@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.17 → 0.6.0-pre.19

package/dist/chunk-MNUTPZRQ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/history/ledger/patch.ts","../src/with-commit/history/ledger/store.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 6902 JSON Patch — compute + apply.\n *\n * This module is the \"delta history\" primitive: instead of\n * snapshotting the full record on every put (the behavior),\n * `Collection.put` computes a JSON Patch from the previous version to\n * the new version and stores only the patch in the ledger. To\n * reconstruct version N, we walk from the genesis snapshot forward\n * applying patches. Storage scales with **edit size**, not record\n * size — a 10 KB record edited 1000 times costs ~10 KB of deltas\n * instead of ~10 MB of snapshots.\n *\n * ## Why hand-roll instead of using a library?\n *\n * RFC 6902 has good libraries (`fast-json-patch`, `rfc6902`) but every\n * single one of them adds a runtime dependency to `@noy-db/core`. The\n * \"zero runtime dependencies\" promise is one of the core's load-bearing\n * features, and the patch surface we actually need is small enough\n * (~150 LoC) that vendoring is the right call.\n *\n * What we implement:\n *   - `add`     — insert a value at a path\n *   - `remove`  — delete the value at a path\n *   - `replace` — overwrite the value at a path\n *\n * What we deliberately skip (out of scope for the ledger use):\n *   - `move` and `copy` — optimizations; the diff algorithm doesn't\n *     emit them, so the apply path doesn't need them\n *   - `test` — used for transactional patches; we already have\n *     optimistic concurrency via `_v` at the envelope layer\n *   - Sophisticated array diffing (LCS, edit distance) — we treat\n *     arrays as atomic values and emit a single `replace` op when\n *     they differ. The accounting domain has small arrays where this\n *     is fine; if we ever need patch-level array diffing we can add\n *     it without changing the storage format.\n *\n * ## Path encoding (RFC 6902 §3)\n *\n * Paths look like `/foo/bar/0`. Each path segment is either an object\n * key or a numeric array index. Two characters need escaping inside\n * keys: `~` becomes `~0` and `/` becomes `~1`. We implement both.\n *\n * Empty path (`\"\"`) refers to the root document. Only `replace` makes\n * sense at the root, and our diff function emits it as a top-level\n * `replace` when `prev` and `next` differ in shape (object vs array,\n * primitive vs object, etc.).\n */\n\n/** A single JSON Patch operation. Subset of RFC 6902 — see file docstring. */\nexport type JsonPatchOp =\n  | { readonly op: 'add'; readonly path: string; readonly value: unknown }\n  | { readonly op: 'remove'; readonly path: string }\n  | { readonly op: 'replace'; readonly path: string; readonly value: unknown }\n\n/** A complete JSON Patch document — an array of operations. */\nexport type JsonPatch = readonly JsonPatchOp[]\n\n// ─── Compute (diff) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute a JSON Patch that, when applied to `prev`, produces `next`.\n *\n * The algorithm is a straightforward recursive object walk:\n *\n *   1. If both inputs are plain objects (and not arrays/null):\n *      - For each key in `prev`, recurse if `next` has it, else emit `remove`\n *      - For each key in `next` not in `prev`, emit `add`\n *   2. If both inputs are arrays AND structurally equal, no-op.\n *      Otherwise emit a single `replace` for the whole array.\n *   3. If both inputs are deeply equal primitives, no-op.\n *   4. Otherwise emit a `replace` at the current path.\n *\n * We do not minimize patches across move-like rearrangements — every\n * generated patch is straightforward enough to apply by hand if you\n * had to debug it.\n */\nexport function computePatch(prev: unknown, next: unknown): JsonPatch {\n  const ops: JsonPatchOp[] = []\n  diff(prev, next, '', ops)\n  return ops\n}\n\nfunction diff(\n  prev: unknown,\n  next: unknown,\n  path: string,\n  out: JsonPatchOp[],\n): void {\n  // Both null / both undefined → no-op (we don't differentiate them\n  // in JSON terms; canonicalJson would reject undefined anyway).\n  if (prev === next) return\n\n  // One side null, the other not → straight replace.\n  if (prev === null || next === null) {\n    out.push({ op: 'replace', path, value: next })\n    return\n  }\n\n  const prevIsArray = Array.isArray(prev)\n  const nextIsArray = Array.isArray(next)\n  const prevIsObject = typeof prev === 'object' && !prevIsArray\n  const nextIsObject = typeof next === 'object' && !nextIsArray\n\n  // Type changed (e.g., object → primitive, array → object). Replace.\n  if (prevIsArray !== nextIsArray || prevIsObject !== nextIsObject) {\n    out.push({ op: 'replace', path, value: next })\n    return\n  }\n\n  // Both arrays. We don't do clever LCS-based diffing — emit a single\n  // replace for the whole array if they differ. See file docstring for\n  // the rationale.\n  if (prevIsArray && nextIsArray) {\n    if (!arrayDeepEqual(prev as unknown[], next as unknown[])) {\n      out.push({ op: 'replace', path, value: next })\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  // Both plain objects. Recurse key by key.\n  if (prevIsObject && nextIsObject) {\n    const prevObj = prev as Record<string, unknown>\n    const nextObj = next as Record<string, unknown>\n    const prevKeys = Object.keys(prevObj)\n    const nextKeys = Object.keys(nextObj)\n\n    // Handle removes and overlapping recursions in one pass over prev.\n    for (const key of prevKeys) {\n      const childPath = path + '/' + escapePathSegment(key)\n      if (!(key in nextObj)) {\n        out.push({ op: 'remove', path: childPath })\n      } else {\n        diff(prevObj[key], nextObj[key], childPath, out)\n      }\n    }\n    // Handle adds.\n    for (const key of nextKeys) {\n      if (!(key in prevObj)) {\n        out.push({\n          op: 'add',\n          path: path + '/' + escapePathSegment(key),\n          value: nextObj[key],\n        })\n      }\n    }\n    return\n  }\n\n  // Two primitives that aren't strictly equal — replace.\n  out.push({ op: 'replace', path, value: next })\n}\n\nfunction arrayDeepEqual(a: unknown[], b: unknown[]): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {\n    if (!deepEqual(a[i], b[i])) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nfunction deepEqual(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {\n  if (a === b) return true\n  if (a === null || b === null) return false\n  if (typeof a !== typeof b) return false\n  if (typeof a !== 'object') return false\n  const aArray = Array.isArray(a)\n  const bArray = Array.isArray(b)\n  if (aArray !== bArray) return false\n  if (aArray && bArray) return arrayDeepEqual(a, b as unknown[])\n  const aObj = a as Record<string, unknown>\n  const bObj = b as Record<string, unknown>\n  const aKeys = Object.keys(aObj)\n  const bKeys = Object.keys(bObj)\n  if (aKeys.length !== bKeys.length) return false\n  for (const key of aKeys) {\n    if (!(key in bObj)) return false\n    if (!deepEqual(aObj[key], bObj[key])) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\n// ─── Apply ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Apply a JSON Patch to a base document and return the result.\n *\n * The base document is **not mutated** — every op clones the parent\n * container before writing to it, so the caller's reference to `base`\n * stays untouched. This costs an extra allocation per op but makes\n * the apply pipeline reorderable and safe to interrupt.\n *\n * Throws on:\n *   - Removing a path that doesn't exist\n *   - Adding to a path whose parent doesn't exist\n *   - A path component that doesn't match the document shape (e.g.,\n *     trying to step into a primitive)\n *\n * Throwing is the right behavior for the ledger use case: a failed\n * apply means the chain is corrupted, which should be loud rather\n * than silently producing a wrong reconstruction.\n */\nexport function applyPatch<T = unknown>(base: T, patch: JsonPatch): T {\n  let result: unknown = clone(base)\n  for (const op of patch) {\n    result = applyOp(result, op)\n  }\n  return result as T\n}\n\nfunction applyOp(doc: unknown, op: JsonPatchOp): unknown {\n  // Empty path → operation targets the root. Only `replace` and `add`\n  // make sense at the root, but we handle `remove` for completeness\n  // (root removal returns null).\n  if (op.path === '') {\n    if (op.op === 'remove') return null\n    return clone(op.value)\n  }\n\n  const segments = parsePath(op.path)\n  return walkAndApply(doc, segments, op)\n}\n\nfunction walkAndApply(\n  doc: unknown,\n  segments: string[],\n  op: JsonPatchOp,\n): unknown {\n  if (segments.length === 0) {\n    // Should never happen — empty path is handled in applyOp().\n    throw new Error('walkAndApply: empty segments (internal error)')\n  }\n\n  const [head, ...rest] = segments\n  if (head === undefined) throw new Error('walkAndApply: undefined segment')\n\n  if (rest.length === 0) {\n    return applyAtTerminal(doc, head, op)\n  }\n\n  // Recurse into the child container, then rebuild the parent with\n  // the modified child.\n  if (Array.isArray(doc)) {\n    const idx = parseArrayIndex(head, doc.length)\n    const child = doc[idx]\n    const newChild = walkAndApply(child, rest, op)\n    const next = doc.slice()\n    next[idx] = newChild\n    return next\n  }\n  if (doc !== null && typeof doc === 'object') {\n    const obj = doc as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (!(head in obj)) {\n      throw new Error(`applyPatch: path segment \"${head}\" not found in object`)\n    }\n    const newChild = walkAndApply(obj[head], rest, op)\n    return { ...obj, [head]: newChild }\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `applyPatch: cannot step into ${typeof doc} at segment \"${head}\"`,\n  )\n}\n\nfunction applyAtTerminal(\n  doc: unknown,\n  segment: string,\n  op: JsonPatchOp,\n): unknown {\n  if (Array.isArray(doc)) {\n    const idx =\n      segment === '-' ? doc.length : parseArrayIndex(segment, doc.length + 1)\n    const next = doc.slice()\n    if (op.op === 'remove') {\n      next.splice(idx, 1)\n      return next\n    }\n    if (op.op === 'add') {\n      next.splice(idx, 0, clone(op.value))\n      return next\n    }\n    if (op.op === 'replace') {\n      if (idx >= doc.length) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `applyPatch: replace at out-of-bounds array index ${idx}`,\n        )\n      }\n      next[idx] = clone(op.value)\n      return next\n    }\n  }\n  if (doc !== null && typeof doc === 'object') {\n    const obj = doc as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (op.op === 'remove') {\n      if (!(segment in obj)) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `applyPatch: remove on missing key \"${segment}\"`,\n        )\n      }\n      const next = { ...obj }\n      delete next[segment]\n      return next\n    }\n    if (op.op === 'add') {\n      // RFC 6902: `add` on an existing key replaces it.\n      return { ...obj, [segment]: clone(op.value) }\n    }\n    if (op.op === 'replace') {\n      if (!(segment in obj)) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `applyPatch: replace on missing key \"${segment}\"`,\n        )\n      }\n      return { ...obj, [segment]: clone(op.value) }\n    }\n  }\n  throw new Error(\n    `applyPatch: cannot apply ${op.op} at terminal segment \"${segment}\"`,\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Path encoding (RFC 6902 §3) ─────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Escape a single path segment per RFC 6902 §3:\n *   `~` → `~0`\n *   `/` → `~1`\n *\n * Order matters: `~` must be escaped first, otherwise the `~1` we\n * just emitted would be re-escaped to `~01`.\n */\nfunction escapePathSegment(segment: string): string {\n  return segment.replace(/~/g, '~0').replace(/\\//g, '~1')\n}\n\nfunction unescapePathSegment(segment: string): string {\n  return segment.replace(/~1/g, '/').replace(/~0/g, '~')\n}\n\nfunction parsePath(path: string): string[] {\n  if (!path.startsWith('/')) {\n    throw new Error(`applyPatch: path must start with '/', got \"${path}\"`)\n  }\n  return path\n    .slice(1)\n    .split('/')\n    .map(unescapePathSegment)\n}\n\nfunction parseArrayIndex(segment: string, max: number): number {\n  if (!/^\\d+$/.test(segment)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `applyPatch: array index must be a non-negative integer, got \"${segment}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n  const idx = Number.parseInt(segment, 10)\n  if (idx < 0 || idx > max) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `applyPatch: array index ${idx} out of range [0, ${max}]`,\n    )\n  }\n  return idx\n}\n\n// ─── Cheap structural clone ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Plain-JSON clone via JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value)).\n *\n * Faster than `structuredClone` for our use because (a) we know our\n * inputs are JSON-compatible (no Dates, Maps, or BigInts — anything\n * else gets rejected by canonicalJson upstream), and (b) `structuredClone`\n * has overhead for handling arbitrary structured data we don't need.\n *\n * For tiny ledger entries (< 1 KB), the JSON round-trip is in the\n * single-digit microsecond range.\n */\nfunction clone<T>(value: T): T {\n  if (value === null || value === undefined) return value\n  if (typeof value !== 'object') return value\n  return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value)) as T\n}\n","/**\n * `LedgerStore` — read/write access to a compartment's hash-chained\n * audit log.\n *\n * The store is a thin wrapper around the adapter's `_ledger/` internal\n * collection. Every append:\n *\n *   1. Loads the current head (or treats an empty ledger as head = -1)\n *   2. Computes `prevHash` = sha256(canonicalJson(head))\n *   3. Builds the new entry with `index = head.index + 1`\n *   4. Encrypts the entry with the compartment's ledger DEK\n *   5. Writes the encrypted envelope to `_ledger/<paddedIndex>`\n *\n * `verify()` walks the chain from genesis forward and returns\n * `{ ok: true, head }` on success or `{ ok: false, divergedAt }` on the\n * first broken link.\n *\n * ## Thread / concurrency model\n *\n * For we assume a **single writer per vault**. Two\n * concurrent `append()` calls would race on the \"read head, write\n * head+1\" cycle and could produce a broken chain. The sync engine\n * is the primary concurrent-writer scenario, and it uses\n * optimistic-concurrency via `expectedVersion` on the adapter — but\n * the ledger path has no such guard today. Multi-writer hardening is a\n * follow-up.\n *\n * Single-writer usage IS safe, including across process restarts:\n * `head()` reads the adapter fresh each call, so a crash between the\n * adapter.put of a data record and the ledger append just means the\n * ledger is missing an entry for that record. `verify()` still\n * succeeds; a future `verifyIntegrity()` helper can cross-check the\n * ledger against the data collections to catch the gap.\n *\n * ## Why hide the ledger from `vault.collection()`?\n *\n * The `_ledger` name starts with `_`, matching the existing prefix\n * convention for internal collections (`_keyring`, `_sync`,\n * `_history`). The Vault's public `collection()` method already\n * returns entries for any name, but `loadAll()` filters out\n * underscore-prefixed collections so backups and exports don't leak\n * ledger metadata. We keep the ledger accessible ONLY via\n * `vault.ledger()` to enforce the hash-chain invariants — direct\n * puts via `collection('_ledger')` would bypass the `append()` logic.\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { ConflictError} from '../../../kernel/errors.js';\nimport { isConflictError, LedgerContentionError } from '../../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  canonicalJson,\n  hashEntry,\n  paddedIndex,\n  sha256Hex,\n  type LedgerEntry,\n} from './entry.js'\nimport type { JsonPatch } from './patch.js'\nimport { applyPatch } from './patch.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION } from './constants.js'\nimport { envelopePayloadHash } from './hash.js'\n\n/**\n * Maximum optimistic-CAS retries on the ledger head. Each failed\n * attempt invalidates the head cache, re-reads, and retries with a\n * fresh next-index. After N failures we surface\n * `LedgerContentionError` so the caller can decide whether to retry,\n * queue, or alert.\n */\nconst MAX_APPEND_ATTEMPTS = 8\n\n//  — re-export the constants + helper so any existing\n// `import { LEDGER_COLLECTION } from '...store.js'` paths keep\n// working. Internal core paths (vault.ts) import from the leaf\n// modules directly to avoid pulling this file's class into the\n// floor bundle.\nexport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, envelopePayloadHash }\n\n/**\n * Input shape for `LedgerStore.append()`. The caller supplies the\n * operation metadata; the store fills in `index` and `prevHash`.\n */\nexport interface AppendInput {\n  op: LedgerEntry['op']\n  collection: string\n  id: string\n  version: number\n  actor: string\n  payloadHash: string\n  /**\n   * Optional JSON Patch representing the delta from the previous\n   * version to the new version. Present only for `put` operations\n   * that had a previous version; omitted for genesis puts and for\n   * deletes. When present, `LedgerStore.append` persists the patch\n   * in `_ledger_deltas/<paddedIndex>` and records its sha256 hash\n   * as the entry's `deltaHash` field.\n   */\n  delta?: JsonPatch\n  /**\n   * Present only for `op === 'amendment'` — structured audit\n   * payload for multi-record repair operations performed via\n   * `withTransactions(...)`. Carried through verbatim to the\n   * resulting ledger entry.\n   */\n  amendment?: LedgerEntry['amendment']\n  /**\n   * Optional human-readable tag describing why this mutation happened.\n   * Threaded from `collection.put(_, _, { reason })`.\n   * Carried verbatim onto the resulting ledger entry's `reason` field;\n   * omitted from canonical JSON when undefined.\n   */\n  reason?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of `LedgerStore.verify()`. On success, `head` is the hash of\n * the last entry — the same value that should be published to any\n * external anchoring service (blockchain, OpenTimestamps, etc.). On\n * failure, `divergedAt` is the 0-based index of the first entry whose\n * recorded `prevHash` does not match the recomputed hash of its\n * predecessor. Entries at `divergedAt` and later are untrustworthy;\n * entries before that index are still valid.\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly head: string; readonly length: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly divergedAt: number\n      readonly expected: string\n      readonly actual: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * A LedgerStore is bound to a single vault. Callers obtain one\n * via `vault.ledger()` — there is no public constructor to keep\n * the hash-chain invariants in one place.\n *\n * The class holds no mutable state beyond its dependencies (adapter,\n * vault name, DEK resolver, actor id). Every method reads the\n * adapter fresh so multiple instances against the same vault\n * see each other's writes immediately (at the cost of re-parsing the\n * ledger on every head() / verify() call; acceptable at scale).\n */\nexport class LedgerStore {\n  private readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  private readonly vault: string\n  private readonly encrypted: boolean\n  private readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  private readonly actor: string\n\n  /**\n   * In-memory cache of the chain head — the most recently appended\n   * entry along with its precomputed hash. Without this, every\n   * `append()` would re-load every prior entry to recompute the\n   * prevHash, making N puts O(N²) — a 1K-record stress test goes from\n   * < 100ms to a multi-second timeout.\n   *\n   * The cache is populated on first read (`append`, `head`, `verify`)\n   * and updated in-place on every successful `append`. Single-writer\n   * usage (the assumption) keeps it consistent. A second\n   * LedgerStore instance writing to the same vault would not\n   * see the first instance's appends in its cached state — that's the\n   * concurrency caveat documented at the class level.\n   *\n   * Sentinel `undefined` means \"not yet loaded\"; an explicit `null`\n   * value means \"loaded and confirmed empty\" — distinguishing these\n   * matters because an empty ledger is a valid state (genesis prevHash\n   * is the empty string), and we don't want to re-scan the adapter\n   * just because the chain is freshly initialized.\n   */\n  private headCache: { entry: LedgerEntry; hash: string } | null | undefined = undefined\n\n  constructor(opts: {\n    adapter: NoydbStore\n    vault: string\n    encrypted: boolean\n    getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n    actor: string\n  }) {\n    this.adapter = opts.adapter\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.encrypted = opts.encrypted\n    this.getDEK = opts.getDEK\n    this.actor = opts.actor\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Lazily load (or return cached) the current chain head. The cache\n   * sentinel is `undefined` until first access; after the first call,\n   * the cache holds either a `{ entry, hash }` for non-empty ledgers\n   * or `null` for empty ones.\n   */\n  private async getCachedHead(): Promise<{ entry: LedgerEntry; hash: string } | null> {\n    if (this.headCache !== undefined) return this.headCache\n    const entries = await this.loadAllEntries()\n    const last = entries[entries.length - 1]\n    if (!last) {\n      this.headCache = null\n      return null\n    }\n    this.headCache = { entry: last, hash: await hashEntry(last) }\n    return this.headCache\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Append a new entry to the ledger. Returns the full entry that was\n   * written (with its assigned index and computed prevHash) so the\n   * caller can use the hash for downstream purposes (e.g., embedding\n   * in a verifiable backup).\n   *\n   * This is the **only** way to add entries. Direct adapter writes to\n   * `_ledger/` would bypass the chain math and would be caught by the\n   * next `verify()` call as a divergence.\n   *\n   * ## Multi-writer correctness\n   *\n   * Append is implemented as an optimistic-CAS retry loop. On every\n   * attempt:\n   *\n   *   1. Read fresh head (cache invalidated on retry).\n   *   2. Compute `nextIndex = head.index + 1`, `prevHash = hash(head)`.\n   *   3. Encrypt delta payload IN MEMORY (no adapter write yet) so we\n   *      can compute `deltaHash` before claiming the chain slot.\n   *   4. Build + encrypt the entry envelope.\n   *   5. `adapter.put(_ledger, paddedIndex, envelope, expectedVersion: 0)`\n   *      — the `expectedVersion: 0` asserts \"this slot must not exist.\"\n   *      Stores with `casAtomic: true` honor the CAS check; under\n   *      contention the second writer's put throws `ConflictError`.\n   *   6. On `ConflictError`: invalidate the head cache, sleep with\n   *      bounded backoff + jitter, retry. After `MAX_APPEND_ATTEMPTS`\n   *      retries throw {@link LedgerContentionError}.\n   *   7. On success: write the delta envelope (if any) at the same\n   *      index. Update the head cache.\n   *\n   * Entry-first ordering matters: writing the delta first under\n   * contention would orphan delta records at indices the writer never\n   * actually claimed. The deltaHash is computed off the encrypted\n   * envelope's `_data` field, which doesn't require the envelope to\n   * be persisted.\n   *\n   * Stores with `casAtomic: false` (file, s3, r2 by default) silently\n   * accept the `expectedVersion: 0` argument and proceed without a\n   * CAS check. Concurrent appends against those stores remain\n   * best-effort — pair them with an advisory lock or with sync\n   * single-writer discipline.\n   */\n  async append(input: AppendInput): Promise<LedgerEntry> {\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_APPEND_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      // Force a fresh head read on every retry. The first attempt may\n      // hit the cache; subsequent attempts must re-scan the adapter\n      // because the prior conflict means our cached state is stale.\n      if (attempt > 0) {\n        this.headCache = undefined\n      }\n      try {\n        return await this.appendOnce(input)\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (isConflictError(err)) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_APPEND_ATTEMPTS - 1) {\n            await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          }\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new LedgerContentionError(MAX_APPEND_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One attempt at the append cycle. Throws `ConflictError` when the\n   * CAS check on the entry put fails — `append()` catches that and\n   * retries. Any other error propagates to the caller.\n   */\n  private async appendOnce(input: AppendInput): Promise<LedgerEntry> {\n    const cached = await this.getCachedHead()\n    const lastEntry = cached?.entry\n    const prevHash = cached?.hash ?? ''\n    const nextIndex = lastEntry ? lastEntry.index + 1 : 0\n\n    // Encrypt the delta in memory so we can compute deltaHash WITHOUT\n    // claiming the deltas slot yet — entry-put is the chain claim.\n    let deltaEnvelope: EncryptedEnvelope | undefined\n    let deltaHash: string | undefined\n    if (input.delta !== undefined) {\n      deltaEnvelope = await this.encryptDelta(input.delta, nextIndex)\n      deltaHash = await sha256Hex(deltaEnvelope._data)\n    }\n\n    // Build the entry. Conditionally include `deltaHash` so\n    // canonicalJson (which rejects undefined) never sees it when\n    // there's no delta.\n    const entryBase = {\n      index: nextIndex,\n      prevHash,\n      op: input.op,\n      collection: input.collection,\n      id: input.id,\n      version: input.version,\n      ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n      actor: input.actor === '' ? this.actor : input.actor,\n      payloadHash: input.payloadHash,\n    } as const\n    const entry: LedgerEntry = {\n      ...entryBase,\n      ...(deltaHash !== undefined ? { deltaHash } : {}),\n      ...(input.amendment !== undefined ? { amendment: input.amendment } : {}),\n      ...(input.reason !== undefined ? { reason: input.reason } : {}),\n    }\n\n    const envelope = await this.encryptEntry(entry)\n    // expectedVersion: 0 ≡ \"the slot must not yet exist.\" Honored by\n    // casAtomic stores; silently passed through by non-CAS stores.\n    await this.adapter.put(\n      this.vault,\n      LEDGER_COLLECTION,\n      paddedIndex(entry.index),\n      envelope,\n      0,\n    )\n\n    // Chain slot claimed. Now write the delta record (if any).\n    if (deltaEnvelope) {\n      await this.adapter.put(\n        this.vault,\n        LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION,\n        paddedIndex(entry.index),\n        deltaEnvelope,\n        0,\n      )\n    }\n\n    // Update the head cache so the next append() doesn't re-scan the\n    // adapter.\n    this.headCache = { entry, hash: await hashEntry(entry) }\n    return entry\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load a delta payload by its entry index. Returns `null` if the\n   * entry at that index doesn't reference a delta (genesis puts and\n   * deletes leave the slot empty) or if the delta row is missing\n   * (possible after a `pruneHistory` fold).\n   *\n   * The caller is responsible for deciding what to do with a missing\n   * delta — `ledger.reconstruct()` uses it as a \"stop walking\n   * backward\" signal and falls back to the on-disk current value.\n   */\n  async loadDelta(index: number): Promise<JsonPatch | null> {\n    const envelope = await this.adapter.get(\n      this.vault,\n      LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION,\n      paddedIndex(index),\n    )\n    if (!envelope) return null\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as JsonPatch\n    }\n    const dek = await this.getDEK(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n    const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, id: paddedIndex(index) }, envelope, dek)\n    return JSON.parse(json) as JsonPatch\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Purge a record's tier-0-era plaintext deltas (#729). Deletes each\n   * `_ledger_deltas/<paddedIndex>` row whose entry matches\n   * `(collection, id)` and carries a delta, then returns the count\n   * deleted.\n   *\n   * Chain-safe by construction: `verify()` recomputes the tamper-chain\n   * from each `_ledger` entry's own canonical fields — including the\n   * stored `deltaHash` field, which lives on the entry, not on the\n   * `_ledger_deltas` row — and never re-reads `_ledger_deltas`.\n   * Deleting a delta row therefore cannot break `verify()`.\n   * `reconstruct()` already treats a missing delta (`loadDelta` →\n   * `null`) as a pruned stop, so a purge just makes the pre-purge\n   * plaintext unreachable rather than corrupting anything.\n   *\n   * No `_ledger` entry is touched and nothing is re-encrypted — this\n   * is irreversible (the deleted plaintext cannot be recovered) but\n   * leaves the entry metadata (that the record was mutated, at which\n   * version/timestamp/actor) fully intact for audit purposes.\n   */\n  async purgeRecordDeltas(collection: string, id: string): Promise<number> {\n    const entries = await this.loadAllEntries()\n    let purged = 0\n    for (const entry of entries) {\n      if (entry.collection !== collection || entry.id !== id) continue\n      if (entry.deltaHash === undefined) continue\n      const key = paddedIndex(entry.index)\n      // adapter.delete() is a void no-op on an already-missing key, so\n      // check for the row's presence first — the count must reflect\n      // rows actually removed (idempotent repeat purges return 0), not\n      // the number of delta-bearing entries (which never changes).\n      const existing = await this.adapter.get(this.vault, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, key)\n      if (!existing) continue\n      await this.adapter.delete(this.vault, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, key)\n      purged++\n    }\n    return purged\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Encrypt a JSON Patch into an envelope for storage. Mirrors encryptEntry.\n   *\n   * `index` is the ledger index this delta will be stored under — the caller\n   * knows it before the entry exists, and it is what makes the envelope's\n   * identity bindable (#1051).\n   */\n  private async encryptDelta(patch: JsonPatch, index: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const identity = { collection: LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, id: paddedIndex(index), by: this.actor, version: 1 }\n    const json = JSON.stringify(patch)\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { iv: '', data: json})\n    }\n    const dek = await this.getDEK(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { iv, data})\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Read all entries in ascending-index order. Used internally by\n   * `append()`, `head()`, `verify()`, and `entries()`. Decryption is\n   * serial because the entries are tiny and the overhead of a Promise\n   * pool would dominate at realistic chain lengths (< 100K entries).\n   */\n  async loadAllEntries(): Promise<LedgerEntry[]> {\n    const keys = await this.adapter.list(this.vault, LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n    // Sort lexicographically, which matches numeric order because\n    // keys are zero-padded to 10 digits.\n    keys.sort()\n    const entries: LedgerEntry[] = []\n    for (const key of keys) {\n      const envelope = await this.adapter.get(\n        this.vault,\n        LEDGER_COLLECTION,\n        key,\n      )\n      if (!envelope) continue\n      entries.push(await this.decryptEntry(key, envelope))\n    }\n    return entries\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return the current head of the ledger: the last entry, its hash,\n   * and the total chain length. `null` on an empty ledger so callers\n   * can distinguish \"no history yet\" from \"empty history\".\n   */\n  async head(): Promise<\n    | { readonly entry: LedgerEntry; readonly hash: string; readonly length: number }\n    | null\n  > {\n    const cached = await this.getCachedHead()\n    if (!cached) return null\n    // `length` is `entry.index + 1` because indices are zero-based and\n    // contiguous. We don't need to re-scan the adapter to compute it.\n    return {\n      entry: cached.entry,\n      hash: cached.hash,\n      length: cached.entry.index + 1,\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Return entries in the requested half-open range `[from, to)`.\n   * Defaults: `from = 0`, `to = length`. The indices are clipped to\n   * the valid range; no error is thrown for out-of-range queries.\n   */\n  async entries(opts: { from?: number; to?: number } = {}): Promise<LedgerEntry[]> {\n    const all = await this.loadAllEntries()\n    const from = Math.max(0, opts.from ?? 0)\n    const to = Math.min(all.length, opts.to ?? all.length)\n    return all.slice(from, to)\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Reconstruct a record's state at a given historical version by\n   * walking the ledger's delta chain backward from the current state.\n   *\n   * ## Algorithm\n   *\n   * Ledger deltas are stored in **reverse** form — each entry's\n   * patch describes how to undo that put, transforming the new\n   * record back into the previous one. `reconstruct` exploits this\n   * by:\n   *\n   *   1. Finding every ledger entry for `(collection, id)` in the\n   *      chain, sorted by index ascending.\n   *   2. Starting from `current` (the present value of the record,\n   *      as held by the caller — typically fetched via\n   *      `Collection.get()`).\n   *   3. Walking entries in **descending** index order and applying\n   *      each entry's reverse patch, stopping when we reach the\n   *      entry whose version equals `atVersion`.\n   *\n   * The result is the record as it existed immediately AFTER the\n   * put at `atVersion`. To get the state at the genesis put\n   * (version 1), the walk runs all the way back through every put\n   * after the first.\n   *\n   * ## Caveats\n   *\n   * - **Delete entries** break the walk: once we see a delete, the\n   *   record didn't exist before that point, so there's nothing to\n   *   reconstruct. We return `null` in that case.\n   * - **Missing deltas** (e.g., after `pruneHistory` folds old\n   *   entries into a base snapshot) also stop the walk. does\n   *   not ship pruneHistory, so today this only happens if an entry\n   *   was deleted out-of-band.\n   * - The caller MUST pass the correct current value. Passing a\n   *   mutated object would corrupt the reconstruction — the patch\n   *   chain is only valid against the exact state that was in\n   *   effect when the most recent put happened.\n   *\n   * For, `reconstruct` is the only way to read a historical\n   * version via deltas. The legacy `_history` collection still\n   * holds full snapshots and `Collection.getVersion()` still reads\n   * from there — the two paths coexist until pruneHistory lands in\n   * a follow-up and delta becomes the default.\n   */\n  async reconstruct<T>(\n    collection: string,\n    id: string,\n    current: T,\n    atVersion: number,\n  ): Promise<T | null> {\n    const all = await this.loadAllEntries()\n    // Filter to entries for this (collection, id), in ascending index.\n    const matching = all.filter(\n      (e) => e.collection === collection && e.id === id,\n    )\n    if (matching.length === 0) {\n      // No ledger history at all; the current state IS version 1\n      // (or there's nothing), so the only valid atVersion is the\n      // current record's version. We can't verify that here, so\n      // return current if atVersion is plausible, null otherwise.\n      return null\n    }\n\n    // Walk entries in descending index order, applying each reverse\n    // delta until we reach the target version.\n    let state: T | null = current\n    for (let i = matching.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n      const entry = matching[i]\n      if (!entry) continue\n\n      // Defensive: skip every non-put/non-delete op variant. The\n      // outer filter on `e.collection === collection && e.id === id`\n      // already excludes `amendment` entries (their collection/id are\n      // empty strings), but a top-of-loop guard keeps the walker\n      // robust if a future op variant slips through the filter.\n      if (entry.op !== 'put' && entry.op !== 'delete') continue\n\n      // Match check FIRST — before applying this entry's reverse\n      // patch. `state` at this point is the record state immediately\n      // after this entry's put (or before this entry's delete), so\n      // if the caller asked for this exact version, we're done.\n      if (entry.version === atVersion && entry.op !== 'delete') {\n        return state\n      }\n\n      if (entry.op === 'delete') {\n        // A delete erases the live state. If the caller asks for a\n        // version older than the delete we should continue walking\n        // (state becomes null and the next put resets it). But we\n        // can't reconstruct that pre-delete state from the current\n        // in-memory `state` — the delete has no reverse patch. So\n        // anything past this point is unreachable; return null.\n        return null\n      }\n\n      if (entry.deltaHash === undefined) {\n        // Genesis put — the earliest state for this lifecycle. We\n        // can't walk further back. If the caller asked for exactly\n        // this version, return the current state (we already failed\n        // the match check above because a fresh genesis after a\n        // delete can have version === atVersion). Otherwise the\n        // target is unreachable from here.\n        if (entry.version === atVersion) return state\n        return null\n      }\n\n      const patch = await this.loadDelta(entry.index)\n      if (!patch) {\n        // Delta row is missing (probably pruned). Stop walking.\n        return null\n      }\n\n      if (state === null) {\n        // We're trying to walk back across a delete range and there's\n        // nothing to apply a reverse patch to. Bail.\n        return null\n      }\n\n      state = applyPatch(state, patch)\n    }\n\n    // Ran off the end of the walk without matching. The target\n    // version doesn't exist in this record's chain.\n    return null\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Walk the chain from genesis forward and verify every link.\n   *\n   * Returns `{ ok: true, head, length }` if every entry's `prevHash`\n   * matches the recomputed hash of its predecessor (and the genesis\n   * entry's `prevHash` is the empty string).\n   *\n   * Returns `{ ok: false, divergedAt, expected, actual }` on the first\n   * mismatch. `divergedAt` is the 0-based index of the BROKEN entry\n   * — entries before that index still verify cleanly; entries at and\n   * after `divergedAt` are untrustworthy.\n   *\n   * This method detects:\n   *   - Mutated entry content (fields changed)\n   *   - Reordered entries (if any adjacent pair swaps, the prevHash\n   *     of the second no longer matches)\n   *   - Inserted entries (the inserted entry's prevHash likely fails,\n   *     and the following entry's prevHash definitely fails)\n   *   - Deleted entries (the entry after the deletion sees a wrong\n   *     prevHash)\n   *\n   * It does NOT detect:\n   *   - Tampering with the DATA collections that bypassed the ledger\n   *     entirely (e.g., an attacker who modifies records without\n   *     appending matching ledger entries — this is why we also\n   *     plan a `verifyIntegrity()` helper in a follow-up)\n   *   - Truncation of the chain at the tail (dropping the last N\n   *     entries leaves a shorter but still consistent chain). External\n   *     anchoring of `head.hash` to a trusted service is the defense\n   *     against this.\n   */\n  async verify(): Promise<VerifyResult> {\n    const entries = await this.loadAllEntries()\n    let expectedPrevHash = ''\n    for (let i = 0; i < entries.length; i++) {\n      const entry = entries[i]\n      if (!entry) continue\n      if (entry.prevHash !== expectedPrevHash) {\n        return {\n          ok: false,\n          divergedAt: i,\n          expected: expectedPrevHash,\n          actual: entry.prevHash,\n        }\n      }\n      if (entry.index !== i) {\n        // An entry whose stored index doesn't match its position in\n        // the sorted list means someone rewrote the adapter keys.\n        // Treat as divergence.\n        return {\n          ok: false,\n          divergedAt: i,\n          expected: `index=${i}`,\n          actual: `index=${entry.index}`,\n        }\n      }\n      expectedPrevHash = await hashEntry(entry)\n    }\n    return {\n      ok: true,\n      head: expectedPrevHash,\n      length: entries.length,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ─── Encryption plumbing ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Serialize + encrypt a ledger entry into an EncryptedEnvelope. The\n   * envelope's `_v` field is set to `entry.index + 1` so the usual\n   * optimistic-concurrency machinery has a reasonable version number\n   * to compare against (the ledger is append-only, so concurrent\n   * writes should always bump the index).\n   */\n  private async encryptEntry(entry: LedgerEntry): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const identity = { collection: LEDGER_COLLECTION, id: paddedIndex(entry.index), by: entry.actor, version: entry.index + 1 }\n    const body = { ts: entry.ts }\n    const json = canonicalJson(entry)\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: '', data: json })\n    }\n    const dek = await this.getDEK(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data })\n  }\n\n  /** Decrypt an envelope into a LedgerEntry. Throws on bad key / tamper. */\n  private async decryptEntry(key: string, envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<LedgerEntry> {\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as LedgerEntry\n    }\n    const dek = await this.getDEK(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n    const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: LEDGER_COLLECTION, id: key }, envelope, dek)\n    return JSON.parse(json) as LedgerEntry\n  }\n}\n\n// `envelopePayloadHash` lives in `./hash.ts` so it can be\n// imported by core code without dragging this file's `LedgerStore`\n// class into the floor bundle. The re-export at the top of this\n// file keeps the `import { envelopePayloadHash } from '.../store.js'`\n// path working.\n\n/**\n * Exponential backoff with jitter for the append CAS retry loop.\n * Attempt 0 → ~5–10 ms, attempt 7 → ~640–1280 ms. Jitter avoids the\n * thundering-herd problem when multiple writers collide repeatedly.\n */\nfunction sleepBackoff(attempt: number): Promise<void> {\n  const base = 5 * Math.pow(2, attempt)\n  const jitter = Math.random() * base\n  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, base + jitter))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4EO,SAAS,aAAa,MAAe,MAA0B;AACpE,QAAM,MAAqB,CAAC;AAC5B,OAAK,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AACxB,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,KACP,MACA,MACA,MACA,KACM;AAGN,MAAI,SAAS,KAAM;AAGnB,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM;AAClC,QAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAC7C;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AACtC,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AACtC,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC;AAClD,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC;AAGlD,MAAI,gBAAgB,eAAe,iBAAiB,cAAc;AAChE,QAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAC7C;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,MAAI,eAAe,aAAa;AAC9B,QAAI,CAAC,eAAe,MAAmB,IAAiB,GAAG;AACzD,UAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,gBAAgB,cAAc;AAChC,UAAM,UAAU;AAChB,UAAM,UAAU;AAChB,UAAM,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,UAAM,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;AAGpC,eAAW,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,YAAM,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG;AACpD,UAAI,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AACrB,YAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,MAC5C,OAAO;AACL,aAAK,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,MACjD;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,eAAW,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,UAAI,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AACrB,YAAI,KAAK;AAAA,UACP,IAAI;AAAA,UACJ,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG;AAAA,UACxC,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,QACpB,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AAAA,IACF;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAC/C;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,GAAc,GAAuB;AAC3D,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,EACrC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,UAAU,GAAY,GAAqB;AAClD,MAAI,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACpB,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAM,QAAO;AACrC,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,EAAG,QAAO;AAClC,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO;AAClC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC9B,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAI,WAAW,OAAQ,QAAO;AAC9B,MAAI,UAAU,OAAQ,QAAO,eAAe,GAAG,CAAc;AAC7D,QAAM,OAAO;AACb,QAAM,OAAO;AACb,QAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AAC9B,QAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AAC9B,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,OAAQ,QAAO;AAC1C,aAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AACvB,QAAI,EAAE,OAAO,MAAO,QAAO;AAC3B,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAsBO,SAAS,WAAwB,MAAS,OAAqB;AACpE,MAAI,SAAkB,MAAM,IAAI;AAChC,aAAW,MAAM,OAAO;AACtB,aAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,EAC7B;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAc,IAA0B;AAIvD,MAAI,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI;AAClB,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,SAAU,QAAO;AAC/B,WAAO,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AAEA,QAAM,WAAW,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI;AAClC,SAAO,aAAa,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE;AACvC;AAEA,SAAS,aACP,KACA,UACA,IACS;AACT,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AAEzB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,+CAA+C;AAAA,EACjE;AAEA,QAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI;AACxB,MAAI,SAAS,OAAW,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iCAAiC;AAEzE,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,WAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EACtC;AAIA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AACtB,UAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,WAAW,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AAC7C,UAAM,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM;AACvB,SAAK,GAAG,IAAI;AACZ,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAC3C,UAAM,MAAM;AACZ,QAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM;AAClB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,6BAA6B,IAAI,uBAAuB;AAAA,IAC1E;AACA,UAAM,WAAW,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE;AACjD,WAAO,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,EACpC;AACA,QAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACR,gCAAgC,OAAO,GAAG,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAAA,EAChE;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,gBACP,KACA,SACA,IACS;AACT,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AACtB,UAAM,MACJ,YAAY,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAS,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC;AACxE,UAAM,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM;AACvB,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAClB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO;AACnB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AACnC,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW;AACvB,UAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AACrB,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,oDAAoD,GAAG;AAAA,QACzD;AAAA,MACF;AACA,WAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAC1B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAC3C,UAAM,MAAM;AACZ,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU;AACtB,UAAI,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM;AACrB,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,sCAAsC,OAAO;AAAA,QAC/C;AAAA,MACF;AACA,YAAM,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI;AACtB,aAAO,KAAK,OAAO;AACnB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO;AAEnB,aAAO,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,IAC9C;AACA,QAAI,GAAG,OAAO,WAAW;AACvB,UAAI,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM;AACrB,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,uCAAuC,OAAO;AAAA,QAChD;AAAA,MACF;AACA,aAAO,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACR,4BAA4B,GAAG,EAAE,yBAAyB,OAAO;AAAA,EACnE;AACF;AAYA,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAyB;AAClD,SAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AACxD;AAEA,SAAS,oBAAoB,SAAyB;AACpD,SAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AACvD;AAEA,SAAS,UAAU,MAAwB;AACzC,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AACzB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8CAA8C,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACvE;AACA,SAAO,KACJ,MAAM,CAAC,EACP,MAAM,GAAG,EACT,IAAI,mBAAmB;AAC5B;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAiB,KAAqB;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,gEAAgE,OAAO;AAAA,IACzE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,EAAE;AACvC,MAAI,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK;AACxB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,2BAA2B,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAAA,IACxD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAeA,SAAS,MAAS,OAAa;AAC7B,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,OAAW,QAAO;AAClD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AACzC;;;ACtTA,IAAM,sBAAsB;AA0ErB,IAAM,cAAN,MAAkB;AAAA,EACN;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAsBT,YAAqE;AAAA,EAE7E,YAAY,MAMT;AACD,SAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACpB,SAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AAClB,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AACtB,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,MAAc,gBAAsE;AAClF,QAAI,KAAK,cAAc,OAAW,QAAO,KAAK;AAC9C,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;AAC1C,UAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;AACvC,QAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACT,WAAK,YAAY;AACjB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,SAAK,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAC5D,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EA4CA,MAAM,OAAO,OAA0C;AACrD,QAAI;AACJ,aAAS,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,qBAAqB,WAAW;AAI9D,UAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AACf,aAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MACnB;AACA,UAAI;AACF,eAAO,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,MACpC,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAI,gBAAgB,GAAG,GAAG;AACxB,yBAAe;AACf,cAAI,UAAU,sBAAsB,GAAG;AACrC,kBAAM,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,UAC5B;AACA;AAAA,QACF;AACA,cAAM;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK;AACL,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACrD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAc,WAAW,OAA0C;AACjE,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,cAAc;AACxC,UAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC1B,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACjC,UAAM,YAAY,YAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,IAAI;AAIpD,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,MAAM,UAAU,QAAW;AAC7B,sBAAgB,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS;AAC9D,kBAAY,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,IACjD;AAKA,UAAM,YAAY;AAAA,MAChB,OAAO;AAAA,MACP;AAAA,MACA,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MACV,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,MAClB,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MACV,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACf,KAAI,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,MAC3B,OAAO,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAC/C,aAAa,MAAM;AAAA,IACrB;AACA,UAAM,QAAqB;AAAA,MACzB,GAAG;AAAA,MACH,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,MAAM,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACtE,GAAI,MAAM,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/D;AAEA,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK;AAG9C,UAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,MACjB,KAAK;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,QAAI,eAAe;AACjB,YAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,QACjB,KAAK;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QACvB;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,SAAK,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE;AACvD,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAYA,MAAM,UAAU,OAA0C;AACxD,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,MAClC,KAAK;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACnB;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACnB,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IAClC;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC/C,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AACnH,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EACxB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAsBA,MAAM,kBAAkB,YAAoB,IAA6B;AACvE,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;AAC1C,QAAI,SAAS;AACb,eAAW,SAAS,SAAS;AAC3B,UAAI,MAAM,eAAe,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,GAAI;AACxD,UAAI,MAAM,cAAc,OAAW;AACnC,YAAM,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK;AAKnC,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AACjF,UAAI,CAAC,SAAU;AACf,YAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AACnE;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EASA,MAAc,aAAa,OAAkB,OAA2C;AACtF,UAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AAC5G,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACnB,aAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC5D;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC/C,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACtE,WAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,KAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,MAAM,iBAAyC;AAC7C,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAGlE,SAAK,KAAK;AACV,UAAM,UAAyB,CAAC;AAChC,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,QAClC,KAAK;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,CAAC,SAAU;AACf,cAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IACrD;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAM,OAGJ;AACA,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,cAAc;AACxC,QAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AAGpB,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACd,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACb,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAuC,CAAC,GAA2B;AAC/E,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;AACtC,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC;AACvC,UAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM;AACrD,WAAO,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC3B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EA+CA,MAAM,YACJ,YACA,IACA,SACA,WACmB;AACnB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;AAEtC,UAAM,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,MACnB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACjD;AACA,QAAI,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AAKzB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAIA,QAAI,QAAkB;AACtB,aAAS,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK;AAC7C,YAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;AACxB,UAAI,CAAC,MAAO;AAOZ,UAAI,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,SAAU;AAMjD,UAAI,MAAM,YAAY,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;AACxD,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAEA,UAAI,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;AAOzB,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAEA,UAAI,MAAM,cAAc,QAAW;AAOjC,YAAI,MAAM,YAAY,UAAW,QAAO;AACxC,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAEA,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK;AAC9C,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AAEV,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAEA,UAAI,UAAU,MAAM;AAGlB,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAEA,cAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACjC;AAIA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAiCA,MAAM,SAAgC;AACpC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;AAC1C,QAAI,mBAAmB;AACvB,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AACvC,YAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,CAAC;AACvB,UAAI,CAAC,MAAO;AACZ,UAAI,MAAM,aAAa,kBAAkB;AACvC,eAAO;AAAA,UACL,IAAI;AAAA,UACJ,YAAY;AAAA,UACZ,UAAU;AAAA,UACV,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,QAChB;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG;AAIrB,eAAO;AAAA,UACL,IAAI;AAAA,UACJ,YAAY;AAAA,UACZ,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,UACpB,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QAC9B;AAAA,MACF;AACA,yBAAmB,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IAC1C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAWA,MAAc,aAAa,OAAgD;AACzE,UAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,mBAAmB,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,EAAE;AAC1H,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG;AAC5B,UAAM,OAAO,cAAc,KAAK;AAChC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACnB,aAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACtE;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC/C,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACtE,WAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5D;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,MAAc,aAAa,KAAa,UAAmD;AACzF,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACnB,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IAClC;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAC/C,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,mBAAmB,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AAC7F,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EACxB;AACF;AAaA,SAAS,aAAa,SAAgC;AACpD,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO;AACpC,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI;AAC/B,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AACpE;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-Z2OFE6IX.js → chunk-MQXYR65M.js}

@@ -1,15 +1,18 @@
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-RVTOCAHQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-KDX6VEYV.js";
 import {
-  encrypt
-} from "./chunk-QTDAPDDV.js";
+  buildRecordAad
+} from "./chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
+import {
+  buildRecordEnvelope
+} from "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
 import {
-  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-5UGEGEIJ.js";
+  encrypt
+} from "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/via/blob/binding.ts
 async function eraseBlobs(ctx, cfg) {
@@ -367,27 +370,15 @@ function generateEvictionId(collection, recordId, slotName) {
 }
 async function writeAuditEntry(ctx, entry) {
   const json = JSON.stringify(entry);
+  const identity = { collection: BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, by: entry.actor, version: 1 };
+  const body = { ts: entry.evictedAt };
   let envelope;
   if (ctx.encrypted) {
     const dek = await ctx.getDEK(BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION);
-    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek);
-    envelope = {
-      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-      _v: 1,
-      _ts: entry.evictedAt,
-      _iv: iv,
-      _data: data,
-      _by: entry.actor
-    };
+    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity));
+    envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data });
   } else {
-    envelope = {
-      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-      _v: 1,
-      _ts: entry.evictedAt,
-      _iv: "",
-      _data: json,
-      _by: entry.actor
-    };
+    envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: "", data: json });
   }
   await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION, entry.id, envelope);
 }
@@ -400,4 +391,4 @@ export {
   BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION,
   runCompaction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z2OFE6IX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MQXYR65M.js.map

package/dist/chunk-MQXYR65M.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/via/blob/binding.ts","../src/port/with/blob-strategy.ts","../src/with-shape/blobs/export-blobs.ts","../src/with-shape/blobs/blob-compaction.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The blob `ViaBinding` (#629 Task 7) — wires the `blobFields` declaration\n * into the kernel's generic Via port as a deliberately THIN binding:\n * declaration + posture + `describeFragment` + `erase` glue, and nothing\n * else. Blob content is fully out-of-band (`collection.blob(id)` →\n * `BlobSet` writing `_blob_*` side-collections; it never touches\n * `_putInternal` or the record codec), so this binding declares **no\n * write/read pipeline hooks** — in particular no `encodeAtRest`/\n * `decodeAtRest`: a blobFields collection must not flip the pipeline's\n * `hasAtRestHooks`, or the codec would abandon its inline seal path for a\n * feature that never seals record fields. The routing/compaction/TTL/\n * legal-hold/exportBlobs machinery stays service-side in\n * `with-shape/blobs/` (the i18n-dictionary precedent — that machinery\n * does real chunk AEAD + key-lifecycle work `via-enclave-isolation`\n * forbids under `via/*`).\n *\n * Like classified (see `port/with/classified-strategy.ts`), the link is\n * EAGER — `port/with/blob-strategy.ts` calls {@link linkBlobVia} at module\n * load. `blobFields` policies are plain object literals (there is no\n * `blob.*()` declaration factory to hang a lazy link on), so the binder\n * must be installed before `compileViaBindings` ever sees one.\n *\n * There is no `declare`-time validation: `blobFields` has never had a\n * construction-time refusal matrix (policies are consulted lazily by\n * `vault.compact()` and `BlobSet.put`), and inventing one here would\n * break the behavior lock.\n *\n * `covers` (#629 Task 8) is a passive coverage predicate, not a pipeline\n * hook — it lets `ViaPipeline.postureFor` recognize a `blobFields` slot so\n * `.where()`/`.orderBy()`/`.aggregate()` can refuse it (posture\n * `queryable: 'none'`); it does not participate in clause building or\n * evaluation.\n */\nimport type { ViaBinding, ViaEraseCtx, ViaEraseReport } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport { installViaBinder } from '../../kernel/via/index.js'\nimport type { BlobFieldsConfig } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-compaction.js'\n\n/**\n * Config a blob collection's `blobFields` declaration resolves to — the\n * binding's construction input. `purgeBlobsForRecord` is an OPTIONAL\n * vault/service-provided closure for the `erase` hook, mapping\n * `collection.blob(id).shredAllForRecord()`'s `{shredded, retainedShared,\n * residue}: string[]` accounting onto `ViaEraseReport` — `shredded`/\n * `retainedShared` become counts, each residue eTag becomes a tagged\n * `{kind: 'blob-residue', eTag}` entry.\n *\n * DELIBERATELY left unwired by `compileViaBindings` (#629 Task 10, resolved\n * within parity-first — see task-10-report.md \"blob purge\" section):\n * `per-blob-cek.test.ts`/`forget.test.ts` prove blob-shred-on-forget is\n * gated SOLELY on the vault's `blobsStrategy` being configured, never on a\n * given collection's OWN `blobFields` declaration (`.blob(id)` is callable,\n * and IS exercised by those tests, on collections with no `blobFields` at\n * all). Routing it exclusively through this binding would silently stop\n * blob crypto-shredding for every such collection; `vault.forget()` keeps\n * calling `collection.blob(id).shredAllForRecord()` directly for that\n * reason. The hook stays real/tested (see `blob-binding.test.ts`) for a\n * future caller that wants it.\n */\nexport interface BlobViaConfig {\n  readonly fields: BlobFieldsConfig\n  readonly collectionName: string\n  /** Purge one record's blob slots (crypto-shred participation). Returns the erase report for `forget()`'s summary. */\n  readonly purgeBlobsForRecord?: (id: string) => Promise<ViaEraseReport>\n}\n\n/**\n * `forget()`'s per-ref blob-purge participation: delegate to the wired\n * closure, or report a clean zero-shredded, zero-residue no-op — the\n * default in production too (#629 Task 10 deliberately leaves this unwired;\n * see `BlobViaConfig`'s doc comment).\n */\nasync function eraseBlobs(ctx: ViaEraseCtx, cfg: BlobViaConfig): Promise<ViaEraseReport> {\n  if (cfg.purgeBlobsForRecord) return cfg.purgeBlobsForRecord(ctx.id)\n  return { shredded: 0, residue: [] }\n}\n\n/**\n * One field's blob knobs as they appear on `describeFragment()`'s payload\n * (#657 — the second real `ViaBinding.describeFragment` consumer after\n * `lookup`'s; see `with-shape/introspection/describe.ts`'s `buildDescription`).\n * Declarative scalars (`retainDays`/`external`/`public`/`backlink`) verbatim;\n * predicate knobs (`evictWhen`/`legalHold`/`retainUntil` — functions over the\n * decrypted record) as presence flags, since a predicate has no serializable\n * form — mirrors `buildBlobDescribeFragment`'s per-field shape below.\n */\nexport interface BlobDescribeFragmentEntry {\n  readonly retainDays?: number\n  readonly evictWhen?: true\n  readonly legalHold?: true\n  readonly retainUntil?: true\n  readonly external?: true\n  readonly public?: true\n  readonly backlink?: string\n}\n\n/** The `'blob'` binding's `describeFragment()` payload shape. */\nexport interface BlobDescribeFragment {\n  readonly blobFields: Record<string, BlobDescribeFragmentEntry>\n}\n\n/**\n * `{ blobFields: { <field>: <knobs> } }` — declarative scalars\n * (`retainDays`/`external`/`public`/`backlink`) verbatim; predicate knobs\n * (`evictWhen`/`legalHold`/`retainUntil` — functions over the decrypted\n * record) as presence flags, since a predicate has no serializable form.\n */\nfunction buildBlobDescribeFragment(fields: BlobFieldsConfig): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    blobFields: Object.fromEntries(\n      Object.entries(fields).map(([field, p]) => [field, {\n        ...(p.retainDays !== undefined ? { retainDays: p.retainDays } : {}),\n        ...(p.evictWhen !== undefined ? { evictWhen: true } : {}),\n        ...(p.legalHold !== undefined ? { legalHold: true } : {}),\n        ...(p.retainUntil !== undefined ? { retainUntil: true } : {}),\n        ...(p.external === true ? { external: true } : {}),\n        ...(p.public === true ? { public: true } : {}),\n        ...(p.backlink !== undefined ? { backlink: p.backlink } : {}),\n      }]),\n    ),\n  }\n}\n\nexport function blobBinding(cfg: BlobViaConfig): ViaBinding {\n  return {\n    brand: 'blob',\n    // encryptedAtRest: 'envelope' — blob chunks are AEAD-encrypted envelopes\n    // in `_blob_chunks` (service-side), not sealed record fields; queryable:\n    // 'none' — nothing indexes blob content; exportable — vault.exportBlobs()\n    // is a first-class door; forgettable — shredAllForRecord participates in\n    // vault.forget().\n    posture: { encryptedAtRest: 'envelope', queryable: 'none', exportable: true, forgettable: true },\n    covers: (field) => field in cfg.fields,\n    erase: (ctx) => eraseBlobs(ctx, cfg),\n    describeFragment: () => buildBlobDescribeFragment(cfg.fields),\n  }\n}\n\nexport function linkBlobVia(): void {\n  installViaBinder('blob', (c) => blobBinding(c as BlobViaConfig))\n}\n","/**\n * Strategy seam between core Collection and the optional blob service\n * (#629 Task 7 — moved out of `with-shape/blobs/strategy.ts`, precedent:\n * `port/with/classified-strategy.ts`/`i18n-strategy.ts`). Lives on the\n * `/with` port (the one seam the kernel spine may import statically) so\n * `Collection`/`Vault` can hold the `NO_BLOBS` default without a\n * spine→service static import.\n *\n * Core imports `BlobsStrategy` as a TYPE-ONLY symbol and `NO_BLOBS` as a\n * minimal runtime stub. Neither pulls in the heavy `BlobSet` / chunk /\n * MIME machinery — those only arrive when the consumer explicitly\n * imports `@noy-db/hub/blobs` (see `via/blob/index.ts` →\n * `withBlobs()` factory).\n *\n * This file is intentionally tiny so the bundler keeps it in the graph\n * without dragging everything else in.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport type { BlobSet } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-set.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { ObjectProjection } from '../../with-shape/blobs/object-projection.js'\nimport type { BlobFieldsConfig } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-compaction.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { BlobCacheStats } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-pinning.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { linkBlobVia } from '../../via/blob/binding.js'\n\n// Install the blob Via binder EAGERLY (#629 Task 7) — `blobFields` policies\n// are plain object literals (there is no `blob.*()` declaration factory to\n// hang a lazy money/i18n-style link on), so the binder must be installed\n// before `compileViaBindings` ever compiles one. This port module is\n// already unconditionally imported by the kernel spine (for the `NO_BLOBS`\n// strategy default below), so linking here guarantees it — same rationale\n// as `port/with/classified-strategy.ts`'s eager `linkClassifiedVia()`. The\n// binding module is hook-free glue (declare/describe/erase) and imports no\n// machinery, so the eager cost is a few hundred bytes, not `BlobSet`.\nlinkBlobVia()\n\n/**\n * Args forwarded by `Collection.blob(id)` to the active strategy's\n * `openSlot`. The strategy is responsible for returning a live\n * `BlobSet` bound to the given record.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface BlobsStrategyOpenArgs {\n  readonly store: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n  readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  readonly userId: string\n  /**\n   * Collection opts into per-record keys (`perRecordKeys`), so its blobs are\n   * erasable: new uploads mint a per-blob content CEK (crypto-shreddable at\n   * `refCount → 0`). Off → legacy shared-`_blob`-DEK chunks. See the per-blob\n   * CEK design spec.\n   */\n  readonly erasableBlobs?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Collection has `tiers` active (#724 I1 completion). Combined with\n   * `erasableBlobs` false, a content write is refused —\n   * `UnsupportedTierCompositionError` — since a legacy blob has no\n   * per-blob `_cek` and can never be tier-isolated on elevate/demote.\n   */\n  readonly tiersActive?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Vault is in debug-plaintext mode (`encrypt: false` + `debugPlaintext: true`).\n   * Blobs are then written as a single un-gzipped object (one base64 chunk) so\n   * the stored object is directly recoverable with native tools (`base64 -d`),\n   * matching the directly-inspectable record layout. Dev-only — see the\n   * plaintext/debug-store-mode design.\n   */\n  readonly debugPlaintext?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Object projection for `external` blob fields (`createNoydb({ objectStore })`).\n   * When present, fields declared `external` in `blobFields` route their raw\n   * bytes here instead of the encrypted-chunk path.\n   */\n  readonly objectStore?: ObjectProjection\n  /** Per-collection blob field policies — used to resolve `external` / `public`. */\n  readonly blobFields?: BlobFieldsConfig\n  /**\n   * The caller's unlocked keyring (#749). Threaded through so `BlobSet.atTier()`\n   * can run `assertTierAccess` — the SAME clearance gate `putAtTier`/`elevate`/\n   * `demote` run before any tier `getDEK` call — rather than relying on a bare\n   * `getDEK`, which auto-mints a DEK for ANY role and never throws (verified: it\n   * is not itself a gate). Omitted only by a construction path that never calls\n   * `atTier()`.\n   */\n  readonly keyring?: UnlockedKeyring\n}\n\n/**\n * The seam interface. `@internal` — do not build public APIs on this\n * shape; it can evolve freely until blobs are extracted into their\n * own package, at which point it will be promoted to public.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport interface BlobsStrategy {\n  openSlot(args: BlobsStrategyOpenArgs): BlobSet\n  /**\n   * Snapshot of this device's blob-cache KPI counters: local-read hits,\n   * network misses, and total bytes downloaded from the object store (#808).\n   *\n   * Lives on the seam rather than on the `withBlobs()` return type so the\n   * service has exactly one name (#844b) — `NO_BLOBS` answers with zeros,\n   * which is the truthful reading of \"blobs were never enabled\".\n   */\n  cacheStats(): BlobCacheStats\n}\n\n/**\n * Default strategy for collections that did not opt into blob storage.\n * Every operation surfaces an actionable error that points the caller\n * at the opt-in path.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const NO_BLOBS: BlobsStrategy = {\n  openSlot() {\n    throw new Error(\n      'Blob storage is not enabled on this Noydb instance. ' +\n      'Import `{ withBlobs }` from \"@noy-db/hub/blobs\" and pass `withBlobs()` to `createNoydb({ blobsStrategy: withBlobs() })`.',\n    )\n  },\n  cacheStats() {\n    return { hits: 0, misses: 0, bytesDownloaded: 0 }\n  },\n}\n","/**\n * `vault.exportBlobs()` — bulk blob extraction primitive.\n *\n * Async-iterable handle over every blob attached to records in a\n * vault, optionally filtered by collection allowlist and per-record\n * predicate. Emits tuples of `{ blobId, recordRef, bytes, meta }` so\n * the consumer can pipe into any sink (zip stream, S3 multipart, USB\n * copy, cold-storage tape) without pulling the whole export into\n * memory.\n *\n * ## Auth + audit\n *\n * - Capability check runs **once** at handle creation via\n *   `Vault.assertCanExport('plaintext', 'blob')`. An operator whose\n *   keyring lacks that bit fails before a single byte of ciphertext\n *   is decrypted.\n * - Audit entry lands in `_export_audit` at handle creation: the\n *   actor, start timestamp, target collections, predicate presence,\n *   and batch mechanism. **No content hashes** — per the spec\n *   non-correlation invariant.\n *\n * ## Abort + resume\n *\n * - `handle.abort()` flips the internal signal; the next iteration\n *   boundary throws `AbortError`. Consumers already in `for await`\n *   can catch and exit cleanly.\n * - Restart after a partial failure with `{ afterBlobId }` — the\n *   iterator skips tuples up to (and including) that blob id before\n *   yielding again. Combined with a blob-count ceiling it supports\n *   idempotent batch re-runs.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Collection } from '../../kernel/collection.js'\nimport type { SlotInfo } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n// ─── Types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Collection allowlist. Omit to export blobs from every collection\n   * the caller has read access to.\n   */\n  readonly collections?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Per-record predicate. Called on the decrypted record BEFORE any\n   * blob bytes are read for that record — returning false skips the\n   * record and all its slots without touching their chunks.\n   */\n  readonly where?: (record: unknown, context: { collection: string; id: string }) => boolean\n  /**\n   * Resume after a specific blob id. The iterator skips tuples up to\n   * and including this id, then yields. Format of the id is the same\n   * as `ExportedBlob.blobId` (the HMAC-keyed eTag).\n   */\n  readonly afterBlobId?: string\n  /**\n   * External abort signal. When fired, the next iterator tick throws\n   * `ExportBlobsAbortedError`. Honored alongside `handle.abort()`.\n   */\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal\n}\n\nexport interface ExportedBlob {\n  /** Opaque blob identifier — HMAC-keyed eTag, stable across vaults. */\n  readonly blobId: string\n  /** Where this blob came from in the vault. */\n  readonly recordRef: {\n    readonly collection: string\n    readonly id: string\n    readonly slot: string\n  }\n  /** Decrypted plaintext bytes. */\n  readonly bytes: Uint8Array\n  /** Best-effort metadata (from the blob slot record). */\n  readonly meta: {\n    readonly size: number\n    /**\n     * User-visible filename stored on the slot. Often equal to the\n     * slot name; differs when the caller supplied an explicit\n     * `filename` to `BlobSet.put()`.\n     */\n    readonly filename: string\n    readonly mimeType?: string\n    readonly createdAt?: string\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsHandle extends AsyncIterable<ExportedBlob> {\n  /** Abort the export. Safe to call multiple times. */\n  abort(): void\n  /** True once `abort()` has fired or the external signal aborted. */\n  readonly aborted: boolean\n}\n\nexport class ExportBlobsAbortedError extends Error {\n  constructor(reason: string) {\n    super(`exportBlobs aborted: ${reason}`)\n    this.name = 'ExportBlobsAbortedError'\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Audit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const EXPORT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_export_audit'\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsAuditEntry {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly mechanism: 'exportBlobs'\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly startedAt: string\n  readonly collections: readonly string[] | null\n  readonly predicate: boolean\n  readonly afterBlobId: string | null\n}\n\n// ─── Implementation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Build the handle. Factored out of `Vault.exportBlobs` so the\n * implementation can be unit-tested without going through the\n * compartment lifecycle.\n */\nexport function createExportBlobsHandle(\n  actor: string,\n  listAccessibleCollections: () => Promise<string[]>,\n  getCollection: <T>(name: string) => Collection<T>,\n  writeAudit: (entry: ExportBlobsAuditEntry) => Promise<void>,\n  options: ExportBlobsOptions,\n): ExportBlobsHandle {\n  let aborted = false\n\n  const abort = (): void => {\n    aborted = true\n  }\n\n  if (options.signal) {\n    if (options.signal.aborted) aborted = true\n    options.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => { aborted = true })\n  }\n\n  function assertLive(): void {\n    if (aborted) throw new ExportBlobsAbortedError('aborted by caller')\n  }\n\n  const allowlist = options.collections ? new Set(options.collections) : null\n\n  // Write the audit entry BEFORE the first yield so a blocked\n  // iteration still leaves an audit trail that the export started.\n  let auditPromise: Promise<void> | null = null\n  function writeAuditOnce(): Promise<void> {\n    if (!auditPromise) {\n      auditPromise = writeAudit({\n        id: generateBatchId(),\n        mechanism: 'exportBlobs',\n        actor,\n        startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n        collections: options.collections ?? null,\n        predicate: Boolean(options.where),\n        afterBlobId: options.afterBlobId ?? null,\n      })\n    }\n    return auditPromise\n  }\n\n  async function* generate(): AsyncGenerator<ExportedBlob> {\n    await writeAuditOnce()\n    assertLive()\n\n    // Resolve target collections lazily — also keeps the call async.\n    const allCollections = await listAccessibleCollections()\n    const targets = allCollections.filter(name => {\n      if (name.startsWith('_')) return false\n      if (allowlist && !allowlist.has(name)) return false\n      return true\n    })\n\n    let resumeCursorHit = options.afterBlobId === undefined\n\n    for (const collectionName of targets) {\n      if (aborted) return\n\n      const coll = getCollection<Record<string, unknown>>(collectionName)\n      const records = await coll.list().catch(() => [])\n      for (const record of records) {\n        if (aborted) return\n        assertLive()\n\n        const idField = (record as { id?: unknown }).id\n        if (typeof idField !== 'string') continue\n\n        if (options.where && !options.where(record, { collection: collectionName, id: idField })) continue\n\n        const blobSet = coll.blob(idField)\n        const slots = await blobSet.list().catch(() => [] as SlotInfo[])\n        for (const slot of slots) {\n          if (aborted) return\n\n          if (!resumeCursorHit) {\n            if (slot.eTag === options.afterBlobId) {\n              resumeCursorHit = true\n            }\n            continue\n          }\n\n          const bytes = await blobSet.get(slot.name)\n          if (!bytes) continue\n\n          const item: ExportedBlob = {\n            blobId: slot.eTag,\n            recordRef: { collection: collectionName, id: idField, slot: slot.name },\n            bytes,\n            meta: {\n              size: slot.size,\n              filename: slot.filename,\n              ...(slot.mimeType !== undefined && { mimeType: slot.mimeType }),\n              ...(slot.uploadedAt !== undefined && { createdAt: slot.uploadedAt }),\n            },\n          }\n          yield item\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const handle: ExportBlobsHandle = {\n    abort,\n    get aborted() { return aborted },\n    [Symbol.asyncIterator]: () => generate(),\n  }\n  return handle\n}\n\n// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction generateBatchId(): string {\n  // 16 bytes of crypto randomness, URL-safe base64, no padding.\n  const raw = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))\n  let s = ''\n  for (const b of raw) s += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')\n  return `batch-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${s.slice(0, 12)}`\n}\n","/**\n * Blob retention + compaction.\n *\n * Declarative per-collection / per-slot eviction policy. Two\n * triggers:\n *\n *   - **`retainDays`** — age-based TTL. A slot uploaded more than N\n *     days ago is evicted.\n *   - **`evictWhen(record)`** — predicate over the **decrypted**\n *     record. Lets consumers express \"the image is safe to drop once\n *     the structured invoice has been reviewed and confirmed.\"\n *\n * Either trigger (or both) causes the slot to evict. Eviction removes\n * the slot entry from `_blob_slots_{collection}`, decrements the\n * blob's refCount (so unreferenced chunks can be GC'd by the next\n * sweep), and writes one entry to the `_blob_eviction_audit`\n * collection for tamper-evident record-keeping.\n *\n * The audit entry carries the eTag of the evicted blob (opaque HMAC\n * of plaintext under the vault's `_blob` DEK) — no plaintext leakage,\n * per the SPEC non-correlation invariant. Consumers reconstructing\n * \"what used to be attached\" can look up the audit entry by record\n * id.\n *\n * Compaction is **consumer-scheduled** — noy-db never runs a\n * background daemon. Call `vault.compact()` whenever your workflow\n * allows (cron, manual \"tidy\" button, cold-storage export prep, …).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, SlotInfo } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n// ─── Config types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface BlobFieldPolicy<T = unknown> {\n  /**\n   * Via port brand marker — lets a `BlobFieldPolicy` satisfy the kernel's\n   * opaque `ViaDescriptor` (#629 Task 7). Optional (the\n   * `ClassifiedFieldSpec._viaBrand` precedent): `blobFields` policies are\n   * plain object literals with no declaration factory to stamp it, so a\n   * mandatory field would break every existing declaration.\n   */\n  readonly _viaBrand?: 'blob'\n  /**\n   * Age-based TTL in days. A slot whose `uploadedAt` is older than\n   * `now - retainDays × 86400s` evicts on the next `vault.compact()`.\n   * Omit to disable age-based eviction.\n   */\n  readonly retainDays?: number\n  /**\n   * Predicate evaluated against the decrypted record. When it returns\n   * `true`, every matching slot on that record evicts. Omit to\n   * disable predicate-based eviction.\n   */\n  readonly evictWhen?: (record: T) => boolean\n  /**\n   * **Legal hold.** When this predicate returns `true`, the slot is\n   * never evicted — `retainDays`/`evictWhen` are overridden. Use for a\n   * litigation / audit hold on a fiscal document: the blob stays until\n   * the predicate returns `false` (the hold is released). Fail-closed:\n   * if the predicate throws, the slot is treated as held.\n   */\n  readonly legalHold?: (record: T) => boolean\n  /**\n   * **Period-bound retention.** Returns the date (Date / ISO string /\n   * epoch ms) until which the slot must be retained — typically derived\n   * from the record's fiscal period (e.g. period end + 10 years). While\n   * `now < retainUntil`, the slot is never evicted, regardless of\n   * `retainDays`. Return `null`/`undefined` to impose no floor.\n   * Fail-closed: a throwing function holds the slot.\n   */\n  readonly retainUntil?: (record: T) => Date | string | number | null | undefined\n  /**\n   * **External projection.** When `true`, this field's bytes are stored in the\n   * vault's `ObjectProjection` (`createNoydb({ objectStore })`) as a single raw,\n   * **unencrypted** object — servable directly from S3/CDN and processable by\n   * native tooling — instead of the encrypted-chunk path. The encrypted slot\n   * record remains the catalog (anchoring invariant). Requires an `objectStore`;\n   * **outside the zero-knowledge guarantee** — use only for assets meant to\n   * leave the vault. See the as-aws-s3 design spec.\n   */\n  readonly external?: boolean\n  /**\n   * For an `external` field: make the object world-readable (CDN origin) rather\n   * than presigned-only. Default `false` (presigned). Ignored unless `external`.\n   */\n  readonly public?: boolean\n  /**\n   * For an `external` field: how to stamp a **backlink** (this record's\n   * vault/collection/id/field) onto the object's metadata — the self-describing\n   * \"secondary store\" that powers reconcile / DR / import re-pairing.\n   * - `'opaque-token'` (default): a random id; preserves the opaque-bucket\n   *   property (no names leak); the token is also recorded on the slot.\n   * - `'encrypted'`: the reference encrypted under the blob DEK (ZK-preserving;\n   *   falls back to `'opaque-token'` on a plaintext vault).\n   * - `'plain'`: the reference in cleartext metadata — **leaks structure** to\n   *   bucket readers; only for non-sensitive deployments.\n   * - `'none'`: no backlink.\n   */\n  readonly backlink?: 'opaque-token' | 'encrypted' | 'plain' | 'none'\n}\n\nexport type BlobFieldsConfig<T = unknown> = Record<string, BlobFieldPolicy<T>>\n\n// ─── Audit collection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_blob_eviction_audit'\n\nexport interface BlobEvictionEntry {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n  readonly slotName: string\n  readonly blobHash: string\n  /** `'budget'` — evicted by the #808 cache-budget LRU pass, not a policy. */\n  readonly reason: 'ttl' | 'predicate' | 'both' | 'budget'\n  readonly evictedAt: string\n  readonly actor: string\n}\n\n// ─── Compaction result ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface CompactionResult {\n  /** Number of blob slots evicted by the policy pass across all collections. */\n  readonly evicted: number\n  /** Number of records touched (iterated + policy checked). */\n  readonly records: number\n  /** Number of collections with `blobFields` configured. */\n  readonly collections: number\n  /**\n   * Number of audit entries written — one per policy eviction plus one per\n   * budget SLOT eviction (dropping a device-local cache copy writes none).\n   */\n  readonly auditEntries: number\n  /**\n   * Number of slots that would have evicted (TTL/predicate triggered)\n   * but were retained by a `legalHold` or `retainUntil` floor.\n   */\n  readonly held: number\n  /**\n   * #808: number of slots whose due policy eviction was skipped because they\n   * are pinned for offline on THIS device (pin state is device-local).\n   */\n  readonly pinned: number\n  /**\n   * #808: number of evictions performed by the `cacheBudget` LRU pass —\n   * internal slots evicted through the standard eviction writer plus\n   * device-local external cache copies dropped. 0 when no budget was given.\n   */\n  readonly budgetEvicted: number\n  /** #808: plaintext bytes freed by the `cacheBudget` LRU pass. */\n  readonly budgetBytesFreed: number\n  /** Per-collection breakdown for diagnostics. */\n  readonly byCollection: Record<string, { records: number; evicted: number }>\n}\n\n// ─── Core ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface CompactRunOptions {\n  /** Override \"now\" for deterministic testing. */\n  readonly now?: Date\n  /**\n   * Stop after this many evictions. Useful for capped batches / cron\n   * jobs that need to fit in a time window. `undefined` = unbounded.\n   */\n  readonly maxEvictions?: number\n  /**\n   * Dry-run — evaluate policies and return the counts, but do NOT\n   * delete slots or write audit entries. Lets a consumer preview\n   * what would happen.\n   */\n  readonly dryRun?: boolean\n  /**\n   * #808 mobile cache budget: cap the locally-cached UNPINNED blob bytes.\n   * After the policy pass, a dedicated LRU pass walks every collection's\n   * slots (pinned slots and `legalHold`/`retainUntil`-held slots are exempt\n   * and uncounted) and evicts oldest-access-first — internal slots through\n   * the standard eviction writer (`deleteSlot` + a `'budget'` audit entry),\n   * external slots by dropping their device-local encrypted cache copy only\n   * (the object-store copy is authoritative and untouched) — until the\n   * remaining unpinned bytes fit `maxBytes`. Internal slots count their\n   * uncompressed `size`; external slots count `cachedBytes` (0 = nothing\n   * local, nothing to evict). LRU order comes from the device-local\n   * `lastAccessAt` stamp, falling back to `uploadedAt`.\n   */\n  readonly cacheBudget?: { readonly maxBytes: number }\n}\n\nexport interface CompactionContext {\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  readonly getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  /**\n   * Resolve a collection's declared `blobFields` config. Returns an\n   * empty map for collections without the config — the walk skips\n   * those.\n   */\n  readonly getBlobFields: <T>(collection: string) => BlobFieldsConfig<T> | null\n  /** List collection names in the vault. */\n  readonly listCollections: () => Promise<string[]>\n  /** List record ids in a collection. */\n  readonly listRecords: (collection: string) => Promise<string[]>\n  /** Decrypt and return the record. Null when absent. */\n  readonly getRecord: <T>(collection: string, id: string) => Promise<T | null>\n  /** Return the BlobSet-like handle for a record's slots. */\n  readonly listSlots: (collection: string, id: string) => Promise<SlotInfo[]>\n  /** Delete a slot and decrement its blob's refCount. */\n  readonly deleteSlot: (collection: string, id: string, slotName: string) => Promise<void>\n  /**\n   * #808: drop a slot's DEVICE-LOCAL cached copy (the encrypted external\n   * side-cache) without touching the slot or the object store. Returns the\n   * plaintext bytes freed. Optional — absent (or a 0 return) means external\n   * cache entries simply cannot be budget-evicted through this context.\n   */\n  readonly dropLocalCache?: (collection: string, id: string, slotName: string) => Promise<number>\n}\n\nexport async function runCompaction(\n  ctx: CompactionContext,\n  options: CompactRunOptions = {},\n): Promise<CompactionResult> {\n  const now = options.now ?? new Date()\n  const maxEvictions = options.maxEvictions ?? Infinity\n  const dryRun = options.dryRun === true\n  if (options.cacheBudget !== undefined\n    && (!Number.isFinite(options.cacheBudget.maxBytes) || options.cacheBudget.maxBytes < 0)) {\n    throw new ValidationError('compact(): cacheBudget.maxBytes must be a non-negative finite number (#808)')\n  }\n\n  const allCollections = await ctx.listCollections()\n  const byCollection: Record<string, { records: number; evicted: number }> = {}\n  let evicted = 0\n  let records = 0\n  let auditEntries = 0\n  let held = 0\n  let pinned = 0\n  let collectionsWithPolicy = 0\n\n  outer: for (const collectionName of allCollections) {\n    if (collectionName.startsWith('_')) continue\n    const config = ctx.getBlobFields(collectionName)\n    if (!config) continue\n    const configuredSlots = Object.keys(config)\n    if (configuredSlots.length === 0) continue\n    collectionsWithPolicy += 1\n    byCollection[collectionName] = { records: 0, evicted: 0 }\n\n    const ids = await ctx.listRecords(collectionName)\n    for (const recordId of ids) {\n      if (evicted >= maxEvictions) break outer\n\n      const record = await ctx.getRecord(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => null)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      records += 1\n      byCollection[collectionName].records += 1\n\n      const slots = await ctx.listSlots(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => [])\n      for (const slot of slots) {\n        if (evicted >= maxEvictions) break outer\n        const policy = config[slot.name]\n        if (!policy) continue\n\n        const reason = evaluatePolicy(policy, record, slot, now)\n        if (!reason) continue\n\n        // #808: device-local offline pin — an exemption inside this existing\n        // pass, exactly like a hold: counted, never evicted. `slot.pinned` is\n        // the device-local annotation `BlobSet.list()` stamps from the\n        // withBlobs() pin registry (never synced state).\n        if (slot.pinned === true) {\n          pinned += 1\n          continue\n        }\n\n        // Retention floor: a legal hold or period-bound retainUntil\n        // blocks an otherwise-due eviction. Counted, never evicted.\n        if (isHeld(policy, record, now)) {\n          held += 1\n          continue\n        }\n\n        if (!dryRun) {\n          await ctx.deleteSlot(collectionName, recordId, slot.name)\n          await writeAuditEntry(ctx, {\n            id: generateEvictionId(collectionName, recordId, slot.name),\n            collection: collectionName,\n            recordId,\n            slotName: slot.name,\n            blobHash: slot.eTag,\n            reason,\n            evictedAt: now.toISOString(),\n            actor: ctx.actor,\n          })\n          auditEntries += 1\n        }\n        evicted += 1\n        byCollection[collectionName].evicted += 1\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // #808: cache-budget LRU pass — runs AFTER the policy pass so a slot that\n  // just evicted no longer counts toward the budget. Reuses this module's own\n  // eviction writer (deleteSlot + audit), never a parallel one.\n  let budgetEvicted = 0\n  let budgetBytesFreed = 0\n  if (options.cacheBudget !== undefined) {\n    const pass = await runBudgetPass(ctx, options.cacheBudget.maxBytes, {\n      now, dryRun, remainingEvictions: maxEvictions - evicted,\n    })\n    budgetEvicted = pass.evicted\n    budgetBytesFreed = pass.bytesFreed\n    auditEntries += pass.auditEntries\n  }\n\n  return {\n    evicted,\n    records,\n    collections: collectionsWithPolicy,\n    auditEntries,\n    held,\n    pinned,\n    budgetEvicted,\n    budgetBytesFreed,\n    byCollection,\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── #808: cache-budget LRU pass ───────────────────────────────────────\n\ninterface BudgetCandidate {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n  readonly slotName: string\n  readonly eTag: string\n  readonly bytes: number\n  /** `'slot'` — internal blob, evicted via `deleteSlot`; `'cache'` — external device-local copy, dropped via `dropLocalCache`. */\n  readonly kind: 'slot' | 'cache'\n  readonly lastAccessMs: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Enforce `cacheBudget.maxBytes` over the locally-cached UNPINNED blob bytes\n * (see {@link CompactRunOptions.cacheBudget} for the full contract). Walks\n * EVERY collection — unlike the policy pass, the budget is not gated on a\n * declared `blobFields` config — but still honors a declared policy's\n * `legalHold`/`retainUntil` floor where one exists.\n */\nasync function runBudgetPass(\n  ctx: CompactionContext,\n  maxBytes: number,\n  opts: { now: Date; dryRun: boolean; remainingEvictions: number },\n): Promise<{ evicted: number; bytesFreed: number; auditEntries: number }> {\n  const candidates: BudgetCandidate[] = []\n  let total = 0\n\n  for (const collectionName of await ctx.listCollections()) {\n    if (collectionName.startsWith('_')) continue\n    const config = ctx.getBlobFields(collectionName)\n    for (const recordId of await ctx.listRecords(collectionName)) {\n      const slots = await ctx.listSlots(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => [])\n      if (slots.length === 0) continue\n      // The record is only needed to evaluate a declared policy's retention\n      // floor — skip the decrypt entirely for policy-less collections.\n      const record = config\n        ? await ctx.getRecord<unknown>(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => null)\n        : null\n      for (const slot of slots) {\n        if (slot.pinned === true) continue // pinned: exempt AND uncounted (#808)\n        const policy = config?.[slot.name]\n        if (policy && record !== null && isHeld(policy, record, opts.now)) continue // floor blocks budget too\n        const lastAccessMs = Date.parse(slot.lastAccessAt ?? slot.uploadedAt) || 0\n        const isExternal = slot.external !== undefined\n        const bytes = isExternal ? slot.cachedBytes ?? 0 : slot.size\n        if (bytes <= 0) continue // external with no local copy: nothing cached to evict\n        total += bytes\n        candidates.push({\n          collection: collectionName, recordId, slotName: slot.name, eTag: slot.eTag,\n          bytes, kind: isExternal ? 'cache' : 'slot', lastAccessMs,\n        })\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Oldest access first; deterministic tiebreak so equal timestamps (common\n  // within one ms) never make the eviction order flap between runs.\n  candidates.sort((a, b) =>\n    a.lastAccessMs - b.lastAccessMs\n    || a.collection.localeCompare(b.collection)\n    || a.recordId.localeCompare(b.recordId)\n    || a.slotName.localeCompare(b.slotName))\n\n  let evicted = 0\n  let bytesFreed = 0\n  let auditEntries = 0\n  for (const c of candidates) {\n    if (total <= maxBytes || evicted >= opts.remainingEvictions) break\n    if (!opts.dryRun) {\n      if (c.kind === 'slot') {\n        await ctx.deleteSlot(c.collection, c.recordId, c.slotName)\n        await writeAuditEntry(ctx, {\n          id: generateEvictionId(c.collection, c.recordId, c.slotName),\n          collection: c.collection,\n          recordId: c.recordId,\n          slotName: c.slotName,\n          blobHash: c.eTag,\n          reason: 'budget',\n          evictedAt: opts.now.toISOString(),\n          actor: ctx.actor,\n        })\n        auditEntries += 1\n      } else {\n        // Device-local cache drop only — the slot (catalog) and the\n        // object-store copy are untouched, so no eviction audit entry.\n        await ctx.dropLocalCache?.(c.collection, c.recordId, c.slotName)\n      }\n    }\n    evicted += 1\n    bytesFreed += c.bytes\n    total -= c.bytes\n  }\n\n  return { evicted, bytesFreed, auditEntries }\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether a retention floor (legal hold or period-bound `retainUntil`)\n * currently blocks eviction of this record's slots. Fail-closed: a\n * throwing predicate holds the slot.\n */\nfunction isHeld<T>(policy: BlobFieldPolicy<T>, record: T, now: Date): boolean {\n  if (policy.legalHold) {\n    try {\n      if (policy.legalHold(record)) return true\n    } catch {\n      return true\n    }\n  }\n  if (policy.retainUntil) {\n    try {\n      const until = policy.retainUntil(record)\n      if (until !== null && until !== undefined) {\n        const t = until instanceof Date ? until.getTime() : typeof until === 'number' ? until : Date.parse(String(until))\n        if (!Number.isFinite(t)) return true   // fail-closed: unparseable retainUntil holds the slot\n        if (t > now.getTime()) return true\n      }\n    } catch {\n      return true\n    }\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction evaluatePolicy<T>(\n  policy: BlobFieldPolicy<T>,\n  record: T,\n  slot: SlotInfo,\n  now: Date,\n): 'ttl' | 'predicate' | 'both' | null {\n  let ttlTriggered = false\n  let predicateTriggered = false\n\n  if (policy.retainDays !== undefined && policy.retainDays > 0) {\n    const uploadedAt = Date.parse(slot.uploadedAt)\n    if (Number.isFinite(uploadedAt)) {\n      const ageMs = now.getTime() - uploadedAt\n      const limitMs = policy.retainDays * 86_400_000\n      if (ageMs > limitMs) ttlTriggered = true\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (policy.evictWhen) {\n    try {\n      if (policy.evictWhen(record)) predicateTriggered = true\n    } catch {\n      // Predicate error → do NOT evict. Fail closed.\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (ttlTriggered && predicateTriggered) return 'both'\n  if (ttlTriggered) return 'ttl'\n  if (predicateTriggered) return 'predicate'\n  return null\n}\n\nfunction generateEvictionId(collection: string, recordId: string, slotName: string): string {\n  const rand = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(8))\n  let suffix = ''\n  for (const b of rand) suffix += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')\n  return `${collection}__${recordId}__${slotName}__${suffix}`\n}\n\nasync function writeAuditEntry(ctx: CompactionContext, entry: BlobEvictionEntry): Promise<void> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(entry)\n  const identity = { collection: BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, by: entry.actor, version: 1 }\n  const body = { ts: entry.evictedAt }\n  let envelope: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (ctx.encrypted) {\n    const dek = await ctx.getDEK(BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n    envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data })\n  } else {\n    envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: '', data: json })\n  }\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION, entry.id, envelope)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuEA,eAAe,WAAW,KAAkB,KAA6C;AACvF,MAAI,IAAI,oBAAqB,QAAO,IAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,EAAE;AAClE,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE;AACpC;AAgCA,SAAS,0BAA0B,QAAmD;AACpF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO;AAAA,QACjD,GAAI,EAAE,eAAe,SAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QACjE,GAAI,EAAE,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QACvD,GAAI,EAAE,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QACvD,GAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,SAAY,EAAE,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC3D,GAAI,EAAE,aAAa,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAChD,GAAI,EAAE,WAAW,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC5C,GAAI,EAAE,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC7D,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAgC;AAC1D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMP,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,YAAY,WAAW,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAC/F,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACnC,kBAAkB,MAAM,0BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,EAC9D;AACF;AAEO,SAAS,cAAoB;AAClC,mBAAiB,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY,CAAkB,CAAC;AACjE;;;ACrGA,YAAY;AAqFL,IAAM,WAA0B;AAAA,EACrC,WAAW;AACT,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,aAAa;AACX,WAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,GAAG,iBAAiB,EAAE;AAAA,EAClD;AACF;;;ACrCO,IAAM,0BAAN,cAAsC,MAAM;AAAA,EACjD,YAAY,QAAgB;AAC1B,UAAM,wBAAwB,MAAM,EAAE;AACtC,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAIO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAmBhC,SAAS,wBACd,OACA,2BACA,eACA,YACA,SACmB;AACnB,MAAI,UAAU;AAEd,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAY;AACxB,cAAU;AAAA,EACZ;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAS,WAAU;AACtC,YAAQ,OAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAE,gBAAU;AAAA,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE;AAEA,WAAS,aAAmB;AAC1B,QAAI,QAAS,OAAM,IAAI,wBAAwB,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACpE;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAIvE,MAAI,eAAqC;AACzC,WAAS,iBAAgC;AACvC,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc;AACjB,qBAAe,WAAW;AAAA,QACxB,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,QACpB,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA,YAAW,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,QAClC,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe;AAAA,QACpC,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,QAChC,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe;AAAA,MACtC,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,kBAAgB,WAAyC;AACvD,UAAM,eAAe;AACrB,eAAW;AAGX,UAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,0BAA0B;AACvD,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO,UAAQ;AAC5C,UAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,UAAI,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC9C,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,CAAC;AAED,QAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAE9C,eAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AACpC,UAAI,QAAS;AAEb,YAAM,OAAO,cAAuC,cAAc;AAClE,YAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAChD,iBAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,YAAI,QAAS;AACb,mBAAW;AAEX,cAAM,UAAW,OAA4B;AAC7C,YAAI,OAAO,YAAY,SAAU;AAEjC,YAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAG;AAE1F,cAAM,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACjC,cAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAe;AAC/D,mBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,cAAI,QAAS;AAEb,cAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,gBAAI,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,aAAa;AACrC,gCAAkB;AAAA,YACpB;AACA;AAAA,UACF;AAEA,gBAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AACzC,cAAI,CAAC,MAAO;AAEZ,gBAAM,OAAqB;AAAA,YACzB,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,YACb,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,YACtE;AAAA,YACA,MAAM;AAAA,cACJ,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,cACX,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,cACf,GAAI,KAAK,aAAa,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,cAC7D,GAAI,KAAK,eAAe,UAAa,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,WAAW;AAAA,YACpE;AAAA,UACF;AACA,gBAAM;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,SAA4B;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,UAAU;AAAE,aAAO;AAAA,IAAQ;AAAA,IAC/B,CAAC,OAAO,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAIA,SAAS,kBAA0B;AAEjC,QAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAChE,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAW,KAAK,IAAK,MAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AACxD,SAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC3D;;;ACrIO,IAAM,iCAAiC;AAiH9C,eAAsB,cACpB,KACA,UAA6B,CAAC,GACH;AAC3B,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,oBAAI,KAAK;AACpC,QAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW;AAClC,MAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,WACtB,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,WAAW,IAAI;AACzF,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,6EAA6E;AAAA,EACzG;AAEA,QAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACjD,QAAM,eAAqE,CAAC;AAC5E,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,MAAI,wBAAwB;AAE5B,QAAO,YAAW,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAClD,QAAI,eAAe,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACpC,UAAM,SAAS,IAAI,cAAc,cAAc;AAC/C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,UAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAC1C,QAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,EAAG;AAClC,6BAAyB;AACzB,iBAAa,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE;AAExD,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,cAAc;AAChD,eAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAI,WAAW,aAAc,OAAM;AAEnC,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI;AAC7E,UAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,iBAAW;AACX,mBAAa,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAExC,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1E,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,YAAI,WAAW,aAAc,OAAM;AACnC,cAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AAC/B,YAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AAEb,cAAM,SAAS,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AACvD,YAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AAMb,YAAI,KAAK,WAAW,MAAM;AACxB,oBAAU;AACV;AAAA,QACF;AAIA,YAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/B,kBAAQ;AACR;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,YAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AACX,gBAAM,IAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AACxD,gBAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,YACzB,IAAI,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,YAC1D,YAAY;AAAA,YACZ;AAAA,YACA,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,YACf,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,YACf;AAAA,YACA,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,YAC3B,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,UACb,CAAC;AACD,0BAAgB;AAAA,QAClB;AACA,mBAAW;AACX,qBAAa,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,MAC1C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,MAAI,gBAAgB;AACpB,MAAI,mBAAmB;AACvB,MAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,QAAW;AACrC,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,MAClE;AAAA,MAAK;AAAA,MAAQ,oBAAoB,eAAe;AAAA,IAClD,CAAC;AACD,oBAAgB,KAAK;AACrB,uBAAmB,KAAK;AACxB,oBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACb;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAsBA,eAAe,cACb,KACA,UACA,MACwE;AACxE,QAAM,aAAgC,CAAC;AACvC,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,aAAW,kBAAkB,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACxD,QAAI,eAAe,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACpC,UAAM,SAAS,IAAI,cAAc,cAAc;AAC/C,eAAW,YAAY,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,cAAc,GAAG;AAC5D,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1E,UAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG;AAGxB,YAAM,SAAS,SACX,MAAM,IAAI,UAAmB,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IACvE;AACJ,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,YAAI,KAAK,WAAW,KAAM;AAC1B,cAAM,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AACjC,YAAI,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,EAAG;AACnE,cAAM,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACzE,cAAM,aAAa,KAAK,aAAa;AACrC,cAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,eAAe,IAAI,KAAK;AACxD,YAAI,SAAS,EAAG;AAChB,iBAAS;AACT,mBAAW,KAAK;AAAA,UACd,YAAY;AAAA,UAAgB;AAAA,UAAU,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,UACtE;AAAA,UAAO,MAAM,aAAa,UAAU;AAAA,UAAQ;AAAA,QAC9C,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,aAAW,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,MAClB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,gBAChB,EAAE,WAAW,cAAc,EAAE,UAAU,KACvC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,KACnC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAEzC,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,aAAa;AACjB,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,aAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAC1B,QAAI,SAAS,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,mBAAoB;AAC7D,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,QAAQ;AAChB,UAAI,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrB,cAAM,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ;AACzD,cAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,UACzB,IAAI,mBAAmB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ;AAAA,UAC3D,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,UACd,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,UACZ,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,UACZ,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,UACZ,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,UAChC,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,QACb,CAAC;AACD,wBAAgB;AAAA,MAClB,OAAO;AAGL,cAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ;AAAA,MACjE;AAAA,IACF;AACA,eAAW;AACX,kBAAc,EAAE;AAChB,aAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACb;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,aAAa;AAC7C;AAOA,SAAS,OAAU,QAA4B,QAAW,KAAoB;AAC5E,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW;AACpB,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,IACvC,QAAQ;AACN,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AACvC,UAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAW;AACzC,cAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAChH,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,YAAI,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,MAChC;AAAA,IACF,QAAQ;AACN,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eACP,QACA,QACA,MACA,KACqC;AACrC,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,MAAI,qBAAqB;AAEzB,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,UAAa,OAAO,aAAa,GAAG;AAC5D,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG;AAC/B,YAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC9B,YAAM,UAAU,OAAO,aAAa;AACpC,UAAI,QAAQ,QAAS,gBAAe;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW;AACpB,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAG,sBAAqB;AAAA,IACrD,QAAQ;AAAA,IAER;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,gBAAgB,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAC/C,MAAI,aAAc,QAAO;AACzB,MAAI,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAC/B,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,mBAAmB,YAAoB,UAAkB,UAA0B;AAC1F,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,aAAW,KAAK,KAAM,WAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AAC9D,SAAO,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM;AAC3D;AAEA,eAAe,gBAAgB,KAAwB,OAAyC;AAC9F,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACjC,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,gCAAgC,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AACzG,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU;AACnC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW;AACjB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,8BAA8B;AAC3D,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACtE,eAAW,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAChE,OAAO;AACL,eAAW,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1E;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,gCAAgC,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AACrF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-5VVBZ6E4.js → chunk-N2HKBESK.js}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-RVTOCAHQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-KDX6VEYV.js";
 import {
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-5UGEGEIJ.js";
+} from "./chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/via/classified/descriptor.ts
 function isClassifiedFieldSpec(x) {
@@ -262,4 +262,4 @@ export {
   enforceClassifiedWrite,
   NO_CLASSIFIED
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5VVBZ6E4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-N2HKBESK.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-HNOBRU24.js → chunk-N7YAQKAO.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-QTDAPDDV.js";
+} from "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/derive.ts
 function isZodSchema(value) {
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ export {
   isZod4Schema,
   derivePersistedSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HNOBRU24.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-N7YAQKAO.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-6U7M7AX6.js → chunk-NH2MST6J.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   NonAdditiveSchemaChangeError,
   SchemaLockedError
-} from "./chunk-I64WQSN3.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/strategies.ts
 function blindUpdate() {
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ export {
   lockSchema,
   coordinatedCutover
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6U7M7AX6.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NH2MST6J.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-JAHIL6WO.js → chunk-NRNTXBHT.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
-  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-5UGEGEIJ.js";
+  buildRecordEnvelope
+} from "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts
 var MemorySealingKeyProvider = class {
@@ -178,14 +178,11 @@ async function saveSealedSecret(store, vault, payload) {
     payload: bytesToBase64(payload.sealed)
   };
   const prior = await store.get(vault, "_meta", SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID);
-  const env = {
-    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,
-    _ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(
+    { collection: "_meta", id: SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },
     // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary.
-    _iv: "",
-    _data: JSON.stringify(persisted)
-  };
+    { iv: "", data: JSON.stringify(persisted) }
+  );
   await store.put(vault, "_meta", SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, env);
 }
 async function loadSealedSecret(store, vault) {
@@ -227,4 +224,4 @@ export {
   loadSealedSecret,
   resolveManagedSecret
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JAHIL6WO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NRNTXBHT.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NRNTXBHT.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Managed-secret mode — rubber-hose-resistant vaults.\n *\n * A vault mode where the secret is machine-generated and never\n * exposed to the user, sealed under a developer-provided\n * {@link SealingKeyProvider} (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential\n * Manager, libsecret, AWS KMS, …). The user has no secret to give\n * up to coercion — they can't reveal what they don't know.\n *\n * ## Components in this file\n *\n *   - {@link SealingKeyProvider} — the interface concrete providers\n *     implement. Provider implementations live OUTSIDE hub (per-\n *     platform packages).\n *   - {@link MemorySealingKeyProvider} — in-memory test provider; uses\n *     a deterministic per-instance \"key\" so two providers with\n *     different ids cannot unseal each other's outputs.\n *   - {@link RecipientHint} — public material a sender uses to seal\n *     plaintext for a specific recipient; published by\n *     {@link RecipientSealer.publishRecipientHint} and transported\n *     out-of-band to the sender before bundle writes.\n *   - {@link RecipientSealer} — interface for asymmetric/granted\n *     providers that support recipient-target sealing (RSA-OAEP,\n *     cloud-KMS asymmetric, etc.); distinct from self-only\n *     {@link SealingKeyProvider} (macOS Keychain, WebAuthn-PRF).\n *   - {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} — in-process reference\n *     implementation of both `RecipientSealer` and\n *     `SealingKeyProvider` using real WebCrypto RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM;\n *     safe for tests and same-process sender/recipient scenarios.\n *   - {@link loadSealedSecret} / {@link saveSealedSecret} —\n *     plaintext envelope storage at `_meta/sealed-secret`.\n *     Mirrors the `_meta/handle` and `_meta/public-envelope` AES-\n *     GCM-bypassed patterns. The sealing layer (provider's job)\n *     is the security boundary; hub doesn't have a key to encrypt\n *     with at this layer — that's the whole point of the design.\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} — orchestrates the \"generate +\n *     seal + persist on first open; unseal on reopen\" flow.\n *     Returns the plaintext secret string that the rest of the\n *     `createNoydb` keyring path consumes.\n *\n * Deferred to follow-ups:\n *   - Block `rotate-secret` policy gate under managed mode.\n *   - Mandatory strong-recovery enforcement.\n *   - Recovery flow under managed mode (generates fresh sealed phrase).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-secret mode\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * The contract concrete providers (per-platform key stores) implement\n * to seal and unseal a hub-generated random secret. The plaintext\n * secret NEVER leaves hub-controlled memory in unsealed form —\n * the provider receives the bytes, returns opaque sealed bytes, and\n * later reverses the operation. Hub treats the sealed bytes as\n * fully opaque.\n *\n * Implementations live OUTSIDE `@noy-db/hub` (separate packages\n * per the issue's \"Concrete providers (live outside hub)\" note):\n *\n * | Platform | Package (TBD) | Backing |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | macOS | `@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain` | Security.framework |\n * | Windows | `@noy-db/seal-wincred` | Credential Manager |\n * | Linux | `@noy-db/seal-libsecret` | libsecret / secret-service |\n * | Cloud / server | `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms` | AWS KMS Decrypt |\n */\nexport interface SealingKeyProvider {\n  /**\n   * Non-sensitive identifier disclosed in the persisted envelope.\n   * Surfaced to consumers via `loadSealedSecret().providerId` so\n   * a vault opened with the wrong provider class can detect the\n   * mismatch and surface a clear error. NOT secret — fine to log.\n   *\n   * Suggested format: `<family>:<scope>` — e.g. `macos-keychain:com.acme.app`,\n   * `aws-kms:arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc`. The hub never\n   * parses this; it's purely audit metadata.\n   */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /** Seal raw secret bytes. Output bytes are opaque to hub. */\n  seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n\n  /**\n   * Reverse {@link seal}. MUST throw on tamper, wrong-provider, or\n   * any other failure — hub treats a thrown error as \"this provider\n   * cannot unlock this vault\" and surfaces it to the caller.\n   */\n  unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory test provider. NOT secure — uses a deterministic\n * per-instance \"key\" (16-byte SHA-256 of `id`) XOR'd over the\n * secret plus a 4-byte provider-id fingerprint prefix. The XOR is\n * sufficient to make different `id` values produce mutually-unsealable\n * outputs (the contract tests for that), but offers ZERO real\n * confidentiality — never use outside tests.\n *\n * Replace with a real platform provider in production.\n */\nexport class MemorySealingKeyProvider implements SealingKeyProvider {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly fingerprint: Uint8Array\n  private readonly keyBytes: Uint8Array\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    // Deterministic 4-byte fingerprint of the provider id, prepended\n    // to every sealed output so we can detect \"wrong provider\" at\n    // unseal time without leaking anything sensitive about either\n    // provider's actual key material.\n    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(opts.id)\n    let h = 0\n    for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i++) {\n      h = (h * 31 + encoded[i]!) >>> 0\n    }\n    this.fingerprint = new Uint8Array([\n      (h >>> 24) & 0xff, (h >>> 16) & 0xff, (h >>> 8) & 0xff, h & 0xff,\n    ])\n    // Deterministic 16-byte \"key\" derived from the id by repeating\n    // the fingerprint with offsets. Good enough for the XOR-stream\n    // test cipher; never confuse this with real key derivation.\n    this.keyBytes = new Uint8Array(16)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {\n      this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4]! ^ (i * 17)\n    }\n  }\n\n  async seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const out = new Uint8Array(4 + secret.length)\n    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0)\n    for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {\n      out[4 + i] = secret[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (sealed.length < 4) {\n      throw new Error('MemorySealingKeyProvider: sealed input too short')\n    }\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealingKeyProvider(\"${this.id}\"): provider-id mismatch on unseal `\n          + '(sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const body = sealed.subarray(4)\n    const out = new Uint8Array(body.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < body.length; i++) {\n      out[i] = body[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. Published by\n * a recipient's RecipientSealer; transported to the sender out-of-band\n * (email, S3, in-app message). The sender obtains the hint, supplies it\n * to writePod's sealedCredentials.perUser[userId].hint, and the\n * hub seals each user's credential against it. Per foundation §11.4.\n */\nexport type RecipientHint = {\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Recipient's provider id; matches the SealedAutoUnlockEntry.pid they'll unseal under. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Algorithm the sender uses to produce the seal. Slice 1 ships RSA-OAEP-SHA256 only. */\n  readonly alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256'\n  /** Public material — alg-specific. For 'rsa-oaep-sha256': { publicKeyPem: string }. */\n  readonly material: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>\n}\n\n// Hoisted to kernel/types.ts (C3 — enclave self-containment: sealing.ts\n// consumes this as a spine-owned contract type). Re-exported here so existing\n// importers of this module are unaffected.\nexport type { RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * Shared RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-GCM seal in the canonical recipient-target\n * TLV wire format. Mints a fresh 32-byte CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts `plaintext`\n * under it, RSA-OAEP-SHA256-wraps the CEK to `publicKeyPem`, and packs:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * This is the single source of truth for the wire format — both\n * {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} and external sealers (e.g. `@noy-db/at-aws-kms`'s\n * asymmetric-KMS recipient sealer) call it so a blob sealed by one unseals\n * by the other. WebCrypto RSA-OAEP/SHA-256 here is wire-compatible with\n * AWS KMS `RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256` (both RSAES-OAEP, SHA-256 hash, MGF1-SHA256,\n * empty label).\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext: Uint8Array, publicKeyPem: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // Parse PEM → SPKI bytes.\n  const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  const spki = base64ToBytes(b64)\n  const recipientPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'spki', spki as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false, ['encrypt'],\n  )\n  // Mint fresh CEK + IV, AES-GCM encrypt plaintext.\n  const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt'])\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const ct = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, plaintext as BufferSource))\n  // RSA-OAEP-wrap the CEK bytes.\n  const wrapped = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, recipientPub, cekBytes as BufferSource))\n  cekBytes.fill(0)\n  if (wrapped.length !== 256) {\n    throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`)\n  }\n  // TLV layout.\n  const out = new Uint8Array(1 + 256 + 12 + ct.length)\n  out[0] = 0x01\n  out.set(wrapped, 1)\n  out.set(iv, 1 + 256)\n  out.set(ct, 1 + 256 + 12)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a {@link sealRsaOaepTlv} blob into its three segments without\n * decrypting. The `wrapped` CEK is RSA-OAEP-SHA256 ciphertext over a\n * 32-byte CEK — the unwrap step is pluggable: {@link MemoryRecipientSealer}\n * decrypts it with a local RSA private key; `@noy-db/at-aws-kms` hands it to\n * KMS `Decrypt`. After unwrapping, pass the CEK + `iv` + `ct` to\n * {@link aesGcmOpen}.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes: Uint8Array): { wrapped: Uint8Array; iv: Uint8Array; ct: Uint8Array } {\n  if (bytes.length < 1 + 256 + 12 + 16) {\n    throw new Error('parseRsaOaepTlv: sealed input too short')\n  }\n  if (bytes[0] !== 0x01) {\n    throw new Error(`parseRsaOaepTlv: unknown TLV version ${bytes[0]}`)\n  }\n  return {\n    wrapped: bytes.subarray(1, 1 + 256),\n    iv: bytes.subarray(1 + 256, 1 + 256 + 12),\n    ct: bytes.subarray(1 + 256 + 12),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-GCM-decrypt the `ct` segment of a {@link parseRsaOaepTlv} result under\n * the unwrapped 32-byte CEK and its `iv`. Throws on a bad tag (tamper) — the\n * same authenticated-decryption guarantee the TLV relies on.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, ct: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt'])\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, ct as BufferSource))\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference implementation of `RecipientSealer` + `SealingKeyProvider`.\n * Uses WebCrypto RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (2048-bit) to wrap a fresh 32-byte\n * AES-GCM CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts plaintext under it, and packs the\n * result into a self-describing TLV:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * Implements BOTH interfaces. `seal(plaintext)` (self-target) is just\n * `sealForRecipient(plaintext, this own hint)` — same TLV. Convenient\n * for tests where one provider plays both ends. Real cloud providers\n * (`at-aws-kms`, etc.) will pick their own internal layouts; the only\n * contract is round-trip identity.\n *\n * SAFE for production within its scope — the cryptography is real\n * (RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM via WebCrypto), but the keypair lives in-process\n * and is regenerated on every construction. Not suitable as a managed\n * keychain; use it for tests and for shipping bundles where the\n * recipient instance lives in the same process as the sender (rare).\n */\nexport class MemoryRecipientSealer implements SealingKeyProvider, RecipientSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keypair: Promise<CryptoKeyPair>\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keypair = crypto.subtle.generateKey(\n      { name: 'RSA-OAEP', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  }\n\n  async publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint> {\n    const { publicKey } = await this.keypair\n    const spki = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('spki', publicKey)\n    const pem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n      + bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(spki)).match(/.{1,64}/g)!.join('\\n')\n      + '\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n    return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256', material: { publicKeyPem: pem } }\n  }\n\n  async sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (hint.v !== 1) {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.v ${String(hint.v)} (expected 1)`)\n    }\n    if (hint.alg !== 'rsa-oaep-sha256') {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.alg '${String(hint.alg)}' (expected 'rsa-oaep-sha256')`)\n    }\n    const pem = hint.material['publicKeyPem']\n    if (typeof pem !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: hint.material.publicKeyPem missing or not a string')\n    }\n    return sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, pem)\n  }\n\n  async seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const hint = await this.publishRecipientHint()\n    return this.sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint)\n  }\n\n  async unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes)\n    const { privateKey } = await this.keypair\n    // Local RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwrap of the CEK — the pluggable step external\n    // sealers replace with KMS Decrypt.\n    const cekBytes = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, privateKey, wrapped as BufferSource))\n    const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct)\n    cekBytes.fill(0)\n    return pt\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Persisted envelope ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Reserved id for the managed-secret envelope under `_meta`. */\nexport const SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID = 'sealed-secret' as const\n\n/** Plaintext payload stored inside the `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope. */\nexport interface SealedSecret {\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  readonly providerId: string\n  /** Sealed bytes. Base64-encoded on the wire; decoded on load. */\n  readonly sealed: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format envelope persisted at `_meta/sealed-secret` for\n * managed-mode vaults. The provider produces raw sealed bytes via\n * {@link SealingKeyProvider.seal}; this wrapper carries the dispatch\n * metadata hub needs to pick the right provider on the unseal path.\n *\n * Stability boundary: once shipped, the wire format only grows by\n * adding optional fields. See the at-* sealing dimension foundation\n * doc, §11.9.1.\n *\n * v1 shape (this release): `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }`.\n *\n * Legacy shape (earlier releases): `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }`\n * — accepted on read for backwards compatibility; never produced on\n * write going forward.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /** Envelope schema version. v1 is the current shape. */\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Magic marker for forensics + legacy-shape detection. */\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  /** Matches the producing provider's `.id`. Dispatch key on unseal. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Sealed bytes from the provider, base64-encoded on the wire. */\n  readonly payload: string\n}\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(b64)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `_meta/sealed-secret` `_data` JSON string into the\n * in-memory {@link SealedSecret} representation. Accepts both:\n *\n *   1. v1 wire format `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }` —\n *      the current shape.\n *   2. Legacy wire format `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }` —\n *      read-only; never written\n *      going forward.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` for any input that doesn't match either shape,\n * so callers can fall back to \"no managed-mode envelope present.\"\n *\n * @internal — exported only for the migration safety-net test suite.\n */\nexport function parseSealedEnvelope(raw: unknown): SealedSecret | undefined {\n  if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined\n  const r = raw as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_sealed !== 1) return undefined\n\n  // v1 shape — preferred.\n  if (\n    r.v === 1\n    && typeof r.pid === 'string'\n    && typeof r.payload === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.pid,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.payload),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Legacy shape — earlier releases. Accept on read for compat.\n  if (\n    typeof r.providerId === 'string'\n    && typeof r.sealed === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.providerId,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.sealed),\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined\n}\n\nexport async function saveSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  payload: { readonly providerId: string; readonly sealed: Uint8Array },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: SealedEnvelope = {\n    v: 1,\n    _noydb_sealed: 1,\n    pid: payload.providerId,\n    payload: bytesToBase64(payload.sealed),\n  }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n\nexport async function loadSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<SealedSecret | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data))\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── createNoydb orchestration ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective plaintext secret string for a managed-mode\n * vault. Two paths:\n *\n *   1. **First open (no envelope persisted):** generate a 256-bit random\n *      via `crypto.getRandomValues`, base64-encode for use as a\n *      secret string, seal the underlying bytes under the\n *      provider, persist `_meta/sealed-secret`, return the\n *      base64 string.\n *\n *   2. **Reopen (envelope exists):** read + unseal + decode → return.\n *      A different provider whose `seal` output disagrees on the\n *      stored bytes throws here, surfaced as a clear error.\n *\n * The returned string is the same shape that `secret:` would take in\n * standard mode — the rest of the keyring path consumes it\n * unchanged.\n *\n * @internal — called from `createNoydb` / `getKeyringInternal`.\n */\nexport async function resolveManagedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  provider: SealingKeyProvider,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const existing = await loadSealedSecret(store, vault)\n  if (existing) {\n    if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Managed-mode vault \"${vault}\" was sealed under provider id `\n        + `\"${existing.providerId}\" but the current SealingKeyProvider is `\n        + `\"${provider.id}\". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled `\n        + 'the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear '\n        + '`_meta/sealed-secret` first.',\n      )\n    }\n    const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed)\n    return bytesToBase64(plaintext)\n  }\n\n  // First open: mint a 256-bit random, seal, persist.\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const sealed = await provider.seal(random)\n  await saveSealedSecret(store, vault, { providerId: provider.id, sealed })\n  return bytesToBase64(random)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAyGO,IAAM,2BAAN,MAA6D;AAAA,EACzD;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AAKf,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE;AAChD,QAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AACvC,UAAK,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAQ;AAAA,IACjC;AACA,SAAK,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,MAC/B,MAAM,KAAM;AAAA,MAAO,MAAM,KAAM;AAAA,MAAO,MAAM,IAAK;AAAA,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D,CAAC;AAID,SAAK,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE;AACjC,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAC3B,WAAK,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,IAAM,IAAI;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,QAAyC;AAClD,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK;AACtC,UAAI,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IAChD;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,QAAyC;AACpD,QAAI,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AACrB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,kDAAkD;AAAA,IACpE;AACA,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG;AACrC,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,6BAA6B,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,QAEtC;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9B,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AACtC,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,IAC1C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AA2CA,eAAsB,eAAe,WAAuB,cAA2C;AAErG,QAAM,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,8BAA8B,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,4BAA4B,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE;AAC7H,QAAM,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG;AAC9B,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,IAAQ;AAAA,IACR,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IAAO,CAAC,SAAS;AAAA,EACnB;AAEA,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,UAA0B,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AACxG,QAAM,KAAK,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACpD,QAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB,GAAG,KAAK,SAAyB,CAAC;AAElI,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,cAAc,QAAwB,CAAC;AACxH,WAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wDAAwD,QAAQ,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC1F;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM;AACnD,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACT,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC;AAClB,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACnB,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AACxB,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAA4E;AAC1G,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACpC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yCAAyC;AAAA,EAC3D;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,GAAM;AACrB,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wCAAwC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,EACpE;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAClC,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,IACxC,IAAI,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,WAAW,UAAsB,IAAgB,IAAqC;AAC1G,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,UAA0B,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;AACxG,SAAO,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAuB,GAAG,KAAK,EAAkB,CAAC;AACzH;AAyBO,IAAM,wBAAN,MAA2E;AAAA,EACvE;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AACf,SAAK,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAC3B,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,eAAe,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACpG;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,uBAA+C;AACnD,UAAM,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC5D,UAAM,MAAM,iCACR,cAAc,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,EAAG,KAAK,IAAI,IAChE;AACJ,WAAO,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,mBAAmB,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACvF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,iBAAiB,WAAuB,MAA0C;AACtF,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAChB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8DAA8D,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,IAC7G;AACA,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAClC,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,iEAAiE,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,gCAAgC;AAAA,IACnI;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,cAAc;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAC3B,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4FAA4F;AAAA,IAC9G;AACA,WAAO,eAAe,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,EACtC;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,WAA4C;AACrD,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,qBAAqB;AAC7C,WAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,OAAwC;AACnD,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,gBAAgB,KAAK;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AAGlC,UAAM,WAAW,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,YAAY,OAAuB,CAAC;AACtH,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAC5C,aAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACf,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAKO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAqCvC,SAAS,cAAc,OAA2B;AAChD,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAK,WAAU,OAAO,aAAa,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE;AAC9E,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AACpB;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,KAAyB;AAC9C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACxC,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAK,KAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AACpE,SAAO;AACT;AAiBO,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAwC;AAC1E,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAM,QAAO;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO;AAGlC,MACE,EAAE,MAAM,KACL,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YACjB,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,UACxB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,MACd,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MACE,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,UACvB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,MACd,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACA,SACe;AACf,QAAM,YAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,GAAG;AAAA,IACH,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,IACb,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,uBAAuB;AACrE,QAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IACV,EAAE,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,yBAAyB,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA;AAAA,IAElF,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EAC5C;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,yBAAyB,GAAG;AAC9D;AAEA,eAAsB,iBACpB,OACA,OACmC;AACnC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,uBAAuB;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,oBAAoB,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAwBA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,UACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,KAAK;AACpD,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,QAAI,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS,IAAI;AACvC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,uBAAuB,KAAK,mCACtB,SAAS,UAAU,4CACnB,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,MAGnB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,MAAM;AACvD,WAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAChC;AAGA,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE;AAChC,aAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AACxC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM;AACzC,QAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM;AAC7B;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-URVL4EKU.js → chunk-NYSD43OE.js}

@@ -2,14 +2,15 @@ import {
   generateULID
 } from "./chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
 import {
+  buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-BKYQNNO3.js";
+} from "./chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
 import {
-  encrypt
-} from "./chunk-QTDAPDDV.js";
+  buildRecordEnvelope
+} from "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
 import {
-  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-5UGEGEIJ.js";
+  encrypt
+} from "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/consent/consent.ts
 var CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = "_consent_audit";
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ async function loadConsentEntries(adapter, vault, encrypted, getDEK, filter = {}
   for (const id of ids.sort()) {
     const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id);
     if (!envelope) continue;
-    const entry = await decryptEntry(envelope, encrypted, getDEK);
+    const entry = await decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK);
     if (!matchesFilter(entry, filter)) continue;
     entries.push(entry);
   }
@@ -37,28 +38,18 @@ async function loadConsentEntries(adapter, vault, encrypted, getDEK, filter = {}
 }
 async function buildEnvelope(entry, encrypted, getDEK) {
   const json = JSON.stringify(entry);
+  const identity = { collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, version: 1 };
+  const body = { ts: entry.timestamp };
   if (!encrypted) {
-    return {
-      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-      _v: 1,
-      _ts: entry.timestamp,
-      _iv: "",
-      _data: json
-    };
+    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: "", data: json });
   }
   const dek = await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION);
-  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek);
-  return {
-    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-    _v: 1,
-    _ts: entry.timestamp,
-    _iv: iv,
-    _data: data
-  };
+  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity));
+  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data });
 }
-async function decryptEntry(envelope, encrypted, getDEK) {
+async function decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK) {
   if (!encrypted) return JSON.parse(envelope._data);
-  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION));
+  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id }, envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION));
   return JSON.parse(json);
 }
 function matchesFilter(entry, f) {
@@ -75,4 +66,4 @@ export {
   writeConsentEntry,
   loadConsentEntries
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-URVL4EKU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NYSD43OE.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NYSD43OE.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/consent/consent.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Consent boundaries — per-access audit log.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const audit = await vault.withConsent(\n *   { purpose: 'quarterly-review', consentHash: '7f3a...' },\n *   async () => {\n *     const invoices = await vault.collection<Invoice>('invoices').list()\n *     return invoices\n *   },\n * )\n *\n * const log = await vault.consentAudit({ since: '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z' })\n * // → entries: { actor, purpose, consentHash, ts, op, collection, id }\n * ```\n *\n * ## Contract\n *\n * Every `get` / `put` / `delete` that happens inside a `withConsent`\n * callback writes one entry to the reserved `_consent_audit`\n * collection. Entries are encrypted with the vault's consent-audit\n * DEK (separate from per-user-collection DEKs so access-log queries\n * don't require unwrapping individual collection keys). Outside a\n * `withConsent` scope, no entries are written — consent is\n * opt-in by design (GDPR Art. 7: *demonstrable*, *specific*\n * consent).\n *\n * ## Why store the hash, not the consent text?\n *\n * The `consentHash` is the sha256 of whatever consent receipt the\n * actor presented (a signed GDPR banner click, a HIPAA authorisation\n * PDF, an API-level `X-Consent-Hash` header). Storing only the hash:\n *\n *   1. Keeps the audit log small and indexable.\n *   2. Preserves zero-knowledge at the adapter — adapters see\n *      ciphertext envelopes of `{ actor, purpose, consentHash, ts,\n *      op, collection, id }`, never the consent record itself.\n *   3. Lets the regulator verify a presented consent doc matches\n *      the logged hash at audit time without the system ever\n *      possessing the doc.\n *\n * ## Concurrency\n *\n * The consent context lives on the {@link Vault} instance. Two\n * concurrent `withConsent` calls on the same Vault would stomp each\n * other — documented limitation; adopters needing per-flight scope\n * should use separate Vault instances or an AsyncLocalStorage shim.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope, NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { generateULID } from '../../with-pod/ulid.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection for consent-audit entries. */\nexport const CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_consent_audit'\n\n/**\n * The consent scope active for a block of work. Set via\n * `vault.withConsent()`; observed by the collection's access hooks.\n */\nexport interface ConsentContext {\n  /**\n   * What this access is for. Used by the audit query (`consentAudit\n   * ({ purpose })`) and carried in the stored entry. Free-form; the\n   * regulator or compliance tooling decides the vocabulary.\n   */\n  readonly purpose: string\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded sha256 of whatever consent artefact the actor\n   * presented. Stored as-is in each entry.\n   */\n  readonly consentHash: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Access operation recorded in an audit entry.\n *\n * Union-widening checklist (I-2) — these three sites widen together or a\n * downstream exhaustive switch breaks at its next in-range minor:\n *   1. `ConsentOp` here (public, re-exported at `index.ts`).\n *   2. `onAccess` op union on `kernel/collection-config.ts`.\n *   3. classified ctx `onAccess` op union on `port/with/classified-strategy.ts`\n *      (the `ClassifiedVerifyCtx` one — the `ClassifiedRevealCtx` one stays `'reveal'`-only).\n */\nexport type ConsentOp = 'get' | 'put' | 'delete' | 'reveal' | 'verify' | 'find'\n\n/** One consent-audit record, as decrypted for the caller. */\nexport interface ConsentAuditEntry {\n  /** ULID — stable insertion-order key. */\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly timestamp: string\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly purpose: string\n  readonly consentHash: string\n  readonly op: ConsentOp\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n}\n\n/** Filter passed to `vault.consentAudit()`. */\nexport interface ConsentAuditFilter {\n  /** Only entries at or after this ISO timestamp. */\n  readonly since?: string\n  /** Only entries at or before this ISO timestamp. */\n  readonly until?: string\n  /** Match entries targeting this collection. */\n  readonly collection?: string\n  /** Match entries written by this actor. */\n  readonly actor?: string\n  /** Match entries with this purpose. */\n  readonly purpose?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Write one audit entry. Called by Vault's onAccess hook when a\n * consent context is active.\n */\nexport async function writeConsentEntry(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  entry: Omit<ConsentAuditEntry, 'id' | 'timestamp'>,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const id = generateULID()\n  const full: ConsentAuditEntry = {\n    id,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n    ...entry,\n  }\n  const envelope = await buildEnvelope(full, encrypted, getDEK)\n  await adapter.put(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id, envelope)\n}\n\n/** Load + decrypt + filter all entries. */\nexport async function loadConsentEntries(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n  filter: ConsentAuditFilter = {},\n): Promise<ConsentAuditEntry[]> {\n  const ids = await adapter.list(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n  const entries: ConsentAuditEntry[] = []\n\n  for (const id of ids.sort()) {\n    const envelope = await adapter.get(vault, CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id)\n    if (!envelope) continue\n    const entry = await decryptEntry(id, envelope, encrypted, getDEK)\n    if (!matchesFilter(entry, filter)) continue\n    entries.push(entry)\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n// ── internals ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function buildEnvelope(\n  entry: ConsentAuditEntry,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(entry)\n  // `entry.id` IS the record id the caller writes under, so identity needs no\n  // threading here (#1051).\n  const identity = { collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id: entry.id, version: 1 }\n  const body = { ts: entry.timestamp }\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv: '', data: json })\n  }\n  const dek = await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek, buildRecordAad(identity))\n  return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { ...body, iv, data })\n}\n\nasync function decryptEntry(\n  id: string,\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>,\n): Promise<ConsentAuditEntry> {\n  if (!encrypted) return JSON.parse(envelope._data) as ConsentAuditEntry\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION, id }, envelope, await getDEK(CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION))\n  return JSON.parse(json) as ConsentAuditEntry\n}\n\nfunction matchesFilter(entry: ConsentAuditEntry, f: ConsentAuditFilter): boolean {\n  if (f.since && entry.timestamp < f.since) return false\n  if (f.until && entry.timestamp > f.until) return false\n  if (f.collection && entry.collection !== f.collection) return false\n  if (f.actor && entry.actor !== f.actor) return false\n  if (f.purpose && entry.purpose !== f.purpose) return false\n  return true\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuDO,IAAM,2BAA2B;AA+DxC,eAAsB,kBACpB,SACA,OACA,WACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AACxB,QAAM,OAA0B;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,IACA,YAAW,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAClC,GAAG;AAAA,EACL;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM;AAC5D,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,IAAI,QAAQ;AACjE;AAGA,eAAsB,mBACpB,SACA,OACA,WACA,QACA,SAA6B,CAAC,GACA;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAC9D,QAAM,UAA+B,CAAC;AAEtC,aAAW,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAC3B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,EAAE;AACtE,QAAI,CAAC,SAAU;AACf,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM;AAChE,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc,OAAO,MAAM,EAAG;AACnC,YAAQ,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,EACpB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAIA,eAAe,cACb,OACA,WACA,QAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAGjC,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE;AAClF,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU;AACnC,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,WAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACtE,SAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAC5D;AAEA,eAAe,aACb,IACA,UACA,WACA,QAC4B;AAC5B,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAChD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,0BAA0B,GAAG,GAAG,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAClI,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AACxB;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAA0B,GAAgC;AAC/E,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AACjD,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AACjD,MAAI,EAAE,cAAc,MAAM,eAAe,EAAE,WAAY,QAAO;AAC9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,UAAU,EAAE,MAAO,QAAO;AAC/C,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY,EAAE,QAAS,QAAO;AACrD,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}