@fntio/infra-client 0.0.0-stage → 0.5.0

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/lib/types/urlencoded.js

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+/*!
+ * body-parser
+ * Copyright(c) 2014 Jonathan Ong
+ * Copyright(c) 2014-2015 Douglas Christopher Wilson
+ * MIT Licensed
+ */
+
+'use strict'
+
+/**
+ * Module dependencies.
+ * @private
+ */
+
+var bytes = require('bytes')
+var contentType = require('content-type')
+var createError = require('http-errors')
+var debug = require('debug')('body-parser:urlencoded')
+var deprecate = require('depd')('body-parser')
+var read = require('../read')
+var typeis = require('type-is')
+
+/**
+ * Module exports.
+ */
+
+module.exports = urlencoded
+
+/**
+ * Cache of parser modules.
+ */
+
+var parsers = Object.create(null)
+
+/**
+ * Create a middleware to parse urlencoded bodies.
+ *
+ * @param {object} [options]
+ * @return {function}
+ * @public
+ */
+
+function urlencoded (options) {
+  var opts = options || {}
+
+  // notice because option default will flip in next major
+  if (opts.extended === undefined) {
+    deprecate('undefined extended: provide extended option')
+  }
+
+  var extended = opts.extended !== false
+  var inflate = opts.inflate !== false
+  var limit = typeof opts.limit === 'undefined' || opts.limit === null
+    ? 102400 // 100kb default
+    : bytes.parse(opts.limit)
+  var type = opts.type || 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
+  var verify = opts.verify || false
+
+  if (limit === null) {
+    throw new TypeError('option limit "' + String(opts.limit) + '" is invalid')
+  }
+
+  if (verify !== false && typeof verify !== 'function') {
+    throw new TypeError('option verify must be function')
+  }
+
+  // create the appropriate query parser
+  var queryparse = extended
+    ? extendedparser(opts)
+    : simpleparser(opts)
+
+  // create the appropriate type checking function
+  var shouldParse = typeof type !== 'function'
+    ? typeChecker(type)
+    : type
+
+  function parse (body) {
+    return body.length
+      ? queryparse(body)
+      : {}
+  }
+
+  return function urlencodedParser (req, res, next) {
+    if (req._body) {
+      debug('body already parsed')
+      next()
+      return
+    }
+
+    req.body = req.body || {}
+
+    // skip requests without bodies
+    if (!typeis.hasBody(req)) {
+      debug('skip empty body')
+      next()
+      return
+    }
+
+    debug('content-type %j', req.headers['content-type'])
+
+    // determine if request should be parsed
+    if (!shouldParse(req)) {
+      debug('skip parsing')
+      next()
+      return
+    }
+
+    // assert charset
+    var charset = getCharset(req) || 'utf-8'
+    if (charset !== 'utf-8') {
+      debug('invalid charset')
+      next(createError(415, 'unsupported charset "' + charset.toUpperCase() + '"', {
+        charset: charset,
+        type: 'charset.unsupported'
+      }))
+      return
+    }
+
+    // read
+    read(req, res, next, parse, debug, {
+      debug: debug,
+      encoding: charset,
+      inflate: inflate,
+      limit: limit,
+      verify: verify
+    })
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the extended query parser.
+ *
+ * @param {object} options
+ */
+
+function extendedparser (options) {
+  var parameterLimit = options.parameterLimit !== undefined
+    ? options.parameterLimit
+    : 1000
+  var depth = options.depth !== undefined ? options.depth : 32
+  var parse = parser('qs')
+
+  if (isNaN(parameterLimit) || parameterLimit < 1) {
+    throw new TypeError('option parameterLimit must be a positive number')
+  }
+
+  if (isNaN(depth) || depth < 0) {
+    throw new TypeError('option depth must be a zero or a positive number')
+  }
+
+  if (isFinite(parameterLimit)) {
+    parameterLimit = parameterLimit | 0
+  }
+
+  return function queryparse (body) {
+    var paramCount = parameterCount(body, parameterLimit)
+
+    if (paramCount === undefined) {
+      debug('too many parameters')
+      throw createError(413, 'too many parameters', {
+        type: 'parameters.too.many'
+      })
+    }
+
+    var arrayLimit = Math.max(100, paramCount)
+
+    debug('parse extended urlencoding')
+    try {
+      return parse(body, {
+        allowPrototypes: true,
+        arrayLimit: arrayLimit,
+        depth: depth,
+        strictDepth: true,
+        parameterLimit: parameterLimit
+      })
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof RangeError) {
+        throw createError(400, 'The input exceeded the depth', {
+          type: 'querystring.parse.rangeError'
+        })
+      } else {
+        throw err
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the charset of a request.
+ *
+ * @param {object} req
+ * @api private
+ */
+
+function getCharset (req) {
+  try {
+    return (contentType.parse(req).parameters.charset || '').toLowerCase()
+  } catch (e) {
+    return undefined
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Count the number of parameters, stopping once limit reached
+ *
+ * @param {string} body
+ * @param {number} limit
+ * @api private
+ */
+
+function parameterCount (body, limit) {
+  var count = 0
+  var index = -1
+
+  do {
+    count++
+    if (count > limit) {
+      return undefined
+    }
+    index = body.indexOf('&', index + 1)
+  } while (index !== -1)
+
+  return count
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get parser for module name dynamically.
+ *
+ * @param {string} name
+ * @return {function}
+ * @api private
+ */
+
+function parser (name) {
+  var mod = parsers[name]
+
+  if (mod !== undefined) {
+    return mod.parse
+  }
+
+  // this uses a switch for static require analysis
+  switch (name) {
+    case 'qs':
+      mod = require('qs')
+      break
+    case 'querystring':
+      mod = require('querystring')
+      break
+  }
+
+  // store to prevent invoking require()
+  parsers[name] = mod
+
+  return mod.parse
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the simple query parser.
+ *
+ * @param {object} options
+ */
+
+function simpleparser (options) {
+  var parameterLimit = options.parameterLimit !== undefined
+    ? options.parameterLimit
+    : 1000
+  var parse = parser('querystring')
+
+  if (isNaN(parameterLimit) || parameterLimit < 1) {
+    throw new TypeError('option parameterLimit must be a positive number')
+  }
+
+  if (isFinite(parameterLimit)) {
+    parameterLimit = parameterLimit | 0
+  }
+
+  return function queryparse (body) {
+    var paramCount = parameterCount(body, parameterLimit)
+
+    if (paramCount === undefined) {
+      debug('too many parameters')
+      throw createError(413, 'too many parameters', {
+        type: 'parameters.too.many'
+      })
+    }
+
+    debug('parse urlencoding')
+    return parse(body, undefined, undefined, { maxKeys: parameterLimit })
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get the simple type checker.
+ *
+ * @param {string} type
+ * @return {function}
+ */
+
+function typeChecker (type) {
+  return function checkType (req) {
+    return Boolean(typeis(req, type))
+  }
+}

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/node_modules/qs/.editorconfig

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+root = true
+
+[*]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 4
+end_of_line = lf
+charset = utf-8
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+insert_final_newline = true
+max_line_length = 180
+quote_type = single
+
+[test/*]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[LICENSE.md]
+indent_size = off
+
+[*.md]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[*.json]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[Makefile]
+max_line_length = off
+
+[CHANGELOG.md]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+[LICENSE]
+indent_size = 2
+max_line_length = off
+
+[coverage/**/*]
+indent_size = off
+indent_style = off
+indent = off
+max_line_length = off
+
+[.nycrc]
+indent_style = tab
+
+[tea.yaml]
+indent_size = 2

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/node_modules/qs/.github/FUNDING.yml

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+# These are supported funding model platforms
+
+github: [ljharb]
+patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
+open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
+ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
+tidelift: npm/qs
+community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
+liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
+issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
+otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
+custom: # Replace with a single custom sponsorship URL

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/node_modules/qs/.github/SECURITY.md

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+# Security
+
+Please file a private vulnerability report via GitHub, email [@ljharb](https://github.com/ljharb), or see https://tidelift.com/security if you have a potential security vulnerability to report.
+
+## Incident Response Plan
+
+Please see our [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/ljharb/.github/blob/main/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md).
+
+## Threat Model
+
+Please see [THREAT_MODEL.md](./THREAT_MODEL.md).

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/node_modules/qs/.github/THREAT_MODEL.md

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+## Threat Model for qs (querystring parsing library)
+
+### 1. Library Overview
+
+- **Library Name:** qs
+- **Brief Description:** A JavaScript library for parsing and stringifying URL query strings, supporting nested objects and arrays. It is widely used in Node.js and web applications for processing query parameters[2][6][8].
+- **Key Public APIs/Functions:** `qs.parse()`, `qs.stringify()`
+
+### 2. Define Scope
+
+This threat model focuses on the core parsing and stringifying functionality, specifically the handling of nested objects and arrays, option validation, and cycle management in stringification.
+
+### 3. Conceptual System Diagram
+
+```
+Caller Application → qs.parse(input, options) → Parsing Engine → Output Object
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+
+Caller Application → qs.stringify(obj, options) → Stringifying Engine → Output String
+                           │
+                           └→ Options Handling
+                           └→ Cycle Tracking
+```
+
+**Trust Boundaries:**
+- **Input string (parse):** May come from untrusted sources (e.g., user input, network requests). `qs` defines its own key grammar, where bracket groups denote nesting, so the parameter names it derives are deliberately not the flat names produced by `URLSearchParams`, `node:querystring`, or a WHATWG-conformant parser. The parsed object, not the raw string, is the only thing a caller should make trust decisions about; see "Interpretation conflict" below.
+- **Input object (stringify):** The calling application's own data, not a direct untrusted channel. May contain cycles (handled by the cycle detector). Deeply-nested non-cyclic input surfaces as a catchable synchronous `RangeError` (stack overflow), not unbounded resource consumption; callers that serialize externally-influenced objects should bound their depth/size beforehand.
+- **Options:** Provided by the caller
+- **Cycle Tracking:** Used only during stringification to detect and handle circular references
+
+### 4. Identify Assets
+
+- **Integrity of parsed output:** Prevent malicious manipulation of the output object structure, especially ensuring builtins/globals are not modified as a result of parse[3][4][8].
+- **Confidentiality of processed data:** Avoid leaking sensitive information through errors or output.
+- **Availability/performance for host application:** Prevent crashes or resource exhaustion in the consuming application.
+- **Security of host application:** Prevent the library from being a vector for attacks (e.g., prototype pollution, DoS).
+- **Reputation of library:** Maintain trust by avoiding supply chain attacks and vulnerabilities[1].
+
+### 5. Identify Threats
+
+| Component / API / Interaction         | S  | T  | R  | I  | D  | E  |
+|---------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
+| Public API Call (`parse`)             | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | ✓  |
+| Public API Call (`stringify`)         | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | ✓  | –  |
+| Options Handling                      | ✓  | ✓  | –  | ✓  | –  | ✓  |
+| Dependency Interaction                | –  | –  | –  | –  | ✓  | –  |
+
+**Key Threats:**
+- **Tampering:** Malicious input can, if not prevented, alter parsed output (e.g., prototype pollution via `__proto__`, modification of builtins/globals)[3][4][8].
+- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages may expose internal details or sensitive data.
+- **Denial of Service:** Large or malformed input can exhaust memory or CPU.
+- **Elevation of Privilege:** Prototype pollution can lead to unintended privilege escalation in the host application[3][4][8].
+- **Interpretation conflict (out of scope):** An application that parses the same query string with two different parsers, and makes a trust decision on one result while consuming the other, can be attacked by any input the two parsers read differently. `qs`'s bracket grammar guarantees such inputs exist, so this is a property of the deployment, not a defect `qs` can remove. It is the calling application's responsibility to parse once and validate the parsed object.
+
+### 6. Mitigation/Countermeasures
+
+| Threat Identified                                 | Proposed Mitigation |
+|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
+| Tampering (malicious input, prototype pollution)  | Strict input validation; keep `allowPrototypes: false` by default; use `plainObjects` for output; ensure builtins/globals are never modified by parse[4][8]. |
+| Information Disclosure (error messages)           | Generic error messages without stack traces or internal paths. |
+| Denial of Service (memory/CPU exhaustion)         | `arrayLimit`, `parameterLimit`, and depth limiting apply with safe defaults. Note that `arrayLimit` is a representation threshold (array vs. object), and `parameterLimit` bounds only the number of `&`-delimited parameters - neither caps the elements produced by `comma: true` splitting. For hard caps on the number of parameters and on each array's length, opt in to `throwOnLimitExceeded: true` (default `false`), which rejects a query string with more than `parameterLimit` parameters, or one that would produce any array longer than `arrayLimit`. `arrayLimit` applies to each array separately, including each parameter's comma-split value, so the total number of values can still reach `parameterLimit` times `arrayLimit`; always bound input size at the transport layer as well[7]. On the `stringify` side, the input is the caller's own object rather than an untrusted string, so unbounded nesting manifests as a catchable `RangeError` (stack overflow) rather than exhaustion; callers serializing externally-influenced objects should bound depth/size beforehand, and may opt into `stringify`'s `depth` option (default `Infinity`) for a deterministic, catchable error. |
+| Elevation of Privilege (prototype pollution)      | Keep `allowPrototypes: false`; validate options against allowlist; use `plainObjects` to avoid prototype pollution[4][8]. |
+| Interpretation conflict (validate-then-use across two parsers) | None available inside `qs`, by construction: `qs` and a flat parser disagree about parameter names for well-formed input, so no hardening can make the two views equal. Parse untrusted input once, with `qs`, and apply deny lists, authorization, and signature checks to the parsed object rather than to raw key text. Text that `qs` cannot place in its grammar is currently dropped, so distinct raw names can share one parsed path ([#619](https://github.com/ljharb/qs/issues/619)). |
+
+### 7. Risk Ranking
+
+- **High:** Denial of Service via array parsing or malformed input (historical vulnerability)
+- **Medium:** Prototype pollution via options or input (if `allowPrototypes` enabled)
+- **Low:** Information disclosure in errors
+
+### 8. Next Steps & Review
+
+1. **Audit option validation logic.**
+2. **Depth limiting:** `parse` enforces a `depth` bound by default (with `strictDepth` to throw); `stringify` offers an opt-in `depth` bound (default `Infinity`, since its input is caller-produced) for defense-in-depth.
+3. **Implement fuzz testing for parser and stringifier edge cases.**
+4. **Regularly review dependencies for vulnerabilities.**
+5. **Keep documentation and threat model up to date.**
+6. **Ensure builtins/globals are never modified as a result of parse.**
+7. **Support round-trip consistency between parse and stringify as a non-security goal, with the right options[5][9].**

package/assets/api/vendor_modules/body-parser/node_modules/qs/.nycrc

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+{
+	"all": true,
+	"check-coverage": false,
+	"reporter": ["text-summary", "text", "html", "json"],
+	"lines": 86,
+	"statements": 85.93,
+	"functions": 82.43,
+	"branches": 76.06,
+	"exclude": [
+		"coverage",
+		"dist"
+	]
+}