@fntio/infra-client 0.0.0-stage → 0.5.0

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/proxy-addr/index.js

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+/*!
+ * proxy-addr
+ * Copyright(c) 2014-2016 Douglas Christopher Wilson
+ * MIT Licensed
+ */
+
+'use strict'
+
+/**
+ * Module exports.
+ * @public
+ */
+
+module.exports = proxyaddr
+module.exports.all = alladdrs
+module.exports.compile = compile
+
+/**
+ * Module dependencies.
+ * @private
+ */
+
+var forwarded = require('forwarded')
+var ipaddr = require('ipaddr.js')
+
+/**
+ * Variables.
+ * @private
+ */
+
+var DIGIT_REGEXP = /^[0-9]+$/
+var isip = ipaddr.isValid
+var parseip = ipaddr.parse
+
+/**
+ * Pre-defined IP ranges.
+ * @private
+ */
+
+var IP_RANGES = {
+  linklocal: ['169.254.0.0/16', 'fe80::/10'],
+  loopback: ['127.0.0.1/8', '::1/128'],
+  uniquelocal: ['10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16', 'fc00::/7']
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get all addresses in the request, optionally stopping
+ * at the first untrusted.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} request
+ * @param {Function|Array|String} [trust]
+ * @public
+ */
+
+function alladdrs (req, trust) {
+  // get addresses
+  var addrs = forwarded(req)
+
+  if (!trust) {
+    // Return all addresses
+    return addrs
+  }
+
+  if (typeof trust !== 'function') {
+    trust = compile(trust)
+  }
+
+  for (var i = 0; i < addrs.length - 1; i++) {
+    if (trust(addrs[i], i)) continue
+
+    addrs.length = i + 1
+  }
+
+  return addrs
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile argument into trust function.
+ *
+ * @param {Array|String} val
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function compile (val) {
+  if (!val) {
+    throw new TypeError('argument is required')
+  }
+
+  var trust
+
+  if (typeof val === 'string') {
+    trust = [val]
+  } else if (Array.isArray(val)) {
+    trust = val.slice()
+  } else {
+    throw new TypeError('unsupported trust argument')
+  }
+
+  for (var i = 0; i < trust.length; i++) {
+    val = trust[i]
+
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(IP_RANGES, val)) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    // Splice in pre-defined range
+    val = IP_RANGES[val]
+    trust.splice.apply(trust, [i, 1].concat(val))
+    i += val.length - 1
+  }
+
+  return compileTrust(compileRangeSubnets(trust))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile `arr` elements into range subnets.
+ *
+ * @param {Array} arr
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function compileRangeSubnets (arr) {
+  var rangeSubnets = new Array(arr.length)
+
+  for (var i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) {
+    rangeSubnets[i] = parseipNotation(arr[i])
+  }
+
+  return rangeSubnets
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile range subnet array into trust function.
+ *
+ * @param {Array} rangeSubnets
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function compileTrust (rangeSubnets) {
+  // Return optimized function based on length
+  var len = rangeSubnets.length
+  return len === 0
+    ? trustNone
+    : len === 1
+      ? trustSingle(rangeSubnets[0])
+      : trustMulti(rangeSubnets)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse IP notation string into range subnet.
+ *
+ * @param {String} note
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function parseipNotation (note) {
+  var pos = note.lastIndexOf('/')
+  var str = pos !== -1
+    ? note.substring(0, pos)
+    : note
+
+  if (!isip(str)) {
+    throw new TypeError('invalid IP address: ' + str)
+  }
+
+  var ip = parseip(str)
+
+  if (pos === -1 && ip.kind() === 'ipv6' && ip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+    // Store as IPv4
+    ip = ip.toIPv4Address()
+  }
+
+  var max = ip.kind() === 'ipv6'
+    ? 128
+    : 32
+
+  var range = pos !== -1
+    ? note.substring(pos + 1, note.length)
+    : null
+
+  if (range === null) {
+    range = max
+  } else if (DIGIT_REGEXP.test(range)) {
+    range = parseInt(range, 10)
+  } else if (ip.kind() === 'ipv4' && isip(range)) {
+    range = parseNetmask(range)
+  } else {
+    range = null
+  }
+
+  if (range <= 0 || range > max) {
+    throw new TypeError('invalid range on address: ' + note)
+  }
+
+  return [ip, range]
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse netmask string into CIDR range.
+ *
+ * @param {String} netmask
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function parseNetmask (netmask) {
+  var ip = parseip(netmask)
+  var kind = ip.kind()
+
+  return kind === 'ipv4'
+    ? ip.prefixLengthFromSubnetMask()
+    : null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Determine address of proxied request.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} request
+ * @param {Function|Array|String} trust
+ * @public
+ */
+
+function proxyaddr (req, trust) {
+  if (!req) {
+    throw new TypeError('req argument is required')
+  }
+
+  if (!trust) {
+    throw new TypeError('trust argument is required')
+  }
+
+  var addrs = alladdrs(req, trust)
+  var addr = addrs[addrs.length - 1]
+
+  return addr
+}
+
+/**
+ * Static trust function to trust nothing.
+ *
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function trustNone () {
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile trust function for multiple subnets.
+ *
+ * @param {Array} subnets
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function trustMulti (subnets) {
+  return function trust (addr) {
+    if (!isip(addr)) return false
+
+    var ip = parseip(addr)
+
+    if (ip.kind() === 'ipv6' && ip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+      // Canonicalize IPv4-mapped candidates to IPv4 so a mapped address
+      // cannot bypass the cross-family guard via the same-family path
+      ip = ip.toIPv4Address()
+    }
+
+    var ipconv
+    var kind = ip.kind()
+
+    for (var i = 0; i < subnets.length; i++) {
+      var subnet = subnets[i]
+      var subnetip = subnet[0]
+      var subnetkind = subnetip.kind()
+      var subnetrange = subnet[1]
+      var trusted = ip
+
+      if (kind !== subnetkind) {
+        if (subnetkind === 'ipv4' && !ip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+          // Incompatible IP addresses
+          continue
+        }
+
+        if (subnetkind !== 'ipv4' && !(subnetrange >= 96 && subnetip.isIPv4MappedAddress())) {
+          // IPv6 subnet only spans IPv4 when it is a mapped subnet whose
+          // prefix covers the ::ffff: marker; otherwise it must not match IPv4
+          continue
+        }
+
+        if (!ipconv) {
+          // Convert IP to match subnet IP kind
+          ipconv = subnetkind === 'ipv4'
+            ? ip.toIPv4Address()
+            : ip.toIPv4MappedAddress()
+        }
+
+        trusted = ipconv
+      } else if (kind === 'ipv6' && subnetip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+        // A native IPv6 candidate cannot match an IPv4-mapped subnet
+        continue
+      }
+
+      if (trusted.match(subnetip, subnetrange)) {
+        return true
+      }
+    }
+
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compile trust function for single subnet.
+ *
+ * @param {Object} subnet
+ * @private
+ */
+
+function trustSingle (subnet) {
+  var subnetip = subnet[0]
+  var subnetkind = subnetip.kind()
+  var subnetisipv4 = subnetkind === 'ipv4'
+  var subnetrange = subnet[1]
+
+  return function trust (addr) {
+    if (!isip(addr)) return false
+
+    var ip = parseip(addr)
+
+    if (ip.kind() === 'ipv6' && ip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+      // Canonicalize IPv4-mapped candidates to IPv4 so a mapped address
+      // cannot bypass the cross-family guard via the same-family path
+      ip = ip.toIPv4Address()
+    }
+
+    var kind = ip.kind()
+
+    if (kind !== subnetkind) {
+      if (subnetisipv4 && !ip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+        // Incompatible IP addresses
+        return false
+      }
+
+      if (!subnetisipv4 && !(subnetrange >= 96 && subnetip.isIPv4MappedAddress())) {
+        // IPv6 subnet only spans IPv4 when it is a mapped subnet whose
+        // prefix covers the ::ffff: marker; otherwise it must not match IPv4
+        return false
+      }
+
+      // Convert IP to match subnet IP kind
+      ip = subnetisipv4
+        ? ip.toIPv4Address()
+        : ip.toIPv4MappedAddress()
+    } else if (kind === 'ipv6' && subnetip.isIPv4MappedAddress()) {
+      // A native IPv6 candidate cannot match an IPv4-mapped subnet
+      return false
+    }
+
+    return ip.match(subnetip, subnetrange)
+  }
+}

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/proxy-addr/package.json

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+{
+  "name": "proxy-addr",
+  "description": "Determine address of proxied request",
+  "version": "2.0.8",
+  "author": "Douglas Christopher Wilson <doug@somethingdoug.com>",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "keywords": [
+    "ip",
+    "proxy",
+    "x-forwarded-for"
+  ],
+  "repository": "jshttp/proxy-addr",
+  "funding": {
+    "type": "opencollective",
+    "url": "https://opencollective.com/express"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "forwarded": "0.2.0",
+    "ipaddr.js": "1.9.1"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "benchmark": "2.1.4",
+    "beautify-benchmark": "0.2.4",
+    "deep-equal": "1.1.2",
+    "eslint": "7.26.0",
+    "eslint-config-standard": "14.1.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-import": "2.32.0",
+    "eslint-plugin-markdown": "2.2.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-node": "11.1.0",
+    "eslint-plugin-promise": "4.3.1",
+    "eslint-plugin-standard": "4.1.0",
+    "mocha": "8.4.0",
+    "nyc": "15.1.0"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "LICENSE",
+    "HISTORY.md",
+    "README.md",
+    "index.js"
+  ],
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">= 0.10"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "bench": "node benchmark/index.js",
+    "lint": "eslint .",
+    "test": "mocha --reporter spec --bail --check-leaks test/",
+    "test-ci": "nyc --reporter=lcov --reporter=text npm test",
+    "test-cov": "nyc --reporter=html --reporter=text npm test"
+  }
+}

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/qs/.editorconfig

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+root = true
+
+[*]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 4
+end_of_line = lf
+charset = utf-8
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+insert_final_newline = true
+max_line_length = 180
+quote_type = single
+
+[test/*]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[LICENSE.md]
+indent_size = off
+
+[*.md]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[*.json]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[Makefile]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[CHANGELOG.md]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+[LICENSE]
+indent_size = 2
+max_line_length = off
+
+[coverage/**/*]
+indent_size = off
+indent_style = off
+indent = off
+max_line_length = off
+
+[.nycrc]
+indent_style = tab
+
+[tea.yaml]
+indent_size = 2

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/qs/.github/FUNDING.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# These are supported funding model platforms
+
+github: [ljharb]
+patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
+open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
+ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
+tidelift: npm/qs
+community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
+liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
+issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
+otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
+custom: # Replace with a single custom sponsorship URL

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/qs/.github/SECURITY.md

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+# Security
+
+Please file a private vulnerability report via GitHub, email [@ljharb](https://github.com/ljharb), or see https://tidelift.com/security if you have a potential security vulnerability to report.
+
+## Incident Response Plan
+
+Please see our [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/ljharb/.github/blob/main/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md).
+
+## Threat Model
+
+Please see [THREAT_MODEL.md](./THREAT_MODEL.md).

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/qs/.github/THREAT_MODEL.md

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+## Threat Model for qs (querystring parsing library)
+
+### 1. Library Overview
+
+- **Library Name:** qs
+- **Brief Description:** A JavaScript library for parsing and stringifying URL query strings, supporting nested objects and arrays. It is widely used in Node.js and web applications for processing query parameters[2][6][8].
+- **Key Public APIs/Functions:** `qs.parse()`, `qs.stringify()`
+
+### 2. Define Scope
+
+This threat model focuses on the core parsing and stringifying functionality, specifically the handling of nested objects and arrays, option validation, and cycle management in stringification.
+
+### 3. Conceptual System Diagram
+
+```
+Caller Application → qs.parse(input, options) → Parsing Engine → Output Object
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+
+Caller Application → qs.stringify(obj, options) → Stringifying Engine → Output String
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+                           └→ Cycle Tracking
+```
+
+**Trust Boundaries:**
+- **Input string (parse):** May come from untrusted sources (e.g., user input, network requests)
+- **Input object (stringify):** May contain cycles, which can lead to infinite loops during stringification
+- **Options:** Provided by the caller
+- **Cycle Tracking:** Used only during stringification to detect and handle circular references
+
+### 4. Identify Assets
+
+- **Integrity of parsed output:** Prevent malicious manipulation of the output object structure, especially ensuring builtins/globals are not modified as a result of parse[3][4][8].
+- **Confidentiality of processed data:** Avoid leaking sensitive information through errors or output.
+- **Availability/performance for host application:** Prevent crashes or resource exhaustion in the consuming application.
+- **Security of host application:** Prevent the library from being a vector for attacks (e.g., prototype pollution, DoS).
+- **Reputation of library:** Maintain trust by avoiding supply chain attacks and vulnerabilities[1].
+
+### 5. Identify Threats
+
+| Component / API / Interaction         | S  | T  | R  | I  | D  | E  |
+|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
+| Public API Call (`parse`)             | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | ✓  |
+| Public API Call (`stringify`)         | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | –  |
+| Options Handling                      | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  |
+| Dependency Interaction                | –  | –  | –  | –  | ✓  | –  |
+
+**Key Threats:**
+- **Tampering:** Malicious input can, if not prevented, alter parsed output (e.g., prototype pollution via `__proto__`, modification of builtins/globals)[3][4][8].
+- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages may expose internal details or sensitive data.
+- **Denial of Service:** Large or malformed input can exhaust memory or CPU.
+- **Elevation of Privilege:** Prototype pollution can lead to unintended privilege escalation in the host application[3][4][8].
+
+### 6. Mitigation/Countermeasures
+
+| Threat Identified                                 | Proposed Mitigation |
+|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
+| Tampering (malicious input, prototype pollution)  | Strict input validation; keep `allowPrototypes: false` by default; use `plainObjects` for output; ensure builtins/globals are never modified by parse[4][8]. |
+| Information Disclosure (error messages)           | Generic error messages without stack traces or internal paths. |
+| Denial of Service (memory/CPU exhaustion)         | Enforce `arrayLimit` and `parameterLimit` with safe defaults; enable `throwOnLimitExceeded`; limit nesting depth[7]. |
+| Elevation of Privilege (prototype pollution)      | Keep `allowPrototypes: false`; validate options against allowlist; use `plainObjects` to avoid prototype pollution[4][8]. |
+
+### 7. Risk Ranking
+
+- **High:** Denial of Service via array parsing or malformed input (historical vulnerability)
+- **Medium:** Prototype pollution via options or input (if `allowPrototypes` enabled)
+- **Low:** Information disclosure in errors
+
+### 8. Next Steps & Review
+
+1. **Audit option validation logic.**
+2. **Add depth limiting to nested parsing and stringification.**
+3. **Implement fuzz testing for parser and stringifier edge cases.**
+4. **Regularly review dependencies for vulnerabilities.**
+5. **Keep documentation and threat model up to date.**
+6. **Ensure builtins/globals are never modified as a result of parse.**
+7. **Support round-trip consistency between parse and stringify as a non-security goal, with the right options[5][9].**

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/qs/.nycrc

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+	"all": true,
+	"check-coverage": false,
+	"reporter": ["text-summary", "text", "html", "json"],
+	"lines": 86,
+	"statements": 85.93,
+	"functions": 82.43,
+	"branches": 76.06,
+	"exclude": [
+		"coverage",
+		"dist"
+	]
+}