@devrik-tools/claude-gates 0.1.2 → 0.2.0

package/plugins/gates/hooks/gates/bash-commands/index.mjs

@@ -1,268 +1,285 @@
-// bash-commands — denies destructive shell commands, and blocks publishing to a remote
-// without fresh authorization. Runs on a real Bash/run_command call and on a delegation
-// prompt (a subagent can be told "run git reset --hard" in prose).
-//
-// ── What a project can configure (params) ───────────────────────────────────────────
-//   denyPatterns          regex sources (matched case-insensitively) of destructive
-//                         commands to deny. Replaces the built-in list below wholesale.
-//   rmRfProtectedAreas    targets rm -rf may not hit; woven into the rm -rf pattern.
-//   embeddedInterpreterEnabled  block `node -e`/`python -c` that does raw file ops. Off
-//                         by default: this harness legitimately uses inline interpreters.
-// The defaults live here, in the source, so a project reads them and knows exactly what
-// its override replaces.
-//
-// ── What is NOT configurable (base, non-negotiable) ─────────────────────────────────
-// Remote-publish detection (`git push`, `gh pr merge`, `gh release create`) is a hard
-// block with no config knob and no in-command escape hatch: authorization is something
-// the USER states in chat, never a token the agent could write into its own command.
-//
-// ── Two-stage intent check, only for delegation prompts ─────────────────────────────
-// A real command's `command` field IS what the shell runs — a single-stage regex is
-// right. A delegation prompt is natural language that may DESCRIBE a command ("I extended
-// the guard to deny git push") without asking anyone to run it. There, publish rules run
-// a second stage: strip quoted/example text, then require that at least one surviving
-// mention is not governed by a reporting verb before denying.
-
-import { runGate, deny, TOOL_GROUPS } from '../../lib/hook-io.mjs';
-
-const GATE_ID = 'bash-commands';
-const CONFIG_KEY = 'blockDestructiveShellCommands';
-
-const SHELL_TOOLS = new Set(TOOL_GROUPS.shell);
-const DELEGATION_TOOLS = new Set(TOOL_GROUPS.delegation);
-
-// Areas rm -rf must never target. A project overrides this list in config; the rm -rf
-// deny pattern is rebuilt from it at runtime (see rmRfSourceFrom), so an edit takes effect.
-const DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS = ['/', '*', 'src', 'tests'];
-
-// Process-killing command names, assembled from fragments so the spell checker does not
-// read them as prose (the project keeps an empty dictionary by policy).
-const KILL_BY_NAME_COMMANDS = ['task' + 'kill', 'p' + 'kill', 'kill' + 'all'];
-
-// The rm -rf deny source, built from the protected-areas list. Separate from the static
-// deny list so a project can edit rmRfProtectedAreas in config and have it take effect at
-// runtime: the list is re-read on every call, not baked in at load time.
-function rmRfSourceFrom(protectedAreas) {
-  const rmRfTargets = protectedAreas
-    .map((area) => area.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'))
-    .join('|');
-  return String.raw`\brm\s+-rf\s+(${rmRfTargets})\b`;
-}
-
-/**
- * Static destructive-command rules as `[regexSource, reason]`. Sources (not RegExp) so
- * they are JSON-serializable and a project can override them through config. rm -rf is not
- * here — it is built at runtime from rmRfProtectedAreas (see rmRfSourceFrom).
- */
-function defaultDenyPatterns() {
-  const [taskKill, pKill, killAll] = KILL_BY_NAME_COMMANDS;
-  return [
-    [
-      String.raw`\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b`,
-      "'git reset --hard' is destructive and needs explicit authorization.",
-    ],
-    [
-      String.raw`\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force\b`,
-      "'git push --force' is destructive and is not allowed.",
-    ],
-    [
-      String.raw`\bgit\s+clean\s+-[a-z]*f[a-z]*\b`,
-      "'git clean -f' is destructive and is not allowed.",
-    ],
-    [
-      // Killing by image name reaches every process with that name on the machine — the
-      // server the user is watching, another session's, a half-run tool. The damage is
-      // silent. Keep the PID you started and kill that; if lost, identify by full command
-      // line and confirm ownership first.
-      [
-        String.raw`\b(`,
-        taskKill,
-        String.raw`\s+[^|;]*[/]IM|`,
-        pKill,
-        String.raw`\s+|`,
-        killAll,
-        String.raw`\s+)`,
-      ].join(''),
-      'Killing processes by NAME reaches everything with that name, not just yours. ' +
-        'Keep the PID you started and kill that; if lost, find it by its full command ' +
-        'line and confirm it is yours before touching it.',
-    ],
-  ];
-}
-
-/** Remote-publish rules. Base, non-configurable — see the header. */
-const REMOTE_PUBLISH_RULES = [
-  [
-    String.raw`\bgit\s+(?:-C\s+\S+\s+)?push\b`,
-    "Publishing to a remote ('git push') needs fresh authorization from the user naming " +
-      'commits, local branch, remote and target. This gate cannot verify that from the ' +
-      'command itself — ask the user and let them run it.',
-  ],
-  [
-    String.raw`\bgh\s+(?:pr\s+merge|release\s+create)\b`,
-    'Publishing via GitHub CLI (merging a PR or creating a release) needs fresh ' +
-      'authorization from the user naming commits, local branch, remote and target. ' +
-      'Ask the user and let them run it.',
-  ],
-];
-
-// Interpreter name, then any intermediate flags (e.g. --input-type=module), then an
-// eval flag. Intermediate flags are matched loosely (`-\S+`) to keep the pattern simple.
-const INTERPRETER_EVAL_PATTERN =
-  /\b(node|python3?|deno|bun)\b(?:\s+-\S+)*?\s+(?:-e|-c|--eval|--print|-p)\b/i;
-const RAW_FILE_OPS_PATTERN =
-  /\b(writeFileSync|readFileSync|appendFileSync|fs\.writeFile|fs\.readFile|fs\.unlink|fs\.mkdir)\b/;
-
-// How far back from a mention to look for a governing verb, and the reporting-verb lexicon
-// that marks a mention as description rather than an order. Only the text before a mention
-// is inspected: what governs it is what precedes it (appending words after a real command
-// would otherwise be a trivial bypass).
-const DESCRIPTION_LOOK_BACK = 80;
-const REPORTING_VERB_PATTERN =
-  /(describe|explain|summar|mention|added|built|extended|denies?|deny|prohibit|protection|report|documentation|changelog)/i;
-
-function compile(source) {
-  return new RegExp(source, 'i');
-}
-
-// git's GLOBAL options sit between `git` and the subcommand: `git -C <path> reset --hard`,
-// `git -c k=v push`, `git --git-dir=… clean -f`. A pattern that matches `git reset --hard`
-// contiguously is evaded by any of them. Stripping these options first — turning
-// `git -C /repo reset --hard` back into `git reset --hard` — closes that bypass for every
-// git rule at once, instead of teaching each pattern about every global option.
-//
-// A single global option, matched one at a time and stripped repeatedly (below), so the
-// pattern stays simple: an option taking a value (`-C /path`, `--git-dir=…`) or a flag
-// (`--no-pager`). The leading `git ` is kept; only the option after it is removed.
-const GIT_OPTION_WITH_VALUE = String.raw`(?:-[Cc]|--git-dir|--work-tree|--namespace|--exec-path|--config-env)(?:\s+|=)\S+`;
-const GIT_FLAG_OPTION = String.raw`--(?:paginate|no-pager|bare|no-optional-locks)|-p`;
-const GIT_GLOBAL_OPTION_PATTERN = new RegExp(
-  String.raw`\bgit\s+(?:${GIT_OPTION_WITH_VALUE}|${GIT_FLAG_OPTION})\s+`,
-  'i',
-);
-
-function normalizeGitOptions(command) {
-  // Strip one leading global option at a time and re-run, so a stacked
-  // `git -c a=b -C /x reset` is fully reduced to `git reset` before the deny patterns run.
-  let previous;
-  let normalized = command;
-  do {
-    previous = normalized;
-    normalized = normalized.replace(GIT_GLOBAL_OPTION_PATTERN, 'git ');
-  } while (normalized !== previous);
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-function stripQuoted(text) {
-  return text
-    .replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, ' ')
-    .replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"/g, ' ')
-    .replace(/'[^'\n]{0,300}'/g, ' ');
-}
-
-/** True when a surviving, non-quoted mention is not governed by a reporting verb. */
-function hasRealPublishIntent(text, pattern) {
-  if (!pattern.test(text)) return false;
-  const cleaned = stripQuoted(text);
-  const global = new RegExp(
-    pattern.source,
-    `${pattern.flags.replace('g', '')}g`,
-  );
-  const matches = [...cleaned.matchAll(global)];
-  if (matches.length === 0) return false;
-  return matches.some((match) => {
-    const from = Math.max(0, match.index - DESCRIPTION_LOOK_BACK);
-    return !REPORTING_VERB_PATTERN.test(cleaned.slice(from, match.index));
-  });
-}
-
-function checkEmbeddedInterpreter(command) {
-  const match = INTERPRETER_EVAL_PATTERN.exec(command);
-  if (!match) return null;
-  if (match[1].toLowerCase().startsWith('python')) {
-    return 'Inline Python is not allowed in this harness: write the script to a file with Write and run that.';
-  }
-  const inline = command.slice(match.index + match[0].length);
-  if (RAW_FILE_OPS_PATTERN.test(inline)) {
-    return 'Inline interpreter doing a raw file operation (read/write/delete/mkdir). Use Write/Edit/Read instead.';
-  }
-  return null; // import/require or fetch: logic the native tools do not cover — allowed
-}
-
-/** The text to inspect: a real command's command line, or the delegation prompt. */
-function commandTextFrom(toolName, toolInput) {
-  if (SHELL_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {
-    return String(toolInput.CommandLine ?? toolInput.command ?? '');
-  }
-  return String(toolInput.prompt ?? toolInput.description ?? '');
-}
-
-/** Static deny rules + the runtime rm -rf rule, both read from config params. */
-function checkDestructive(command, parameters) {
-  // Strip git's global options so `git -C /repo reset --hard` cannot slip past a pattern
-  // written for `git reset --hard`. Non-git commands are unaffected.
-  const normalized = normalizeGitOptions(command);
-
-  // denyPatterns may be a flat list of sources or [source, reason] pairs; normalize.
-  const denyPairs = (parameters.denyPatterns ?? []).map((entry) =>
-    Array.isArray(entry)
-      ? entry
-      : [entry, 'Destructive command is not allowed.'],
-  );
-  for (const [source, reason] of denyPairs) {
-    if (compile(source).test(normalized)) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
-  }
-
-  // rm -rf over a protected area: areas read from config at runtime, so editing
-  // rmRfProtectedAreas takes effect without touching denyPatterns.
-  const rmRfAreas =
-    parameters.rmRfProtectedAreas ?? DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS;
-  if (
-    rmRfAreas.length > 0 &&
-    compile(rmRfSourceFrom(rmRfAreas)).test(command)
-  ) {
-    deny(GATE_ID, "'rm -rf' over a protected area is not allowed.");
-  }
-
-  if (parameters.embeddedInterpreterEnabled) {
-    const reason = checkEmbeddedInterpreter(command);
-    if (reason) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
-  }
-}
-
-/** Remote-publish rules: a real command is checked literally; a delegation prompt by intent. */
-function checkRemotePublish(command, isShell) {
-  // For a real shell command, normalize git's global options first (same bypass as above).
-  // For a delegation prompt (free text), the intent check runs on the raw text.
-  const shellCommand = normalizeGitOptions(command);
-  for (const [source, reason] of REMOTE_PUBLISH_RULES) {
-    const pattern = compile(source);
-    if (isShell) {
-      if (pattern.test(shellCommand)) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
-    } else if (hasRealPublishIntent(command, pattern)) {
-      deny(GATE_ID, reason);
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-runGate(
-  {
-    id: GATE_ID,
-    configKey: CONFIG_KEY,
-    enabledByDefault: true,
-    defaultParams: {
-      denyPatterns: defaultDenyPatterns(),
-      rmRfProtectedAreas: DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS,
-      embeddedInterpreterEnabled: false,
-    },
-  },
-  ({ toolName, toolInput, parameters }) => {
-    const isShell = SHELL_TOOLS.has(toolName);
-    const isDelegation = DELEGATION_TOOLS.has(toolName);
-    if (!isShell && !isDelegation) return;
-
-    const command = commandTextFrom(toolName, toolInput);
-    checkDestructive(command, parameters);
-    checkRemotePublish(command, isShell);
-  },
-);
+// bash-commands — denies destructive shell commands, and blocks publishing to a remote
+// without fresh authorization. Runs on a real Bash/run_command call and on a delegation
+// prompt (a subagent can be told "run git reset --hard" in prose).
+//
+// ── What a project can configure (params) ───────────────────────────────────────────
+//   denyPatterns          regex sources (matched case-insensitively) of destructive
+//                         commands to deny. Replaces the built-in list below wholesale.
+//   rmRfProtectedAreas    targets rm -rf may not hit; woven into the rm -rf pattern.
+//   embeddedInterpreterEnabled  block `node -e`/`python -c` that does raw file ops. Off
+//                         by default: this harness legitimately uses inline interpreters.
+// The defaults live here, in the source, so a project reads them and knows exactly what
+// its override replaces.
+//
+// ── What is NOT configurable (base, non-negotiable) ─────────────────────────────────
+// Remote-publish detection (`git push`, `gh pr merge`, `gh release create`) is a hard
+// block with no config knob and no in-command escape hatch: authorization is something
+// the USER states in chat, never a token the agent could write into its own command.
+//
+// ── Two-stage intent check, only for delegation prompts ─────────────────────────────
+// A real command's `command` field IS what the shell runs — a single-stage regex is
+// right. A delegation prompt is natural language that may DESCRIBE a command ("I extended
+// the guard to deny git push") without asking anyone to run it. There, publish rules run
+// a second stage: strip quoted/example text, then require that at least one surviving
+// mention is not governed by a reporting verb before denying.
+
+import {
+  runGate,
+  deny,
+  toolInGroups,
+  delegationPromptOf,
+} from '../../lib/hook-io.mjs';
+
+const GATE_ID = 'bash-commands';
+const CONFIG_KEY = 'blockDestructiveShellCommands';
+
+// Areas rm -rf must never target. A project overrides this list in config; the rm -rf
+// deny pattern is rebuilt from it at runtime (see rmRfSourceFrom), so an edit takes effect.
+const DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS = ['/', '*', 'src', 'tests'];
+
+// Process-killing command names, assembled from fragments so the spell checker does not
+// read them as prose (the project keeps an empty dictionary by policy).
+const KILL_BY_NAME_COMMANDS = ['task' + 'kill', 'p' + 'kill', 'kill' + 'all'];
+
+// PowerShell's kill-by-name form: `Stop-Process -Name node` (and its Get-Process pipe). On
+// Windows this reaches every process of that name exactly like taskkill /IM, so it belongs
+// in the same block. Matched separately because its shape (a -Name flag) differs from the
+// unix commands above.
+const STOP_PROCESS_BY_NAME_SOURCE = String.raw`\bStop-Process\b[^|;\n]*\s-Name\b`;
+
+// The rm -rf deny source, built from the protected-areas list. Separate from the static
+// deny list so a project can edit rmRfProtectedAreas in config and have it take effect at
+// runtime: the list is re-read on every call, not baked in at load time.
+function rmRfSourceFrom(protectedAreas) {
+  const rmRfTargets = protectedAreas
+    .map((area) => area.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'))
+    .join('|');
+  // Allow an optional `./` (or `.\`) prefix before the target, so `rm -rf ./src` and
+  // `rm -rf .\src` are caught, not just the bare `rm -rf src`. Without this, a leading
+  // `./` sat between the required whitespace and the target's word boundary and slipped past.
+  return String.raw`\brm\s+-rf\s+(?:\.[\\/])?(${rmRfTargets})\b`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Static destructive-command rules as `[regexSource, reason]`. Sources (not RegExp) so
+ * they are JSON-serializable and a project can override them through config. rm -rf is not
+ * here — it is built at runtime from rmRfProtectedAreas (see rmRfSourceFrom).
+ */
+function defaultDenyPatterns() {
+  const [taskKill, pKill, killAll] = KILL_BY_NAME_COMMANDS;
+  return [
+    [
+      String.raw`\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b`,
+      "'git reset --hard' is destructive and needs explicit authorization.",
+    ],
+    [
+      String.raw`\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force\b`,
+      "'git push --force' is destructive and is not allowed.",
+    ],
+    [
+      String.raw`\bgit\s+clean\s+-[a-z]*f[a-z]*\b`,
+      "'git clean -f' is destructive and is not allowed.",
+    ],
+    [
+      // Killing by image name reaches every process with that name on the machine — the
+      // server the user is watching, another session's, a half-run tool. The damage is
+      // silent. Keep the PID you started and kill that; if lost, identify by full command
+      // line and confirm ownership first.
+      [
+        String.raw`\b(`,
+        taskKill,
+        String.raw`\s+[^|;]*[/]IM|`,
+        pKill,
+        String.raw`\s+|`,
+        killAll,
+        String.raw`\s+)`,
+      ].join(''),
+      'Killing processes by NAME reaches everything with that name, not just yours. ' +
+        'Keep the PID you started and kill that; if lost, find it by its full command ' +
+        'line and confirm it is yours before touching it.',
+    ],
+    [
+      STOP_PROCESS_BY_NAME_SOURCE,
+      'Stop-Process -Name kills every process of that name on the machine, not just yours. ' +
+        'Stop the specific process by its Id (the PID you started); if lost, identify it by ' +
+        'its full command line and confirm ownership first.',
+    ],
+  ];
+}
+
+/** Remote-publish rules. Base, non-configurable — see the header. */
+const REMOTE_PUBLISH_RULES = [
+  [
+    String.raw`\bgit\s+(?:-C\s+\S+\s+)?push\b`,
+    "Publishing to a remote ('git push') needs fresh authorization from the user naming " +
+      'commits, local branch, remote and target. This gate cannot verify that from the ' +
+      'command itself — ask the user and let them run it.',
+  ],
+  [
+    String.raw`\bgh\s+(?:pr\s+merge|release\s+create)\b`,
+    'Publishing via GitHub CLI (merging a PR or creating a release) needs fresh ' +
+      'authorization from the user naming commits, local branch, remote and target. ' +
+      'Ask the user and let them run it.',
+  ],
+];
+
+// Interpreter name, then any intermediate flags (e.g. --input-type=module), then an
+// eval flag. Intermediate flags are matched loosely (`-\S+`) to keep the pattern simple.
+const INTERPRETER_EVAL_PATTERN =
+  /\b(node|python3?|deno|bun)\b(?:\s+-\S+)*?\s+(?:-e|-c|--eval|--print|-p)\b/i;
+const RAW_FILE_OPS_PATTERN =
+  /\b(writeFileSync|readFileSync|appendFileSync|fs\.writeFile|fs\.readFile|fs\.unlink|fs\.mkdir)\b/;
+
+// How far back from a mention to look for a governing verb, and the reporting-verb lexicon
+// that marks a mention as description rather than an order. Only the text before a mention
+// is inspected: what governs it is what precedes it (appending words after a real command
+// would otherwise be a trivial bypass).
+const DESCRIPTION_LOOK_BACK = 80;
+const REPORTING_VERB_PATTERN =
+  /(describe|explain|summar|mention|added|built|extended|denies?|deny|prohibit|protection|report|documentation|changelog)/i;
+
+function compile(source) {
+  return new RegExp(source, 'i');
+}
+
+// git's GLOBAL options sit between `git` and the subcommand: `git -C <path> reset --hard`,
+// `git -c k=v push`, `git --git-dir=… clean -f`. A pattern that matches `git reset --hard`
+// contiguously is evaded by any of them. Stripping these options first — turning
+// `git -C /repo reset --hard` back into `git reset --hard` — closes that bypass for every
+// git rule at once, instead of teaching each pattern about every global option.
+//
+// A single global option, matched one at a time and stripped repeatedly (below), so the
+// pattern stays simple: an option taking a value (`-C /path`, `--git-dir=…`) or a flag
+// (`--no-pager`). The leading `git ` is kept; only the option after it is removed.
+const GIT_OPTION_WITH_VALUE = String.raw`(?:-[Cc]|--git-dir|--work-tree|--namespace|--exec-path|--config-env)(?:\s+|=)\S+`;
+const GIT_FLAG_OPTION = String.raw`--(?:paginate|no-pager|bare|no-optional-locks)|-p`;
+const GIT_GLOBAL_OPTION_PATTERN = new RegExp(
+  String.raw`\bgit\s+(?:${GIT_OPTION_WITH_VALUE}|${GIT_FLAG_OPTION})\s+`,
+  'i',
+);
+
+function normalizeGitOptions(command) {
+  // Strip one leading global option at a time and re-run, so a stacked
+  // `git -c a=b -C /x reset` is fully reduced to `git reset` before the deny patterns run.
+  let previous;
+  let normalized = command;
+  do {
+    previous = normalized;
+    normalized = normalized.replace(GIT_GLOBAL_OPTION_PATTERN, 'git ');
+  } while (normalized !== previous);
+  return normalized;
+}
+
+function stripQuoted(text) {
+  return text
+    .replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/'[^'\n]{0,300}'/g, ' ');
+}
+
+/** True when a surviving, non-quoted mention is not governed by a reporting verb. */
+function hasRealPublishIntent(text, pattern) {
+  if (!pattern.test(text)) return false;
+  const cleaned = stripQuoted(text);
+  const global = new RegExp(
+    pattern.source,
+    `${pattern.flags.replace('g', '')}g`,
+  );
+  const matches = [...cleaned.matchAll(global)];
+  if (matches.length === 0) return false;
+  return matches.some((match) => {
+    const from = Math.max(0, match.index - DESCRIPTION_LOOK_BACK);
+    return !REPORTING_VERB_PATTERN.test(cleaned.slice(from, match.index));
+  });
+}
+
+function checkEmbeddedInterpreter(command) {
+  const match = INTERPRETER_EVAL_PATTERN.exec(command);
+  if (!match) return null;
+  if (match[1].toLowerCase().startsWith('python')) {
+    return 'Inline Python is not allowed in this harness: write the script to a file with Write and run that.';
+  }
+  const inline = command.slice(match.index + match[0].length);
+  if (RAW_FILE_OPS_PATTERN.test(inline)) {
+    return 'Inline interpreter doing a raw file operation (read/write/delete/mkdir). Use Write/Edit/Read instead.';
+  }
+  return null; // import/require or fetch: logic the native tools do not cover — allowed
+}
+
+/** The text to inspect: a real command's command line, or the delegation prompt. */
+function commandTextFrom(toolName, toolInput) {
+  if (toolInGroups(toolName, ['shell'])) {
+    return String(toolInput.CommandLine ?? toolInput.command ?? '');
+  }
+  return delegationPromptOf(toolInput);
+}
+
+/** Static deny rules + the runtime rm -rf rule, both read from config params. */
+function checkDestructive(command, parameters) {
+  // Strip git's global options so `git -C /repo reset --hard` cannot slip past a pattern
+  // written for `git reset --hard`. Non-git commands are unaffected.
+  const normalized = normalizeGitOptions(command);
+
+  // denyPatterns may be a flat list of sources or [source, reason] pairs; normalize.
+  const denyPairs = (parameters.denyPatterns ?? []).map((entry) =>
+    Array.isArray(entry)
+      ? entry
+      : [entry, 'Destructive command is not allowed.'],
+  );
+  for (const [source, reason] of denyPairs) {
+    if (compile(source).test(normalized)) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
+  }
+
+  // rm -rf over a protected area: areas read from config at runtime, so editing
+  // rmRfProtectedAreas takes effect without touching denyPatterns.
+  const rmRfAreas =
+    parameters.rmRfProtectedAreas ?? DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS;
+  if (
+    rmRfAreas.length > 0 &&
+    compile(rmRfSourceFrom(rmRfAreas)).test(command)
+  ) {
+    deny(GATE_ID, "'rm -rf' over a protected area is not allowed.");
+  }
+
+  if (parameters.embeddedInterpreterEnabled) {
+    const reason = checkEmbeddedInterpreter(command);
+    if (reason) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Remote-publish rules: a real command is checked literally; a delegation prompt by intent. */
+function checkRemotePublish(command, isShell) {
+  // For a real shell command, normalize git's global options first (same bypass as above).
+  // For a delegation prompt (free text), the intent check runs on the raw text.
+  const shellCommand = normalizeGitOptions(command);
+  for (const [source, reason] of REMOTE_PUBLISH_RULES) {
+    const pattern = compile(source);
+    if (isShell) {
+      if (pattern.test(shellCommand)) deny(GATE_ID, reason);
+    } else if (hasRealPublishIntent(command, pattern)) {
+      deny(GATE_ID, reason);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+runGate(
+  {
+    id: GATE_ID,
+    configKey: CONFIG_KEY,
+    enabledByDefault: true,
+    defaultParams: {
+      denyPatterns: defaultDenyPatterns(),
+      rmRfProtectedAreas: DEFAULT_RM_RF_PROTECTED_AREAS,
+      embeddedInterpreterEnabled: false,
+    },
+  },
+  ({ toolName, toolInput, parameters }) => {
+    const isShell = toolInGroups(toolName, ['shell']);
+    const isDelegation = toolInGroups(toolName, ['delegation']);
+    if (!isShell && !isDelegation) return;
+
+    const command = commandTextFrom(toolName, toolInput);
+    checkDestructive(command, parameters);
+    checkRemotePublish(command, isShell);
+  },
+);