@devrik-tools/claude-gates 0.1.2 → 0.2.0

package/plugins/gates/hooks/gates/intent-flow/index.mjs

@@ -1,238 +1,260 @@
-// intent-flow — denies an implementation delegation that has real intent to mutate a
-// high-impact area (money, auth, persisted data, public contract, irreversible...)
-// without declaring IN SCOPE / OUT OF SCOPE / EDGE CASES, and hard-denies whenever it
-// also leaves a high-impact UNKNOWN unresolved.
-//
-// ── How this differs from brief-before-delegate ─────────────────────────────────────
-// brief-before-delegate asks "was the task thought through" (goal+steps+criterion).
-// This gate asks a different, complementary question: "was the SCOPE declared — what
-// is in, what is explicitly out, and what edge cases were considered — for work that
-// really intends to touch a sensitive area?" Both run on the same delegation prompt
-// independently; neither depends on the other's verdict.
-//
-// ── Two-stage intent check (not lexical match) ──────────────────────────────────────
-// Stage 1 (cheap prefilter): does the raw prompt contain BOTH an implementation verb
-// and a high-impact signal anywhere? If not, there is no candidate — allow immediately.
-// Stage 2 (confirmation, only on candidates): strip quoted/templated text, then require
-// near co-occurrence between an implementation verb and a high-impact signal, and
-// discard a verb whose immediate object is a documentary deliverable (a doc/report/
-// README/.md/.html describing the area is not mutating it). Only surviving (a)+(b)+(c)
-// counts as real intent.
-
-import { runGate, deny, TOOL_GROUPS } from '../../lib/hook-io.mjs';
-
-const GATE_ID = 'intent-flow';
-const CONFIG_KEY = 'requireScopeListBeforeDelegating';
-
-const DELEGATION_TOOLS = new Set(TOOL_GROUPS.delegation);
-
-const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_SUBAGENTS = ['explore', 'claude-code-guide', 'plan'];
-const DEFAULT_HIGH_IMPACT_PATTERNS = [
-  'dinero|pago|cobro|money|payment',
-  'auth|autenticaci[oó]n|authentication|permiso|permission|token|sesi[oó]n|session|seguridad|security|PII',
-  'borrar|delete|drop|migraci[oó]n|migration|schema',
-  'contrato|contract|irreversible|producci[oó]n|production|API p[uú]blica|public api',
-];
-
-const MIN_REQUEST_LENGTH = 40;
-const CO_OCCURRENCE_WINDOW = 100;
-const VERB_OBJECT_WINDOW = 60;
-// How much of an over-length prompt to quote back in a denial message.
-const PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH = 80;
-
-function withUnicodeWordBoundary(alternatives) {
-  return new RegExp(
-    `(?<![\\p{L}\\p{N}_])(${alternatives})(?![\\p{L}\\p{N}_])`,
-    'iu',
-  );
-}
-
-const IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'implementa|implementar|implement(á|é)|agreg(a|á)|agregar|añad(e|í)|añadir|cre(a|á)|crear|' +
-    'arregl(a|á)|arreglar|cambi(a|á)|cambiar|migr(a|á)|migrar|escrib(í|e) c[oó]digo|escribir c[oó]digo|' +
-    'corrige|corregir|correg(í|ir)|constru(ye|í)|construir|modific(a|á)|modificar|' +
-    'refactoriz(a|á)|refactorizar|elimin(a|á)|eliminar|reescrib(e|í)|reescribir|desplieg(a|á)|desplegar|' +
-    'implement|build|fix|migrate|modify|refactor|remove|rewrite|deploy',
-);
-
-const QUERY_VERBS = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'explica|explic(á|ar)|qu[eé]|c[oó]mo|muestra|mostr(á|ar)|analiza|analiz(á|ar)|investiga|' +
-    'investig(á|ar)|revisa|revis(á|ar)|audita|audit(á|ar)|diagnostica|diagnostic(á|ar)|' +
-    'explain|what|how|show|analyze|investigate|review|audit|diagnose',
-);
-
-const IN_SCOPE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'qu[eé] s[ií]|qu[eé] s[ií] entra|alcance|in scope|lo pedido|se va a hacer|incluye',
-);
-const OUT_OF_SCOPE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'qu[eé] no|fuera de alcance|out of scope|no tocar|no modificar|no debe cambiar|' +
-    'must not change|no se debe (cambiar|tocar|modificar)',
-);
-const EDGE_CASES_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'edge cases?|edge-cases?|casos? borde|casos? l[ií]mite|caso l[ií]mite|sin edge cases|' +
-    'no (hay|aplican) edge cases|no hay casos borde',
-);
-const UNRESOLVED_UNKNOWN_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'unknown|no se sabe|no sabemos|sin resolver|no est[aá] claro|no est[aá] definido|' +
-    'a definir|por definir|desconocido|no est[aá] decidido',
-);
-const DOCUMENTARY_DELIVERABLE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
-  'documento|documentaci[oó]n|reporte|informe|diagrama|readme|wiki|changelog|' +
-    'p[aá]gina de documentaci[oó]n|archivo html|p[aá]gina html|markdown|document|documentation|report',
-);
-const DOCUMENTARY_EXTENSION_PATTERN = /\.(md|html?|adoc)\b/iu;
-
-function isReadOnlySubagent(toolInput, readOnlySubagents) {
-  const type = String(
-    toolInput.subagent_type ?? toolInput.subagentType ?? '',
-  ).toLowerCase();
-  return new Set(readOnlySubagents.map((name) => name.toLowerCase())).has(type);
-}
-
-function isImplementationRequest(prompt) {
-  return IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS.test(prompt);
-}
-
-function isExemptQuery(prompt) {
-  if (isImplementationRequest(prompt)) return false; // implementation verb takes priority
-  return QUERY_VERBS.test(prompt);
-}
-
-function stripQuoted(text) {
-  return text
-    .replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, ' ')
-    .replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"/g, ' ')
-    .replace(/'[^'\n]{0,300}'/g, ' ');
-}
-
-function allMatches(pattern, text) {
-  const flags = pattern.flags.includes('g')
-    ? pattern.flags
-    : `${pattern.flags}g`;
-  return [...text.matchAll(new RegExp(pattern.source, flags))];
-}
-
-function verbProducesDocument(text, verbMatch) {
-  const from = verbMatch.index;
-  const to = from + verbMatch[0].length + VERB_OBJECT_WINDOW;
-  const objectOfVerb = text.slice(from, to);
-  return (
-    DOCUMENTARY_DELIVERABLE_PATTERN.test(objectOfVerb) ||
-    DOCUMENTARY_EXTENSION_PATTERN.test(objectOfVerb)
-  );
-}
-
-function hasRealSensitiveMutation(prompt, highImpactPattern) {
-  const isCandidate =
-    IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS.test(prompt) && highImpactPattern.test(prompt);
-  if (!isCandidate) return false; // stage 1: cheap, no stage 2 spent
-
-  const text = stripQuoted(prompt); // stage 2(a)
-  const verbs = allMatches(IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS, text);
-  const signals = allMatches(highImpactPattern, text);
-
-  for (const verb of verbs) {
-    if (verbProducesDocument(text, verb)) continue; // stage 2(c)
-    for (const signal of signals) {
-      if (Math.abs(signal.index - verb.index) <= CO_OCCURRENCE_WINDOW)
-        return true; // stage 2(b)
-    }
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-function missingSignals(prompt) {
-  const missing = [];
-  if (!IN_SCOPE_PATTERN.test(prompt))
-    missing.push('IN SCOPE (what is requested, stated explicitly)');
-  if (!OUT_OF_SCOPE_PATTERN.test(prompt))
-    missing.push('OUT OF SCOPE (what must not be touched)');
-  if (!EDGE_CASES_PATTERN.test(prompt)) {
-    missing.push(
-      'EDGE CASES (considered, or an explicit mark that none apply)',
-    );
-  }
-  return missing;
-}
-
-function denyUnresolvedUnknown() {
-  deny(
-    GATE_ID,
-    'This request touches a high-impact signal (money/auth/persisted data/public contract/' +
-      'irreversible/production) AND declares an unresolved UNKNOWN. Do not relaunch assuming an ' +
-      'answer — ask the user what to decide about that UNKNOWN before delegating again.',
-  );
-}
-
-function denyTooShortForScopeList(prompt) {
-  const excerpt = prompt.slice(0, PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH);
-  const ellipsis = prompt.length > PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH ? '…' : '';
-  deny(
-    GATE_ID,
-    `This implementation request ("${excerpt}${ellipsis}") does not carry a scope list: missing IN ` +
-      'SCOPE, OUT OF SCOPE and EDGE CASES. Add it to the prompt before relaunching.',
-  );
-}
-
-function denyMissingSignals(missing) {
-  deny(
-    GATE_ID,
-    `This implementation request does not declare, in recognizable form: ${missing.join('; ')}. ` +
-      'Add what is missing to the prompt before relaunching this delegation.',
-  );
-}
-
-function buildHighImpactPattern(highImpactPatterns) {
-  return new RegExp(
-    (highImpactPatterns ?? []).map((source) => `(?:${source})`).join('|'),
-    'iu',
-  );
-}
-
-/** True when this delegation is exempt from the whole check: not a recognizable
- * implementation request, a read-only subagent, or an exempt query. */
-function isExempt(toolInput, prompt, readOnlySubagents) {
-  if (!prompt.trim()) return true;
-  if (isReadOnlySubagent(toolInput, readOnlySubagents)) return true;
-  if (isExemptQuery(prompt)) return true;
-  return !isImplementationRequest(prompt);
-}
-
-runGate(
-  {
-    id: GATE_ID,
-    configKey: CONFIG_KEY,
-    enabledByDefault: false,
-    defaultParams: {
-      highImpactPatterns: DEFAULT_HIGH_IMPACT_PATTERNS,
-      readOnlySubagents: DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_SUBAGENTS,
-    },
-  },
-  ({ toolName, toolInput, parameters }) => {
-    if (!DELEGATION_TOOLS.has(toolName)) return;
-
-    const prompt = String(
-      toolInput.prompt ?? toolInput.description ?? toolInput.task ?? '',
-    );
-    if (isExempt(toolInput, prompt, parameters.readOnlySubagents)) return;
-
-    const highImpactPattern = buildHighImpactPattern(
-      parameters.highImpactPatterns,
-    );
-    if (!hasRealSensitiveMutation(prompt, highImpactPattern)) return;
-
-    if (UNRESOLVED_UNKNOWN_PATTERN.test(stripQuoted(prompt))) {
-      denyUnresolvedUnknown();
-    }
-
-    const trimmed = prompt.trim();
-    if (trimmed.length < MIN_REQUEST_LENGTH) {
-      denyTooShortForScopeList(trimmed);
-    }
-
-    const missing = missingSignals(prompt);
-    if (missing.length === 0) return;
-
-    denyMissingSignals(missing);
-  },
-);
+// intent-flow — denies an implementation delegation that has real intent to mutate a
+// high-impact area (money, auth, persisted data, public contract, irreversible...)
+// without declaring IN SCOPE / OUT OF SCOPE / EDGE CASES, and hard-denies whenever it
+// also leaves a high-impact UNKNOWN unresolved.
+//
+// ── How this differs from brief-before-delegate ─────────────────────────────────────
+// brief-before-delegate asks "was the task thought through" (goal+steps+criterion).
+// This gate asks a different, complementary question: "was the SCOPE declared — what
+// is in, what is explicitly out, and what edge cases were considered — for work that
+// really intends to touch a sensitive area?" Both run on the same delegation prompt
+// independently; neither depends on the other's verdict.
+//
+// ── Two-stage intent check (not lexical match) ──────────────────────────────────────
+// Stage 1 (cheap prefilter): does the raw prompt contain BOTH an implementation verb
+// and a high-impact signal anywhere? If not, there is no candidate — allow immediately.
+// Stage 2 (confirmation, only on candidates): strip quoted/templated text, then require
+// near co-occurrence between an implementation verb and a high-impact signal, and
+// discard a verb whose immediate object is a documentary deliverable (a doc/report/
+// README/.md/.html describing the area is not mutating it). Only surviving (a)+(b)+(c)
+// counts as real intent.
+//
+// ── readOnlySubagents is a declared label, not a verified capability ────────────────
+// This hook cannot check what tools a named subagent actually has — the whitelist
+// exemption is void whenever the prompt itself carries a mutation-risk signal (money/
+// auth/data/write/deploy): the signal in the text outranks the label on the call.
+
+import {
+  runGate,
+  deny,
+  toolInGroups,
+  delegationPromptOf,
+} from '../../lib/hook-io.mjs';
+import { MUTATION_RISK_SIGNAL } from '../../lib/signals.mjs';
+
+const GATE_ID = 'intent-flow';
+const CONFIG_KEY = 'requireScopeListBeforeDelegating';
+
+const DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_SUBAGENTS = ['explore', 'claude-code-guide', 'plan'];
+const DEFAULT_HIGH_IMPACT_PATTERNS = [
+  'dinero|pago|cobro|money|payment',
+  'auth|autenticaci[oó]n|authentication|permiso|permission|token|sesi[oó]n|session|seguridad|security|PII',
+  'borrar|delete|drop|migraci[oó]n|migration|schema',
+  'contrato|contract|irreversible|producci[oó]n|production|API p[uú]blica|public api',
+];
+
+const MIN_REQUEST_LENGTH = 40;
+const CO_OCCURRENCE_WINDOW = 100;
+const VERB_OBJECT_WINDOW = 60;
+// How much of an over-length prompt to quote back in a denial message.
+const PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH = 80;
+
+function withUnicodeWordBoundary(alternatives) {
+  return new RegExp(
+    `(?<![\\p{L}\\p{N}_])(${alternatives})(?![\\p{L}\\p{N}_])`,
+    'iu',
+  );
+}
+
+// A prompt-level signal that a whitelisted read-only subagent name should NOT be
+// trusted to exempt this call: the name is a declared label, never a verified
+// capability this hook can check, and real mutation risk in the text must win over it.
+// Deliberately broad — over-including only means this gate's check still runs.
+// Centralized in lib/signals.mjs (ES+EN) — see its header for the class this covers.
+const MUTATION_RISK_SIGNAL_PATTERN = MUTATION_RISK_SIGNAL;
+
+const IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'implementa|implementar|implement(á|é)|agreg(a|á)|agregar|añad(e|í)|añadir|cre(a|á)|crear|' +
+    'arregl(a|á)|arreglar|cambi(a|á)|cambiar|migr(a|á)|migrar|escrib(í|e) c[oó]digo|escribir c[oó]digo|' +
+    'corrige|corregir|correg(í|ir)|constru(ye|í)|construir|modific(a|á)|modificar|' +
+    'refactoriz(a|á)|refactorizar|elimin(a|á)|eliminar|reescrib(e|í)|reescribir|desplieg(a|á)|desplegar|' +
+    'implement|build|fix|migrate|modify|refactor|remove|rewrite|deploy',
+);
+
+const QUERY_VERBS = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'explica|explic(á|ar)|qu[eé]|c[oó]mo|muestra|mostr(á|ar)|analiza|analiz(á|ar)|investiga|' +
+    'investig(á|ar)|revisa|revis(á|ar)|audita|audit(á|ar)|diagnostica|diagnostic(á|ar)|' +
+    'explain|what|how|show|analyze|investigate|review|audit|diagnose',
+);
+
+const IN_SCOPE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'qu[eé] s[ií]|qu[eé] s[ií] entra|alcance|in scope|lo pedido|se va a hacer|incluye',
+);
+const OUT_OF_SCOPE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'qu[eé] no|fuera de alcance|out of scope|no tocar|no modificar|no debe cambiar|' +
+    'must not change|no se debe (cambiar|tocar|modificar)',
+);
+const EDGE_CASES_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'edge cases?|edge-cases?|casos? borde|casos? l[ií]mite|caso l[ií]mite|sin edge cases|' +
+    'no (hay|aplican) edge cases|no hay casos borde',
+);
+const UNRESOLVED_UNKNOWN_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'unknown|no se sabe|no sabemos|sin resolver|no est[aá] claro|no est[aá] definido|' +
+    'a definir|por definir|desconocido|no est[aá] decidido',
+);
+const DOCUMENTARY_DELIVERABLE_PATTERN = withUnicodeWordBoundary(
+  'documento|documentaci[oó]n|reporte|informe|diagrama|readme|wiki|changelog|' +
+    'p[aá]gina de documentaci[oó]n|archivo html|p[aá]gina html|markdown|document|documentation|report',
+);
+const DOCUMENTARY_EXTENSION_PATTERN = /\.(md|html?|adoc)\b/iu;
+
+function isReadOnlySubagentName(toolInput, readOnlySubagents) {
+  const type = String(
+    toolInput.subagent_type ?? toolInput.subagentType ?? '',
+  ).toLowerCase();
+  return new Set(readOnlySubagents.map((name) => name.toLowerCase())).has(type);
+}
+
+/** A whitelisted subagent name exempts a call ONLY when the prompt carries no
+ * mutation-risk signal. The name is a declared label, never a verified capability this
+ * hook can check — a real risk signal in the text must win over it. */
+function isReadOnlySubagent(toolInput, prompt, readOnlySubagents) {
+  if (!isReadOnlySubagentName(toolInput, readOnlySubagents)) return false;
+  return !MUTATION_RISK_SIGNAL_PATTERN.test(prompt);
+}
+
+function isImplementationRequest(prompt) {
+  return IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS.test(prompt);
+}
+
+function isExemptQuery(prompt) {
+  if (isImplementationRequest(prompt)) return false; // implementation verb takes priority
+  return QUERY_VERBS.test(prompt);
+}
+
+function stripQuoted(text) {
+  return text
+    .replace(/```[\s\S]*?```/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/'[^'\n]{0,300}'/g, ' ');
+}
+
+function allMatches(pattern, text) {
+  const flags = pattern.flags.includes('g')
+    ? pattern.flags
+    : `${pattern.flags}g`;
+  return [...text.matchAll(new RegExp(pattern.source, flags))];
+}
+
+function verbProducesDocument(text, verbMatch) {
+  const from = verbMatch.index;
+  const to = from + verbMatch[0].length + VERB_OBJECT_WINDOW;
+  const objectOfVerb = text.slice(from, to);
+  return (
+    DOCUMENTARY_DELIVERABLE_PATTERN.test(objectOfVerb) ||
+    DOCUMENTARY_EXTENSION_PATTERN.test(objectOfVerb)
+  );
+}
+
+function hasRealSensitiveMutation(prompt, highImpactPattern) {
+  const isCandidate =
+    IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS.test(prompt) && highImpactPattern.test(prompt);
+  if (!isCandidate) return false; // stage 1: cheap, no stage 2 spent
+
+  const text = stripQuoted(prompt); // stage 2(a)
+  const verbs = allMatches(IMPLEMENTATION_VERBS, text);
+  const signals = allMatches(highImpactPattern, text);
+
+  for (const verb of verbs) {
+    if (verbProducesDocument(text, verb)) continue; // stage 2(c)
+    for (const signal of signals) {
+      if (Math.abs(signal.index - verb.index) <= CO_OCCURRENCE_WINDOW)
+        return true; // stage 2(b)
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function missingSignals(prompt) {
+  const missing = [];
+  if (!IN_SCOPE_PATTERN.test(prompt))
+    missing.push('IN SCOPE (what is requested, stated explicitly)');
+  if (!OUT_OF_SCOPE_PATTERN.test(prompt))
+    missing.push('OUT OF SCOPE (what must not be touched)');
+  if (!EDGE_CASES_PATTERN.test(prompt)) {
+    missing.push(
+      'EDGE CASES (considered, or an explicit mark that none apply)',
+    );
+  }
+  return missing;
+}
+
+function denyUnresolvedUnknown() {
+  deny(
+    GATE_ID,
+    'This request touches a high-impact signal (money/auth/persisted data/public contract/' +
+      'irreversible/production) AND declares an unresolved UNKNOWN. Do not relaunch assuming an ' +
+      'answer — ask the user what to decide about that UNKNOWN before delegating again.',
+  );
+}
+
+function denyTooShortForScopeList(prompt) {
+  const excerpt = prompt.slice(0, PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH);
+  const ellipsis = prompt.length > PROMPT_EXCERPT_LENGTH ? '…' : '';
+  deny(
+    GATE_ID,
+    `This implementation request ("${excerpt}${ellipsis}") does not carry a scope list: missing IN ` +
+      'SCOPE, OUT OF SCOPE and EDGE CASES. Add it to the prompt before relaunching.',
+  );
+}
+
+function denyMissingSignals(missing) {
+  deny(
+    GATE_ID,
+    `This implementation request does not declare, in recognizable form: ${missing.join('; ')}. ` +
+      'Add what is missing to the prompt before relaunching this delegation.',
+  );
+}
+
+function buildHighImpactPattern(highImpactPatterns) {
+  return new RegExp(
+    (highImpactPatterns ?? []).map((source) => `(?:${source})`).join('|'),
+    'iu',
+  );
+}
+
+/** True when this delegation is exempt from the whole check: not a recognizable
+ * implementation request, a read-only subagent, or an exempt query. */
+function isExempt(toolInput, prompt, readOnlySubagents) {
+  if (!prompt.trim()) return true;
+  if (isReadOnlySubagent(toolInput, prompt, readOnlySubagents)) return true;
+  if (isExemptQuery(prompt)) return true;
+  return !isImplementationRequest(prompt);
+}
+
+runGate(
+  {
+    id: GATE_ID,
+    configKey: CONFIG_KEY,
+    enabledByDefault: false,
+    defaultParams: {
+      highImpactPatterns: DEFAULT_HIGH_IMPACT_PATTERNS,
+      readOnlySubagents: DEFAULT_READ_ONLY_SUBAGENTS,
+    },
+  },
+  ({ toolName, toolInput, parameters }) => {
+    if (!toolInGroups(toolName, ['delegation'])) return;
+
+    const prompt = delegationPromptOf(toolInput);
+    if (isExempt(toolInput, prompt, parameters.readOnlySubagents)) return;
+
+    const highImpactPattern = buildHighImpactPattern(
+      parameters.highImpactPatterns,
+    );
+    if (!hasRealSensitiveMutation(prompt, highImpactPattern)) return;
+
+    if (UNRESOLVED_UNKNOWN_PATTERN.test(stripQuoted(prompt))) {
+      denyUnresolvedUnknown();
+    }
+
+    const trimmed = prompt.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length < MIN_REQUEST_LENGTH) {
+      denyTooShortForScopeList(trimmed);
+    }
+
+    const missing = missingSignals(prompt);
+    if (missing.length === 0) return;
+
+    denyMissingSignals(missing);
+  },
+);

package/plugins/gates/hooks/gates/intent-flow/intent-flow.edge.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// Edge-case audit for intent-flow. Each test demonstrates a confirmed BUG or an OK.
+// Run: node --test intent-flow.edge.test.mjs
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { test } from 'node:test';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+const GATE = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'index.mjs');
+
+function runGate(payload, { config } = {}) {
+  const project = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'intent-flow-edge-'));
+  mkdirSync(join(project, '.git'));
+  if (config) {
+    mkdirSync(join(project, '.ai'));
+    writeFileSync(join(project, '.ai', 'config.json'), JSON.stringify(config));
+  }
+  const out = execFileSync(process.execPath, [GATE], {
+    input: JSON.stringify(payload),
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    cwd: project,
+    env: { ...process.env, HOME: project, USERPROFILE: project },
+  });
+  return out.trim() ? JSON.parse(out.trim()) : null;
+}
+
+function isDeny(result) {
+  return result?.hookSpecificOutput?.permissionDecision === 'deny';
+}
+
+const ENABLED = { config: { gates: { requireScopeListBeforeDelegating: true } } };
+
+const SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE =
+  'Implementa el cobro del pago con la nueva pasarela de dinero para el checkout.';
+
+test('FIXED: a delegation tool name outside the native list is now caught via toolInGroups (MCP delegation signal)', () => {
+  const result = runGate(
+    { tool_name: 'mcp__orchestrator__spawn_agent', tool_input: { prompt: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE } },
+    ENABLED,
+  );
+  assert.ok(isDeny(result), 'gate now denies the sensitive-no-scope prompt under the MCP tool name too');
+});
+
+test('FIXED: prompt carried in a field other than prompt/description/task is now read via delegationPromptOf', () => {
+  const result = runGate(
+    { tool_name: 'Agent', tool_input: { instructions: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE } },
+    ENABLED,
+  );
+  assert.ok(isDeny(result), 'gate now sees the prompt under "instructions" and denies it for missing scope list');
+});
+
+test('FIXED: a mutation-risk signal in the prompt overrides a whitelisted read-only subagent name', () => {
+  // isReadOnlySubagent now voids the name-based exemption whenever the prompt itself
+  // carries a mutation-risk signal (money/auth/data/write/deploy): a subagent named
+  // "explore" cannot exempt a real money-mutation delegation just by using that label.
+  const result = runGate(
+    { tool_name: 'Agent', tool_input: { prompt: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE, subagent_type: 'explore' } },
+    ENABLED,
+  );
+  assert.ok(
+    isDeny(result),
+    'gate no longer exempts a real money-mutation delegation solely because subagent_type says "explore"',
+  );
+});
+
+test('OK: a whitelisted read-only subagent name with no mutation-risk signal is still exempt', () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    runGate(
+      {
+        tool_name: 'Agent',
+        tool_input: {
+          prompt: 'Arregla el boton que no cambia de color al pasar el mouse.',
+          subagent_type: 'explore',
+        },
+      },
+      ENABLED,
+    ),
+    null,
+  );
+});
+
+test('OK: same sensitive prompt without a read-only subagent name is denied', () => {
+  const result = runGate({ tool_name: 'Agent', tool_input: { prompt: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE } }, ENABLED);
+  assert.ok(isDeny(result));
+});
+
+test('OK: Task and invoke_subagent tool names are both covered', () => {
+  assert.ok(isDeny(runGate({ tool_name: 'Task', tool_input: { prompt: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE } }, ENABLED)));
+  assert.ok(
+    isDeny(
+      runGate({ tool_name: 'invoke_subagent', tool_input: { prompt: SENSITIVE_NO_SCOPE } }, ENABLED),
+    ),
+  );
+});