@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.17 → 0.6.0-pre.19

package/dist/{chunk-D6E5N2O3.js.map → chunk-TENLCGYD.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/forget/strategy.ts","../src/with-audit/forget/subject-index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withForget` — declaration surface for GDPR right-to-erasure via\n * per-record CEK crypto-shred.\n *\n * This file holds only the *declaration* shape and the disabled sentinel.\n * The actual erasure machinery lives in:\n *   - `subject-index.ts` — the encrypted `_subject_index` reserved collection\n *   - `vault.ts` `forget()` — the per-record tombstone + ledger flow\n *   - `collection.ts` `_writeTombstone` — the envelope rewrite\n *\n * A `ForgetStrategy` declares which collections carry erasable subject data\n * and the (dotted-path) field on each record that names the data subject.\n * Declaring a collection here ALSO forces `perRecordKeys: true` for it (a\n * shred can only erase a record whose body is keyed off a per-record CEK),\n * so adopters opt into the CEK foundation transitively.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { LedgerEntry } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/entry.js'\n\n/**\n * User-supplied declaration passed to {@link withForget}. Maps a\n * collection name to the record field (dotted path supported, e.g.\n * `'billing.buyerId'`) that identifies the data subject for erasure.\n *\n * ```ts\n * withForget({ subjects: { invoices: 'buyerId', contacts: 'id' } })\n * ```\n */\nexport interface SubjectDeclaration {\n  readonly subjects: Record<string, string>\n  /**\n   * #633 — opt-in: gate the vault-level `_sealed_cek` and blob purges on\n   * per-collection via declarations instead of running them unconditionally\n   * for every forgotten ref. Default `false`/absent = today's unconditional\n   * behavior (byte-identical). See `purge-scope.ts` for the partition logic\n   * and the `scopedPurgeResidue` skip-reporting this enables.\n   *\n   * **Footgun:** a bare `sensitive: [...]` collection — no `classifiedFields`\n   * (no classified via binder compiled in) — counts as UNDECLARED for the\n   * sealed-CEK arm. Under `scopedPurge: true`, its `_sealed_cek` host-delivery\n   * envelopes are SKIPPED, not purged (reported via `scopedPurgeResidue`,\n   * reason `'skipped-undeclared-sealed-cek'`) even if that collection called\n   * `sealRecordToHost()` — the sealed CEK stays recoverable by that granted\n   * host until purged. Add a `classifiedFields` binding to close the gap, or\n   * leave `scopedPurge` off/false for the unconditional (always-purged) default.\n   * The declaration signal is session-local: a declared collection never opened\n   * (with its config) before `forget()` in this session counts as UNDECLARED —\n   * open it first, or its entries are skipped-and-reported.\n   */\n  readonly scopedPurge?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolved forget strategy threaded through Noydb → every Vault. Carries\n * the same `subjects` map the user declared. `NO_FORGET` (empty map) is the\n * off-by-default sentinel; `vault.forget()` throws\n * `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError` when the map is empty.\n */\nexport interface ForgetStrategy {\n  /** Collection → subject-field (dotted path). Empty under `NO_FORGET`. */\n  readonly subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>\n  /** #633 — see {@link SubjectDeclaration.scopedPurge}. */\n  readonly scopedPurge?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Disabled sentinel — no collections declare a subject field. `vault.forget()`\n * refuses with `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError`; no write hooks register; no\n * collection is forced into `perRecordKeys`. Non-adopters pay nothing.\n */\nexport const NO_FORGET: ForgetStrategy = { subjects: {} }\n\n// The `withForget` factory lives in `active.ts` (canonical\n// strategy.ts/active.ts/index.ts split); this file holds only the\n// declaration shape + disabled sentinel.\n\n/**\n * The outcome of a `vault.forget(subjectId)` call.\n *\n * `unmigratedRecords` lists `collection:id` pairs that were tombstoned but\n * whose body had NOT been migrated to a per-record CEK at shred time (legacy\n * body still under the shared collection DEK). Those records are tombstoned\n * (live envelope + history stripped) but their pre-shred ciphertext, if it\n * leaked into a backup before migration, remains decryptable under the\n * collection DEK — so erasure-completeness is NOT guaranteed for them. Run\n * the per-record-CEK migration pass, then re-forget, to close the gap.\n *\n * Blob attachments: a shredded record's **erasable** blobs (on a\n * `perRecordKeys` collection) are crypto-shredded inline — `blobsShredded`\n * counts those taken to refCount 0 (BlobObject deleted → chunks permanently\n * undecryptable), `blobsRetainedShared` counts those still referenced by\n * another record (shared content legitimately persists for its other owner).\n * `blobResidueCollections` now lists only collections with blobs that could\n * NOT be crypto-shredded: **legacy** blobs (no per-blob `_cek`, chunks under\n * the shared `_blob` DEK — migrate them), or a session without the blob\n * service loaded. An all-erasable subject yields an empty residue list.\n */\nexport interface ForgetResult {\n  /** The subject id passed to `forget()`. Echoed for caller convenience. */\n  readonly subject: string\n  /** Count of live records rewritten to a tombstone. */\n  readonly recordsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_history` envelopes tombstoned across all shredded records. */\n  readonly historyVersionsShredded: number\n  /** Distinct collections that had at least one record shredded. */\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id` pairs shredded while still un-migrated (see type docs). */\n  readonly unmigratedRecords: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of erasable blobs crypto-shredded (refCount → 0, BlobObject deleted). */\n  readonly blobsShredded: number\n  /** Count of erasable blobs retained because still referenced elsewhere (shared). */\n  readonly blobsRetainedShared: number\n  /** Collections with blobs that could NOT be crypto-shredded — legacy (no `_cek`) or blobs disabled (see type docs). */\n  readonly blobResidueCollections: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of persisted `_idx/<field>/<recordId>` index side-cars hard-deleted\n   * across the shredded records. These live under the retained\n   * collection DEK, so crypto-shred alone would leave the indexed field VALUES\n   * readable — `forget()` must delete them.\n   */\n  readonly indexPostingsPurged: number\n  /**\n   * `collection:id:field` entries whose persisted `_idx` side-car could NOT be\n   * deleted — index residue that still leaks the indexed value under the\n   * retained collection DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE: retry, or\n   * purge the side-car out of band.\n   */\n  readonly indexResidue: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of `_sealed[field]` slots dropped from the live store across the\n   * shredded records. For slots written under `sensitive` +\n   * `perRecordKeys` (the current path), the key derives off the per-record CEK,\n   * so tombstoning the record — which drops `_cek` and `_sealed` — also\n   * crypto-shreds the value. A legacy slot (written before per-record CEKs) keys\n   * off the collection DEK instead, so dropping it removes it from the live store but a\n   * pre-forget backup remains recoverable by a DEK holder (same caveat `_data`\n   * carries); migrate by re-`put`ting before forgetting for full crypto-shred.\n   */\n  readonly sealedFieldsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_sealed_cek` host-delivery envelopes deleted (#H-1). A record sealed to an\n   * at-* host via sealRecordToHost persists its raw CEK there; forget() must destroy them. */\n  readonly sealedCekEnvelopesPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` whose `_sealed_cek` purge failed (residue — the host-recoverable CEK may survive). */\n  readonly sealedCekResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id:field` sealed slots that were DEK-derived (legacy, written before per-record CEKs) and thus NOT crypto-shredded\n   * by dropping `_cek` — the collection DEK is retained, so synced/backup copies stay decryptable (#M-1). */\n  readonly sealedResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of `_ledger_deltas` rows hard-deleted across the shredded records (#734) — the\n   * erasure twin of #729's elevate-side purge. Entry metadata (that the record was mutated,\n   * at which version/timestamp/actor) is retained; only the plaintext delta content is removed. */\n  readonly ledgerDeltasPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` refs whose `_ledger_deltas` purge failed — plaintext delta residue still\n   * readable under the retained ledger DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE. */\n  readonly ledgerDeltaResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** The single `op:'forget'` ledger entry appended for this erasure. */\n  readonly ledgerEntry: LedgerEntry\n  /** #622 — record-grain derived artifacts (MV rows, per-record derived copies) erased\n   *  because their source subject was forgotten. Overlay outputs are intentionally out of\n   *  scope here — an overlay is always sourced from an MV, never directly from a subject\n   *  collection, so the personal-data-bearing MV rows it reads are already erased above. */\n  readonly derivedRecordsErased: number\n  /** #622 — aggregate-grain targets (rollups) recomputed without the forgotten contribution. */\n  readonly derivedAggregatesRecomputed: number\n  /** #622 — `collection:id` derived writes SKIPPED because the target period is frozen\n   *  (recompute deferred; the aggregate retains the forgotten contribution — audited). */\n  readonly derivedResidueFrozen: readonly string[]\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing records tombstoned via a `'ref'` edge's `cascade` policy. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesCascaded: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing fields cleared via a `'ref'` edge's `nullify` policy. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesNullified: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 review (Important fix) — `'ref'` edges whose compare-key could NOT be resolved,\n   *  even from the LIVE pre-shred backing row — cascade/nullify propagation was SKIPPED for these.\n   *  Always empty in the ordinary case; non-empty means the skip is reported, never silent. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** #633 — scoped-purge skip notices (opt-in `scopedPurge`, see {@link SubjectDeclaration}).\n   *  Always empty under the unconditional default. Non-empty means a `_sealed_cek` entry or a\n   *  blob scan was skipped for an undeclared collection — reported, never a silent skip. */\n  readonly scopedPurgeResidue: readonly ScopedPurgeResidueNotice[]\n  /** #776/#782/#785 — `collection:id` MV-output rows that survived erasure invalidation (eager\n   *  tombstone leg AND lazy/manual `invalidateMVAtRest`) despite belonging to the forgotten\n   *  subject, because the `_materializedFrom` ownership stamp could NOT be decoded (undecodable\n   *  under the collection's default DEK — e.g. elevated above tier 0 on a tiered output\n   *  collection; ownership unconfirmed — could be a plain user record on a same-collection\n   *  partition MV). Never erased, but surfaced here rather than silently skipped (the #724\n   *  posture). Non-empty means the row may still hold the forgotten/pre-elevation contribution,\n   *  decryptable by tier-holders. */\n  readonly derivedResidueUndecodable: readonly string[]\n  /** #782/#785 — `collection:id` MV-output rows that DID decode and stamp-match via\n   *  `_materializedFrom`, but whose erasure was declined by the #718 tier-elevation gate\n   *  (`_internalDelete` returned false). Ownership CONFIRMED here — a real silent survival,\n   *  not a stamp-mismatch skip — surfaced rather than dropped. Non-empty means a live,\n   *  tier-holder-decryptable copy of the forgotten contribution was deliberately retained. */\n  readonly derivedResidueDeclined: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/** #633 — the two `scopedPurgeResidue` skip reasons. Single source of truth: `purge-scope.ts`\n *  (the port-internal partition helpers) imports this rather than redeclaring it. */\nexport type ScopedPurgeResidueReason = 'skipped-undeclared-sealed-cek' | 'skipped-undeclared-blob-scan'\n\n/** #633 — one `ForgetResult.scopedPurgeResidue` entry: an undeclared collection's sealed-CEK\n *  entries left unpurged, or its blob scan skipped entirely, under `scopedPurge`. `count` is the\n *  number of `_sealed_cek` entries left in place (sealed-cek reason) or the number of refs whose\n *  blob scan was skipped (blob-scan reason) — aggregated per collection across the whole call. */\nexport interface ScopedPurgeResidueNotice {\n  readonly reason: ScopedPurgeResidueReason\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly count: number\n}\n","/**\n * The encrypted subject index.\n *\n * GDPR crypto-shred needs to answer \"which records belong to data subject\n * X?\" portably (the index must travel with the vault/bundle) WITHOUT leaking\n * subject-equivalence to the store. The rejected alternative — an unencrypted\n * subject tag in envelope metadata — would let anyone with store access see\n * which records share a subject. Instead we keep a reserved `_subject_index`\n * collection, encrypted under its OWN DEK (`getDEK('_subject_index')`):\n *\n *   - record id  = `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2). A bare\n *     `sha256Hex(subjectId)` would be offline-computable: an attacker with\n *     store access and a candidate list (emails / customer ids are low-entropy)\n *     could dictionary the hash to confirm \"subject X is present here.\" Keying\n *     the id with the vault-only index DEK removes that capability — without the\n *     DEK the id cannot be derived. (Legacy entries written before M-2 used the\n *     bare sha256 id; the read/remove paths dual-look-up both forms.)\n *   - record body = AES-GCM(JSON `{ r: [{ collection, id }], p }`) under the\n *     index DEK, where `p` pads the plaintext to a bucketed length so the\n *     ciphertext `_data` length does not leak the approximate record count.\n *     Legacy bodies were a bare `[{ collection, id }]` array; reads accept both.\n *\n * ## Concurrency (RISK #3 — known v1 limitation)\n *\n * `addSubjectRef` / `removeSubjectRef` are read-modify-write with no CAS. The\n * design assumes a SINGLE WRITER (the noy-db single-process write model). Two\n * concurrent writers racing on the SAME subject can lose an entry (last-write\n * wins on the ref list). This is documented, not fixed in v1:\n * `rebuildSubjectIndex` performs a full scan to recover a correct index from\n * the canonical records, so a lost ref is recoverable. A CAS-backed index is\n * deferred to a later slice.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, hmacSha256Hex, sha256Hex, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection holding the encrypted subject → records index. */\nexport const SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION = '_subject_index'\n\n/**\n * Bucket (bytes) the encrypted ref-list plaintext is padded up to, so the\n * ciphertext `_data` length leaks only `count` rounded up to a bucket — not the\n * exact record count. 256 keeps small subjects (the common case) indistinguishable.\n */\nconst REF_LIST_BUCKET = 256\n\n/** A single record reference held in a subject's index entry. */\nexport interface SubjectRef {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n}\n\ntype GetDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/** SHA-256 hex of a UTF-8 string. The LEGACY (pre-M-2) subject-index key. */\nasync function sha256HexString(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(new TextEncoder().encode(input))\n}\n\n/**\n * The subject-index record id(s) to consult for a subject, most-current first.\n *\n * - Encrypted vault: the PRIMARY id is `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2)\n *   — not offline-computable. The LEGACY `sha256Hex(subjectId)` id is also\n *   returned so reads/removes still find entries written before M-2 (dual-lookup).\n * - Plaintext/debug vault: no DEK to key with, so the only id is the legacy\n *   sha256 form (unchanged behaviour — plaintext mode is not zero-knowledge anyway).\n */\nasync function subjectKeys(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string[]> {\n  const legacy = await sha256HexString(subjectId)\n  if (!encrypted) return [legacy]\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const keyed = await hmacSha256Hex(dek, new TextEncoder().encode(subjectId))\n  return keyed === legacy ? [keyed] : [keyed, legacy]\n}\n\n/** The id new writes land under (keyed when encrypted, else legacy sha256). */\nasync function primarySubjectKey(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string> {\n  return (await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId))[0]!\n}\n\n/** Parse a stored ref-list body: new padded `{ r, p }` wrapper OR legacy bare array. */\nfunction parseRefs(json: string): SubjectRef[] {\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(json) as SubjectRef[] | { r: SubjectRef[] }\n  return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.r\n}\n\n/** Serialize + pad the ref list to a bucket boundary (encrypted vaults only). */\nfunction serializeRefs(refs: SubjectRef[]): string {\n  const base = JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: '' })\n  const pad = Math.ceil(base.length / REF_LIST_BUCKET) * REF_LIST_BUCKET - base.length\n  return JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: ' '.repeat(pad) })\n}\n\n/** Read + decrypt the ref list at a SINGLE index key. Returns `[]` when absent. */\nasync function readRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const env = await adapter.get(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n  if (!env || !env._data) return []\n  if (!encrypted) return parseRefs(env._data)\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(env, dek)\n  return parseRefs(json)\n}\n\n/** Encrypt + write a ref list for a subject under its derived key. */\nasync function writeRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n  refs: SubjectRef[],\n): Promise<void> {\n  let env: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext/debug vault: keep the legacy bare-array form (no padding needed).\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: '', _data: JSON.stringify(refs) }\n  } else {\n    const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(serializeRefs(refs), dek)\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data }\n  }\n  await adapter.put(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key, env)\n}\n\n/**\n * Add a `{ collection, id }` ref to a subject's index entry (idempotent —\n * a duplicate ref is not appended). Read-modify-write; see the concurrency\n * note in the module docstring.\n */\nexport async function addSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n  if (refs.some((r) => r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id)) return\n  refs.push(ref)\n  await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n}\n\n/**\n * Remove a `{ collection, id }` ref from a subject's index entry. When the\n * last ref is removed the (now empty) entry is deleted so the store holds no\n * residual key for an erased subject.\n */\nexport async function removeSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Dual-lookup: drop the ref from BOTH the keyed (M-2) and the legacy sha256\n  // entry, so a pre-M-2 subject is still fully erased.\n  for (const key of await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)) {\n    const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n    const next = refs.filter((r) => !(r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id))\n    if (next.length === refs.length) continue\n    if (next.length === 0) {\n      await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n    } else {\n      await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, next)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Look up every record ref for a subject. Returns `[]` when none exist. Unions\n * the keyed (M-2) and legacy sha256 entries (dual-lookup), deduplicated, so a\n * subject indexed before M-2 is still fully found.\n */\nexport async function lookupSubject(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const keys = await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const out: SubjectRef[] = []\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    for (const ref of await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)) {\n      const dedup = `${ref.collection}\\u0000${ref.id}`\n      if (seen.has(dedup)) continue\n      seen.add(dedup)\n      out.push(ref)\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebuild the entire subject index from the canonical records (the recovery\n * path for the documented read-modify-write race). Scans each declared\n * collection, reads `record[subjectField]` (dotted path), and rewrites the\n * index from scratch. Tombstoned (already-shredded) records contribute no\n * ref — their body is gone, so they cannot be re-indexed.\n *\n * `decodeRecord` decrypts an envelope to a plain object (or returns null for\n * a tombstone / unreadable record); supplied by the caller so this module\n * stays free of Collection internals.\n */\nexport async function rebuildSubjectIndex(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n  decodeRecord: (collection: string, id: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>,\n): Promise<number> {\n  // Drop every existing index entry first so removed refs don't linger.\n  const existing = await adapter.list(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  for (const k of existing) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, k)\n  }\n\n  // subjectId → refs, accumulated across all declared collections.\n  const bySubject = new Map<string, SubjectRef[]>()\n  for (const [collection, field] of Object.entries(subjects)) {\n    const ids = await adapter.list(vault, collection)\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      if (id.startsWith('_')) continue\n      const env = await adapter.get(vault, collection, id)\n      if (!env || !env._data) continue // missing or tombstone\n      const record = await decodeRecord(collection, id, env)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      const subjectValue = readDottedPath(record, field)\n      if (subjectValue === undefined || subjectValue === null) continue\n      const subjectId = coerceSubjectId(subjectValue)\n      const list = bySubject.get(subjectId) ?? []\n      list.push({ collection, id })\n      bySubject.set(subjectId, list)\n    }\n  }\n\n  let entries = 0\n  for (const [subjectId, refs] of bySubject) {\n    const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n    await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n    entries++\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n/**\n * Coerce a read subject-field value to a stable string id. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/forget/strategy.ts","../src/with-audit/forget/subject-index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withForget` — declaration surface for GDPR right-to-erasure via\n * per-record CEK crypto-shred.\n *\n * This file holds only the *declaration* shape and the disabled sentinel.\n * The actual erasure machinery lives in:\n *   - `subject-index.ts` — the encrypted `_subject_index` reserved collection\n *   - `vault.ts` `forget()` — the per-record tombstone + ledger flow\n *   - `collection.ts` `_writeTombstone` — the envelope rewrite\n *\n * A `ForgetStrategy` declares which collections carry erasable subject data\n * and the (dotted-path) field on each record that names the data subject.\n * Declaring a collection here ALSO forces `perRecordKeys: true` for it (a\n * shred can only erase a record whose body is keyed off a per-record CEK),\n * so adopters opt into the CEK foundation transitively.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { LedgerEntry } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/entry.js'\n\n/**\n * User-supplied declaration passed to {@link withForget}. Maps a\n * collection name to the record field (dotted path supported, e.g.\n * `'billing.buyerId'`) that identifies the data subject for erasure.\n *\n * ```ts\n * withForget({ subjects: { invoices: 'buyerId', contacts: 'id' } })\n * ```\n */\nexport interface SubjectDeclaration {\n  readonly subjects: Record<string, string>\n  /**\n   * #633 — opt-in: gate the vault-level `_sealed_cek` and blob purges on\n   * per-collection via declarations instead of running them unconditionally\n   * for every forgotten ref. Default `false`/absent = today's unconditional\n   * behavior (byte-identical). See `purge-scope.ts` for the partition logic\n   * and the `scopedPurgeResidue` skip-reporting this enables.\n   *\n   * **Footgun:** a bare `sensitive: [...]` collection — no `classifiedFields`\n   * (no classified via binder compiled in) — counts as UNDECLARED for the\n   * sealed-CEK arm. Under `scopedPurge: true`, its `_sealed_cek` host-delivery\n   * envelopes are SKIPPED, not purged (reported via `scopedPurgeResidue`,\n   * reason `'skipped-undeclared-sealed-cek'`) even if that collection called\n   * `sealRecordToHost()` — the sealed CEK stays recoverable by that granted\n   * host until purged. Add a `classifiedFields` binding to close the gap, or\n   * leave `scopedPurge` off/false for the unconditional (always-purged) default.\n   * The declaration signal is session-local: a declared collection never opened\n   * (with its config) before `forget()` in this session counts as UNDECLARED —\n   * open it first, or its entries are skipped-and-reported.\n   */\n  readonly scopedPurge?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolved forget strategy threaded through Noydb → every Vault. Carries\n * the same `subjects` map the user declared. `NO_FORGET` (empty map) is the\n * off-by-default sentinel; `vault.forget()` throws\n * `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError` when the map is empty.\n */\nexport interface ForgetStrategy {\n  /** Collection → subject-field (dotted path). Empty under `NO_FORGET`. */\n  readonly subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>\n  /** #633 — see {@link SubjectDeclaration.scopedPurge}. */\n  readonly scopedPurge?: boolean\n}\n\n/**\n * Disabled sentinel — no collections declare a subject field. `vault.forget()`\n * refuses with `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError`; no write hooks register; no\n * collection is forced into `perRecordKeys`. Non-adopters pay nothing.\n */\nexport const NO_FORGET: ForgetStrategy = { subjects: {} }\n\n// The `withForget` factory lives in `active.ts` (canonical\n// strategy.ts/active.ts/index.ts split); this file holds only the\n// declaration shape + disabled sentinel.\n\n/**\n * The outcome of a `vault.forget(subjectId)` call.\n *\n * `unmigratedRecords` lists `collection:id` pairs that were tombstoned but\n * whose body had NOT been migrated to a per-record CEK at shred time (legacy\n * body still under the shared collection DEK). Those records are tombstoned\n * (live envelope + history stripped) but their pre-shred ciphertext, if it\n * leaked into a backup before migration, remains decryptable under the\n * collection DEK — so erasure-completeness is NOT guaranteed for them. Run\n * the per-record-CEK migration pass, then re-forget, to close the gap.\n *\n * Blob attachments: a shredded record's **erasable** blobs (on a\n * `perRecordKeys` collection) are crypto-shredded inline — `blobsShredded`\n * counts those taken to refCount 0 (BlobObject deleted → chunks permanently\n * undecryptable), `blobsRetainedShared` counts those still referenced by\n * another record (shared content legitimately persists for its other owner).\n * `blobResidueCollections` now lists only collections with blobs that could\n * NOT be crypto-shredded: **legacy** blobs (no per-blob `_cek`, chunks under\n * the shared `_blob` DEK — migrate them), or a session without the blob\n * service loaded. An all-erasable subject yields an empty residue list.\n */\nexport interface ForgetResult {\n  /** The subject id passed to `forget()`. Echoed for caller convenience. */\n  readonly subject: string\n  /** Count of live records rewritten to a tombstone. */\n  readonly recordsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_history` envelopes tombstoned across all shredded records. */\n  readonly historyVersionsShredded: number\n  /** Distinct collections that had at least one record shredded. */\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id` pairs shredded while still un-migrated (see type docs). */\n  readonly unmigratedRecords: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of erasable blobs crypto-shredded (refCount → 0, BlobObject deleted). */\n  readonly blobsShredded: number\n  /** Count of erasable blobs retained because still referenced elsewhere (shared). */\n  readonly blobsRetainedShared: number\n  /** Collections with blobs that could NOT be crypto-shredded — legacy (no `_cek`) or blobs disabled (see type docs). */\n  readonly blobResidueCollections: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of persisted `_idx/<field>/<recordId>` index side-cars hard-deleted\n   * across the shredded records. These live under the retained\n   * collection DEK, so crypto-shred alone would leave the indexed field VALUES\n   * readable — `forget()` must delete them.\n   */\n  readonly indexPostingsPurged: number\n  /**\n   * `collection:id:field` entries whose persisted `_idx` side-car could NOT be\n   * deleted — index residue that still leaks the indexed value under the\n   * retained collection DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE: retry, or\n   * purge the side-car out of band.\n   */\n  readonly indexResidue: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of `_sealed[field]` slots dropped from the live store across the\n   * shredded records. For slots written under `sensitive` +\n   * `perRecordKeys` (the current path), the key derives off the per-record CEK,\n   * so tombstoning the record — which drops `_cek` and `_sealed` — also\n   * crypto-shreds the value. A legacy slot (written before per-record CEKs) keys\n   * off the collection DEK instead, so dropping it removes it from the live store but a\n   * pre-forget backup remains recoverable by a DEK holder (same caveat `_data`\n   * carries); migrate by re-`put`ting before forgetting for full crypto-shred.\n   */\n  readonly sealedFieldsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_sealed_cek` host-delivery envelopes deleted (#H-1). A record sealed to an\n   * at-* host via sealRecordToHost persists its raw CEK there; forget() must destroy them. */\n  readonly sealedCekEnvelopesPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` whose `_sealed_cek` purge failed (residue — the host-recoverable CEK may survive). */\n  readonly sealedCekResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id:field` sealed slots that were DEK-derived (legacy, written before per-record CEKs) and thus NOT crypto-shredded\n   * by dropping `_cek` — the collection DEK is retained, so synced/backup copies stay decryptable (#M-1). */\n  readonly sealedResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of `_ledger_deltas` rows hard-deleted across the shredded records (#734) — the\n   * erasure twin of #729's elevate-side purge. Entry metadata (that the record was mutated,\n   * at which version/timestamp/actor) is retained; only the plaintext delta content is removed. */\n  readonly ledgerDeltasPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` refs whose `_ledger_deltas` purge failed — plaintext delta residue still\n   * readable under the retained ledger DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE. */\n  readonly ledgerDeltaResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** The single `op:'forget'` ledger entry appended for this erasure. */\n  readonly ledgerEntry: LedgerEntry\n  /** #622 — record-grain derived artifacts (MV rows, per-record derived copies) erased\n   *  because their source subject was forgotten. Overlay outputs are intentionally out of\n   *  scope here — an overlay is always sourced from an MV, never directly from a subject\n   *  collection, so the personal-data-bearing MV rows it reads are already erased above. */\n  readonly derivedRecordsErased: number\n  /** #622 — aggregate-grain targets (rollups) recomputed without the forgotten contribution. */\n  readonly derivedAggregatesRecomputed: number\n  /** #622 — `collection:id` derived writes SKIPPED because the target period is frozen\n   *  (recompute deferred; the aggregate retains the forgotten contribution — audited). */\n  readonly derivedResidueFrozen: readonly string[]\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing records tombstoned via a `'ref'` edge's `cascade` policy. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesCascaded: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 (#648) — referencing fields cleared via a `'ref'` edge's `nullify` policy. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesNullified: number\n  /** #650 Task 5 review (Important fix) — `'ref'` edges whose compare-key could NOT be resolved,\n   *  even from the LIVE pre-shred backing row — cascade/nullify propagation was SKIPPED for these.\n   *  Always empty in the ordinary case; non-empty means the skip is reported, never silent. */\n  readonly lookupReferencesResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** #633 — scoped-purge skip notices (opt-in `scopedPurge`, see {@link SubjectDeclaration}).\n   *  Always empty under the unconditional default. Non-empty means a `_sealed_cek` entry or a\n   *  blob scan was skipped for an undeclared collection — reported, never a silent skip. */\n  readonly scopedPurgeResidue: readonly ScopedPurgeResidueNotice[]\n  /** #776/#782/#785 — `collection:id` MV-output rows that survived erasure invalidation (eager\n   *  tombstone leg AND lazy/manual `invalidateMVAtRest`) despite belonging to the forgotten\n   *  subject, because the `_materializedFrom` ownership stamp could NOT be decoded (undecodable\n   *  under the collection's default DEK — e.g. elevated above tier 0 on a tiered output\n   *  collection; ownership unconfirmed — could be a plain user record on a same-collection\n   *  partition MV). Never erased, but surfaced here rather than silently skipped (the #724\n   *  posture). Non-empty means the row may still hold the forgotten/pre-elevation contribution,\n   *  decryptable by tier-holders. */\n  readonly derivedResidueUndecodable: readonly string[]\n  /** #782/#785 — `collection:id` MV-output rows that DID decode and stamp-match via\n   *  `_materializedFrom`, but whose erasure was declined by the #718 tier-elevation gate\n   *  (`_internalDelete` returned false). Ownership CONFIRMED here — a real silent survival,\n   *  not a stamp-mismatch skip — surfaced rather than dropped. Non-empty means a live,\n   *  tier-holder-decryptable copy of the forgotten contribution was deliberately retained. */\n  readonly derivedResidueDeclined: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/** #633 — the two `scopedPurgeResidue` skip reasons. Single source of truth: `purge-scope.ts`\n *  (the port-internal partition helpers) imports this rather than redeclaring it. */\nexport type ScopedPurgeResidueReason = 'skipped-undeclared-sealed-cek' | 'skipped-undeclared-blob-scan'\n\n/** #633 — one `ForgetResult.scopedPurgeResidue` entry: an undeclared collection's sealed-CEK\n *  entries left unpurged, or its blob scan skipped entirely, under `scopedPurge`. `count` is the\n *  number of `_sealed_cek` entries left in place (sealed-cek reason) or the number of refs whose\n *  blob scan was skipped (blob-scan reason) — aggregated per collection across the whole call. */\nexport interface ScopedPurgeResidueNotice {\n  readonly reason: ScopedPurgeResidueReason\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly count: number\n}\n","/**\n * The encrypted subject index.\n *\n * GDPR crypto-shred needs to answer \"which records belong to data subject\n * X?\" portably (the index must travel with the vault/bundle) WITHOUT leaking\n * subject-equivalence to the store. The rejected alternative — an unencrypted\n * subject tag in envelope metadata — would let anyone with store access see\n * which records share a subject. Instead we keep a reserved `_subject_index`\n * collection, encrypted under its OWN DEK (`getDEK('_subject_index')`):\n *\n *   - record id  = `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2). A bare\n *     `sha256Hex(subjectId)` would be offline-computable: an attacker with\n *     store access and a candidate list (emails / customer ids are low-entropy)\n *     could dictionary the hash to confirm \"subject X is present here.\" Keying\n *     the id with the vault-only index DEK removes that capability — without the\n *     DEK the id cannot be derived. (Legacy entries written before M-2 used the\n *     bare sha256 id; the read/remove paths dual-look-up both forms.)\n *   - record body = AES-GCM(JSON `{ r: [{ collection, id }], p }`) under the\n *     index DEK, where `p` pads the plaintext to a bucketed length so the\n *     ciphertext `_data` length does not leak the approximate record count.\n *     Legacy bodies were a bare `[{ collection, id }]` array; reads accept both.\n *\n * ## Concurrency (RISK #3 — known v1 limitation)\n *\n * `addSubjectRef` / `removeSubjectRef` are read-modify-write with no CAS. The\n * design assumes a SINGLE WRITER (the noy-db single-process write model). Two\n * concurrent writers racing on the SAME subject can lose an entry (last-write\n * wins on the ref list). This is documented, not fixed in v1:\n * `rebuildSubjectIndex` performs a full scan to recover a correct index from\n * the canonical records, so a lost ref is recoverable. A CAS-backed index is\n * deferred to a later slice.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, hmacSha256Hex, sha256Hex, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection holding the encrypted subject → records index. */\nexport const SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION = '_subject_index'\n\n/**\n * Bucket (bytes) the encrypted ref-list plaintext is padded up to, so the\n * ciphertext `_data` length leaks only `count` rounded up to a bucket — not the\n * exact record count. 256 keeps small subjects (the common case) indistinguishable.\n */\nconst REF_LIST_BUCKET = 256\n\n/** A single record reference held in a subject's index entry. */\nexport interface SubjectRef {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n}\n\ntype GetDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/** SHA-256 hex of a UTF-8 string. The LEGACY (pre-M-2) subject-index key. */\nasync function sha256HexString(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(new TextEncoder().encode(input))\n}\n\n/**\n * The subject-index record id(s) to consult for a subject, most-current first.\n *\n * - Encrypted vault: the PRIMARY id is `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2)\n *   — not offline-computable. The LEGACY `sha256Hex(subjectId)` id is also\n *   returned so reads/removes still find entries written before M-2 (dual-lookup).\n * - Plaintext/debug vault: no DEK to key with, so the only id is the legacy\n *   sha256 form (unchanged behaviour — plaintext mode is not zero-knowledge anyway).\n */\nasync function subjectKeys(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string[]> {\n  const legacy = await sha256HexString(subjectId)\n  if (!encrypted) return [legacy]\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const keyed = await hmacSha256Hex(dek, new TextEncoder().encode(subjectId))\n  return keyed === legacy ? [keyed] : [keyed, legacy]\n}\n\n/** The id new writes land under (keyed when encrypted, else legacy sha256). */\nasync function primarySubjectKey(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string> {\n  return (await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId))[0]!\n}\n\n/** Parse a stored ref-list body: new padded `{ r, p }` wrapper OR legacy bare array. */\nfunction parseRefs(json: string): SubjectRef[] {\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(json) as SubjectRef[] | { r: SubjectRef[] }\n  return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.r\n}\n\n/** Serialize + pad the ref list to a bucket boundary (encrypted vaults only). */\nfunction serializeRefs(refs: SubjectRef[]): string {\n  const base = JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: '' })\n  const pad = Math.ceil(base.length / REF_LIST_BUCKET) * REF_LIST_BUCKET - base.length\n  return JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: ' '.repeat(pad) })\n}\n\n/** Read + decrypt the ref list at a SINGLE index key. Returns `[]` when absent. */\nasync function readRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const env = await adapter.get(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n  if (!env || !env._data) return []\n  if (!encrypted) return parseRefs(env._data)\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, id: key }, env, dek)\n  return parseRefs(json)\n}\n\n/** Encrypt + write a ref list for a subject under its derived key. */\nasync function writeRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n  refs: SubjectRef[],\n): Promise<void> {\n  const identity = { collection: SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, id: key, version: 1 }\n  let env: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext/debug vault: keep the bare-array form (no padding needed).\n    env = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(refs) })\n  } else {\n    const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(serializeRefs(refs), dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n    env = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { iv, data })\n  }\n  await adapter.put(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key, env)\n}\n\n/**\n * Add a `{ collection, id }` ref to a subject's index entry (idempotent —\n * a duplicate ref is not appended). Read-modify-write; see the concurrency\n * note in the module docstring.\n */\nexport async function addSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n  if (refs.some((r) => r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id)) return\n  refs.push(ref)\n  await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n}\n\n/**\n * Remove a `{ collection, id }` ref from a subject's index entry. When the\n * last ref is removed the (now empty) entry is deleted so the store holds no\n * residual key for an erased subject.\n */\nexport async function removeSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Dual-lookup: drop the ref from BOTH the keyed (M-2) and the legacy sha256\n  // entry, so a pre-M-2 subject is still fully erased.\n  for (const key of await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)) {\n    const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n    const next = refs.filter((r) => !(r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id))\n    if (next.length === refs.length) continue\n    if (next.length === 0) {\n      await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n    } else {\n      await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, next)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Look up every record ref for a subject. Returns `[]` when none exist. Unions\n * the keyed (M-2) and legacy sha256 entries (dual-lookup), deduplicated, so a\n * subject indexed before M-2 is still fully found.\n */\nexport async function lookupSubject(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const keys = await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const out: SubjectRef[] = []\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    for (const ref of await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)) {\n      const dedup = `${ref.collection}\\u0000${ref.id}`\n      if (seen.has(dedup)) continue\n      seen.add(dedup)\n      out.push(ref)\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebuild the entire subject index from the canonical records (the recovery\n * path for the documented read-modify-write race). Scans each declared\n * collection, reads `record[subjectField]` (dotted path), and rewrites the\n * index from scratch. Tombstoned (already-shredded) records contribute no\n * ref — their body is gone, so they cannot be re-indexed.\n *\n * `decodeRecord` decrypts an envelope to a plain object (or returns null for\n * a tombstone / unreadable record); supplied by the caller so this module\n * stays free of Collection internals.\n */\nexport async function rebuildSubjectIndex(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n  decodeRecord: (collection: string, id: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>,\n): Promise<number> {\n  // Drop every existing index entry first so removed refs don't linger.\n  const existing = await adapter.list(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  for (const k of existing) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, k)\n  }\n\n  // subjectId → refs, accumulated across all declared collections.\n  const bySubject = new Map<string, SubjectRef[]>()\n  for (const [collection, field] of Object.entries(subjects)) {\n    const ids = await adapter.list(vault, collection)\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      if (id.startsWith('_')) continue\n      const env = await adapter.get(vault, collection, id)\n      if (!env || !env._data) continue // missing or tombstone\n      const record = await decodeRecord(collection, id, env)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      const subjectValue = readDottedPath(record, field)\n      if (subjectValue === undefined || subjectValue === null) continue\n      const subjectId = coerceSubjectId(subjectValue)\n      const list = bySubject.get(subjectId) ?? []\n      list.push({ collection, id })\n      bySubject.set(subjectId, list)\n    }\n  }\n\n  let entries = 0\n  for (const [subjectId, refs] of bySubject) {\n    const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n    await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n    entries++\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n/**\n * Coerce a read subject-field value to a stable string id. Primitives use\n * their natural string form; objects/arrays are JSON-stringified so structural\n * subjects still get a deterministic key (avoids the `[object Object]` trap).\n */\nexport function coerceSubjectId(value: unknown): string {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value\n  if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' || typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    return String(value)\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value)\n}\n\n/** Read a (possibly dotted) field path from a plain record. */\nexport function readDottedPath(record: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): unknown {\n  if (!field.includes('.')) return record[field]\n  let cursor: unknown = record\n  for (const segment of field.split('.')) {\n    if (cursor === null || cursor === undefined) return undefined\n    cursor = (cursor as Record<string, unknown>)[segment]\n  }\n  return cursor\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuEO,IAAM,YAA4B,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE;;;ACjCjD,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAOxC,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAWxB,eAAe,gBAAgB,OAAgC;AAC7D,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAClD;AAWA,eAAe,YAAY,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAsC;AACnG,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS;AAC9C,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAC1E,SAAO,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGA,eAAe,kBAAkB,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAoC;AACvG,UAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5D;AAGA,SAAS,UAAU,MAA4B;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,SAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AACjD;AAGA,SAAS,cAAc,MAA4B;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,eAAe,IAAI,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAC9E,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACvD;AAGA,eAAe,SACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACuB;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO,QAAO,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG;AAC/F,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI;AACvB;AAGA,eAAe,UACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACA,MACe;AACf,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE;AAC7E,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AAEd,UAAM,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E,OAAO;AACL,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACrF,UAAM,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,KAAK,GAAG;AAC7D;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE,EAAG;AAC1E,OAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AACb,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC9D;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AAGf,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;AACrF,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,OAAQ;AACjC,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAAA,IAC3D,OAAO;AACL,YAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACuB;AACvB,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAC3D,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,QAAM,MAAoB,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AACxE,YAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,UAAU,KAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAC9C,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG;AACrB,WAAK,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,UAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACd;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAaA,eAAsB,oBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,UACA,cACiB;AAEjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACnE,aAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AACxB,UAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD;AAGA,QAAM,YAAY,oBAAI,IAA0B;AAChD,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1D,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU;AAChD,eAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAI,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACxB,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE;AACnD,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO;AACxB,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG;AACrD,UAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,YAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjD,UAAI,iBAAiB,UAAa,iBAAiB,KAAM;AACzD,YAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAC9C,YAAM,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AAC1C,WAAK,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5B,gBAAU,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,UAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC5D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAOO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAwB;AACtD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AACxF,WAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAC7B;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,QAAiC,OAAwB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAC7C,MAAI,SAAkB;AACtB,aAAW,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AACtC,QAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AACpD,aAAU,OAAmC,OAAO;AAAA,EACtD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-X2FXEEQT.js → chunk-VH2W6BOG.js}

@@ -7,28 +7,28 @@ import {
   deriveSchemaManifest,
   loadSchemaManifestEntry,
   saveSchemaManifest
-} from "./chunk-OAWVM5L6.js";
+} from "./chunk-E6VDPBE3.js";
 import {
   MANIFEST_COLLECTION
 } from "./chunk-EPFF7LOX.js";
 import {
   loadFence,
   saveFence
-} from "./chunk-C52CJDFO.js";
+} from "./chunk-HJRTFXAA.js";
 import {
   derivePersistedSchema
-} from "./chunk-HNOBRU24.js";
+} from "./chunk-N7YAQKAO.js";
 import {
   loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
   savePersistedSchema
-} from "./chunk-6JRIYG2C.js";
+} from "./chunk-YVTADFTC.js";
 import {
   envelopePayloadHash
-} from "./chunk-N4GAJSRQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-RNSC2ARR.js";
 import {
   ManifestConflictError,
   isConflictError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/field-ids.ts
 var BASE32URL_ALPHABET = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz234567";
@@ -257,4 +257,4 @@ export {
   persistClassifiedMarker,
   persistSatelliteMarker
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-X2FXEEQT.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VH2W6BOG.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-FHFMWYGM.js → chunk-VHVMJWM6.js}

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 import {
   PERIODS_COLLECTION
-} from "./chunk-V4M4BZNW.js";
+} from "./chunk-HTHRCGWP.js";
 import {
   canonicalJson,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-N4GAJSRQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-RNSC2ARR.js";
 import {
   isDeleteMarker
-} from "./chunk-RGPB25DB.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
 import {
   PeriodClosedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/periods/periods.ts
 function resolveReopenState(events) {
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ async function loadPeriods(adapter, vault, decrypt) {
   const records = [];
   for (const id of ids) {
     const env = await adapter.get(vault, PERIODS_COLLECTION, id);
-    if (env) records.push(await decrypt(env));
+    if (env) records.push(await decrypt(id, env));
   }
   records.sort((a, b) => a.closedAt.localeCompare(b.closedAt));
   return records;
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ function validatePeriodName(name, existing, partition) {
 }
 async function appendPeriodLedgerEntry(ledger, actor, envelope, name, collection = PERIODS_COLLECTION) {
   if (!ledger) return;
-  const { envelopePayloadHash } = await import("./ledger-3RDSSMGD.js");
+  const { envelopePayloadHash } = await import("./ledger-62CEPRPX.js");
   await ledger.append({
     op: "put",
     collection,
@@ -198,4 +198,4 @@ export {
   purgeMarkersOn,
   withPeriods
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FHFMWYGM.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VHVMJWM6.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-FHFMWYGM.js.map → chunk-VHVMJWM6.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/periods/periods.ts","../src/with-audit/periods/active.ts","../src/with-audit/periods/strategy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Accounting-period closure + opening.\n *\n * A closed period seals every record whose envelope `_ts` is at or\n * before the period's `endDate`: further writes (`put` / `delete`)\n * against such records throw {@link PeriodClosedError}. The period\n * itself is stored as a record in the reserved `_periods` collection\n * and written through the normal ledger-instrumented path, so every\n * closure appends a tamper-evident entry to the vault's hash chain.\n *\n * ## Closure model\n *\n * ```\n * vault.closePeriod({ name: 'FY2026-Q1', endDate: '2026-03-31' })\n *   └─► PeriodRecord written to _periods/<name>\n *         ├─ priorPeriodName / priorPeriodHash — chain to last close\n *         ├─ closedAt / closedBy — provenance\n *         └─ normal ledger append fires (LedgerStore.append)\n * ```\n *\n * Enforcement (`assertTsWritable`) is vault-local: the Vault caches\n * the list of closed periods on first read and consults that cache in\n * the `Collection.put` / `.delete` path via the `periodGuard` hook.\n *\n * ## Opening model\n *\n * ```\n * vault.openPeriod({\n *   name: 'FY2026-Q2',\n *   startDate: '2026-04-01',\n *   fromPeriod: 'FY2026-Q1',\n *   carryForward: async (priorView) => Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>,\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * `carryForward` receives a read-only `VaultInstant` anchored at the\n * prior period's `endDate` (built via `vault.at(endDate)`) so the\n * callback can compute closing aggregates from the sealed state. The\n * returned `{ [collectionName]: { [id]: record } }` map is written\n * before the new `PeriodRecord` lands — opening balances materialise\n * as normal records with fresh timestamps that fall outside every\n * closed period.\n *\n * ## Freeze\n *\n * ```\n * vault.freezePeriod('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► physically purges delete markers whose write-time falls inside\n *       the closed period's window (via the #589 `_purgeDeleteMarkers`\n *       seam), then records the fact:\n *         ├─ PeriodFreezeRecord written to _period_freezes/<name>\n *         └─ normal ledger append fires (LedgerStore.append)\n * ```\n *\n * The chained `_periods/<name>` record is never mutated — `frozenAt` /\n * `frozenBy` / `purgedMarkerCount` are merged onto the returned\n * `PeriodRecord` at read time from the companion, so a tamper with the\n * freeze can never break the inter-period hash chain. Freezing is\n * terminal (a closed period, once frozen, stays frozen) and idempotent\n * (a second call is a no-op that returns the same merged record without\n * re-purging or re-appending a ledger entry). Freeze does NOT purge\n * forget-tombstones (GDPR crypto-shred erasure evidence), `_history`\n * versions, or live records — the delete-markers-only seam leaves all\n * three untouched by construction.\n *\n * Freeze purges the LOCAL adapter only. On a synced vault, markers already\n * pushed to sync targets survive there, and a later pull re-imports them\n * (benign — they still read deleted, but the space isn't reclaimed). A\n * re-imported marker keeps its original `_ts` (inside the already-frozen\n * period's window), so — like any late-booked delete — it is reclaimed by\n * the NEXT period's freeze, whose window covers it; freeze stays terminal\n * and does NOT re-purge an already-frozen period (#611). Sweeping the sync\n * targets themselves is a cross-target-purge concern deferred to the\n * cold-archival spec. Purging re-opens the #589 resurrection window for a\n * peer offline since before the cutoff, which is why the closed period is\n * the operator-asserted safe-point that gates the call.\n *\n * A period whose purge window has not fully elapsed cannot be frozen —\n * `freezePeriod` throws rather than purge markers for deletes that may not\n * have converged yet (#610).\n *\n * ## Archive\n *\n * ```\n * vault.archivePeriod('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► relocates the closed period's in-window records (those with\n *       `_ts < periodExclusiveUpperBound(endDate)`) from the hot store to\n *       the configured cold tier (routeStore's `cold` route), then records:\n *         ├─ PeriodArchiveRecord written to _period_archives/<name>\n *         └─ a ledger entry attributed to _period_archives\n * ```\n *\n * Archival is NON-DESTRUCTIVE: routeStore reads fall through to the cold\n * tier on a hot miss, so an archived record still reads normally. It is\n * therefore gated only on `closed` (not `frozen`) — it does not re-open the\n * #589 resurrection window and needs no convergence safe-point. Freeze\n * (purge markers) and archive (relocate records) are independent and compose\n * in either order. Like freeze, archival keeps the chained `_periods/<name>`\n * record byte-immutable (state lives in the companion) and is idempotent.\n *\n * Bounds by write-time `_ts`, NOT business date: the store tier sees only\n * encrypted envelopes. A record with an in-period business date but a later\n * `_ts` (late-booked) archives at the NEXT period's archive — the same rule\n * freeze uses for late-booked delete markers. Requires a `routeStore` with a\n * cold route (`age: { cold }`); throws otherwise.\n *\n * Read cost: with `withLazy()` (per-id reads) archived records are truly\n * cold — fetched from cold only on access. In the default hydrated mode,\n * `loadAll` merges the cold store, so archived records still load into RAM\n * on vault open (hot-tier STORAGE is reclaimed; RAM is not). Summaries\n * (`_`-prefixed) always stay hot.\n *\n * ## Target-purge\n *\n * ```\n * vault.purgePeriodTargets('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► sweeps delete markers (`_ts < periodExclusiveUpperBound(endDate)`) off\n *       the vault's PUSH-ONLY sync targets (backup/archive roles), then records:\n *         ├─ PeriodTargetPurgeRecord written to _period_target_purges/<name>\n *         └─ a ledger entry attributed to _period_target_purges\n * ```\n *\n * Extends freeze's local marker purge to the vault's own remote sinks.\n * `sync-peer` (bidirectional) targets are SKIPPED: purging a marker there\n * re-opens the #589 resurrection window for a client offline before the\n * cutoff, an assertion no single vault can verify. Backup/archive targets are\n * push-only — never pulled from into convergence — so sweeping their markers\n * is safe. Requires the period be frozen first (closed → frozen →\n * target-purged) so the local safe-point is already established. Idempotent\n * once run; a vault with no push-only targets writes no companion and is\n * re-runnable (so a target added later is still swept). Single-vault only —\n * fleet-wide purge across sovereign vaults is klum's concern over\n * `@noy-db/hub/cargo`.\n *\n * ## Not covered\n *\n * - Partial re-opening of a closed period. If an auditor needs to\n *   make a correction inside a sealed period, the sanctioned path is\n *   a compensating entry in the NEW period, not an unlock of the\n *   old one.\n * - Automatic period rollover. `closePeriod` / `openPeriod` are\n *   deliberately explicit operator calls so the caller decides when\n *   the boundary lands.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport { sha256Hex, canonicalJson } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport { isDeleteMarker } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { PeriodClosedError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// The reserved collection names + `periodExclusiveUpperBound` moved to the\n// dependency-light `window.ts` so the sync engine's period-scoped pull (#807)\n// can import them without this module's ledger imports; re-exported here so\n// every existing import path keeps working.\nexport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n  periodExclusiveUpperBound,\n} from './window.js'\nimport { PERIODS_COLLECTION } from './window.js'\n\n/**\n * Companion record recording that a closed period was frozen (its delete\n * markers physically purged). Stored in {@link PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION},\n * keyed by period name — kept OFF the hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so\n * freeze never alters the inter-period chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodFreezeRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly frozenAt: string\n  readonly frozenBy: string\n  readonly purgedMarkerCount: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion record noting that a closed period was cold-archived (its\n * in-window records physically relocated hot → cold). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION}, keyed by period name — kept OFF the\n * hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so archive never alters the chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodArchiveRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly archivedAt: string\n  readonly archivedBy: string\n  readonly archivedRecordCount: number\n}\n\n/** Per-target count of delete markers purged off one push-only sync target (#615). */\nexport interface TargetPurgeCount {\n  readonly label?: string\n  readonly role: 'backup' | 'archive'\n  readonly purgedCount: number\n}\n\n/**\n * One entry in a period's append-only reopen/reclose log (#1022).\n *\n * Real accounting close is a three-state lifecycle — open / closed / reopened\n * — not a one-way door. A month gets closed, a missing invoice arrives or a\n * filing is rejected, the month is reopened, corrected, and reclosed. The audit\n * value is not the ability to write again; it is the chain being able to say\n * *closed at T1, reopened at T2 by U, reclosed at T3*.\n */\nexport interface PeriodReopenEvent {\n  readonly op: 'reopen' | 'reclose'\n  /** ISO timestamp the event was recorded. */\n  readonly at: string\n  /** userId of the keyring that performed it. */\n  readonly by: string\n  /**\n   * `reopen` only — ISO instant after which the period re-seals on its own,\n   * with nobody acting. Absent means the window stays open until an explicit\n   * `reclosePeriod`.\n   */\n  readonly until?: string\n  /** Free-text justification, carried verbatim into the audit trail. */\n  readonly reason?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion holding a period's reopen/reclose history (#1022). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION}, keyed by the period's storage key — kept\n * OFF the hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record for the same reason freeze and\n * archive are: reopening must never rewrite the close, or the chain that proves\n * the close happened is the very thing the reopen destroys.\n *\n * `events` is APPEND-ONLY. Where the other companions are single-shot and\n * idempotent, this one accumulates, because the cycle repeats.\n */\nexport interface PeriodReopenRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  readonly events: readonly PeriodReopenEvent[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Collapse an append-only reopen log into the return-only fields merged onto a\n * {@link PeriodRecord} on read.\n *\n * Expiry is deliberately NOT resolved here: `reopenedUntil` is carried through\n * verbatim and compared against the clock at write-guard time, so a bounded\n * window re-seals on its own without anything having to run.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function resolveReopenState(events: readonly PeriodReopenEvent[]): {\n  reopenedAt?: string\n  reopenedBy?: string\n  reopenedUntil?: string\n  reopenReason?: string\n  reclosedAt?: string\n  reopenCount: number\n} {\n  let lastReopen: PeriodReopenEvent | undefined\n  let reclosedAfter: string | undefined\n  let reopenCount = 0\n  for (const e of events) {\n    if (e.op === 'reopen') {\n      lastReopen = e\n      reclosedAfter = undefined\n      reopenCount++\n    } else if (lastReopen !== undefined) {\n      reclosedAfter = e.at\n    }\n  }\n  if (!lastReopen) return { reopenCount }\n  return {\n    reopenedAt: lastReopen.at,\n    reopenedBy: lastReopen.by,\n    ...(lastReopen.until !== undefined && { reopenedUntil: lastReopen.until }),\n    ...(lastReopen.reason !== undefined && { reopenReason: lastReopen.reason }),\n    ...(reclosedAfter !== undefined && { reclosedAt: reclosedAfter }),\n    reopenCount,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this period writable right now on account of a reopen? (#1022)\n *\n * Three ways to be sealed again: never reopened, explicitly reclosed after the\n * last reopen, or a bounded window that has elapsed. The clock is read by the\n * caller and passed in, so the guard and any diagnostic agree on one instant.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function isEffectivelyReopened(period: PeriodRecord, nowIso: string): boolean {\n  if (period.reopenedAt === undefined) return false\n  if (period.reclosedAt !== undefined && period.reclosedAt >= period.reopenedAt) return false\n  if (period.reopenedUntil !== undefined && nowIso > period.reopenedUntil) return false\n  return true\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion record noting that a closed+frozen period's delete markers were\n * swept off the vault's push-only sync targets (#615). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION}, keyed by period name — kept OFF the\n * hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so target-purge never alters the chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodTargetPurgeRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly purgedAt: string\n  readonly purgedBy: string\n  readonly targets: readonly TargetPurgeCount[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Scope tuple for a period timeline (#1005).\n *\n * Identical in shape and semantics to `SequenceOptions.partition`: a\n * partitioned timeline is always disjoint from any unpartitioned one, and from\n * every other tuple. `['acme', 'vat']` and `['acme', 'wht']` are two\n * independent close calendars for the same subject — which is the whole point,\n * since sub-ledgers for one legal entity and one month routinely close on\n * different statutory deadlines.\n */\nexport type PeriodPartition = readonly (string | number)[]\n\n/**\n * Resolve the `_periods` storage key for a (name, partition) pair.\n *\n * Deliberately the same encoding as `resolveSequenceKey`: `name` verbatim when\n * unpartitioned, else `${name}\\x00${parts}` with each component\n * `encodeURIComponent`d and `'/'`-joined. The null-byte separator cannot occur\n * in a period name, so a partitioned key never collides with an unpartitioned\n * one; URI-encoding keeps `['a/b']` distinct from `['a','b']`.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} on an empty component or a non-finite number.\n * @internal\n */\nexport function resolvePeriodKey(name: string, partition?: PeriodPartition): string {\n  if (!partition || partition.length === 0) return name\n  const parts = partition.map((p) => {\n    if (typeof p === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(p)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`period partition component must be a finite number, got ${p}`)\n    }\n    const s = String(p)\n    if (s === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError('period partition component must not be empty')\n    }\n    return encodeURIComponent(s)\n  })\n  return `${name}\\x00${parts.join('/')}`\n}\n\n/**\n * Do two partitions denote the same timeline? Absent and empty both mean \"the\n * unpartitioned timeline\", so they compare equal.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function samePartition(a?: PeriodPartition, b?: PeriodPartition): boolean {\n  const x = a ?? []\n  const y = b ?? []\n  if (x.length !== y.length) return false\n  return x.every((v, i) => String(v) === String(y[i]))\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves a record to the timeline that governs it. Supplied by\n * `withPeriods({ subjects })`; returns `undefined` for any collection with no\n * mapping, which is what keeps an unconfigured vault on the single vault-wide\n * timeline it has always had.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport type PartitionResolver = (\n  collection: string,\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n) => PeriodPartition | undefined\n\n/**\n * Stored record for one closed or opened accounting period. One entry\n * per period, keyed by `name` in the reserved `_periods` collection.\n *\n * The hash chain between periods is computed at read time by\n * `loadPeriods()` — each record carries the name + hash of its\n * predecessor so a tamper with any period's record breaks the chain\n * into the next one, the same way the ledger's `prevHash` works.\n */\nexport interface PeriodRecord {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable name (e.g., `'FY2026-Q1'`). Unique per PARTITION — two\n   * timelines may each carry a `'2026-06'`, which is the normal case when one\n   * vault serves several subjects (#1005). Unique per vault when unpartitioned.\n   */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * The timeline this period belongs to. Absent = the vault-wide timeline.\n   * Two periods with the same `name` and different `partition` are unrelated:\n   * separate hash chains, separate close state, and the write guard applies\n   * each only to records that resolve to its own tuple.\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  /**\n   * Role discriminator. A period is `'closed'` from the moment its\n   * `closedAt` is recorded; `'opened'` marks a period whose opening\n   * entries have been carried forward via {@link openPeriod}. Many\n   * workflows will produce one opened period per closed period (the\n   * opened one is the SUCCESSOR — its `startDate` equals the prior\n   * `endDate + 1 day`).\n   */\n  readonly kind: 'closed' | 'opened'\n  /** ISO date — inclusive upper bound for records belonging to this period. */\n  readonly endDate: string\n  /** ISO date — lower bound (present on opened periods only). */\n  readonly startDate?: string\n  /**\n   * Record field carrying the business date (e.g. `'date'` on an\n   * invoice, `'paidAt'` on a payment). The guard compares\n   * `record[dateField]` against `endDate` — NOT the envelope `_ts`.\n   * Accounting entries booked late (business date `2026-01-15`,\n   * write-time `2026-04-22`) still get sealed when Q1 closes at\n   * `2026-03-31` because the comparison uses the business date.\n   *\n   * Optional for backwards compat. When absent, the guard falls back\n   * to envelope `_ts` — that's a write-time seal, appropriate for\n   * content that doesn't carry a logical business date (e.g. system\n   * settings) but almost never right for accounting ledgers.\n   */\n  readonly dateField?: string\n  /** ISO timestamp recorded at `closePeriod()` / `openPeriod()` call time. */\n  readonly closedAt: string\n  /** userId of the keyring that invoked the close/open. */\n  readonly closedBy: string\n  /** Name of the prior period this one chains to, if any. */\n  readonly priorPeriodName?: string\n  /** sha256(canonicalJson(priorPeriod)) — empty for the first period. */\n  readonly priorPeriodHash: string\n  /**\n   * Opened periods only — the names of the collections whose\n   * carry-forward aggregates were written by {@link openPeriod}.\n   * Recorded for auditability so a future `verifyPeriodChain()` can\n   * cross-check the opening balances against the closing snapshot.\n   */\n  readonly openingCollections?: readonly string[]\n  /** #604 return-only — merged from the `_period_freezes/<name>` companion on\n   *  read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record (would break\n   *  the hash chain). Absent = not yet frozen. */\n  readonly frozenAt?: string\n  readonly frozenBy?: string\n  readonly purgedMarkerCount?: number\n  /** #613 return-only — merged from the `_period_archives/<name>` companion on\n   *  read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record. Absent = not\n   *  yet archived. */\n  readonly archivedAt?: string\n  readonly archivedBy?: string\n  readonly archivedRecordCount?: number\n  /** #615 return-only — merged from the `_period_target_purges/<name>` companion\n   *  on read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record. Absent =\n   *  target-purge not yet run (or the vault has no push-only targets). */\n  readonly targetsPurgedAt?: string\n  readonly targetsPurgedBy?: string\n  readonly targetsPurged?: readonly TargetPurgeCount[]\n  /** #1022 return-only — collapsed from the `_period_reopens/<key>` append-only\n   *  log on read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record, so a\n   *  reopen cannot disturb the inter-period hash chain. Absent = never reopened.\n   *  `reclosedAt` present (and >= `reopenedAt`) means the window was closed\n   *  again explicitly; `reopenedUntil` in the past means it lapsed on its own.\n   *  Use {@link isEffectivelyReopened} rather than reading these directly. */\n  readonly reopenedAt?: string\n  readonly reopenedBy?: string\n  readonly reopenedUntil?: string\n  readonly reopenReason?: string\n  readonly reclosedAt?: string\n  /** How many times this period has been reopened, ever. */\n  readonly reopenCount?: number\n}\n\n/** Options for `vault.closePeriod()`. */\nexport interface ClosePeriodOptions {\n  /** Human-readable name. Must not collide with an existing period. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * Inclusive upper cutoff. A record is sealed when its\n   * `record[dateField]` (or, if absent, the envelope `_ts`) is at or\n   * before this ISO timestamp.\n   */\n  readonly endDate: string\n  /**\n   * Record field carrying the business date used for period\n   * membership. Recommended for accounting workflows — e.g. an\n   * invoice booked late (write-time after close) is still sealed\n   * when its `invoice.date` falls inside the closed period.\n   *\n   * Omit to use envelope `_ts` (write-time seal). This fallback\n   * rarely matches real-world accounting semantics; prefer passing\n   * an explicit `dateField`.\n   */\n  readonly dateField?: string\n  /**\n   * Close only this timeline (#1005). Omit for the vault-wide timeline.\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * vault.closePeriod({\n   *   name: '2026-06', endDate: '2026-06-30', dateField: 'issuedAt',\n   *   partition: [clientId, 'vat'],\n   * })\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Which records the resulting seal applies to is decided by the\n   * `subjects` map passed to `withPeriods()` — without one, no record ever\n   * resolves to a partition and a partitioned close seals nothing.\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n}\n\n/** Options for `vault.openPeriod()`. */\nexport interface OpenPeriodOptions<TCollections = Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  /** Human-readable name for the new period. Must be unique. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * The timeline to open in. Must match the partition of `fromPeriod` — a\n   * period cannot chain across timelines, since each carries its own hash\n   * chain (#1005).\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  /** ISO lower bound of the new period (usually prior `endDate + 1 day`). */\n  readonly startDate: string\n  /**\n   * Name of the prior CLOSED period this one chains from. The prior\n   * period's record is verified to exist and to be `kind: 'closed'`;\n   * its `endDate` is made available to the `carryForward` callback.\n   */\n  readonly fromPeriod: string\n  /**\n   * Receives a read-only facade over the vault's CURRENT state,\n   * plus the prior period's `endDate`. Accounting semantics: after\n   * a period closes, records with `record[dateField] <= endDate`\n   * are frozen — current state equals closing state, so a caller\n   * can compute closing balances by querying the live collection\n   * with a `where('date', '<=', priorEndDate)` filter.\n   *\n   * Returns opening-balance records keyed by collection name.\n   * Example:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * carryForward: async (ctx) => {\n   *   const closing = await ctx.collection<Journal>('journal')\n   *     .query().where('date', '<=', ctx.priorEndDate).toArray()\n   *   const opening: Record<string, Journal> = {}\n   *   for (const entry of closing) {\n   *     opening[`OB-${entry.id}`] = { ...entry, date: '2026-04-01' }\n   *   }\n   *   return { journal: opening }\n   * }\n   * ```\n   */\n  readonly carryForward: (\n    ctx: CarryForwardContext,\n  ) => Promise<TCollections> | TCollections\n}\n\n/**\n * Context passed to `OpenPeriodOptions.carryForward`. Exposes a\n * read-only subset of the live vault (`collection(name).get/list`)\n * plus the prior period's `endDate` so business-date filters can\n * be built by the caller.\n *\n * Writes go via the return value, not via the facade — the\n * `collection()` here is deliberately restricted to reads.\n */\nexport interface CarryForwardContext {\n  /** The prior period's `endDate` — the boundary of the closing snapshot. */\n  readonly priorEndDate: string\n  /** Read-only collection facade over current vault state. */\n  collection<T = unknown>(name: string): ReadOnlyCollection<T>\n}\n\n/** Minimum read surface exposed to `carryForward`. */\nexport interface ReadOnlyCollection<T> {\n  get(id: string): Promise<T | null>\n  list(): Promise<T[]>\n}\n\n/**\n * Load every period record currently stored on the adapter.\n * Decrypting is the caller's responsibility (we return plain records\n * so the vault can use its own `_periods` DEK).\n *\n * @internal — called by Vault methods that need the closed-period\n * cache. Not part of the public API surface.\n */\nexport async function loadPeriods(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  decrypt: (envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<PeriodRecord>,\n): Promise<PeriodRecord[]> {\n  const ids = await adapter.list(vault, PERIODS_COLLECTION)\n  const records: PeriodRecord[] = []\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vault, PERIODS_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (env) records.push(await decrypt(env))\n  }\n  // Stable order by closedAt so chain verification is reproducible.\n  records.sort((a, b) => a.closedAt.localeCompare(b.closedAt))\n  return records\n}\n\n/**\n * Given the current ordered period list, pick the last entry that\n * belongs to the hash chain — used as the `priorPeriodHash` anchor\n * for the next closure/opening.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function chainAnchor(\n  records: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  partition?: PeriodPartition,\n): Promise<{ priorPeriodName?: string; priorPeriodHash: string }> {\n  // #1005 — each timeline carries its OWN chain. Anchoring a partitioned close\n  // to whatever happened to be written last vault-wide would interleave\n  // unrelated subjects into one chain, so verifying client A's June would\n  // depend on client B never having closed in between.\n  const inTimeline = records.filter((p) => samePartition(p.partition, partition))\n  const last = inTimeline[inTimeline.length - 1]\n  if (!last) return { priorPeriodHash: '' }\n  const hash = await sha256Hex(canonicalJson(last as unknown as Record<string, unknown>))\n  return { priorPeriodName: last.name, priorPeriodHash: hash }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throw `PeriodClosedError` if the record being touched falls within\n * any closed period.\n *\n * Three signals, evaluated per period:\n *\n *  1. If the period declares a `dateField`, the guard reads\n *     `record[dateField]` on BOTH the existing (prior) record AND the\n *     incoming (new) record. Either comparing `<= endDate` triggers\n *     the error — callers cannot slide a record into a closed period\n *     by editing its date field.\n *  2. If the period has no `dateField`, the guard falls back to the\n *     envelope `_ts` of the existing record. Fresh inserts (no\n *     existing envelope) pass.\n *  3. For a delete, only the existing side is checked.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function assertTsWritable(\n  existing: { ts: string | null; record: Record<string, unknown> | null } | null,\n  incomingRecord: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n  closedPeriods: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  scope?: { collection: string; resolve?: PartitionResolver },\n): void {\n  // #1005 — a period only governs records that resolve to ITS timeline. With no\n  // resolver (the default `withPeriods()`), nothing resolves to a partition, so\n  // every record sits on the vault-wide timeline exactly as before and a\n  // partitioned period governs nothing.\n  const partitionOf = (r: Record<string, unknown> | null): PeriodPartition | undefined => {\n    if (!r || !scope?.resolve) return undefined\n    return scope.resolve(scope.collection, r)\n  }\n  const existingRecord = existing?.record ?? null\n  const existingPartition = partitionOf(existingRecord)\n  const incomingPartition = partitionOf(incomingRecord)\n  // One instant for the whole check, so a bounded reopen window cannot expire\n  // between two periods in the same loop and seal a write half-way.\n  const now = new Date().toISOString()\n\n  for (const p of closedPeriods) {\n    if (p.kind !== 'closed') continue\n    // #1022 — a reopened period is writable again. This is the ONLY thing a\n    // reopen does: it withdraws the period's veto. It cannot grant a write that\n    // some other gate forbids, because the guard bus ANDs every handler and\n    // record-level guards are registered ahead of this one.\n    if (isEffectivelyReopened(p, now)) continue\n    if (p.dateField) {\n      const checkRecord = (\n        label: string,\n        r: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n        recordPartition: PeriodPartition | undefined,\n      ): void => {\n        if (!r) return\n        // Both sides are checked under their OWN partition, which is what stops\n        // a write from sliding a record either INTO or OUT OF a sealed\n        // timeline by rewriting the fields the subject mapping reads.\n        if (!samePartition(recordPartition, p.partition)) return\n        const v = r[p.dateField!]\n        if (typeof v === 'string' && v <= p.endDate) {\n          throw new PeriodClosedError(p.name, p.endDate, `${label}[${p.dateField}]=${v}`)\n        }\n      }\n      checkRecord('existing', existingRecord, existingPartition)\n      checkRecord('incoming', incomingRecord, incomingPartition)\n      continue\n    }\n    // Fallback: write-time seal via envelope _ts. Scoped by the EXISTING\n    // record's partition — `_ts` belongs to the stored envelope, so the\n    // incoming side has no write-time of its own to compare.\n    if (!samePartition(existingPartition, p.partition)) continue\n    const existingTs = existing?.ts ?? null\n    if (existingTs !== null && existingTs <= p.endDate) {\n      throw new PeriodClosedError(p.name, p.endDate, existingTs)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanity-check a proposed period name + endDate against existing\n * records. Shared by closePeriod / openPeriod so the two pathways\n * produce identical diagnostics.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function validatePeriodName(\n  name: string,\n  existing: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  partition?: PeriodPartition,\n): void {\n  if (name.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError('Period name cannot be empty.')\n  }\n  // Validates the components as a side effect — an empty or non-finite\n  // component must be rejected at the call, not encoded into a storage key.\n  resolvePeriodKey(name, partition)\n  // #1005 — uniqueness is per TIMELINE. `'2026-06'` in `['A','vat']` does not\n  // collide with `'2026-06'` in `['B','vat']`.\n  if (existing.some((p) => p.name === name && samePartition(p.partition, partition))) {\n    const where = partition && partition.length > 0\n      ? ` in partition [${partition.join(', ')}]`\n      : ''\n    throw new ValidationError(`Period \"${name}\" already exists${where}.`)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire a reserved-collection ledger append for a period record. The\n * period itself is stored via the adapter as an encrypted envelope;\n * the ledger entry is a normal `put` with the period's payloadHash,\n * so period closures inherit the chain's tamper-evidence.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function appendPeriodLedgerEntry(\n  ledger: LedgerStore | null,\n  actor: string,\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  name: string,\n  collection: string = PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ledger) return\n  const { envelopePayloadHash } = await import('../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js')\n  await ledger.append({\n    op: 'put',\n    collection,\n    id: name,\n    version: envelope._v,\n    actor,\n    payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(envelope),\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * @internal #615. Sweep delete markers with `_ts < before` off ANY store\n * (the vault's local adapter, or a push-only sync target). Returns the count\n * removed. Shared by `vault._purgeDeleteMarkers` (local) and\n * `vault._purgePeriodTargets` (push-only targets).\n */\nexport async function purgeMarkersOn(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  before: string,\n  collections?: string[],\n): Promise<number> {\n  const snapshot = await store.loadAll(vault)\n  let removed = 0\n  for (const [coll, records] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {\n    if (collections && !collections.includes(coll)) continue\n    for (const [id, env] of Object.entries(records)) {\n      if (isDeleteMarker(env) && env._ts < before) {\n        await store.delete(vault, coll, id)\n        removed++\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return removed\n}\n","/**\n * Active periods strategy factory. Only reachable through the\n * `@noy-db/hub/periods` subpath.\n */\n\nimport {\n  loadPeriods,\n  chainAnchor,\n  assertTsWritable,\n  validatePeriodName,\n  appendPeriodLedgerEntry,\n} from './periods.js'\nimport type { PeriodPartition, PartitionResolver } from './periods.js'\nimport type { PeriodsStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link withPeriods}. */\nexport interface WithPeriodsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maps a collection to the timeline each of its records belongs to (#1005) —\n   * the answer to \"which close calendar governs THIS record\".\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * withPeriods({\n   *   subjects: { receipts: (r) => [r.clientId, layerOf(r)] },\n   * })\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Same shape as `withForget({ subjects })`, which answers the same question\n   * for erasure. A collection with no entry — and every collection when\n   * `subjects` is omitted entirely — stays on the vault-wide timeline, so an\n   * existing vault behaves exactly as it did before partitions existed.\n   *\n   * Return `undefined` from a mapper to put an individual record back on the\n   * vault-wide timeline (e.g. a record that predates the field the mapping\n   * reads).\n   */\n  readonly subjects?: Readonly<\n    Record<string, (record: Record<string, unknown>) => PeriodPartition | undefined>\n  >\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the default periods strategy. Pass into\n * `createNoydb({ periodsStrategy: withPeriods() })` to enable\n * `vault.closePeriod()` / `vault.openPeriod()` / write-guards.\n *\n * Pass `subjects` to run more than one close calendar in a single vault — see\n * {@link WithPeriodsOptions.subjects}.\n */\nexport function withPeriods(options?: WithPeriodsOptions): PeriodsStrategy {\n  const subjects = options?.subjects\n  const partitionOf: PartitionResolver | undefined = subjects\n    ? (collection, record) => subjects[collection]?.(record)\n    : undefined\n\n  return {\n    loadPeriods,\n    chainAnchor,\n    assertTsWritable,\n    validatePeriodName,\n    appendPeriodLedgerEntry,\n    ...(partitionOf !== undefined && { partitionOf }),\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Strategy seam for the optional accounting-periods service. Core\n * imports `PeriodsStrategy` type-only + `NO_PERIODS` stub; the real\n * `loadPeriods` / `chainAnchor` / `assertTsWritable` /\n * `validatePeriodName` / `appendPeriodLedgerEntry` functions are\n * only reachable via `withPeriods()` in `./active.ts`.\n *\n * Applications that never call `vault.closePeriod()` /\n * `vault.openPeriod()` ship none of the ~363 LOC.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope, NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport type { PeriodRecord, PeriodPartition, PartitionResolver } from './periods.js'\n\n/**\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface PeriodsStrategy {\n  loadPeriods(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    decrypt: (envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<PeriodRecord>,\n  ): Promise<PeriodRecord[]>\n  chainAnchor(records: readonly PeriodRecord[], partition?: PeriodPartition): Promise<{\n    priorPeriodName?: string\n    priorPeriodHash: string\n  }>\n  assertTsWritable(\n    existing: { ts: string | null; record: Record<string, unknown> | null } | null,\n    incoming: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n    periods: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n    scope?: { collection: string; resolve?: PartitionResolver },\n  ): void\n  validatePeriodName(\n    name: string,\n    existing: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n    partition?: PeriodPartition,\n  ): void\n  /**\n   * Record → timeline resolver built from `withPeriods({ subjects })` (#1005).\n   * `undefined` when the caller configured no subjects, which keeps every\n   * record on the vault-wide timeline.\n   */\n  readonly partitionOf?: PartitionResolver\n  appendPeriodLedgerEntry(\n    ledger: LedgerStore | null,\n    actor: string,\n    envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    periodName: string,\n    collection?: string,\n  ): Promise<void>\n}\n\n/**\n * No-periods stub. `loadPeriods` returns `[]`; the write-guards do\n * nothing (vaults without closed periods never reject writes);\n * `validatePeriodName` / `appendPeriodLedgerEntry` throw because\n * those paths are only reached when the user explicitly called\n * `closePeriod()` / `openPeriod()` — if they did that without the\n * strategy, they need to wire it.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst NOT_ENABLED = new Error(\n  'Accounting periods require the periods strategy. Import ' +\n  '`{ withPeriods }` from \"@noy-db/hub/periods\" and pass it to ' +\n  '`createNoydb({ periodsStrategy: withPeriods() })`.',\n)\n\nexport const NO_PERIODS: PeriodsStrategy = {\n  async loadPeriods() { return [] },\n  async chainAnchor() { return { priorPeriodHash: '' } },\n  assertTsWritable() {},\n  validatePeriodName() { throw NOT_ENABLED },\n  async appendPeriodLedgerEntry() { throw NOT_ENABLED },\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA2PO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAOjC;AACA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,cAAc;AAClB,aAAW,KAAK,QAAQ;AACtB,QAAI,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AACrB,mBAAa;AACb,sBAAgB;AAChB;AAAA,IACF,WAAW,eAAe,QAAW;AACnC,sBAAgB,EAAE;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAY,QAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AACtC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,YAAY,WAAW;AAAA,IACvB,YAAY,WAAW;AAAA,IACvB,GAAI,WAAW,UAAU,UAAa,EAAE,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;AAAA,IACxE,GAAI,WAAW,WAAW,UAAa,EAAE,cAAc,WAAW,OAAO;AAAA,IACzE,GAAI,kBAAkB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY,cAAc;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAWO,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAsB,QAAyB;AACnF,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,OAAW,QAAO;AAC5C,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,UAAa,OAAO,cAAc,OAAO,WAAY,QAAO;AACtF,MAAI,OAAO,kBAAkB,UAAa,SAAS,OAAO,cAAe,QAAO;AAChF,SAAO;AACT;AAuCO,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAc,WAAqC;AAClF,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG;AAChD,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,2DAA2D,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IAC1F;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,MAAM,IAAI;AACZ,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,8CAA8C;AAAA,IAC1E;AACA,WAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7B,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI,KAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACtC;AAQO,SAAS,cAAc,GAAqB,GAA8B;AAC/E,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAChB,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAChB,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,SAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAmOA,eAAsB,YACpB,SACA,OACA,SACyB;AACzB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,UAA0B,CAAC;AACjC,aAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,oBAAoB,EAAE;AAC3D,QAAI,IAAK,SAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AAEA,UAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC3D,SAAO;AACT;AASA,eAAsB,YACpB,SACA,WACgE;AAKhE,QAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9E,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AAC7C,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG;AACxC,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,IAA0C,CAAC;AACtF,SAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAC7D;AAoBO,SAAS,iBACd,UACA,gBACA,eACA,OACM;AAKN,QAAM,cAAc,CAAC,MAAmE;AACtF,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,QAAS,QAAO;AAClC,WAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,QAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,UAAU;AAC3C,QAAM,oBAAoB,YAAY,cAAc;AACpD,QAAM,oBAAoB,YAAY,cAAc;AAGpD,QAAM,OAAM,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAEnC,aAAW,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7B,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,SAAU;AAKzB,QAAI,sBAAsB,GAAG,GAAG,EAAG;AACnC,QAAI,EAAE,WAAW;AACf,YAAM,cAAc,CAClB,OACA,GACA,oBACS;AACT,YAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAIR,YAAI,CAAC,cAAc,iBAAiB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG;AAClD,cAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,SAAU;AACxB,YAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AAC3C,gBAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,QAChF;AAAA,MACF;AACA,kBAAY,YAAY,gBAAgB,iBAAiB;AACzD,kBAAY,YAAY,gBAAgB,iBAAiB;AACzD;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc,mBAAmB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG;AACpD,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,MAAM;AACnC,QAAI,eAAe,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,SAAS;AAClD,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,IAC3D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AASO,SAAS,mBACd,MACA,UACA,WACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAC1D;AAGA,mBAAiB,MAAM,SAAS;AAGhC,MAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG;AAClF,UAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,UAAU,SAAS,IAC1C,kBAAkB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,MACtC;AACJ,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,IAAI,mBAAmB,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACtE;AACF;AAUA,eAAsB,wBACpB,QACA,OACA,UACA,MACA,aAAqB,oBACN;AACf,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,QAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,sBAA2C;AACxF,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAClB,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,IACA,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ;AAAA,EACjD,CAAC;AACH;AAQA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OACA,QACA,aACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC1C,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AACtD,QAAI,eAAe,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,EAAG;AAChD,eAAW,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/C,UAAI,eAAe,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AAC3C,cAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC7tBO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA+C;AACzE,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AAC1B,QAAM,cAA6C,WAC/C,CAAC,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,IACrD;AAEJ,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,gBAAgB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACjD;AACF;;;ACGA,IAAM,cAAc,IAAI;AAAA,EACtB;AAGF;AAEO,IAAM,aAA8B;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,cAAc;AAAE,WAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EAAE;AAAA,EAChC,MAAM,cAAc;AAAE,WAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAAA,EAAE;AAAA,EACrD,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAAC;AAAA,EACpB,qBAAqB;AAAE,UAAM;AAAA,EAAY;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAAE,UAAM;AAAA,EAAY;AACtD;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/periods/periods.ts","../src/with-audit/periods/active.ts","../src/with-audit/periods/strategy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Accounting-period closure + opening.\n *\n * A closed period seals every record whose envelope `_ts` is at or\n * before the period's `endDate`: further writes (`put` / `delete`)\n * against such records throw {@link PeriodClosedError}. The period\n * itself is stored as a record in the reserved `_periods` collection\n * and written through the normal ledger-instrumented path, so every\n * closure appends a tamper-evident entry to the vault's hash chain.\n *\n * ## Closure model\n *\n * ```\n * vault.closePeriod({ name: 'FY2026-Q1', endDate: '2026-03-31' })\n *   └─► PeriodRecord written to _periods/<name>\n *         ├─ priorPeriodName / priorPeriodHash — chain to last close\n *         ├─ closedAt / closedBy — provenance\n *         └─ normal ledger append fires (LedgerStore.append)\n * ```\n *\n * Enforcement (`assertTsWritable`) is vault-local: the Vault caches\n * the list of closed periods on first read and consults that cache in\n * the `Collection.put` / `.delete` path via the `periodGuard` hook.\n *\n * ## Opening model\n *\n * ```\n * vault.openPeriod({\n *   name: 'FY2026-Q2',\n *   startDate: '2026-04-01',\n *   fromPeriod: 'FY2026-Q1',\n *   carryForward: async (priorView) => Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>,\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * `carryForward` receives a read-only `VaultInstant` anchored at the\n * prior period's `endDate` (built via `vault.at(endDate)`) so the\n * callback can compute closing aggregates from the sealed state. The\n * returned `{ [collectionName]: { [id]: record } }` map is written\n * before the new `PeriodRecord` lands — opening balances materialise\n * as normal records with fresh timestamps that fall outside every\n * closed period.\n *\n * ## Freeze\n *\n * ```\n * vault.freezePeriod('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► physically purges delete markers whose write-time falls inside\n *       the closed period's window (via the #589 `_purgeDeleteMarkers`\n *       seam), then records the fact:\n *         ├─ PeriodFreezeRecord written to _period_freezes/<name>\n *         └─ normal ledger append fires (LedgerStore.append)\n * ```\n *\n * The chained `_periods/<name>` record is never mutated — `frozenAt` /\n * `frozenBy` / `purgedMarkerCount` are merged onto the returned\n * `PeriodRecord` at read time from the companion, so a tamper with the\n * freeze can never break the inter-period hash chain. Freezing is\n * terminal (a closed period, once frozen, stays frozen) and idempotent\n * (a second call is a no-op that returns the same merged record without\n * re-purging or re-appending a ledger entry). Freeze does NOT purge\n * forget-tombstones (GDPR crypto-shred erasure evidence), `_history`\n * versions, or live records — the delete-markers-only seam leaves all\n * three untouched by construction.\n *\n * Freeze purges the LOCAL adapter only. On a synced vault, markers already\n * pushed to sync targets survive there, and a later pull re-imports them\n * (benign — they still read deleted, but the space isn't reclaimed). A\n * re-imported marker keeps its original `_ts` (inside the already-frozen\n * period's window), so — like any late-booked delete — it is reclaimed by\n * the NEXT period's freeze, whose window covers it; freeze stays terminal\n * and does NOT re-purge an already-frozen period (#611). Sweeping the sync\n * targets themselves is a cross-target-purge concern deferred to the\n * cold-archival spec. Purging re-opens the #589 resurrection window for a\n * peer offline since before the cutoff, which is why the closed period is\n * the operator-asserted safe-point that gates the call.\n *\n * A period whose purge window has not fully elapsed cannot be frozen —\n * `freezePeriod` throws rather than purge markers for deletes that may not\n * have converged yet (#610).\n *\n * ## Archive\n *\n * ```\n * vault.archivePeriod('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► relocates the closed period's in-window records (those with\n *       `_ts < periodExclusiveUpperBound(endDate)`) from the hot store to\n *       the configured cold tier (routeStore's `cold` route), then records:\n *         ├─ PeriodArchiveRecord written to _period_archives/<name>\n *         └─ a ledger entry attributed to _period_archives\n * ```\n *\n * Archival is NON-DESTRUCTIVE: routeStore reads fall through to the cold\n * tier on a hot miss, so an archived record still reads normally. It is\n * therefore gated only on `closed` (not `frozen`) — it does not re-open the\n * #589 resurrection window and needs no convergence safe-point. Freeze\n * (purge markers) and archive (relocate records) are independent and compose\n * in either order. Like freeze, archival keeps the chained `_periods/<name>`\n * record byte-immutable (state lives in the companion) and is idempotent.\n *\n * Bounds by write-time `_ts`, NOT business date: the store tier sees only\n * encrypted envelopes. A record with an in-period business date but a later\n * `_ts` (late-booked) archives at the NEXT period's archive — the same rule\n * freeze uses for late-booked delete markers. Requires a `routeStore` with a\n * cold route (`age: { cold }`); throws otherwise.\n *\n * Read cost: with `withLazy()` (per-id reads) archived records are truly\n * cold — fetched from cold only on access. In the default hydrated mode,\n * `loadAll` merges the cold store, so archived records still load into RAM\n * on vault open (hot-tier STORAGE is reclaimed; RAM is not). Summaries\n * (`_`-prefixed) always stay hot.\n *\n * ## Target-purge\n *\n * ```\n * vault.purgePeriodTargets('FY2026-Q1')\n *   └─► sweeps delete markers (`_ts < periodExclusiveUpperBound(endDate)`) off\n *       the vault's PUSH-ONLY sync targets (backup/archive roles), then records:\n *         ├─ PeriodTargetPurgeRecord written to _period_target_purges/<name>\n *         └─ a ledger entry attributed to _period_target_purges\n * ```\n *\n * Extends freeze's local marker purge to the vault's own remote sinks.\n * `sync-peer` (bidirectional) targets are SKIPPED: purging a marker there\n * re-opens the #589 resurrection window for a client offline before the\n * cutoff, an assertion no single vault can verify. Backup/archive targets are\n * push-only — never pulled from into convergence — so sweeping their markers\n * is safe. Requires the period be frozen first (closed → frozen →\n * target-purged) so the local safe-point is already established. Idempotent\n * once run; a vault with no push-only targets writes no companion and is\n * re-runnable (so a target added later is still swept). Single-vault only —\n * fleet-wide purge across sovereign vaults is klum's concern over\n * `@noy-db/hub/cargo`.\n *\n * ## Not covered\n *\n * - Partial re-opening of a closed period. If an auditor needs to\n *   make a correction inside a sealed period, the sanctioned path is\n *   a compensating entry in the NEW period, not an unlock of the\n *   old one.\n * - Automatic period rollover. `closePeriod` / `openPeriod` are\n *   deliberately explicit operator calls so the caller decides when\n *   the boundary lands.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport { sha256Hex, canonicalJson } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport { isDeleteMarker } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { PeriodClosedError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// The reserved collection names + `periodExclusiveUpperBound` moved to the\n// dependency-light `window.ts` so the sync engine's period-scoped pull (#807)\n// can import them without this module's ledger imports; re-exported here so\n// every existing import path keeps working.\nexport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n  periodExclusiveUpperBound,\n} from './window.js'\nimport { PERIODS_COLLECTION } from './window.js'\n\n/**\n * Companion record recording that a closed period was frozen (its delete\n * markers physically purged). Stored in {@link PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION},\n * keyed by period name — kept OFF the hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so\n * freeze never alters the inter-period chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodFreezeRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly frozenAt: string\n  readonly frozenBy: string\n  readonly purgedMarkerCount: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion record noting that a closed period was cold-archived (its\n * in-window records physically relocated hot → cold). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION}, keyed by period name — kept OFF the\n * hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so archive never alters the chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodArchiveRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly archivedAt: string\n  readonly archivedBy: string\n  readonly archivedRecordCount: number\n}\n\n/** Per-target count of delete markers purged off one push-only sync target (#615). */\nexport interface TargetPurgeCount {\n  readonly label?: string\n  readonly role: 'backup' | 'archive'\n  readonly purgedCount: number\n}\n\n/**\n * One entry in a period's append-only reopen/reclose log (#1022).\n *\n * Real accounting close is a three-state lifecycle — open / closed / reopened\n * — not a one-way door. A month gets closed, a missing invoice arrives or a\n * filing is rejected, the month is reopened, corrected, and reclosed. The audit\n * value is not the ability to write again; it is the chain being able to say\n * *closed at T1, reopened at T2 by U, reclosed at T3*.\n */\nexport interface PeriodReopenEvent {\n  readonly op: 'reopen' | 'reclose'\n  /** ISO timestamp the event was recorded. */\n  readonly at: string\n  /** userId of the keyring that performed it. */\n  readonly by: string\n  /**\n   * `reopen` only — ISO instant after which the period re-seals on its own,\n   * with nobody acting. Absent means the window stays open until an explicit\n   * `reclosePeriod`.\n   */\n  readonly until?: string\n  /** Free-text justification, carried verbatim into the audit trail. */\n  readonly reason?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion holding a period's reopen/reclose history (#1022). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION}, keyed by the period's storage key — kept\n * OFF the hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record for the same reason freeze and\n * archive are: reopening must never rewrite the close, or the chain that proves\n * the close happened is the very thing the reopen destroys.\n *\n * `events` is APPEND-ONLY. Where the other companions are single-shot and\n * idempotent, this one accumulates, because the cycle repeats.\n */\nexport interface PeriodReopenRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  readonly events: readonly PeriodReopenEvent[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Collapse an append-only reopen log into the return-only fields merged onto a\n * {@link PeriodRecord} on read.\n *\n * Expiry is deliberately NOT resolved here: `reopenedUntil` is carried through\n * verbatim and compared against the clock at write-guard time, so a bounded\n * window re-seals on its own without anything having to run.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function resolveReopenState(events: readonly PeriodReopenEvent[]): {\n  reopenedAt?: string\n  reopenedBy?: string\n  reopenedUntil?: string\n  reopenReason?: string\n  reclosedAt?: string\n  reopenCount: number\n} {\n  let lastReopen: PeriodReopenEvent | undefined\n  let reclosedAfter: string | undefined\n  let reopenCount = 0\n  for (const e of events) {\n    if (e.op === 'reopen') {\n      lastReopen = e\n      reclosedAfter = undefined\n      reopenCount++\n    } else if (lastReopen !== undefined) {\n      reclosedAfter = e.at\n    }\n  }\n  if (!lastReopen) return { reopenCount }\n  return {\n    reopenedAt: lastReopen.at,\n    reopenedBy: lastReopen.by,\n    ...(lastReopen.until !== undefined && { reopenedUntil: lastReopen.until }),\n    ...(lastReopen.reason !== undefined && { reopenReason: lastReopen.reason }),\n    ...(reclosedAfter !== undefined && { reclosedAt: reclosedAfter }),\n    reopenCount,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Is this period writable right now on account of a reopen? (#1022)\n *\n * Three ways to be sealed again: never reopened, explicitly reclosed after the\n * last reopen, or a bounded window that has elapsed. The clock is read by the\n * caller and passed in, so the guard and any diagnostic agree on one instant.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function isEffectivelyReopened(period: PeriodRecord, nowIso: string): boolean {\n  if (period.reopenedAt === undefined) return false\n  if (period.reclosedAt !== undefined && period.reclosedAt >= period.reopenedAt) return false\n  if (period.reopenedUntil !== undefined && nowIso > period.reopenedUntil) return false\n  return true\n}\n\n/**\n * Companion record noting that a closed+frozen period's delete markers were\n * swept off the vault's push-only sync targets (#615). Stored in\n * {@link PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION}, keyed by period name — kept OFF the\n * hash-chained `_periods/<name>` record so target-purge never alters the chain.\n */\nexport interface PeriodTargetPurgeRecord {\n  readonly period: string\n  readonly purgedAt: string\n  readonly purgedBy: string\n  readonly targets: readonly TargetPurgeCount[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Scope tuple for a period timeline (#1005).\n *\n * Identical in shape and semantics to `SequenceOptions.partition`: a\n * partitioned timeline is always disjoint from any unpartitioned one, and from\n * every other tuple. `['acme', 'vat']` and `['acme', 'wht']` are two\n * independent close calendars for the same subject — which is the whole point,\n * since sub-ledgers for one legal entity and one month routinely close on\n * different statutory deadlines.\n */\nexport type PeriodPartition = readonly (string | number)[]\n\n/**\n * Resolve the `_periods` storage key for a (name, partition) pair.\n *\n * Deliberately the same encoding as `resolveSequenceKey`: `name` verbatim when\n * unpartitioned, else `${name}\\x00${parts}` with each component\n * `encodeURIComponent`d and `'/'`-joined. The null-byte separator cannot occur\n * in a period name, so a partitioned key never collides with an unpartitioned\n * one; URI-encoding keeps `['a/b']` distinct from `['a','b']`.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} on an empty component or a non-finite number.\n * @internal\n */\nexport function resolvePeriodKey(name: string, partition?: PeriodPartition): string {\n  if (!partition || partition.length === 0) return name\n  const parts = partition.map((p) => {\n    if (typeof p === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(p)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`period partition component must be a finite number, got ${p}`)\n    }\n    const s = String(p)\n    if (s === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError('period partition component must not be empty')\n    }\n    return encodeURIComponent(s)\n  })\n  return `${name}\\x00${parts.join('/')}`\n}\n\n/**\n * Do two partitions denote the same timeline? Absent and empty both mean \"the\n * unpartitioned timeline\", so they compare equal.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function samePartition(a?: PeriodPartition, b?: PeriodPartition): boolean {\n  const x = a ?? []\n  const y = b ?? []\n  if (x.length !== y.length) return false\n  return x.every((v, i) => String(v) === String(y[i]))\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves a record to the timeline that governs it. Supplied by\n * `withPeriods({ subjects })`; returns `undefined` for any collection with no\n * mapping, which is what keeps an unconfigured vault on the single vault-wide\n * timeline it has always had.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport type PartitionResolver = (\n  collection: string,\n  record: Record<string, unknown>,\n) => PeriodPartition | undefined\n\n/**\n * Stored record for one closed or opened accounting period. One entry\n * per period, keyed by `name` in the reserved `_periods` collection.\n *\n * The hash chain between periods is computed at read time by\n * `loadPeriods()` — each record carries the name + hash of its\n * predecessor so a tamper with any period's record breaks the chain\n * into the next one, the same way the ledger's `prevHash` works.\n */\nexport interface PeriodRecord {\n  /**\n   * Human-readable name (e.g., `'FY2026-Q1'`). Unique per PARTITION — two\n   * timelines may each carry a `'2026-06'`, which is the normal case when one\n   * vault serves several subjects (#1005). Unique per vault when unpartitioned.\n   */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * The timeline this period belongs to. Absent = the vault-wide timeline.\n   * Two periods with the same `name` and different `partition` are unrelated:\n   * separate hash chains, separate close state, and the write guard applies\n   * each only to records that resolve to its own tuple.\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  /**\n   * Role discriminator. A period is `'closed'` from the moment its\n   * `closedAt` is recorded; `'opened'` marks a period whose opening\n   * entries have been carried forward via {@link openPeriod}. Many\n   * workflows will produce one opened period per closed period (the\n   * opened one is the SUCCESSOR — its `startDate` equals the prior\n   * `endDate + 1 day`).\n   */\n  readonly kind: 'closed' | 'opened'\n  /** ISO date — inclusive upper bound for records belonging to this period. */\n  readonly endDate: string\n  /** ISO date — lower bound (present on opened periods only). */\n  readonly startDate?: string\n  /**\n   * Record field carrying the business date (e.g. `'date'` on an\n   * invoice, `'paidAt'` on a payment). The guard compares\n   * `record[dateField]` against `endDate` — NOT the envelope `_ts`.\n   * Accounting entries booked late (business date `2026-01-15`,\n   * write-time `2026-04-22`) still get sealed when Q1 closes at\n   * `2026-03-31` because the comparison uses the business date.\n   *\n   * Optional for backwards compat. When absent, the guard falls back\n   * to envelope `_ts` — that's a write-time seal, appropriate for\n   * content that doesn't carry a logical business date (e.g. system\n   * settings) but almost never right for accounting ledgers.\n   */\n  readonly dateField?: string\n  /** ISO timestamp recorded at `closePeriod()` / `openPeriod()` call time. */\n  readonly closedAt: string\n  /** userId of the keyring that invoked the close/open. */\n  readonly closedBy: string\n  /** Name of the prior period this one chains to, if any. */\n  readonly priorPeriodName?: string\n  /** sha256(canonicalJson(priorPeriod)) — empty for the first period. */\n  readonly priorPeriodHash: string\n  /**\n   * Opened periods only — the names of the collections whose\n   * carry-forward aggregates were written by {@link openPeriod}.\n   * Recorded for auditability so a future `verifyPeriodChain()` can\n   * cross-check the opening balances against the closing snapshot.\n   */\n  readonly openingCollections?: readonly string[]\n  /** #604 return-only — merged from the `_period_freezes/<name>` companion on\n   *  read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record (would break\n   *  the hash chain). Absent = not yet frozen. */\n  readonly frozenAt?: string\n  readonly frozenBy?: string\n  readonly purgedMarkerCount?: number\n  /** #613 return-only — merged from the `_period_archives/<name>` companion on\n   *  read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record. Absent = not\n   *  yet archived. */\n  readonly archivedAt?: string\n  readonly archivedBy?: string\n  readonly archivedRecordCount?: number\n  /** #615 return-only — merged from the `_period_target_purges/<name>` companion\n   *  on read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record. Absent =\n   *  target-purge not yet run (or the vault has no push-only targets). */\n  readonly targetsPurgedAt?: string\n  readonly targetsPurgedBy?: string\n  readonly targetsPurged?: readonly TargetPurgeCount[]\n  /** #1022 return-only — collapsed from the `_period_reopens/<key>` append-only\n   *  log on read; NEVER written into the stored `_periods/<name>` record, so a\n   *  reopen cannot disturb the inter-period hash chain. Absent = never reopened.\n   *  `reclosedAt` present (and >= `reopenedAt`) means the window was closed\n   *  again explicitly; `reopenedUntil` in the past means it lapsed on its own.\n   *  Use {@link isEffectivelyReopened} rather than reading these directly. */\n  readonly reopenedAt?: string\n  readonly reopenedBy?: string\n  readonly reopenedUntil?: string\n  readonly reopenReason?: string\n  readonly reclosedAt?: string\n  /** How many times this period has been reopened, ever. */\n  readonly reopenCount?: number\n}\n\n/** Options for `vault.closePeriod()`. */\nexport interface ClosePeriodOptions {\n  /** Human-readable name. Must not collide with an existing period. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * Inclusive upper cutoff. A record is sealed when its\n   * `record[dateField]` (or, if absent, the envelope `_ts`) is at or\n   * before this ISO timestamp.\n   */\n  readonly endDate: string\n  /**\n   * Record field carrying the business date used for period\n   * membership. Recommended for accounting workflows — e.g. an\n   * invoice booked late (write-time after close) is still sealed\n   * when its `invoice.date` falls inside the closed period.\n   *\n   * Omit to use envelope `_ts` (write-time seal). This fallback\n   * rarely matches real-world accounting semantics; prefer passing\n   * an explicit `dateField`.\n   */\n  readonly dateField?: string\n  /**\n   * Close only this timeline (#1005). Omit for the vault-wide timeline.\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * vault.closePeriod({\n   *   name: '2026-06', endDate: '2026-06-30', dateField: 'issuedAt',\n   *   partition: [clientId, 'vat'],\n   * })\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Which records the resulting seal applies to is decided by the\n   * `subjects` map passed to `withPeriods()` — without one, no record ever\n   * resolves to a partition and a partitioned close seals nothing.\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n}\n\n/** Options for `vault.openPeriod()`. */\nexport interface OpenPeriodOptions<TCollections = Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>> {\n  /** Human-readable name for the new period. Must be unique. */\n  readonly name: string\n  /**\n   * The timeline to open in. Must match the partition of `fromPeriod` — a\n   * period cannot chain across timelines, since each carries its own hash\n   * chain (#1005).\n   */\n  readonly partition?: PeriodPartition\n  /** ISO lower bound of the new period (usually prior `endDate + 1 day`). */\n  readonly startDate: string\n  /**\n   * Name of the prior CLOSED period this one chains from. The prior\n   * period's record is verified to exist and to be `kind: 'closed'`;\n   * its `endDate` is made available to the `carryForward` callback.\n   */\n  readonly fromPeriod: string\n  /**\n   * Receives a read-only facade over the vault's CURRENT state,\n   * plus the prior period's `endDate`. Accounting semantics: after\n   * a period closes, records with `record[dateField] <= endDate`\n   * are frozen — current state equals closing state, so a caller\n   * can compute closing balances by querying the live collection\n   * with a `where('date', '<=', priorEndDate)` filter.\n   *\n   * Returns opening-balance records keyed by collection name.\n   * Example:\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * carryForward: async (ctx) => {\n   *   const closing = await ctx.collection<Journal>('journal')\n   *     .query().where('date', '<=', ctx.priorEndDate).toArray()\n   *   const opening: Record<string, Journal> = {}\n   *   for (const entry of closing) {\n   *     opening[`OB-${entry.id}`] = { ...entry, date: '2026-04-01' }\n   *   }\n   *   return { journal: opening }\n   * }\n   * ```\n   */\n  readonly carryForward: (\n    ctx: CarryForwardContext,\n  ) => Promise<TCollections> | TCollections\n}\n\n/**\n * Context passed to `OpenPeriodOptions.carryForward`. Exposes a\n * read-only subset of the live vault (`collection(name).get/list`)\n * plus the prior period's `endDate` so business-date filters can\n * be built by the caller.\n *\n * Writes go via the return value, not via the facade — the\n * `collection()` here is deliberately restricted to reads.\n */\nexport interface CarryForwardContext {\n  /** The prior period's `endDate` — the boundary of the closing snapshot. */\n  readonly priorEndDate: string\n  /** Read-only collection facade over current vault state. */\n  collection<T = unknown>(name: string): ReadOnlyCollection<T>\n}\n\n/** Minimum read surface exposed to `carryForward`. */\nexport interface ReadOnlyCollection<T> {\n  get(id: string): Promise<T | null>\n  list(): Promise<T[]>\n}\n\n/**\n * Load every period record currently stored on the adapter.\n * Decrypting is the caller's responsibility (we return plain records\n * so the vault can use its own `_periods` DEK).\n *\n * @internal — called by Vault methods that need the closed-period\n * cache. Not part of the public API surface.\n */\nexport async function loadPeriods(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  decrypt: (id: string, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<PeriodRecord>,\n): Promise<PeriodRecord[]> {\n  const ids = await adapter.list(vault, PERIODS_COLLECTION)\n  const records: PeriodRecord[] = []\n  for (const id of ids) {\n    const env = await adapter.get(vault, PERIODS_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (env) records.push(await decrypt(id, env))\n  }\n  // Stable order by closedAt so chain verification is reproducible.\n  records.sort((a, b) => a.closedAt.localeCompare(b.closedAt))\n  return records\n}\n\n/**\n * Given the current ordered period list, pick the last entry that\n * belongs to the hash chain — used as the `priorPeriodHash` anchor\n * for the next closure/opening.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function chainAnchor(\n  records: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  partition?: PeriodPartition,\n): Promise<{ priorPeriodName?: string; priorPeriodHash: string }> {\n  // #1005 — each timeline carries its OWN chain. Anchoring a partitioned close\n  // to whatever happened to be written last vault-wide would interleave\n  // unrelated subjects into one chain, so verifying client A's June would\n  // depend on client B never having closed in between.\n  const inTimeline = records.filter((p) => samePartition(p.partition, partition))\n  const last = inTimeline[inTimeline.length - 1]\n  if (!last) return { priorPeriodHash: '' }\n  const hash = await sha256Hex(canonicalJson(last as unknown as Record<string, unknown>))\n  return { priorPeriodName: last.name, priorPeriodHash: hash }\n}\n\n/**\n * Throw `PeriodClosedError` if the record being touched falls within\n * any closed period.\n *\n * Three signals, evaluated per period:\n *\n *  1. If the period declares a `dateField`, the guard reads\n *     `record[dateField]` on BOTH the existing (prior) record AND the\n *     incoming (new) record. Either comparing `<= endDate` triggers\n *     the error — callers cannot slide a record into a closed period\n *     by editing its date field.\n *  2. If the period has no `dateField`, the guard falls back to the\n *     envelope `_ts` of the existing record. Fresh inserts (no\n *     existing envelope) pass.\n *  3. For a delete, only the existing side is checked.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function assertTsWritable(\n  existing: { ts: string | null; record: Record<string, unknown> | null } | null,\n  incomingRecord: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n  closedPeriods: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  scope?: { collection: string; resolve?: PartitionResolver },\n): void {\n  // #1005 — a period only governs records that resolve to ITS timeline. With no\n  // resolver (the default `withPeriods()`), nothing resolves to a partition, so\n  // every record sits on the vault-wide timeline exactly as before and a\n  // partitioned period governs nothing.\n  const partitionOf = (r: Record<string, unknown> | null): PeriodPartition | undefined => {\n    if (!r || !scope?.resolve) return undefined\n    return scope.resolve(scope.collection, r)\n  }\n  const existingRecord = existing?.record ?? null\n  const existingPartition = partitionOf(existingRecord)\n  const incomingPartition = partitionOf(incomingRecord)\n  // One instant for the whole check, so a bounded reopen window cannot expire\n  // between two periods in the same loop and seal a write half-way.\n  const now = new Date().toISOString()\n\n  for (const p of closedPeriods) {\n    if (p.kind !== 'closed') continue\n    // #1022 — a reopened period is writable again. This is the ONLY thing a\n    // reopen does: it withdraws the period's veto. It cannot grant a write that\n    // some other gate forbids, because the guard bus ANDs every handler and\n    // record-level guards are registered ahead of this one.\n    if (isEffectivelyReopened(p, now)) continue\n    if (p.dateField) {\n      const checkRecord = (\n        label: string,\n        r: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n        recordPartition: PeriodPartition | undefined,\n      ): void => {\n        if (!r) return\n        // Both sides are checked under their OWN partition, which is what stops\n        // a write from sliding a record either INTO or OUT OF a sealed\n        // timeline by rewriting the fields the subject mapping reads.\n        if (!samePartition(recordPartition, p.partition)) return\n        const v = r[p.dateField!]\n        if (typeof v === 'string' && v <= p.endDate) {\n          throw new PeriodClosedError(p.name, p.endDate, `${label}[${p.dateField}]=${v}`)\n        }\n      }\n      checkRecord('existing', existingRecord, existingPartition)\n      checkRecord('incoming', incomingRecord, incomingPartition)\n      continue\n    }\n    // Fallback: write-time seal via envelope _ts. Scoped by the EXISTING\n    // record's partition — `_ts` belongs to the stored envelope, so the\n    // incoming side has no write-time of its own to compare.\n    if (!samePartition(existingPartition, p.partition)) continue\n    const existingTs = existing?.ts ?? null\n    if (existingTs !== null && existingTs <= p.endDate) {\n      throw new PeriodClosedError(p.name, p.endDate, existingTs)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanity-check a proposed period name + endDate against existing\n * records. Shared by closePeriod / openPeriod so the two pathways\n * produce identical diagnostics.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function validatePeriodName(\n  name: string,\n  existing: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n  partition?: PeriodPartition,\n): void {\n  if (name.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError('Period name cannot be empty.')\n  }\n  // Validates the components as a side effect — an empty or non-finite\n  // component must be rejected at the call, not encoded into a storage key.\n  resolvePeriodKey(name, partition)\n  // #1005 — uniqueness is per TIMELINE. `'2026-06'` in `['A','vat']` does not\n  // collide with `'2026-06'` in `['B','vat']`.\n  if (existing.some((p) => p.name === name && samePartition(p.partition, partition))) {\n    const where = partition && partition.length > 0\n      ? ` in partition [${partition.join(', ')}]`\n      : ''\n    throw new ValidationError(`Period \"${name}\" already exists${where}.`)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire a reserved-collection ledger append for a period record. The\n * period itself is stored via the adapter as an encrypted envelope;\n * the ledger entry is a normal `put` with the period's payloadHash,\n * so period closures inherit the chain's tamper-evidence.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport async function appendPeriodLedgerEntry(\n  ledger: LedgerStore | null,\n  actor: string,\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  name: string,\n  collection: string = PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (!ledger) return\n  const { envelopePayloadHash } = await import('../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js')\n  await ledger.append({\n    op: 'put',\n    collection,\n    id: name,\n    version: envelope._v,\n    actor,\n    payloadHash: await envelopePayloadHash(envelope),\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * @internal #615. Sweep delete markers with `_ts < before` off ANY store\n * (the vault's local adapter, or a push-only sync target). Returns the count\n * removed. Shared by `vault._purgeDeleteMarkers` (local) and\n * `vault._purgePeriodTargets` (push-only targets).\n */\nexport async function purgeMarkersOn(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  before: string,\n  collections?: string[],\n): Promise<number> {\n  const snapshot = await store.loadAll(vault)\n  let removed = 0\n  for (const [coll, records] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {\n    if (collections && !collections.includes(coll)) continue\n    for (const [id, env] of Object.entries(records)) {\n      if (isDeleteMarker(env) && env._ts < before) {\n        await store.delete(vault, coll, id)\n        removed++\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return removed\n}\n","/**\n * Active periods strategy factory. Only reachable through the\n * `@noy-db/hub/periods` subpath.\n */\n\nimport {\n  loadPeriods,\n  chainAnchor,\n  assertTsWritable,\n  validatePeriodName,\n  appendPeriodLedgerEntry,\n} from './periods.js'\nimport type { PeriodPartition, PartitionResolver } from './periods.js'\nimport type { PeriodsStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link withPeriods}. */\nexport interface WithPeriodsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maps a collection to the timeline each of its records belongs to (#1005) —\n   * the answer to \"which close calendar governs THIS record\".\n   *\n   * ```ts\n   * withPeriods({\n   *   subjects: { receipts: (r) => [r.clientId, layerOf(r)] },\n   * })\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Same shape as `withForget({ subjects })`, which answers the same question\n   * for erasure. A collection with no entry — and every collection when\n   * `subjects` is omitted entirely — stays on the vault-wide timeline, so an\n   * existing vault behaves exactly as it did before partitions existed.\n   *\n   * Return `undefined` from a mapper to put an individual record back on the\n   * vault-wide timeline (e.g. a record that predates the field the mapping\n   * reads).\n   */\n  readonly subjects?: Readonly<\n    Record<string, (record: Record<string, unknown>) => PeriodPartition | undefined>\n  >\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the default periods strategy. Pass into\n * `createNoydb({ periodsStrategy: withPeriods() })` to enable\n * `vault.closePeriod()` / `vault.openPeriod()` / write-guards.\n *\n * Pass `subjects` to run more than one close calendar in a single vault — see\n * {@link WithPeriodsOptions.subjects}.\n */\nexport function withPeriods(options?: WithPeriodsOptions): PeriodsStrategy {\n  const subjects = options?.subjects\n  const partitionOf: PartitionResolver | undefined = subjects\n    ? (collection, record) => subjects[collection]?.(record)\n    : undefined\n\n  return {\n    loadPeriods,\n    chainAnchor,\n    assertTsWritable,\n    validatePeriodName,\n    appendPeriodLedgerEntry,\n    ...(partitionOf !== undefined && { partitionOf }),\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Strategy seam for the optional accounting-periods service. Core\n * imports `PeriodsStrategy` type-only + `NO_PERIODS` stub; the real\n * `loadPeriods` / `chainAnchor` / `assertTsWritable` /\n * `validatePeriodName` / `appendPeriodLedgerEntry` functions are\n * only reachable via `withPeriods()` in `./active.ts`.\n *\n * Applications that never call `vault.closePeriod()` /\n * `vault.openPeriod()` ship none of the ~363 LOC.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope, NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport type { PeriodRecord, PeriodPartition, PartitionResolver } from './periods.js'\n\n/**\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface PeriodsStrategy {\n  loadPeriods(\n    adapter: NoydbStore,\n    vault: string,\n    decrypt: (id: string, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<PeriodRecord>,\n  ): Promise<PeriodRecord[]>\n  chainAnchor(records: readonly PeriodRecord[], partition?: PeriodPartition): Promise<{\n    priorPeriodName?: string\n    priorPeriodHash: string\n  }>\n  assertTsWritable(\n    existing: { ts: string | null; record: Record<string, unknown> | null } | null,\n    incoming: Record<string, unknown> | null,\n    periods: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n    scope?: { collection: string; resolve?: PartitionResolver },\n  ): void\n  validatePeriodName(\n    name: string,\n    existing: readonly PeriodRecord[],\n    partition?: PeriodPartition,\n  ): void\n  /**\n   * Record → timeline resolver built from `withPeriods({ subjects })` (#1005).\n   * `undefined` when the caller configured no subjects, which keeps every\n   * record on the vault-wide timeline.\n   */\n  readonly partitionOf?: PartitionResolver\n  appendPeriodLedgerEntry(\n    ledger: LedgerStore | null,\n    actor: string,\n    envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n    periodName: string,\n    collection?: string,\n  ): Promise<void>\n}\n\n/**\n * No-periods stub. `loadPeriods` returns `[]`; the write-guards do\n * nothing (vaults without closed periods never reject writes);\n * `validatePeriodName` / `appendPeriodLedgerEntry` throw because\n * those paths are only reached when the user explicitly called\n * `closePeriod()` / `openPeriod()` — if they did that without the\n * strategy, they need to wire it.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nconst NOT_ENABLED = new Error(\n  'Accounting periods require the periods strategy. Import ' +\n  '`{ withPeriods }` from \"@noy-db/hub/periods\" and pass it to ' +\n  '`createNoydb({ periodsStrategy: withPeriods() })`.',\n)\n\nexport const NO_PERIODS: PeriodsStrategy = {\n  async loadPeriods() { return [] },\n  async chainAnchor() { return { priorPeriodHash: '' } },\n  assertTsWritable() {},\n  validatePeriodName() { throw NOT_ENABLED },\n  async appendPeriodLedgerEntry() { throw NOT_ENABLED },\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA2PO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAOjC;AACA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,cAAc;AAClB,aAAW,KAAK,QAAQ;AACtB,QAAI,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AACrB,mBAAa;AACb,sBAAgB;AAChB;AAAA,IACF,WAAW,eAAe,QAAW;AACnC,sBAAgB,EAAE;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAY,QAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AACtC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,YAAY,WAAW;AAAA,IACvB,YAAY,WAAW;AAAA,IACvB,GAAI,WAAW,UAAU,UAAa,EAAE,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;AAAA,IACxE,GAAI,WAAW,WAAW,UAAa,EAAE,cAAc,WAAW,OAAO;AAAA,IACzE,GAAI,kBAAkB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY,cAAc;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAWO,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAsB,QAAyB;AACnF,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,OAAW,QAAO;AAC5C,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,UAAa,OAAO,cAAc,OAAO,WAAY,QAAO;AACtF,MAAI,OAAO,kBAAkB,UAAa,SAAS,OAAO,cAAe,QAAO;AAChF,SAAO;AACT;AAuCO,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAc,WAAqC;AAClF,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG;AAChD,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,2DAA2D,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IAC1F;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,MAAM,IAAI;AACZ,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,8CAA8C;AAAA,IAC1E;AACA,WAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7B,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI,KAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACtC;AAQO,SAAS,cAAc,GAAqB,GAA8B;AAC/E,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAChB,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAChB,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,SAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAmOA,eAAsB,YACpB,SACA,OACA,SACyB;AACzB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,UAA0B,CAAC;AACjC,aAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,oBAAoB,EAAE;AAC3D,QAAI,IAAK,SAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9C;AAEA,UAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC3D,SAAO;AACT;AASA,eAAsB,YACpB,SACA,WACgE;AAKhE,QAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9E,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC;AAC7C,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG;AACxC,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,IAA0C,CAAC;AACtF,SAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAC7D;AAoBO,SAAS,iBACd,UACA,gBACA,eACA,OACM;AAKN,QAAM,cAAc,CAAC,MAAmE;AACtF,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,QAAS,QAAO;AAClC,WAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,QAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,UAAU;AAC3C,QAAM,oBAAoB,YAAY,cAAc;AACpD,QAAM,oBAAoB,YAAY,cAAc;AAGpD,QAAM,OAAM,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAEnC,aAAW,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7B,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,SAAU;AAKzB,QAAI,sBAAsB,GAAG,GAAG,EAAG;AACnC,QAAI,EAAE,WAAW;AACf,YAAM,cAAc,CAClB,OACA,GACA,oBACS;AACT,YAAI,CAAC,EAAG;AAIR,YAAI,CAAC,cAAc,iBAAiB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG;AAClD,cAAM,IAAI,EAAE,EAAE,SAAU;AACxB,YAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AAC3C,gBAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,QAChF;AAAA,MACF;AACA,kBAAY,YAAY,gBAAgB,iBAAiB;AACzD,kBAAY,YAAY,gBAAgB,iBAAiB;AACzD;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc,mBAAmB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG;AACpD,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,MAAM;AACnC,QAAI,eAAe,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,SAAS;AAClD,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,IAC3D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AASO,SAAS,mBACd,MACA,UACA,WACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAC1D;AAGA,mBAAiB,MAAM,SAAS;AAGhC,MAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG;AAClF,UAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,UAAU,SAAS,IAC1C,kBAAkB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,MACtC;AACJ,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,IAAI,mBAAmB,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACtE;AACF;AAUA,eAAsB,wBACpB,QACA,OACA,UACA,MACA,aAAqB,oBACN;AACf,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,QAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,sBAA2C;AACxF,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAClB,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,IACA,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ;AAAA,EACjD,CAAC;AACH;AAQA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OACA,QACA,aACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC1C,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AACtD,QAAI,eAAe,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,EAAG;AAChD,eAAW,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/C,UAAI,eAAe,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AAC3C,cAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AAClC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC7tBO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA+C;AACzE,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AAC1B,QAAM,cAA6C,WAC/C,CAAC,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,IACrD;AAEJ,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,gBAAgB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACjD;AACF;;;ACGA,IAAM,cAAc,IAAI;AAAA,EACtB;AAGF;AAEO,IAAM,aAA8B;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,cAAc;AAAE,WAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EAAE;AAAA,EAChC,MAAM,cAAc;AAAE,WAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAAA,EAAE;AAAA,EACrD,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAAC;AAAA,EACpB,qBAAqB;AAAE,UAAM;AAAA,EAAY;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,0BAA0B;AAAE,UAAM;AAAA,EAAY;AACtD;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-QTDAPDDV.js → chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   InvalidKeyError,
   TamperedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts
 var PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 6e5;
@@ -175,13 +175,25 @@ async function decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek, aad) {
     return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext);
   } catch (err) {
     if (err instanceof Error && err.name === "OperationError") {
-      throw new TamperedError();
+      throw new TamperedError(...await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad));
     }
     throw new DecryptionError(
       err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Decryption failed"
     );
   }
 }
+async function classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad) {
+  if (aad === void 0) return [];
+  try {
+    await subtle.decrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, dek, ciphertext);
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+  return [
+    "This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format transition, not tampering \u2014 but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.",
+    "unbound-legacy-format"
+  ];
+}
 async function encryptBytes(data, dek) {
   const iv = generateIV();
   const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(
@@ -427,4 +439,4 @@ export {
   bufferToBase64,
   base64ToBuffer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QTDAPDDV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js.map

package/dist/chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\nexport interface EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly echo: string\n  readonly key: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\nconst ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT = new Uint8Array([0xff, ...new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-echo-secret-v1')])\n\n/**\n * AG-1 encoding: domain context + 4-byte big-endian length prefix per\n * part. Two independent guarantees make a single typed string unable to\n * derive an echo vault's KEK (spec AG-1):\n *\n *   1. The `0xFF` context prefix — UTF-8 never produces that byte, so the\n *      encoding is provably not the encoding of ANY string (not merely of\n *      no separator-joined form).\n *   2. Structural length prefixes — part boundaries are key material, so\n *      re-splitting the same characters changes the derived KEK.\n *\n * @throws ValidationError when any part is not a string — the single\n * chokepoint every echo KEK derivation and block mint passes through, so a\n * malformed parts object cannot be `TextEncoder`-coerced into key material.\n */\nexport function encodeEchoParts(parts: EchoSecretParts): Uint8Array {\n  for (const name of ['prompt', 'echo', 'key'] as const) {\n    if (typeof parts?.[name] !== 'string') {\n      throw new ValidationError('echo secret parts must be three strings: prompt, echo, key')\n    }\n  }\n  const enc = new TextEncoder()\n  const segments = [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key].map((p) => enc.encode(p))\n  const total = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length + segments.reduce((n, s) => n + 4 + s.length, 0)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total)\n  out.set(ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT, 0)\n  let offset = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length\n  for (const s of segments) {\n    new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(offset, s.length, false)\n    out.set(s, offset + 4)\n    offset += 4 + s.length\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Derive the tier-1 KEK from a 3-part echo secret (spec: KEK from ALL parts). */\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call.\n *\n * `aad` binds the record's identity into the auth tag (#1041) — see\n * `record-aad.ts` for what is bound and why `_v` is not. A body sealed with\n * AAD can only be opened by a reader supplying the identical bytes, which is\n * what stops an untrusted store from relocating or re-tiering an envelope.\n *\n * Optional **only while the call-site sweep is in progress**. It becomes\n * mandatory once every `encrypt`/`decrypt` pair supplies it, at which point\n * the format version bumps and the reader rejects anything unbound. Until\n * then an omitted `aad` reproduces the previous, unauthenticated behaviour.\n */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n    },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data.\n *\n * `aad` must be byte-identical to what {@link encrypt} was given, or the auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError` (#1041). Note the asymmetry that\n * makes this useful: a mismatched identity is indistinguishable from a\n * corrupted body, so relocation fails **closed** rather than returning a\n * plausible record in the wrong place.\n */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError(...(await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad)))\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Distinguish a FORMAT TRANSITION from an attack, when the enclave can (#1103).\n *\n * ## The problem\n *\n * Since #1041 switched identity AAD on, one `TamperedError` covers at least\n * four situations: legitimate pre-binding data, a store that reconstructs an\n * envelope and drops a bound field, a CEK/rotation mismatch, and actual\n * tampering. `SECURITY.md` and the subsystem docs teach the LAST reading — so a\n * user who upgrades, hits this on their own honest data, and consults the docs\n * is told their store has been compromised.\n *\n * That is a false positive on the product's central security claim, and the\n * cost is not merely a confusing message: **a tamper alarm that cries wolf is\n * one users learn to ignore.**\n *\n * ## Why the probe is sound, and why it is NOT a downgrade\n *\n * A body sealed before #1041 carries no AAD, so it opens under an empty one.\n * Retrying that way is **positive evidence** of the legacy format rather than a\n * guess: forging a body that decrypts under this DEK requires the DEK, and an\n * untrusted store does not hold one.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Classification ONLY — the plaintext is discarded and the caller still\n * throws.** That is the entire safety argument: the outcome is identical either\n * way, so this cannot become the lenient path #1041 exists to remove. A variant\n * that RETURNED the retry's plaintext would be exactly the accept-without-AAD\n * downgrade the binding was built to prevent. Do not \"optimise\" it into one.\n *\n * Note what the honest message concedes: pre-#1041 data had no authenticated\n * metadata, so a legacy record that was ALSO tampered with reads as legacy.\n * That is not a weakening — it is an accurate statement about data that\n * genuinely never carried a binding.\n */\nasync function classifyTagFailure(\n  iv: Uint8Array,\n  ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array | undefined,\n): Promise<[] | [string, 'unbound-legacy-format']> {\n  // Only meaningful when AAD was supplied: with none there is no second\n  // interpretation to test, and the failure is a plain tag mismatch.\n  if (aad === undefined) return []\n  try {\n    await subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, dek, ciphertext as BufferSource)\n  } catch {\n    return [] // no benign explanation — the security alert stands\n  }\n  return [\n    'This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this ' +\n    'version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format ' +\n    'transition, not tampering — but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. ' +\n    'There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.',\n    'unbound-legacy-format',\n  ]\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random 12-byte IV for AES-GCM. */\nexport function generateIV(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_BYTES))\n}\n\n/** Generate a random 32-byte salt for PBKDF2. */\nexport function generateSalt(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SALT_BYTES))\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function bufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n  const 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package/dist/{chunk-RDPZMUCX.js → chunk-W6NFONOV.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   OverlayIdMismatchError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/overlay-views/virtual-collection.ts
 var OverlayedCollection = class {
@@ -206,4 +206,4 @@ var OverlayedCollection = class {
 export {
   OverlayedCollection
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RDPZMUCX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-W6NFONOV.js.map