@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.59.0 → 1.63.0

package/tests/agent_board_inbox_rpcs.test.sql

@@ -378,7 +378,9 @@ begin
       '{}'::jsonb
     );
   v_board_message := v_result.message_id;
-  insert into _tap(line) select is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 3, 'board delivery reaches joined and subscribed members only (incl. the seeded owner-creator)');
+  -- #608: the sender is the board's seeded owner-creator, and the author of a post is not one of
+  -- its recipients (its row is feed-only), so two of the three active members are counted.
+  insert into _tap(line) select is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 2, 'board delivery reaches joined and subscribed members only, not the author (#608)');
   insert into _tap(line) select is(
     (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.delivery_recipients where source_message_id = v_board_message and recipient_agent_id = v_left_member),
     0,
@@ -409,7 +411,8 @@ begin
       '{}'::jsonb
     );
   v_task := v_result.task_id;
-  insert into _tap(line) select is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 4, 'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts (incl. the seeded owner-creator)');
+  -- #608: the creator (the seeded owner-creator) keeps a feed-only row that is not counted: 1 explicit + 2 board.
+  insert into _tap(line) select is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 3, 'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts, not the creator (#608)');
   insert into _tap(line) select is(
     (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.delivery_recipients where source_task_id = v_task),
     3,

package/tests/agent_board_invite_no_downgrade.test.sql

@@ -453,8 +453,9 @@ select is(
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.write_re('board_memberships')),
   array['_fedsession_autojoin_default_board', '_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent',
         '_upsert_board_membership_state', 'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships',
-        'create_board', 'grant_board_role']::text[],
-  '#317: the set of functions that WRITE board_memberships is exactly these six — a new writer fails here NAMING itself');
+        'create_board', 'grant_board_role', 'link_session_alias', 'mint_delegated_child',
+        'readmit_session_identity', 'set_board_member_label']::text[],
+  'message-board#317: the set of functions that WRITE board_memberships is exactly these ten — a new writer fails here NAMING itself');
 
 -- The direction claim itself: of those writers, only the shared sink assigns
 -- membership_state in a SET clause, so only the sink can move an EXISTING row between
@@ -492,8 +493,9 @@ select is(
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true)
           ~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.col_assign_frag('board_memberships', 'role', agent_board_test.bare_ok(p.oid)))),
   array['_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent', '_upsert_board_membership_state',
-        'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships', 'create_board', 'grant_board_role']::text[],
-  '#317 canary: the SET-clause predicate still matches real SET clauses (these five assign `role`) — so an empty membership_state result means empty, not blind');
+        'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships', 'create_board', 'grant_board_role',
+        'link_session_alias', 'mint_delegated_child', 'readmit_session_identity']::text[],
+  'message-board#317 canary: the SET-clause predicate still matches real SET clauses (these eight assign `role`) — so an empty membership_state result means empty, not blind');
 
 -- THE DOORS THAT ARE NOT FUNCTION BODIES. Every predicate above reads function source, so
 -- anything that writes membership_state WITHOUT a function body naming the table is invisible
@@ -598,12 +600,12 @@ select is(
      from pg_proc p
      join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
     where n.nspname = 'agent_board'
-      and p.proname in ('_fedsession_autojoin_default_board', '_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent',
-                        '_upsert_board_membership_state', 'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships',
-                        'create_board', 'grant_board_role')
+      and p.prokind in ('f', 'p')
+      and p.prolang <> (select oid from pg_language where lanname = 'internal')
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.write_re('board_memberships')
       and not p.prosecdef),
   array[]::text[],
-  '#317: every one of the six FUNCTION writers is SECURITY DEFINER — a function writer that is not would need a direct table grant, which the assertion above forbids (FK cascade is covered there, not here)');
+  'message-board#317: every catalog-derived FUNCTION writer is SECURITY DEFINER — an invoker writer would need a direct table grant, which the assertion above forbids (FK cascade is covered there, not here)');
 
 select is(
   (select coalesce(array_agg(distinct c.relname::text order by c.relname::text), array[]::text[])

package/tests/agent_board_ledger_authority.test.sql

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ begin;
 -- 88 at #276; #280 deletes 7 (EXEMPTION B1/B2/B3, the three RESIDUAL assertions, and a fourth
 -- residual companion in section 10 that named only the slug) and adds 10 in section 11.
 -- 92 with HOSTED (20261008000100): EXEMPTION E below licenses add_delegate_to_board.
-select plan(92);
+select plan(98);
 
 create function pg_temp.claims(p_sub text) returns void language plpgsql as $$
 begin
@@ -549,10 +549,10 @@ select is(
         or agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'board_invite_tokens'))),
   '_fedsession_autojoin_default_board,_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent,'
   || '_upsert_board_membership_state,bootstrap_board_owner_memberships,create_board,'
-  || 'create_invite_link,grant_board_role,set_board_authority_ceiling,set_board_claim_policy,'
+  || 'create_invite_link,grant_board_role,link_session_alias,mint_delegated_child,readmit_session_identity,set_board_authority_ceiling,set_board_claim_policy,'
   || 'set_board_role_gate',
   'the functions that WRITE a board-authority relation — in ANY shape, including a mintable '
-  'invite preset_role — are exactly these ten');
+  'invite preset_role — include the three SID room/role writers');
 
 -- EITHER helper counts as consulting the ledger: the invite redeem path calls the UNLOCKED
 -- predicate (see the migration header), so a side that matched only the share-locking assert
@@ -567,10 +567,10 @@ select is(
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid)
           ~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.call_frag('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked')
                                 || '|' || agent_board_test.call_frag('_actor_fleet_revoked'))),
-  '_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent,add_delegate_to_board,create_board,create_invite_link,grant_board_role,'
+  '_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent,_session_identity_ancestor_ceiling,add_delegate_to_board,approve_identity_state,create_board,create_invite_link,grant_board_role,'
+  || 'link_session_alias,mint_delegated_child,readmit_session_identity,rename_agent,revoke_agent,revoke_session_identity,'
   || 'set_board_authority_ceiling,set_board_claim_policy,set_board_role_gate',
-  'the functions that consult the fleet revocation ledger are exactly these eight (#280 added '
-  'create_board; HOSTED added add_delegate_to_board)');
+  'the catalog-derived ledger-consult set includes SID writers and the read-only ancestor gate');
 
 -- The gate proper: the two sets must differ by EXACTLY the three asserted exemptions, and any
 -- other member of the difference is NAMED in the failure. Each excluded name is licensed by a
@@ -597,6 +597,10 @@ select is(
                 -- ...HOSTED's add_delegate_to_board, which consults the ledger for the OWNER and
                 -- writes no authority relation itself (EXEMPTION E, positively, below)...
                 'add_delegate_to_board',
+                -- read-only lineage validity gate, positively pinned below
+                '_session_identity_ancestor_ceiling',
+                -- Principal/identity owner gates, each positively pinned below.
+                'approve_identity_state', 'rename_agent', 'revoke_agent', 'revoke_session_identity',
                 -- ...and the two helpers, which ARE the gate rather than users of it
                 '_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked', '_actor_fleet_revoked')
           and ((agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'board_memberships')
@@ -691,15 +695,69 @@ select is(
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
     where n.nspname = 'agent_board'
       and p.proname <> '_upsert_board_membership_state'
-      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_upsert_board_membership_state')),
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_upsert_board_membership_state')
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('board_memberships', 'role')),
   'add_delegate_to_board(p_agent_id uuid, p_board_id uuid)'
   || ' | invite_board_member(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_created_by_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)'
   || ' | join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text, p_created_by_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)'
   || ' | request_join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)'
   || ' | resolve_board_request(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text, p_created_by_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)'
   || ' | update_board_membership(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_membership_state text, p_metadata jsonb)',
-  'EXEMPTION A4: EVERY caller of _upsert_board_membership_state takes EXACTLY these parameters '
-  '— not one declares a role, so "no caller can hand it one" is checked rather than argued');
+  'EXEMPTION A4: every state-only sink caller takes exactly these parameters; direct role writers join the ledger-gated class');
+
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(p.proname, ',' order by p.proname) from pg_proc p
+    where p.pronamespace = 'agent_board'::regnamespace
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_upsert_board_membership_state', false)
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('board_memberships', 'role')
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked', false)),
+  'link_session_alias,mint_delegated_child,readmit_session_identity',
+  'EXEMPTION A4-SID: every mixed role/state sink caller is positively a ledger-gated authority writer');
+
+select ok(
+  (select p.prorettype = 'timestamptz'::regtype
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_actor_fleet_revoked', false)
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) like '%v_ancestor.id%'
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('from', 'agents', false)
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.write_re('board_memberships')
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.write_re('board_authority_ceilings')
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.write_re('boards')
+    and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.write_re('board_invite_tokens')
+   from pg_proc p where p.oid = 'agent_board._session_identity_ancestor_ceiling(uuid)'::regprocedure),
+  'EXEMPTION SID-ANCESTOR: the ledger consumer reads lineage and returns only an expiry, never writes board authority');
+
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.approve_identity_state(uuid,text,jsonb)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.approve_identity_state(uuid,text,jsonb)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.approve_identity_state(uuid,text,jsonb)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('session_identities','approved_risky_digest'),
+  'EXEMPTION SID-APPROVE: locked owner ledger gate authorises stored identity approval, not a board-role write');
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.rename_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.rename_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('auth.uid',false)
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.rename_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('agents','display_name'),
+  'EXEMPTION SID-RENAME: locked human-owner ledger gate authorises the principal display-name update');
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_revoke_session_identity_family')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_agent(uuid,text)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('agents','status'),
+  'EXEMPTION SID-ADMIN-REVOKE: locked actor ledger gate authorises principal suspension and session-family revocation');
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_session_identity(uuid)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_assert_actor_not_fleet_revoked')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_session_identity(uuid)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.revoke_session_identity(uuid)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_revoke_agent_principal'),
+  'EXEMPTION SID-OWNER-REVOKE: locked human-owner ledger gate authorises the principal revocation primitive');
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- EXEMPTIONS C and D — the two remaining service_role-only seeders. (What used to be
@@ -960,14 +1018,14 @@ select ok(
 
 select ok(
   strpos(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure),
-         'agent_board.agents a where a.id = p_agent_id for update') > 0
+         'agent_board.agents a where a.id = v_id for update') > 0
   and strpos(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure),
          'insert into agent_board.fleet_revocation_events') > 0
   and strpos(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure),
-         'agent_board.agents a where a.id = p_agent_id for update')
+         'agent_board.agents a where a.id = v_id for update')
     < strpos(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure),
          'insert into agent_board.fleet_revocation_events'),
-  '_revoke_agent_principal locks the agents row BEFORE writing the ledger too');
+  '_revoke_agent_principal locks each closure principal agents row BEFORE writing its ledger too');
 
 -- The lock the gate itself takes, and its MODE. FOR KEY SHARE would not conflict with the FOR
 -- NO KEY UPDATE a plain status change takes; the isolation spec is what proves the conflict,

package/tests/agent_board_membership_current_row_class.test.sql

@@ -306,10 +306,13 @@ select is(
     '_grant_within_ceiling/limit/filtered:''joined'',''subscribed''',
     '_upsert_board_membership_state/limit/active-first',
     'join_board/limit/active-first',
+    'link_session_alias/limit/filtered:''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'list_board_members/distinct/active-first',
     'list_board_members/limit/active-first',
     'list_board_pending_memberships/distinct/active-first',
     'list_my_board_requests/limit/active-first',
+    'mint_delegated_child/limit/filtered:''joined'',''subscribed''',
+    'readmit_session_identity/limit/active-first',
     'request_join_board/limit/filtered:''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'resolve_board_request/limit/filtered:''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'resolve_board_request/limit/filtered:''requested'',''invited''',
@@ -340,6 +343,8 @@ select is(
 --     grantor's highest active role, among active rows only. With one active row
 --     per (board, agent) the order is moot; it is in the class because the class
 --     no longer requires a recency operand (an alias or ordinal would hide one).
+--   link_session_alias / mint_delegated_child -- use the same exact ACTIVE
+--     parent-role filter; removed historical roles cannot grant room authority.
 --   resolve_board_request (pending) -- MBROWID 3c: the approval gate must see the
 --     newest requested/invited marker, NOT prefer a coexisting active row; the
 --     active case is handled by the probe above.
@@ -350,11 +355,13 @@ select is(
   array[
     '_active_board_membership_id=''joined'',''subscribed''',
     '_grant_within_ceiling=''joined'',''subscribed''',
+    'link_session_alias=''joined'',''subscribed''',
+    'mint_delegated_child=''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'request_join_board=''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'resolve_board_request=''joined'',''subscribed''',
     'resolve_board_request=''requested'',''invited'''
   ]::text[],
-  'CRC-3: the five filtered exemptions pin exactly these membership_state sets');
+  'CRC-3: the filtered exemptions pin exactly these membership_state sets');
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- CRC-4: the active-first members, exactly.
@@ -369,6 +376,7 @@ select is(
     'list_board_members/limit',
     'list_board_pending_memberships/distinct',
     'list_my_board_requests/limit',
+    'readmit_session_identity/limit',
     'update_board_membership/limit',
     'update_board_membership/limit'
   ]::text[],

package/tests/agent_board_mint_fleet_agent_session.test.sql

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ end
 $$;
 
 -- Function existence -----------------------------------------------------------
-select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_fleet_agent_session', array['uuid','text','uuid','uuid','integer'], 'mint_fleet_agent_session exists');
+select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_fleet_agent_session', array['uuid','text','uuid','uuid','integer','text','text'], 'mint_fleet_agent_session exists');
 select has_function('agent_board', '_agent_principal_active', array['uuid'], '_agent_principal_active exists');
 
 -- _agent_principal_active lineage semantics ------------------------------------
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ select throws_ok(
 
 -- Privileges -------------------------------------------------------------------
 select function_privs_are(
-  'agent_board', 'mint_fleet_agent_session', array['uuid','text','uuid','uuid','integer'],
+  'agent_board', 'mint_fleet_agent_session', array['uuid','text','uuid','uuid','integer','text','text'],
   'authenticated', array[]::text[], 'mint_fleet_agent_session execute is revoked from authenticated');
 select function_privs_are(
   'agent_board', '_agent_principal_active', array['uuid'],

package/tests/agent_board_mint_harden.test.sql

@@ -7,10 +7,9 @@
 --   * mint raw-byte fingerprint + cross-path dedup (same key => same fingerprint across
 --     mint and enroll, so the UNIQUE backstop finally bites);
 --   * non-positive-TTL floor;
---   * F1 authenticated (self-service) RE-CLAMP of max_active_children and TTL ceiling —
---     the stored caps are NOT trusted (a root can self-widen its policy, #142) — vs the
---     operator path which keeps its latitude;
---   * per-root provisioning RATE cap on the authenticated path only;
+--   * SIDSCHEMA's global 200 active/60 hourly bounds and any tighter policy,
+--     including the legacy self-service 24-hour TTL vs operator TTL latitude;
+--   * real grant-created rolling-hour census on both mint paths;
 --   * EXECUTE class: mint stays service_role-only (topology A; the EF is the auth surface).
 --
 -- Allow-side assertions use lives_ok(...) + a separate state read (never
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(32);
+select plan(33);
 
 create temp table _mh (
   owner_id uuid,
@@ -62,28 +61,33 @@ begin
   insert into agent_board.delegation_policies(root_agent_id, mode, max_depth, allowed_scopes, child_ttl_ceiling, require_child_signing_key)
   values (v_r_wide, 'root_minted', 1, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), interval '30 days', false);
 
-  -- r_capnull: operator-set max_active_children=100 (a self-widened row), no key -> F1 cap
-  -- clamp. Pre-load 25 LIVE grants: self-service clamps to 25 (raise); operator keeps 100.
+  -- A tighter stored 100-cap still bounds the new global 200 maximum. Historical
+  -- legacy grants count as active authority but lie outside the rolling hour.
   insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, owner_user_id)
   values (v_r_capnull, 'agent', 'mh-rcap-'||s, 'MH RCap', 'active', u_owner);
   insert into agent_board.delegation_policies(root_agent_id, mode, max_depth, max_active_children, allowed_scopes, child_ttl_ceiling, require_child_signing_key)
   values (v_r_capnull, 'root_minted', 1, 100, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), interval '8 hours', false);
-  for i in 1..25 loop
+  for i in 1..100 loop
     v_child := gen_random_uuid();
     insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, owner_user_id)
     values (v_child, 'agent', 'mh-cap-child-'||s||'-'||i, 'MH Cap Child', 'active', u_owner);
-    insert into agent_board.delegation_grants(child_agent_id, root_agent_id, parent_agent_id, delegation_policy_id, granted_scopes, grant_expires_at)
-    select v_child, v_r_capnull, v_r_capnull, dp.id, '[]'::jsonb, now() + interval '1 hour'
+    insert into agent_board.delegation_grants(child_agent_id, root_agent_id, parent_agent_id, delegation_policy_id, granted_scopes, grant_expires_at, created_at)
+    select v_child, v_r_capnull, v_r_capnull, dp.id, '[]'::jsonb, now() + interval '1 hour', now() - interval '2 hours'
       from agent_board.delegation_policies dp where dp.root_agent_id = v_r_capnull;
   end loop;
 
-  -- r_rate: uncapped, no key -> rate cap test. Pre-load 25 rate events (at the cap).
+  -- Expired grants remain hourly mints, without contributing active authority.
   insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, owner_user_id)
   values (v_r_rate, 'agent', 'mh-rrate-'||s, 'MH RRate', 'active', u_owner);
   insert into agent_board.delegation_policies(root_agent_id, mode, max_depth, allowed_scopes, child_ttl_ceiling, require_child_signing_key)
   values (v_r_rate, 'root_minted', 1, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), interval '8 hours', false);
-  for i in 1..25 loop
-    insert into agent_board.child_mint_rate_events(root_agent_id, created_at) values (v_r_rate, now());
+  for i in 1..60 loop
+    v_child := gen_random_uuid();
+    insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, owner_user_id, parent_agent_id, root_agent_id)
+    values (v_child, 'agent', 'mh-rate-child-' || s || '-' || i, 'Hourly child', 'active', u_owner, v_r_rate, v_r_rate);
+    insert into agent_board.delegation_grants(child_agent_id, root_agent_id, parent_agent_id, delegation_policy_id, granted_scopes, grant_expires_at)
+    select v_child, v_r_rate, v_r_rate, dp.id, '[]'::jsonb, now() - interval '1 hour'
+      from agent_board.delegation_policies dp where dp.root_agent_id = v_r_rate;
   end loop;
 
   -- d_dup: a dummy agent already holding the raw key k_dup (helper fingerprint) -> the
@@ -276,37 +280,44 @@ select ok(
   (select grant_expires_at <= now() + interval '24 hours' + interval '1 minute' from _m_ss_ttl),
   'self-service path re-clamps the TTL ceiling to <= 24h (stored 30-day ceiling NOT trusted)');
 
--- Self-service cap: stored max_active_children=100 is re-clamped to 25; with 25 live grants
--- the self-service mint is refused (the mutation dropping the clamp lets a 26th through).
+-- A tighter stored cap remains enforced; SIDSCHEMA no longer restores the old 25 pin.
 select throws_ok(
   (select format($q$select agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), null, null, true)$q$,
      r_capnull, 'mh-sscap-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-','')) from _mh),
   '42501', 'max_active_children: root has reached its active delegated-child ceiling',
-  'self-service re-clamps max_active_children to 25 (stored 100 NOT trusted)');
+  'self-service honors the tighter 100 active ceiling under the global 200 bound');
 
--- Operator path under the SAME 100-cap policy + 25 live grants still mints (its latitude).
+-- Release one historical grant: both paths have room below the tighter ceiling.
+update agent_board.delegation_grants set revoked_at = now() where child_agent_id = (
+  select g.child_agent_id from agent_board.delegation_grants g, _mh where g.root_agent_id = _mh.r_capnull order by g.child_agent_id limit 1);
 select lives_ok(
   (select format($q$create temp table _m_op_cap as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), null, null, false)$q$,
      r_capnull, 'mh-opcap-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-','')) from _mh),
-  'operator path honors the stored 100 cap (25 < 100 => mint succeeds)');
+  'operator path honors the stored 100 cap (99 < 100 => mint succeeds)');
 select is((select count(*) from _m_op_cap), 1::bigint,
   'operator cap mint produced exactly one child (not a silent zero-row pass)');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
--- F. Per-root provisioning RATE cap (authenticated path only).
+-- F. Root rolling-hour census applies to both legacy and session mint paths.
 -- ===========================================================================
--- r_rate has 25 rate events (at the cap) and 0 live grants, so only the rate cap can fire.
+-- r_rate has 60 actual recent expired grants, so only the hourly cap can fire.
 select throws_ok(
   (select format($q$select agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), null, null, true)$q$,
      r_rate, 'mh-ssrate-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-','')) from _mh),
-  '42501', 'mint_rate_exceeded: root has reached its provisioning rate cap for the current window',
-  'self-service mint is refused once the per-root provisioning rate cap is reached');
+  '42501', 'identity_limit_hourly_exceeded',
+  'self-service mint is refused at 60 real mints in the rolling hour');
 
--- The operator path is NOT rate-capped (the same full rate table does not block it).
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), null, null, false)$q$,
+     r_rate, 'mh-opfull-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-','')) from _mh),
+  '42501', 'identity_limit_hourly_exceeded',
+  'operator mint cannot bypass the global rolling-hour ceiling');
+update agent_board.delegation_grants set created_at = now() - interval '2 hours' where child_agent_id = (
+  select g.child_agent_id from agent_board.delegation_grants g, _mh where g.root_agent_id = _mh.r_rate order by g.child_agent_id limit 1);
 select lives_ok(
   (select format($q$create temp table _m_op_rate as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), null, null, false)$q$,
      r_rate, 'mh-oprate-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-','')) from _mh),
-  'operator path is not rate-capped (mints despite a full rate table)');
+  'operator path mints the 60th real child when one old mint leaves the rolling hour');
 select is((select count(*) from _m_op_rate), 1::bigint,
   'operator rate-path mint produced exactly one child (not a silent zero-row pass)');
 
@@ -314,13 +325,13 @@ select is((select count(*) from _m_op_rate), 1::bigint,
 -- G. EXECUTE class — mint stays service_role-only (topology A; EF is the auth surface).
 -- ===========================================================================
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('authenticated',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'authenticated has NO direct EXECUTE on mint_delegated_child (EF-mediated only)');
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('anon',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'anon has NO EXECUTE on mint_delegated_child');
 select ok(has_function_privilege('service_role',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'service_role retains EXECUTE on mint_delegated_child');