@connexum/ai-governance 1.0.0-beta.11

package/dist/packs/iso-26262.js

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+"use strict";
+/**
+ * ISO 26262 Automotive Functional Safety Compliance Pack
+ *
+ * ISO 26262:2018 — "Road vehicles — Functional safety." International standard
+ * for functional safety of electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems in road
+ * vehicles. Replaces IEC 61508 as the sector-specific standard for automotive
+ * E/E functional safety. The 2018 second edition extends scope from passenger
+ * vehicles (first edition 2011) to trucks, buses, motorcycles, and trailers.
+ *
+ * Standards referenced (citations only; no verbatim text from the standard):
+ *   - ISO 26262:2018 (all 12 parts) — Road vehicles — Functional safety
+ *   - ISO 26262-3:2018 — Concept phase (item definition + HARA + FSC)
+ *   - ISO 26262-4:2018 — System-level development (TSC + FTTI)
+ *   - ISO 26262-5:2018 — Hardware development
+ *   - ISO 26262-6:2018 — Software development (SSR + arch + unit verification)
+ *   - ISO 26262-7:2018 — Production, operation, service, decommissioning
+ *   - ISO 26262-8:2018 — Supporting processes (CM, change, TCL, DIA)
+ *   - ISO 26262-9:2018 — ASIL-oriented + safety-oriented analyses (decomposition)
+ *   - ISO 26262-10:2018 — Guidelines for ISO 26262 in general
+ *   - ISO 26262-11:2018 — Guidelines for application to semiconductors
+ *   - ISO 26262-12:2018 — Adaptation for motorcycles
+ *   - ISO/SAE 21434:2021 — Road vehicle cybersecurity engineering (pairing standard)
+ *   - UNECE WP.29 Regulations 155 (cybersecurity) + 156 (software updates)
+ *   - NHTSA Defect Reporting 49 CFR Part 573 — 5-day/24h clock for safety-related defects
+ *   - EU Type Approval Reg (EU) 2018/858 + Reg (EU) 2019/2144 (ALKS)
+ *   - SAE J3016 — Automated driving taxonomy (L0–L5 reference for ASIL scope)
+ *
+ * ASIL Classification (ISO 26262-3 §6 — Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment):
+ *   Each safety goal is assigned an ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level)
+ *   derived from three parameters in the HARA:
+ *     S — Severity   (S0–S3: no injury to life-threatening / fatal)
+ *     E — Exposure   (E0–E4: incredible to high probability)
+ *     C — Controllability (C0–C3: controllable to uncontrollable)
+ *
+ *   | ASIL | Risk  | Typical examples                                        |
+ *   |------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|
+ *   | D    | Max   | Steering, service braking, airbag deployment            |
+ *   | C    | High  | Adaptive cruise control, eCall emergency system         |
+ *   | B    | Mod   | Lane-keep assist, blind-spot detection, TPMS            |
+ *   | A    | Min   | Interior lighting controller, climate control actuation |
+ *   | QM   | None  | Infotainment brightness — quality management only       |
+ *
+ *   ASIL D is the maximum process burden. QM is outside ISO 26262 functional
+ *   safety scope (ordinary quality-management methods are sufficient).
+ *   Default when ASIL not declared: ASIL B (conservative per §6.4.3).
+ *
+ * Key automotive customers:
+ *   OEMs — BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen Group, Stellantis, Toyota, GM,
+ *           Ford, Hyundai-Kia, SAIC, Geely-Volvo, Tesla, Rivian
+ *   Tier 1s — Bosch, Continental, ZF, Aptiv, Magna, Denso, Valeo, Vitesco,
+ *              Forvia, Visteon, Lear, Panasonic Automotive
+ *
+ * Retention:
+ *   ISO 26262-7 §6 + UNECE WP.29 Reg 79/156 require safety documentation
+ *   to be retained for the vehicle service lifetime plus post-production
+ *   support period. For passenger vehicles this is effectively 20 years
+ *   (7300 days). NHTSA 49 CFR 573.8 mandates 10-year retention of defect
+ *   records; the 20-year ISO 26262 / UNECE WP.29 window is more stringent.
+ *
+ * @connexum/ai-governance
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.ISO_26262_PACK = exports.ISO_26262_CATEGORY_CLASSIFIERS = void 0;
+/**
+ * ISO 26262 category classifiers.
+ *
+ * Covers ASIL classification signals, HARA artefacts, functional and
+ * technical safety concepts, software safety requirements, ASIL-D
+ * MC/DC coverage records, fault tree + FMEA artefacts, and tool
+ * confidence level (TCL) qualification records per Part 8 §11.
+ */
+exports.ISO_26262_CATEGORY_CLASSIFIERS = {
+    /**
+     * ASIL_D — Maximum automotive safety integrity level (ISO 26262-3 §6).
+     * Represents uncontrollable, high-severity, high-exposure hazards.
+     * Examples: steering control loss, service brake failure, airbag
+     * inadvertent deployment / non-deployment. Unauthorised changes BLOCKED.
+     */
+    ASIL_D: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — HARA; ASIL determination',
+            'ISO 26262-4:2018 §6 — system safety requirements at ASIL D',
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 — software unit verification at ASIL D (MC/DC required)',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:ASIL[_\s-]?D|ASIL\s+D\s+(?:requirement|function|item|element|component)|automotive\s+safety\s+integrity\s+level\s+D)\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:asil_d_function|ASIL_D_ITEM|ASIL_D_ELEMENT|asild|ASILD)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:steering\s+(?:control|loss|failure)\s+ASIL|service\s+brake\s+(?:failure|ASIL)|airbag\s+(?:ASIL|deployment\s+ASIL))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * ASIL_C — High automotive safety integrity level (ISO 26262-3 §6).
+     * High-severity, moderate-exposure hazards; possibly survivable serious
+     * injuries. Examples: adaptive cruise control, emergency call (eCall).
+     * Anomaly closure requires approval-queue gate.
+     */
+    ASIL_C: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — HARA; ASIL C determination',
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 §7 — software architectural design at ASIL C',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:ASIL[_\s-]?C|ASIL\s+C\s+(?:requirement|function|item|element|component)|automotive\s+safety\s+integrity\s+level\s+C)\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:asil_c_function|ASIL_C_ITEM|ASIL_C_ELEMENT|asilc|ASILC)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * ASIL_B — Moderate automotive safety integrity level (ISO 26262-3 §6).
+     * Moderate-severity or moderate-exposure hazards; light to moderate
+     * injuries. Examples: lane-keep assist, blind-spot detection, TPMS.
+     * Default classification when ASIL not declared.
+     */
+    ASIL_B: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — HARA; ASIL B determination',
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 §6 — software safety requirements at ASIL B',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:ASIL[_\s-]?B|ASIL\s+B\s+(?:requirement|function|item|element|component)|automotive\s+safety\s+integrity\s+level\s+B)\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:asil_b_function|ASIL_B_ITEM|ASIL_B_ELEMENT|asilb|ASILB)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * ASIL_A — Minimum functional safety level (ISO 26262-3 §6).
+     * Low-severity, high-controllability hazards; minor / non-injury.
+     * Examples: interior lighting controller, climate control actuation.
+     * ALLOWED with audit logging; basic process objectives apply.
+     */
+    ASIL_A: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — HARA; ASIL A determination',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:ASIL[_\s-]?A|ASIL\s+A\s+(?:requirement|function|item|element|component)|automotive\s+safety\s+integrity\s+level\s+A)\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:asil_a_function|ASIL_A_ITEM|ASIL_A_ELEMENT|asila|ASILA)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * QM — Quality Management only; outside ISO 26262 functional safety scope
+     * (ISO 26262-3 §6.4.1). Normal product-quality methods apply; no
+     * ISO 26262 process objectives. Logging only for classification traceability.
+     */
+    QM: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6.4.1 — QM: no ASIL requirements; quality management sufficient',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:QM\s+(?:function|item|element|component|classification)|quality\s+management\s+only\s+(?:ISO.?26262|ASIL)|ASIL[_\s-]?QM)\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:asil_qm|ASIL_QM|qm_function|QM_ITEM)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * HARA_ARTEFACT — Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment artefacts
+     * (ISO 26262-3 §6). Foundational document that determines ASIL.
+     * Includes hazard catalogues, risk assessments, safety goals, and
+     * rationale for ASIL assignment. Changes require immediate review.
+     */
+    HARA_ARTEFACT: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment',
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6.4 — determination of ASIL and safety goals',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:HARA|hazard\s+analysis\s+(?:and\s+)?risk\s+assessment|hazard\s+catalogue|risk\s+assessment\s+(?:ISO.?26262|automotive)|safety\s+goal\s+(?:ASIL|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:HARA_(?:document|record|update|review)|hara_doc|hazard_analysis_record)\b/.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * FUNCTIONAL_SAFETY_CONCEPT — Output of ISO 26262-3 §7.
+     * Documents functional safety requirements (FSR) derived from the
+     * safety goals + HARA. Includes preliminary architecture, FTTI
+     * (fault tolerant time interval) requirements, and safe states.
+     * Required before any system or software development artefact.
+     */
+    FUNCTIONAL_SAFETY_CONCEPT: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §7 — Functional safety concept',
+            'ISO 26262-3:2018 §7.4 — functional safety requirements allocation',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:functional\s+safety\s+concept|FSC\s+(?:document|record|update)|functional\s+safety\s+requirement[s]?\s+(?:ISO.?26262|automotive|FSR))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:FTTI|fault\s+tolerant\s+time\s+interval|safe\s+state\s+(?:requirement|definition|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * SOFTWARE_SAFETY_REQUIREMENT — Software safety requirements (SSR) per
+     * ISO 26262-6 §6. Derived from the technical safety concept (TSC).
+     * Includes software safety requirements + rationale. Required for
+     * ASIL A/B/C/D software elements. REVIEWED on change.
+     */
+    SOFTWARE_SAFETY_REQUIREMENT: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 §6 — software safety requirements',
+            'ISO 26262-4:2018 §6 — technical safety concept (TSC source)',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:software\s+safety\s+requirement[s]?\s+(?:ISO.?26262|ASIL|SSR)|SSR\s+(?:document|record|specification|update))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:technical\s+safety\s+concept\s+(?:document|record)|TSC\s+(?:document|record|update|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * MC_DC_COVERAGE_ASIL_D — Modified Condition / Decision Coverage records
+     * for ASIL D software (ISO 26262-6 §9 + Table 12). MANDATORY at 100%
+     * for ASIL D software units. MC/DC is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED for ASIL C.
+     * Changes to ASIL D units without MC/DC evidence BLOCKED.
+     */
+    MC_DC_COVERAGE_ASIL_D: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 — software unit verification',
+            'ISO 26262-6:2018 Table 12 — structural coverage at unit level (ASIL D: MC/DC mandatory)',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:MC.?DC\s+(?:coverage|record|analysis|ASIL.?D)|modified\s+condition\s*\/?\s*decision\s+coverage\s+(?:ASIL|automotive))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:structural\s+coverage\s+ASIL.?D|ASIL.?D\s+MC.?DC|coverage\s+record\s+(?:ASIL|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+    /**
+     * TOOL_CONFIDENCE_LEVEL — TCL classification records per ISO 26262-8 §11.
+     * Every tool used in the safety lifecycle must be classified:
+     *   TCL 1 (no confidence measures) / TCL 2 (validation only) / TCL 3 (full qualification).
+     * AI-assisted code generation, static analysis, and test generation tools
+     * targeting ASIL B/C/D typically require TCL 2 or TCL 3.
+     */
+    TOOL_CONFIDENCE_LEVEL: {
+        references: [
+            'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — Tool confidence level (TCL)',
+            'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11.4.7 — TCL determination',
+        ],
+        classifier: (input) => {
+            if (/\b(?:TCL[_\s-]?[123]|tool\s+confidence\s+level|TCL\s+(?:classification|determination|assessment|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            if (/\b(?:tool_qualification\s+(?:ISO.?26262|automotive)|tool\s+error\s+detection\s+(?:TD|ISO.?26262))\b/i.test(input))
+                return true;
+            return false;
+        },
+    },
+};
+/**
+ * ISO 26262 Automotive Functional Safety Compliance Pack.
+ *
+ * Pack ID: 'iso-26262'
+ * Jurisdiction: International (ISO TC 22/SC 32 joint standard; mandated
+ *   by EU type approval (EU) 2018/858 + (EU) 2019/2144 ALKS, UNECE WP.29,
+ *   adopted by NHTSA, China GB/T 34590, Korea K-ETAS, Japan JASO Z 0001,
+ *   India AIS 172, and all major OEM supplier-quality agreements).
+ *
+ * Guard-layer wiring:
+ *   - G1-G4 (audit, logging, classification, session): always active
+ *   - G5-G6 (supply-chain TCL, approval-queue): ASIL A/B/C/D
+ *   - G7-G8 (attestation, anomaly-detection): ASIL B/C/D
+ *   - G9 (transparency): ASIL D only (maximum disclosure burden)
+ *   - Approval Queue: always active (ASIL D/C immediate; ASIL B closure)
+ *
+ * Human-in-loop tier:
+ *   - T1: ASIL A (engineering safety review)
+ *   - T2: ASIL B/C/D (certified functional safety engineer / TÜV/DEKRA/SGS)
+ */
+exports.ISO_26262_PACK = {
+    categoryClassifiers: exports.ISO_26262_CATEGORY_CLASSIFIERS,
+    /**
+     * HARA artefacts and safety concept documents are subject-keyed
+     * per item / safety goal — they must be traceable to specific
+     * vehicle functions under Part 3.
+     */
+    subjectKeyedCategories: [
+        'HARA_ARTEFACT',
+        'FUNCTIONAL_SAFETY_CONCEPT',
+        'SOFTWARE_SAFETY_REQUIREMENT',
+        'MC_DC_COVERAGE_ASIL_D',
+        'TOOL_CONFIDENCE_LEVEL',
+    ],
+    id: 'iso-26262',
+    name: 'ISO 26262 Automotive Functional Safety',
+    version: '1.0.0',
+    description: 'ISO 26262:2018 Road vehicles — Functional safety. International standard for ' +
+        'E/E (electrical/electronic) system functional safety in passenger cars, trucks, ' +
+        'buses, motorcycles, and trailers. Five ASIL levels (D: maximum — steering/braking; ' +
+        'C: adaptive cruise / eCall; B: lane-keep / TPMS; A: lighting / climate; QM: outside ' +
+        'functional safety scope) drive scaled process objectives. Validators cover HARA + item ' +
+        'definition + functional + technical safety concepts (Parts 3–4), software safety ' +
+        'requirements + architectural design + unit verification + ASIL-D MC/DC coverage ' +
+        '(Part 6), ASIL decomposition + FMEA + fault-tree analysis (Part 9), tool confidence ' +
+        'level (TCL) qualification (Part 8 §11), and configuration + change management (Part 8). ' +
+        '20-year vehicle-lifetime retention. 30-day NHTSA defect notification. Reviewer tier: ' +
+        'TÜV / SGS / DEKRA functional-safety-engineer-certified.',
+    authority: 'ISO/TC 22/SC 32 (Road vehicles — Electrical and electronic components and general ' +
+        'system aspects); UNECE WP.29; widely adopted by NHTSA, EU type approval (Reg (EU) ' +
+        '2018/858 + 2019/2144), China GB/T 34590, Korea K-ETAS, Japan JASO Z 0001',
+    industries: [
+        'automotive',
+        'autonomous-vehicles',
+        'tier-1-supplier',
+        'tier-2-supplier',
+        'commercial-vehicles',
+        'motorcycles',
+        'electric-vehicles',
+        'embedded-automotive',
+        'adas',
+        'powertrain-control',
+        'chassis-control',
+        'occupant-safety',
+    ],
+    requiredModules: [
+        {
+            name: 'governance-runtime',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'ASIL tracking (A/B/C/D/QM) mandatory for every ISO 26262 process gate. ' +
+                'ASIL D changes require blocking until verification + DER-equivalent review. ' +
+                'ASIL C changes require approval gate. Governance runtime enforces HARA ' +
+                'and functional safety concept prerequisite checks before software work proceeds.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — HARA + ASIL determination; ISO 26262-4:2018 §6 — TSC',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'audit-integrity',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'Tamper-evident records for safety lifecycle artefacts: HARA, item definition, ' +
+                'functional safety concept, technical safety concept, software safety requirements, ' +
+                'software architectural design, unit verification records, FMEA/fault-tree reports, ' +
+                'and tool confidence level qualification evidence. Required for UNECE WP.29 ' +
+                'type-approval audit trails and NHTSA defect investigation submissions.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §7 — configuration management; ISO 26262-7:2018 §6 — documentation',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'data-classifier',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'ASIL signal detection (A/B/C/D/QM); HARA artefact categorisation; functional ' +
+                'safety concept and software safety requirement identification; MC/DC coverage ' +
+                'record tracking for ASIL D; TCL qualification artefact scanning.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — ASIL classification; ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — TCL',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'supply-chain',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'Tool confidence level (TCL) inventory per ISO 26262-8 §11; COTS component ' +
+                'qualification under Part 8 §12; AUTOSAR and RTOS evaluation. AI-assisted ' +
+                'code generation tools targeting ASIL B/C/D require TCL 2 or TCL 3 ' +
+                'qualification with tool validation plan and usage guidance before outputs ' +
+                'are accepted as satisfying safety requirements.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — tool confidence level; §12 — qualification of software components',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'approval-queue',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'ASIL D change approval (functional-safety-engineer sign-off required). ' +
+                'ASIL C change approval gate. ASIL B anomaly closure review. All safety ' +
+                'goal changes and HARA updates require human review before downstream ' +
+                'requirements and design work proceeds. Qualification of any new ' +
+                'COTS/SOUP component requires approval-queue routing.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §8 — change management; ISO 26262-3:2018 §7 — functional safety concept',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'attestation-manager',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'Safety case attestation; functional safety assessment (FSA) sign-off; ' +
+                'ASIL D MC/DC coverage attestation; software release attestation (DIA — ' +
+                'development interface agreement); confirmation of ASIL-D unit verification ' +
+                'completion. Certification engineers (TÜV / SGS / DEKRA) sign the safety ' +
+                'case at vehicle-level sign-off.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-2:2018 §6 — functional safety management; ISO 26262-8:2018 §5 — DIA',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'session-persistence',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'ISO 26262 safety documentation must persist for the vehicle operational ' +
+                'lifetime plus post-production support (effective 20 years per UNECE WP.29 ' +
+                'Reg 79/156). Continuity of HARA, safety concept, and verification records ' +
+                'across sessions is mandatory for in-service defect investigation, field ' +
+                'monitoring, and recall analysis under NHTSA 49 CFR Part 573.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-7:2018 §6 — documentation retention; UNECE WP.29 Reg 79/156',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'anomaly-detector',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'Real-time detection of unverified changes to ASIL D/C safety elements. ' +
+                'Flags conditions that may require immediate safety engineer notification. ' +
+                'Detects ASIL D software modifications without verification record — must ' +
+                'block immediately. Detects ASIL C anomalies requiring immediate escalation ' +
+                'to functional safety manager.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §8 — change management; ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 — unit verification',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'transparency-injector',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'AI-generated code provenance disclosure to functional safety engineers, ' +
+                'certification authorities (TÜV / SGS / DEKRA), and OEM safety managers. ' +
+                'Tool confidence level (TCL) status disclosure on every AI output used in ' +
+                'a safety lifecycle task without independent manual verification.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — TCL disclosure; ISO 26262-2:2018 §6 — safety management',
+        },
+        {
+            name: 'event-bus',
+            required: true,
+            reason: 'ASIL D change event routing; HARA update lifecycle events; safety goal ' +
+                'change notification; FMEA / fault-tree analysis milestone events; TCL ' +
+                'qualification status events; in-vehicle field monitoring notification routing ' +
+                'for post-production change management under Part 7.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-7:2018 §5 — field monitoring; ISO 26262-8:2018 §8 — change management lifecycle',
+        },
+    ],
+    moduleConfig: {
+        'governance-runtime': {
+            asilTrackingRequired: true,
+            asilDChangeApprovalRequired: true,
+            asilCChangeApprovalRequired: true,
+            asilBAnomalyClosureApprovalRequired: true,
+            asilDAnomalyImmediateEscalationRequired: true,
+            asilCAnomalyImmediateEscalationRequired: true,
+            iso26262Part6SoftwareProcessRequired: true,
+            haraRequired: true,
+            itemDefinitionRequired: true,
+            functionalSafetyConceptRequired: true,
+        },
+        'approval-queue': {
+            asilDChangeApprovalRequired: true,
+            asilCChangeApprovalRequired: true,
+            asilBAnomalyClosureApprovalRequired: true,
+            functionalSafetyEngineerReviewRequired: true,
+            humanInLoopTierAsilA: 'T1',
+            humanInLoopTierAsilBCD: 'T2',
+        },
+        'attestation-manager': {
+            safetyAssessmentAttestationRequired: true,
+            asilDMcDcCoverageAttestationRequired: true,
+            softwareReleaseAttestationRequired: true,
+            functionalSafetyAssessmentSignOffRequired: true,
+            itemDefinitionAttestationRequired: true,
+        },
+        'supply-chain': {
+            toolConfidenceLevelInventoryRequired: true,
+            tclClassificationRequired: true,
+            cotsComponentQualificationRequired: true,
+            autosarRtosEvaluationRequired: true,
+            aiCodeGenToolTclRequired: true,
+        },
+        'anomaly-detector': {
+            asilDAnomalyImmediateEscalationRequired: true,
+            asilCAnomalyImmediateEscalationRequired: true,
+            unverifiedAsilDChangeDetectionActive: true,
+        },
+        'transparency-injector': {
+            aiGeneratedCodeProvenanceDisclosureRequired: true,
+            toolConfidenceLevelDisclosureRequired: true,
+        },
+        'event-bus': {
+            asilDChangeEventsActive: true,
+            haraUpdateEventsActive: true,
+            safetyGoalChangeEventsActive: true,
+            tclQualificationStatusEventsActive: true,
+            fieldMonitoringEventsActive: true,
+        },
+    },
+    providerPolicy: {
+        blockedProviders: ['deepseek', 'baidu', 'alibaba'],
+        requiredCapabilities: ['ISO-26262-READY', 'AUTOMOTIVE-SAFETY-LIFECYCLE'],
+        blockReasons: {
+            deepseek: 'PRC-jurisdiction LLM providers cannot meet UNECE WP.29 / EU type-approval ' +
+                'data-handling requirements for safety-critical automotive E/E development. ' +
+                'ASIL D artefacts and HARA records require verifiable non-PRC jurisdiction ' +
+                'under EU Reg (EU) 2018/858 type-approval bilateral agreements and ITAR/EAR ' +
+                'dual-use controls on automotive safety software.',
+            baidu: 'PRC-jurisdiction LLM; automotive functional safety records (HARA, safety ' +
+                'concept, ASIL D verification evidence) must remain under verifiable non-PRC ' +
+                'jurisdiction control per UNECE WP.29 data sovereignty requirements and ' +
+                'PRC data localisation law (DSL + CSL). EU type-approval certification ' +
+                'authority access requirements are incompatible with PRC data residency.',
+            alibaba: 'PRC-jurisdiction LLM; ASIL D and ASIL C safety lifecycle artefacts must ' +
+                'remain outside PRC data jurisdiction per UNECE WP.29 Reg 155 cybersecurity ' +
+                'requirements and EU (EU) 2019/2144 ALKS type-approval data-handling ' +
+                'obligations. PRC dual-use export controls on automotive E/E safety software ' +
+                'create unresolvable compliance conflict.',
+        },
+    },
+    dataPolicy: {
+        scanCategories: [
+            'ASIL_D',
+            'ASIL_C',
+            'ASIL_B',
+            'ASIL_A',
+            'QM',
+            'HARA_ARTEFACT',
+            'FUNCTIONAL_SAFETY_CONCEPT',
+            'SOFTWARE_SAFETY_REQUIREMENT',
+            'MC_DC_COVERAGE_ASIL_D',
+            'TOOL_CONFIDENCE_LEVEL',
+        ],
+        categoryActions: {
+            // ASIL D: unauthorised changes BLOCKED — functional safety engineer required
+            ASIL_D: 'BLOCK',
+            // ASIL C: changes enter approval queue for safety engineer review
+            ASIL_C: 'REVIEWED',
+            // ASIL B: anomaly closure requires approval; changes logged
+            ASIL_B: 'REVIEWED',
+            // ASIL A: logging sufficient for basic engineering review
+            ASIL_A: 'LOG',
+            // QM: outside functional safety scope; logging for classification traceability
+            QM: 'LOG',
+            // HARA artefacts: REVIEWED — changes require HARA update review
+            HARA_ARTEFACT: 'REVIEWED',
+            // Functional safety concept: REVIEWED — changes affect all downstream work
+            FUNCTIONAL_SAFETY_CONCEPT: 'REVIEWED',
+            // Software safety requirements: REVIEWED — changes traced to safety goals
+            SOFTWARE_SAFETY_REQUIREMENT: 'REVIEWED',
+            // MC/DC coverage records: BLOCK without verification evidence
+            MC_DC_COVERAGE_ASIL_D: 'BLOCK',
+            // TCL records: REVIEWED — TCL changes require re-evaluation
+            TOOL_CONFIDENCE_LEVEL: 'REVIEWED',
+        },
+        encryptionRequired: true,
+        encryptionStandard: 'AES-256-GCM',
+        minimumClassification: 'RESTRICTED',
+    },
+    retentionPolicy: {
+        /**
+         * ISO 26262-7:2018 §6 + UNECE WP.29 Reg 79 (typeapproval) + Reg 156
+         * (software updates) require safety documentation to be retained for the
+         * vehicle operational lifetime plus post-production support obligations.
+         * For passenger vehicles this is effectively 20 years (7300 days).
+         * NHTSA 49 CFR 573.8 mandates 10-year defect record retention; the
+         * 20-year ISO 26262 / UNECE WP.29 period is the more stringent requirement
+         * and governs this pack.
+         */
+        sovereignty: ['international'],
+        auditLogRetentionDays: 7300, // 20 years — vehicle lifetime + post-production support
+        sessionRetentionDays: 7300,
+        incidentRetentionDays: 7300,
+        reference: 'ISO 26262-7:2018 §6 — documentation retention for vehicle operational lifetime. ' +
+            'UNECE WP.29 Reg 79/156 — type-approval and software update documentation obligations. ' +
+            'NHTSA 49 CFR 573.8 — 10-year defect record minimum (ISO 26262 20-year period governs). ' +
+            'Effective minimum: 20 years (7300 days).',
+    },
+    incidentPolicy: {
+        /**
+         * NHTSA 49 CFR Part 573 — Defect and Noncompliance Reporting:
+         *   §573.6(a): manufacturer that learns of a safety defect must report to
+         *   NHTSA within 5 working days if it determines that a defect exists.
+         *   Self-discovered defects: formal report within 30 days per §573.6(c).
+         *   Using 720 hours (30 days) as the baseline for self-discovered defects.
+         * EU Type Approval Reg (EU) 2018/858 Art. 20 + UNECE WP.29:
+         *   Market surveillance authorities must be notified without undue delay.
+         * OEM customer liaison notification: DIA-governed; OEM-specific SLAs
+         *   typically require immediate notification for ASIL D field events.
+         */
+        notificationDeadlineHours: 720, // 30 days — NHTSA self-discovered defect reporting baseline
+        reference: 'NHTSA 49 CFR Part 573 §573.6(c) — 30-day (720h) window for self-discovered safety ' +
+            'defects. EU Reg (EU) 2018/858 Art. 20 — type-approval market surveillance notification. ' +
+            'UNECE WP.29 Reg 79/156 — safety-related software update notification obligations. ' +
+            'ISO 26262-7:2018 §5 — field monitoring and customer notification requirements.',
+        requiredRecipients: [
+            'safety-manager',
+            'quality-management',
+            'product-engineering',
+            'regulatory-affairs',
+            'oem-customer-liaison',
+        ],
+        formalNotificationRequired: true,
+    },
+    validators: [
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-asil-assigned',
+            description: 'ASIL (A, B, C, D, or QM) assigned to every safety-related E/E function ' +
+                'with documented rationale derived from the HARA (Severity × Exposure × ' +
+                'Controllability per ISO 26262-3 §6.4.3). Default: ASIL B when not declared.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — Item Definition + HARA; §6.4.3 ASIL determination',
+            check: 'iso26262_asil_assigned',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-item-definition',
+            description: 'Item definition documented per ISO 26262-3 §5: item boundary, functions, ' +
+                'operating modes, known hazardous events, legal and regulatory constraints, ' +
+                'and preliminary hazardous events with initial risk estimates on file.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §5 — Item definition',
+            check: 'iso26262_item_definition_active',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-hara-active',
+            description: 'Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) document on file; hazard catalogue ' +
+                'complete; every safety goal has assigned ASIL with S/E/C rationale; HARA ' +
+                'reviewed and approved by functional safety manager.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §6 — Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment',
+            check: 'iso26262_hara_active',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-functional-safety-concept',
+            description: 'Functional Safety Concept (FSC) established; functional safety requirements ' +
+                '(FSR) derived from safety goals; preliminary architectural assumptions ' +
+                'documented; safe states and FTTI (fault-tolerant time interval) defined ' +
+                'for every ASIL B/C/D safety goal.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-3:2018 §7 — Functional safety concept',
+            check: 'iso26262_functional_safety_concept_active',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-technical-safety-concept',
+            description: 'Technical Safety Concept (TSC) on file per ISO 26262-4 §6; technical safety ' +
+                'requirements (TSR) allocated to system elements; hardware-software interface ' +
+                '(HSI) specification draft; preliminary system architecture reflecting ASIL ' +
+                'decomposition decisions.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-4:2018 §6 — Technical safety concept',
+            check: 'iso26262_technical_safety_concept_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-software-safety-requirements',
+            description: 'Software safety requirements (SSR) derived from the TSC and documented per ' +
+                'ISO 26262-6 §6; traceable to technical safety requirements; rationale for ' +
+                'derived SSR on file; SSR review and approval complete for ASIL B/C/D.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-6:2018 §6 — Software safety requirements',
+            check: 'iso26262_software_safety_requirements_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-software-architectural-design',
+            description: 'Software architectural design documented per ISO 26262-6 §7; software ' +
+                'components and their safety properties defined; data and control flow ' +
+                'between components described; design rationale traceable to SSR; ' +
+                'ASIL D: formal notation or semi-formal notation required.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-6:2018 §7 — Software architectural design',
+            check: 'iso26262_software_architectural_design_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-unit-verification',
+            description: 'Software unit verification per ISO 26262-6 §9; unit test cases cover ' +
+                'requirements and structural coverage criteria for the applicable ASIL; ' +
+                'unit verification evidence on file with traceability to SSR.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 — Software unit verification',
+            check: 'iso26262_unit_verification_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-asil-d-mc-dc-coverage',
+            description: 'ASIL D: Modified Condition / Decision Coverage (MC/DC) at 100% achieved ' +
+                'and verified; MC/DC evidence on file per ISO 26262-6 Table 12. ASIL C: ' +
+                'MC/DC highly recommended (HR); coverage gaps require documented rationale. ' +
+                'Unverified ASIL D changes BLOCKED pending MC/DC re-analysis.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 + Table 12 — structural coverage; MC/DC mandatory for ASIL D',
+            check: 'iso26262_asil_d_mc_dc_coverage_active',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-asil-decomposition',
+            description: 'ASIL decomposition rules applied per ISO 26262-9 §5 when decomposing ' +
+                'a safety goal into redundant elements (e.g., ASIL D → ASIL B + ASIL B(D); ' +
+                'ASIL C → ASIL A + ASIL A(C)). Independent implementation requirement ' +
+                'documented and verified for each decomposition.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-9:2018 §5 — ASIL-oriented analyses: ASIL decomposition',
+            check: 'iso26262_asil_decomposition_active',
+            failSeverity: 'MEDIUM',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-fmea-fault-tree',
+            description: 'Safety analyses per ISO 26262-9 §8: FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) ' +
+                'or fault-tree analysis (FTA) on file at the appropriate level; results ' +
+                'traceable to HARA safety goals; ASIL D requires both FMEA and FTA at ' +
+                'system and hardware level.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-9:2018 §8 — Safety analyses: FMEA, FTA, FMEDA',
+            check: 'iso26262_fmea_fault_tree_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-tool-confidence-level',
+            description: 'Tool Confidence Level (TCL) classification per ISO 26262-8 §11 for every ' +
+                'software tool in the safety lifecycle. TCL 1 (no confidence measures), ' +
+                'TCL 2 (validation), or TCL 3 (full qualification with TQP) assigned with ' +
+                'rationale. AI code generation and static analysis tools targeting ASIL B/C/D ' +
+                'typically require TCL 2 or TCL 3.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — Tool confidence level (TCL) classification and qualification',
+            check: 'iso26262_tool_confidence_level_active',
+            failSeverity: 'HIGH',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-config-management',
+            description: 'Configuration management plan active per ISO 26262-8 §7; all safety ' +
+                'lifecycle artefacts under configuration control; baseline records on file; ' +
+                'change control procedures enforced; configuration items identified with ' +
+                'traceability to safety goals.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §7 — Configuration management',
+            check: 'iso26262_config_management_active',
+            failSeverity: 'MEDIUM',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-change-management',
+            description: 'Change management process active per ISO 26262-8 §8; all changes to ' +
+                'safety-relevant items assessed for safety impact; change impact analysis ' +
+                'on file; ASIL D and ASIL C changes require functional safety engineer ' +
+                'approval before implementation.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-8:2018 §8 — Change management',
+            check: 'iso26262_change_management_active',
+            failSeverity: 'MEDIUM',
+        },
+        {
+            id: 'iso26262-behavioral-validator-asil-d-unverified-change',
+            description: 'Behavioral validator: detects unverified software changes to ASIL D elements. ' +
+                'Any AI-generated or agent-initiated modification to an ASIL D software unit ' +
+                'must be blocked pending unit verification completion, MC/DC coverage ' +
+                're-analysis at 100%, and functional safety engineer impact review. ' +
+                'No partial-pass path: ASIL D unverified changes are an absolute block.',
+            reference: 'ISO 26262-6:2018 §9 — unit verification; §9 Table 12 — MC/DC mandatory for ASIL D; ' +
+                'ISO 26262-8:2018 §11 — TCL for AI code generation tools',
+            check: 'behavioralValidator_iso26262_asil_d_unverified_change',
+            failSeverity: 'CRITICAL',
+        },
+    ],
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=iso-26262.js.map