@luanpdd/kit-mcp 1.20.0 → 1.22.0

package/kit/skills/crm-lead-pipeline-patterns/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: crm-lead-pipeline-patterns
+description: Use ao implementar CRM lead pipeline em B2B SaaS Supabase — 6 stages canônicos lead→qualified→proposal→negotiation→won|lost, trigger PG BEFORE UPDATE valida transições (CHECK constraint não basta), ownership transfer com notification+audit, lead dedup via unique(org_id, phone)+(org_id, email), integração WhatsApp lookup contact_phone.
+---
+
+# CRM Lead Pipeline — Patterns Canônicos
+
+## Quando usar
+
+LLM carrega esta skill ao implementar CRM lead pipeline em B2B multi-tenant. Trigger phrases:
+
+- "CRM lead pipeline", "sales pipeline stages"
+- "lead state machine Postgres", "transition validation"
+- "ownership transfer lead", "lead assignment"
+- "lead dedup phone email"
+- "integração WhatsApp CRM lead"
+
+## Regras absolutas
+
+**REGRA #1 (6 stages canônicos):** Pipeline tem 6 stages: `lead → qualified → proposal → negotiation → won | lost`. Custom stages permitidos via prefix `custom_*` mas estes 6 são obrigatórios.
+
+**REGRA #2 (trigger PG > CHECK constraint):** Validar transições via **trigger BEFORE UPDATE** com `RAISE EXCEPTION`, não apenas CHECK constraint. CHECK valida valor, mas não valida **transição** (lead → won direto = bug, deve passar por qualified+proposal+negotiation).
+
+**REGRA #3 (ownership transfer com audit):** Mudança em `leads.owner_id` SEMPRE dispara: (a) notificação ao novo owner, (b) entry em audit_logs com `previous_owner_id, new_owner_id, reason`. Trigger AFTER UPDATE.
+
+**REGRA #4 (dedup unique constraints):** `unique(org_id, contact_phone)` + `unique(org_id, contact_email)` em `leads`. Insert duplicado falha — app code precisa fazer lookup ANTES.
+
+**REGRA #5 (lookup ANTES de criar via WhatsApp):** Webhook handler WhatsApp inbound: `SELECT id FROM leads WHERE org_id=$1 AND contact_phone=$2`. Se existe, append message à conversa do lead. Se não existe, criar lead novo com `source='whatsapp_inbound'`.
+
+## Patterns canônicos
+
+### Tabela `leads`
+
+```sql
+create table public.leads (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  org_id uuid not null references public.organizations(id) on delete cascade,
+  dept_id uuid references public.departments(id) on delete set null,
+
+  -- Contato
+  contact_name text not null,
+  contact_email text,
+  contact_phone text,
+  contact_company text,
+
+  -- Pipeline
+  stage text not null default 'lead'
+    check (stage in ('lead', 'qualified', 'proposal', 'negotiation', 'won', 'lost')
+           or stage like 'custom\_%'),
+  source text,  -- 'whatsapp_inbound', 'website_form', 'manual', etc.
+
+  -- Ownership
+  owner_id uuid references auth.users(id) on delete set null,
+
+  -- Dados financeiros
+  expected_value numeric(12, 2),
+  expected_close_date date,
+  closed_at timestamptz,
+  closed_reason text,
+
+  -- Metadata
+  metadata jsonb not null default '{}'::jsonb,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+
+  -- REGRA #4: dedup
+  unique (org_id, contact_phone),
+  unique (org_id, contact_email)
+);
+
+create index leads_org_stage_idx on public.leads (org_id, stage);
+create index leads_org_owner_idx on public.leads (org_id, owner_id) where owner_id is not null;
+create index leads_org_dept_idx on public.leads (org_id, dept_id) where dept_id is not null;
+
+-- RLS: aplicar pattern multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy
+alter table public.leads enable row level security;
+
+create policy "leads_select_member" on public.leads
+  for select to authenticated
+  using (private.is_member_of(org_id));
+
+create policy "leads_insert_with_permission" on public.leads
+  for insert to authenticated
+  with check (private.has_permission('create', 'leads', org_id));
+
+create policy "leads_update_with_permission_or_owner" on public.leads
+  for update to authenticated
+  using (
+    private.has_permission('update', 'leads', org_id)
+    or owner_id = (select auth.uid())
+  )
+  with check (
+    private.has_permission('update', 'leads', org_id)
+    or owner_id = (select auth.uid())
+  );
+
+create policy "leads_delete_admin" on public.leads
+  for delete to authenticated
+  using (private.has_role(org_id, 'admin') or private.has_role(org_id, 'owner'));
+
+create policy "leads_super_admin_bypass" on public.leads
+  as permissive for all to authenticated
+  using (private.is_super_admin())
+  with check (private.is_super_admin());
+```
+
+### Trigger validação de transição (REGRA #2)
+
+```sql
+-- Tabela de transições permitidas (data-driven)
+create table public.lead_stage_transitions (
+  from_stage text not null,
+  to_stage text not null,
+  primary key (from_stage, to_stage)
+);
+
+-- Insert transições canônicas
+insert into public.lead_stage_transitions (from_stage, to_stage) values
+  ('lead', 'qualified'),
+  ('lead', 'lost'),
+  ('qualified', 'proposal'),
+  ('qualified', 'lost'),
+  ('proposal', 'negotiation'),
+  ('proposal', 'lost'),
+  ('negotiation', 'won'),
+  ('negotiation', 'lost'),
+  ('negotiation', 'proposal'),  -- back-step permitido
+  ('won', 'closed'),
+  ('lost', 'lead'),  -- reativar lost
+  -- self-transition (no-op) sempre permitida
+  ('lead', 'lead'), ('qualified', 'qualified'), ('proposal', 'proposal'),
+  ('negotiation', 'negotiation'), ('won', 'won'), ('lost', 'lost')
+on conflict do nothing;
+
+-- Trigger BEFORE UPDATE valida transição
+create or replace function private.validate_lead_stage_transition()
+returns trigger
+language plpgsql
+security invoker
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+begin
+  if new.stage = old.stage then
+    return new;  -- no-op
+  end if;
+
+  -- Custom stages: aceitar qualquer transição (admin responsibility)
+  if new.stage like 'custom\_%' or old.stage like 'custom\_%' then
+    return new;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Validar transição na tabela
+  if not exists (
+    select 1 from public.lead_stage_transitions
+    where from_stage = old.stage and to_stage = new.stage
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'invalid_lead_transition: % → % not allowed', old.stage, new.stage;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Auto-popular closed_at em won/lost
+  if new.stage in ('won', 'lost') and new.closed_at is null then
+    new.closed_at := now();
+  end if;
+
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+create trigger validate_lead_stage_transition_trigger
+  before update of stage on public.leads
+  for each row execute function private.validate_lead_stage_transition();
+```
+
+### Trigger ownership transfer (REGRA #3)
+
+```sql
+create or replace function private.audit_lead_ownership_change()
+returns trigger
+language plpgsql
+security definer  -- precisa escrever em audit_logs mesmo sem permission do user
+set search_path = ''
+as $$
+begin
+  if old.owner_id is distinct from new.owner_id then
+    -- Audit log
+    perform private.audit_log(
+      'custom_lead_ownership_transfer',
+      new.org_id,
+      new.id, 'lead', null,
+      jsonb_build_object(
+        'previous_owner_id', old.owner_id,
+        'new_owner_id', new.owner_id,
+        'lead_stage', new.stage,
+        'lead_value', new.expected_value
+      )
+    );
+
+    -- TODO: notificar novo owner (delegar para Edge Function de notification)
+    -- perform net.http_post('<edge_fn_url>', ...);
+  end if;
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+create trigger audit_lead_ownership_change_trigger
+  after update of owner_id on public.leads
+  for each row execute function private.audit_lead_ownership_change();
+```
+
+### Lookup contact → lead (integração WhatsApp — REGRA #5)
+
+```typescript
+// supabase/functions/whatsapp-webhook/index.ts (cross-ref Phase 112)
+import { createClient } from 'jsr:@supabase/supabase-js@2'
+
+async function handleInboundWhatsApp(orgId: string, contactPhone: string, contactName: string, content: string) {
+  const admin = createClient(
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_URL')!,
+    Deno.env.get('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY')!
+  )
+
+  // REGRA #5: lookup ANTES de criar
+  const { data: existingLead } = await admin
+    .from('leads')
+    .select('id, owner_id, stage')
+    .eq('org_id', orgId)
+    .eq('contact_phone', contactPhone)
+    .maybeSingle()
+
+  if (existingLead) {
+    // Append message à conversa existente do lead (não criar novo)
+    return existingLead
+  }
+
+  // Criar lead novo
+  const { data: newLead } = await admin
+    .from('leads')
+    .insert({
+      org_id: orgId,
+      contact_phone: contactPhone,
+      contact_name: contactName,
+      source: 'whatsapp_inbound',
+      stage: 'lead',
+      metadata: { first_message: content, channel: 'whatsapp' }
+    })
+    .select()
+    .single()
+
+  return newLead
+}
+```
+
+### Frontend kanban — drag&drop entre stages
+
+```typescript
+// LeadsKanban.tsx (sketch para Phase 115)
+async function moveLead(leadId: string, toStage: string) {
+  const { error } = await supabase
+    .from('leads')
+    .update({ stage: toStage })
+    .eq('id', leadId)
+
+  if (error?.message.includes('invalid_lead_transition')) {
+    toast.error('Transição inválida — siga ordem do funil')
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+### Anti-pattern 1: Apenas CHECK constraint (sem trigger)
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+stage text check (stage in ('lead', 'qualified', 'proposal', 'negotiation', 'won', 'lost'))
+-- Update lead diretamente lead → won (sem passar pelos intermediários)
+```
+
+**Por quê:** CHECK valida valor final, não transição. Lead pula etapas → métricas erradas (conversion rate por stage), forecasting quebrado.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #2 — trigger BEFORE UPDATE valida `lead_stage_transitions`.
+
+### Anti-pattern 2: Ownership transfer sem notification
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+update leads set owner_id = '<new_owner>' where id = '<lead>';
+-- Owner antigo não sabe que perdeu lead, novo não sabe que ganhou
+```
+
+**Por quê:** transferência silenciosa = lead "esquecido", ninguém follow up, SLA perdido.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #3 — trigger AFTER UPDATE dispara notification (Slack, email, in-app) via Edge Function.
+
+### Anti-pattern 3: Lead duplicate sem dedup
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+-- Sem unique constraints
+-- WhatsApp inbound + website form mesmo phone = 2 leads
+```
+
+**Por quê:** vendedor liga 2× mesmo contato, dashboard com count errado, embaraçoso para client.
+
+**Certo:** REGRA #4 — `unique(org_id, contact_phone)` + lookup before insert (REGRA #5).
+
+### Anti-pattern 4: Hard delete lead com pipeline activities órfãs
+
+**Errado:**
+```sql
+delete from public.leads where id = '<lead_id>';
+-- pipeline_activities (FK lead_id) ficam órfãs ou cascade deleta histórico
+```
+
+**Por quê:** atividades históricas perdidas = audit trail compromised + analytics afetada.
+
+**Certo:** soft delete (`status = 'archived'`) ou FK CASCADE com cuidado + audit log antes.
+
+## Prevenção de Lost Update em Stage Transition (v1.22+)
+
+> A trigger `validate_lead_stage_transition` deve usar `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` em rows lidas para prevenir lost update quando 2 reps tentam mover o mesmo lead simultaneamente. Padrão completo em [`postgres-isolamento-concorrencia`](../postgres-isolamento-concorrencia/SKILL.md) (v1.22 — DDIA Ch 7).
+
+Exemplo aplicado:
+
+```sql
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION validate_lead_stage_transition()
+RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
+BEGIN
+  -- Lock row para prevenir lost update
+  PERFORM 1 FROM leads WHERE id = NEW.id FOR UPDATE;
+  -- ... validação ...
+END;
+$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+```
+
+## Ver também
+
+- [b2b-saas-architecture](../b2b-saas-architecture/SKILL.md) — schema base
+- [multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy](../multi-tenant-rls-hierarchy/SKILL.md) — RLS policies
+- [evolution-go-whatsapp-integration](../evolution-go-whatsapp-integration/SKILL.md) — Phase 112, integração inbound
+- [whatsapp-conversation-state-machine](../whatsapp-conversation-state-machine/SKILL.md) — Phase 112, conversa.action_taken → lead
+- [audit-log-multi-tenant](../audit-log-multi-tenant/SKILL.md) — Phase 109, eventos `custom_lead_*`
+- [_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md](../_shared-multi-tenant/glossary.md) — `lead`, `stages canônicos`, `ownership transfer`, `lead dedup`