@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.2 → 0.6.0-pre.21

package/dist/with-party/team/roster-tag.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * #1096 — the authenticated half of a `_keyring` file's AUTHORITY.
+ *
+ * A `_keyring` file is stored plaintext (`_iv: ''`) so admins can edit a
+ * member's authority without holding that member's credential. That means
+ * `role`/`permissions` were authenticated by NOTHING — a hostile store could
+ * promote a viewer to admin by editing one word (proven in
+ * `__tests__/keyring-replay-escalation.test.ts`).
+ *
+ * The fix is a vault-wide ROSTER KEY, carried as a reserved DEK-map entry
+ * (`deks['_roster']`, see `ROSTER_KEY_ID`) so it reaches every member through
+ * the channels a DEK already travels — grant's `_`-prefix propagation,
+ * `persistKeyring`, the wrapped-DEKs recovery blob, `peer-recover`, pod
+ * recipient slots — and a `roster_tag`: AES-GCM of the canonical authority
+ * fields under that key. Every roster EDITOR holds the key (constraint:
+ * admins edit authority they don't hold the target's credential for) — which
+ * is what sets the bound below.
+ *
+ * `user_id` is inside the canonical string so a genuine tag cannot be
+ * transplanted onto another member's file.
+ *
+ * ## What "authority half" does NOT cover
+ *
+ * The canonical string is exactly {@link RosterAuthorityFields} — the fields a
+ * privilege decision reads. Other plaintext fields are deliberately excluded
+ * and REMAIN FORGEABLE by the store: `display_name` (cosmetic), `policy`
+ * (round-tripped, never enforced at v1.0), `echo` and `authenticators` (each
+ * authenticated by its own wrapped key material — a forged one fails to
+ * unlock rather than granting anything), plus `created_at` / `salt` /
+ * `_noydb_keyring`. Adding a field to the tag means adding it to
+ * `rosterCanonical`; nothing else here is a claim about it.
+ *
+ * ## The bound
+ *
+ * This stops the STORE, which holds no keys. It deliberately does NOT stop a
+ * malicious MEMBER: every roster editor must hold the roster key, so anyone
+ * who legitimately holds it can forge any authority field for any member.
+ * That bound must be stated in `SECURITY.md` (tracked as part of the #1096
+ * PR) — it is not written there yet.
+ */
+import type { KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js';
+import type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js';
+export interface RosterTag {
+    readonly iv: string;
+    readonly data: string;
+}
+export type RosterAuthorityFields = Pick<KeyringFile, 'user_id' | 'role' | 'permissions' | 'granted_by' | 'expires_at' | 'export_capability' | 'import_capability'>;
+export declare function rosterCanonical(file: RosterAuthorityFields): string;
+export declare function mintRosterTag(file: RosterAuthorityFields, rosterKey: EnclaveKey): Promise<RosterTag>;
+/**
+ * false on decrypt failure OR canonical mismatch — never throws.
+ *
+ * `null` is accepted alongside `undefined` because the tag arrives from
+ * JSON a store controls: `"roster_tag": null` is a shape the type system
+ * says is impossible and the wire permits.
+ */
+export declare function verifyRosterTag(file: RosterAuthorityFields, tag: RosterTag | undefined | null, rosterKey: EnclaveKey): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * #1096 — THE CHOKEPOINT. Verify a keyring file's plaintext AUTHORITY half
+ * against the roster key carried in its own, already-unwrapped, DEK set.
+ * Throws {@link KeyringTamperedError}; returns silently when the roster is
+ * authentic.
+ *
+ * **Every path that builds an `UnlockedKeyring` from a `KeyringFile` must call
+ * this — not just `loadKeyring`.** A tier-2 unlock that reconstructs
+ * `role`/`permissions` from the plaintext header without it accepts exactly
+ * the forgery tier-1 refuses, and the vault is only as strong as its weakest
+ * unlock path. That is not hypothetical: the wrap-DEKs password path shipped
+ * in this state until it was caught in review.
+ *
+ * Deliberately says nothing about the canary. The canary proves the KEK, and
+ * tier-2 paths have no KEK to prove — the roster key they hold comes from the
+ * slot's own wrapped-DEK blob, which is authenticated by its own AES-GCM tag.
+ * Callers that DO hold a KEK check the canary separately, before this.
+ *
+ * @param deks the caller's UNWRAPPED DEK set — a roster key here is proof of
+ *   possession, so this must never be handed a map built from unverified input.
+ */
+export declare function assertRosterAuthenticated(file: KeyringFile, deks: ReadonlyMap<string, EnclaveKey>, userId: string): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * #1096 — VERIFY BEFORE YOU TRUST, and especially before you RESTAMP.
+ *
+ * The sibling of {@link assertRosterAuthenticated} for the other half of the
+ * problem. That one guards paths that *unlock* a keyring; this one guards paths
+ * that **read another member's file** — because the roster key is vault-wide, a
+ * caller holding it can verify any member's tag, not just their own.
+ *
+ * Every read-modify-write on a member's roster must call this **before** the
+ * modify. A flow that reads a forged file, edits one field and restamps does
+ * not merely tolerate the forgery — it **launders** it, converting a file
+ * `loadKeyring` refuses into one it accepts, under a genuine tag. `revoke`
+ * calls into such a flow unconditionally, so without this a single forged
+ * member plus any later revocation anywhere in the vault is a complete bypass.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed, deliberately: a forged member's file aborts the operation rather
+ * than being skipped. Skipping would complete the revoke while leaving the
+ * forgery in place, and an untrusted store can already refuse writes — so the
+ * availability it costs was never guaranteed, while the integrity it buys is
+ * the point of the mechanism.
+ */
+export declare function assertRosterTagValid(file: KeyringFile, rosterKey: EnclaveKey, userId: string): Promise<void>;

package/dist/with-party/team/tiers.d.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@
  */
 import type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js';
 /** Canonical DEK key for a given collection + tier. Tier 0 → bare name. */
-export declare function dekKey(collection: string, tier: number): string;
+import { dekKey } from '../../kernel/tier-visibility.js';
+export { dekKey };
 /**
  * Returns the user's effective clearance for a given collection: the
  * maximum tier for which their keyring holds a DEK. Falls back to 0

package/dist/with-pod/format.d.ts

@@ -47,14 +47,14 @@
  */
 import type { Cover } from '../with-party/directory/cover/types.js';
 import type { Redirect } from './redirect.js';
-/** Magic bytes 'NDB1' (ASCII), identifying a NOYDB bundle. */
-export declare const NOYDB_BUNDLE_MAGIC: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
+/** Magic bytes 'NDB1' (ASCII) — `NoyDB 1` — identifying a NOYDB pod (`.noydb` container). */
+export declare const NOYDB_POD_MAGIC: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
 /** Total fixed prefix before the header JSON: 4+1+1+4 bytes. */
-export declare const NOYDB_BUNDLE_PREFIX_BYTES = 10;
+export declare const NOYDB_POD_PREFIX_BYTES = 10;
 /** Current bundle format version. Bumped on layout changes. Default for unsigned pods. */
-export declare const NOYDB_BUNDLE_FORMAT_VERSION = 1;
+export declare const NOYDB_POD_FORMAT_VERSION = 1;
 /** Format version for pods carrying a header signature (`sig`/`keyId`/`sigAlg`). */
-export declare const NOYDB_BUNDLE_FORMAT_VERSION_SIGNED = 2;
+export declare const NOYDB_POD_FORMAT_VERSION_SIGNED = 2;
 /**
  * Bitfield interpretation of the flags byte.
  *
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ export type CompressionAlgo = 0 | 1 | 2;
  *
  * **Minimum-disclosure rules:** these are the ONLY allowed keys.
  * Any other key in a parsed header causes
- * `validateBundleHeader` to throw. The set is kept short to
+ * `validatePodHeaderFields` to throw. The set is kept short to
  * minimize attack surface from cloud-storage metadata indexing —
  * see the file-level doc comment for the rationale.
  *
@@ -249,8 +249,6 @@ export interface NoydbPodHeader {
  * family (see `unlockMethods` doc comment on `NoydbPodHeader`).
  */
 export type UnlockMethod = 'password' | 'webauthn' | 'oidc' | 'totp' | 'email-otp' | 'magic-link' | 'pin' | 'recovery' | 'shamir';
-/** @deprecated Use `NoydbPodHeader`. */
-export type NoydbBundleHeader = NoydbPodHeader;
 /**
  * Validate a parsed bundle header. Throws on any deviation from
  * the minimum-disclosure schema:
@@ -266,18 +264,18 @@ export type NoydbBundleHeader = NoydbPodHeader;
  * The error messages name the offending field so consumers can
  * fix the producer rather than the reader.
  */
-export declare function validateBundleHeader(parsed: unknown): asserts parsed is NoydbPodHeader;
+export declare function validatePodHeaderFields(parsed: unknown): asserts parsed is NoydbPodHeader;
 /**
  * Encode a header object to UTF-8 JSON bytes after validating
  * minimum disclosure. Used by the writer to serialize the header
  * region of the container.
  */
-export declare function encodeBundleHeader(header: NoydbPodHeader): Uint8Array;
+export declare function encodePodHeader(header: NoydbPodHeader): Uint8Array;
 /**
  * Parse a bundle header from its UTF-8 JSON bytes. Throws on
  * invalid JSON or any minimum-disclosure violation.
  */
-export declare function decodeBundleHeader(bytes: Uint8Array): NoydbPodHeader;
+export declare function decodePodHeader(bytes: Uint8Array): NoydbPodHeader;
 /**
  * Read a uint32 from `bytes` at `offset` in big-endian byte order.
  * No bounds check — callers must guarantee `offset + 4 <= bytes.length`.
@@ -295,4 +293,4 @@ export declare function writeUint32BE(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number, value:
  * 4 bytes match `NDB1`. Used by readers as a fast file-type check
  * before any further parsing.
  */
-export declare function hasNoydbBundleMagic(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean;
+export declare function hasNoydbPodMagic(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean;

package/dist/with-pod/index.d.ts

@@ -11,19 +11,19 @@
  * omit this subpath and save ~805 LOC of format code + Brotli/gzip
  * wiring.
  */
-export { writePod, readPod, readPodHeader, readPodCover, writeNoydbBundle, readNoydbBundle, readNoydbBundleHeader, resetBrotliSupportCache, } from './bundle.js';
+export { writePod, readPod, readPodHeader, readPodCover, resetBrotliSupportCache, } from './pod.js';
 export type { Cover } from '../with-party/directory/cover/types.js';
-export type { WritePodOptions, WriteNoydbBundleOptions, ReadNoydbBundleOptions, NoydbBundleReadResult, } from './bundle.js';
-export { verifyPodHeader } from './bundle.js';
-export type { PodVerifyResult } from './bundle.js';
+export type { WritePodOptions, ReadPodOptions, PodReadResult, } from './pod.js';
+export { verifyPodHeader } from './pod.js';
+export type { PodVerifyResult } from './pod.js';
 export { signRecord, verifyRecord, signedBytes, POD_SIG_ALG } from './signature.js';
-export { NOYDB_BUNDLE_MAGIC, NOYDB_BUNDLE_PREFIX_BYTES, NOYDB_BUNDLE_FORMAT_VERSION, FLAG_COMPRESSED, FLAG_HAS_INTEGRITY_HASH, COMPRESSION_NONE, COMPRESSION_GZIP, COMPRESSION_BROTLI, validateBundleHeader, encodeBundleHeader, hasNoydbBundleMagic, } from './format.js';
-export type { CompressionAlgo, NoydbPodHeader, NoydbBundleHeader, UnlockMethod, } from './format.js';
+export { NOYDB_POD_MAGIC, NOYDB_POD_PREFIX_BYTES, NOYDB_POD_FORMAT_VERSION, FLAG_COMPRESSED, FLAG_HAS_INTEGRITY_HASH, COMPRESSION_NONE, COMPRESSION_GZIP, COMPRESSION_BROTLI, validatePodHeaderFields, encodePodHeader, hasNoydbPodMagic, } from './format.js';
+export type { CompressionAlgo, NoydbPodHeader, UnlockMethod, } from './format.js';
 export { generateULID, isULID } from './ulid.js';
-export { wrapPodStore, createPodStore, wrapBundleStore, createBundleStore } from './pod-store.js';
-export type { WrappedPodNoydbStore, WrapPodStoreOptions, WrappedBundleNoydbStore, WrapBundleStoreOptions, } from './pod-store.js';
-export { BundleIntegrityError, BundleSealMismatchError, PodVersionConflictError, BundleVersionConflictError, BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError, } from '../kernel/errors.js';
-export { readPodRedirect } from './bundle.js';
+export { wrapPodStore, createPodStore } from './pod-store.js';
+export type { WrappedPodNoydbStore, WrapPodStoreOptions, } from './pod-store.js';
+export { PodIntegrityError, PodSealMismatchError, PodVersionConflictError, BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError, } from '../kernel/errors.js';
+export { readPodRedirect } from './pod.js';
 export { signRedirect, verifyRedirect, followRedirects } from './redirect.js';
 export type { Redirect, RedirectHop, FollowRedirectsResult } from './redirect.js';
 export type { DocSigner } from '../with-audit/attestation/signer.js';

package/dist/with-pod/open.d.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * reachable through published seams). Composes, in order:
  *
  *   1. `readPod` — parse + integrity-check the container (throws
- *      `BundleIntegrityError` on a corrupted/truncated pod).
+ *      `PodIntegrityError` on a corrupted/truncated pod).
  *   2. `verifyPodHeader` — only when `opts.trustedKeys` is supplied.
  *      `'unsigned'` is benign (legacy pod, or `writePod({ sign: false })`)
  *      and open() proceeds; `'untrusted'` / `'tampered'` are fail-closed —
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
  * @module
  */
 import type { NoydbPodHeader } from './format.js';
-import type { PodVerifyResult } from './bundle.js';
+import type { PodVerifyResult } from './pod.js';
 import type { Noydb } from '../kernel/noydb.js';
 import type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js';
 import type { NoydbOptions, NoydbStore, EchoSecretParts } from '../kernel/types.js';

package/dist/with-pod/pod-handle.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/**
+ * Vault bundle handle — the stable opaque ULID identifying a vault
+ * across `.noydb` exports.
+ *
+ * Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline `Vault.getPodHandle`
+ * method this function replaced. `Vault` keeps the public method as
+ * a thin delegator.
+ *
+ * Internal — reached through `vault.getPodHandle()`.
+ */
+import type { NoydbStore } from '../kernel/types.js';
+/**
+ * Return the stable opaque bundle handle for the given vault adapter,
+ * generating and persisting a fresh ULID on first call.
+ *
+ * See {@link import('../kernel/vault.js').Vault.getPodHandle} for
+ * the full rationale and storage-path documentation.
+ */
+export declare function buildPodHandle(adapter: NoydbStore, name: string): Promise<string>;

package/dist/with-pod/pod-store.d.ts

@@ -44,11 +44,3 @@ export declare function wrapPodStore(bundle: NoydbPodStore, options?: WrapPodSto
  * analogous to `createStore` for KV stores.
  */
 export declare function createPodStore<TOptions>(factory: (options: TOptions) => NoydbPodStore): (options: TOptions) => NoydbPodStore;
-/** @deprecated Use wrapPodStore. */
-export declare const wrapBundleStore: typeof wrapPodStore;
-/** @deprecated Use createPodStore. */
-export declare const createBundleStore: typeof createPodStore;
-/** @deprecated Use WrappedPodNoydbStore. */
-export type WrappedBundleNoydbStore = WrappedPodNoydbStore;
-/** @deprecated Use WrapPodStoreOptions. */
-export type WrapBundleStoreOptions = WrapPodStoreOptions;

package/dist/with-pod/{bundle.d.ts → pod.d.ts}

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import { type NoydbPodHeader, type UnlockMethod } from './format.js';
 import type { Redirect } from './redirect.js';
 import type { DocSigner } from '../with-audit/attestation/signer.js';
 import type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js';
-import type { BundleRecipient } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js';
+import type { PodRecipient } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js';
 import type { Cover } from '../with-party/directory/cover/types.js';
 import type { SealingKeyProvider, RecipientSealer, RecipientHint } from '../with-party/team/managed-secret.js';
 /**
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ export interface WritePodOptions {
      * the bundle inherits the source keyring as-is (today's behaviour,
      * suited to personal backup-and-restore).
      */
-    readonly recipients?: readonly BundleRecipient[];
+    readonly recipients?: readonly PodRecipient[];
     /**
      * Auto-unlock — unsealed per-user credentials.
      *
@@ -266,15 +266,28 @@ export interface WritePodOptions {
      */
     readonly redirect?: Redirect;
 }
-/** @deprecated Use `WritePodOptions`. */
-export type WriteNoydbBundleOptions = WritePodOptions;
+/**
+ * Every key `writePod` reads, in declaration order (#991).
+ *
+ * A pod is a wire artifact, so an option this list doesn't name is refused
+ * rather than ignored: a dropped write option produces a structurally valid
+ * bundle that is missing something, and the defect surfaces later — in
+ * whoever imports it — with nothing left to trace it back to.
+ *
+ * `bundle-option-keys.test.ts` parses `WritePodOptions` out of this file and
+ * fails if the two ever drift, so adding an option is enough; you do not have
+ * to remember to update this list, only to keep the interface shape parseable.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export declare const WRITE_POD_OPTION_KEYS: readonly ["compression", "collections", "since", "where", "tierAtMost", "exportSecret", "recipients", "autoCredentials", "sealedCredentials", "autoSecrets", "sealedSecrets", "sign", "engineRange", "unlockMethods", "hasApp", "species", "pointerMode", "redirect"];
 /**
  * Result returned by `readPod`. The caller is expected to
  * pass `dumpJson` into `vault.load(json, secret)` to
  * actually restore a vault. Splitting the layers keeps the
  * bundle module free of crypto concerns — see file-level docs.
  */
-export interface NoydbBundleReadResult {
+export interface PodReadResult {
     readonly header: NoydbPodHeader;
     readonly dumpJson: string;
     /**
@@ -302,7 +315,7 @@ export interface NoydbBundleReadResult {
  * auto-unlock paths. Without these the reader behaves exactly as before
  * (header parsed; body returned as `dumpJson`).
  */
-export interface ReadNoydbBundleOptions {
+export interface ReadPodOptions {
     /**
      * Recipient-side sealing providers used to unseal entries from
      * `sealedSecrets`. The reader picks the one whose `.id`
@@ -358,7 +371,7 @@ export declare function resetBrotliSupportCache(): void;
  *
  * Pipeline:
  *   1. Resolve or create the compartment's stable bundle handle
- *      via `vault.getBundleHandle()` — same handle on
+ *      via `vault.getPodHandle()` — same handle on
  *      every export from the same vault instance, so cloud
  *      adapters can use it as a primary key.
  *   2. `vault.dump()` → JSON string with encrypted records
@@ -383,7 +396,7 @@ export declare function resetBrotliSupportCache(): void;
  *
  * @internal
  */
-export declare function assembleBundleContainer(opts: {
+export declare function assemblePodContainer(opts: {
     handle: string;
     bodyJsonStr: string;
     compression: WritePodOptions['compression'];
@@ -398,8 +411,6 @@ export declare function assembleBundleContainer(opts: {
     signer?: DocSigner;
 }): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 export declare function writePod(vault: Vault, opts?: WritePodOptions): Promise<Uint8Array>;
-/** @deprecated Use `writePod`. */
-export declare const writeNoydbBundle: typeof writePod;
 /**
  * Read just the bundle header — no body decompression, no
  * integrity verification. Intended for cloud-listing UIs that want
@@ -415,8 +426,6 @@ export declare const writeNoydbBundle: typeof writePod;
  * range requests against bundles that may carry icons.
  */
 export declare function readPodHeader(bytes: Uint8Array): NoydbPodHeader;
-/** @deprecated Use `readPodHeader`. */
-export declare const readNoydbBundleHeader: typeof readPodHeader;
 /**
  * Outcome of {@link verifyPodHeader}.
  *
@@ -442,7 +451,7 @@ export interface PodVerifyResult {
  * (`keyId → publicKeyB64` the caller already trusts), it reports whether the
  * header was signed by a trusted document signer.
  *
- * Pairs with the signing half in `assembleBundleContainer`/`writePod`: the
+ * Pairs with the signing half in `assemblePodContainer`/`writePod`: the
  * signed payload is the final wire header with `sig` removed, so verification
  * reconstructs it by stripping EXACTLY the `sig` field — `keyId`, `sigAlg`,
  * and every other header field stay in the verified payload.
@@ -454,7 +463,7 @@ export interface PodVerifyResult {
  * header (which includes the *claimed* `bodySha256`) is signed by a trusted
  * key; it does NOT prove the body matches that hash. To trust the pod's
  * BODY you MUST also confirm the body hashes to `header.bodySha256` — call
- * `readPod`, which throws `BundleIntegrityError` on mismatch. A `verified`
+ * `readPod`, which throws `PodIntegrityError` on mismatch. A `verified`
  * header paired with a swapped body is caught only by that integrity check.
  * This function stays body-free by design so a static page can authenticate a
  * header without decompressing the body; composing the two checks is the
@@ -483,7 +492,7 @@ export declare function readPodCover(bytes: Uint8Array, opts?: {
  * the header's `redirect` field or `undefined` if the bundle was written
  * without one.
  *
- * The record is returned UNVERIFIED: `validateBundleHeader` only checks
+ * The record is returned UNVERIFIED: `validatePodHeaderFields` only checks
  * its shape at parse time (a parser has no `trustedKeys`). Callers that
  * intend to follow the redirect MUST separately call `verifyRedirect`
  * (`redirect.js`) before trusting `target`.
@@ -495,7 +504,7 @@ export declare function readPodRedirect(bytes: Uint8Array): Redirect | undefined
  * original `vault.dump()` JSON string ready to pass to
  * `vault.load()`.
  *
- * Throws `BundleIntegrityError` if the body's actual SHA-256 does
+ * Throws `PodIntegrityError` if the body's actual SHA-256 does
  * not match the value declared in the header. Distinct from a
  * format error so consumers can pattern-match in catch blocks
  * (corrupted-in-transit vs malformed-by-producer).
@@ -507,6 +516,4 @@ export declare function readPodRedirect(bytes: Uint8Array): Redirect | undefined
  * free of crypto concerns and lets the same code feed format
  * inspectors that never decrypt anything.
  */
-export declare function readPod(bytes: Uint8Array, opts?: ReadNoydbBundleOptions): Promise<NoydbBundleReadResult>;
-/** @deprecated Use `readPod`. */
-export declare const readNoydbBundle: typeof readPod;
+export declare function readPod(bytes: Uint8Array, opts?: ReadPodOptions): Promise<PodReadResult>;

package/dist/with-pod/ulid.d.ts

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  *
  * If a future use case needs timestamp-free handles, a v2 of the
  * format could specify "use the random portion only" without a
- * format break — `validateBundleHeader` only checks the regex
+ * format break — `validatePodHeaderFields` only checks the regex
  * shape, not the encoded timestamp.
  */
 /**

package/dist/with-shape/blobs/blob-set.d.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ export declare const BLOB_COLLECTION = "_blob";
 /** Stores `BlobObject` metadata envelopes, keyed by eTag. */
 export declare const BLOB_INDEX_COLLECTION = "_blob_index";
 /**
- * Stores encrypted chunk envelopes, keyed by `{eTag}/{chunkIndex}`.
+ * Stores encrypted chunk envelopes, keyed by `{eTag}_{chunkIndex}`.
  * NOT loaded into the in-memory query layer. Fetched on demand by
  * `BlobSet.get()` / `BlobSet.response()`.
  */
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: number;
  *
  * ```
  * _blob_index/{eTag}                            BlobObject metadata (vault-shared DEK)
- * _blob_chunks/{eTag}/{chunkIndex}              Encrypted chunk data (vault-shared DEK + AAD)
+ * _blob_chunks/{eTag}_{chunkIndex}              Encrypted chunk data (vault-shared DEK + AAD)
  * _blob_slots_{collection}/{recordId}           Slot map (parent collection DEK)
  * _blob_versions_{collection}/{recordId}/{slot}/{label}  Published versions (parent collection DEK)
  * ```

package/dist/with-shape/introspection/index.d.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ export { jsonSchemaToFields } from './fields.js';
 export type { SchemaIntrospection } from './types.js';
 export type { FieldMeta, SemanticType } from './field-meta.js';
 export type { CollectionDescription, DescribedField, DescribeOptions } from './describe.js';
+export type { StandardSchemaV1Issue } from '../../kernel/schema.js';
 export { applyListProjection } from './projection.js';
 export type { ListProjectionOptions } from './projection.js';
 export type { BehaviorSummary, GuardBehaviorEntry, DerivationBehaviorEntry, DerivationOutputEntry, MaterializedViewBehaviorEntry, OverlayBehaviorEntry, SatelliteBehaviorEntry, } from './behaviors.js';

package/dist/with-sync/engine.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { NoydbStore, DirtyEntry, ConflictStrategy, CollectionConflictResolver, PushOptions, PullOptions, PushResult, PullResult, SyncStatus, SyncTargetRole } from '../kernel/types.js';
+import type { MergeAuthority } from '../port/with/merge-authority.js';
 import { type PeriodPullSource } from './period-scope.js';
 import type { NoydbEventEmitter } from '../kernel/events.js';
 import type { SyncPolicy } from '../kernel/sync-policy.js';
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ export interface ReservedLookupSource {
 }
 /** Sync engine: dirty tracking, push, pull, conflict resolution, scheduling. */
 export declare class SyncEngine {
+    private readonly mergeAuthority;
     private readonly local;
     private readonly remote;
     private readonly strategy;
@@ -24,8 +26,17 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
      *  into the scheduler below. */
     readonly policy: SyncPolicy | undefined;
     private dirty;
+    /** #1036 — last SUCCESSFUL push/pull. Never advanced by a failed attempt. */
     private lastPush;
     private lastPull;
+    /**
+     * #1036 — the failure that ended the most recent attempt, cleared by the next
+     * success. Live state only: deliberately NOT persisted in `_sync/meta`, since a
+     * reload cannot know whether the target is still failing. It exists so a poller
+     * can separate "never synced" (both null) from "synced a while ago, failing
+     * since" (`lastPush` set, `lastError` set).
+     */
+    private lastError;
     private loaded;
     private autoSyncInterval;
     private isOnline;
@@ -92,6 +103,15 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
         syncPolicy?: SyncPolicy;
         role?: SyncTargetRole;
         label?: string;
+        /**
+         * #1042 — the merge's verify/re-stamp capability. Optional so an engine
+         * built without one behaves exactly as before; the Vault supplies it.
+         *
+         * A closure, not an import: `with-sync` is DEK-free and
+         * `check:architecture` enforces that, so the capability arrives already
+         * bound to the keys rather than the engine reaching for them.
+         */
+        mergeAuthority?: MergeAuthority;
     });
     /** Start the sync scheduler. Called after vault is fully opened. */
     startScheduler(): void;
@@ -148,6 +168,18 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
      * are removed from the dirty log on success.
      */
     pushFiltered(predicate: (entry: DirtyEntry) => boolean): Promise<PushResult>;
+    /**
+     * #1036 — close out a push/pull. `push()` and `pull()` collect per-record
+     * failures into their result's `errors` rather than throwing, and the clock used
+     * to be stamped regardless — so an unreachable store still reported a fresh
+     * `lastPush`, and a UI rendered "Last synced: just now" over a sync that moved
+     * nothing. An attempt only advances the clock when it had no errors.
+     *
+     * An empty dirty log is a success, not a failure: nothing to send is not the
+     * same as failing to send, and treating it otherwise would leave a quiet vault
+     * looking permanently unsynced.
+     */
+    private recordOutcome;
     /** Get current sync status. */
     status(): SyncStatus;
     /** Start auto-sync: listen for online/offline events, optional periodic sync. */
@@ -168,11 +200,28 @@ export declare class SyncEngine {
      * the remote's (the same-`_v` push tie), re-stamp it at `remote._v + 1`.
      * Without this the loser's next pull sees no delta (`_v`-based
      * detection) and the peers stay silently diverged at the same version.
-     * `_v` is envelope metadata — AEAD-unbound, and `_vdig` is deliberately
-     * `_v`-independent — so the engine may restamp ciphertext. Callers must
-     * mirror the advanced envelope locally (`applyRemote`) so both sides
-     * agree. The 'merged' branch needs none of this: resolver output is
-     * already stamped `max(local, remote) + 1`.
+     * ## Why this is async, and why it goes through `MergeAuthority` (#1093)
+     *
+     * It used to be `{ ...winner, _v: remote._v + 1 }` — a metadata restamp on
+     * ciphertext the engine cannot decrypt. That spread was the SOLE reason `_v`
+     * could not be bound into the AAD: a version rewritten onto a body sealed at
+     * a different one produces a record no reader can open.
+     *
+     * `with-sync` is DEK-free by design and `check:architecture` enforces it, so
+     * the re-seal cannot happen here. It happens in the injected authority, which
+     * holds the keys. The engine still decides WHICH version to advance to; it
+     * simply no longer pretends it can rewrite a sealed body.
+     *
+     * The authority is ALWAYS present in the product — `kernel/noydb.ts` builds
+     * one from the keyring and passes it at both engine-construction sites, and
+     * `with-sync/active.ts` is the only place an engine is constructed. The
+     * fallback below is reachable only by constructing `SyncEngine` directly,
+     * which tests do. It restamps, as before — and would produce an unreadable
+     * record if such a test ever held AEAD-sealed envelopes. None do; the
+     * fixtures that reach it build their own plaintext ones.
+     *
+     * The 'merged' branch needs none of this: resolver output is already stamped
+     * `max(local, remote) + 1` by whoever built it.
      */
     private advancePastRemote;
     private applyRemote;

package/dist/with-sync/strategy.d.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
  * @internal
  */
 import type { NoydbStore, ConflictStrategy, SyncTargetRole } from '../kernel/types.js';
+import type { MergeAuthority } from '../port/with/merge-authority.js';
 import type { NoydbEventEmitter } from '../kernel/events.js';
 import type { SyncPolicy } from '../kernel/sync-policy.js';
 import type { SyncEngine } from './engine.js';
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@ export interface BuildSyncEngineOptions {
     syncPolicy?: SyncPolicy;
     role?: SyncTargetRole;
     label?: string;
+    /** #1042 — the merge's verify/re-stamp capability, bound to the keys by the caller. */
+    mergeAuthority?: MergeAuthority;
 }
 /**
  * @internal

package/dist/withdraw-accessible-4JTDFRFZ.js

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import {
+  FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION,
+  freezeAndDeleteClosure,
+  freezeSnapshotOnly,
+  randomId,
+  withdrawAccessibleData
+} from "./chunk-5Q7AJ7DN.js";
+import "./chunk-GBBDFE6C.js";
+import "./chunk-QSIEL6TL.js";
+import "./chunk-S56VYR4Q.js";
+import "./chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "./chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
+import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+export {
+  FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION,
+  freezeAndDeleteClosure,
+  freezeSnapshotOnly,
+  randomId,
+  withdrawAccessibleData
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=withdraw-accessible-4JTDFRFZ.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@noy-db/hub",
-  "version": "0.6.0-pre.2",
+  "version": "0.6.0-pre.21",
   "description": "Zero-knowledge, offline-first, encrypted document store — core library with AES-256-GCM, PBKDF2, multi-user keyring, and sync engine",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
       "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/index.js"
     },
+    "./codemods/0.4.0-pre.json": "./codemods/0.4.0-pre.json",
     "./i18n": {
       "types": "./dist/via/i18n/index.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/i18n/index.js"
@@ -36,6 +37,10 @@
       "types": "./dist/with-party/session/index.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/session/index.js"
     },
+    "./vault-head": {
+      "types": "./dist/with-commit/vault-head/index.d.ts",
+      "default": "./dist/vault-head/index.js"
+    },
     "./history": {
       "types": "./dist/with-commit/history/index.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/history/index.js"
@@ -195,27 +200,30 @@
     "./reduce": {
       "types": "./dist/with-lookup/reduce/index.d.ts",
       "default": "./dist/reduce/index.js"
-    }
+    },
+    "./codemods/0.6.0-pre.json": "./codemods/0.6.0-pre.json"
   },
   "module": "./dist/index.js",
   "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
   "files": [
     "dist",
     "README.md",
-    "LICENSE"
+    "CHANGELOG.md",
+    "LICENSE",
+    "codemods"
   ],
   "engines": {
     "node": ">=22.0.0"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.6.0-pre.2"
+    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.6.0-pre.21"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
     "esbuild": "^0.25.0",
     "zod": "^4.0.0",
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.2",
-    "@noy-db/on-shamir": "0.6.0-pre.2"
+    "@noy-db/on-shamir": "0.6.0-pre.21"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.0"