@luanpdd/kit-mcp 1.20.0 → 1.22.0

package/kit/skills/evolution-go-whatsapp-integration/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+---
+name: evolution-go-whatsapp-integration
+description: Use ao integrar Evolution Go (whatsmeow) ou Meta Cloud API com Supabase B2B multi-tenant — webhook handler com tenant_id no URL path, HMAC-SHA256 (Meta) ou API key + IP whitelist (Evolution Go), idempotência via unique(org_id, message_id), rate limit Meta 80 msg/s, throttle Evolution Go 1 msg/s.
+---
+
+# Evolution Go + WhatsApp — Integração Multi-Tenant Supabase
+
+## Quando usar
+
+LLM carrega esta skill ao integrar WhatsApp em B2B SaaS multi-tenant. Trigger phrases:
+
+- "Evolution Go integration", "evolution-api whatsmeow"
+- "WhatsApp Cloud API Meta", "WhatsApp Business API"
+- "webhook signature HMAC SHA256"
+- "tenant identification webhook"
+- "whatsapp idempotency message_id"
+- "rate limit Meta 80 msg/s", "Evolution Go throttle"
+
+## Regras absolutas
+
+**REGRA #1 (HMAC validation antes de JSON.parse — Meta):** Meta envia `X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hmac>` header. Validar HMAC sobre **raw body** **ANTES** de parse JSON. Middleware que parseia primeiro = signature inválida (body mutado).
+
+**REGRA #2 (timing-safe comparison):** HMAC validation usa `crypto.timingSafeEqual` (Node) ou `crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual` (Deno). Comparação `===` direta = timing attack — atacante deduz HMAC byte-a-byte por timing.
+
+**REGRA #3 (tenant identification):** Webhook URL contém `org_id`: `/functions/v1/whatsapp/{org_id}/webhook`. Edge Function valida UUID format ANTES de qualquer processamento. Para Evolution Go, alternativa é `instance_name` no payload → lookup `org_id` em tabela `org_whatsapp_configs`.
+
+**REGRA #4 (idempotência via unique constraint):** Tabela `whatsapp_messages` tem `unique(org_id, message_id)`. INSERT usa `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`. Meta entrega at-least-once com retry 7 dias — duplicatas SÃO normais, não excessões.
+
+**REGRA #5 (rate limit Meta — 80 msg/s):** Meta Cloud API: 80 msg/s default por número. Erro 131056 quando exceder, escala para 24h ban se persistir. Throttle server-side via `pgmq` queue ou rate limiter Edge.
+
+**REGRA #6 (throttle Evolution Go — 1 msg/s):** Evolution Go usa whatsmeow (protocolo WhatsApp Web não-oficial). WhatsApp Web bane número se enviar massivamente. Default conservador: 1 msg/s manual no app code (biblioteca não enforce).
+
+**REGRA #7 (HMAC secret per-org):** Cada org tem `hmac_secret` próprio (gerado no setup, armazenado em `org_whatsapp_configs`). Vazamento de secret de uma org não compromete outras.
+
+## Patterns canônicos
+
+### Tabela `org_whatsapp_configs`
+
+```sql
+create table public.org_whatsapp_configs (
+  org_id uuid primary key references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  provider text not null check (provider in ('meta_cloud', 'evolution_go')),
+  phone_number_id text,                  -- Meta Cloud API phone_number_id
+  evolution_instance_name text,          -- Evolution Go instance name (alternative)
+  hmac_secret text,                       -- per-org webhook HMAC (Meta) — REGRA #7
+  api_key_vault_ref text,                -- Vault secret reference (não armazenar key direto)
+  enabled boolean not null default true,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.org_whatsapp_configs enable row level security;
+
+-- RLS: members com permission update:org_settings
+create policy "org_whatsapp_configs_select" on public.org_whatsapp_configs
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.is_member_of(org_id));
+
+create policy "org_whatsapp_configs_update" on public.org_whatsapp_configs
+  for update to authenticated
+  using (private.has_permission('update', 'org_settings', org_id))
+  with check (private.has_permission('update', 'org_settings', org_id));
+```
+
+### Tabela `whatsapp_messages` — idempotency built-in
+
+```sql
+create table public.whatsapp_messages (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  message_id text not null,              -- ID do WhatsApp (provider)
+  direction text not null check (direction in ('inbound', 'outbound')),
+  contact_phone text not null,
+  contact_name text,
+  content text,
+  message_type text check (message_type in ('text', 'image', 'audio', 'document', 'location', 'contact', 'reaction')),
+  payload jsonb,                          -- raw payload do provider
+  status text default 'received' check (status in ('received', 'sent', 'delivered', 'read', 'failed')),
+  conversation_id uuid,                   -- FK para conversations (state machine)
+  received_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  unique (org_id, message_id)            -- REGRA #4: idempotency
+);
+
+create index whatsapp_messages_org_phone_idx on public.whatsapp_messages (org_id, contact_phone, received_at desc);
+create index whatsapp_messages_conversation_idx on public.whatsapp_messages (conversation_id) where conversation_id is not null;
+
+alter table public.whatsapp_messages enable row level security;
+-- RLS standard multi-tenant (members lê todas, super_admin bypass)
+```
+
+### Webhook handler — Edge Function (Meta Cloud)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-webhook/index.ts
+import { createClient } from 'jsr:@supabase/supabase-js@2'
+import { encodeHex } from 'jsr:@std/encoding@1/hex'
+
+// REGRA #2: timing-safe comparison nativo Deno
+async function verifyHmac(rawBody: string, signature: string, secret: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    'raw',
+    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
+    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },
+    false,
+    ['sign']
+  )
+
+  const computedSig = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, new TextEncoder().encode(rawBody))
+  const expected = encodeHex(new Uint8Array(computedSig))
+
+  // Timing-safe comparison
+  if (signature.length !== expected.length) return false
+  let result = 0
+  for (let i = 0; i < signature.length; i++) {
+    result |= signature.charCodeAt(i) ^ expected.charCodeAt(i)
+  }
+  return result === 0
+}
+
+Deno.serve(async (req) => {
+  // REGRA #3: extract org_id from URL path
+  const url = new URL(req.url)
+  const pathParts = url.pathname.split('/')
+  const orgId = pathParts[pathParts.length - 2]  // /whatsapp/<org_id>/webhook
+  if (!orgId.match(/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/)) {
+    return new Response('invalid_org_id', { status: 400 })
+  }
+
+  // REGRA #1: read raw body BEFORE parse
+  const rawBody = await req.text()
+
+  // service_role para acessar org_whatsapp_configs (webhook não tem JWT user)
+  const admin = createClient(
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!,
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!
+  )
+
+  // Buscar HMAC secret da org
+  const { data: config } = await admin
+    .from('org_whatsapp_configs')
+    .select('hmac_secret, provider, enabled')
+    .eq('org_id', orgId)
+    .single()
+
+  if (!config || !config.enabled) {
+    return new Response('config_not_found_or_disabled', { status: 404 })
+  }
+
+  // Validar HMAC (Meta) — REGRA #1 + #2
+  if (config.provider === 'meta_cloud') {
+    const sigHeader = req.headers.get('x-hub-signature-256') || ''
+    const sig = sigHeader.replace('sha256=', '')
+    if (!await verifyHmac(rawBody, sig, config.hmac_secret)) {
+      return new Response('invalid_signature', { status: 403 })
+    }
+  } else if (config.provider === 'evolution_go') {
+    // Evolution Go usa API key + IP whitelist (HMAC não documentada)
+    const apiKey = req.headers.get('apikey')
+    if (apiKey !== Deno.env.get('EVOLUTION_GO_API_KEY')) {
+      return new Response('invalid_api_key', { status: 403 })
+    }
+    // Optional: validar IP origem em allowlist
+  }
+
+  // Agora parse JSON (signature já validada)
+  const payload = JSON.parse(rawBody)
+
+  // Extrair message do payload (formato varia por provider)
+  const messages = config.provider === 'meta_cloud'
+    ? payload.entry?.[0]?.changes?.[0]?.value?.messages || []
+    : payload.data?.messages || [payload.data]
+
+  // REGRA #4: idempotent insert
+  for (const msg of messages) {
+    const { error } = await admin.from('whatsapp_messages').insert({
+      org_id: orgId,
+      message_id: msg.id,
+      direction: 'inbound',
+      contact_phone: msg.from,
+      contact_name: msg.profile?.name,
+      content: msg.text?.body || null,
+      message_type: msg.type,
+      payload: msg
+    })
+    // ON CONFLICT (org_id, message_id) DO NOTHING — duplicate ignored silently
+    // (Postgres returns 0 rows affected, no error)
+  }
+
+  // Audit log inbound
+  await admin.rpc('audit_log', {
+    p_event_type: 'custom_whatsapp_webhook_received',
+    p_tenant_id: orgId,
+    p_payload: { message_count: messages.length, provider: config.provider }
+  })
+
+  // Meta espera 200 OK rapidamente (timeout 20s — processamento longo deve ser async)
+  return new Response('ok', { status: 200 })
+})
+```
+
+### Send message com rate limit (Meta Cloud)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-send/index.ts
+// PT-BR: rate limiter via pgmq (queue + worker) para respeitar 80 msg/s Meta
+// REGRA #5
+
+Deno.serve(async (req) => {
+  const auth = req.headers.get('Authorization')
+  // ... validate JWT, extract org_id ...
+
+  const { to, message } = await req.json()
+
+  // Em vez de enviar direto, enfilera em pgmq (rate limit no consumer)
+  await admin.rpc('pgmq_send', {
+    queue_name: `whatsapp_outbound_${orgId.replace(/-/g, '_')}`,
+    msg: { to, message, sent_by: caller.id, timestamp: new Date() }
+  })
+
+  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ queued: true }), { status: 202 })
+})
+
+// Worker separado (cron 1s) consome queue e chama Meta API respeitando 80 msg/s
+// (Edge Function `whatsapp-send-worker` invocada por pg_cron a cada 1s)
+```
+
+### Lookup contact → lead (integração CRM)
+
+```typescript
+// Em handler webhook, após inserir whatsapp_messages, criar/lookup lead
+const { data: existingLead } = await admin
+  .from('leads')
+  .select('id, owner_id')
+  .eq('org_id', orgId)
+  .eq('contact_phone', msg.from)
+  .maybeSingle()
+
+if (!existingLead) {
+  // Auto-create lead (Phase 113)
+  await admin.from('leads').insert({
+    org_id: orgId,
+    contact_phone: msg.from,
+    contact_name: msg.profile?.name,
+    stage: 'lead',
+    source: 'whatsapp_inbound'
+  })
+}
+```
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+### Anti-pattern 1: HMAC validation depois de JSON.parse
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+const payload = await req.json()  // body já parsed e mutado
+if (!verifyHmac(JSON.stringify(payload), sig, secret)) { ... }  // signature inválida!
+```
+
+**Por quê:** `JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(body))` não retorna bytes idênticos ao original (espaço, ordem keys, números). Hash diferente. Validação sempre falha (ou nunca falha, dependendo do bug).
+
+**Certo:** `req.text()` para raw body, validar HMAC, depois `JSON.parse(rawBody)`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 2: Comparação `===` em HMAC
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+if (computedSig === providedSig) { ... }
+```
+
+**Por quê:** comparação JS faz short-circuit no primeiro byte diferente. Atacante mede tempo de resposta, deduz HMAC byte-a-byte ao longo de horas.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #2 — `crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual` ou loop XOR-only.
+
+### Anti-pattern 3: Webhook sem idempotency
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+await admin.from('whatsapp_messages').insert({ ..., message_id: msg.id })
+// Sem ON CONFLICT — segundo retry duplica
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Meta retry behavior at-least-once por 7 dias. Sem dedup, mesma mensagem entra N vezes na DB → CRM com leads duplicadas, contagens erradas, cobrança errada.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #4 — `unique(org_id, message_id)` + `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 4: Send direto sem rate limit
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+// Loop enviando 1000 mensagens
+for (const lead of leads) {
+  await fetch('https://graph.facebook.com/.../messages', { body: ... })
+}
+// → 80 msg/s exceeded → erro 131056 → 24h ban do número
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Meta enforce rigoroso. Penalty é severa (24h sem usar o número = perda de cliente real ligando).
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #5 — pgmq queue + worker com rate limit 80 msg/s. Para Evolution Go, REGRA #6 — 1 msg/s manual.
+
+### Anti-pattern 5: HMAC secret compartilhado entre orgs
+
+**Errado:**
+```typescript
+const secret = Deno.env.get('META_HMAC_SECRET')  // global, mesmo para todas orgs
+```
+
+**Por quê:** vazamento via uma org = comprometimento de todas. Compliance multi-tenant exige isolation.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #7 — `hmac_secret` em `org_whatsapp_configs` per-org. Generate no setup do Meta App per-org.
+
+## Ver também
+
+- [whatsapp-conversation-state-machine](../whatsapp-conversation-state-machine/SKILL.md) — Phase 112 sibling, modelagem de conversas
+- [crm-lead-pipeline-patterns](../crm-lead-pipeline-patterns/SKILL.md) — Phase 113, lookup contact→lead
+- [audit-log-multi-tenant](../audit-log-multi-tenant/SKILL.md) — Phase 109, eventos `custom_whatsapp_*`
+- [supabase-cron-queues](../supabase-cron-queues/SKILL.md) — pgmq queue + worker pattern para rate limit
+- [supabase-edge-fn-writer](../../agents/supabase-edge-fn-writer.md) — agent que escreve Edge Functions
+- [_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md](../_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md) — `Evolution Go`, `Meta Cloud API`, `HMAC-SHA256`, `idempotency key`, `rate limit Meta`
+- [Meta Developers — WhatsApp Webhooks](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/whatsapp/cloud-api/guides/set-up-webhooks/)
+- [Meta Developers — Messaging Limits](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/whatsapp/messaging-limits/)
+- [Evolution API Documentation](https://doc.evolution-api.com/v2/en/configuration/webhooks)

package/kit/skills/lgpd-multi-tenant-compliance/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+---
+name: lgpd-multi-tenant-compliance
+description: Use ao implementar compliance LGPD (Lei 13.709/2018) per-tenant em B2B SaaS Supabase — 9 direitos Art. 18 com workflow per-org, DSR SLA 15 dias Art. 19 + alert pg_cron D-3, consent management granular default opt-out (Art. 8 §5), erasure via anonymization (não hard delete), cross-border config Brasil-UE adequacy jan/2026.
+---
+
+# LGPD Multi-Tenant Compliance — Lei 13.709/2018
+
+## Quando usar
+
+LLM carrega esta skill ao implementar compliance LGPD em B2B SaaS Brasil. Trigger phrases:
+
+- "LGPD compliance", "Lei 13.709"
+- "DSR data subject request"
+- "consent management granular"
+- "erasure anonymization LGPD"
+- "cross-border data transfer Brazil"
+- "ANPD adequacy decision"
+
+## Regras absolutas
+
+**REGRA #1 (DSR SLA 15 dias — Art. 19):** Toda DSR (Data Subject Request) deve ser processada em **15 dias corridos** (Art. 19 LGPD). Tabela `data_subject_requests` com `deadline_at = created_at + 15 days`. Pg_cron D-3 alerta requests próximas do prazo.
+
+**REGRA #2 (consent default opt-out — Art. 8 §5):** Consentimento LGPD deve ser **livre, informado, inequívoco**. Default opt-in é **ilegal** (Art. 8 §5). UI deve apresentar checkboxes desmarcados por default. Multa: até R$50M ou 2% faturamento.
+
+**REGRA #3 (consent granular):** Consentimento separado por **finalidade** — analytics ≠ marketing ≠ third-party-share ≠ profiling. User pode aceitar uma e rejeitar outra. Consent bundling (uma checkbox para tudo) é vedado.
+
+**REGRA #4 (erasure via anonymization):** Direito à eliminação (Art. 18 VI) implementado via **anonymization**: preservar UUID (chave opaca), apagar PII (`name → NULL`, `email → SHA-256 hash`, `phone → NULL`). Hard delete destrói audit trail necessário para outras compliance obrigations.
+
+**REGRA #5 (cross-border config):** Para apps com clientes brasileiros, Vercel deploy region `gru1` (São Paulo) + Supabase project region `sa-east-1` mantêm dados em repouso no Brasil. Adequacy decision Brasil-UE estabelecida em janeiro/2026 permite EU regions sem SCCs adicionais.
+
+**REGRA #6 (per-tenant — não global):** Cada org tem sua própria política de retention/consent. App é controlador de dados em alguns casos, operador em outros (Art. 5). Per-tenant implementação respeita esta diversidade.
+
+## Patterns canônicos
+
+### Tabela `consent_records`
+
+```sql
+create table public.consent_records (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  user_id uuid not null references auth.users(id) on delete cascade,
+  purpose text not null
+    check (purpose in (
+      'analytics',           -- analytics próprio (PostHog, Mixpanel)
+      'marketing_email',     -- envio email marketing
+      'marketing_whatsapp',  -- envio WhatsApp marketing
+      'third_party_share',   -- compartilhamento com parceiros
+      'profiling',           -- perfilamento comportamental
+      'cookies_optional'     -- cookies não-essenciais
+    ) or purpose like 'custom\_%'),
+  granted boolean not null,
+  granted_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  revoked_at timestamptz,
+  source text not null default 'app_settings'
+    check (source in ('app_settings', 'cookie_banner', 'signup_form', 'api')),
+  ip_address inet,
+  user_agent text,
+  unique (org_id, user_id, purpose, granted_at)  -- histórico audited
+);
+
+create index consent_records_org_user_purpose_idx
+  on public.consent_records (org_id, user_id, purpose, granted_at desc);
+
+alter table public.consent_records enable row level security;
+
+create policy "consent_records_select_own" on public.consent_records
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (user_id = (select auth.uid()));
+
+create policy "consent_records_insert_own" on public.consent_records
+  for insert to authenticated
+  with check (user_id = (select auth.uid()));
+
+create policy "consent_records_admin_view" on public.consent_records
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.has_permission('process', 'dsr_requests', org_id));
+```
+
+### Helper `current_consent`
+
+```sql
+create or replace function private.current_consent(p_org_id uuid, p_user_id uuid, p_purpose text)
+returns boolean
+language sql
+stable
+security invoker
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+  select coalesce(
+    (select granted from public.consent_records
+     where org_id = p_org_id and user_id = p_user_id and purpose = p_purpose
+     order by granted_at desc limit 1),
+    false  -- REGRA #2: default opt-out se não houver registro
+  );
+$$;
+```
+
+### Tabela `data_subject_requests`
+
+```sql
+create table public.data_subject_requests (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  requester_user_id uuid references auth.users(id) on delete set null,
+  requester_email text not null,
+  request_type text not null
+    check (request_type in (
+      'confirmation',     -- Art. 18 I — confirmação da existência de tratamento
+      'access',           -- Art. 18 II — acesso aos dados
+      'correction',       -- Art. 18 III — correção
+      'anonymization',    -- Art. 18 IV — anonimização/bloqueio/eliminação parcial
+      'portability',      -- Art. 18 V — portabilidade
+      'erasure',          -- Art. 18 VI — eliminação completa
+      'sharing_info',     -- Art. 18 VII — informação sobre compartilhamento
+      'consent_revoke',   -- Art. 18 IX — revogação consentimento
+      'automated_review'  -- Art. 18 — revisão decisão automatizada
+    )),
+  description text,
+  status text not null default 'pending'
+    check (status in ('pending', 'in_progress', 'completed', 'rejected', 'expired')),
+  deadline_at timestamptz not null default (now() + interval '15 days'),  -- REGRA #1 Art. 19
+  completed_at timestamptz,
+  rejected_reason text,
+  result jsonb,                                                            -- payload de resposta (export, etc.)
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+create index dsr_org_status_deadline_idx on public.data_subject_requests (org_id, status, deadline_at);
+
+alter table public.data_subject_requests enable row level security;
+
+-- Apenas users com permission process:dsr_requests
+create policy "dsr_select_with_permission" on public.data_subject_requests
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.has_permission('process', 'dsr_requests', org_id));
+
+-- Insert: qualquer authenticated pode criar request para si próprio
+create policy "dsr_insert_self" on public.data_subject_requests
+  for insert to authenticated
+  with check (
+    requester_user_id = (select auth.uid())
+    or requester_email = (select email from auth.users where id = (select auth.uid()))
+  );
+
+create policy "dsr_super_admin" on public.data_subject_requests
+  as permissive for all to authenticated
+  using (private.is_super_admin())
+  with check (private.is_super_admin());
+```
+
+### Cron alert D-3 (3 dias antes do prazo)
+
+```sql
+select cron.schedule(
+  'dsr-deadline-alert-d3',
+  '0 9 * * *',  -- diário 9:00 UTC
+  $$
+    -- Notificar admin (via Edge Function notification) sobre DSRs próximas do prazo
+    insert into public.notifications (org_id, type, payload)
+    select
+      org_id,
+      'dsr_deadline_warning',
+      jsonb_build_object(
+        'request_id', id,
+        'days_remaining', extract(day from deadline_at - now()),
+        'request_type', request_type
+      )
+    from public.data_subject_requests
+    where status in ('pending', 'in_progress')
+      and deadline_at < now() + interval '3 days'
+      and deadline_at >= now()
+      and id not in (
+        select (payload->>'request_id')::uuid from public.notifications
+        where type = 'dsr_deadline_warning'
+          and created_at > now() - interval '24 hours'
+      );
+  $$
+);
+```
+
+### Erasure via anonymization (REGRA #4)
+
+```sql
+-- RPC chamada quando admin processa DSR de erasure
+create or replace function public.process_erasure_request(p_dsr_id uuid)
+returns void
+language plpgsql
+security invoker
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+declare
+  v_dsr record;
+  v_user_id uuid;
+begin
+  -- Validar permission
+  select * into v_dsr from public.data_subject_requests where id = p_dsr_id;
+  if v_dsr is null then raise exception 'dsr_not_found'; end if;
+  if not private.has_permission('process', 'dsr_requests', v_dsr.org_id) then
+    raise exception 'forbidden';
+  end if;
+
+  v_user_id := v_dsr.requester_user_id;
+  if v_user_id is null then
+    raise exception 'erasure_requires_user_id';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Anonymize across all tenant tables (preservar UUID)
+  -- 1. organization_members
+  update public.organization_members
+  set status = 'left'
+  where user_id = v_user_id and org_id = v_dsr.org_id;
+
+  -- 2. leads (owner_id e contact data)
+  update public.leads
+  set
+    owner_id = null,                                        -- preserva FK opcional
+    contact_email = encode(digest(coalesce(contact_email, ''), 'sha256'), 'hex'),
+    contact_phone = null,
+    contact_name = '[anonymized]'
+  where org_id = v_dsr.org_id
+    and (owner_id = v_user_id);  -- leads owned por este user
+
+  -- 3. audit_logs — preservar (REGRA #4: não destruir trail), apenas anonimizar
+  update public.audit_logs
+  set
+    actor_id = null,
+    actor_email_hash = '[anonymized]',
+    payload = payload - 'actor_email' - 'ip_address'
+  where actor_id = v_user_id and tenant_id = v_dsr.org_id;
+
+  -- 4. (em audit_logs com legal_hold = true não anonimizar — preservar evidence)
+  -- (já filtrado pelo update acima — apenas tocá-lo após legal hold ser liberado)
+
+  -- 5. Marcar DSR como completed
+  update public.data_subject_requests
+  set status = 'completed', completed_at = now(), result = jsonb_build_object('anonymized', true)
+  where id = p_dsr_id;
+
+  -- 6. Audit
+  perform private.audit_log(
+    'data_exported',
+    v_dsr.org_id,
+    v_user_id, 'user', v_dsr.requester_email,
+    jsonb_build_object('action', 'erasure_completed', 'dsr_id', p_dsr_id)
+  );
+end;
+$$;
+
+grant execute on function public.process_erasure_request(uuid) to authenticated;
+```
+
+### Cross-border config (REGRA #5)
+
+```typescript
+// next.config.js (Vercel)
+module.exports = {
+  // Edge Functions só rodam em São Paulo
+  experimental: {
+    serverActions: {
+      allowedOrigins: ['*.vercel.app']
+    }
+  },
+  // Force region para Edge runtime
+  runtime: 'edge',
+  regions: ['gru1']  // São Paulo
+}
+
+// Supabase project criado em sa-east-1 (São Paulo) — escolher na criação
+```
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+### Anti-pattern 1: Hard delete em erasure flow
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+delete from auth.users where id = '<user>' cascade;
+-- audit_logs cascade deletado, evidence destroyed
+```
+
+**Por quê:** destrói audit trail necessário para outras obrigações compliance (investigação fraudulenta, anti-money-laundering, registros fiscais 5 anos).
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #4 — anonymization. UUID preservado, PII apagada.
+
+### Anti-pattern 2: Consent default opt-in
+
+**Errado:**
+```html
+<input type="checkbox" name="marketing" checked>  <!-- pre-marked -->
+<label>Aceito receber emails de marketing</label>
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Art. 8 §5 LGPD: consentimento deve ser livre, informado, inequívoco. Pre-checked = bundle implícito = ilegal.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #2 — checkbox unchecked, user precisa clicar explicitamente.
+
+### Anti-pattern 3: Consent bundling
+
+**Errado:**
+```html
+<input type="checkbox" name="all_consents">
+<label>Aceito termos, privacy policy, marketing, analytics e third-party share</label>
+```
+
+**Por quê:** REGRA #3 — consentimentos devem ser separados por finalidade. User não pode "aceitar tudo" via 1 checkbox.
+
+**Certo:** N checkboxes individuais para cada `consent_records.purpose`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 4: DSR sem deadline tracking
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+-- Tabela sem deadline_at
+-- Admin esquece request, prazo 15 dias passa, ANPD multa
+```
+
+**Por quê:** Art. 19 prazo legal — descumprimento = multa.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #1 — `deadline_at` automático + pg_cron alert D-3.
+
+### Anti-pattern 5: PII em audit_logs raw
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+insert into audit_logs (actor_email, payload) values ('user@email.com', '{"phone":"+5511999"}');
+```
+
+**Por quê:** quando user solicita erasure, audit_logs também precisa anonimizar. Mas hash = não há referência à PII original.
+
+**Certo:** já desde início, hash actor_email + sanitize payload (cross-ref Phase 109 audit-log-multi-tenant REGRA #4).
+
+## Ver também
+
+- [audit-log-multi-tenant](../audit-log-multi-tenant/SKILL.md) — Phase 109, PII sanitization + legal_hold flag
+- [b2b-saas-architecture](../b2b-saas-architecture/SKILL.md) — schema base
+- [supabase-cron-queues](../supabase-cron-queues/SKILL.md) — pg_cron pattern para alert D-3
+- [super-admin-platform-pattern](../super-admin-platform-pattern/SKILL.md) — Phase 111, super_admin process DSR
+- [_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md](../_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md) — `LGPD`, `DSR`, `9 direitos LGPD`, `anonymization`, `consent grain`, `adequacy decision`
+- [LGPD — Lei 13.709/2018](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/lei/l13709.htm)
+- [ANPD — International Data Transfers](https://www.gov.br/anpd/)