@mycadet/assistant 0.12.7 → 0.12.8

package/src/__tests__/credential-routes.test.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, test } from "bun:test";
 
+import { setOverridesForTesting } from "../__tests__/feature-flag-test-helpers.js";
 import {
   BadRequestError,
   ForbiddenError,
@@ -17,7 +18,6 @@ let syncRejects: boolean;
 let disconnectedProviders: string[];
 let credentialIdCounter: number;
 let scrubbedValues: string[];
-let scrubRejects: boolean;
 let liveRecordsUnreachable: boolean;
 
 function metaKey(service: string, field: string): string {
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@ mock.module("../runtime/auth/route-policy.js", () => ({
   ACTOR_PRINCIPALS: [],
 }));
 
-let chatCredentialRevealFlag = false;
-mock.module("../config/assistant-feature-flags.js", () => ({
-  isAssistantFeatureFlagEnabled: (key: string) =>
-    key === "chat-credential-reveal" && chatCredentialRevealFlag,
-}));
 mock.module("../config/loader.js", () => ({
   getConfig: () => ({}),
 }));
@@ -117,16 +112,13 @@ mock.module("../oauth/oauth-store.js", () => ({
   }),
 }));
 
-mock.module("../credential-execution/managed-catalog.js", () => ({
-  fetchManagedCatalog: mock(async () => ({ ok: true, descriptors: [] })),
+mock.module("../credential-execution/cloud-catalog.js", () => ({
+  fetchCloudCatalog: mock(async () => ({ ok: true, descriptors: [] })),
 }));
 
 mock.module("../daemon/credential-transcript-scrub.js", () => ({
   scrubStoredCredentialFromTranscripts: mock(async (value: string) => {
     scrubbedValues.push(value);
-    if (scrubRejects) {
-      throw new Error("transcript sweep failed");
-    }
     return { dbMessagesScrubbed: 0, residentMessagesScrubbed: 0 };
   }),
 }));
@@ -179,7 +171,7 @@ type ListResponse = {
     scrubbedValue: string;
     hasSecret: boolean;
   }>;
-  managedCredentials: unknown[];
+  cloudCredentials: unknown[];
 };
 type DeleteResponse = {
   service: string;
@@ -199,11 +191,10 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     disconnectedProviders = [];
     credentialIdCounter = 0;
     scrubbedValues = [];
-    scrubRejects = false;
     liveRecordsUnreachable = false;
     _resetRevealSuccessRegistryForTest();
     resetForChatMintRegistryForTest();
-    chatCredentialRevealFlag = false;
+    setOverridesForTesting({ "chat-credential-reveal": false });
   });
 
   describe("credentials_reveal", () => {
@@ -341,7 +332,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("a direct local forChat reveal returns the sentinel, records the mint, and no plaintext proof", async () => {
-      chatCredentialRevealFlag = true;
+      setOverridesForTesting({ "chat-credential-reveal": true });
       secureStore.set(seedKey("vercel", "api_token"), SECRET_VALUE);
       openRevealProofWindow();
       const watermark = currentRevealSuccessWatermark();
@@ -376,7 +367,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("a gateway-proxied forChat reveal returns the sentinel but records no mint", async () => {
-      chatCredentialRevealFlag = true;
+      setOverridesForTesting({ "chat-credential-reveal": true });
       secureStore.set(seedKey("vercel", "api_token"), SECRET_VALUE);
 
       const result = (await revealRoute!.handler({
@@ -400,7 +391,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
       // Direct terminal use (outside any conversation's tool shell) has no
       // nonce to forward. The reveal works, but neither registry records —
       // there is no conversation whose transcript could spend the record.
-      chatCredentialRevealFlag = true;
+      setOverridesForTesting({ "chat-credential-reveal": true });
       secureStore.set(seedKey("vercel", "api_token"), SECRET_VALUE);
       openRevealProofWindow();
       const watermark = currentRevealSuccessWatermark();
@@ -421,7 +412,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("a forChat reveal with no principal header records no mint (fails closed)", async () => {
-      chatCredentialRevealFlag = true;
+      setOverridesForTesting({ "chat-credential-reveal": true });
       secureStore.set(seedKey("vercel", "api_token"), SECRET_VALUE);
 
       const result = (await revealRoute!.handler({
@@ -622,57 +613,6 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
       expect(scrubbedValues).toEqual([SECRET_VALUE]);
     });
 
-    test("non-secret cadet cloud fields are stored but never scrubbed", async () => {
-      /**
-       * Platform identity ids are benign UUIDs that legitimately appear in
-       * transcripts; scrubbing them would redact ordinary conversation
-       * content. Shares the exemption with the /v1/secrets credential branch
-       * via isNonSecretPlatformField.
-       *
-       * `platform_base_url` carries the same exemption but is not settable
-       * here: it decides which host receives the platform API key, so the
-       * credentials API refuses it (see the platform-managed suite).
-       */
-      for (const field of [
-        "platform_assistant_id",
-        "platform_organization_id",
-        "platform_user_id",
-      ]) {
-        const result = (await setRoute!.handler({
-          body: {
-            service: "cadet",
-            field,
-            value: "0198f4c2-1111-2222-3333-444455556666",
-          },
-        })) as SetResponse;
-        expect(result.service).toBe("cadet");
-      }
-
-      expect(scrubbedValues).toEqual([]);
-    });
-
-    test("the set still succeeds when the transcript scrub rejects", async () => {
-      /**
-       * The scrub is post-store hygiene: the credential IS stored, so a
-       * scrub failure is logged and must stay invisible to the caller.
-       */
-      // GIVEN a scrub that rejects
-      scrubRejects = true;
-
-      // WHEN a credential is stored
-      const result = (await setRoute!.handler({
-        body: { service: "vercel", field: "api_token", value: SECRET_VALUE },
-      })) as SetResponse;
-
-      // THEN the route still returns success and the secret is persisted
-      expect(result.service).toBe("vercel");
-      expect(result.credentialId).toBe("cred-1");
-      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("vercel", "api_token"))).toBe(
-        SECRET_VALUE,
-      );
-      expect(scrubbedValues).toEqual([SECRET_VALUE]);
-    });
-
     test("leaves a non-ACP service unaffected by the OAuth-field guard", async () => {
       /**
        * The guard is scoped to the ACP service; the same field name on another
@@ -858,16 +798,15 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  describe("platform-managed credentials", () => {
+  describe("cloud credentials", () => {
     const PLATFORM_KEY = "vk-platform-provisioned-key";
-    const PLATFORM_BASE_URL = "https://platform.example";
 
     /**
-     * The platform provisions the pod's own credentials by POSTing them to
+     * The cloud provisions the pod's own credentials by POSTing them to
      * `/v1/secrets` as `credential` entries, which land in the same secure
      * store and metadata table as a user's own credentials.
      */
-    function seedPlatformCredential(field: string, value: string): string {
+    function seedCloudCredential(field: string, value: string): string {
       // The secure store speaks the REAL credentialKey format; the metadata
       // mock keeps its own service:field addressing.
       secureStore.set(seedKey("cadet", field), value);
@@ -886,9 +825,8 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     }
 
     test("the listing omits cloud credentials and keeps the user's own", async () => {
-      // GIVEN the platform's provisioned credentials alongside a user's
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      // GIVEN the cloud's provisioned credentials alongside a user's
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
       await setRoute!.handler({
         body: { service: "vercel", field: "api_token", value: SECRET_VALUE },
       });
@@ -903,12 +841,12 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
       expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(PLATFORM_KEY);
     });
 
-    test("reveal refuses the platform API key for every principal", async () => {
+    test("reveal refuses the cloud API key for every principal", async () => {
       /**
        * Both farming paths land on this handler: the assistant's own tool
        * shell arrives as `local`, a Settings click as `user`.
        */
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
       for (const principal of ["local", "user", "svc_gateway"]) {
         await expect(
@@ -921,7 +859,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("reveal refuses a cloud credential looked up by UUID", async () => {
-      const credentialId = seedPlatformCredential(
+      const credentialId = seedCloudCredential(
         "assistant_api_key",
         PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
@@ -935,75 +873,67 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("inspect refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          inspectRoute!.handler({
-            body: { service: "cadet", field },
-          }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        inspectRoute!.handler({
+          body: { service: "cadet", field: "assistant_api_key" },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
     });
 
     test("set refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
       /**
-       * A write is a read by another name: repointing `platform_base_url`
-       * sends the next platform call, bearing the API key, to a host the
-       * writer chose. The platform's own provisioning does not come through
+       * The cloud key is owned by the cloud's own provisioning; a
+       * hand-set key would spend Cadet's inference budget on a caller the
+       * writer chose. The cloud's own provisioning does not come through
        * this route; it writes over `POST /v1/secrets`.
        */
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          setRoute!.handler({
-            body: { service: "cadet", field, value: "https://attacker.test" },
-          }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        setRoute!.handler({
+          body: {
+            service: "cadet",
+            field: "assistant_api_key",
+            value: "attacker-key",
+          },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
 
       expect(secureStore.has(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
         false,
       );
-      expect(secureStore.has(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        false,
-      );
     });
 
     test("set does not overwrite an already-provisioned cloud credential", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
       await expect(
         setRoute!.handler({
           body: {
             service: "cadet",
-            field: "platform_base_url",
-            value: "https://attacker.test",
+            field: "assistant_api_key",
+            value: "attacker-key",
           },
         }),
       ).rejects.toThrow(/owned by Cadet Cloud/);
 
-      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        PLATFORM_BASE_URL,
+      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
+        PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
     });
 
     test("delete refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          deleteRoute!.handler({ body: { service: "cadet", field } }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        deleteRoute!.handler({
+          body: { service: "cadet", field: "assistant_api_key" },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
 
       expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
         PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
-      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        PLATFORM_BASE_URL,
-      );
     });
 
     test("a user credential is still writable and deletable", async () => {
@@ -1023,7 +953,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("a user credential still inspects and reveals", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
       await setRoute!.handler({
         body: { service: "vercel", field: "api_token", value: SECRET_VALUE },
       });
@@ -1041,16 +971,15 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  describe("platform-managed credentials", () => {
+  describe("cloud credentials", () => {
     const PLATFORM_KEY = "vk-platform-provisioned-key";
-    const PLATFORM_BASE_URL = "https://platform.example";
 
     /**
-     * The platform provisions the pod's own credentials by POSTing them to
+     * The cloud provisions the pod's own credentials by POSTing them to
      * `/v1/secrets` as `credential` entries, which land in the same secure
      * store and metadata table as a user's own credentials.
      */
-    function seedPlatformCredential(field: string, value: string): string {
+    function seedCloudCredential(field: string, value: string): string {
       // The secure store speaks the REAL credentialKey format; the metadata
       // mock keeps its own service:field addressing.
       secureStore.set(seedKey("cadet", field), value);
@@ -1069,9 +998,8 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     }
 
     test("the listing omits cloud credentials and keeps the user's own", async () => {
-      // GIVEN the platform's provisioned credentials alongside a user's
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      // GIVEN the cloud's provisioned credentials alongside a user's
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
       await setRoute!.handler({
         body: { service: "vercel", field: "api_token", value: SECRET_VALUE },
       });
@@ -1086,12 +1014,12 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
       expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(PLATFORM_KEY);
     });
 
-    test("reveal refuses the platform API key for every principal", async () => {
+    test("reveal refuses the cloud API key for every principal", async () => {
       /**
        * Both farming paths land on this handler: the assistant's own tool
        * shell arrives as `local`, a Settings click as `user`.
        */
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
       for (const principal of ["local", "user", "svc_gateway"]) {
         await expect(
@@ -1104,7 +1032,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("reveal refuses a cloud credential looked up by UUID", async () => {
-      const credentialId = seedPlatformCredential(
+      const credentialId = seedCloudCredential(
         "assistant_api_key",
         PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
@@ -1118,75 +1046,67 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("inspect refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          inspectRoute!.handler({
-            body: { service: "cadet", field },
-          }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        inspectRoute!.handler({
+          body: { service: "cadet", field: "assistant_api_key" },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
     });
 
     test("set refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
       /**
-       * A write is a read by another name: repointing `platform_base_url`
-       * sends the next platform call, bearing the API key, to a host the
-       * writer chose. The platform's own provisioning does not come through
+       * The cloud key is owned by the cloud's own provisioning; a
+       * hand-set key would spend Cadet's inference budget on a caller the
+       * writer chose. The cloud's own provisioning does not come through
        * this route; it writes over `POST /v1/secrets`.
        */
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          setRoute!.handler({
-            body: { service: "cadet", field, value: "https://attacker.test" },
-          }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        setRoute!.handler({
+          body: {
+            service: "cadet",
+            field: "assistant_api_key",
+            value: "attacker-key",
+          },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
 
       expect(secureStore.has(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
         false,
       );
-      expect(secureStore.has(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        false,
-      );
     });
 
     test("set does not overwrite an already-provisioned cloud credential", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
       await expect(
         setRoute!.handler({
           body: {
             service: "cadet",
-            field: "platform_base_url",
-            value: "https://attacker.test",
+            field: "assistant_api_key",
+            value: "attacker-key",
           },
         }),
       ).rejects.toThrow(/owned by Cadet Cloud/);
 
-      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        PLATFORM_BASE_URL,
+      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
+        PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
     });
 
     test("delete refuses cloud credentials", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
-      seedPlatformCredential("platform_base_url", PLATFORM_BASE_URL);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
 
-      for (const field of ["assistant_api_key", "platform_base_url"]) {
-        await expect(
-          deleteRoute!.handler({ body: { service: "cadet", field } }),
-        ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
-      }
+      await expect(
+        deleteRoute!.handler({
+          body: { service: "cadet", field: "assistant_api_key" },
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(ForbiddenError);
 
       expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "assistant_api_key"))).toBe(
         PLATFORM_KEY,
       );
-      expect(secureStore.get(seedKey("cadet", "platform_base_url"))).toBe(
-        PLATFORM_BASE_URL,
-      );
     });
 
     test("a user credential is still writable and deletable", async () => {
@@ -1206,7 +1126,7 @@ describe("credentials routes", () => {
     });
 
     test("a user credential still inspects and reveals", async () => {
-      seedPlatformCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
+      seedCloudCredential("assistant_api_key", PLATFORM_KEY);
       await setRoute!.handler({
         body: { service: "vercel", field: "api_token", value: SECRET_VALUE },
       });

package/src/__tests__/credential-security-invariants.test.ts

@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ describe("Invariant 2: no generic plaintext secret read API", () => {
       "runtime/routes/inference-provider-connection-routes.ts", // connection delete removes its dedicated per-connection key slot (deleteSecureKeyAsync only; no reads)
       "daemon/handlers/config-slack-channel.ts", // Slack channel config credential management
       "daemon/handlers/config-discord-channel.ts", // Discord channel bot token management
-      "providers/platform-proxy/context.ts", // managed proxy API key lookup for provider initialization
-      "platform/client.ts", // platform client credential store fallback for standalone CLI auth
+      "providers/cloud-proxy/context.ts", // cloud proxy API key lookup for provider initialization
+      "cloud/client.ts", // cloud client credential store fallback for standalone CLI auth
       "mcp/mcp-header-store.ts", // MCP static auth header persistence (credential store CRUD + legacy migration)
       "mcp/mcp-oauth-provider.ts", // MCP OAuth token/client/discovery persistence
       "messaging/providers/slack/auth.ts", // canonical Slack auth resolver (bot/user token lookup for adapter + routes)
@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ describe("Invariant 2: no generic plaintext secret read API", () => {
       "persistence/llm-request-log-source-clickhouse.ts", // ClickHouse read source — lazy lookup of clickhouse:url + clickhouse:password + cadet:platform_assistant_id for self-scoped mirror reads
       "persistence/llm-request-log-sink-clickhouse.ts", // ClickHouse write sink — lazy lookup of clickhouse:url + clickhouse:password + cadet:platform_assistant_id for self-scoped log writes
       "persistence/compaction-log-store-clickhouse.ts", // ClickHouse compaction log writer — lazy lookup of clickhouse:url + clickhouse:password + cadet:platform_assistant_id for self-scoped event writes
-      "config/platform-identity.ts", // assistant API key lookup for platform identity validate
-      "config/platform-rehydration.ts", // startup rehydration of platform base URL from the credential store and ids from platform validate
+      "config/cloud-identity.ts", // assistant API key lookup for platform identity validate
+      "config/cloud-rehydration.ts", // startup rehydration of platform base URL from the credential store and ids from platform validate
       "workspace/migrations/006-services-config.ts", // services config migration reads provider API keys
       "workspace/migrations/018-rekey-compound-credential-keys.ts", // re-key compound credential storage keys
       "daemon/conversation-process.ts", // masked provider key display
@@ -223,14 +223,13 @@ describe("Invariant 2: no generic plaintext secret read API", () => {
       "runtime/routes/credential-prompt-routes.ts", // Route for secure credential prompt (stores secret via setSecureKeyAsync)
       "runtime/routes/credential-routes.ts", // CLI credential management routes (CLI-migrated to IPC)
       "runtime/routes/sanity-routes.ts", // Sanity connect/discover routes (reads stored api_token from credential store)
-      "runtime/routes/platform-routes.ts", // CLI platform connect/disconnect/status routes (CLI-migrated to IPC)
+      "runtime/routes/cloud-routes.ts", // CLI platform connect/disconnect/status routes (CLI-migrated to IPC)
       "runtime/routes/roadmap-routes.ts", // signs public-roadmap calls with the assistant API key (outbound Authorization header only; the value never reaches a response, a log, or the CLI process)
-      "inbound/platform-callback-registration.ts", // managed credential lookup for platform base URL and API key
+      "inbound/cloud-callback-registration.ts", // managed API key lookup for callback registration
       "tts/providers/elevenlabs-provider.ts", // ElevenLabs TTS API key lookup
       "tts/providers/deepgram-provider.ts", // Deepgram TTS API key lookup
       "tts/providers/xai-provider.ts", // xAI TTS API key lookup
       "credential-health/credential-health-service.ts", // credential health check reads access tokens for liveness pings
-      "runtime/routes/avatar-routes.ts", // avatar generate route reads platform_base_url from credential store
       "cli/commands/keys.ts", // CLI provider key management
       "cli/commands/oauth/connect.ts", // CLI OAuth connect stored-secret verification
       "runtime/routes/identity-routes.ts", // health/readyz endpoint checks CES connectivity via getCesClient

package/src/__tests__/custom-profile-ensure.test.ts

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ describe("ensureCompleteCustomProfiles", () => {
     expect(saved.provider_connection).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
-  test("inherits the cadet managed connection only onto managed-routable providers", () => {
+  test("inherits the cadet cloud connection only onto managed-routable providers", () => {
     writeConfig({
       llm: {
         default: { ...distinctiveDefault, provider_connection: "cadet" },

package/src/__tests__/date-context.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
 
-import { UiConfigSchema } from "../config/schemas/platform.js";
+import { UiConfigSchema } from "../config/schemas/cloud.js";
 import {
   canonicalizeTimeZone,
   extractUserTimeZoneFromRecall,

package/src/__tests__/default-profile-catalog-fallback.test.ts

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
  *   upstream than its primary, so an outage at the primary's provider can
  *   be served by the backup.
  * - Probe coverage: every backup model is a catalog member of its upstream
- *   provider, which is what feeds the platform's model liveness probe.
- * - Scoping: backups exist for the managed column only. A BYOK or chatgpt
+ *   provider, which is what feeds the cloud's model liveness probe.
+ * - Scoping: backups exist for the cloud column only. A BYOK or chatgpt
  *   default provider materializes no backup profiles, and its primaries
  *   carry no `fallbackProfile` pointers.
  * - The effective catalog parses under `LLMSchema` (exercising the
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ import {
   FALLBACK_PROFILE_BY_KEY,
 } from "../config/default-profile-names.js";
 import { LLMSchema, type ProfileEntry } from "../config/schemas/llm.js";
-import { getManagedUpstream } from "../providers/cadet-model-routing.js";
+import { getCloudUpstream } from "../providers/cadet-model-routing.js";
 import { isModelInCatalog } from "../providers/model-catalog.js";
 
 const cadet = { provider: "cadet" as const };
@@ -76,12 +76,12 @@ describe("fallbackProfile pointers on the cadet column", () => {
 });
 
 describe("cross-provider rule", () => {
-  test("every backup dispatches through a different managed upstream than its primary", () => {
+  test("every backup dispatches through a different cloud upstream than its primary", () => {
     for (const key of DEFAULT_PROFILE_KEYS) {
       const primary = CODE_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ENTRIES[key];
       const backup = CODE_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ENTRIES[FALLBACK_PROFILE_BY_KEY[key]];
-      const primaryUpstream = getManagedUpstream(primary.model as string);
-      const backupUpstream = getManagedUpstream(backup.model as string);
+      const primaryUpstream = getCloudUpstream(primary.model as string);
+      const backupUpstream = getCloudUpstream(backup.model as string);
       expect(primaryUpstream).not.toBeNull();
       expect(backupUpstream).not.toBeNull();
       expect(backupUpstream).not.toBe(primaryUpstream);
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ describe("cross-provider rule", () => {
   test("every backup model is a catalog member of its upstream (liveness-probe coverage)", () => {
     for (const key of BACKUP_PROFILE_KEYS) {
       const model = CODE_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ENTRIES[key].model as string;
-      const upstream = getManagedUpstream(model);
+      const upstream = getCloudUpstream(model);
       expect(upstream).not.toBeNull();
       expect(isModelInCatalog(upstream as string, model)).toBe(true);
     }
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ describe("cross-provider rule", () => {
 });
 
 describe("managed-column-only scoping", () => {
-  test("the managed column materializes the backups after the primaries", () => {
+  test("the cloud column materializes the backups after the primaries", () => {
     const effective = getEffectiveProfilesForProvider(
       LLMSchema.parse({ default: cadet }),
     );
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ describe("managed-column-only scoping", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  test("a persisted managed stub does not resurrect a backup off the managed column", () => {
-    // A `config get` -> `config set` round-trip on a managed install can
+  test("a persisted managed stub does not resurrect a backup off the cloud column", () => {
+    // A `config get` -> `config set` round-trip on a cloud install can
     // leave a thin managed stub for a backup in `llm.profiles`
-    // (`normalizeManagedProfileWrites`). The stub is the workspace's slot for
+    // (`normalizeCloudProfileWrites`). The stub is the workspace's slot for
     // a code-owned body, not a profile, so once the column has no body behind
     // it the name must stop being listed rather than resolve to a
     // providerless entry the pickers would offer and `LLMSchema` would
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ describe("managed-column-only scoping", () => {
         }),
       ).toBeUndefined();
     }
-    // The managed column still has a body for the stub to stand for.
+    // The cloud column still has a body for the stub to stand for.
     expect(
       getEffectiveProfilesForProvider(
         LLMSchema.parse({ profiles: workspace, default: cadet }),
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ describe("managed-column-only scoping", () => {
     ).toBe(CODE_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ENTRIES["balanced-backup"]?.model);
   });
 
-  test("a user-owned entry under a backup name stays listed off the managed column", () => {
+  test("a user-owned entry under a backup name stays listed off the cloud column", () => {
     // Nothing code-owned resolves there, so the entry is simply a profile of
     // that name and keeps its own body.
     const workspace: Record<string, ProfileEntry> = {
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ describe("effective-profile machinery", () => {
   test("a workspace entry never overlays a backup, whatever its source", () => {
     // Backups are code-owned (`CODE_OWNED_PROFILE_NAMES`), so unlike the
     // primaries they take no workspace overlay at all: not the usual
-    // label/status/topP whitelist from a managed stub, and not a user-owned
+    // label/status/topP whitelist from a cloud stub, and not a user-owned
     // shadow. Disabling a backup through a hand-edited config would strand
     // the primary's fallback exactly when it is needed.
     for (const source of ["managed", "user"] as const) {
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ describe("effective-profile machinery", () => {
 
   test("backup profiles are delete-protected like the other managed defaults", () => {
     // Membership in these sets is what wires the route-level deletion
-    // rejection (`rejectManagedProfileDeletion`, `handleCreateProfile`) and
+    // rejection (`rejectCloudProfileDeletion`, `handleCreateProfile`) and
     // the commitConfigWrite invariant guard
     // (`assertInvariantProfilesPreserved`).
     for (const key of BACKUP_PROFILE_KEYS) {