@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.59.0 → 1.63.0

package/tests/agent_board_write_enforcement_class.test.sql

@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(25);
+select plan(30);
 
 -- ===========================================================================================
 -- THE CLASS, derived from pg_catalog. Nothing below is a list of names.
@@ -430,10 +430,12 @@ select distinct p.oid,
 -- 60 -> 62 with HOSTED's delegate_instances and delegate_allowed_operations (20261008000100).
 -- Both are written only by service_role-only definers or the migration itself, so neither joins
 -- the `authenticated` writer population below.
+-- SIDSCHEMA adds identities and aliases. Human-owner readmission writes them and
+-- delegation_grants; these remain in the derived class, not an exemption list.
 select is(
   (select count(*)::text from _wec_target where relkind = 'r'),
-  '62',
-  '#325 canary: agent_board has 62 base tables — the universe the write scan runs over, pinned so an empty violating set below cannot mean an empty universe');
+  '64',
+  '#325 canary: agent_board has 64 base tables — the universe the write scan runs over, pinned so an empty violating set below cannot mean an empty universe');
 
 -- WEC-2. The relations the class writes, as an EXACT SET. A new one names itself.
 select is(
@@ -459,6 +461,7 @@ select is(
         'callback_subscriptions',
         'claims',
         'conflicts',
+        'delegation_grants',
         'delegation_policies',
         'delegations',
         'delivery_recipients',
@@ -476,11 +479,13 @@ select is(
         'presence',
         'read_receipts',
         'send_authz_telemetry',
+        'session_id_aliases',
+        'session_identities',
         'task_events',
         'tasks',
         'threads'
         ]::text[],
-  '#325: these 37 agent_board relations are written by an authenticated-executable function, directly or through a callee — five of them (board_invite_redemptions, board_membership_events, callback_outbox_events, delivery_recipients, send_authz_telemetry) were invisible while membership was own-body');
+  '#325: these 40 agent_board relations are written by an authenticated-executable function, directly or through a callee — SIDSCHEMA readmission adds grants, identities and aliases without excluding their writers');
 
 -- WEC-3. The class itself, as an EXACT SET of SIGNATURES, and it is signatures rather than
 -- `count(*) = 59` for two reasons. The routine response to a red count is to bump the count,
@@ -495,6 +500,8 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     -- HOSTED (20261008000100): the owner places its hosted delegate through the sink.
     'agent_board.add_delegate_to_board(uuid,uuid)',
     'agent_board.append_task_event(uuid,uuid,text,jsonb,text,uuid,timestamp with time zone)',
+    -- Approval's measured fingerprint is service-only until SIDSERVER binds it.
+    -- Its ACL and real human/ancestor actors are pinned in the fingerprint suite.
     'agent_board.block_board_inviter(uuid,uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.create_board(uuid,text,text,text,jsonb,text)',
     'agent_board.create_fleet_onboarding_invite(uuid,uuid,text,text,text,text,text,text,text,integer,timestamp with time zone,uuid,jsonb)',
@@ -509,6 +516,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.disable_callback_endpoint(uuid,uuid,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid,uuid,text,uuid)',
     'agent_board.heartbeat(uuid,uuid,text,text,interval,jsonb)',
+    'agent_board.heartbeat_session_identity(uuid)',
     'agent_board.invite_board_member(uuid,uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(uuid,text,interval)',
     'agent_board.join_board(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb)',
@@ -520,13 +528,17 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.provision_agent(text,text,jsonb,uuid)',
     'agent_board.raise_conflict(uuid,uuid,text,text,text,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.raise_escalation(uuid,uuid,text,text,text,uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
+    'agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)',
     'agent_board.record_signing_key_proof_result(uuid,uuid,text,boolean,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.redeem_invite_link(text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.register_agent(text,text,text,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.register_callback_endpoint(uuid,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.register_fleet_machine(uuid,uuid,text,text,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.release_claim(uuid)',
+    'agent_board.rename_agent(uuid,text)',
     'agent_board.renew_claim(uuid,timestamp with time zone)',
+    -- Fresh renewal attestation is service-role-only; lifetime's trust assertion
+    -- positively pins the ACL, rather than excluding a reachable writer here.
     'agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.resolve_conflict(uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
@@ -535,6 +547,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.revoke_fleet_machine_agent_binding(uuid,uuid,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.revoke_fleet_subject(text,uuid,uuid,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.revoke_invite_link(text,jsonb)',
+    'agent_board.revoke_session_identity(uuid)',
     'agent_board.rotate_callback_signing_key(uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.self_enroll_human(text)',
     'agent_board.send_direct_message(uuid,uuid,jsonb,text,text,text,text,text,text,jsonb)',
@@ -543,6 +556,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.send_multicast_message(uuid,uuid,uuid[],text,text,text,text,text,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.set_board_authority_ceiling(uuid,text,uuid)',
     'agent_board.set_board_claim_policy(uuid,text)',
+    'agent_board.set_board_member_label(uuid,uuid,text)',
     'agent_board.set_board_role_gate(uuid,boolean)',
     'agent_board.set_fleet_receive_policy(uuid,text,text,boolean,uuid,uuid,jsonb)',
     'agent_board.subscribe_callback_endpoint(uuid,uuid,text,text,uuid,jsonb)',
@@ -553,7 +567,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid,text,jsonb,integer,interval,boolean)',
     'agent_board.verify_callback_endpoint(uuid,uuid,jsonb)'
     ]::text[],
-  '#325: the effect-derived class is exactly these 61 authenticated-executable writer OVERLOADS — per-OID, and TRANSITIVE, so a delegating wrapper whose own body holds no DML is a member rather than a blind spot');
+  '#325: the effect-derived class is exactly these 66 authenticated-executable writer OVERLOADS — per-OID, and TRANSITIVE, so a delegating wrapper whose own body holds no DML is a member rather than a blind spot');
 
 -- WEC-4. THE DELEGATION-CHAIN LIVENESS PIN, and the mitigation for the fail-open inversion the
 -- header describes. Everything above depends on `fn_call_closure()` actually resolving edges; a
@@ -614,8 +628,8 @@ select is(
   (select coalesce(array_agg(p.sig order by p.sig), array[]::text[])
      from _wec_pop p
     where agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('auth.uid', false)),
-  array['agent_board.self_enroll_human(text)']::text[],
-  '#325: exactly ONE writer derives from raw auth.uid() — self_enroll_human CREATES the identity a session would resolve to, so it cannot use the resolver; scored on the own body because the closure form matches all 59 and would make Half A vacuous');
+  array['agent_board.rename_agent(uuid,text)', 'agent_board.self_enroll_human(text)']::text[],
+  '#325: exactly these writers derive from raw auth.uid() — self enrollment creates the human identity; rename requires its active human owner, positively exercised by WEC-26..29');
 
 -- ===========================================================================================
 -- HALF B — every writer REFUSES SOMEBODY. Labelled honestly: it pins that a refusal exists on the
@@ -673,7 +687,6 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(uuid,text,interval) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
     'agent_board.provision_agent(text,text,jsonb,uuid) -> _require_platform_admin_user_id',
     'agent_board.register_callback_endpoint(uuid,text,jsonb) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
-    'agent_board.revoke_agent(uuid,text) -> _require_platform_admin_user_id',
     'agent_board.rotate_callback_signing_key(uuid,uuid,jsonb) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
     'agent_board.subscribe_callback_endpoint(uuid,uuid,text,text,uuid,jsonb) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
     'agent_board.unblock_board_inviter(uuid,uuid,uuid) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
@@ -682,7 +695,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked
     'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid,text,jsonb,integer,interval,boolean) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id',
     'agent_board.verify_callback_endpoint(uuid,uuid,jsonb) -> _resolved_actor_agent_id'
     ]::text[],
-  '#325 HALF B, part 1: exactly these 16 writers reach NO shared authz predicate and raise no 42501 of their own, and each NAMES the raising resolver it relies on — 14 the session resolver, 2 the platform-admin one; a new ungated writer joins this set, and a member that loses or switches its resolver reds here');
+  '#325 HALF B, part 1: exactly these 15 writers reach NO shared authz predicate and raise no 42501 of their own, and each NAMES the raising resolver it relies on — 14 the session resolver, 1 the platform-admin one; revoke_agent now refuses an unresolved actor in its own body; a new ungated writer joins this set, and a member that loses or switches its resolver reds here');
 
 -- WEC-9. The union, and the only assertion here that is a claim about the WHOLE class rather than
 -- about a category. Not spelled over the CLOSURE for 42501: that form is satisfied by 59 of 59
@@ -875,7 +888,7 @@ select is(
      cross join unnest(array['INSERT', 'UPDATE', 'DELETE', 'TRUNCATE']) as pv
     where has_table_privilege(r, t.reloid, pv)),
   array[]::text[],
-  '#325: NEITHER authenticated NOR anon holds a direct write privilege on ANY of the 37 class relations — so for those two roles every write goes through some agent_board function; WEC-3 is what says which');
+  '#325: NEITHER authenticated NOR anon holds a direct write privilege on ANY of the 40 class relations — so for those two roles every write goes through some agent_board function; WEC-3 is what says which');
 
 -- WEC-18. The arm that DOES NOT hold, pinned as an exact set rather than omitted. service_role
 -- writes thirteen of these relations directly, with no function and no body — the structural
@@ -900,6 +913,7 @@ select is(
         'INSERT:board_invite_redemptions',
         'INSERT:board_invite_tokens',
         'INSERT:board_membership_events',
+        'INSERT:delegation_grants',
         'INSERT:fleet_harness_registrations',
         'INSERT:fleet_machine_agents',
         'INSERT:fleet_machines',
@@ -911,6 +925,7 @@ select is(
         'UPDATE:board_authority_ceilings',
         'UPDATE:board_invite_redemptions',
         'UPDATE:board_invite_tokens',
+        'UPDATE:delegation_grants',
         'UPDATE:fleet_harness_registrations',
         'UPDATE:fleet_machine_agents',
         'UPDATE:fleet_machines',
@@ -919,7 +934,7 @@ select is(
         'UPDATE:fleet_revocation_events',
         'UPDATE:fleet_trust_domains'
         ]::text[],
-  '#325: service_role holds direct DML on THIRTEEN of the 37 class relations — the plan asserts this bound holds and it DOES NOT; pinned as an exact set so the hole is bounded and a widening names itself');
+  '#325: service_role holds direct DML on FOURTEEN of the 40 class relations — grants newly enter this class through readmission, not through a new grant; the exact privilege set bounds the hole');
 
 -- WEC-19. The rule-1-correct arm. WEC-17 and WEC-18 are hand lists of three role names between
 -- them, so an INSERT granted to a brand-new role self-names in NEITHER. This reads the ACL itself.
@@ -952,7 +967,7 @@ select ok(
      where c.relowner <> 'postgres'::regrole) = 0
     and has_table_privilege('postgres', 'agent_board.threads', 'INSERT')
     and has_table_privilege('postgres', 'agent_board.threads', 'DELETE'),
-  '#325: postgres OWNS every one of the 37 class relations (pg_class.relowner, not inferred from a privilege) and holds writes on them — so the WEC-19 exclusion is a fact about ownership, not a carve-out');
+  '#325: postgres OWNS every one of the 40 class relations (pg_class.relowner, not inferred from a privilege) and holds writes on them — so the WEC-19 exclusion is a fact about ownership, not a carve-out');
 
 -- WEC-21. The over-revoke guard. A file that only ever asserts absence would call a schema with
 -- every privilege revoked a success.
@@ -1006,12 +1021,13 @@ select is(
         'agent_board.fleet_trust_domains',
         'agent_board.inbox_items',
         'agent_board.messages',
+        'agent_board.session_identities',
         'agent_board.task_events',
         'agent_board.tasks',
         'agent_board.threads',
         'auth.users'
         ]::text[],
-  '#325: deleting a row in one of these 19 parents CASCADES or SET NULLs into a class relation — a write path with no privilege check and no function body, so no assertion in this file gates it; one parent is auth.users, i.e. outside agent_board entirely');
+  '#325: deleting a row in one of these 20 parents CASCADES or SET NULLs into a class relation — a write path with no privilege check and no function body; one parent is auth.users, i.e. outside agent_board entirely');
 
 -- WEC-23. The edge count. This IS a bare count and the hazard is stated rather than left for a
 -- reviewer: the routine response to a red count is to bump it, which absorbs a new cascade edge
@@ -1023,8 +1039,8 @@ select is(
      from _wec_class_tables t
      join pg_constraint con on con.conrelid = t.reloid
     where con.contype = 'f' and con.confdeltype in ('c', 'n', 'd')),
-  '88',
-  '#325: 88 writing referential actions (74 CASCADE + 14 SET NULL) reach the 37 class relations — bump this number only after confirming the new edge is intended; see WEC-22, which names parents independently');
+  '92',
+  '#325: 92 writing referential actions (78 CASCADE + 14 SET NULL) reach the 40 class relations — the four SIDSCHEMA class additions are positively pinned in WEC-30');
 
 -- ===========================================================================================
 -- WEC-24/25 — THE CROSS-CHECK (Consiliency/message-board#416 / #417 / #424, plan change 9).
@@ -1138,6 +1154,49 @@ select is(
   'mark_retention_metadata',
   'WEC-25 (change 9): the plpgsql bodies WEC-24 skips for dynamic SQL are exactly these — mark_retention_metadata writes board_memberships through format(), which neither write_re nor the parser can see; a second dynamic writer fails here by name');
 
+-- WEC-26..29: raw auth.uid() for rename is a human-ownership check, not agent
+-- self-authentication or a service-role assertion. Exercise the real API role.
+create temp table _wec_owner(user_id uuid, original_handle text) on commit drop;
+do $$ declare u uuid; begin
+  u := public.ensure_github_user('wec-owner-' || gen_random_uuid(), 'wec-owner@example.test',
+    'wec-owner-' || gen_random_uuid(), 'WEC owner');
+  insert into agent_board.agents(agent_type, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
+    values ('human', 'wec-human-' || gen_random_uuid(), 'WEC owner', 'active', u, u);
+  update agent_board.agents set owner_user_id = u
+    where id = (select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a');
+  insert into _wec_owner select u, handle from agent_board.agents
+    where id = (select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a');
+end $$;
+grant select on _wec_owner, _wec_agent to authenticated;
+grant usage on schema extensions to authenticated;
+set local role authenticated;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select user_id from _wec_owner)::text, true);
+select lives_ok($$select agent_board.rename_agent((select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a'), 'WEC renamed')$$,
+  'WEC-26: active authenticated human owner can rename its agent');
+reset role;
+select is((select display_name || '/' || (handle = original_handle)::text
+  from agent_board.agents cross join _wec_owner where id = (select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a')),
+  'WEC renamed/true', 'WEC-27: raw-human rename writes only the intended display name and preserves handle');
+-- The nearest invalid owner: ownership matches the agent's auth user, but that
+-- principal is not a human. A stranger would hide loss of the human predicate.
+update agent_board.agents set owner_user_id = (select user_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a')
+  where id = (select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a');
+set local role authenticated;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select user_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a')::text, true);
+select throws_ok($$select agent_board.rename_agent((select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a'), 'WEC agent renamed')$$,
+  '42501', 'agent rename requires the human owner', 'WEC-28: the agent credential is not its human owner');
+reset role;
+select is((select display_name from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_id from _wec_agent where label = 'a')),
+  'WEC renamed', 'WEC-29: refused agent rename leaves the human-owned state unchanged');
+select is((select array_agg(c.conname::text || ':' || c.confdeltype::text order by c.conname::text)
+  from _wec_class_tables t join pg_constraint c on c.conrelid = t.reloid
+  where t.relname in ('delegation_grants', 'session_identities', 'session_id_aliases')
+    and c.contype = 'f' and c.confdeltype in ('c', 'n', 'd')),
+  array['delegation_grants_child_agent_id_fkey:c', 'delegation_grants_root_agent_id_fkey:c',
+    'session_id_aliases_identity_agent_id_fkey:c', 'session_identities_agent_id_fkey:c']::text[],
+  'WEC-30: all four newly class-visible referential writes are the intended principal/grant/identity/alias cascades');
+
 select * from finish();
 
 rollback;

package/tests/catalog/function_execute_privileges.json

@@ -559,6 +559,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_mint_fleet_agent_session_legacy",
+      "signature": "_mint_fleet_agent_session_legacy(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_next_callback_attempt_number",
       "signature": "_next_callback_attempt_number(p_outbox_event_id uuid)",
@@ -775,6 +784,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_revoke_session_identity_family",
+      "signature": "_revoke_session_identity_family(p_agent_id uuid, p_actor uuid, p_reason text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_role_rank",
       "signature": "_role_rank(p_role text)",
@@ -793,6 +811,105 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_agent_lineage",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_agent_lineage()",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_ancestor_actor",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_ancestor_actor(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_ancestor_ceiling",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_ancestor_ceiling(p_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_check_limits",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_check_limits(p_root uuid, p_parent uuid, p_reactivation uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_has_human_owner",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_has_human_owner(p_root_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_kind_immutable",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_kind_immutable()",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_lease_live",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_lease_live(p_identity uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_lineage",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_lineage()",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_owner",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_owner(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_read_allowed",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_read_allowed(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "_session_identity_revocation_actor",
+      "signature": "_session_identity_revocation_actor(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "_signed_write_actor_id",
       "signature": "_signed_write_actor_id(p_payload jsonb, p_gateway_decision jsonb, p_actor_field text)",
@@ -883,6 +1000,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "approve_identity_state",
+      "signature": "approve_identity_state(p_identity_agent_id uuid, p_risky_digest text, p_recorded_fingerprint jsonb)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "block_board_inviter",
       "signature": "block_board_inviter(p_board_id uuid, p_inviter_agent_id uuid, p_target_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)",
@@ -1108,6 +1234,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "get_session_identity_state",
+      "signature": "get_session_identity_state(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "grant_board_role",
       "signature": "grant_board_role(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_grantee_role text, p_grantor_agent_id uuid)",
@@ -1126,6 +1261,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "heartbeat_session_identity",
+      "signature": "heartbeat_session_identity(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "invite_board_for_display",
       "signature": "invite_board_for_display(p_code_sha256 text)",
@@ -1171,6 +1315,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "link_session_alias",
+      "signature": "link_session_alias(p_identity_agent_id uuid, p_identity_lease_epoch text, p_session_id text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "list_board_members",
       "signature": "list_board_members(p_board_id uuid)",
@@ -1198,6 +1351,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "list_session_children",
+      "signature": "list_session_children(p_parent_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "mark_read",
       "signature": "mark_read(p_thread_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_last_read_message_sequence bigint)",
@@ -1218,7 +1380,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "mint_delegated_child",
-      "signature": "mint_delegated_child(p_root_agent_id uuid, p_child_slug text, p_requested_scopes jsonb, p_child_public_key text, p_ttl interval, p_self_service boolean)",
+      "signature": "mint_delegated_child(p_root_agent_id uuid, p_child_slug text, p_requested_scopes jsonb, p_child_public_key text, p_ttl interval, p_self_service boolean, p_session_harness text, p_session_id text, p_minter_lease_epoch text, p_requested_rooms jsonb, p_fingerprint jsonb, p_forked_from uuid)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
         "service_role": true,
@@ -1227,7 +1389,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "mint_fleet_agent_session",
-      "signature": "mint_fleet_agent_session(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer)",
+      "signature": "mint_fleet_agent_session(p_challenge_id uuid, p_nonce text, p_signing_key_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_max_ttl_seconds integer, p_holder_secret text, p_session_id text)",
       "executable_by": {
         "anon": false,
         "service_role": true,
@@ -1315,6 +1477,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "readmit_session_identity",
+      "signature": "readmit_session_identity(p_identity_agent_id uuid, p_child_slug text, p_child_public_key text, p_requested_scopes jsonb, p_requested_rooms jsonb, p_ttl interval)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "reap_expired_enroll_rate_events",
       "signature": "reap_expired_enroll_rate_events(p_older_than interval)",
@@ -1396,6 +1567,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "record_session_identity_state",
+      "signature": "record_session_identity_state(p_identity_agent_id uuid, p_fingerprint jsonb)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "record_signing_key_proof_result",
       "signature": "record_signing_key_proof_result(p_challenge_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_key_id text, p_verified boolean, p_failure_class text, p_metadata jsonb)",
@@ -1450,6 +1630,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "rename_agent",
+      "signature": "rename_agent(p_agent_id uuid, p_display_name text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "renew_claim",
       "signature": "renew_claim(p_lease_token uuid, p_lease_expires_at timestamp with time zone)",
@@ -1468,6 +1657,15 @@
         "authenticated": false
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "renew_session_identity",
+      "signature": "renew_session_identity(p_identity_agent_id uuid, p_risky_digest text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": true,
+        "authenticated": false
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "request_join_board",
       "signature": "request_join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb)",
@@ -1585,6 +1783,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "revoke_session_identity",
+      "signature": "revoke_session_identity(p_identity_agent_id uuid)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "rotate_agent_token",
       "signature": "rotate_agent_token(p_agent_id uuid)",
@@ -1666,6 +1873,15 @@
         "authenticated": true
       }
     },
+    {
+      "name": "set_board_member_label",
+      "signature": "set_board_member_label(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_label text)",
+      "executable_by": {
+        "anon": false,
+        "service_role": false,
+        "authenticated": true
+      }
+    },
     {
       "name": "set_board_role_gate",
       "signature": "set_board_role_gate(p_board_id uuid, p_enforced boolean)",