff(before, record)`. Reuses the\n   * existing per-record diff helper so consumers can render git-style\n   * `path: from → to` rows without re-walking the records.\n   */\n  readonly fieldDiffs: readonly FieldDiffEntry[]\n}\n\nexport interface VaultDiff<T = unknown> {\n  readonly added: readonly VaultDiffEntry<T>[]\n  readonly modified: readonly VaultDiffModifiedEntry<T>[]\n  readonly deleted: readonly VaultDiffEntry<T>[]\n  /** Only populated when `options.includeUnchanged: true`. */\n  readonly unchanged: readonly VaultDiffEntry<T>[] | undefined\n  readonly summary: {\n    readonly add: number\n    readonly modify: number\n    readonly delete: number\n    readonly total: number\n  }\n  /**\n   * Format the diff as a human-readable string.\n   *\n   *   - `'count'`   — one line, just the numbers (`12 added · 3 modified · 0 deleted`)\n   *   - `'one-line'` — count plus a single overview line\n   *   - `'full'`    — count + one row per added/modified/deleted record (default)\n   */\n  format(opts?: { detail?: 'count' | 'one-line' | 'full' }): string\n}\n\nexport interface DiffOptions {\n  /** Restrict the diff to a subset of collections. */\n  readonly collections?: readonly string[]\n  /** Field on each record that carries its id. Defaults to `'id'`. */\n  readonly idKey?: string\n  /** Override the default deep-equal check for \"modified vs unchanged\". */\n  readonly compareFn?: (a: unknown, b: unknown) => boolean\n  /** If true, include unchanged records in the diff (off by default to save memory). */\n  readonly includeUnchanged?: boolean\n  /**\n   * When `true`, each entry in `added`, `modified`, and `deleted` will carry a\n   * `metadata` field with the RECEIVER-side envelope metadata\n   * (`version`, `timestamp`, `by?`, `source?`, `sourceTs?`).\n   *\n   * Off by default — no extra adapter reads, no behavior change for existing callers.\n   */\n  readonly includeMetadata?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Candidate state to diff the vault against:\n *\n *   - A `Vault` instance — both sides are walked via `exportStream()`.\n *   - A `Record<collection, records[]>` map — same shape `as-json.toObject()`\n *     produces. Useful for diffing parsed file content against the live vault.\n *   - A `VaultDump` (output of `vault.dump()`) — a JSON string carrying the\n *     full vault state. Parsed and reduced to the map shape above.\n */\nexport type DiffCandidate<T = unknown> =\n  | Vault\n  | Record<string, readonly T[]>\n  | string\n\n// ─── Implementation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute the diff between a live vault and a candidate state.\n *\n * Ungated shared import/merge infrastructure: the `as-*` exporters call this\n * internally from their `fromString`/import merge logic, so it is always\n * available (not behind `withCargo()`). Only `extractPartition` is a gated\n * cargo capability.\n *\n * Returns a fully buffered `VaultDiff` — no streaming. Memory cost is\n * O(n + m) in the row count of vault + candidate. For documented\n * 1K-50K-record vaults this is fine; a streaming variant lands as a\n * follow-up if a > 100K-record consumer arrives.\n */\nexport async function diffVault<T = unknown>(\n  vault: Vault,\n  candidate: DiffCandidate<T>,\n  options: DiffOptions = {},\n): Promise<VaultDiff<T>> {\n  const idKey = options.idKey ?? 'id'\n  const filter = options.collections ? new Set(options.collections) : null\n  const compareFn =\n    options.compareFn ?? ((a: unknown, b: unknown) => fieldDiff(a, b).length === 0)\n\n  // Side A — walk the live vault via exportStream(). Each chunk arrives\n  // already decrypted and ACL-scoped, so collections the caller can't\n  // read silently drop out. exportStream's records are typed `unknown[]`\n  // — diffVault is the type-erasure boundary; the caller asserts the\n  // record shape via the function's `<T>` generic.\n  const live = new Map<string, Map<string, T>>()\n  for await (const chunk of vault.exportStream({ granularity: 'collection' })) {\n    if (filter && !filter.has(chunk.collection)) continue\n    const collection = live.get(chunk.collection) ?? new Map<string, T>()\n    for (const record of chunk.records) {\n      const id = readIdField(record, idKey)\n      if (!id) continue\n      collection.set(id, record as T)\n    }\n    live.set(chunk.collection, collection)\n  }\n\n  // Side B — normalise the candidate into the same shape.\n  const cand = await normaliseCandidate<T>(candidate, idKey, filter)\n\n  // Walk every (collection, id) on either side and bucket.\n  const added: VaultDiffEntry<T>[] = []\n  const modified: VaultDiffModifiedEntry<T>[] = []\n  const deleted: VaultDiffEntry<T>[] = []\n  const unchanged: VaultDiffEntry<T>[] | undefined = options.includeUnchanged ? [] : undefined\n\n  const collectionNames = new Set([...live.keys(), ...cand.keys()])\n  for (const collection of [...collectionNames].sort()) {\n    const liveColl = live.get(collection) ?? new Map<string, T>()\n    const candColl = cand.get(collection) ?? new Map<string, T>()\n    const allIds = new Set([...liveColl.keys(), ...candColl.keys()])\n\n    for (const id of [...allIds].sort()) {\n      const before = liveColl.get(id)\n      const after = candColl.get(id)\n\n      if (before === undefined && after !== undefined) {\n        // added: record only in candidate — no receiver envelope\n        added.push({ collection, id, record: after })\n      } else if (before !== undefined && after === undefined) {\n        // deleted: record only in receiver — attach metadata if requested\n        const metadata = options.includeMetadata\n          ? (await vault.collection(collection).getMetadata(id)) ?? undefined\n          : undefined\n        deleted.push({ collection, id, record: before, ...(metadata !== undefined ? { metadata } : {}) })\n      } else if (before !== undefined && after !== undefined) {\n        if (compareFn(before, after)) {\n          unchanged?.push({ collection, id, record: after })\n        } else {\n          // modified: record in both — attach receiver-side metadata if requested\n          const metadata = options.includeMetadata\n            ? (await vault.collection(collection).getMetadata(id)) ?? undefined\n            : undefined\n          const fieldDiffs = fieldDiff(before, after)\n          const fieldsChanged = uniqueTopLevelKeys(fieldDiffs)\n          modified.push({\n            collection,\n            id,\n            record: after,\n            before,\n            fieldsChanged,\n            fieldDiffs,\n            ...(metadata !== undefined ? { metadata } : {}),\n          })\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const summary = {\n    add: added.length,\n    modify: modified.length,\n    delete: deleted.length,\n    total: added.length + modified.length + deleted.length,\n  }\n\n  return {\n    added,\n    modified,\n    deleted,\n    unchanged,\n    summary,\n    format(opts) {\n      return formatDiff(opts?.detail ?? 'full', { added, modified, deleted, summary })\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function normaliseCandidate<T>(\n  candidate: DiffCandidate<T>,\n  idKey: string,\n  filter: Set<string> | null,\n): Promise<Map<string, Map<string, T>>> {\n  const out = new Map<string, Map<string, T>>()\n\n  // Vault instance — duck-type via the exportStream method (matches\n  // vault.ts's structural shape without forcing a runtime instanceof check\n  // that would import the class and risk circular deps).\n  if (\n    typeof candidate === 'object' &&\n    candidate !== null &&\n    'exportStream' in candidate &&\n    typeof (candidate as Vault).exportStream === 'function'\n  ) {\n    for await (const chunk of (candidate as Vault).exportStream({ granularity: 'collection' })) {\n      if (filter && !filter.has(chunk.collection)) continue\n      const collection = out.get(chunk.collection) ?? new Map<string, T>()\n      for (const record of chunk.records) {\n        const id = readIdField(record, idKey)\n        if (!id) continue\n        collection.set(id, record as T)\n      }\n      out.set(chunk.collection, collection)\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n\n  // String — assume a vault.dump() JSON string. Parse and reduce to the map shape.\n  if (typeof candidate === 'string') {\n    let parsed: unknown\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(candidate)\n    } catch (err) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `diffVault: candidate string is not valid JSON (${(err as Error).message})`,\n      )\n    }\n    return collectionsFromObject<T>(parsed, idKey, filter)\n  }\n\n  // Plain object — `Record<collection, records[]>` (same shape as-json.toObject() returns).\n  return collectionsFromObject<T>(candidate, idKey, filter)\n}\n\nfunction collectionsFromObject<T>(\n  raw: unknown,\n  idKey: string,\n  filter: Set<string> | null,\n): Map<string, Map<string, T>> {\n  const out = new Map<string, Map<string, T>>()\n  if (raw === null || typeof raw !== 'object') {\n    throw new Error('diffVault: candidate must be a Vault, an object, or a JSON string')\n  }\n  // A vault dump JSON has a top-level shape like { _compartment, _keyring, <coll>: <records[]> }.\n  // We accept both: keys starting with `_` are skipped (they're metadata), the rest are collections.\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(raw)) {\n    if (key.startsWith('_')) continue\n    if (filter && !filter.has(key)) continue\n    if (!Array.isArray(value)) continue\n    const collection = new Map<string, T>()\n    for (const record of value as readonly T[]) {\n      if (record === null || typeof record !== 'object') continue\n      const id = readIdField(record, idKey)\n      if (!id) continue\n      collection.set(id, record)\n    }\n    out.set(key, collection)\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\nfunction uniqueTopLevelKeys(diffs: readonly FieldDiffEntry[]): readonly string[] {\n  const keys = new Set<string>()\n  for (const d of diffs) {\n    // path is dot-separated; the top-level key is everything before the\n    // first `.` or `[`. (`a.b.c` → `a`, `tags[0]` → `tags`, `(root)` → `(root)`).\n    const m = /^[^.[]+/.exec(d.path)\n    if (m) keys.add(m[0])\n  }\n  return [...keys]\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the id field off a record without going through `String(obj)`,\n * which would emit `[object Object]` for nested objects and silently\n * collapse rows that share the same parent. Only string and number ids\n * are accepted; anything else returns the empty string and the record\n * is skipped at the call site.\n */\nfunction readIdField(record: unknown, idKey: string): string {\n  if (record === null || typeof record !== 'object') return ''\n  const v = (record as Record<string, unknown>)[idKey]\n  if (typeof v === 'string') return v\n  if (typeof v === 'number' && Number.isFinite(v)) return String(v)\n  return ''\n}\n\ninterface FormatBuckets<T> {\n  readonly added: readonly VaultDiffEntry<T>[]\n  readonly modified: readonly VaultDiffModifiedEntry<T>[]\n  readonly deleted: readonly VaultDiffEntry<T>[]\n  readonly summary: VaultDiff<T>['summary']\n}\n\nfunction formatDiff<T>(\n  detail: 'count' | 'one-line' | 'full',\n  b: FormatBuckets<T>,\n): string {\n  const head = `${b.summary.add} added · ${b.summary.modify} modified · ${b.summary.delete} deleted`\n  if (detail === 'count') return head\n  if (b.summary.total === 0) return head + '\\n(no changes)'\n  if (detail === 'one-line') return head\n\n  const rows: string[] = [head, '']\n  for (const e of b.added) rows.push(`${e.collection}/${e.id}\\tadded`)\n  for (const e of b.modified) {\n    const fields = e.fieldDiffs\n      .map((f) => `${f.path}: ${shortJSON(f.from)} → ${shortJSON(f.to)}`)\n      .join(', ')\n    rows.push(`${e.collection}/${e.id}\\tmodified\\t${fields}`)\n  }\n  for (const e of b.deleted) rows.push(`${e.collection}/${e.id}\\tdeleted`)\n  return rows.join('\\n')\n}\n\nfunction shortJSON(value: unknown): string {\n  if (value === undefined) return 'undefined'\n  const s = JSON.stringify(value)\n  // JSON.stringify returns string for any JSON value except `undefined`\n  // (handled above), `function`, and `symbol`. Fall back to a static\n  // tag for those — never let an arbitrary object hit the default\n  // stringifier (which the lint rule explicitly bans).\n  if (typeof s !== 'string') return '<unrepresentable>'\n  return s.length > 60 ? s.slice(0, 57) + '...' : s\n}\n","/**\n * Enable the cargo (partition extraction) capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ cargoStrategy: withCargo() })` to make the source-side\n * `extractPartition(vault, ...)` free function live. The extraction crypto\n * engine is dynamically imported here, so it stays out of the floor bundle\n * until opted in. The recipient-side `adoptPartition` /\n * `decryptExtractedPartition` free functions — and `diffVault` (shared\n * import/merge infra) — are ungated and unaffected.\n */\nimport type { CargoStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\nexport function withCargo(): CargoStrategy {\n  return {\n    async extractPartition(vault, opts) {\n      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import('./extract-partition.js')\n      return extractPartitionCore(vault, opts)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Partition-extraction dry-run. Read-only preview of what an\n * `extractPartition` would move: record counts, byte totals, and the\n * timestamp span per collection — computed from raw encrypted\n * envelopes WITHOUT decrypting them. Writes nothing, mutates nothing.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js'\nimport { walkClosure, type WalkClosureOptions, type DanglingRefNotice } from './walk-closure.js'\n\nexport interface ExtractionPreview {\n  readonly totalRecords: number\n  /** Sum of serialized encrypted-envelope sizes (bytes). */\n  readonly totalBytes: number\n  readonly byCollection: ReadonlyArray<{\n    readonly name: string\n    readonly recordCount: number\n    readonly bytes: number\n    /** Earliest envelope `_ts` in this collection (lexicographic). */\n    readonly oldestTs?: string\n    readonly newestTs?: string\n  }>\n  readonly graph: { readonly depth: number; readonly cyclesDetected: boolean }\n  /** Records the walk reached but whose envelope couldn't be read. */\n  readonly inaccessible: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly collection: string; readonly id: string }>\n  /**\n   * #772: outbound FK edges whose referenced parent was excluded from the\n   * closure (missing, or tier-elevated and therefore invisible) — mirrors\n   * `ExtractPartitionResult.danglingRefs` (#759) so a preview/extract pair\n   * gives the SAME signal. A parent excluded this way never appears in\n   * `byCollection` at all; this is the only preview-time indicator.\n   */\n  readonly danglingRefs: ReadonlyArray<DanglingRefNotice>\n}\n\nexport async function describeExtraction(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: WalkClosureOptions,\n): Promise<ExtractionPreview> {\n  const { closure, graph, danglingRefs } = await walkClosure(vault, opts)\n\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder()\n\n  const byCollection: Array<{\n    name: string; recordCount: number; bytes: number; oldestTs?: string; newestTs?: string\n  }> = []\n  const inaccessible: Array<{ collection: string; id: string }> = []\n  let totalBytes = 0\n  let totalRecords = 0\n\n  for (const [collectionName, ids] of closure) {\n    let bytes = 0\n    let oldestTs: string | undefined\n    let newestTs: string | undefined\n    let recordCount = 0\n\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, collectionName, id)\n      if (!env) {\n        // Walk reached it (via decrypted list) but the raw store read\n        // returned nothing — surface rather than miscount.\n        inaccessible.push({ collection: collectionName, id })\n        continue\n      }\n      recordCount++\n      bytes += encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(env)).length\n      const ts = env._ts\n      if (oldestTs === undefined || ts < oldestTs) oldestTs = ts\n      if (newestTs === undefined || ts > newestTs) newestTs = ts\n    }\n\n    byCollection.push({\n      name: collectionName,\n      recordCount,\n      bytes,\n      // Spread conditionally — exactOptionalPropertyTypes forbids an\n      // explicit `undefined` on an optional property.\n      ...(oldestTs !== undefined ? { oldestTs } : {}),\n      ...(newestTs !== undefined ? { newestTs } : {}),\n    })\n    totalBytes += bytes\n    totalRecords += recordCount\n  }\n\n  byCollection.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name))\n\n  return Object.freeze({\n    totalRecords,\n    totalBytes,\n    byCollection,\n    graph,\n    inaccessible,\n    danglingRefs,\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * Partition adoption. Recipient side: verify an extracted bundle,\n * validate the transfer key, import the re-keyed collections into a\n * destination store, and record an `_meta/adoption` marker. The bundle\n * stays UNOWNED after adoption — `createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition`\n * mints the owner; the transfer seal is then destroyed.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { base64ToBuffer, wrapKey, type EnclaveKey } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { TransferSealError, AdoptionStateError, ValidationError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, VaultSnapshot, KeyringFile } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from '../with-party/team/managed-secret.js'\nimport type { SealingKeyProvider } from '../with-party/team/managed-secret.js'\nimport type { ShamirRecoveryProvider } from '../with-party/team/shamir-recovery-provider.js'\nimport type { RecoveryEnrollmentInput } from '../with-party/team/rotate-recover.js'\nimport { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport type { TransferSealPayload } from '../with-pod/bundle.js'\nimport { readPodHeader, readPod, parseExtractedPartitionBody } from '../with-pod/bundle.js'\n\n/**\n * Reverse of `sealDeks`. Imports the transfer key, decrypts the\n * sealed `{ collection: base64(rawDEK) }` map (layout iv(12)‖ct‖tag), and\n * re-imports each DEK as an AES-GCM key. Throws `TransferSealError` on a\n * wrong key (AES-GCM auth-tag failure) or malformed payload.\n */\nexport async function unsealDeks(\n  seal: TransferSealPayload,\n  transferKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Map<string, EnclaveKey>> {\n  if (transferKey.byteLength !== 32) {\n    throw new TransferSealError(\n      `transfer key must be 32 bytes, got ${transferKey.byteLength}.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', transferKey as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt'])\n  const raw = base64ToBuffer(seal.payload)\n  let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: raw.slice(0, 12) as BufferSource },\n      key,\n      raw.slice(12) as BufferSource,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new TransferSealError(\n      'transfer seal could not be opened — wrong transfer key (AES-GCM authentication failed).',\n    )\n  }\n  let dekMap: Record<string, string>\n  try {\n    dekMap = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as Record<string, string>\n  } catch {\n    throw new TransferSealError('transfer seal payload is not valid JSON after decryption.')\n  }\n  const deks = new Map<string, EnclaveKey>()\n  for (const [collection, b64] of Object.entries(dekMap)) {\n    // Extractable: the recipient must be able to re-wrap these under their\n    // own KEK (AES-KW) at owner-creation. Matches generateDEK.\n    const dek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', base64ToBuffer(b64) as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n    deks.set(collection, dek)\n  }\n  return deks\n}\n\nexport interface AdoptPartitionOptions {\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n  readonly destinationStore: NoydbStore\n  readonly vaultName: string\n}\n\nexport interface AdoptPartitionResult {\n  readonly vaultName: string\n  readonly needsOwner: true\n  readonly sealId: string\n}\n\nexport async function adoptPartition(\n  bundleBytes: Uint8Array,\n  opts: AdoptPartitionOptions,\n): Promise<AdoptPartitionResult> {\n  const { transferKey, destinationStore, vaultName } = opts\n\n  const header = readPodHeader(bundleBytes)\n  if (header.bundleKind !== 'extracted-partition' || header.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'adoptPartition requires an extracted-partition bundle with a transfer seal. '\n      + 'For ordinary backups use readPod + vault.load.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const { dumpJson } = await readPod(bundleBytes)\n  const { dump, seal } = parseExtractedPartitionBody(dumpJson)\n\n  // Validate the transfer key by unsealing in memory; throws\n  // TransferSealError on mismatch. DEKs are discarded here — they stay\n  // sealed at rest (in _meta/adoption) until owner-creation wraps them under the\n  // recipient's KEK.\n  await unsealDeks(seal, transferKey)\n\n  // Single-occupancy per vaultName: an `_meta/adoption` marker already present\n  // means this slot holds a partition (adopted-and-unowned, or already owned).\n  // saveAll below would overwrite its data and replace the marker, stranding the\n  // prior adoption's transfer seal. Refuse regardless of sealId — re-adopting the\n  // SAME bundle is a redundant call, and adopting a DIFFERENT bundle here would\n  // clobber the existing partition. Either way, pick a fresh vaultName.\n  const existing = await destinationStore.get(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption')\n  if (existing) {\n    const prior = JSON.parse(existing._data) as { sealId?: string }\n    if (prior.sealId === seal.sealId) {\n      throw new AdoptionStateError(\n        `partition (sealId ${seal.sealId}) is already adopted into vault \"${vaultName}\".`,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already holds an adopted partition (sealId ${prior.sealId}); `\n      + `adopting a different partition (sealId ${seal.sealId}) here would overwrite it. `\n      + `Adopt into a fresh vaultName instead.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // The marker-only check above misses a worse case: a vaultName already in use\n  // by an ORDINARY vault (createNoydb + openVault) carries no `_meta/adoption`,\n  // yet `saveAll` below is destructive on SQL adapters (`DELETE FROM ... WHERE\n  // vault = ?` followed by upsert) and would wipe the legitimate keyring +\n  // data. Refuse adoption into ANY occupied slot — a fresh vaultName is the\n  // documented precondition.\n  const existingKeyring = await destinationStore.list(vaultName, '_keyring')\n  if (existingKeyring.length > 0) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already holds a keyring (an unrelated owner exists at this slot); `\n      + `adoptPartition requires a fresh vaultName to avoid destructive saveAll on SQL adapters.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const backup = JSON.parse(dump) as { collections: VaultSnapshot; _internal?: VaultSnapshot }\n  await destinationStore.saveAll(vaultName, backup.collections)\n\n  // Import carried internal collections (e.g. _schemas from carrySchemas).\n  // saveAll only writes data collections; _internal is written per-record.\n  if (backup._internal) {\n    for (const [collection, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n      for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n        await destinationStore.put(vaultName, collection, id, envelope)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const adoptedAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const adoption = { sealId: seal.sealId, adoptedAt, needsOwner: true as const, transferSeal: seal }\n  await destinationStore.put(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption', {\n    _noydb: 1, _v: 1, _ts: adoptedAt, _iv: '', _data: JSON.stringify(adoption),\n  })\n\n  return { vaultName, needsOwner: true, sealId: seal.sealId }\n}\n\nexport interface CreateOwnerResult {\n  readonly vaultName: string\n  readonly userId: string\n}\n\n/** Standard-mode owner: recipient supplies the secret. */\nexport interface CreateOwnerStandardOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly secret: string\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Managed-mode owner: the secret is minted + sealed under\n * a `SealingKeyProvider` (e.g. an `at-*` OS keychain) so the partition\n * auto-unlocks on the recipient's device. Managed mode mandates a strong\n * (Shamir) recovery profile at creation, which needs the\n * `shamirRecovery` provider injected.\n */\nexport interface CreateOwnerManagedOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly secretMode: 'managed'\n  readonly sealingKey: SealingKeyProvider\n  readonly recovery: ReadonlyArray<RecoveryEnrollmentInput>\n  readonly shamirRecovery: ShamirRecoveryProvider\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n}\n\nexport type CreateOwnerOptions = CreateOwnerStandardOptions | CreateOwnerManagedOptions\n\nfunction isManaged(o: CreateOwnerOptions): o is CreateOwnerManagedOptions {\n  return 'secretMode' in o && o.secretMode === 'managed'\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint the first owner keyring on an adopted-but-unowned partition,\n * then destroy the transfer seal.\n *\n * Standard mode: the recipient supplies a secret. Managed mode: the\n * secret is minted + sealed under a `SealingKeyProvider` and a strong\n * (Shamir) recovery profile is enrolled — orchestrated via the existing\n * `openVaultAndEnrollRecovery` ceremony.\n *\n * Either way, reuses `createOwnerKeyring` to derive the KEK + write the base\n * keyring, then wraps the partition's DEKs (recovered from the seal) under that\n * KEK and re-persists the merged keyring file.\n *\n * Idempotent under retry: the seal is destroyed LAST (Stage D), after the\n * keyring (Stage A), the ledger transition (Stage B), and — in managed mode —\n * strong-recovery enrollment (Stage C). A failure in the fallible enrollment\n * step leaves the seal intact, and re-running with the same `userId` +\n * `transferKey` resumes from the first incomplete stage. (Multi-profile recovery\n * arrays may re-enroll an already-enrolled profile on retry; managed mode's\n * mandated single Shamir profile does not.)\n */\nexport async function createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vaultName: string,\n  opts: CreateOwnerOptions,\n): Promise<CreateOwnerResult> {\n  const { userId, transferKey } = opts\n\n  // Managed mode requires a strong (Shamir) recovery profile, validated BEFORE\n  // any disk write — same gate as createNoydb.\n  if (isManaged(opts) && !opts.recovery.some((r) => r.profile === 'shamir')) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      'managed-mode adoption requires at least one strong (shamir) recovery profile in '\n      + '`recovery` — paper alone is not strong when there is no user secret to fall back on.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 1. Verify adopted-unowned state.\n  const adoptionEnv = await store.get(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption')\n  if (!adoptionEnv) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" is not an adopted partition (no _meta/adoption). `\n      + `createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition only applies to vaults created via adoptPartition.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const adoption = JSON.parse(adoptionEnv._data) as {\n    sealId: string; adoptedAt: string; needsOwner?: boolean\n    consumedAt?: string; transferSeal?: TransferSealPayload\n  }\n  if (adoption.consumedAt !== undefined || adoption.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already has an owner (transfer seal consumed at ${adoption.consumedAt}).`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 2. Recover the partition DEKs from the seal (throws on wrong key) BEFORE\n  //    writing any keyring, so a bad transfer key leaves no trace. Always\n  //    validated, including when resuming a partial prior call.\n  const partitionDeks = await unsealDeks(adoption.transferSeal, transferKey)\n\n  // The ceremony below is split into stages so a failure in the fallible\n  // managed-enrollment step (network/provider outage) leaves the call RETRYABLE\n  // — the seal is destroyed only once everything durable is in place. Each stage\n  // detects its own prior completion rather than relying on a single resume bit.\n\n  // A keyring present for a DIFFERENT user (with the seal still unconsumed) is a\n  // genuine second-owner attempt — refuse it. A same-user keyring is a resumed\n  // partial call and is handled by the stage checks below.\n  const existingKeyring = await store.get(vaultName, '_keyring', userId)\n  const otherOwners = (await store.list(vaultName, '_keyring')).filter((u) => u !== userId)\n  if (otherOwners.length > 0) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already has a keyring for a different owner; cannot create owner \"${userId}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Stage A — mint the owner keyring + merge the partition DEKs. Considered done\n  // only when the keyring already holds every partition DEK. createOwnerKeyring\n  // overwrites (fresh KEK + fresh _users DEK), so re-running is safe ONLY while\n  // no recovery has been enrolled yet — guaranteed here because enrollment\n  // (Stage C) runs strictly after Stage A completes.\n  const partitionCollections = [...partitionDeks.keys()]\n  const priorDeks = existingKeyring ? (JSON.parse(existingKeyring._data) as KeyringFile).deks : {}\n  const ownerMinted = existingKeyring !== null && partitionCollections.every((c) => c in priorDeks)\n  if (!ownerMinted) {\n    // Resolve the owner secret. Managed mode mints a random secret, seals\n    // it under the provider, and persists _meta/sealed-secret (so the\n    // partition auto-unlocks on the recipient's device); standard mode uses the\n    // caller's secret. Idempotent under retry — resolveManagedSecret's reopen\n    // arm reuses an already-sealed secret.\n    const secret = isManaged(opts)\n      ? await resolveManagedSecret(store, vaultName, opts.sealingKey)\n      : opts.secret\n\n    // Mint the owner keyring (KEK + _users DEK + canary, written to disk).\n    const unlocked = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vaultName, { userId: userId, secret: secret })\n\n    // Merge the partition DEKs (wrapped under the new KEK) into the keyring.\n    const env = await store.get(vaultName, '_keyring', userId)\n    if (!env) throw new AdoptionStateError(`keyring write for \"${userId}\" did not persist`)\n    const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n    const kek = unlocked.kek\n    if (!kek) throw new AdoptionStateError(`owner keyring for \"${userId}\" has no KEK to wrap partition DEKs under`)\n    const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n    for (const [collection, dek] of partitionDeks) {\n      mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, kek)\n    }\n    const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n    await store.put(vaultName, '_keyring', userId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n  }\n\n  // Stage B — record the ownership transition on the carried\n  // audit chain (carryLedger sealed the _ledger DEK). No-op without that DEK.\n  // Idempotent: appended only if the closing `transfer-seal-consumed` entry is\n  // absent, so a retry does not duplicate the pair.\n  const ledgerDek = partitionDeks.get(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n  if (ledgerDek) {\n    const ledger = new LedgerStore({\n      adapter: store,\n      vault: vaultName,\n      encrypted: true,\n      getDEK: async () => ledgerDek,\n      actor: userId,\n    })\n    const creationReason = `creation-of-new-owner:${userId}`\n    const consumedReason = `transfer-seal-consumed:${adoption.sealId}`\n    // Gate each append on its own presence — a crash or store error strictly\n    // between the two adjacent puts would otherwise re-append the first one\n    // on retry. The pair is the audit record, not a single transaction.\n    const recordedReasons = new Set((await ledger.loadAllEntries()).map((e) => e.reason))\n    if (!recordedReasons.has(creationReason)) {\n      await ledger.append({ op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: '', payloadHash: '', reason: creationReason })\n    }\n    if (!recordedReasons.has(consumedReason)) {\n      await ledger.append({ op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: '', payloadHash: '', reason: consumedReason })\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Stage C — Managed mode: enroll the mandatory strong recovery\n  //    by orchestrating the existing public ceremony. The partition is\n  //    now a managed-mode vault on disk (sealed secret + keyring), so we\n  //    open it as a normal client and let openVaultAndEnrollRecovery do the\n  //    gate-bypass + enroll + re-assert. Dynamic import keeps the Noydb class\n  //    out of the @noy-db/hub/cargo static graph. Runs BEFORE seal destruction\n  //    so a failure here leaves the seal intact and the call retryable.\n  if (isManaged(opts)) {\n    const { createNoydb } = await import('../kernel/noydb.js')\n    const db = await createNoydb({\n      store,\n      user: userId,\n      secretMode: 'managed',\n      sealingKey: opts.sealingKey,\n      shamirRecovery: opts.shamirRecovery,\n    })\n    await db.team.openVaultAndEnrollRecovery(vaultName, { recovery: opts.recovery })\n  }\n\n  // Stage D — Destroy the transfer seal LAST — the commit point. Everything\n  //    above is either idempotent or resumable, so the seal is only consumed\n  //    once the owner keyring (and, in managed mode, strong recovery) is\n  //    durably in place. Retain sealId + consumedAt for audit.\n  const consumed = { sealId: adoption.sealId, adoptedAt: adoption.adoptedAt, consumedAt: new Date().toISOString() }\n  await store.put(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption', { ...adoptionEnv, _data: JSON.stringify(consumed) })\n\n  return { vaultName, userId }\n}\n","/**\n * Read-side counterpart to `extractPartition`: decrypt an\n * extracted-partition bundle's records to plaintext using its transfer\n * key, WITHOUT adopting it into a vault. Used by an outward\n * orchestration layer's reconcile/merge and field-authority flows to\n * compare incoming records against a receiver. The transfer key validates the bundle\n * (wrong key throws).\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { openEnvelopeJson } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { readPodHeader, readPod, parseExtractedPartitionBody } from '../with-pod/bundle.js'\nimport { unsealDeks } from './adopt-partition.js'\n\n/** One decrypted record from an extracted-partition compartment. */\nexport interface DecryptedRecord {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly record: Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Source envelope write timestamp (ISO) — for last-write-wins merges. */\n  readonly ts: string\n  /** Source envelope version. */\n  readonly version: number\n  /** Provenance source id (FR-5). Present only when the source collection had provenance:true and a source was supplied on put. */\n  readonly source?: string\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the provenance source was recorded (FR-5). */\n  readonly sourceTs?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt every record of an extracted-partition bundle to plaintext,\n * grouped by collection. Throws if the bundle isn't an\n * extracted-partition or the transfer key is wrong.\n */\nexport async function decryptExtractedPartition(\n  bundleBytes: Uint8Array,\n  transferKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Record<string, DecryptedRecord[]>> {\n  const header = readPodHeader(bundleBytes)\n  if (header.bundleKind !== 'extracted-partition' || header.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new Error('decryptExtractedPartition: bundle is not an extracted-partition.')\n  }\n  const { dumpJson } = await readPod(bundleBytes)\n  const { dump, seal } = parseExtractedPartitionBody(dumpJson)\n  const deks = await unsealDeks(seal, transferKey) // throws TransferSealError on wrong key\n  const backup = JSON.parse(dump) as { collections: Record<string, Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope>> }\n  const out: Record<string, DecryptedRecord[]> = {}\n  for (const [collection, byId] of Object.entries(backup.collections)) {\n    const dek = deks.get(collection)\n    if (dek === undefined) continue // no DEK sealed for this collection — skip\n    const recs: DecryptedRecord[] = []\n    for (const [id, env] of Object.entries(byId)) {\n      const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(env, dek)\n      const body = JSON.parse(plaintext) as Record<string, unknown>\n      recs.push({\n        id,\n        record: { ...body, id },\n        ts: env._ts,\n        version: env._v,\n        ...(env._source !== undefined ? { source: env._source } : {}),\n        ...(env._sourceTs !== undefined ? { sourceTs: env._sourceTs } : {}),\n      })\n    }\n    out[collection] = recs\n  }\n  return out\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA2JA,eAAsB,UACpB,OACA,WACA,UAAuB,CAAC,GACD;AACvB,QAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC/B,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AACpE,QAAM,YACJ,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAC,GAAY,MAAe,KAAU,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW;AAO/E,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAA4B;AAC7C,mBAAiB,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG;AAC3E,QAAI,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,EAAG;AAC7C,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,oBAAI,IAAe;AACpE,eAAW,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;AAClC,YAAM,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,GAAI;AACT,iBAAW,IAAI,IAAI,MAAW;AAAA,IAChC;AACA,SAAK,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,EACvC;AAGA,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,mBAAsB,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAGjE,QAAM,QAA6B,CAAC;AACpC,QAAM,WAAwC,CAAC;AAC/C,QAAM,UAA+B,CAAC;AACtC,QAAM,YAA6C,QAAQ,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI;AAEnF,QAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAI,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,aAAW,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AACpD,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK,oBAAI,IAAe;AAC5D,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK,oBAAI,IAAe;AAC5D,UAAM,SAAS,oBAAI,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AAE/D,eAAW,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAC9B,YAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAE7B,UAAI,WAAW,UAAa,UAAU,QAAW;AAE/C,cAAM,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,MAC9C,WAAW,WAAW,UAAa,UAAU,QAAW;AAEtD,cAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,kBACpB,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAM,SACxD;AACJ,gBAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAI,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG,CAAC;AAAA,MAClG,WAAW,WAAW,UAAa,UAAU,QAAW;AACtD,YAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AAC5B,qBAAW,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,QACnD,OAAO;AAEL,gBAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,kBACpB,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAM,SACxD;AACJ,gBAAM,aAAa,KAAU,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC1C,gBAAM,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACnD,mBAAS,KAAK;AAAA,YACZ;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,YACA,QAAQ;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,YACA;AAAA,YACA,GAAI,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,UAC/C,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACd,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACX,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACjB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClD;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,MAAM;AACX,aAAO,WAAW,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IACjF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAIA,eAAe,mBACb,WACA,OACA,QACsC;AACtC,QAAM,MAAM,oBAAI,IAA4B;AAK5C,MACE,OAAO,cAAc,YACrB,cAAc,QACd,kBAAkB,aAClB,OAAQ,UAAoB,iBAAiB,YAC7C;AACA,qBAAiB,SAAU,UAAoB,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG;AAC1F,UAAI,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,EAAG;AAC7C,YAAM,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,oBAAI,IAAe;AACnE,iBAAW,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS;AAClC,cAAM,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,YAAI,CAAC,GAAI;AACT,mBAAW,IAAI,IAAI,MAAW;AAAA,MAChC;AACA,UAAI,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IACtC;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,cAAc,UAAU;AACjC,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACF,eAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,IAC/B,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,kDAAmD,IAAc,OAAO;AAAA,MAC1E;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,sBAAyB,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACvD;AAGA,SAAO,sBAAyB,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAC1D;AAEA,SAAS,sBACP,KACA,OACA,QAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM,MAAM,oBAAI,IAA4B;AAC5C,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAC3C,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AAGA,aAAW,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAC9C,QAAI,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACzB,QAAI,UAAU,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG;AAChC,QAAI,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG;AAC3B,UAAM,aAAa,oBAAI,IAAe;AACtC,eAAW,UAAU,OAAuB;AAC1C,UAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW,SAAU;AACnD,YAAM,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,GAAI;AACT,iBAAW,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,IAC3B;AACA,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EACzB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAAqD;AAC/E,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,aAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AAGrB,UAAM,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI;AAC/B,QAAI,EAAG,MAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACtB;AACA,SAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI;AACjB;AASA,SAAS,YAAY,QAAiB,OAAuB;AAC3D,MAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW,SAAU,QAAO;AAC1D,QAAM,IAAK,OAAmC,KAAK;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAClC,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AAChE,SAAO;AACT;AASA,SAAS,WACP,QACA,GACQ;AACR,QAAM,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG,eAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,kBAAe,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM;AACxF,MAAI,WAAW,QAAS,QAAO;AAC/B,MAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO;AACzC,MAAI,WAAW,WAAY,QAAO;AAElC,QAAM,OAAiB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;AAChC,aAAW,KAAK,EAAE,MAAO,MAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,QAAS;AACnE,aAAW,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU;AAC1B,UAAM,SAAS,EAAE,WACd,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,WAAM,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EACjE,KAAK,IAAI;AACZ,SAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,aAAe,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC1D;AACA,aAAW,KAAK,EAAE,QAAS,MAAK,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,UAAW;AACvE,SAAO,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AACvB;AAEA,SAAS,UAAU,OAAwB;AACzC,MAAI,UAAU,OAAW,QAAO;AAChC,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAK9B,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAClC,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClD;;;AC5XO,SAAS,YAA2B;AACzC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,YAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,iCAAwB;AACtE,aAAO,qBAAqB,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACkBA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,MAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI;AAEtE,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC5D,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY;AAEhC,QAAM,eAED,CAAC;AACN,QAAM,eAA0D,CAAC;AACjE,MAAI,aAAa;AACjB,MAAI,eAAe;AAEnB,aAAW,CAAC,gBAAgB,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,cAAc;AAElB,eAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,EAAE;AAC3D,UAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AAGR,qBAAa,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC;AACpD;AAAA,MACF;AACA;AACA,eAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE;AAC7C,YAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACf,UAAI,aAAa,UAAa,KAAK,SAAU,YAAW;AACxD,UAAI,aAAa,UAAa,KAAK,SAAU,YAAW;AAAA,IAC1D;AAEA,iBAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MAChB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGA,GAAI,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC7C,GAAI,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,kBAAc;AACd,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB;AAEA,eAAa,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAExD,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACnB;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;;;ACpEA,eAAsB,WACpB,MACA,aACkC;AAClC,MAAI,YAAY,eAAe,IAAI;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,sCAAsC,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,aAA6B,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AAC3G,QAAM,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,OAAO;AACvC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAY,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAkB;AAAA,MACxD;AAAA,MACA,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,IACd;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,aAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,2DAA2D;AAAA,EACzF;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAwB;AACzC,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAGtD,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG,GAAmB,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AAC7H,SAAK,IAAI,YAAY,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1B;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAcA,eAAsB,eACpB,aACA,MAC+B;AAC/B,QAAM,EAAE,aAAa,kBAAkB,UAAU,IAAI;AAErD,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,WAAW;AACxC,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,yBAAyB,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAW;AACpF,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW;AAC9C,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,4BAA4B,QAAQ;AAM3D,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW;AAQlC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,UAAU;AAC1E,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACvC,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ;AAChC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,qBAAqB,KAAK,MAAM,oCAAoC,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/E;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,UAAU,SAAS,gDAAgD,MAAM,MAAM,6CACnC,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IAEzD;AAAA,EACF;AAQA,QAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,WAAW,UAAU;AACzE,MAAI,gBAAgB,SAAS,GAAG;AAC9B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IAErB;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,QAAM,iBAAiB,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,WAAW;AAI5D,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW;AACpB,eAAW,CAAC,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AACpE,iBAAW,CAAC,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACpD,cAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,MAChE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AACzC,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,YAAY,MAAe,cAAc,KAAK;AACjG,QAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY;AAAA,IACzD,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAG,IAAI;AAAA,IAAG,KAAK;AAAA,IAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC3E,CAAC;AAED,SAAO,EAAE,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC5D;AAgCA,SAAS,UAAU,GAAuD;AACxE,SAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,EAAE,eAAe;AAC/C;AAuBA,eAAsB,8BACpB,OACA,WACA,MAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI;AAIhC,MAAI,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAG;AACzE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,UAAU;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa;AAChB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IAErB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK;AAI7C,MAAI,SAAS,eAAe,UAAa,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAW;AAC5E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,UAAU,SAAS,qDAAqD,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,IAC7F;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,WAAW;AAUzE,QAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM;AACrE,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AACxF,MAAI,YAAY,SAAS,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,UAAU,SAAS,uEAAuE,MAAM;AAAA,IAClG;AAAA,EACF;AAOA,QAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC,GAAG,cAAc,KAAK,CAAC;AACrD,QAAM,YAAY,kBAAmB,KAAK,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,EAAkB,OAAO,CAAC;AAC/F,QAAM,cAAc,oBAAoB,QAAQ,qBAAqB,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChG,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa;AAMhB,UAAM,SAAS,UAAU,IAAI,IACzB,MAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK,UAAU,IAC5D,KAAK;AAGT,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,WAAW,EAAE,QAAgB,OAAe,CAAC;AAG9F,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM;AACzD,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,mBAAmB,sBAAsB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AACtF,UAAM,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACxC,UAAM,MAAM,SAAS;AACrB,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,mBAAmB,sBAAsB,MAAM,2CAA2C;AAC9G,UAAM,aAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK;AACjE,eAAW,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7C,iBAAW,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACjD;AACA,UAAM,aAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,WAAW;AACnE,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9F;AAMA,QAAM,YAAY,cAAc,IAAI,iBAAiB;AACrD,MAAI,WAAW;AACb,UAAM,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,MAC7B,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,WAAW;AAAA,MACX,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,MACpB,OAAO;AAAA,IACT,CAAC;AACD,UAAM,iBAAiB,yBAAyB,MAAM;AACtD,UAAM,iBAAiB,0BAA0B,SAAS,MAAM;AAIhE,UAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;AACpF,QAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG;AACxC,YAAM,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,eAAe,CAAC;AAAA,IACjI;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG;AACxC,YAAM,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,aAAa,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,eAAe,CAAC;AAAA,IACjI;AAAA,EACF;AASA,MAAI,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG;AACnB,UAAM,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAoB;AACzD,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY;AAAA,MAC3B;AAAA,MACA,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB,CAAC;AACD,UAAM,GAAG,KAAK,2BAA2B,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EACjF;AAMA,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,WAAW,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,EAAE;AAChH,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;AAEnG,SAAO,EAAE,WAAW,OAAO;AAC7B;;;ACrUA,eAAsB,0BACpB,aACA,aAC4C;AAC5C,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,WAAW;AACxC,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,yBAAyB,OAAO,iBAAiB,QAAW;AACpF,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kEAAkE;AAAA,EACpF;AACA,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW;AAC9C,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,4BAA4B,QAAQ;AAC3D,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW;AAC/C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAyC,CAAC;AAChD,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG;AACnE,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU;AAC/B,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAW;AACvB,UAAM,OAA0B,CAAC;AACjC,eAAW,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAC5C,YAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG;AACjD,YAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,WAAK,KAAK;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,QACtB,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,QACb,GAAI,IAAI,YAAY,SAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC3D,GAAI,IAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACnE,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,QAAI,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,EACpB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-TOAIYQJR.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/schema-update/fence.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Schema-fence document. Vault-level generation counter + drain\n * state, stored at `_meta/schema-fence` using the plaintext-envelope\n * pattern of `_meta/policy` (no PII — a counter + a state enum).\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\nexport type FenceState = 'normal' | 'draining' | 'migrating' | 'complete'\n\nexport interface FenceDoc {\n  readonly currentSchemaVersion: number\n  readonly fenceState: FenceState\n  /**\n   * Content hash (`PersistedSchemaEnvelope.hash`) of the schema most\n   * recently persisted while the vault sat at `currentSchemaVersion` —\n   * binds \"generation N\" to a concrete schema-content hash (#946), so\n   * \"which schema is generation N\" is answerable from `schemaFenceState()`\n   * alone. Optional: absent on a fresh vault (generation 0, nothing\n   * persisted yet) and on a fence document written before #946.\n   */\n  readonly schemaHash?: string\n}\n\nexport const FENCE_RECORD_ID = 'schema-fence'\nconst META_COLLECTION = '_meta'\n\nexport const DEFAULT_FENCE: FenceDoc = { currentSchemaVersion: 0, fenceState: 'normal' }\n\nexport async function loadFence(store: NoydbStore, vault: string): Promise<FenceDoc> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, META_COLLECTION, FENCE_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return DEFAULT_FENCE\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as unknown\n    if (!isFenceDoc(parsed)) return DEFAULT_FENCE\n    return parsed\n  } catch {\n    return DEFAULT_FENCE\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function saveFence(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, fence: FenceDoc): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(fence),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, META_COLLECTION, FENCE_RECORD_ID, envelope)\n}\n\nfunction isFenceDoc(x: unknown): x is FenceDoc {\n  if (x === null || typeof x !== 'object') return false\n  const o = x as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (typeof o['currentSchemaVersion'] !== 'number') return false\n  if (o['fenceState'] !== 'normal' && o['fenceState'] !== 'draining'\n    && o['fenceState'] !== 'migrating' && o['fenceState'] !== 'complete') return false\n  // schemaHash is optional (#946) — a legacy fence doc without it is still valid.\n  return o['schemaHash'] === undefined || typeof o['schemaHash'] === 'string'\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAwBO,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAC/B,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAEjB,IAAM,gBAA0B,EAAE,sBAAsB,GAAG,YAAY,SAAS;AAEvF,eAAsB,UAAU,OAAmB,OAAkC;AACnF,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,eAAe;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACxC,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,eAAsB,UAAU,OAAmB,OAAe,OAAgC;AAChG,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EAC7B;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AACnE;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,GAA2B;AAC7C,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAC1D,MAAI,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,cACnD,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,eAAe,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,WAAY,QAAO;AAE/E,SAAO,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM,UAAa,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,MAAM;AACrE;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-UHXCLPGC.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/via/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// kernel/via/index.ts — the ONLY kernel-resident via surface.\nimport { NoydbError } from '../errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\n\n/** Awaitable type for potentially async results. */\ntype Awaitable<T> = T | Promise<T>\n\n/** Declared security posture — a property the kernel enforces (enforcement activates in phases B/C). */\nexport interface ViaPosture {\n  readonly encryptedAtRest: 'envelope' | 'sealed'\n  readonly queryable: 'none' | 'det-exact' | 'ordered' | 'full'\n  readonly exportable: boolean\n  readonly forgettable: boolean\n}\n\n/** Opaque marker every feature descriptor extends; the kernel never sees concrete descriptor types. */\nexport interface ViaDescriptor { readonly _viaBrand: string }\n\n/** Per-call write context (A: minimal; B/C extend). */\nexport interface ViaWriteCtx {\n  readonly id: string\n  /** Owning vault name (event payload identity — e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** Prior stored record (decoded), lazily resolved. Null when creating. */\n  readonly prior: () => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>\n  /** Typed event emission (e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly emit: (event: string, payload: unknown) => void\n}\n\n/** Per-call read context — mirrors LocaleReadOptions loosely; features narrow. */\nexport interface ViaReadCtx {\n  readonly locale?: unknown\n  readonly fallback?: unknown\n  readonly layer: string\n}\n\n/** One sealed slot's ciphertext — matches the existing `iv:data` sealed map entries (seam map §2 step 2). */\nexport interface SealedSlotRef { readonly iv: string; readonly data: string }\n\n/**\n * A scoped crypto capability handed to a `via` feature's `encodeAtRest`/\n * `decodeAtRest`/`erase` hooks — never the keyring, never the enclave.\n * `sealedSlots` is pre-bound to one `(collection, recordId)`; `reservedEnvelopes`\n * is a whole-envelope encrypt/decrypt door scoped to collection names under a\n * declared prefix (e.g. `_dict_`).\n */\nexport interface ViaCryptoCtx {\n  readonly sealedSlots: {\n    seal(field: string, plaintext: unknown): Promise<SealedSlotRef>\n    unseal(field: string, ref: SealedSlotRef): Promise<unknown>\n    delete(field: string): Promise<void>\n  }\n  reservedEnvelopes(prefix: string): {\n    encrypt(collection: string, json: string, v: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope>\n    decrypt(collection: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  }\n}\n\n/** Per-call erase context — `forget()`'s per-ref participation door (phase C). */\nexport interface ViaEraseCtx { readonly id: string; readonly vault: string; readonly live: unknown /* EncryptedEnvelope */; readonly crypto: ViaCryptoCtx }\n/**\n * What an `erase` hook reports back to `forget()`'s summary ledger entry.\n * `retainedShared` is additive (#629 Task 10) — content NOT erased because\n * still referenced by another live record (blob's shared-chunk dual\n * accounting, `shredAllForRecord()`'s `retainedShared` count). Absent/0 for\n * bindings with no such concept (a sealed field is never \"shared\").\n */\nexport interface ViaEraseReport { readonly shredded: number; readonly residue: readonly unknown[]; readonly retainedShared?: number }\n\n/**\n * A feature bound to one collection's declared config. Record-grain hooks —\n * every hook receives the whole record (matches the real engine signatures,\n * e.g. quantizeMoneyFields(record, moneyFields)). All hooks optional;\n * absent = passthrough. Query-participation hooks are SYNC (#553).\n */\nexport interface ViaBinding {\n  readonly brand: string\n  readonly posture: ViaPosture\n  /** Declared dependencies (field paths / cross-record specs). MANDATORY for any future\n   *  derive-bearing binding — phase C validates well-formedness (strings, non-empty,\n   *  reference declared fields) and graph-registers a derived edge for each covered\n   *  field at declare time, right after `compileViaBindings` builds the bindings\n   *  (unknown source field throws `ValidationError`). See\n   *  `kernel/collection-config.ts`'s `resolveViaBindingDepsEdges`. */\n  readonly deps?: readonly string[]\n  /** Collection-name prefixes this binding's `reservedEnvelopes` capability may address (e.g. `_dict_`). */\n  readonly reservedPrefixes?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Does this binding own `field`? Backs `ViaPipeline.postureFor` (#629 Task\n   * 8's posture consumer) — a passive coverage check, independent of\n   * `buildClause`/`compareForOrder` (which some bindings, e.g. classified and\n   * blob, never define). SYNC, no side effects.\n   *\n   * Contract (documentation only — not enforced at runtime, future work):\n   * any binding declaring a non-default posture value — `queryable: 'none'`\n   * (#629 Task 8) or `exportable: false` (#629 Task 9's `redactForExport`)\n   * — MUST implement `covers()`. `postureFor`'s consumers only engage for\n   * fields a binding actively claims via `covers()`; a binding that omits\n   * it would silently fall through to the generic (unrefused/unredacted)\n   * path instead.\n   */\n  covers?(field: string): boolean\n  // NOTE: phase C adds a `derive` hook ADDITIVELY — do not stub it now.\n  // ── write pipeline ──\n  /** Refuse a write before crypto runs (classified step-3 slot: storage:'never' rejection + validators). Throws to refuse. */\n  enforceWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): void | Promise<void>\n  /** First pipeline stage (money canonicalizeIncomingMoney). SYNC. */\n  ingest?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Decode STORED form to canonical for internal boundaries (gates, derivations, patch bases). SYNC. */\n  canonicalizeStored?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Post-validation write encoding (money quantize; i18n translate→script→validate→densify). May be async. */\n  encodeWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Final write-pipeline stage: seal/encrypt declared fields via `crypto` before the envelope body is built (classified step-2 slot). */\n  encodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx): Promise<{ record: Record<string, unknown>; sealed?: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> }>\n  // ── read pipeline ──\n  /** First read-pipeline stage: unseal/decrypt declared fields via `crypto` before `present` runs (classified sealed-handle slot). */\n  decodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, sealed: Record<string, SealedSlotRef>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx, opts: { asHandles: boolean }): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Read-time presentation (money decode+virtuals; i18n locale/labels/strip). May be async. */\n  present?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /**\n   * Late read-time presentation (#669) — runs AFTER every binding's `present()` in the\n   * money+computed present-order segment (`ViaPipeline`'s `_presentOrder`, `kernel/via/\n   * pipeline.ts`), BEFORE the \"everything else\" segment (i18n/lookup dressing, taint\n   * redaction) runs. Exists for a binding that needs to react to a virtual computed\n   * field's fresh OWN-field output before anything dresses it (money's MAJOR-UNITS\n   * quantize-and-present for a field that is BOTH money AND `mode:'virtual'` computed) —\n   * `present()` alone can't express \"run after computed for THESE fields only, before\n   * computed for all others\", since it's a per-BINDING fold, not per-field. Folded over\n   * `bindings` in declaration order (mirrors every other per-binding fold), so lookup/\n   * i18n dressing and taint/redaction (both in the \"everything else\" segment) still see\n   * the already-dressed value.\n   */\n  presentLate?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  // ── query participation (ALL SYNC — #553) ──\n  /** Returns an opaque clause payload when this binding covers `field`, else undefined. */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  buildClause?(field: string, op: string, value: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /** Evaluate a payload produced by buildClause against a raw stored value. */\n  evaluateClause?(actual: unknown, op: string, payload: unknown): boolean\n  /**\n   * Optional: the STORED-form operand for a direct secondary-index probe\n   * against a payload produced by `buildClause` (#625) — lets\n   * `candidateRecords()` (`query/builder.ts`) hit `CollectionIndexes.\n   * lookupEqual`/`lookupIn` for `==`/`in` clauses instead of falling back\n   * to a linear scan + per-record `evaluateClause`. Returning `undefined`\n   * means \"no sound probe for this op/payload\" (e.g. a comparison whose\n   * stored form isn't a single index-bucketable value, or an op the index\n   * can't serve) — the caller falls back to the scan. A binding that\n   * never implements this hook always falls back, unchanged from before\n   * this hook existed.\n   */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  indexProbe?(op: string, payload: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /**\n   * Optional: canonicalize a raw STORED field value into the bucket key an\n   * eager index should use (#672) — lets `CollectionIndexes` group a\n   * pre-declaration / non-canonical stored value (e.g. a money field's\n   * leftover `'0100'` written before its `money()` declaration) under the\n   * SAME key a canonical write produces (`'100'`), so the index-probe fast\n   * path (`indexProbe` above) and the fallback scan (`evaluateClause`)\n   * agree on which records match. `undefined` means \"not mine / can't\n   * canonicalize this value\" — the caller buckets the raw stringified\n   * value, unchanged from before this hook existed. MUST agree with what\n   * this binding's own `evaluateClause`/`indexProbe` treat as equal, or\n   * the fast path and the scan will disagree.\n   */\n  canonicalizeIndexKey?(field: string, rawValue: unknown): string | undefined\n  /** Decode a raw stored record for query/scan results and callback views ('raw' — no virtuals). */\n  decodeResults?(record: unknown): unknown\n  /** Exact ordering for a covered field; undefined when the field is not covered. */\n  compareForOrder?(field: string, a: unknown, b: unknown): number | undefined\n  /**\n   * Per-key, PER-CALL-locale label resolution for `orderBy(field, dir,\n   * { by: 'label' })` (#650 Task 7) — the sibling `compareForOrder` above\n   * structurally cannot serve, since it carries no locale parameter.\n   * `locale` is the query's per-call locale (`undefined` for a locale-less\n   * query — a binding may fall back to its own descriptor-level default,\n   * mirroring `present`'s displayLocale hinge). `undefined` return = this\n   * binding doesn't resolve a label for `key` at `field` — caller falls\n   * back to the raw stored value, same graceful-degrade discipline every\n   * other via query hook uses. SYNC (#553 — query participation).\n   */\n  resolveOrderLabel?(field: string, key: string, locale: string | undefined): string | undefined\n  /** Rewrite an aggregate spec (money exact reducers). */\n  wrapReducers?(spec: unknown): unknown\n  // ── forget participation ──\n  /** `forget()`'s per-ref erasure door — shred/report this binding's residue for one record (classified/blob forget participation). */\n  erase?(ctx: ViaEraseCtx): Promise<ViaEraseReport>\n  // ── introspection ──\n  describeFragment?(): Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Binder: constructs a binding from a collection's declared config. Installed by the feature's declaration factory. */\nexport type ViaBinder = (config: unknown) => ViaBinding\n\nconst binders = new Map<string, ViaBinder>()\n\n/** @internal — called (idempotently, first-wins) by a feature's declaration factory, e.g. money(). */\nexport function installViaBinder(brand: string, binder: ViaBinder): void {\n  if (!binders.has(brand)) binders.set(brand, binder)\n}\n\n/** @internal — registry presence check. Used by tests (mirrors isMoneyEngineInstalled) and by vault's i18n validator delegators as a no-i18n-ever-declared fast path. */\nexport function isViaInstalled(brand: string): boolean {\n  return binders.has(brand)\n}\n\n/** @internal — resolve a binder; throws when the declaration factory never ran (hand-rolled descriptors). */\nexport function viaBinder(brand: string): ViaBinder {\n  const b = binders.get(brand)\n  if (!b) {\n    throw new NoydbError(\n      'VIA_NOT_LINKED',\n      `via feature \"${brand}\" requires descriptors created via its declaration factory from @noy-db/hub`,\n    )\n  }\n  return b\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAmMA,IAAM,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAuB;AAGpC,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAe,QAAyB;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG,SAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,OAAwB;AACrD,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1B;AAGO,SAAS,UAAU,OAA0B;AAClD,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-UIBGXRDD.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/directory/storage.ts","../src/with-party/directory/visibility.ts","../src/with-party/directory/user-envelope/storage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Persistence helpers for the vault-level user-directory toggle\n * (`_meta/directory`). Mirrors the bypass-AES pattern used by\n * `_meta/policy` — the directory document is plain JSON, the\n * envelope's `_iv` field is left empty.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md → Directory visibility\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/plaintext-bypass.md — every `_iv: ''` write site\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { DirectoryConfig } from './types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection name for vault-level metadata documents. */\nexport const META_COLLECTION = '_meta'\n/** Reserved id for the vault-level directory document. */\nexport const DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID = 'directory'\n\n/**\n * Read the directory toggle from `_meta/directory`. Returns `undefined`\n * when no document has been persisted — callers treat that as the\n * default-on case (`{ enabled: true }`).\n *\n * Tolerates corrupted documents the same way `_meta/policy` does: a\n * JSON parse failure surfaces as `undefined`, not a thrown error, so a\n * bad write never permanently breaks team enumeration.\n */\nexport async function readDirectoryConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DirectoryConfig | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, META_COLLECTION, DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as unknown\n    if (!isDirectoryConfig(parsed)) return undefined\n    return parsed\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist the directory toggle at `_meta/directory`. Idempotent — call\n * on every `db.setDirectoryEnabled()` invocation. Owner-only at the\n * caller site; this primitive does not check roles.\n */\nexport async function persistDirectoryConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  config: DirectoryConfig,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify({ enabled: config.enabled }),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, META_COLLECTION, DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID, envelope)\n}\n\nfunction isDirectoryConfig(x: unknown): x is DirectoryConfig {\n  if (x === null || typeof x !== 'object') return false\n  if (!('enabled' in x)) return false\n  return typeof (x as { enabled: unknown }).enabled === 'boolean'\n}\n","/**\n * Persistence helpers for the per-user visibility flag\n * (`_meta/visibility/<keyringId>`). Mirrors the bypass-AES pattern used\n * by `_meta/policy` — the visibility document is plain JSON, the\n * envelope's `_iv` field is left empty.\n *\n * Stored alongside the keyring file rather than inside the encrypted\n * user envelope (`_users/<keyringId>`) because:\n *\n *  - `UserEnvelope<T>.data` is opaque-to-hub by contract — hub does not\n *    introspect or reserve any keys inside it. Adding `hidden` there\n *    would violate that contract.\n *  - `listUsersWithEnvelopes` filters by the flag, and the filter must\n *    work even when decryption fails (legacy keyrings predating the\n *    envelope feature, or a corrupted envelope).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md → Directory visibility\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/plaintext-bypass.md — every `_iv: ''` write site\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UserVisibility } from './types.js'\nimport { META_COLLECTION } from './storage.js'\n\n/** Prefix for per-user visibility records inside `_meta`. */\nexport const VISIBILITY_RECORD_PREFIX = 'visibility/'\n\n/** Compose the `_meta` record id for a keyring's visibility doc. */\nexport function visibilityRecordId(keyringId: string): string {\n  return VISIBILITY_RECORD_PREFIX + keyringId\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the visibility flag for `keyringId`. Returns `undefined` when no\n * document has been persisted — callers treat that as the default-visible\n * case (`{ hidden: false }`).\n */\nexport async function readUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n): Promise<UserVisibility | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId))\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as unknown\n    if (!isUserVisibility(parsed)) return undefined\n    return parsed\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist the visibility flag for `keyringId` at\n * `_meta/visibility/<keyringId>`. Idempotent — call on every\n * `vault.user.setMyVisibility()` invocation. Own-only at the caller\n * site; this primitive does not enforce keyring ownership.\n */\nexport async function persistUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n  visibility: UserVisibility,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify({ hidden: visibility.hidden }),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId), envelope)\n}\n\n/**\n * Delete the visibility flag for `keyringId`. Called from `revoke()`\n * alongside `deleteUserEnvelope` so the sidecar does not leak to a\n * re-granted principal with the same `userId`. Idempotent — the store's\n * `delete()` is already a no-op when the record is absent.\n */\nexport async function deleteUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  await store.delete(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId))\n}\n\nfunction isUserVisibility(x: unknown): x is UserVisibility {\n  if (x === null || typeof x !== 'object') return false\n  if (!('hidden' in x)) return false\n  return typeof (x as { hidden: unknown }).hidden === 'boolean'\n}\n","/**\n * Persistence helpers for per-principal user envelopes stored at\n * `_users/<keyringId>` (logically: `_meta/user/<keyringId>`).\n *\n * Unlike `_meta/policy` and `_meta/handle` which are plaintext, user\n * envelopes carry user data and are encrypted with a dedicated\n * {@link USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION} DEK (provisioned at vault open and\n * propagated to every keyring via the system-collection DEK path in\n * `team/keyring.ts`).\n *\n * This module is the **storage primitive** layer. The public API\n * (`vault.user.*`) sits on top of this; permission gates, own-only\n * write enforcement, and presence-channel propagation live there.\n *\n * @see design-history/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, UserEnvelope } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError, UserEnvelopeOversizedError } from '../../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION,\n  USER_ENVELOPE_MAX_BYTES,\n} from '../../../kernel/constants.js'\n\n/**\n * Read and decrypt the user envelope for `keyringId`. Returns `null`\n * when no envelope has been persisted (either the principal has never\n * called `updateMe`, or the keyring predates this feature).\n *\n * Decryption errors propagate — a tampered or wrong-keyed envelope\n * surfaces as the underlying crypto error rather than masquerading as\n * \"not found\".\n */\nexport async function loadUserEnvelope<T = unknown>(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<UserEnvelope<T> | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, keyringId)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, dek)\n  const data = JSON.parse(plaintext) as T\n  return {\n    keyringId,\n    data,\n    _v: envelope._v,\n    _ts: envelope._ts,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist the user envelope for `keyringId`. The new\n * version is `(prior._v ?? 0) + 1`. Pass `expectedVersion` to enable\n * optimistic-concurrency checks: a mismatch with the stored version\n * throws {@link ConflictError} with the actual stored version.\n *\n * `expectedVersion: 0` means \"expect no prior envelope\"; the write\n * succeeds only if no envelope exists yet.\n *\n * Soft-caps the JSON-serialized payload at {@link USER_ENVELOPE_MAX_BYTES};\n * larger payloads throw {@link UserEnvelopeOversizedError}.\n */\nexport async function saveUserEnvelope<T>(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n  payload: T,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  expectedVersion?: number,\n): Promise<UserEnvelope<T>> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(payload)\n  // TextEncoder counts bytes correctly for multi-byte UTF-8 (Thai text,\n  // emoji, etc.) — JSON.stringify().length would undercount.\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(json).byteLength\n  if (bytes > USER_ENVELOPE_MAX_BYTES) {\n    throw new UserEnvelopeOversizedError(bytes)\n  }\n\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, keyringId)\n  if (expectedVersion !== undefined) {\n    const priorVersion = prior?._v ?? 0\n    if (priorVersion !== expectedVersion) {\n      throw new ConflictError(\n        priorVersion,\n        `User envelope for \"${keyringId}\" expected version ${expectedVersion}, ` +\n          `actual ${priorVersion}`,\n      )\n    }\n  }\n\n  const nextVersion = (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1\n  const ts = new Date().toISOString()\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek)\n\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: nextVersion,\n    _ts: ts,\n    _iv: iv,\n    _data: data,\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, keyringId, envelope)\n\n  return {\n    keyringId,\n    data: payload,\n    _v: nextVersion,\n    _ts: ts,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Delete the user envelope for `keyringId`. Idempotent — no error if\n * the envelope is already absent. Called from the keyring revoke path\n * (cascade-delete) and is a no-op for keyrings that never wrote.\n */\nexport async function deleteUserEnvelope(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  await store.delete(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, keyringId)\n}\n\n/**\n * List the keyring ids that have a user envelope persisted in `vault`.\n * Order is store-defined — callers that need a stable order should sort.\n */\nexport async function listUserEnvelopeIds(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<string[]> {\n  return store.list(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAgBO,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAExB,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAWnC,eAAsB,oBACpB,OACA,OACsC;AACtC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,mBAAmB;AAC5E,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACxC,QAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACvC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,uBACpB,OACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACnD;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,qBAAqB,QAAQ;AACvE;AAEA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAkC;AAC3D,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,MAAI,EAAE,aAAa,GAAI,QAAO;AAC9B,SAAO,OAAQ,EAA2B,YAAY;AACxD;;;ACzCO,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAGjC,SAAS,mBAAmB,WAA2B;AAC5D,SAAO,2BAA2B;AACpC;AAOA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACqC;AACrC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,mBAAmB,SAAS,CAAC;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACxC,QAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACtC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAQA,eAAsB,sBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACA,YACe;AACf,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,mBAAmB,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ;AACjF;AAQA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB,mBAAmB,SAAS,CAAC;AAC1E;AAEA,SAAS,iBAAiB,GAAiC;AACzD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,MAAI,EAAE,YAAY,GAAI,QAAO;AAC7B,SAAO,OAAQ,EAA0B,WAAW;AACtD;;;AC3DA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACA,KACiC;AACjC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,SAAS;AAC3E,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,GAAG;AACtD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IACb,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAChB;AACF;AAcA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACA,SACA,KACA,iBAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO;AAGnC,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE;AAC7C,MAAI,QAAQ,yBAAyB;AACnC,UAAM,IAAI,2BAA2B,KAAK;AAAA,EAC5C;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,SAAS;AACxE,MAAI,oBAAoB,QAAW;AACjC,UAAM,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,QAAI,iBAAiB,iBAAiB;AACpC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA,sBAAsB,SAAS,sBAAsB,eAAe,YACxD,YAAY;AAAA,MAC1B;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AACvC,QAAM,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAClC,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAE5C,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,WAAW,QAAQ;AAEpE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,KAAK;AAAA,EACP;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,SAAS;AAC/D;AAMA,eAAsB,oBACpB,OACA,OACmB;AACnB,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACnD;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-V5KYPBUR.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/portability/request-withdrawal.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Two-party withdrawal ceremony.\n *\n * The conservative counterpart to `unilateralWithdrawal`: a non-owner —\n * including a read-only `client`/`viewer` who cannot self-serve a deletion —\n * files a durable REQUEST; an owner/admin reviews it and either APPROVES\n * (extract-and-dispose under firm authority) or REJECTS it. Every step is\n * audited in the tamper-evident ledger.\n *\n *   requester:  vault.user.requestWithdrawal({ scope, disposition?, legalBasis? })\n *   owner:      vault.user.listWithdrawalRequests()\n *               vault.user.approveWithdrawal(requestId, { reKey })  → { bundle, snapshot? }\n *               vault.user.rejectWithdrawal(requestId, { reason })\n *\n * Requests live in the reserved `_user_withdrawal_requests` namespace. The\n * record body is plaintext metadata (collection names + disposition + legal\n * basis — none secret in this trust model; the owner sees the data anyway) and\n * carries NO secret: the re-key secret is supplied by the approver at\n * approval time and conveyed to the requester out-of-band, so no secret is\n * stored at rest.\n */\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NoydbError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { resolveAccessibleCollections, buildAccessibleBundle } from './export-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeAndDeleteClosure, randomId, type FrozenSnapshotRef, type WithdrawResult } from './withdraw-accessible.js'\n\nexport const WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION = '_user_withdrawal_requests'\n\n/** Raised when a request is missing, already decided, or expired. */\nexport class WithdrawalRequestError extends NoydbError {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super('WITHDRAWAL_REQUEST', message)\n    this.name = 'WithdrawalRequestError'\n  }\n}\n\nexport type WithdrawalRequestStatus = 'pending' | 'approved' | 'rejected'\n\nexport interface WithdrawalRequest {\n  readonly requestId: string\n  readonly requester: string\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n  readonly disposition: 'delete' | 'freeze'\n  readonly legalBasis?: string\n  readonly status: WithdrawalRequestStatus\n  readonly requestedAt: string\n  readonly expiresAt?: string\n  readonly decidedAt?: string\n  readonly decidedBy?: string\n  readonly rejectReason?: string\n  readonly snapshotSha256?: string\n}\n\nexport interface RequestWithdrawalOptions {\n  readonly scope?: { readonly collections?: readonly string[] }\n  readonly disposition?: 'delete' | 'freeze'\n  readonly legalBasis?: string\n  /** Time-to-live in ms; after this the request can no longer be approved. */\n  readonly expiresInMs?: number\n}\n\nexport interface RequestWithdrawalResult {\n  readonly requestId: string\n  readonly status: WithdrawalRequestStatus\n  readonly expiresAt?: string\n}\n\nfunction writeRequest(vault: Vault, req: WithdrawalRequest, expectedVersion: number): Promise<void> {\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  const body = JSON.stringify(req)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: expectedVersion + 1, _ts: req.decidedAt ?? req.requestedAt,\n    _iv: '', _data: body, _by: req.decidedBy ?? req.requester,\n  }\n  return adapter.put(vaultName, WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION, req.requestId, env, expectedVersion)\n}\n\nasync function readRequest(vault: Vault, requestId: string): Promise<{ req: WithdrawalRequest; version: number }> {\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION, requestId)\n  if (!env) throw new WithdrawalRequestError(`withdrawal request \"${requestId}\" not found`)\n  return { req: JSON.parse(env._data) as WithdrawalRequest, version: env._v }\n}\n\n/**\n * Requester side. Files a durable request for the caller's accessible scope.\n * Gated by `user-request-withdrawal` (checked in the UserApi wrapper).\n */\nexport async function requestWithdrawal(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: RequestWithdrawalOptions = {},\n): Promise<RequestWithdrawalResult> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  // Resolve the requester's accessible collections (read access defines \"theirs\";\n  // the owner — who can delete anything — executes the disposition on approval).\n  const collections = resolveAccessibleCollections(keyring, opts.scope, false)\n  if (!collections || collections.length === 0) {\n    throw new WithdrawalRequestError(\n      'requestWithdrawal needs a concrete scope.collections (the caller has all-collection access — name the collections to withdraw)',\n    )\n  }\n  const requestId = `wr-${randomId()}`\n  const requestedAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const req: WithdrawalRequest = {\n    requestId, requester: keyring.userId, collections, disposition: opts.disposition ?? 'delete',\n    status: 'pending', requestedAt,\n    ...(opts.legalBasis ? { legalBasis: opts.legalBasis } : {}),\n    ...(opts.expiresInMs ? { expiresAt: new Date(Date.parse(requestedAt) + opts.expiresInMs).toISOString() } : {}),\n  }\n  await writeRequest(vault, req, 0) // create-only\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: keyring.userId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `user-withdrawal-request:${requestId}:${keyring.userId}`,\n  })\n  return { requestId, status: 'pending', ...(req.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: req.expiresAt } : {}) }\n}\n\n/** Owner side. List filed requests (optionally by status). */\nexport async function listWithdrawalRequests(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: { status?: WithdrawalRequestStatus } = {},\n): Promise<WithdrawalRequest[]> {\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  const ids = await adapter.list(vaultName, WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION)\n  const out: WithdrawalRequest[] = []\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!env) continue\n    const req = JSON.parse(env._data) as WithdrawalRequest\n    if (!opts.status || req.status === opts.status) out.push(req)\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\nfunction assertApprover(vault: Vault): string {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  // FR-6: custodian is INTENTIONALLY excluded (SAFER default — review flag).\n  // Approving a two-party withdrawal is a destructive extract-and-dispose\n  // exercised under FIRM authority — a governance act adjacent to grant/revoke,\n  // which a non-owning custodian cannot do. It stays owner/admin-only.\n  if (keyring.role !== 'owner' && keyring.role !== 'admin') {\n    throw new WithdrawalRequestError('approveWithdrawal / rejectWithdrawal require an owner or admin')\n  }\n  return keyring.userId\n}\n\nfunction assertPending(req: WithdrawalRequest): void {\n  if (req.status !== 'pending') {\n    throw new WithdrawalRequestError(`withdrawal request \"${req.requestId}\" is already ${req.status}`)\n  }\n  if (req.expiresAt && Date.now() > Date.parse(req.expiresAt)) {\n    throw new WithdrawalRequestError(`withdrawal request \"${req.requestId}\" expired at ${req.expiresAt}`)\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ApproveWithdrawalOptions {\n  /** Re-key the handed-back bundle to a secret the requester will use. */\n  readonly reKey?: { readonly secret: string }\n}\n\n/**\n * Owner side. Extract the requester's recorded scope under firm authority,\n * dispose of the source per the request's disposition, mark the request\n * approved, and return the re-keyed bundle to hand back. Gated by\n * `approve-user-withdrawal` (checked in the UserApi wrapper) + owner/admin role.\n */\nexport async function approveWithdrawal(\n  vault: Vault,\n  requestId: string,\n  opts: ApproveWithdrawalOptions = {},\n): Promise<WithdrawResult> {\n  const approver = assertApprover(vault)\n  const { req, version } = await readRequest(vault, requestId)\n  assertPending(req)\n\n  // 1. Produce the requester's re-keyed portable copy FIRST (owner authority\n  //    holds every DEK, so the recorded collections are all readable).\n  const bundle = await buildAccessibleBundle(vault, [...req.collections], opts.reKey)\n\n  // 2. + 3. dispose of the source (freeze snapshot, optional → delete-closure).\n  const snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef | undefined = await freezeAndDeleteClosure(vault, req.collections, {\n    disposition: req.disposition, actorUserId: approver, withdrawalId: `wd-${requestId}`,\n  })\n\n  // 4. mark approved + audit (OCC against the version we read).\n  const decidedAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  await writeRequest(vault, {\n    ...req, status: 'approved', decidedAt, decidedBy: approver,\n    ...(snapshot ? { snapshotSha256: snapshot.sha256 } : {}),\n  }, version)\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: approver, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `user-withdrawal-approved:${requestId}:${req.requester}:${req.disposition}`,\n  })\n\n  return snapshot ? { bundle, snapshot } : { bundle }\n}\n\nexport interface RejectWithdrawalOptions {\n  readonly reason?: string\n}\n\n/** Owner side. Decline a pending request (no data is touched). */\nexport async function rejectWithdrawal(\n  vault: Vault,\n  requestId: string,\n  opts: RejectWithdrawalOptions = {},\n): Promise<WithdrawalRequest> {\n  const approver = assertApprover(vault)\n  const { req, version } = await readRequest(vault, requestId)\n  assertPending(req)\n  const decidedAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const updated: WithdrawalRequest = {\n    ...req, status: 'rejected', decidedAt, decidedBy: approver,\n    ...(opts.reason ? { rejectReason: opts.reason } : {}),\n  }\n  await writeRequest(vault, updated, version)\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: approver, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `user-withdrawal-rejected:${requestId}:${req.requester}`,\n  })\n  return updated\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4BO,IAAM,iCAAiC;AAGvC,IAAM,yBAAN,cAAqC,WAAW;AAAA,EACrD,YAAY,SAAiB;AAC3B,UAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO;AACnC,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAiCA,SAAS,aAAa,OAAc,KAAwB,iBAAwC;AAClG,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC5D,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG;AAC/B,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAsB,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAAG,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,IACjF,KAAK;AAAA,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IAAM,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,EAClD;AACA,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,gCAAgC,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,eAAe;AACnG;AAEA,eAAe,YAAY,OAAc,WAAyE;AAChH,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,gCAAgC,SAAS;AAClF,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,uBAAuB,SAAS,aAAa;AACxF,SAAO,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,GAAwB,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AAC5E;AAMA,eAAsB,kBACpB,OACA,OAAiC,CAAC,GACA;AAClC,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAG3C,QAAM,cAAc,6BAA6B,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK;AAC3E,MAAI,CAAC,eAAe,YAAY,WAAW,GAAG;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAClC,QAAM,eAAc,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAC3C,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,IAAW,WAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAQ;AAAA,IAAa,aAAa,KAAK,eAAe;AAAA,IACpF,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAW;AAAA,IACnB,GAAI,KAAK,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,KAAK,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACzD,GAAI,KAAK,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9G;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAChC,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IACzF,QAAQ,2BAA2B,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,EAChE,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,EAAE,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAI,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAChG;AAGA,eAAsB,uBACpB,OACA,OAA6C,CAAC,GAChB;AAC9B,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,WAAW,8BAA8B;AACxE,QAAM,MAA2B,CAAC;AAClC,aAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,gCAAgC,EAAE;AAC3E,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK;AACV,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AAChC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,OAAQ,KAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EAC9D;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,OAAsB;AAC5C,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAK3C,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS;AACxD,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,gEAAgE;AAAA,EACnG;AACA,SAAO,QAAQ;AACjB;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,KAA8B;AACnD,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW;AAC5B,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,uBAAuB,IAAI,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EACnG;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3D,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,uBAAuB,IAAI,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACtG;AACF;AAaA,eAAsB,kBACpB,OACA,WACA,OAAiC,CAAC,GACT;AACzB,QAAM,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK;AACrC,QAAM,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS;AAC3D,gBAAc,GAAG;AAIjB,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK;AAGlF,QAAM,WAA0C,MAAM,uBAAuB,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa;AAAA,IACnG,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,aAAa;AAAA,IAAU,cAAc,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,EACpF,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AACzC,QAAM,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,GAAG;AAAA,IAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAY;AAAA,IAAW,WAAW;AAAA,IAClD,GAAI,WAAW,EAAE,gBAAgB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACxD,GAAG,OAAO;AACV,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IAAU,aAAa;AAAA,IACnF,QAAQ,4BAA4B,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,EACnF,CAAC;AAED,SAAO,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO;AACpD;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,WACA,OAAgC,CAAC,GACL;AAC5B,QAAM,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK;AACrC,QAAM,EAAE,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS;AAC3D,gBAAc,GAAG;AACjB,QAAM,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AACzC,QAAM,UAA6B;AAAA,IACjC,GAAG;AAAA,IAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,IAAY;AAAA,IAAW,WAAW;AAAA,IAClD,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AAC1C,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IAAU,aAAa;AAAA,IACnF,QAAQ,4BAA4B,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EAChE,CAAC;AACD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-VCETL77O.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\nexport interface EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly echo: string\n  readonly key: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\nconst ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT = new Uint8Array([0xff, ...new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-echo-secret-v1')])\n\n/**\n * AG-1 encoding: domain context + 4-byte big-endian length prefix per\n * part. Two independent guarantees make a single typed string unable to\n * derive an echo vault's KEK (spec AG-1):\n *\n *   1. The `0xFF` context prefix — UTF-8 never produces that byte, so the\n *      encoding is provably not the encoding of ANY string (not merely of\n *      no separator-joined form).\n *   2. Structural length prefixes — part boundaries are key material, so\n *      re-splitting the same characters changes the derived KEK.\n *\n * @throws ValidationError when any part is not a string — the single\n * chokepoint every echo KEK derivation and block mint passes through, so a\n * malformed parts object cannot be `TextEncoder`-coerced into key material.\n */\nexport function encodeEchoParts(parts: EchoSecretParts): Uint8Array {\n  for (const name of ['prompt', 'echo', 'key'] as const) {\n    if (typeof parts?.[name] !== 'string') {\n      throw new ValidationError('echo secret parts must be three strings: prompt, echo, key')\n    }\n  }\n  const enc = new TextEncoder()\n  const segments = [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key].map((p) => enc.encode(p))\n  const total = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length + segments.reduce((n, s) => n + 4 + s.length, 0)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total)\n  out.set(ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT, 0)\n  let offset = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length\n  for (const s of segments) {\n    new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(offset, s.length, false)\n    out.set(s, offset + 4)\n    offset += 4 + s.length\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Derive the tier-1 KEK from a 3-part echo secret (spec: KEK from ALL parts). */\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/** Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call. */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/** Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data. */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random 12-byte IV for AES-GCM. */\nexport function generateIV(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_BYTES))\n}\n\n/** Generate a random 32-byte salt for PBKDF2. */\nexport function generateSalt(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SALT_BYTES))\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function bufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n  const bytes = buffer instanceof Uint8Array ? buffer : new Uint8Array(buffer)\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\n    binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  }\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nexport function base64ToBuffer(base64: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  const binary = atob(base64)\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n    bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  }\n  return bytes\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAoDA,IAAM,oBAAoB;AAC1B,IAAM,aAAa;AACnB,IAAM,WAAW;AACjB,IAAM,WAAW;AAEjB,IAAM,SAAS,WAAW,OAAO;AAKjC,eAAsB,UACpB,QACA,MACoB;AACpB,SAAO,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI;AACrE;AAOA,eAAe,sBACb,UACA,MACoB;AACpB,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,UAA0B,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;AAC1G,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,MAA4B,YAAY,mBAAmB,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IAC7F;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW;AAAA,EACzB;AACF;AAcA,IAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,KAAM,GAAG,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC;AAiB5F,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAoC;AAClE,aAAW,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAY;AACrD,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU;AACrC,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,4DAA4D;AAAA,IACxF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY;AAC5B,QAAM,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/E,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AACrF,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AAChC,MAAI,IAAI,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC3B,MAAI,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAC9B,aAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AACxB,QAAI,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC1D,QAAI,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;AACrB,cAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAsB,cACpB,OACA,MACoB;AACpB,SAAO,sBAAsB,gBAAgB,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI;AAC3D;AAkBA,eAAsB,gBACpB,QACA,MACA,QACoB;AACpB,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,EACd;AAEA,SAAO,OAAO,aAAa,YACvB,OAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MACnB,MAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB,IACA,OAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MACnB,MAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW;AAAA,EACzB;AACN;AAKA,eAAsB,cAAkC;AACtD,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAKA,eAAsB,QAAQ,KAAgB,KAAiC;AAC7E,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC9D,SAAO,eAAe,OAAO;AAC/B;AAGA,eAAsB,UACpB,eACA,KACoB;AACpB,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,aAAa;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACpC;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5B;AACF;AAsBA,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAoC;AACzD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACtD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI;AAC1C,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;AAChF;AAMA,eAAsB,QAAQ,KAAgB,KAAiC;AAC7E,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC5B,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC7D,SAAO,eAAe,OAAO;AAC/B;AAMA,eAAsB,UAAU,eAAuB,KAAoC;AACzF,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC5B,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,aAAa;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACpC;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC5B;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,UAAU,QAAwC;AACtE,SAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AAClH;AAUA,eAAsB,QACpB,WACA,KACwB;AACxB,QAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AACtB,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS;AAElD,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AAGA,eAAsB,QACpB,UACA,YACA,KACiB;AACjB,QAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;AAClC,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,UAAU;AAE5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB;AAAA,MAC1C;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS;AAAA,EAC3C,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,kBAAkB;AACzD,YAAM,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IAC1B;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAUA,eAAsB,aACpB,MACA,KACwB;AACxB,QAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AACtB,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AAMA,eAAsB,aACpB,UACA,YACA,KACqB;AACrB,QAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;AAClC,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,UAAU;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB;AAAA,MAC1C;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACjC,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,kBAAkB;AACzD,YAAM,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IAC1B;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAQA,eAAsB,UAAU,MAAmC;AACjE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,IAA+B;AAC3E,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,EACnC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,EAC1C,KAAK,EAAE;AACZ;AAgBA,eAAsB,cAAc,KAAgB,MAAmC;AAErF,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC3B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,MAAM;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,IAA+B;AAC9E,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC,EAClC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,EAC1C,KAAK,EAAE;AACZ;AAgBA,eAAsB,oBACpB,MACA,KACA,KACwB;AACxB,QAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AACtB,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,oBACpB,UACA,YACA,KACA,KACqB;AACrB,QAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ;AAClC,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,UAAU;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7B;AAAA,QACE,MAAM;AAAA,QACN;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACjC,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,kBAAkB;AACzD,YAAM,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IAC1B;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAiBA,eAAsB,kBAAkB,KAAgB,gBAA4C;AAElG,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAGhD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC3B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,YAAY;AAAA,EACf;AAGA,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACtD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,cAAc;AACpD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAyBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,KACA,gBACA,OACoB;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,cAAc;AAIpD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7F,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAoBA,eAAsB,4BACpB,KACA,gBACA,OACoB;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AACjG,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AA+BA,eAAsB,uBAAuB,KAAoC;AAC/E,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AACnE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAyBA,eAAe,sBACb,KACA,SACA,WACqB;AACrB,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAChD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAC9D,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,KAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AAClE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,IACA,WAAW;AAAA,EACb;AACA,SAAO,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAC5B;AAgBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,WACA,KACA,SACwB;AACxB,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK,SAAS,SAAS;AAC9D,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS;AAClD,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,eAAe,EAAE;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,eAAe,UAAU;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AAQA,eAAsB,qBACpB,UACA,YACA,KACiB;AACjB,SAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG;AAC1C;AAKO,SAAS,aAAyB;AACvC,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnE;AAGO,SAAS,eAA2B;AACzC,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,UAAU,CAAC;AACrE;AAIO,SAAS,eAAe,QAA0C;AACvE,QAAM,QAAQ,kBAAkB,aAAa,SAAS,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AAC3E,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AACrC,cAAU,OAAO,aAAa,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AACpB;AAEO,SAAS,eAAe,QAAyC;AACtE,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM;AAC1B,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAC1C,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK;AACtC,UAAM,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}