@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.17 → 0.6.0-pre.19

package/dist/chunk-LUFZPROB.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/attestation/revoke.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { AttestationError, ConflictError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { loadOrCreateSigner, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, REVOKED_RECORD_ID } from './signer.js'\nimport { signRevocationList, type RevocationList } from '@noy-db/attestation'\n\n/** Everything the revoke core needs from the Vault, injected for testability. */\nexport interface RevokeContext {\n  readonly store: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly role: string\n  /** The _attestations collection DEK. */\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\ninterface RevokedSet {\n  docIds: string[]\n  updatedAt: string\n}\n\nfunction requireOwner(ctx: RevokeContext, op: string): void {\n  if (ctx.role !== 'owner') {\n    throw new AttestationError(`${op} requires the 'owner' role; caller is '${ctx.role}'. Revocation is the firm's identity operation.`)\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readSet(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, dek: EnclaveKey): Promise<{ docIds: Set<string>; version: number | undefined }> {\n  const env = await store.get(vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, REVOKED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!env) return { docIds: new Set<string>(), version: undefined }\n  const set = JSON.parse(await openEnvelopeJson(env, dek)) as RevokedSet\n  return { docIds: new Set(set.docIds), version: env._v }\n}\n\n/** Read-modify-write the _revoked set with optimistic concurrency + one retry. */\nasync function mutateSet(ctx: RevokeContext, mutate: (ids: Set<string>) => void): Promise<void> {\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {\n    const { docIds, version } = await readSet(ctx.store, ctx.vault, dek)\n    mutate(docIds)\n    const payload: RevokedSet = { docIds: [...docIds].sort(), updatedAt: new Date().toISOString() }\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(JSON.stringify(payload), dek)\n    const expectedVersion = version ?? 0\n    const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: expectedVersion + 1, _ts: payload.updatedAt, _iv: iv, _data: data,\n    }\n    try {\n      await ctx.store.put(ctx.vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, REVOKED_RECORD_ID, env, expectedVersion)\n      return\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof ConflictError && attempt === 0) continue\n      throw e\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function revokeDocCore(ctx: RevokeContext, docId: string): Promise<void> {\n  requireOwner(ctx, 'revokeAttestation')\n  const issued = await ctx.store.get(ctx.vault, ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION, docId)\n  if (!issued) throw new AttestationError(`revokeAttestation: attestation '${docId}' not found (was it issued by this vault?).`)\n  await mutateSet(ctx, (ids) => ids.add(docId))\n}\n\nexport async function unrevokeDocCore(ctx: RevokeContext, docId: string): Promise<void> {\n  requireOwner(ctx, 'unrevokeAttestation')\n  await mutateSet(ctx, (ids) => ids.delete(docId))\n}\n\nexport async function getRevokedDocIdsCore(ctx: RevokeContext): Promise<string[]> {\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n  const { docIds } = await readSet(ctx.store, ctx.vault, dek)\n  return [...docIds].sort()\n}\n\nexport async function publishRevocationListCore(ctx: RevokeContext): Promise<RevocationList> {\n  requireOwner(ctx, 'publishRevocationList')\n  const docIds = await getRevokedDocIdsCore(ctx)\n  const signer = await loadOrCreateSigner(ctx.store, ctx.vault, () => ctx.getDEK())\n  return signRevocationList(docIds, new Date().toISOString(), signer.keyId, signer.privateKeyPkcs8B64)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAKA,SAAS,0BAA+C;AAgBxD,SAAS,aAAa,KAAoB,IAAkB;AAC1D,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACxB,UAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,GAAG,EAAE,0CAA0C,IAAI,IAAI,iDAAiD;AAAA,EACrI;AACF;AAEA,eAAe,QAAQ,OAAmB,OAAe,KAAgF;AACvI,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,iBAAiB;AAC7E,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAY,GAAG,SAAS,OAAU;AACjE,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACvD,SAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AACxD;AAGA,eAAe,UAAU,KAAoB,QAAmD;AAC9F,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7B,WAAS,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,WAAW;AAC5C,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACnE,WAAO,MAAM;AACb,UAAM,UAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,YAAW,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,EAAE;AAC9F,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/D,UAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW;AACnC,UAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,MAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,MAAsB,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAAG,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,MAAW,KAAK;AAAA,MAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IACjG;AACA,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,mBAAmB,KAAK,eAAe;AAC/F;AAAA,IACF,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,UAAI,aAAa,iBAAiB,YAAY,EAAG;AACjD,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,eAAsB,cAAc,KAAoB,OAA8B;AACpF,eAAa,KAAK,mBAAmB;AACrC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,yBAAyB,KAAK;AAC5E,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,OAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,mCAAmC,KAAK,6CAA6C;AAC7H,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAC9C;AAEA,eAAsB,gBAAgB,KAAoB,OAA8B;AACtF,eAAa,KAAK,qBAAqB;AACvC,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACjD;AAEA,eAAsB,qBAAqB,KAAuC;AAChF,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7B,QAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1D,SAAO,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AAC1B;AAEA,eAAsB,0BAA0B,KAA6C;AAC3F,eAAa,KAAK,uBAAuB;AACzC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAChF,SAAO,mBAAmB,SAAQ,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,kBAAkB;AACrG;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-OAWVM5L6.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/manifest/types.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/storage.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/derive.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The pod-wide **schema manifest** record type (#941).\n *\n * This is an INDEX, not a full-inline manifest: `SchemaManifest.collections`\n * carries per-collection *metadata* (generation / content hash / field ids),\n * never the JSON Schema body itself. The JSON Schema stays the source of\n * truth at `_schemas/<collection>`, encrypted under that collection's own\n * DEK (see `with-shape/persisted-schemas`). Inlining full schemas into one\n * pod-wide manifest record would either leak every collection's schema to a\n * principal scoped to a single collection, or force the manifest itself\n * onto a collection-DEK it has no business holding — the index preserves\n * per-collection DEK isolation while still giving a single place to answer\n * \"what schema generation is this pod at, and does collection X's stored\n * schema match its declared content hash.\"\n *\n * `aggregateHash` binds the whole per-collection index's content: it is\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))`, so any change to any collection's\n * entry (a new generation, a changed hash, added/renamed field ids) changes\n * `aggregateHash` too. Canonical JSON (sorted object keys, no whitespace)\n * makes the hash independent of the map's key insertion order.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\n/** Per-collection entry inside a {@link SchemaManifest}'s `collections` index. */\nexport interface SchemaManifestEntry {\n  /** The vault-wide schema-fence generation this collection's schema was last written at. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** SHA-256 (hex) of the collection's canonicalised JSON Schema (see `persisted-schemas/derive.ts`). */\n  readonly contentHash: string\n  /** Stable per-field ids (#946), keyed by the field's current name. Absent when the collection has none. */\n  readonly fieldIds?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * The pod-wide schema manifest — one record per pod, stored at\n * `_manifest/schema` (see `storage.ts`). An INDEX over the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` entries, not the schemas themselves.\n */\nexport interface SchemaManifest {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly kind: 'schema'\n  /** Pod-wide schema-fence generation (`FenceDoc.currentSchemaVersion`) as of this manifest's derivation. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** Per-collection index: collection name → its manifest entry. */\n  readonly collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>\n  /** `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding over the index. */\n  readonly aggregateHash: string\n}\n\n/** The record id the schema manifest is stored under inside `_manifest`. */\nexport const MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID = 'schema' as const\n","/**\n * Read / write the pod-wide `_manifest/schema` envelope.\n *\n * Mirrors `with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts`'s shape: the same\n * standard noy-db record envelope, AES-GCM encrypted with a collection DEK\n * (here, the `_manifest` collection's own DEK — the manifest INDEX\n * discloses collection names + hashes + generations + field ids, metadata\n * rather than schema bodies, so it gets the same encryption grain as\n * `_schemas` itself).\n *\n * Storage layout:\n *\n *   <vault>/_manifest/schema   →   EncryptedEnvelope\n *\n * Unlike `persisted-schemas/storage.ts` (which takes an already-resolved\n * `EnclaveKey`), these functions take a `getDEK` resolver and call\n * `getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)` themselves — there is exactly one manifest\n * record per pod, so there is no per-collection DEK the caller needs to\n * pick; resolving it here keeps every manifest call-site symmetric.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { openEnvelopeJson, writeEnvelopeBody, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { canonicalJson, sha256Hex } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from './reserved-collections.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, type SchemaManifest, type SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/** A resolver for a collection's DEK — the same shape as `Vault`'s internal `getDEK`. */\nexport type GetManifestDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/**\n * A decrypted schema-manifest read paired with the wrapping envelope's `_v`\n * — the optimistic-concurrency token. Pass `version` back to\n * {@link saveSchemaManifest} (via `writeSchemaManifest`'s `expectedVersion`)\n * to make the write a strict CAS.\n */\nexport interface LoadedSchemaManifest {\n  /** Wrapping envelope `_v`. */\n  readonly version: number\n  /** Decrypted schema manifest. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the `_manifest/schema` envelope together with its wrapping `_v`.\n * Returns `undefined` when no manifest has ever been written, when the\n * envelope fails to decrypt (wrong DEK), or when it doesn't parse as a\n * `v: 1, kind: 'schema'` manifest.\n */\nexport async function loadSchemaManifestEntry(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<LoadedSchemaManifest | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, dek)\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext) as SchemaManifest\n    if (parsed.v !== 1 || parsed.kind !== 'schema') return undefined\n    return { version: envelope._v, manifest: parsed }\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist the schema manifest as a strict CAS write:\n * `expectedVersion` must match the stored envelope's `_v` (0 when no\n * envelope exists yet) or `store.put` throws `ConflictError` — surfaced by\n * `writer.ts`'s `writeSchemaManifest` as `ManifestConflictError` rather than\n * retried.\n */\nexport async function saveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  manifest: SchemaManifest,\n  expectedVersion: number,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  const json = JSON.stringify(manifest)\n  const body = await writeEnvelopeBody(json, dek)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: expectedVersion + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    ...body,\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, env, expectedVersion)\n}\n\n/**\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding\n * over a schema manifest's per-collection index. Canonical JSON sorts\n * object keys at every depth, so the result is independent of the map's\n * key insertion order. Shared by the writer's tests and (#941 Task 3) the\n * derivation path, so the hash is computed identically everywhere.\n */\nexport async function computeAggregateHash(\n  collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))\n}\n","/**\n * Derive the pod-wide {@link SchemaManifest} from the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` records — the source of truth (#941 Task 3).\n *\n * The manifest is an INDEX, never a cache with independent state: every\n * field in a {@link SchemaManifestEntry} is a direct projection of the\n * matching `PersistedSchemaEnvelope` (`hash` → `contentHash`, `fieldIds` →\n * `fieldIds`, `generation` → `generation`, falling back to the live fence's\n * `currentSchemaVersion` for a legacy pre-#946 envelope that never got a\n * generation stamp). Re-running this function against the same stored state\n * always produces the same manifest — that's what makes round-trip identity\n * (AC #2: dump → restore → re-derive matches the original) hold for free,\n * with no special-cased restore logic.\n *\n * A collection whose `_schemas/<collection>` envelope decrypts successfully\n * but has no derivable content (`hash === null` — a stub envelope for a\n * non-Zod validator) is legitimately omitted from the index: there is no\n * content hash to bind.\n *\n * ## Scoped principals: \"cannot decrypt\" is NOT \"doesn't exist\"\n *\n * A `_schemas/<collection>` envelope is encrypted under **that data\n * collection's own DEK** — the same key its records use — NOT a shared\n * `_schemas`-wide key. In a team vault, a collection-scoped grantee (e.g.\n * `grant(..., { role: 'operator', permissions: { invoices: 'rw' } })`) holds\n * only the DEKs their `permissions` name, plus every system-prefixed (`_*`)\n * collection's DEK — `_manifest` included, by `grant()`'s \"propagate system\n * collections to every role\" rule (`keyring.ts`). So a member scoped to\n * `invoices` CAN decrypt `_manifest/schema` (the pod-wide index) but CANNOT\n * decrypt a sibling's `_schemas/customers` envelope — even though that\n * envelope is right there in `store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)`.\n *\n * `lookupDEK` (the {@link LookupDEK} passed in) reflects this: it returns\n * `undefined` for a collection name whose DEK the caller does not hold —\n * deliberately NEVER minting a fresh one (see the module doc on\n * `LookupDEK` for why). This function distinguishes that case\n * (`undecodableCollections`) from \"the schema envelope legitimately has no\n * derivable content\" (`hash === null`) — the caller (`sync.ts`) MUST treat\n * an incomplete view differently: writing a manifest derived from a\n * partial view would silently drop every collection this principal can't\n * see. See `sync.ts`'s module doc for how the sync path handles this.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { loadFence } from '../schema-update/fence.js'\nimport { loadPersistedSchema, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { computeAggregateHash } from './storage.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { SchemaManifest, SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * A NON-MINTING DEK lookup: returns the collection's DEK if the caller\n * already holds it, `undefined` otherwise. Deliberately distinct from\n * `storage.ts`'s `GetManifestDEK` (which mints+persists a fresh DEK for an\n * absent collection — correct for a caller about to WRITE that collection,\n * e.g. `_manifest` itself). `deriveSchemaManifest` only ever READS sibling\n * collections it never created and has no business minting keys for — an\n * absent DEK here means \"not my collection to see,\" never \"new collection\n * that needs a key.\" Minting here would be worse than a no-op: it would\n * silently persist a garbage DEK into the caller's OWN `_keyring/<user>`\n * file (via `ensureCollectionDEK`'s `persistKeyring` side effect) that\n * still can't decrypt anything — see `sync.ts` / `with-pod/open.ts`'s\n * fix notes (#941 review).\n */\nexport type LookupDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n\nexport interface DeriveSchemaManifestResult {\n  /** The derived manifest — an index over every collection this principal could decrypt. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n  /**\n   * Names present in `_schemas` (per `store.list`) whose envelope this\n   * principal could NOT decrypt — either no DEK held for that collection,\n   * or the DEK held failed to decrypt/parse it (treated the same: the\n   * caller cannot verify what's there, so it cannot safely be omitted or\n   * asserted). Empty for a principal with full visibility (typically the\n   * owner/admin/custodian). Non-empty means `manifest.collections` is\n   * DEFINITELY INCOMPLETE relative to the pod's true collection set —\n   * see `sync.ts` for why that must gate whether the manifest gets written.\n   */\n  readonly undecodableCollections: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the fence generation + every `_schemas/<collection>` envelope this\n * principal can decrypt, and project them into a fresh {@link SchemaManifest}.\n * `lookupDEK` is called once per collection found under `_schemas` (never\n * mints — see {@link LookupDEK}). Names whose DEK isn't held, or whose\n * envelope fails to decrypt/parse despite holding a DEK, are reported via\n * `undecodableCollections` rather than silently dropped from the result.\n */\nexport async function deriveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  lookupDEK: LookupDEK,\n): Promise<DeriveSchemaManifestResult> {\n  const fence = await loadFence(store, vault)\n  const collectionNames = await store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)\n\n  const collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry> = {}\n  const undecodableCollections: string[] = []\n  for (const name of collectionNames) {\n    const dek = await lookupDEK(name)\n    if (dek === undefined) {\n      undecodableCollections.push(name) // present in _schemas, but not decodable by this principal\n      continue\n    }\n\n    const payload = await loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, name, dek)\n    if (!payload) {\n      // Held a DEK but still couldn't decrypt/parse — cannot distinguish\n      // \"wrong key after all\" from real corruption from here; treat as\n      // undecodable (never silently drop) rather than \"no content.\"\n      undecodableCollections.push(name)\n      continue\n    }\n    if (payload.hash === null) continue // legitimately no derivable content (stub envelope)\n\n    const entry: SchemaManifestEntry = {\n      generation: payload.generation ?? fence.currentSchemaVersion,\n      contentHash: payload.hash,\n    }\n    collections[name] = payload.fieldIds !== undefined ? { ...entry, fieldIds: payload.fieldIds } : entry\n  }\n\n  const aggregateHash = await computeAggregateHash(collections)\n  const manifest: SchemaManifest = { v: 1, kind: 'schema', generation: fence.currentSchemaVersion, collections, aggregateHash }\n  return { manifest, undecodableCollections }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDO,IAAM,4BAA4B;;;ACCzC,eAAsB,wBACpB,OACA,OACA,QAC2C;AAC3C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,yBAAyB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,GAAG;AACtD,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACnC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO;AACvD,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,EAClD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,UACA,iBACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ;AACpC,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,GAAG;AAC9C,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACtB,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,GAAG;AAAA,EACL;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,2BAA2B,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7F;AASA,eAAsB,qBACpB,aACiB;AACjB,SAAO,UAAU,cAAc,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7C;;;ACfA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACqC;AACrC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAElE,QAAM,cAAmD,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,yBAAmC,CAAC;AAC1C,aAAW,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAClC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI;AAChC,QAAI,QAAQ,QAAW;AACrB,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,oBAAoB,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG;AACjE,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AAIZ,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAM;AAE3B,UAAM,QAA6B;AAAA,MACjC,YAAY,QAAQ,cAAc,MAAM;AAAA,MACxC,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,gBAAY,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,EAClG;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,qBAAqB,WAAW;AAC5D,QAAM,WAA2B,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,sBAAsB,aAAa,cAAc;AAC5H,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,uBAAuB;AAC5C;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-OXRPH6AR.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/via/lookup/handle.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `_dict_*` reserved-collection storage engine — `LookupHandle`.\n *\n * Verbatim move of `DictionaryHandle` out of `via/i18n/dictionary.ts`\n * (#650 Task 1 — via-lookup extraction, phase D). The class is renamed to\n * `LookupHandle` (the dict tier is one backing kind the eventual lookup\n * layer supports); `via/i18n/dictionary.ts` re-exports it as\n * `DictionaryHandle` for one release so existing importers compile\n * unchanged. `DictEntry` / `DictionaryOptions` / `DICT_COLLECTION_PREFIX` /\n * `dictCollectionName` move with it — they were exclusively consumed by\n * this class's constructor/methods.\n *\n * No behavior change from the pre-move class: same encryption door\n * (`reservedEnvelopes('_dict_')`, #629 Task 4), same ACL, same ledger\n * shape, same sync-cache/snapshot contract for dict joins.\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbEventEmitter } from '../../kernel/events.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport type { ViaCryptoCtx } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { envelopePayloadHash } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/hash.js'\nimport {\n  PermissionDeniedError,\n  DictKeyMissingError,\n} from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/**\n * Delete-marker predicate, duplicated (not imported) from\n * `kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts`'s `isDeleteMarker` (#647 fix wave 1).\n * `via/lookup/**` may not statically import `kernel/enclave/` — not even the barrel\n * (Check 15, `via-enclave-isolation`) — and this predicate carries zero crypto/protected-body\n * surface (just the `_del` protocol-header field, not `_iv`/`_data`), so duplicating it here\n * mirrors the same call `port/with/i18n-strategy.ts` already makes for `isDictCollectionName`\n * (see its doc comment). Keep the two in sync if the marker shape ever changes.\n *\n * `buildDeleteMarker` (which DOES construct the protected `_iv`/`_data` body fields — Check 11,\n * `enclave-body-only`) can't be duplicated the same way; it's injected via the constructor\n * instead, built from the real `kernel/enclave` function at the Vault call site.\n */\nfunction isDeleteMarker(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return envelope._del === true\n}\n\n/** Reserved collection name prefix. Never collides with user collections. */\nexport const DICT_COLLECTION_PREFIX = '_dict_'\n\n/** Return the adapter collection name for a named dictionary. */\nexport function dictCollectionName(dictionaryName: string): string {\n  return `${DICT_COLLECTION_PREFIX}${dictionaryName}`\n}\n\n// ─── Dictionary entry shape ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * One entry in a `_dict_*` collection. The record `id` (adapter-side\n * key) IS the stable dictionary key (e.g. `'paid'`). The `labels`\n * record maps locale codes to display strings.\n */\nexport interface DictEntry {\n  /** Stable key — same as the record id in the adapter. */\n  readonly key: string\n  /** Locale → label map, e.g. `{ en: 'Paid', th: 'ชำระแล้ว' }`. */\n  readonly labels: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n// ─── Per-dictionary options ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Options for `vault.dictionary(name, options?)`.\n *\n * `writableBy` controls the minimum role for write operations (put,\n * putAll, delete, rename). Defaults to `'admin'` to match the standard\n * \"dictionary contents are owned by admins\" convention; set to\n * `'operator'` for user-editable dictionaries like custom tags.\n */\nexport interface DictionaryOptions {\n  /** Minimum role allowed to write dictionary entries. Default: `'admin'`. */\n  readonly writableBy?: 'owner' | 'admin' | 'operator'\n}\n\n// ─── LookupHandle ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Handle to a named dictionary within a vault.\n *\n * Obtained via `vault.dictionary(name)`. Provides strongly-typed\n * CRUD for dictionary entries, plus the `rename()` operation that is the\n * only sanctioned mass-mutation path for dictKey fields.\n *\n * All writes are encrypted under the compartment's DEK for the\n * `_dict_<name>` collection. Adapters never see plaintext.\n */\nexport class LookupHandle<Keys extends string = string> {\n  private readonly collName: string\n\n  /**\n   * Synchronous write-through cache for dict-join support.\n   * Populated on every `put()`, `delete()`, and `rename()`. The snapshot\n   * is built from this cache by `snapshotEntries()` — the query executor\n   * calls this synchronously inside `.toArray()`.\n   *\n   * `null` means \"not yet initialized\" — callers should use `list()`\n   * to warm the cache before using dict joins on pre-existing data.\n   */\n  private readonly _syncCache = new Map<string, DictEntry>()\n\n  /**\n   * Return all cached entries as `{ key, labels, ...labels }` records —\n   * usable synchronously by the join executor's `snapshot()` call.\n   * Returns an empty array when the cache has never been populated.\n   */\n  snapshotEntries(): readonly Record<string, unknown>[] {\n    return Array.from(this._syncCache.values()).map((e) => ({\n      key: e.key,\n      labels: e.labels,\n      ...e.labels,\n    }))\n  }\n\n  constructor(\n    private readonly adapter: NoydbStore,\n    private readonly compartmentName: string,\n    private readonly dictionaryName: string,\n    private readonly keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n    /**\n     * The `reservedEnvelopes('_dict_')` capability — this handle's sanctioned\n     * crypto door onto its `_dict_<name>` collection (#629 Task 4). Bound by\n     * the Vault; never a keyring, raw DEK, or enclave import.\n     */\n    private readonly reservedEnvelopes: ReturnType<ViaCryptoCtx['reservedEnvelopes']>,\n    private readonly encrypted: boolean,\n    private readonly ledger: LedgerStore | undefined,\n    private readonly options: DictionaryOptions,\n    /**\n     * Callback provided by the Vault to find and rewrite records\n     * in any registered collection that has a dictKeyField pointing at\n     * this dictionary, used by `rename()`.\n     */\n    private readonly findAndUpdateReferences:\n      | ((\n          dictionaryName: string,\n          oldKey: string,\n          newKey: string,\n        ) => Promise<void>)\n      | undefined,\n    private readonly emitter: NoydbEventEmitter,\n    /**\n     * #647 fix wave 1 — mints a version-ordered delete-marker envelope (the reserved-tier\n     * mirror of #589's ordinary-collection delete marker). Injected rather than imported:\n     * `buildDeleteMarker` constructs the envelope's protected-body fields (`_iv`/`_data`), and\n     * `via/lookup/**` may not reach `kernel/enclave/` directly (Check 11\n     * `enclave-body-only` / Check 15 `via-enclave-isolation`) — the Vault binds the real\n     * `kernel/enclave` function at construction time, same pattern as `reservedEnvelopes` above.\n     */\n    private readonly buildDeleteMarker: (identity: { collection: string; id: string }, version: number, actor: string) => EncryptedEnvelope,\n    /** #650 Task 4 (#647) — dirty-log participation hook (origin `local-write`), threaded from `BuildLookupHandleOptions`. */\n    private readonly onDirty?: (collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete', version: number) => Promise<void>,\n    /** #650 Task 4 — thin `graphDispatch.collect`-equivalent; opens/collects/flushes a one-shot wave for this touch. */\n    private readonly onRecordMutated?: (collection: string, id: string, action: 'put' | 'delete', version: number) => Promise<void>,\n    /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — the real reference check `delete()`'s strict branch calls: restrict\n     *  throws `DictKeyInUseError`, cascade/nullify apply their propagation. Vault-bound; a no-op\n     *  when the dimension has no declared lookup-referencing edges. */\n    private readonly checkReferencesOnDelete?: (key: string) => Promise<unknown>,\n  ) {\n    this.collName = dictCollectionName(dictionaryName)\n  }\n\n  // ─── Access checks ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  private requireWriteAccess(): void {\n    const minRole = this.options.writableBy ?? 'admin'\n    const roleRank: Record<string, number> = {\n      client: 1,\n      viewer: 2,\n      operator: 3,\n      admin: 4,\n      owner: 5,\n    }\n    const callerRank = roleRank[this.keyring.role] ?? 0\n    const requiredRank = roleRank[minRole] ?? 4\n    if (callerRank < requiredRank) {\n      throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n        `Dictionary \"${this.dictionaryName}\" writes require \"${minRole}\" role or above. ` +\n          `Current role: \"${this.keyring.role}\".`,\n      )\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ─── Internal helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  private async encryptEntry(entry: DictEntry, version: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return {\n        _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n        _v: version,\n        _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n        _iv: '',\n        _data: JSON.stringify(entry),\n        _by: this.keyring.userId,\n      }\n    }\n    const envelope = await this.reservedEnvelopes.encrypt(this.collName, JSON.stringify(entry), version)\n    return { ...envelope, _by: this.keyring.userId }\n  }\n\n  private async decryptEntry(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<DictEntry> {\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as DictEntry\n    }\n    const json = await this.reservedEnvelopes.decrypt(this.collName, envelope)\n    return JSON.parse(json) as DictEntry\n  }\n\n  /** @internal #650 Task 4 — re-read `key`'s CURRENT adapter truth into `_syncCache` (delete the\n   *  cache entry when the key is now gone). Called by `Vault._invalidateSyncApplied` after a\n   *  reserved-lookup row applies via sync, so an already-warmed snapshot/membership/altIndex read\n   *  never sees a stale verdict for a pulled vocabulary edit — the same invalidation a local\n   *  put()/delete()/rename() already triggers via `_syncCache.set`/`delete` above. */\n  async _refreshSyncCache(key: string): Promise<void> {\n    const envelope = await this.adapter.get(this.compartmentName, this.collName, key)\n    if (!envelope || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) { this._syncCache.delete(key); return }\n    this._syncCache.set(key, await this.decryptEntry(envelope))\n  }\n\n  // ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Add or overwrite a single dictionary entry.\n   *\n   * @param key    The stable key to store (e.g. `'paid'`).\n   * @param labels Locale → label map (e.g. `{ en: 'Paid', th: 'ชำระแล้ว' }`).\n   */\n  async put(key: Keys, labels: Record<string, string>): Promise<void> {\n    this.requireWriteAccess()\n\n    const entry: DictEntry = { key, labels }\n    const existing = await this.adapter.get(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      key,\n    )\n    const version = existing ? existing._v + 1 : 1\n    const envelope = await this.encryptEntry(entry, version)\n\n    await this.adapter.put(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      key,\n      envelope,\n      existing ? existing._v : undefined,\n    )\n\n    // Maintain synchronous cache for dict-join snapshot\n    this._syncCache.set(key, entry)\n\n    // #650 Task 4 (#647) — choke-point participation: dirty-log tracking BEFORE the emit (mirrors\n    // Collection._onRecordMutated's local-write order), then the wave-open hook AFTER.\n    await this.onDirty?.(this.collName, key, 'put', version)\n\n    this.emitter.emit('change', {\n      vault: this.compartmentName,\n      collection: this.collName,\n      id: key,\n      action: 'put',\n    })\n\n    await this.onRecordMutated?.(this.collName, key, 'put', version)\n\n    if (this.ledger) {\n      await this.ledger.append({\n        op: 'put',\n        collection: this.collName,\n        id: key,\n        version,\n        actor: this.keyring.userId,\n        //  — must be the real envelope hash so\n        // vault.verifyBackupIntegrity()'s data-cross-check matches.\n        payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(envelope),\n      })\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Batch-add or overwrite multiple dictionary entries in one call.\n   *\n   * @param entries  `{ key: { locale: label } }` map.\n   */\n  async putAll(entries: Record<Keys, Record<string, string>>): Promise<void> {\n    this.requireWriteAccess()\n    for (const [key, labels] of Object.entries(entries) as [Keys, Record<string, string>][]) {\n      await this.put(key, labels)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load the label map for a single key.\n   *\n   * @returns The label map, or `null` if the key doesn't exist.\n   */\n  async get(key: Keys): Promise<Record<string, string> | null> {\n    const envelope = await this.adapter.get(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      key,\n    )\n    if (!envelope || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) return null\n    const entry = await this.decryptEntry(envelope)\n    return entry.labels\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Delete a dictionary key.\n   *\n   * Default mode is `'strict'` — throws `DictKeyInUseError` if any\n   * registered collection has a record referencing this key. Pass\n   * `{ mode: 'warn' }` to skip the check (dev-mode cleanup only).\n   *\n   * Under sync, deletion writes a version-ordered delete-marker row rather than removing the\n   * adapter key outright (#647 fix wave 1) — markers accumulate over time; GC is future work,\n   * acceptable for vocabulary-scale data.\n   */\n  async delete(key: Keys, opts: { mode?: 'strict' | 'warn' } = {}): Promise<void> {\n    this.requireWriteAccess()\n\n    const existing = await this.adapter.get(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      key,\n    )\n    if (!existing || isDeleteMarker(existing)) {\n      throw new DictKeyMissingError(this.dictionaryName, key)\n    }\n\n    // #650 Task 5 (#648) — the real reference check: restrict throws `DictKeyInUseError` naming\n    // the referencing collection, cascade/nullify apply their propagation. `mode: 'warn'` skips\n    // this entirely (today's dev-mode-cleanup escape hatch, unconditional delete). A dimension\n    // with no declared lookup-referencing edges is a no-op (undeclared refs keep dangling).\n    const mode = opts.mode ?? 'strict'\n    if (mode === 'strict') {\n      await this.checkReferencesOnDelete?.(key)\n    }\n\n    // #647 fix wave 1 — mirrors Collection._doDelete's identical `this.onDirty`-gated branch\n    // (#589): under sync, a raw adapter.delete() is invisible to a peer's next pull (the key\n    // simply stops appearing in remote.list()) — a deleted key never propagates and can be\n    // silently resurrected by a later edit. Write a version-ordered DELETE-MARKER instead, so\n    // the removal round-trips like any other row. No-op (plain adapter.delete) when sync isn't wired.\n    const nextVersion = existing._v + 1\n    if (this.onDirty) {\n      await this.adapter.put(this.compartmentName, this.collName, key, this.buildDeleteMarker({ collection: this.collName, id: key }, nextVersion, this.keyring.userId))\n    } else {\n      await this.adapter.delete(this.compartmentName, this.collName, key)\n    }\n\n    // Maintain synchronous cache for dict-join snapshot\n    this._syncCache.delete(key)\n\n    // #650 Task 4 (#647) — same choke-point ordering as put() above.\n    // #647 fix wave 1: the dirty entry's ACTION is 'put' (not 'delete') — mirrors\n    // Collection._onRecordMutated's 'local-delete' case exactly: the marker rides push's\n    // CAS-put path, not push's raw remote.delete() path (which would strip the marker off the\n    // remote too and reopen this same hole). The version is the MARKER's version, so push's CAS\n    // (expectedVersion = entry.version - 1) matches the pre-delete remote copy.\n    await this.onDirty?.(this.collName, key, 'put', nextVersion)\n\n    this.emitter.emit('change', {\n      vault: this.compartmentName,\n      collection: this.collName,\n      id: key,\n      action: 'delete',\n    })\n\n    await this.onRecordMutated?.(this.collName, key, 'delete', nextVersion)\n\n    if (this.ledger) {\n      await this.ledger.append({\n        op: 'delete',\n        collection: this.collName,\n        id: key,\n        version: existing._v,\n        actor: this.keyring.userId,\n        //  — for delete the prior envelope is what was just\n        // removed; we hash it so the chain captures intent. The\n        // verifyBackupIntegrity data-cross-check skips delete\n        // entries entirely (the live record is gone), but the\n        // chain still benefits from a stable non-empty hash.\n        payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(existing),\n      })\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Rename a dictionary key — the only sanctioned mass-mutation path.\n   *\n   * Atomically:\n   * 1. Adds the new key with the same labels as the old key.\n   * 2. Updates every registered record that stores the old key to\n   *    store the new key instead.\n   * 3. Deletes the old key.\n   * 4. Appends a single ledger entry recording the rename.\n   *\n   * Respects ACL: throws `PermissionDeniedError` before any mutation\n   * if the caller can't write. The cascade is best-effort atomic\n   * within this call — no two-phase commit across adapter calls.\n   *\n   * Cascade-on-delete is NOT supported. Use `rename()` when you need\n   * to change a key that records reference.\n   */\n  async rename(oldKey: Keys, newKey: string): Promise<void> {\n    this.requireWriteAccess()\n\n    // 1. Load old entry\n    const existing = await this.adapter.get(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      oldKey,\n    )\n    if (!existing || isDeleteMarker(existing)) {\n      throw new DictKeyMissingError(this.dictionaryName, oldKey)\n    }\n    const oldEntry = await this.decryptEntry(existing)\n\n    // 2. Write new key\n    const newEntry: DictEntry = { key: newKey, labels: oldEntry.labels }\n    const newEnvelope = await this.encryptEntry(newEntry, 1)\n    await this.adapter.put(\n      this.compartmentName,\n      this.collName,\n      newKey,\n      newEnvelope,\n    )\n\n    // #670 — publish newKey to the sync cache BEFORE step 3 rewrites referencing records: a\n    // vocabulary:'closed' referencing field's enforceWrite reads checkLookupMembership ->\n    // snapshotEntries() -> this._syncCache, so if newKey isn't a member yet, step 3's own write of\n    // newKey into those records self-refuses with UnknownLookupKeyError. Transition semantics:\n    // mid-rename BOTH oldKey and newKey are legitimately members (records are transitioning\n    // old->new during the rewrite) — oldKey stays a member until its removal completes below.\n    this._syncCache.set(newKey, newEntry)\n\n    // 3. Update all referencing records in registered collections\n    if (this.findAndUpdateReferences) {\n      await this.findAndUpdateReferences(this.dictionaryName, oldKey, newKey)\n    }\n\n    // 4. Remove old key — #647 fix wave 1: same delete-marker convention as delete() above, so\n    // the old key's removal propagates on sync instead of leaving a phantom stale row on a peer\n    // that only observes the new key arriving.\n    const oldKeyNextVersion = existing._v + 1\n    if (this.onDirty) {\n      await this.adapter.put(this.compartmentName, this.collName, oldKey, this.buildDeleteMarker({ collection: this.collName, id: oldKey }, oldKeyNextVersion, this.keyring.userId))\n    } else {\n      await this.adapter.delete(this.compartmentName, this.collName, oldKey)\n    }\n\n    // Maintain synchronous cache for dict-join snapshot — oldKey's removal from the cache lands\n    // here (after step 3), completing the old->new membership transition begun above.\n    this._syncCache.delete(oldKey)\n\n    // #650 Task 4 (#647) — same choke-point ordering as put()/delete() above, for BOTH touches.\n    // #647 fix wave 1: oldKey's dirty action is 'put' (not 'delete') — see delete()'s comment\n    // above for why the marker must ride push's CAS-put path, at the marker's version.\n    await this.onDirty?.(this.collName, oldKey, 'put', oldKeyNextVersion)\n    this.emitter.emit('change', {\n      vault: this.compartmentName,\n      collection: this.collName,\n      id: oldKey,\n      action: 'delete',\n    })\n    await this.onRecordMutated?.(this.collName, oldKey, 'delete', oldKeyNextVersion)\n\n    await this.onDirty?.(this.collName, newKey, 'put', 1)\n    this.emitter.emit('change', {\n      vault: this.compartmentName,\n      collection: this.collName,\n      id: newKey,\n      action: 'put',\n    })\n    await this.onRecordMutated?.(this.collName, newKey, 'put', 1)\n\n    // 5. Ledger — record the rename as delete(oldKey) + put(newKey)\n    // so verifyBackupIntegrity()'s data-cross-check matches reality\n    // (the oldKey envelope is gone; the newKey envelope is what was\n    // just written). Two entries instead of one — the chain still\n    // captures the rename intent via the matching ts + actor.\n    if (this.ledger) {\n      await this.ledger.append({\n        op: 'delete',\n        collection: this.collName,\n        id: oldKey,\n        version: existing._v,\n        actor: this.keyring.userId,\n        payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(existing),\n      })\n      await this.ledger.append({\n        op: 'put',\n        collection: this.collName,\n        id: newKey,\n        version: 1,\n        actor: this.keyring.userId,\n        payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(newEnvelope),\n      })\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * List all entries in this dictionary.\n   *\n   * @returns Array of `{ key, labels }` objects.\n   */\n  async list(): Promise<DictEntry[]> {\n    const keys = await this.adapter.list(this.compartmentName, this.collName)\n    const entries: DictEntry[] = []\n    for (const key of keys) {\n      const envelope = await this.adapter.get(\n        this.compartmentName,\n        this.collName,\n        key,\n      )\n      // #647 fix wave 1 — a delete-marker row is a removed key, not a live entry: exclude it\n      // from the listing and drop any stale cache entry a prior warm may have left under it.\n      if (!envelope || isDeleteMarker(envelope)) { this._syncCache.delete(key); continue }\n      const entry = await this.decryptEntry(envelope)\n      entries.push(entry)\n      // Warm the synchronous cache\n      this._syncCache.set(key, entry)\n    }\n    return entries\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a key to its label for the given locale.\n   *\n   * Used by the collection's locale-aware read path to populate\n   * `<field>Label` virtual fields. Returns `undefined` when the\n   * key doesn't exist or has no label for the requested locale\n   * (after exhausting the fallback chain).\n   */\n  async resolveLabel(\n    key: string,\n    locale: string,\n    fallback?: string | readonly string[],\n  ): Promise<string | undefined> {\n    const labels = await this.get(key as Keys)\n    if (!labels) return undefined\n\n    // Try primary locale\n    if (labels[locale] !== undefined) return labels[locale]\n\n    // Try fallback chain\n    const chain = Array.isArray(fallback) ? (fallback as readonly string[]) : fallback ? [fallback as string] : []\n    for (const fb of chain) {\n      if (fb === 'any') {\n        // Return any available label\n        const any = Object.values(labels)[0]\n        if (any !== undefined) return any\n      } else if (labels[fb] !== undefined) {\n        return labels[fb]\n      }\n    }\n\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n// Compat alias — existing importers of `DictionaryHandle` (the pre-#650\n// name) keep compiling unchanged. `via/i18n/dictionary.ts` re-exports\n// this same binding for one release.\nexport { LookupHandle as DictionaryHandle 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package/dist/chunk-P5ARVLNW.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `unilateralWithdrawal`: a non-owner extracts their accessible scope\n * AND disposes of the source copy. Destructive; gated by the default-off\n * fail-closed built-in `client-unilateral-withdraw` policy (checked in the\n * UserApi wrapper).\n *\n * Two source dispositions:\n *  - 'delete'  — delete-closure: the records leave the source vault entirely.\n *  - 'freeze'  — the firm retains a cryptographically-frozen, read-only, write-once\n *                snapshot (hash-pinned in the tamper-evident ledger) while the live\n *                records are removed.\n *\n * Ordering guarantees no data loss: the client's re-keyed export bundle (and the\n * freeze snapshot) are produced BEFORE anything is deleted.\n *\n * The `freezeAndDeleteClosure` core is shared with the two-party approval path\n * (`request-withdrawal.ts`).\n */\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport { sha256Hex } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ReadOnlyError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { resolveAccessibleCollections, buildAccessibleBundle } from './export-accessible.js'\n\nexport const FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION = '_frozen_snapshots'\nconst ENC = new TextEncoder()\n\n/** 24-hex-char random id (used for withdrawal ids + request ids). */\nexport function randomId(): string {\n  const b = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  return Array.from(b, (x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')\n}\n\nexport interface FrozenSnapshotRef {\n  readonly withdrawalId: string\n  readonly sha256: string\n  readonly recordCount: number\n  readonly frozenAt: string\n}\n\nexport interface WithdrawAccessibleOptions {\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'gdpr-art-17'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  /** Re-key the exported bundle to a new owner secret. */\n  readonly reKey?: { readonly secret: string }\n  /** Source disposition. Default 'delete'. */\n  readonly disposition?: 'delete' | 'freeze'\n  readonly scope?: { readonly collections?: readonly string[] }\n  /** Stable id for idempotent resume (default random). */\n  readonly withdrawalId?: string\n}\n\nexport interface WithdrawResult {\n  readonly bundle: Uint8Array\n  readonly snapshot?: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Freeze a write-once, hash-pinned snapshot of the current ciphertext for\n * `collections` WITHOUT touching the live records. Returns the snapshot ref.\n *\n * This is the non-destructive core shared by two callers:\n *  - `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdrawal, disposition `'freeze'`) — which\n *    pins the snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records.\n *  - FR-6 `liberateVault` (custody) — which pins a PRE-liberation evidence\n *    snapshot but PRESERVES the live data for the new owner (operational\n *    continuity; liberation transfers, it does not erase).\n *\n * The snapshot put is write-once (CAS expectedVersion 0) and the ledger pin is\n * appended on success, so a crashed run re-run with the same `withdrawalId` is\n * safe. The snapshot is taken under the vault's own firm-owned DEKs — no re-key.\n */\nexport async function freezeSnapshotOnly(\n  vault: Vault,\n  collections: readonly string[],\n  opts: { actorUserId: string; withdrawalId?: string },\n): Promise<FrozenSnapshotRef> {\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n\n  // Enumerate the closure (record ids per collection).\n  const closure: Array<{ collection: string; id: string }> = []\n  for (const c of collections) {\n    for (const id of await adapter.list(vaultName, c)) closure.push({ collection: c, id })\n  }\n\n  const withdrawalId = opts.withdrawalId ?? `wd-${randomId()}`\n  const snap: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>> = {}\n  for (const { collection, id } of closure) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, collection, id)\n    if (env) (snap[collection] ??= {})[id] = env\n  }\n  const frozenAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ withdrawalId, frozenAt, by: opts.actorUserId, collections: snap })\n  const sha = await sha256Hex(ENC.encode(body))\n  // Write-once: expectedVersion 0 rejects an overwrite (idempotent resume).\n  await adapter.put(\n    vaultName,\n    FROZEN_SNAPSHOTS_COLLECTION,\n    withdrawalId,\n    { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: frozenAt, _iv: '', _data: body, _by: opts.actorUserId },\n    0,\n  )\n  // Hash-pin into the tamper-evident ledger — makes the snapshot provably unaltered.\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.actorUserId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `withdrawal-frozen-snapshot:${withdrawalId}:${sha}`,\n  })\n  return { withdrawalId, sha256: sha, recordCount: closure.length, frozenAt }\n}\n\n/**\n * Dispose of the source records for `collections`: optionally freeze a\n * write-once hash-pinned snapshot of the original ciphertext, then\n * delete-closure the live records. Returns the snapshot ref on freeze.\n *\n * Caller MUST have produced the portable bundle FIRST — this is destructive.\n * The delete is best-effort + idempotent (re-deleting an absent record is a\n * no-op) and the snapshot put is write-once (CAS expectedVersion 0), so a\n * crashed run re-run with the same `withdrawalId` is safe.\n */\nexport async function freezeAndDeleteClosure(\n  vault: Vault,\n  collections: readonly string[],\n  opts: { disposition: 'delete' | 'freeze'; actorUserId: string; withdrawalId?: string },\n): Promise<FrozenSnapshotRef | undefined> {\n  // freeze: pin a write-once, hash-pinned snapshot BEFORE any delete. The\n  // snapshot-only core is shared with FR-6 liberation (which never deletes).\n  const snapshot = opts.disposition === 'freeze'\n    ? await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, {\n        actorUserId: opts.actorUserId,\n        ...(opts.withdrawalId ? { withdrawalId: opts.withdrawalId } : {}),\n      })\n    : undefined\n\n  // delete-closure — only after the snapshot is durable.\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  for (const c of collections) {\n    for (const id of await adapter.list(vaultName, c)) {\n      await vault.collection(c).delete(id)\n    }\n  }\n\n  return snapshot\n}\n\nexport async function withdrawAccessibleData(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: WithdrawAccessibleOptions,\n): Promise<WithdrawResult> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  const disposition = opts.disposition ?? 'delete'\n\n  // Owner-class roles hold blanket authority — they use extractPartition.\n  if (keyring.role === 'owner' || keyring.role === 'admin') {\n    throw new ReadOnlyError(\n      'unilateralWithdrawal is the scoped self-service path; an owner/admin should use extractPartition',\n    )\n  }\n  // FR-6: a custodian must NOT destructively SEVER the vault. It holds the DEKs\n  // and operates fully, but ownership is claimed only through the audited\n  // Liberate ceremony — never by a one-sided delete/freeze withdrawal. 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package/dist/chunk-QJBXB4WU.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/directory/storage.ts","../src/with-party/directory/visibility.ts","../src/with-party/directory/user-envelope/storage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Persistence helpers for the vault-level user-directory toggle\n * (`_meta/directory`). Mirrors the bypass-AES pattern used by\n * `_meta/policy` — the directory document is plain JSON, the\n * envelope's `_iv` field is left empty.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md → Directory visibility\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/plaintext-bypass.md — every `_iv: ''` write site\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { DirectoryConfig } from './types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection name for vault-level metadata documents. */\nexport const META_COLLECTION = '_meta'\n/** Reserved id for the vault-level directory document. */\nexport const DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID = 'directory'\n\n/**\n * Read the directory toggle from `_meta/directory`. Returns `undefined`\n * when no document has been persisted — callers treat that as the\n * default-on case (`{ enabled: true }`).\n *\n * Tolerates corrupted documents the same way `_meta/policy` does: a\n * JSON parse failure surfaces as `undefined`, not a thrown error, so a\n * bad write never permanently breaks team enumeration.\n */\nexport async function readDirectoryConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DirectoryConfig | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, META_COLLECTION, DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as unknown\n    if (!isDirectoryConfig(parsed)) return undefined\n    return parsed\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist the directory toggle at `_meta/directory`. Idempotent — call\n * on every `db.setDirectoryEnabled()` invocation. Owner-only at the\n * caller site; this primitive does not check roles.\n */\nexport async function persistDirectoryConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  config: DirectoryConfig,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify({ enabled: config.enabled }),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, META_COLLECTION, DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID, envelope)\n}\n\nfunction isDirectoryConfig(x: unknown): x is DirectoryConfig {\n  if (x === null || typeof x !== 'object') return false\n  if (!('enabled' in x)) return false\n  return typeof (x as { enabled: unknown }).enabled === 'boolean'\n}\n","/**\n * Persistence helpers for the per-user visibility flag\n * (`_meta/visibility/<keyringId>`). Mirrors the bypass-AES pattern used\n * by `_meta/policy` — the visibility document is plain JSON, the\n * envelope's `_iv` field is left empty.\n *\n * Stored alongside the keyring file rather than inside the encrypted\n * user envelope (`_users/<keyringId>`) because:\n *\n *  - `UserEnvelope<T>.data` is opaque-to-hub by contract — hub does not\n *    introspect or reserve any keys inside it. Adding `hidden` there\n *    would violate that contract.\n *  - `listUsersWithEnvelopes` filters by the flag, and the filter must\n *    work even when decryption fails (legacy keyrings predating the\n *    envelope feature, or a corrupted envelope).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/user-envelope.md → Directory visibility\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/plaintext-bypass.md — every `_iv: ''` write site\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UserVisibility } from './types.js'\nimport { META_COLLECTION } from './storage.js'\n\n/** Prefix for per-user visibility records inside `_meta`. */\nexport const VISIBILITY_RECORD_PREFIX = 'visibility/'\n\n/** Compose the `_meta` record id for a keyring's visibility doc. */\nexport function visibilityRecordId(keyringId: string): string {\n  return VISIBILITY_RECORD_PREFIX + keyringId\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the visibility flag for `keyringId`. Returns `undefined` when no\n * document has been persisted — callers treat that as the default-visible\n * case (`{ hidden: false }`).\n */\nexport async function readUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n): Promise<UserVisibility | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId))\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(envelope._data) as unknown\n    if (!isUserVisibility(parsed)) return undefined\n    return parsed\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist the visibility flag for `keyringId` at\n * `_meta/visibility/<keyringId>`. Idempotent — call on every\n * `vault.user.setMyVisibility()` invocation. Own-only at the caller\n * site; this primitive does not enforce keyring ownership.\n */\nexport async function persistUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n  visibility: UserVisibility,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify({ hidden: visibility.hidden }),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId), envelope)\n}\n\n/**\n * Delete the visibility flag for `keyringId`. Called from `revoke()`\n * alongside `deleteUserEnvelope` so the sidecar does not leak to a\n * re-granted principal with the same `userId`. Idempotent — the store's\n * `delete()` is already a no-op when the record is absent.\n */\nexport async function deleteUserVisibility(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  await store.delete(vault, META_COLLECTION, visibilityRecordId(keyringId))\n}\n\nfunction isUserVisibility(x: unknown): x is UserVisibility {\n  if (x === null || typeof x !== 'object') return false\n  if (!('hidden' in x)) return false\n  return typeof (x as { hidden: unknown }).hidden === 'boolean'\n}\n","/**\n * Persistence helpers for per-principal user envelopes stored at\n * `_users/<keyringId>` (logically: `_meta/user/<keyringId>`).\n *\n * Unlike `_meta/policy` and `_meta/handle` which are plaintext, user\n * envelopes carry user data and are encrypted with a dedicated\n * {@link USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION} DEK (provisioned at vault open and\n * propagated to every keyring via the system-collection DEK path in\n * `team/keyring.ts`).\n *\n * This module is the **storage primitive** layer. The public API\n * (`vault.user.*`) sits on top of this; permission gates, own-only\n * write enforcement, and presence-channel propagation live there.\n *\n * @see design-history/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, UserEnvelope } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError, UserEnvelopeOversizedError } from '../../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION,\n  USER_ENVELOPE_MAX_BYTES,\n} from '../../../kernel/constants.js'\n\n/**\n * Read and decrypt the user envelope for `keyringId`. Returns `null`\n * when no envelope has been persisted (either the principal has never\n * called `updateMe`, or the keyring predates this feature).\n *\n * Decryption errors propagate — a tampered or wrong-keyed envelope\n * surfaces as the underlying crypto error rather than masquerading as\n * \"not found\".\n */\nexport async function loadUserEnvelope<T = unknown>(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyringId: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<UserEnvelope<T> | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION, keyringId)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, dek)\n  const data = JSON.parse(plaintext) as T\n  return {\n    keyringId,\n    data,\n    _v: envelope._v,\n    _ts: envelope._ts,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist the user envelope for `keyringId`. The new\n * version is `(prior._v ?? 0) + 1`. 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package/dist/chunk-QKRJUPAC.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/deed.ts","../src/with-party/custody/liberate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * FR-6 — Deed: sealed / hidden-owner provisioning.\n *\n * A **Deed** is a vault owned by a *latent* principal who never\n * authenticates. The owner credential (the random secret that\n * derives `KEK_owner`) is minted machine-side and sealed under a\n * **non-firm** {@link SealingKeyProvider} — that sealing boundary is\n * the cryptographic *inalienability anchor*: whoever holds the\n * provider (the client / their KMS) is the only party that can ever\n * re-derive `KEK_owner`. A firm-side custodian operates the vault\n * fully but can never reach the owner key — there is deliberately NO\n * firm-controlled fallback.\n *\n * Provisioning reuses the managed-mode seam:\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} mints + seals + persists the random\n *     secret at `_meta/sealed-secret` (and unseals it on every\n *     subsequent open through the same provider).\n *   - {@link createOwnerKeyring} derives `KEK_owner` from that\n *     secret and writes the `_keyring/<ownerUserId>` file.\n *\n * On top of that, a Deed writes a `_meta/deed` **marker**. The marker\n * is PLAINTEXT metadata — it records WHO the latent owner is and WHICH\n * sealing boundary protects them, so it must be readable without\n * unlocking the vault (a custodian or auditor inspecting the vault must\n * be able to see \"this is a Deed vault, owner = X, sealed under Y\"\n * without any key). The marker itself is therefore never sealed; only\n * the owner *credential* is.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport type { SealingKeyProvider } from './managed-secret.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from './managed-secret.js'\n\n/** Reserved id for the Deed marker under `_meta`. */\nexport const DEED_RECORD_ID = 'deed' as const\n\n/**\n * Plaintext metadata recording a vault's latent-owner Deed. Persisted\n * at `_meta/deed`. Readable without unlocking the vault by design — it\n * carries no secret material, only the identity of the latent owner\n * and the sealing boundary that anchors inalienability.\n */\nexport interface DeedMarker {\n  /** The latent owner principal — the user id of the `_keyring/<id>` owner file. */\n  readonly ownerUserId: string\n  /**\n   * The `SealingKeyProvider.id` the owner credential is sealed under.\n   * The inalienability anchor: only the holder of this (non-firm)\n   * provider can re-derive `KEK_owner`. Audit metadata — never secret.\n   */\n  readonly sealedUnder: string\n  /** Always `true` for a Deed — the owner never authenticates interactively. */\n  readonly latent: true\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the Deed was issued. */\n  readonly issuedAt: string\n  /**\n   * ISO-8601 timestamp the vault was liberated (a new owner claimed it\n   * via the audited Liberate ceremony), if any. Absent until liberation.\n   */\n  readonly liberatedAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format payload stored inside the `_meta/deed` envelope. Carries\n * a magic marker for forensics + the {@link DeedMarker} fields. JSON,\n * AES-GCM bypassed (the marker is plaintext metadata by design).\n */\ninterface DeedEnvelopePayload extends DeedMarker {\n  readonly _noydb_deed: 1\n}\n\n/**\n * Provision a Deed: a latent owner whose credential is sealed under\n * `sealing` (a NON-firm provider). Mints + seals the owner secret\n * via {@link resolveManagedSecret}, derives the owner keyring via\n * {@link createOwnerKeyring}, then writes the plaintext `_meta/deed`\n * marker. Returns the unlocked owner keyring.\n *\n * The returned keyring is the only in-memory window onto `KEK_owner`\n * for this call; the persistent re-entry point is the sealing provider\n * (re-run {@link resolveManagedSecret} with the same provider to\n * re-resolve the secret, then {@link createOwnerKeyring}/load to\n * unlock — no interactive secret is ever required).\n *\n * There is deliberately no firm-controlled fallback: the marker's\n * `sealedUnder` is the single cryptographic anchor of ownership.\n */\nexport async function createDeedOwner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  ownerUserId: string,\n  sealing: SealingKeyProvider,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Mint + seal + persist the random owner secret under the\n  //    non-firm provider (writes _meta/sealed-secret).\n  const secret = await resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, sealing)\n\n  // 2. Derive KEK_owner from the (never-human-seen) secret and\n  //    write the owner keyring file.\n  const keyring = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vault, { userId: ownerUserId, secret: secret })\n\n  // 3. Write the plaintext Deed marker. NOT sealed — it is audit\n  //    metadata that must be readable without unlocking.\n  await saveDeedMarker(store, vault, {\n    ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: sealing.id,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  })\n\n  return keyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the {@link DeedMarker} from `_meta/deed`, or `null` if the vault\n * has no Deed marker (i.e. it is not a Deed vault). Plaintext read — no\n * unlocking required.\n */\nexport async function loadDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DeedMarker | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload === null) return null\n  const r = payload as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_deed !== 1) return null\n  if (\n    typeof r.ownerUserId !== 'string'\n    || typeof r.sealedUnder !== 'string'\n    || r.latent !== true\n    || typeof r.issuedAt !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return null\n  }\n  const marker: DeedMarker = {\n    ownerUserId: r.ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: r.sealedUnder,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: r.issuedAt,\n    ...(typeof r.liberatedAt === 'string' ? { liberatedAt: r.liberatedAt } : {}),\n  }\n  return marker\n}\n\n/** Whether `vault` carries a Deed marker (a sealed/latent owner). */\nexport async function isDeedVault(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await loadDeedMarker(store, vault)) !== null\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist a {@link DeedMarker} at `_meta/deed`. Mirrors\n * `saveSealedSecret`'s envelope shape: a standard\n * {@link EncryptedEnvelope} with AES-GCM bypassed (`_iv: ''`), the\n * payload stored as plaintext JSON in `_data`. The marker is metadata,\n * not a secret — sealing it would defeat its purpose (auditors /\n * custodians must read it without a key).\n *\n * @internal — used by `createDeedOwner` and (later) the Liberate\n * ceremony to stamp `liberatedAt`.\n */\nexport async function saveDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  marker: DeedMarker,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: DeedEnvelopePayload = { _noydb_deed: 1, ...marker }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the marker is plaintext audit metadata.\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(persisted),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n","/**\n * `liberateVault` — the audited claim of ownership over a\n * sealed-owner (Deed) vault. The inverse of withdrawal.\n *\n * A **Deed** vault's owner credential is sealed under a non-firm provider, so\n * the firm-side **custodian** (which holds every collection DEK and operates\n * the vault fully) can never reach `KEK_owner`. Liberation is the ONLY route\n * by which a custodian assumes ownership, and it is deliberately a manual,\n * audited ceremony:\n *\n *   1. gate `'liberate-vault'` (fail-closed)\n *   2. caller MUST be the `custodian` (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)\n *   3. freeze a PRE-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot (hash-pinned in the ledger) —\n *      but PRESERVE the live data for the new owner (see the freeze decision\n *      below)\n *   4. mint a NEW owner keyring re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n *      owner's KEK\n *   5. lifecycle ledger `liberation-claimed:<newOwnerId>:<legalBasis>`\n *   6. stamp the `_meta/deed` marker with `liberatedAt`\n *\n * ## Security: the inalienability floor\n *\n * Liberation **mints a new owner from the custodian's DEKs** — it does NOT\n * unseal the original sealed owner. The old sealed-owner credential is left\n * untouched and ORPHANED (its `_keyring/<id>` file remains, its KEK is still\n * sealed under the non-firm provider), never impersonated. The new owner is a\n * DISTINCT principal under a fresh KEK derived from `newOwnerSecret`. This\n * preserves the inalienability floor: the act of claiming ownership is itself\n * auditable and produces a different principal, rather than silently assuming\n * the latent owner's identity.\n *\n * ## Freeze decision: snapshot-only, not freeze-and-delete\n *\n * `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdraw-accessible.ts) writes a hash-pinned\n * snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records — correct for a\n * destructive withdrawal, WRONG for liberation. Liberation transfers\n * operational continuity; it must leave the live data intact for the new\n * owner. We therefore call the snapshot-only core `freezeSnapshotOnly`\n * (factored out of that module; the freeze-AND-delete withdrawal path is\n * unchanged) to pin the evidence snapshot while preserving the records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { FactorProofBundle, KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { PermissionDeniedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { wrapKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from '../team/keyring.js'\nimport type { FrozenSnapshotRef } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeSnapshotOnly } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { loadDeedMarker, saveDeedMarker } from '../team/deed.js'\n\nexport interface LiberateOptions {\n  /** The id of the new owner principal the custodian mints by claiming ownership. */\n  readonly newOwnerId: string\n  /** The secret that derives the new owner's KEK (the DEKs are re-wrapped under it). */\n  readonly newOwnerSecret: string\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'contractual-handover'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  readonly factors?: FactorProofBundle\n}\n\nexport interface LiberateResult {\n  /** The hash-pinned pre-liberation evidence snapshot. */\n  readonly snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Audited claim of ownership over a sealed-owner vault by its custodian. See\n * the module doc for the full ceremony + security rationale.\n */\nexport async function liberateVault(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: LiberateOptions,\n): Promise<LiberateResult> {\n  // 1. gate — fail-closed `liberate-vault`.\n  await vault.noydb.checkGate(vault.name, 'liberate-vault', opts.factors)\n\n  // 2. caller must be the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs).\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter, keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  if (keyring.role !== 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'liberation is claimed only by the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Refuse to clobber an existing principal: the new owner must be a FRESH id.\n  // (Checked before any side effect so a colliding id never leaves a half-run\n  //  ceremony — no orphan snapshot, no partial keyring overwrite.)\n  const existing = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `liberateVault: newOwnerId \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" already exists as a principal; choose a fresh id (liberation mints a distinct owner, it never overwrites an existing keyring)`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Pre-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot of every operational collection —\n  //    snapshot-only (live data preserved for the new owner; liberation\n  //    transfers operational continuity, it does not erase).\n  const collections = await listOperationalCollections(vault)\n  const snapshot = await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, { actorUserId: keyring.userId })\n\n  // 4. Mint a NEW owner keyring, re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n  //    owner's fresh KEK. The old sealed owner is NOT unsealed — a DISTINCT\n  //    principal is minted and the original owner credential is left orphaned\n  //    (inalienability floor). Mirrors adopt-partition.ts's DEK re-wrap.\n  const newOwner = await createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vaultName, { userId: opts.newOwnerId, secret: opts.newOwnerSecret })\n  if (!newOwner.kek) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" has no KEK to re-wrap the incumbent DEKs under`,\n    )\n  }\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (!env) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" did not persist`)\n  }\n  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n  const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n  for (const [collection, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, newOwner.kek)\n  }\n  const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n  await adapter.put(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n\n  // 5. Lifecycle ledger audit (no-op if the history strategy is absent).\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.newOwnerId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `liberation-claimed:${opts.newOwnerId}:${opts.legalBasis}`,\n  })\n\n  // 6. Stamp the Deed marker with `liberatedAt` (if a marker exists).\n  const marker = await loadDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName)\n  if (marker) {\n    await saveDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName, { ...marker, liberatedAt: new Date().toISOString() })\n  }\n\n  return { snapshot }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate the vault's operational (user-facing) collections — those carried\n * by the caller's keyring DEK map, minus the reserved internal collections\n * (`_*`). These are the collections frozen into the evidence snapshot.\n */\nasync function listOperationalCollections(vault: Vault): Promise<readonly string[]> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  return [...keyring.deks.keys()].filter((c) => !c.startsWith('_'))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuCO,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAqD9B,eAAsB,gBACpB,OACA,OACA,aACA,SAC0B;AAG1B,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAI/D,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,aAAa,OAAe,CAAC;AAI9F,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,WAAU,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AAED,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,cAAU,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,EACrC,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,YAAY,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO;AAC5D,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,MACE,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACtB,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACzB,EAAE,WAAW,QACb,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,UACzB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,SAAqB;AAAA,IACzB,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,IACZ,GAAI,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAsB,YACpB,OACA,OACkB;AAClB,SAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,MAAO;AAClD;AAaA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,YAAiC,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO;AACnE,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA,IAE5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACrD;;;ACvHA,eAAsB,cACpB,OACA,MACyB;AAEzB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO;AAGtE,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AACrE,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,aAAa;AAChC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACzE,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,8BAA8B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC/C;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,2BAA2B,KAAK;AAC1D,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAM7F,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK,eAAe,CAAC;AACtH,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK;AACjB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC3C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACpE,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAC9F;AACA,QAAM,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACxC,QAAM,aAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK;AACjE,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC5C,eAAW,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1D;AACA,QAAM,aAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,WAAW;AACnE,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AAGvG,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IAC1F,QAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EAClE,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe,SAAS,SAAS;AACtD,MAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAM,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,cAAa,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/F;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS;AACpB;AAOA,eAAe,2BAA2B,OAA0C;AAClF,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC3C,SAAO,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC;AAClE;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-QTDAPDDV.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\nexport interface EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly echo: string\n  readonly key: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\nconst ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT = new Uint8Array([0xff, ...new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-echo-secret-v1')])\n\n/**\n * AG-1 encoding: domain context + 4-byte big-endian length prefix per\n * part. Two independent guarantees make a single typed string unable to\n * derive an echo vault's KEK (spec AG-1):\n *\n *   1. The `0xFF` context prefix — UTF-8 never produces that byte, so the\n *      encoding is provably not the encoding of ANY string (not merely of\n *      no separator-joined form).\n *   2. Structural length prefixes — part boundaries are key material, so\n *      re-splitting the same characters changes the derived KEK.\n *\n * @throws ValidationError when any part is not a string — the single\n * chokepoint every echo KEK derivation and block mint passes through, so a\n * malformed parts object cannot be `TextEncoder`-coerced into key material.\n */\nexport function encodeEchoParts(parts: EchoSecretParts): Uint8Array {\n  for (const name of ['prompt', 'echo', 'key'] as const) {\n    if (typeof parts?.[name] !== 'string') {\n      throw new ValidationError('echo secret parts must be three strings: prompt, echo, key')\n    }\n  }\n  const enc = new TextEncoder()\n  const segments = [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key].map((p) => enc.encode(p))\n  const total = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length + segments.reduce((n, s) => n + 4 + s.length, 0)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total)\n  out.set(ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT, 0)\n  let offset = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length\n  for (const s of segments) {\n    new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(offset, s.length, false)\n    out.set(s, offset + 4)\n    offset += 4 + s.length\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Derive the tier-1 KEK from a 3-part echo secret (spec: KEK from ALL parts). */\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call.\n *\n * `aad` binds the record's identity into the auth tag (#1041) — see\n * `record-aad.ts` for what is bound and why `_v` is not. A body sealed with\n * AAD can only be opened by a reader supplying the identical bytes, which is\n * what stops an untrusted store from relocating or re-tiering an envelope.\n *\n * Optional **only while the call-site sweep is in progress**. It becomes\n * mandatory once every `encrypt`/`decrypt` pair supplies it, at which point\n * the format version bumps and the reader rejects anything unbound. Until\n * then an omitted `aad` reproduces the previous, unauthenticated behaviour.\n */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n    },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data.\n *\n * `aad` must be byte-identical to what {@link encrypt} was given, or the auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError` (#1041). Note the asymmetry that\n * makes this useful: a mismatched identity is indistinguishable from a\n * corrupted body, so relocation fails **closed** rather than returning a\n * plausible record in the wrong place.\n */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. 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package/dist/chunk-RGPB25DB.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-envelope.ts","../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The one place an `EncryptedEnvelope` is constructed (#1051).\n *\n * ## Why this exists\n *\n * 49 files built envelopes with an object literal, bypassing\n * `RecordCodec.buildEnvelope` (which had 4 callers). That is **writer\n * fan-out**: N independent places each had to know the envelope contract, and\n * nothing checked that they agreed.\n *\n * It only became load-bearing with #1041. Binding a record's identity into the\n * AEAD requires every writer to supply that identity — and a writer that\n * doesn't produces data the reader rejects. Reader fan-out you fix by threading\n * an argument through call sites; **writer fan-out cannot be migrated\n * incrementally**, because the first migrated writer emits envelopes the\n * unmigrated readers refuse.\n *\n * ## Why adopting it is safe\n *\n * `identity` is **required but not yet used**. Output is byte-identical to the\n * literals it replaces, so every producer can migrate independently and the\n * existing suite verifies each step. The behaviour change happens **once**,\n * when AAD is switched on here — by which point every writer already supplies\n * identity, and the compiler proved it.\n *\n * That ordering is deliberate: a required-but-unused parameter converts \"did\n * we find every writer?\" from a question into a compile error, the same trick\n * that made the `NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION` single-sourcing safe in #1048.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../types.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\nimport type { RecordIdentity } from './record-aad.js'\n\n/** The body an envelope carries, independent of who is writing it. */\nexport interface RecordEnvelopeBody {\n  readonly version: number\n  /** AES-GCM IV, base64. Empty string for a plaintext or tombstone envelope. */\n  readonly iv: string\n  /** Ciphertext (or plaintext JSON when the collection stores plaintext). */\n  readonly data: string\n  /** ISO timestamp. Defaults to now — pass it when the caller has a real one. */\n  readonly ts?: string | undefined\n  readonly by?: string | undefined\n  /** Wrapped per-record CEK, when the record has one. */\n  readonly cek?: string | undefined\n  readonly provenance?: { readonly source: string; readonly sourceTs: string } | undefined\n  /** Slots the envelope may additionally carry. */\n  readonly extra?: Partial<Pick<EncryptedEnvelope, '_tier' | '_det' | '_sealed' | '_vdig' | '_bidx'>> | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an envelope for `identity`.\n *\n * `identity` is required and currently unused — see the module docs. Do not\n * \"simplify\" it away: its presence is what makes the eventual AAD binding a\n * one-line change here instead of a 49-site hunt.\n */\nexport function buildRecordEnvelope(\n  identity: RecordIdentity,\n  body: RecordEnvelopeBody,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  void identity\n  return {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: body.version,\n    _ts: body.ts ?? new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: body.iv,\n    _data: body.data,\n    ...(body.by !== undefined ? { _by: body.by } : {}),\n    ...(body.cek !== undefined ? { _cek: body.cek } : {}),\n    ...(body.provenance !== undefined\n      ? { _source: body.provenance.source, _sourceTs: body.provenance.sourceTs }\n      : {}),\n    ...(body.extra ?? {}),\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Tombstone shape + predicate for the per-record-key (CEK) layer.\n *\n * A *tombstone* is the residue a GDPR crypto-shred (`vault.forget()`)\n * leaves on disk: the live envelope rewritten to `{ _noydb, _v, _ts, _by,\n * _iv:'', _data:'' }`, dropping `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det`. With the wrapped\n * per-record CEK gone, the body — and every history version under the same\n * CEK — is permanently undecryptable, while the record KEY survives so the\n * version counter and \"record existed and was erased\" persist for the audit\n * ledger.\n *\n * These two helpers are the pure, collection-independent core of that\n * contract: {@link buildTombstone} mints the shape, {@link isTombstone}\n * recognises it on the read path. The orchestration that *writes* a tombstone\n * (`_writeTombstone`) and drives `vault.forget()` lives with the collection /\n * vault; it calls into these.\n */\nimport { type EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../record-envelope.js'\nimport type { RecordIdentity } from '../record-aad.js'\n\n/**\n * Shape-only tombstone recognition for layers that have no per-collection\n * context (the sync engine, #590): a tombstone carries an empty `_data` and\n * no wrapped CEK. No live envelope can match — record bodies never serialize\n * to the empty string (the `_sync` meta envelope carries non-empty `_data`,\n * and legacy migration envelopes carry non-empty `_iv`/`_data`).\n */\nexport function isTombstoneShape(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return envelope._data === '' && envelope._cek === undefined && envelope._del !== true\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this envelope a crypto-shred tombstone?\n *\n * A tombstone carries no body (`_data` empty) and no wrapped CEK (`_cek`\n * absent) — decrypting it would call `decrypt('', '', dek)` → an AES-GCM\n * throw, so every read choke point must short-circuit to `null` instead.\n *\n * `encrypted` is the collection's encryption flag: on an unencrypted\n * collection there are no envelopes to shred, so nothing is ever a tombstone.\n * (Legacy migration envelopes carry non-empty `_iv`/`_data`, so they are not\n * tombstones and stay readable.)\n */\nexport function isTombstone(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, encrypted: boolean): boolean {\n  if (!encrypted) return false\n  return isTombstoneShape(envelope)\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a tombstone envelope from a record's live version + actor.\n *\n * Keeps `_v` (the displaced version) so the counter is monotonic across the\n * shred, stamps a fresh `_ts`, and records `_by` when an actor is supplied.\n * Deliberately omits `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det` — that omission *is* the\n * erasure.\n */\nexport function buildTombstone(\n  identity: RecordIdentity,\n  version: number,\n  actor: string,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, {\n    version,\n    iv: '',\n    data: '',\n    ...(actor ? { by: actor } : {}),\n  })\n}\n\n/** #589: is this envelope an ordinary-delete marker (version-ordered, reads as absent)? */\nexport function isDeleteMarker(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): boolean {\n  return envelope._del === true\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a delete marker from the deleted record's next version + actor (#589).\n * Minted at the NEXT version (`existing._v + 1`) — unlike `buildTombstone`, which\n * keeps the displaced `_v` — so it wins convergence over the pre-delete copy and a\n * re-create can still win over it at a higher version.\n */\nexport function buildDeleteMarker(\n  identity: RecordIdentity,\n  version: number,\n  actor: string,\n): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  // `_del` is not one of buildRecordEnvelope's declared slots — a delete marker\n  // is a distinct envelope class, not a record body — so it is stamped here.\n  return {\n    ...buildRecordEnvelope(identity, {\n      version,\n      iv: '',\n      data: '',\n      ...(actor ? { by: actor } : {}),\n    }),\n    _del: true,\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA2DO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,MACmB;AACnB,OAAK;AACL,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACT,KAAK,KAAK,OAAM,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACvC,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACV,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,GAAI,KAAK,OAAO,SAAY,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAChD,GAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAY,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnD,GAAI,KAAK,eAAe,SACpB,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,WAAW,SAAS,IACvE,CAAC;AAAA,IACL,GAAI,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;;;ACjDO,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAsC;AACrE,SAAO,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,UAAa,SAAS,SAAS;AACnF;AAcO,SAAS,YAAY,UAA6B,WAA6B;AACpF,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO;AACvB,SAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AAClC;AAUO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,SACA,OACmB;AACnB,SAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,GAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/B,CAAC;AACH;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,UAAsC;AACnE,SAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AAC3B;AAQO,SAAS,kBACd,UACA,SACA,OACmB;AAGnB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,GAAG,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,MACA,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,GAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/B,CAAC;AAAA,IACD,MAAM;AAAA,EACR;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-RVTOCAHQ.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/via/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// kernel/via/index.ts — the ONLY kernel-resident via surface.\nimport { NoydbError } from '../errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\n\n/** Awaitable type for potentially async results. */\ntype Awaitable<T> = T | Promise<T>\n\n/** Declared security posture — a property the kernel enforces (enforcement activates in phases B/C). */\nexport interface ViaPosture {\n  readonly encryptedAtRest: 'envelope' | 'sealed'\n  readonly queryable: 'none' | 'det-exact' | 'ordered' | 'full'\n  readonly exportable: boolean\n  readonly forgettable: boolean\n}\n\n/** Opaque marker every feature descriptor extends; the kernel never sees concrete descriptor types. */\nexport interface ViaDescriptor { readonly _viaBrand: string }\n\n/** Per-call write context (A: minimal; B/C extend). */\nexport interface ViaWriteCtx {\n  readonly id: string\n  /** Owning vault name (event payload identity — e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** Prior stored record (decoded), lazily resolved. Null when creating. */\n  readonly prior: () => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>\n  /** Typed event emission (e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly emit: (event: string, payload: unknown) => void\n}\n\n/** Per-call read context — mirrors LocaleReadOptions loosely; features narrow. */\nexport interface ViaReadCtx {\n  readonly locale?: unknown\n  readonly fallback?: unknown\n  readonly layer: string\n}\n\n/** One sealed slot's ciphertext — matches the existing `iv:data` sealed map entries (seam map §2 step 2). */\nexport interface SealedSlotRef { readonly iv: string; readonly data: string }\n\n/**\n * A scoped crypto capability handed to a `via` feature's `encodeAtRest`/\n * `decodeAtRest`/`erase` hooks — never the keyring, never the enclave.\n * `sealedSlots` is pre-bound to one `(collection, recordId)`; `reservedEnvelopes`\n * is a whole-envelope encrypt/decrypt door scoped to collection names under a\n * declared prefix (e.g. `_dict_`).\n */\nexport interface ViaCryptoCtx {\n  readonly sealedSlots: {\n    seal(field: string, plaintext: unknown): Promise<SealedSlotRef>\n    unseal(field: string, ref: SealedSlotRef): Promise<unknown>\n    delete(field: string): Promise<void>\n  }\n  reservedEnvelopes(prefix: string): {\n    encrypt(collection: string, json: string, v: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope>\n    decrypt(collection: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  }\n}\n\n/** Per-call erase context — `forget()`'s per-ref participation door (phase C). */\nexport interface ViaEraseCtx { readonly id: string; readonly vault: string; readonly live: unknown /* EncryptedEnvelope */; readonly crypto: ViaCryptoCtx }\n/**\n * What an `erase` hook reports back to `forget()`'s summary ledger entry.\n * `retainedShared` is additive (#629 Task 10) — content NOT erased because\n * still referenced by another live record (blob's shared-chunk dual\n * accounting, `shredAllForRecord()`'s `retainedShared` count). Absent/0 for\n * bindings with no such concept (a sealed field is never \"shared\").\n */\nexport interface ViaEraseReport { readonly shredded: number; readonly residue: readonly unknown[]; readonly retainedShared?: number }\n\n/**\n * A feature bound to one collection's declared config. Record-grain hooks —\n * every hook receives the whole record (matches the real engine signatures,\n * e.g. quantizeMoneyFields(record, moneyFields)). All hooks optional;\n * absent = passthrough. Query-participation hooks are SYNC (#553).\n */\nexport interface ViaBinding {\n  readonly brand: string\n  readonly posture: ViaPosture\n  /** Declared dependencies (field paths / cross-record specs). MANDATORY for any future\n   *  derive-bearing binding — phase C validates well-formedness (strings, non-empty,\n   *  reference declared fields) and graph-registers a derived edge for each covered\n   *  field at declare time, right after `compileViaBindings` builds the bindings\n   *  (unknown source field throws `ValidationError`). See\n   *  `kernel/collection-config.ts`'s `resolveViaBindingDepsEdges`. */\n  readonly deps?: readonly string[]\n  /** Collection-name prefixes this binding's `reservedEnvelopes` capability may address (e.g. `_dict_`). */\n  readonly reservedPrefixes?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Does this binding own `field`? Backs `ViaPipeline.postureFor` (#629 Task\n   * 8's posture consumer) — a passive coverage check, independent of\n   * `buildClause`/`compareForOrder` (which some bindings, e.g. classified and\n   * blob, never define). SYNC, no side effects.\n   *\n   * Contract (documentation only — not enforced at runtime, future work):\n   * any binding declaring a non-default posture value — `queryable: 'none'`\n   * (#629 Task 8) or `exportable: false` (#629 Task 9's `redactForExport`)\n   * — MUST implement `covers()`. `postureFor`'s consumers only engage for\n   * fields a binding actively claims via `covers()`; a binding that omits\n   * it would silently fall through to the generic (unrefused/unredacted)\n   * path instead.\n   */\n  covers?(field: string): boolean\n  // NOTE: phase C adds a `derive` hook ADDITIVELY — do not stub it now.\n  // ── write pipeline ──\n  /** Refuse a write before crypto runs (classified step-3 slot: storage:'never' rejection + validators). Throws to refuse. */\n  enforceWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): void | Promise<void>\n  /** First pipeline stage (money canonicalizeIncomingMoney). SYNC. */\n  ingest?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Decode STORED form to canonical for internal boundaries (gates, derivations, patch bases). SYNC. */\n  canonicalizeStored?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Post-validation write encoding (money quantize; i18n translate→script→validate→densify). May be async. */\n  encodeWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Final write-pipeline stage: seal/encrypt declared fields via `crypto` before the envelope body is built (classified step-2 slot). */\n  encodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx): Promise<{ record: Record<string, unknown>; sealed?: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> }>\n  // ── read pipeline ──\n  /** First read-pipeline stage: unseal/decrypt declared fields via `crypto` before `present` runs (classified sealed-handle slot). */\n  decodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, sealed: Record<string, SealedSlotRef>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx, opts: { asHandles: boolean }): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Read-time presentation (money decode+virtuals; i18n locale/labels/strip). May be async. */\n  present?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /**\n   * Late read-time presentation (#669) — runs AFTER every binding's `present()` in the\n   * money+computed present-order segment (`ViaPipeline`'s `_presentOrder`, `kernel/via/\n   * pipeline.ts`), BEFORE the \"everything else\" segment (i18n/lookup dressing, taint\n   * redaction) runs. Exists for a binding that needs to react to a virtual computed\n   * field's fresh OWN-field output before anything dresses it (money's MAJOR-UNITS\n   * quantize-and-present for a field that is BOTH money AND `mode:'virtual'` computed) —\n   * `present()` alone can't express \"run after computed for THESE fields only, before\n   * computed for all others\", since it's a per-BINDING fold, not per-field. Folded over\n   * `bindings` in declaration order (mirrors every other per-binding fold), so lookup/\n   * i18n dressing and taint/redaction (both in the \"everything else\" segment) still see\n   * the already-dressed value.\n   */\n  presentLate?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  // ── query participation (ALL SYNC — #553) ──\n  /** Returns an opaque clause payload when this binding covers `field`, else undefined. */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  buildClause?(field: string, op: string, value: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /** Evaluate a payload produced by buildClause against a raw stored value. */\n  evaluateClause?(actual: unknown, op: string, payload: unknown): boolean\n  /**\n   * Optional: the STORED-form operand for a direct secondary-index probe\n   * against a payload produced by `buildClause` (#625) — lets\n   * `candidateRecords()` (`query/builder.ts`) hit `CollectionIndexes.\n   * lookupEqual`/`lookupIn` for `==`/`in` clauses instead of falling back\n   * to a linear scan + per-record `evaluateClause`. Returning `undefined`\n   * means \"no sound probe for this op/payload\" (e.g. a comparison whose\n   * stored form isn't a single index-bucketable value, or an op the index\n   * can't serve) — the caller falls back to the scan. A binding that\n   * never implements this hook always falls back, unchanged from before\n   * this hook existed.\n   */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  indexProbe?(op: string, payload: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /**\n   * Optional: canonicalize a raw STORED field value into the bucket key an\n   * eager index should use (#672) — lets `CollectionIndexes` group a\n   * pre-declaration / non-canonical stored value (e.g. a money field's\n   * leftover `'0100'` written before its `money()` declaration) under the\n   * SAME key a canonical write produces (`'100'`), so the index-probe fast\n   * path (`indexProbe` above) and the fallback scan (`evaluateClause`)\n   * agree on which records match. `undefined` means \"not mine / can't\n   * canonicalize this value\" — the caller buckets the raw stringified\n   * value, unchanged from before this hook existed. MUST agree with what\n   * this binding's own `evaluateClause`/`indexProbe` treat as equal, or\n   * the fast path and the scan will disagree.\n   */\n  canonicalizeIndexKey?(field: string, rawValue: unknown): string | undefined\n  /** Decode a raw stored record for query/scan results and callback views ('raw' — no virtuals). */\n  decodeResults?(record: unknown): unknown\n  /** Exact ordering for a covered field; undefined when the field is not covered. */\n  compareForOrder?(field: string, a: unknown, b: unknown): number | undefined\n  /**\n   * Per-key, PER-CALL-locale label resolution for `orderBy(field, dir,\n   * { by: 'label' })` (#650 Task 7) — the sibling `compareForOrder` above\n   * structurally cannot serve, since it carries no locale parameter.\n   * `locale` is the query's per-call locale (`undefined` for a locale-less\n   * query — a binding may fall back to its own descriptor-level default,\n   * mirroring `present`'s displayLocale hinge). `undefined` return = this\n   * binding doesn't resolve a label for `key` at `field` — caller falls\n   * back to the raw stored value, same graceful-degrade discipline every\n   * other via query hook uses. SYNC (#553 — query participation).\n   */\n  resolveOrderLabel?(field: string, key: string, locale: string | undefined): string | undefined\n  /** Rewrite an aggregate spec (money exact reducers). */\n  wrapReducers?(spec: unknown): unknown\n  // ── forget participation ──\n  /** `forget()`'s per-ref erasure door — shred/report this binding's residue for one record (classified/blob forget participation). */\n  erase?(ctx: ViaEraseCtx): Promise<ViaEraseReport>\n  // ── introspection ──\n  describeFragment?(): Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Binder: constructs a binding from a collection's declared config. Installed by the feature's declaration factory. */\nexport type ViaBinder = (config: unknown) => ViaBinding\n\nconst binders = new Map<string, ViaBinder>()\n\n/** @internal — called (idempotently, first-wins) by a feature's declaration factory, e.g. money(). */\nexport function installViaBinder(brand: string, binder: ViaBinder): void {\n  if (!binders.has(brand)) binders.set(brand, binder)\n}\n\n/** @internal — registry presence check. Used by tests (mirrors isMoneyEngineInstalled) and by vault's i18n validator delegators as a no-i18n-ever-declared fast path. */\nexport function isViaInstalled(brand: string): boolean {\n  return binders.has(brand)\n}\n\n/** @internal — resolve a binder; throws when the declaration factory never ran (hand-rolled descriptors). */\nexport function viaBinder(brand: string): ViaBinder {\n  const b = binders.get(brand)\n  if (!b) {\n    throw new NoydbError(\n      'VIA_NOT_LINKED',\n      `via feature \"${brand}\" requires descriptors created via its declaration factory from @noy-db/hub`,\n    )\n  }\n  return b\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAmMA,IAAM,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAuB;AAGpC,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAe,QAAyB;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG,SAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,OAAwB;AACrD,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1B;AAGO,SAAS,UAAU,OAA0B;AAClD,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-SJOK23XT.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-formula/materialized-views/stale.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Collection } from '../../kernel/collection.js'\nimport type { MaterializedViewExecutor as MVExecutorType } from './executor.js'\nimport type { TxContext } from '../../with-commit/tx/transaction.js'\nimport type { PutDerivedOutputCtx } from '../../kernel/via/dispatch.js'\nimport type { MaterializedViewRegistry, RegisteredMV } from './registry.js'\n// Type-only — runtime class loaded via dynamic import in\n// `resolveStaleMVOnRead` only when a stale flag actually fires.\n// Keeps the executor chunk out of the floor bundle (mirrors v1 floor-bundle isolation).\nimport type { MVQueryContext } from './types.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { RecordCodec } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\nimport { lazy } from '../../kernel/lazy.js'\n\n/** #846c — one memoized binding instead of a cast at the call site. */\nconst loadMVExecutor = lazy(() => import('./executor.js'))\n\n/**\n * Accessor shape passed in from the owning Vault. Provides the\n * registry (used as a stable WeakMap key + to look up MVs by output\n * collection) and the runtime context the lazy refresh needs.\n * Mirrors v1's `DerivationStaleAccessor`.\n */\nexport interface MVStaleAccessor {\n  registry(): MaterializedViewRegistry\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  getCollection(name: string): Collection<any>\n  getActiveTxContext(): TxContext | null\n  getQueryContext(): MVQueryContext\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory stale map keyed by `MaterializedViewRegistry` instance\n * (stable per vault). Each registry maps to a set of MV names that\n * have at least one pending source-change requiring a re-materialize.\n *\n * Persistence across vault close is NOT implemented in this iteration\n * (concern flagged in the v2 spec, mirrors v1 derivation behavior).\n * On vault re-open, the unset stale flag is interpreted as \"fresh\" —\n * `vault.refreshView(name)` is the explicit recompute escape hatch.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst _staleByRegistry = new WeakMap<MaterializedViewRegistry, Set<string>>()\n\n/**\n * Mark an MV as stale. Called from `Collection.dispatchMaterializedViews`\n * when a source-write fires for a `refresh: 'lazy'` MV.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function markMVStale(registry: MaterializedViewRegistry, mvName: string): void {\n  let set = _staleByRegistry.get(registry)\n  if (!set) {\n    set = new Set()\n    _staleByRegistry.set(registry, set)\n  }\n  set.add(mvName)\n}\n\n/**\n * Test-only: check whether a given MV name is currently flagged stale\n * against a registry. Exported so the regression suite can pin the\n * stale-bit lifecycle without touching the internal `WeakMap`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function isMVStale(registry: MaterializedViewRegistry, mvName: string): boolean {\n  return _staleByRegistry.get(registry)?.has(mvName) ?? false\n}\n\n/**\n * Reserved collection holding CONTENT-FREE lazy-stale markers (record id =\n * MV name, plaintext `_iv: ''` envelope, no payload) — mirrors the\n * `_meta`/schema-fence marker envelope shape. Written only from the\n * delete/forget/elevate dispatcher (#736); ordinary source writes stay\n * in-memory-only (the cheap path). Read via the adapter directly, never\n * through `vault.collection()` — same reserved-collection convention as\n * `_subject_index`/`_meta`.\n */\nexport const MV_STALE_COLLECTION = '_mv_stale'\n\n/**\n * Once-per-registry hydrate guard for `resolveStaleMVOnRead`'s persisted-marker fold-in.\n * Stores the in-flight/settled PROMISE (not a boolean) — a concurrent cold first read that\n * arrives while the hydrate is still awaiting `adapter.list` must await the SAME promise\n * rather than observing \"already hydrating\" and reading an empty pending set (#736\n * whole-branch review).\n */\nconst _hydratedByRegistry = new WeakMap<MaterializedViewRegistry, Promise<void>>()\n\n/** The adapter + vault name backing any collection in this vault (all collections share both). */\nfunction storeOf(accessor: MVStaleAccessor, collectionName: string): { adapter: NoydbStore; vault: string } {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  const c = accessor.getCollection(collectionName) as any\n  return { adapter: c.adapter as NoydbStore, vault: c.vault as string }\n}\n\nasync function writeMVStaleMarker(adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, mvName: string): Promise<void> {\n  // Content-free — the marker's only payload is its key (the MV name).\n  const env = RecordCodec.buildPlaintextEnvelope({ version: 1, data: '{}' })\n  await adapter.put(vault, MV_STALE_COLLECTION, mvName, env)\n}\n\nasync function deleteMVStaleMarker(adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, mvName: string): Promise<void> {\n  await adapter.delete(vault, MV_STALE_COLLECTION, mvName)\n}\n\n/**\n * On first `resolveStaleMVOnRead` call for a (cold-reopened) registry, fold every\n * persisted `_mv_stale` marker into the in-memory pending set — otherwise a cold\n * session's empty `WeakMap` entry reads as \"fresh\" and serves the emptied output\n * collection forever.\n */\nasync function hydratePersistedStaleMarkers(accessor: MVStaleAccessor, registry: MaterializedViewRegistry): Promise<void> {\n  const mvs = registry.all()\n  if (mvs.length === 0) return\n  const { adapter, vault } = storeOf(accessor, mvs[0]!.outputCollection)\n  // No try/catch: a genuine store failure here must surface, not be read as\n  // \"nothing pending\" — silently treating it as fresh is the exact leak class\n  // this module closes (mirrors `subject-index.ts`'s bare `adapter.list` reads).\n  for (const name of await adapter.list(vault, MV_STALE_COLLECTION)) markMVStale(registry, name)\n}\n\n/**\n * Invalidate an MV from the delete/forget/elevate dispatcher (#736) — the ordinary\n * source-write path (`dispatchMaterializedViews`) never calls this. Deletes EVERY\n * persisted row in `reg.outputCollection` via `_internalDelete` (the at-rest law: a\n * stale mark alone leaves the elevated/forgotten source's plaintext sitting in the\n * output row) using the adapter directly so the read-path's `resolveStaleMVOnRead`\n * isn't triggered mid-invalidation. `mode: 'lazy'` also persists the stale mark so a\n * cold session recomputes on next read; `'manual'` gets the purge only — the MV\n * serves empty until an explicit `vault.refreshView()` (erasure wins). Deletion is\n * stamp-scoped (`_materializedFrom.mvName === reg.spec.name` — see the loop below),\n * so another registered MV sharing this output collection keeps its own rows intact:\n * no cross-MV re-marking is needed here, only `reg` itself is marked stale.\n *\n * Returns the count of rows actually `_internalDelete`d (#761 item 1) — folded by the\n * caller into `dispatchMaterializedViewsOnDelete`'s `deleted` so `ForgetResult.derivedRecordsErased`\n * counts lazy/manual purges too, not just the eager executor's tombstone leg — plus\n * `residueUndecodable`, the bare ids whose ownership stamp could NOT be decoded (#776): a\n * candidate row that fails to decode under the collection's default DEK (e.g. elevated above\n * tier 0 on a tiered output collection) has UNKNOWN ownership — it might be this MV's own\n * output, or (same-collection shape) a plain user record — so it is never erased, but it must\n * be SURFACED rather than silently skipped (the #724 posture), since it may still hold the\n * forgotten/pre-elevation contribution, decryptable by tier-holders — and `residueDeclined`\n * (#785), the bare ids that DID decode and stamp-match but whose `_internalDelete` declined\n * (ownership CONFIRMED, erasure declined).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function invalidateMVAtRest(\n  accessor: MVStaleAccessor,\n  reg: RegisteredMV,\n  mode: 'lazy' | 'manual',\n): Promise<{ deleted: number; residueUndecodable: string[]; residueDeclined: string[] }> {\n  const outputColl = accessor.getCollection(reg.outputCollection)\n  const txCtx = accessor.getActiveTxContext()\n  const { adapter, vault } = storeOf(accessor, reg.outputCollection)\n  let deleted = 0\n  const residueUndecodable: string[] = []\n  const residueDeclined: string[] = []\n  for (const id of await adapter.list(vault, reg.outputCollection)) {\n    // A same-collection partition MV (`output: { collection: <source>, partition }`,\n    // the DERIV-PP30-001 shape) writes INTO its own source collection — `adapter.list`\n    // over `reg.outputCollection` then also returns untouched user source records.\n    // Decode each candidate row (the invalidation path is rare; this cost is fine\n    // here) and only erase rows THIS MV stamped via `_materializedFrom.mvName` —\n    // an unstamped row, or one stamped by a different MV, is never this MV's to\n    // delete (#736 whole-branch review, Critical).\n    const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, reg.outputCollection, id)\n    if (envelope === null) continue\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    const decoded = await (outputColl as any)._decodeEnvelope(envelope, id)\n    if (decoded === null) { residueUndecodable.push(id); continue } // #776 — ownership unknown, surfaced not skipped\n    const stampedBy = (decoded as Record<string, unknown>)._materializedFrom as { mvName?: string } | undefined\n    if (stampedBy?.mvName !== reg.spec.name) continue\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    if (await (outputColl as any)._internalDelete(id, txCtx)) {\n      deleted++\n    } else {\n      // #782 part b — decoded AND stamp-owned, but erasure declined (#718 tier-elevation\n      // gate). Ownership IS confirmed — a real silent survival, not a legit stamp-mismatch\n      // skip. Surface it too, in its own channel (#785 — distinct from the decode-null case).\n      residueDeclined.push(id)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // `mode: 'manual'` gets the purge only (erasure wins, no auto-recompute promise);\n  // `'lazy'` also marks + persists ITS OWN stale bit for cold-session recompute. No\n  // sibling MV on the same output collection is touched here — the stamp-scoped\n  // deletion above never erased sibling rows in the first place (#736 re-review).\n  if (mode === 'lazy') {\n    const registry = accessor.registry()\n    markMVStale(registry, reg.spec.name)\n    await writeMVStaleMarker(adapter, vault, reg.spec.name)\n  }\n  return { deleted, residueUndecodable, residueDeclined }\n}\n\n/**\n * Called from `Collection.get` (and any reader that materializes the\n * MV's output collection). If any MV producing `outputCollection` is\n * flagged stale, runs the executor against the live source state\n * before returning. No-op when there is no pending work — keeps the\n * read fast path negligible.\n *\n * `dispatchCtx` (#641): threaded from the calling `Collection`'s\n * `#dispatchCtx({ collection: outputCollection, id: 'resolve-on-read' })` — a read has no\n * real \"reacting write\" record, so `'resolve-on-read'` is the sentinel id, mirroring\n * `Vault.refreshView()`'s `'refreshView'` sentinel for the same reason. Passed straight\n * through to the executor so a stale row whose output lands in a closed period follows the\n * frozen-output rule (skip + `derivation:skipped-frozen`, #637) instead of throwing\n * `PeriodClosedError` out of a read.\n *\n * Dynamic-imports the executor only when a stale flag actually fires\n * (the floor-bundle isolation pattern v1 derivations established in\n * floor-bundle isolation pattern).\n */\nexport async function resolveStaleMVOnRead(\n  accessor: MVStaleAccessor,\n  outputCollection: string,\n  dispatchCtx?: PutDerivedOutputCtx,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const registry = accessor.registry()\n  // Cold session: the in-memory WeakMap has no entry for this (freshly\n  // constructed) registry yet — fold any persisted `_mv_stale` markers in\n  // before reading the pending set, once per registry (#736). Memoize the\n  // PROMISE, not a boolean: a concurrent first read arriving while the\n  // hydrate is still awaiting `adapter.list` must await the SAME promise —\n  // otherwise it observes \"already hydrating\", skips straight to an empty\n  // pending set, and serves the purged/stale view as fresh (#736\n  // whole-branch review, hydrate-once race). On rejection, evict the entry\n  // BEFORE rethrowing — a cached rejected promise would otherwise poison the\n  // MV read surface for the rest of the session (every later read re-awaits\n  // the same rejection instead of retrying the store call) (#736 re-review).\n  let hydrate = _hydratedByRegistry.get(registry)\n  if (!hydrate) {\n    hydrate = hydratePersistedStaleMarkers(accessor, registry).catch((err: unknown) => {\n      _hydratedByRegistry.delete(registry)\n      throw err\n    })\n    _hydratedByRegistry.set(registry, hydrate)\n  }\n  await hydrate\n  const pending = _staleByRegistry.get(registry)\n  if (!pending || pending.size === 0) return\n\n  const { adapter, vault } = storeOf(accessor, outputCollection)\n\n  // Clean up persisted markers for MV names no longer registered (renamed or\n  // removed since the marker was written). Without this sweep an orphaned name\n  // can never become a `candidate` below — `candidates` is built from\n  // `registry.all()`, which no longer lists it — so both the in-memory pending\n  // entry and the persisted `_mv_stale` row would linger forever, re-hydrating\n  // on every cold session (#736 whole-branch review).\n  for (const name of pending) {\n    if (registry.byName(name)) continue\n    pending.delete(name)\n    await deleteMVStaleMarker(adapter, vault, name)\n  }\n  if (pending.size === 0) return\n\n  // Find every MV that writes to this output collection AND is\n  // currently flagged stale. Multiple MVs CAN share an output\n  // collection in theory; in practice the registration validation +\n  // cycle detection make this unusual.\n  const candidates: string[] = []\n  for (const mv of registry.all()) {\n    if (mv.outputCollection !== outputCollection) continue\n    if (!pending.has(mv.spec.name)) continue\n    candidates.push(mv.spec.name)\n  }\n  if (candidates.length === 0) return\n\n  let executor: typeof MVExecutorType | null = null\n  for (const name of candidates) {\n    const reg = registry.byName(name)\n    if (!reg) {\n      // Unreachable in practice — `candidates` is drawn from `registry.all()`,\n      // and the orphan sweep above already cleared any name absent from it.\n      // Kept as a defensive fallback; also clears the persisted marker so it\n      // can't linger if this ever does fire.\n      pending.delete(name)\n      await deleteMVStaleMarker(adapter, vault, name)\n      continue\n    }\n    executor ??= (await loadMVExecutor()).MaterializedViewExecutor\n    // A cold-hydrated stale flag (unlike an in-session one) can fire with\n    // NONE of the MV's dependency collections touched yet this session —\n    // the sync `Query.toArray()` `spec.query()` runs reads straight off\n    // `Collection`'s in-memory cache, populated only by a prior async\n    // touch (`ensureHydrated()`, called from `get`/`list`/`put`, never\n    // from `query()` itself). Warm every dependency first so the recompute\n    // sees the live persisted state instead of an empty cache (#736).\n    for (const dep of reg.dependencies) {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      await (accessor.getCollection(dep) as any).ensureHydrated()\n    }\n    await executor.refresh(reg, {\n      getCollection: (n) => accessor.getCollection(n),\n      getActiveTxContext: () => accessor.getActiveTxContext(),\n      getQueryContext: () => accessor.getQueryContext(),\n      ...(dispatchCtx !== undefined ? { dispatchCtx } : {}),\n    })\n    pending.delete(name)\n    // Runs even when no marker was ever persisted for this name (an in-session-only\n    // stale bit — e.g. the cheap ordinary-write path never writes one, see the\n    // \"cheap-path guarantee\" test). `adapter.delete` on an absent key is a harmless\n    // void — keeping this unconditional avoids branching on marker origin here.\n    await deleteMVStaleMarker(adapter, vault, name)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop every stale flag for a registry. Used after a manual\n * `vault.refreshView(name)` runs the executor explicitly — the\n * post-refresh state matches the registered strategies, so\n * lingering stale bits would force a redundant refresh on the next\n * read.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function clearMVStale(registry: MaterializedViewRegistry, mvName: string): void {\n  _staleByRegistry.get(registry)?.delete(mvName)\n}\n\n/**\n * `clearMVStale` plus the persisted marker (#736) — `Vault.refreshView()`'s\n * completion path. A lingering persisted marker after a manual refresh would\n * make the NEXT cold session recompute redundantly.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function clearMVStaleFully(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  registry: MaterializedViewRegistry,\n  mvName: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  clearMVStale(registry, mvName)\n  await deleteMVStaleMarker(adapter, vault, mvName)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAeA,IAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAe,CAAC;AA4BzD,IAAM,mBAAmB,oBAAI,QAA+C;AAQrE,SAAS,YAAY,UAAoC,QAAsB;AACpF,MAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ;AACvC,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,oBAAI,IAAI;AACd,qBAAiB,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACpC;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AAChB;AASO,SAAS,UAAU,UAAoC,QAAyB;AACrF,SAAO,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AACxD;AAWO,IAAM,sBAAsB;AASnC,IAAM,sBAAsB,oBAAI,QAAiD;AAGjF,SAAS,QAAQ,UAA2B,gBAAgE;AAE1G,QAAM,IAAI,SAAS,cAAc,cAAc;AAC/C,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAuB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAgB;AACtE;AAEA,eAAe,mBAAmB,SAAqB,OAAe,QAA+B;AAEnG,QAAM,MAAM,YAAY,uBAAuB,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AACzE,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC3D;AAEA,eAAe,oBAAoB,SAAqB,OAAe,QAA+B;AACpG,QAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,qBAAqB,MAAM;AACzD;AAQA,eAAe,6BAA6B,UAA2B,UAAmD;AACxH,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACzB,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW,EAAG;AACtB,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,EAAG,gBAAgB;AAIrE,aAAW,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB,EAAG,aAAY,UAAU,IAAI;AAC/F;AA6BA,eAAsB,mBACpB,UACA,KACA,MACuF;AACvF,QAAM,aAAa,SAAS,cAAc,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAC9D,QAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,mBAAmB;AAC1C,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACjE,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,QAAM,qBAA+B,CAAC;AACtC,QAAM,kBAA4B,CAAC;AACnC,aAAW,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,gBAAgB,GAAG;AAQhE,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAClE,QAAI,aAAa,KAAM;AAEvB,UAAM,UAAU,MAAO,WAAmB,gBAAgB,UAAU,EAAE;AACtE,QAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAAE,yBAAmB,KAAK,EAAE;AAAG;AAAA,IAAS;AAC9D,UAAM,YAAa,QAAoC;AACvD,QAAI,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,KAAM;AAEzC,QAAI,MAAO,WAAmB,gBAAgB,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AACxD;AAAA,IACF,OAAO;AAIL,sBAAgB,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ;AACnB,UAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;AACnC,gBAAY,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AACnC,UAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EACxD;AACA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB,gBAAgB;AACxD;AAqBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,UACA,kBACA,aACe;AACf,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS;AAYnC,MAAI,UAAU,oBAAoB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC9C,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AACZ,cAAU,6BAA6B,UAAU,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAiB;AACjF,0BAAoB,OAAO,QAAQ;AACnC,YAAM;AAAA,IACR,CAAC;AACD,wBAAoB,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,EAC3C;AACA,QAAM;AACN,QAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC7C,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAG;AAEpC,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,gBAAgB;AAQ7D,aAAW,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC1B,QAAI,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,EAAG;AAC3B,YAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AACnB,UAAM,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,EAChD;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAG;AAMxB,QAAM,aAAuB,CAAC;AAC9B,aAAW,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AAC/B,QAAI,GAAG,qBAAqB,iBAAkB;AAC9C,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,EAAG;AAChC,eAAW,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EAC9B;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,WAAW,EAAG;AAE7B,MAAI,WAAyC;AAC7C,aAAW,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC7B,UAAM,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI;AAChC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AAKR,cAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AACnB,YAAM,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI;AAC9C;AAAA,IACF;AACA,kBAAc,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG;AAQtC,eAAW,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc;AAElC,YAAO,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG,EAAU,eAAe;AAAA,IAC5D;AACA,UAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,MAC1B,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,MAC9C,oBAAoB,MAAM,SAAS,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACtD,iBAAiB,MAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChD,GAAI,gBAAgB,SAAY,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACrD,CAAC;AACD,YAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AAKnB,UAAM,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,EAChD;AACF;AAWO,SAAS,aAAa,UAAoC,QAAsB;AACrF,mBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM;AAC/C;AASA,eAAsB,kBACpB,SACA,OACA,UACA,QACe;AACf,eAAa,UAAU,MAAM;AAC7B,QAAM,oBAAoB,SAAS,OAAO,MAAM;AAClD;","names":[]}