@event4u/agent-config 9.7.0 → 9.9.0

package/docs/decisions/ADR-061-corpus-grounding-layer.md

@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 061
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-07
-decision: corpus-grounding-layer
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: frontend design intelligence (road-to-frontend-design-intelligence, Phase 0)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-061 — Reusable corpus-grounding layer; frontend is its first instance
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-07. Records the AI-council convergence
-(anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5 + anthropic/claude-opus-4-5 + openai/gpt-4o,
-deep 3-round debate, 2026-06-03 — no split, no tie-break) plus the four
-implementation forks resolved 2026-06-07 (anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-openai/gpt-4o, converged).
-
-## Context
-
-The package's UI directive set (`audit → design → apply → review → polish`)
-produces design briefs from agent judgment plus the `fe-design` heuristics —
-there is no queryable design-knowledge corpus. The MIT-licensed
-`nextlevelbuilder/ui-ux-pro-max-skill` repository ships exactly that: ~15
-tabular CSVs (161-row `ui-reasoning` with JSON decision rules, WCAG-adjusted
-color token sets, typography pairings, chart-selection knowledge, 16
-per-framework best-practice files) plus a dependency-free pure-stdlib BM25
-engine. The owner's escalated goal — *"real knowledge + real orchestration in
-every domain, as flexible and good as possible"* — reshaped the adoption from
-"copy a frontend corpus" into "build a reusable grounding layer; frontend is
-its first instance."
-
-## Decision
-
-### 1. Four-operation routing — never one corpus for everything
-
-Each domain's knowledge is split across four mechanisms; conflating them is a
-named failure mode ("grounding theater"):
-
-| Operation | When | Mechanism |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Grounding** | *before* action — constrains the option space | curated corpus + decision rules |
-| **Reference** | *during* action — factual lookup | on-demand `references/` / RAG, not the corpus |
-| **Validation** | *after* action — constraint check | rules / linters |
-| **Method** | the procedure itself | framework skill |
-
-A corpus **grounds** (pre-action). Mid-action lookup is reference; post-action
-checking is a rule; the procedure stays a skill.
-
-### 2. One shared engine, invoked not inherited
-
-A generic engine lives at `src/skills/_lib/corpus-grounding/`
-(`bm25_search.py`, `decision_engine.py`, `schema_validator.py`) with a
-**versioned interface-stability contract** documented in its README before any
-domain adopts it. Domains plug in via a manifest; the engine is grep-able,
-never a hidden god-dependency. Retrieval: BM25 default with a structured
-`filters` pre-filter from day one; retriever selected by name
-(`bm25`/`structured`/`hybrid`); embeddings only on measured recall failure,
-never network-by-default.
-
-### 3. Schema-agnostic plug-in contract — explicitly NOT uniform
-
-Each domain declares its own axes via a manifest (corpus files, search
-columns, output columns, reasoning-map location) and an output tier:
-**lookup-only → conditional-grounding (decision rules) → constraint-emission**.
-Forcing the frontend schema onto other domains is a named failure mode. Every
-corpus output carries a **confidence score + an evidence-gap line** by
-contract (prevents false precision / authority inflation).
-
-### 4. Grounding default = lightweight consultation
-
-Default integration: a skill consults the corpus → proposes grounded options
-with confidence + evidence-gap → human confirms. Directive-engine integration
-is reserved for mature, naturally-sequential domains (frontend keeps its
-directive engine — Tier 2); "directive engines everywhere" is rejected as
-orchestration envy. `directives/ui/design.py` never imports the engine — the
-corpus call lives in the skill layer (`ui-design-brief` /
-`design-intelligence`), keeping the engine an optional dependency.
-
-### 5. Qualification by decision-rule utility, NOT row count
-
-A domain qualifies when (i) its selection/constraint decision is
-externalizable as auditable rules that beat the agent's priors, and (ii)
-grounding happens before action. Verdicts:
-
-- **Strong**: security/threat-modeling (MITRE-derived), accessibility
-  (WCAG/ARIA patterns), API design, DB-query tuning.
-- **Conditional (evidence-gated)**: finance *method selection*,
-  architecture-pattern selection — thin pre-action selection corpora only;
-  land only if a corpus measurably beats the existing framework skill over
-  ≥10 real sessions (the council's change-my-mind anchor).
-- **Reject as corpus**: anything that is really reference (→ RAG), really
-  validation (→ rule), volatile/culturally-specific (people/org fads), or a
-  thin corpus that doesn't beat priors. Test: *if it fits in 5 lines of an
-  always-on rule, it's a rule, not a corpus.*
-
-### 6. Provenance / freshness — the upstream-source line is part of DoD
-
-Every adopted asset carries an inline upstream-source line: upstream repo +
-commit SHA + last-checked date. Per-corpus header additionally names a
-maintainer + refresh cadence + last-validated date (domain-adoption Gate 2).
-CI link-checks; volatile content is tiered by rot velocity or marked
-reference-only. **Definition of done for every adoption phase includes this
-line** (refresh stays mechanical, not archaeological).
-
-### 7. Licensing
-
-Root corpus + scripts: MIT (Next Level Builder, 2024) → retain notice.
-`ui-styling`-derived material: **Apache-2.0** (vendored "claudekit"; the
-dedicated `LICENSE.txt` wins over the MIT frontmatter claim) → retain notice,
-mark modified files (§4b), ship the license copy alongside derived assets.
-Recorded in `src/skills/design-intelligence/ATTRIBUTION.md`.
-
-### 8. Implementation forks (council-resolved 2026-06-07)
-
-| Fork | Resolution |
-|---|---|
-| Pack placement | **New `frontend-design` pack** (ADR-013 amendment, same PR). `requires: [engineering-base]`, `suggests: [react, nextjs]` — corpus is stack-agnostic data, React never required. Keeps ~1 MB of design data out of `engineering-base`. |
-| `google-fonts.csv` (745 KB, 1923 rows) | **Skip.** Redundant with the public Google Fonts API; `font-pairings-reference.csv` (73 curated pairings) carries the pairing decision. Document the API fallback for fonts outside the curated set. |
-| Stack-corpus surfacing | **`--stack <name>` search domain** on the one grounding engine — single mechanism, no 16-way prose-staleness vector. |
-| Brand→token pipeline | **Defer** with a watch note pinning the upstream commit SHA; adopt on first consumer demand. |
-
-### 9. Out of scope (explicit)
-
-- The upstream slide/presentation engine (out of frontend scope).
-- The Gemini generative brand-asset suite (logo/CIP/icon/banner/social) —
-  gated by `domain-adoption-policy`; see the domain-watch note. If gates
-  pass later, it adapts into `pack-ai-video` (no second image-gen stack).
-- Business-pack corpora (people/org, GTM, founder-strategy verdicts) —
-  rejected per the qualification rubric; reference belongs to RAG,
-  validation to rules.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- A new domain ships a manifest + data + a named owner — not a forked engine.
-- `engineering-base` stays lean; design intelligence is opt-in via the
-  `frontend-design` pack.
-- The skill-bundled `scripts/` + `data/` delivery path becomes a sanctioned,
-  tested pattern (delivery-mechanism gate, Phase 1) — load-bearing for every
-  later domain corpus.
-- Corpus maintenance is a standing cost: named owner + cadence per corpus, or
-  the corpus is not merged.
-
-## Alternatives considered
-
-- **One corpus for everything (CSV per domain)** — rejected; conflates the
-  four operations, produces grounding theater + maintenance bloat.
-- **Fold the corpus into `fe-design`** — rejected 2-of-3; size discipline.
-  `fe-design` stays heuristics and *invokes* `design-intelligence`.
-- **Directive engines for every domain** — rejected; consultation default.
-- **Keep `.cjs` token generators on Node** — rejected unanimously; ported to
-  Python (no Node runtime dependency for core flows).
-- **Adopt `google-fonts.csv`** — rejected; public-API-redundant bloat.
-
-## References
-
-- `agents/roadmaps/archive/road-to-frontend-design-intelligence.md` —
-  implementing roadmap, archived 2026-06-07 (full source analysis + phase
-  plan + per-step evidence notes).
-- [ADR-013 — Discovery frontmatter contract](ADR-013-discovery-frontmatter-contract.md)
-  — `frontend-design` pack amendment (2026-06-07).
-- `src/skills/design-intelligence/ATTRIBUTION.md` — upstream provenance +
-  license obligations.
-- `agents/settings/contexts/domain-watch/generative-brand-assets.md` — gated
-  Gemini-suite watch note.
-- Upstream: `nextlevelbuilder/ui-ux-pro-max-skill` @
-  `b7e3af80f6e331f6fb456667b82b12cade7c9d35` (last checked 2026-06-07).
-
-## Amendment — 2026-06-16 (§8/§9 superseded in part)
-
-The image/brand/typography work re-examined the gated and deferred items of
-§8/§9 on the merits for the product vision. A two-round merits council
-(anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5 + openai/gpt-4o, 2026-06-13, design lens,
-web-research-grounded) overturned three of them. The four-operation routing
-(§1) and the no-forked-engine principle (§2) are unchanged — the brand corpus
-is a second instance of the same grounding engine.
-
-- **§8 brand→token defer — resolved, no longer deferred.** This work was the
-  "first consumer demand" §8 named. `brand-to-tokens` ships: brand decisions →
-  a DTCG `.tokens.json` source of truth → `design-tokens/scripts/tokens.py`
-  (no Node). The same `.tokens.json` is the export pack-ai-image's brand-asset
-  generation and the greenfield-scaffold seed consume.
-- **§8 font fork — superseded.** "Skip `google-fonts.csv`, rely on the live
-  Google Fonts API" is replaced by **adopt-lite pinned metadata**: pin the MIT
-  `google-font-metadata` mirror (or a slim top-N slice) as a deterministic
-  offline **Reference**; the live API needs a key, is nondeterministic, and
-  carries no pairing metadata. `font-pairings-reference.csv` stays the curated
-  pairing Reference with a freshness contract.
-- **§9 brand-asset generation — superseded, ADOPTED.** The Gemini generative
-  brand-asset suite (logo/CIP/banner/social) was gated as a possible second
-  image-gen stack. The merits pass established it never was one: generation is
-  structured prompting + brand-token injection + provider routing on the
-  **existing** adapters (now the neutral `scripts/media/` substrate), with a
-  `recraft`/LLM-SVG vector path for marks raster models can't emit. Generation
-  lives in **pack-ai-image**; brand governance/tokens stay in **pack-brand**,
-  which exports tokens pack-ai-image consumes (dependency B → A, never
-  inverted). The `domain-watch/generative-brand-assets.md` gate is cleared.
-- **§9 slide/presentation engine — confirmed out of scope, but reasoned.**
-  Document assembly ≠ brand UX; owning a render engine (reveal.js / Presenton /
-  Gamma) is scope creep. pack-brand instead **exports validated brand
-  templates** (Marp/reveal YAML with locked brand variables) for the user's own
-  deck tools — enforcement via the template, not engine ownership. Re-open only
-  on evidenced demand.
-
-The brand corpus deviates from the §8-implied "adopt the SHA-pinned claudekit
-brand sub-skills" framing: it is **original-authored** from public brand
-frameworks (Jung / Mark-Pearson archetypes, public messaging frameworks),
-`upstream: null` — honest provenance, no third-party SHA to pin, no §4b file
-marking. The shared grounding engine is still attributed via
-`design-intelligence/ATTRIBUTION.md`.
-
-Implementing roadmap: `road-to-image-brand-typography` (Phase A–D),
-archived 2026-06-16; live-validation + command-surface follow-on tracked in
-its sibling follow-up roadmap.
-
-## Resolution note — retrieval ranking at scale (2026-07-09)
-
-The "no engine fork / no minisearch-class dependency" decision is honoured at
-memory/knowledge retrieval scale by a **hand-rolled BM25 + trigram index**
-(`src/scripts/_lib/lexical_index.ts`, pure Node stdlib) rather than SQLite-FTS5
-or any embedded search engine. It activates at the `lint_knowledge_scale`
-tripwire (>200/type or >500 total files) and replaces the coarse `_score`
-bucket scorer's ranking; measured lift on the retrieval-precision corpus is a
-mean top tie-set of 3.333 → 1.0 with precision@1/@5 unchanged
-(`internal/bench/reports/lexical-ranking.json`). This closes the ADR-061 ↔
-FTS5 open question flagged in `road-to-retrieval-substrate-hardening` (B2): the
-BM25 core ADR-061 sanctioned is realised without an engine dependency.

package/docs/decisions/ADR-062-encrypt-at-rest-store-architecture.md

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 062
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: encrypt-at-rest-store-architecture
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof, Step 3)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-062 — Encrypt-at-rest store architecture: AES-256-GCM + Python-authoritative store access
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via two-round AI-council debate
-(anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-5 + openai/gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08). Both
-members independently converged in round 2. This ADR records the architecture;
-the **implementation is a dedicated follow-up PR** (scope + must-haves below) —
-it is deliberately **not** bundled into a reconciliation diff.
-
-## Context
-
-Phase 8 of the employee-product workstream adds at-rest encryption for the
-three workspace stores under `~/.event4u/agent-config/workspace/`
-(sessions `*.jsonl`, documents `*.md` + `*.history.jsonl`, analytics
-`events.jsonl`). The crypto layer `workspace_crypto.py` is shipped behind the
-`workspace.encrypt_at_rest` flag (default **OFF** — no field data is encrypted
-yet). A prior council (2026-06-07) deferred the *store wiring* to its own PR
-because the Node-side crypto/key approach was undecided.
-
-Two problems had to be resolved before any wiring:
-
-1. **Cipher drift.** `docs/contracts/at-rest-encryption.md` specifies
-   **AES-256-GCM** (envelope `AC1\0` + version + 12-byte nonce + 16-byte tag +
-   ciphertext) and lists `keytar` (Node) alongside `keyring` (Python). The
-   shipped `workspace_crypto.py` actually uses **Fernet** (AES-128-CBC +
-   HMAC-SHA256, magic `E4U-WSv1`). Fernet is not natively reproducible in
-   Node's `node:crypto`; AES-256-GCM is.
-2. **The Node GUI server reads/writes the stores directly** (`src/server/routes/workspace.ts`
-   via `fs` — readdir/readFile/writeFile/appendFile, filtering by `.jsonl` /
-   `.md`). If Python writes `.enc`, those direct reads break.
-
-## Decision
-
-### A — Cipher: align the code to the contract's **AES-256-GCM**
-
-The code is wrong, not the contract. Re-cipher `workspace_crypto.py` from
-Fernet to AES-256-GCM with the documented `AC1\0` + version-byte envelope,
-keeping the public API (`encrypt_bytes` / `decrypt_bytes` / `encrypt_file` /
-`decrypt_file`) and the plaintext-pass-through-on-read back-compat. Reject
-unknown envelope versions explicitly. Safe to do because the flag is default-OFF
-and **no Fernet-encrypted field data exists** to migrate. AES-256-GCM is native
-in both `cryptography` (Python `AESGCM`) and `node:crypto`, so the same envelope
-is byte-reproducible across runtimes.
-
-### B — Store access: **Option 4, Python-authoritative end-to-end**
-
-The Node GUI server stops reading/writing the encrypted store files directly.
-All store access routes through the Python CLI modules (the canonical writers),
-which own encryption. Rejected alternatives:
-
-- **keytar in Node** — `keytar` is deprecated (Dec 2022, superseded by
-  Electron `safeStorage`); cross-library keychain interop between Python
-  `keyring` and `keytar` is unproven. Both council members rejected it.
-- **Reimplement Fernet in Node** — moot once A picks AES-256-GCM, and still a
-  new format-fiddly surface.
-- **Dual native crypto** — duplicates the security-critical path in two
-  runtimes; the council called line-count "narrowness" that leaves a dual-write
-  footgun a false economy.
-
-To avoid Python interpreter cold-start cost (the dissent's concern, sharp on
-Windows ~200–500 ms), store reads use **batched** CLI calls (e.g.
-`workspace_sessions.py list --decrypt` returns all decrypted records in one
-subprocess), not one subprocess per file.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- The follow-up PR is a **real refactor of the GUI data path**, not a wiring
-  one-liner. The council was explicit: *"ship the right architecture now, or
-  don't ship encryption at all"* — Option 1 (shell-out as a temporary
-  intermediate) was rejected as process theatre.
-- The flag stays **default OFF** through this work; the `true` flip waits for
-  external (recruit-session) validation per `agents/roles/EVIDENCE_BASIS.md`'s
-  sibling reasoning.
-
-### Must-haves before the implementation PR is greenlit (council checklist)
-
-1. **`cryptography` exercised in CI.** Today the round-trip tests in
-   `tests/test_workspace_crypto.py` **skip** when `cryptography` is absent —
-   and it is absent in CI, so the cipher has never actually round-tripped under
-   test. The implementation PR MUST add `cryptography` to the test job so the
-   AES-256-GCM round-trip genuinely runs (otherwise the cipher ships unverified
-   — a `verify-before-complete` violation on a security primitive).
-2. **Migration with concurrency safety.** Detect plaintext → encrypt-in-place
-   atomically (temp + fsync + rename + delete), roll back on any error; refuse
-   to migrate while the GUI server is running (or make it non-destructive).
-3. **Key rotation path.** Wrong-key today = permanent data loss; ship
-   `workspace_crypto.py rekey` + a documented recovery/export flow.
-4. **Kill-switch / rollback criteria.** `AGENT_CONFIG_NO_ENCRYPTION` already
-   forces-disable reads; add an emergency bulk-decrypt and a documented
-   error-rate auto-disable.
-5. **Envelope version semantics.** Version byte defined; unknown versions
-   rejected with a clear error, not a crash.
-6. **Cross-runtime integration test.** Python encrypts → Node reads back the
-   decrypted record through the Python-authoritative path (Option 4).
-
-## Alternatives
-
-See § Decision B rejected alternatives (keytar / Fernet-in-Node / dual native)
-and the cipher A alternative (keep Fernet + reconcile the contract to document
-it — rejected because it forecloses native Node interop and the contract's
-AES-256-GCM was the deliberate original design).
-
-## References
-
-- Contract: [`docs/contracts/at-rest-encryption.md`](../contracts/at-rest-encryption.md).
-- Crypto layer: `src/cli/python/workspace_crypto.py`.
-- GUI store IO: `src/server/routes/workspace.ts`.
-- Prior deferral: AI-council 2026-06-07 (recorded in the roadmap Phase 8 Step 3 deferral note).
-- Roadmap: `agents/roadmaps/archive/road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof.md` Phase 8.

package/docs/decisions/ADR-063-append-jsonl-encryption-deferred.md

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 063
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: append-jsonl-encryption-deferred
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof, Step 3)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-063 — Append-JSONL store encryption deferred (nonce-management gate)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 + gpt-4o, design mode,
-2026-06-08). Records why encrypt-at-rest Part B ships **documents-only** and
-what must be solved before the append-heavy JSONL stores are encrypted.
-
-## Context
-
-ADR-062 chose AES-256-GCM + Option-4 Python-authoritative store access. The
-three workspace stores have different write shapes:
-
-- **documents** — whole-file `<slug>.md`. Whole-file `.md.enc` is a natural
-  fit; encrypted in Part B.
-- **sessions** — `sessions/<day>/<id>.jsonl`, **append-heavy** (one record per
-  host turn).
-- **analytics** — `analytics/events.jsonl`, **append-heavy** on a hot UI path.
-- **document revision logs** — `<slug>.history.jsonl`, append-once-per-save.
-
-AES-256-GCM encrypts a whole blob — you cannot append a line to an encrypted
-blob. Two strategies were weighed:
-
-- **Whole-file read-decrypt-append-encrypt-rewrite** per append: O(file) per
-  event under a lock — unacceptable for the analytics hot path.
-- **Per-record encryption** (one envelope per line, append stays append):
-  attractive, but the council flagged it as **cryptographically unsafe as
-  sketched** — AES-GCM security collapses on (key, nonce) reuse, and the
-  design had no nonce-derivation scheme, no crash/concurrency reuse proof, no
-  nonce-exhaustion handling.
-
-## Decision
-
-**Defer encryption of all append-JSONL stores** — `sessions/*.jsonl`,
-`analytics/events.jsonl`, and document `*.history.jsonl` — to a dedicated
-follow-up. Part B encrypts document `.md` bodies only (the highest-sensitivity
-content: offer / mail / memo / brief bodies). The append-JSONL set stays
-plaintext until a per-record encryption protocol is designed and ADR'd.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- Document bodies are encrypted end-to-end (write + Python-authoritative read);
-  edit metadata in `.history.jsonl` and session/analytics records remain
-  plaintext for now. The at-rest-encryption contract scope table is updated to
-  mark this split explicitly so no one assumes the JSONL stores are protected.
-- The flag stays default-OFF; nothing about today's behaviour changes.
-
-### Must-solve before append-JSONL encryption (the follow-up ADR's gate)
-
-1. **Nonce-derivation scheme** that provably never reuses (key, nonce):
-   deterministic from (key, file-id, monotonic-record-index) or a
-   crash-persistent counter — not bare random per line.
-2. **Concurrent-append serialization** (file lock + atomic record-index
-   allocation) so two writers cannot mint the same nonce.
-3. **Crash safety** — partial/truncated final record detected and skipped, not
-   fatal; counter state survives process restart.
-4. **Nonce-exhaustion / rotation** before the GCM 2^32-per-key limit.
-5. **Hot-path cost** — analytics `emit()` must stay non-blocking; per-record
-   encryption must not reintroduce whole-file rewrite.
-
-## Alternatives
-
-Whole-file-rewrite-per-append (rejected: O(file) on the hot path) and
-ship-all-three-now with random per-line nonces (rejected: nonce-reuse
-vulnerability). See ADR-062 for the cipher + Option-4 architecture this builds
-on.
-
-## References
-
-- ADR-062 — encrypt-at-rest store architecture (cipher + Option 4).
-- Contract: [`docs/contracts/at-rest-encryption.md`](../contracts/at-rest-encryption.md).
-- Stores: `src/cli/python/workspace_sessions.py`, `workspace_analytics.py`, `workspace_documents.py`.

package/docs/decisions/ADR-064-append-jsonl-per-record-encryption.md

@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 064
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: append-jsonl-per-record-encryption
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof, Step 3)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-064 — Append-JSONL per-record encryption protocol
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Resolves the nonce-management gate ADR-063 set.
-Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 + gpt-4o, design mode,
-2026-06-08) — a cautious round that raised six refinements (nonce-count
-awareness, single-writer enforcement, per-store corruption policy, envelope
-versioning, OS preconditions, scope sequencing); the protocol below folds them
-in. First store shipped under this protocol: **analytics**.
-
-## Context
-
-ADR-063 deferred encrypting the append-heavy JSONL stores because AES-GCM
-cannot append to a blob and the per-record scheme needed a nonce-management
-design. This ADR fixes the protocol.
-
-## Decision
-
-### Protocol — per-record self-contained envelope
-
-Each JSONL record is encrypted independently into its own `AC1\0` AES-256-GCM
-envelope (the Part-A cipher, with its version byte), base64-encoded as **one
-line**. Append = `encrypt_line(json)` → a single atomic `O_APPEND` write. No
-whole-file rewrite, no shared counter. Helpers live in `workspace_crypto`
-(`encrypt_line` / `decrypt_line`); `decrypt_line` passes a plaintext JSON line
-(`{`/`[`-prefixed) through unchanged, so a file with mixed plaintext+encrypted
-records (flag flipped mid-life) reads correctly.
-
-- **Nonce (N1):** a fresh **random 96-bit nonce per record**. NIST SP 800-38D
-  permits random-construction nonces up to 2^32 invocations per key; a session
-  or analytics file is many orders below that, and `rekey` resets the per-key
-  count. Random nonces carry **no crash-fragile counter state** — the prior
-  round's "catastrophic reuse" concern was about counters resetting on crash,
-  which this scheme does not use.
-- **Concurrency (N2):** correctness rests on **single-writer-per-file**, not
-  locks. Each record line is independent (own nonce, own envelope), so one
-  atomic append per line suffices. The single-writer guarantee is
-  **architectural**: the Python store module is the sole writer. For sessions
-  (Node reads+writes today) this means routing through the Python CLI
-  (ADR-062 Option 4) so there is still exactly one writer — the protocol is
-  single-writer-based, **not** Python-only-based, so it extends to sessions
-  unchanged.
-- **Corruption (N3) — per store:** *analytics* is best-effort telemetry →
-  skip-and-continue on a torn/undecryptable line. *Document history* (when it
-  lands) is state-critical → fail-closed. The reader policy is the store's
-  call, not the protocol's.
-- **Versioning (N4):** the envelope version byte (Part A) lets a future
-  scheme coexist; unknown versions already reject.
-
-### Operations parity
-
-Each encrypted append-JSONL store ships `migrate` (plaintext → per-record
-`.enc` lines, idempotent), `decrypt-all` (kill-switch → plaintext, works
-flag-off), and `rekey` (rotate key + re-encrypt every record). `prune` (and any
-age/query reader) is decrypt-aware but keeps the original encrypted line at
-rest.
-
-### Rollout order
-
-1. **analytics** — Python-only, single-writer already true. **Shipped.**
-2. **document `.history.jsonl`** — Python-only, inside `workspace_documents.py`;
-   its whole-file `.md` migrate/rekey/decrypt-all gained a parallel per-line
-   history pass. **Shipped.**
-3. **sessions** — Node reads+writes; the Option-4 Node-session refactor routed
-   all 5 endpoints (list / read / launch / append) through the Python CLI
-   (`--root` validated, `--host` / `--data-json` for record fidelity).
-   **Shipped.** All three append-JSONL stores now encrypt at rest.
-
-> **Routing choice (sessions):** the refactor went **uniform** Python-routing
-> (reads + writes always through the CLI, like documents), not the
-> conditional flag-gated routing this ADR's design round leaned toward. Uniform
-> removes the need for Node to read the flag (Python owns the flag decision —
-> true single source of truth), is consistent with the documents precedent, and
-> is fully CI-testable (plaintext path needs no `cryptography`). The design
-> round's perf concern targeted *machine-hot* appends; session appends are
-> human-turn-paced, so the per-op subprocess cost is imperceptible.
-
-## Consequences
-
-- Analytics records are encrypted at rest when the flag is on; the flag stays
-  **default-OFF**, so nothing changes for today's users.
-- `emit()` stays non-blocking and never raises: a crypto error DROPS the event
-  (consistent with the existing scrub-fail-drop), never persists it
-  unencrypted.
-- The shared `encrypt_line`/`decrypt_line` protocol is now the contract the
-  history + session follow-ups reuse verbatim.
-
-## Alternatives
-
-Counter-based nonces (rejected: crash-fragile state, concurrent-index
-allocation) and whole-file read-modify-rewrite per append (rejected by ADR-063:
-O(file) on the analytics hot path). See ADR-062 (cipher + Option 4) and ADR-063
-(the deferral gate this resolves).
-
-## References
-
-- ADR-062 — cipher + Python-authoritative architecture.
-- ADR-063 — the deferral + nonce gate this resolves.
-- `src/cli/python/workspace_crypto.py` (`encrypt_line`/`decrypt_line`),
-  `workspace_analytics.py` (emit/read/prune/migrate/decrypt-all/rekey).
-- Contract: [`docs/contracts/at-rest-encryption.md`](../contracts/at-rest-encryption.md).

package/docs/decisions/ADR-065-tier3-inbox-handoff-v0.md

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
----
-adr: 065
-status: accepted
-date: 2026-06-08
-decision: tier3-inbox-handoff-v0
-supersedes: —
-superseded_by: —
-phase: employee-product Phase 8 (road-to-employee-product-and-external-proof)
-type: structural
----
-
-# ADR-065 — Tier-3 host hand-off inbox: plaintext, ephemeral v0 (encryption declined)
-
-## Status
-
-**Accepted** · 2026-06-08. Design converged via AI-council (claude-sonnet-4-5 +
-gpt-4o, design mode, 2026-06-08). The encrypt-at-rest arc (ADR-062/063/064)
-listed the inbox as the one deferred store; the council round that scoped it
-found the inbox did not exist yet **and** that encrypting it would be security
-theater. This ADR records the honest v0: build the hand-off, ship it plaintext.
-
-## Context
-
-ADR-023 specifies a **Tier-3 host hand-off**: for hosts the workspace cannot
-drive (Augment, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, JetBrains), the workspace writes the
-rendered prompt into `~/.event4u/agent-config/workspace/inbox/<id>.md` and
-surfaces a copy-to-clipboard banner; the user opens the host themselves. No
-code wrote or read that file — the feature was specified, never built.
-
-## Decision
-
-Build the Tier-3 inbox as a **plaintext, ephemeral, content-minimal** store.
-
-- **Plaintext — encryption declined.** The inbox holds a prompt the user
-  *reads to copy-paste*; the adversary an at-rest cipher defends against is a
-  filesystem attacker. That same prompt content already lives in the
-  **encrypted sessions store**. Encrypting the inbox therefore stops **no
-  incremental threat** — it would add migrate/rekey/decrypt-all/Python-routing
-  complexity for zero marginal security. Revisit only if a distinct threat
-  model emerges (e.g. the inbox starts holding content not in sessions).
-- **Ephemeral.** `prune` drops hand-off files older than 24h; the store is a
-  transient hand-off surface, not durable storage.
-- **Content-minimal (v0).** The file is a small frontmatter header
-  (id / role / task / session / created_at) + the **rendered prompt body**
-  supplied by the caller. Skill-body pre-rendering **shipped** as a follow-up
-  ([`ADR-066`](ADR-066-skill-body-prerendering.md) — `--skill-hint` resolves the
-  skill body into the hand-off). Still **deferred:** host-tier **auto-detection**
-  (v0 takes the hand-off intent explicitly from the caller).
-- **Python-authoritative, ships dark.** `workspace_inbox.py`
-  (write / read / list / forget / prune, `--root` validated to
-  `…/workspace/inbox`) is the store; the Node `POST /api/v1/workspace/inbox`
-  + `GET /api/v1/workspace/inbox/:id` endpoints route through it and are
-  **gated behind `AGENT_CONFIG_TIER3_INBOX` (default off)** until the hand-off
-  UX is validated. The write endpoint returns `{id, path, banner}`; the banner
-  text only — clipboard / UI wiring is the Preact shell's job, deferred.
-- A pasted credential in the prompt is **scrubbed** on write (disposable
-  hand-off posture, same as the session/analytics telemetry stores).
-
-## Consequences
-
-- The Tier-3 hand-off has a real, tested writer/reader for the first time;
-  the encrypt-at-rest arc is closed (the inbox is intentionally plaintext, not
-  an outstanding encryption gap).
-- The feature ships dark — zero behaviour change until an operator sets the
-  flag.
-- If the inbox later carries content NOT mirrored in sessions, encryption
-  must be revisited (reuse the documents whole-file `.md.enc` pattern); the
-  contract scope table records this trigger.
-
-## Alternatives
-
-- **Encrypt the inbox** (the arc's original intent) — rejected as security
-  theater per the threat-model analysis above.
-- **Fold into `launch`** (write the inbox when a Tier-3 launch happens) —
-  rejected for v0: requires host-tier auto-detection, which is deferred; a
-  standalone endpoint is more testable and modular.
-- **Skill-body pre-rendering in v0** — rejected: a new skill-resolution trust
-  boundary; its own ADR.
-
-## References
-
-- ADR-023 — host-agent protocol (Tier-3 hand-off spec).
-- ADR-024 — workspace v0 floor (the inbox is a post-floor addition).
-- ADR-062/063/064 — the encrypt-at-rest arc this closes.
-- `src/cli/python/workspace_inbox.py`, `src/server/routes/workspace.ts`.
-- Contract: [`docs/contracts/at-rest-encryption.md`](../contracts/at-rest-encryption.md).