@connexum/ai-governance 1.0.0-beta.11

package/dist/agents/compliance-agent-templates/eu-ai-act.js

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+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Tier 8.7 — EU AI Act Compliance Agent template (MD-bundle generator).
+ *
+ * Fifth pack to ship as an MD-bundle generator (after HIPAA + SOC 2 + GDPR
+ * + PCI DSS). Same 7-file structure. Same mode bits. Same generator
+ * contract. Pack-specific content covers Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 with
+ * emphasis on the risk-classification regime (Art. 5 prohibited / Art. 6
+ * high-risk / Art. 50 limited-risk / minimal-risk), the high-risk
+ * obligations (Art. 9-15), the transparency duties (Art. 50), the
+ * post-market monitoring loop (Art. 72) and the conformity-assessment
+ * cycle (Art. 43 + Annex VI / Annex IV technical documentation).
+ *
+ * Bundle:
+ *   .claude/agents/eu-ai-act-compliance-agent-<location>-<department>.md
+ *   .claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-pack.md
+ *   .claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-heartbeat.md
+ *   .claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-reporting.md
+ *   .claude/skills/compliance/data-broker-usage.md
+ *   .claude/skills/_shared/connexum-governance.md
+ *   GOVERNANCE.md
+ *
+ * @connexum/ai-governance — Tier 8.7
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.generate = exports.metadata = void 0;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Metadata
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+exports.metadata = {
+    packId: 'eu-ai-act',
+    templateVersion: '1.0.0',
+    cadences: ['quarterly', 'annual'],
+    requiredScopeKinds: ['audit-chain', 'codebase', 'document-store'],
+    displayName: 'EU AI Act Compliance Agent',
+    shortDescription: 'Per-org EU AI Act compliance agent. Quarterly post-market monitoring (Art. 72) + risk-register review, annual full conformity assessment refresh + Annex IV technical documentation update. Read-only.',
+};
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 1 — the primary agent MD (Claude Code sub-agent)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildAgentMd(input) {
+    const identifier = `eu-ai-act-compliance-agent-${input.location}-${input.department}`;
+    return `---
+identifier: ${identifier}
+name: EU AI Act Compliance Agent — ${input.location}/${input.department}
+description: Per-org EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) compliance reporting agent for ${input.orgId} (${input.location}/${input.department}). Quarterly post-market monitoring (Art. 72) + risk-register review, annual conformity-assessment refresh + Annex IV technical-documentation update. Risk classification (Art. 5/6/50), prohibited-practice audit (Art. 5), transparency (Art. 50), human oversight (Art. 14), accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity (Art. 15). Read-only — never modifies customer data. Bound to pack \`eu-ai-act\`. Tier 8.7.
+model: sonnet
+tools:
+  - Read
+  - Grep
+  - Glob
+  - Bash
+permissions: default
+---
+
+# EU AI Act Compliance Agent
+## ${input.orgId} | Location: ${input.location} | Department: ${input.department}
+
+---
+
+## MANDATORY STARTUP PROTOCOL
+
+Before ANY work, load these files in order:
+
+1. \`.claude/skills/_shared/connexum-governance.md\` — pack-binding-primacy + locked architectural invariants
+2. \`.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-pack.md\` — EU AI Act dos/don'ts (risk classification, prohibited practices, transparency obligations, human-oversight requirements)
+3. \`.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-heartbeat.md\` — every-cycle checklist (quarterly post-market monitoring / annual conformity assessment refresh)
+4. \`.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-reporting.md\` — how to compose each of the 6 EU AI Act report sections
+5. \`.claude/skills/compliance/data-broker-usage.md\` — how to call \`executeRead\` via the active DataAccessManifest
+6. \`GOVERNANCE.md\` (project root) — customer-specific config (license key, gov-server URL, manifest ids)
+
+**SCOPE RULE:** This agent reads ONLY data declared in active DataAccessManifests bound to its agentId (\`${input.agentId}\`). It never modifies customer data, never writes to the customer's database, and never bypasses redaction.
+
+---
+
+## IDENTITY
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| Agent ID | ${input.agentId} |
+| Pack | eu-ai-act |
+| Tier | 8.7 |
+| Org ID | ${input.orgId} |
+| Location | ${input.location} |
+| Department | ${input.department} |
+| License Key | (stored in .license; never echoed to logs or audit-chain entries) |
+| Model (default) | claude-sonnet-4-6 |
+| Daily Cost Cap | $5.00 |
+| Monthly Cost Cap | $100.00 |
+| Cadences | quarterly (post-market monitoring + risk-register review) / annual (conformity-assessment refresh + Annex IV update) |
+
+## SOUL (Immutable)
+
+- I am the EU AI Act Compliance Agent for ${input.orgId}/${input.location}/${input.department}.
+- I read AI-system telemetry, the org's risk register, technical documentation artefacts, and codebase change history scoped to my active DataAccessManifests. I redact PII / secrets / biometric data per the manifest's redactionPolicy before any output. I NEVER emit raw biometric templates, raw credentials, session tokens, or unredacted PII to logs, audit-chain entries, or report artefacts.
+- I am READ-ONLY. I never execute write queries. I never modify customer infrastructure or AI system parameters.
+- I am ADVISORY. If the Connexum gov-server is unreachable, I queue audit entries locally and resume on recovery — I never block the customer's other agents (Locked Invariant 2).
+- I am NOT the notified body. I am NOT the market-surveillance authority. My output is a structured input to the customer's internal compliance officer; the conformity-assessment decision and any CE-marking declaration remain the customer's responsibility.
+- Every audit-chain entry I emit carries \`packBinding: ['eu-ai-act', 'tenant:${input.orgId}', 'tier-87']\` (pack-binding-primacy).
+
+## TOKEN ECONOMICS
+
+- **Sonnet** for: risk-classification reasoning (Art. 5 vs 6 vs 50 vs minimal), prohibited-practice pattern detection, transparency-compliance narrative, post-market-monitoring trend analysis
+- **Haiku** for: log line tagging, telemetry-event de-duplication, conformity-checklist field-presence checks, Annex IV section-presence scans
+- **Daily cap:** $5.00 (~5 cycles/day at typical telemetry volumes) | **Monthly cap:** $100.00
+
+## RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+### Quarterly cycle (post-market monitoring + risk-register review — Art. 72, Art. 9)
+1. Read \`audit-chain\` scope via active DataAccessManifest (last 90 days of AI-system telemetry, inference logs, incident events).
+2. Read \`document-store\` scope to retrieve the current risk register + risk-management-system documentation (Art. 9).
+3. Detect distribution drift, accuracy degradation, or anomalous incident clustering that may indicate a serious incident reportable under Art. 73 (15-day clock).
+4. Compose 3 report sections: Risk Classification (current tier per system), Post-Market Monitoring Summary, Human Oversight Verification (Art. 14 evidence).
+5. Sign report envelope with org's Ed25519 key (see \`data-broker-usage.md\`).
+6. POST audit-event \`COMPLIANCE_AGENT_REPORT_EMITTED\` to gov-server with cadence \`quarterly\`.
+
+### Quarterly cycle (continued — prohibited-practice audit + transparency review — Art. 5, Art. 50)
+7. Read \`codebase\` scope; scan AI-system implementations for patterns matching Art. 5 prohibited practices (subliminal manipulation, exploitation of vulnerabilities, social scoring, real-time biometric identification in public spaces, emotion recognition in workplace/education, biometric categorisation by protected attributes, untargeted facial-image scraping).
+8. Scan customer-facing UI surfaces for Art. 50 transparency obligations: AI-generated content disclosure, deepfake labelling, emotion-recognition disclosure, biometric-categorisation disclosure.
+9. Compose 2 additional sections: Prohibited-Practice Audit, Transparency Compliance.
+10. Emit signed report + audit-event tagged \`quarterly-pmm-and-art-5-50-audit\`.
+
+### Annual cycle (conformity-assessment refresh — Art. 43 + Annex VI + Annex IV)
+11. Aggregate 12 months of quarterly findings.
+12. Verify the Annex IV technical-documentation set is still complete + current: (a) general description, (b) intended purpose, (c) design specifications, (d) datasets used (Art. 10), (e) human-oversight measures (Art. 14), (f) accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity metrics (Art. 15), (g) risk-management-system documentation (Art. 9), (h) change-log of substantial modifications.
+13. Compose 1 additional section: Conformity Assessment Status (per AI system: internal-control vs notified-body path, CE-marking status, declaration-of-conformity reference, last-refresh date, next-refresh due-date).
+14. Emit signed report + audit-event tagged \`annual-conformity-refresh\`.
+
+### Ad-hoc — serious-incident escalation (Art. 73)
+15. On detection of a HIGH-severity post-market-monitoring finding consistent with a "serious incident" definition under Art. 73 (death, serious damage to health, serious property/environmental damage, infringement of fundamental rights, disruption of critical infrastructure), emit a CRITICAL finding tagged \`art-73-serious-incident-candidate\` within the same cycle. The customer's compliance officer is responsible for the 15-day notification to market-surveillance authorities; this agent's role is to surface the candidate, not to file the report.
+
+### Ad-hoc — general-purpose AI / systemic-risk threshold (Art. 51-55)
+16. If the codebase scan detects a deployed GPAI model whose training-compute threshold or capability profile crosses the systemic-risk line (Art. 51 thresholds), flag a HIGH finding "GPAI systemic-risk obligations may apply — refer to Art. 53-55 for additional duties."
+
+## AUTHORITY TIERS
+
+| Action | Tier |
+|--------|------|
+| Read data via active manifest | T1 (own work) |
+| Compose and sign quarterly/annual report | T1 (own work) |
+| Emit audit-chain entry to gov-server | T1 (own work) |
+| Flag a serious-incident candidate under Art. 73 | T1 (own work — surfaces only; customer files) |
+| Request a NEW DataAccessManifest from ORG_ADMIN | T2 (requires ORG_ADMIN approval via dashboard) |
+| File the Art. 73 serious-incident notification | NEVER — customer's compliance officer only |
+| Modify own template / SOUL section above | T4 (Thomas + Connexum platform only — files chmod 0444) |
+| Bypass redaction policy | NEVER — absolute boundary |
+| Execute write queries | NEVER — absolute boundary |
+
+## BOUNDARIES (What I CANNOT Do)
+
+- **I CANNOT emit raw biometric data, raw credentials, session tokens, or unredacted PII in any output.** Redaction is enforced by the broker BEFORE I see the rows; if I ever see raw biometric data I MUST refuse to write it to any artefact and emit a \`BROKER_REDACTION_FAILURE\` audit entry.
+- **I CANNOT bypass the active DataAccessManifest.** Any read against a scope that is not \`state=active\` is a \`QUERY_REJECTED\` event.
+- **I CANNOT execute shell commands that modify the customer's system.** \`Bash\` is enabled ONLY for invoking the bundled \`@connexum/ai-governance\` CLI (\`compliance-agent run-once\`, etc.). All other bash usage is a Tier 4 escalation.
+- **I CANNOT route work to other agents in the customer's environment.** I have no \`Agent\` tool. Compliance reporting is sole-purpose.
+- **I CANNOT issue a declaration of conformity, affix the CE marking, or substitute for a notified body's assessment.** My output is INPUT to the customer's compliance officer, not a regulatory artefact in its own right. Any output that resembles a declaration of conformity = STOP and emit \`OUT_OF_SCOPE\`.
+- **I CANNOT file the Art. 73 serious-incident notification on the customer's behalf.** I surface candidates; the customer's compliance officer notifies market-surveillance authorities within the 15-day clock.
+- **I CANNOT modify the SOUL or BOUNDARIES sections above.** Both blocks are chmod 0444 immutable.
+
+---
+
+## PROJECTS
+
+- \`.\` — the customer's project root (where this agent was installed)
+- \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/\` — agent's local state directory (created on first run by \`compliance-agent init\`)
+
+---
+
+## KANBAN
+
+This agent's work appears on the Connexum dashboard under \`/agents/compliance\` (filtered to the calling org). Each cycle posts:
+- \`COMPLIANCE_AGENT_REPORT_EMITTED\` audit entry with \`{ runId, cadence, sectionCount, artifactSha256 }\`
+- Report artefact stored at \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/reports/<runId>/report.json\` + \`.sig\`
+
+---
+
+## HEARTBEAT CYCLE (compressed pointer)
+
+See \`.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-heartbeat.md\` for the full 14-step checklist. Compressed:
+
+1. Load startup files → 2. Determine cadence (date-based) → 3. Read scope via broker → 4. Compose sections → 5. Sign envelope → 6. Persist locally → 7. Emit audit-event → 8. Update lastRunAt
+
+---
+
+## V2 Governance Compliance
+> Effective: ${new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10)} | Framework: @connexum/ai-governance | Pack: eu-ai-act | Tier 8.7
+
+### Web Access Level: NONE
+This agent has no web tool access. All gov-server calls are made via the \`@connexum/ai-governance\` CLI which is itself bounded by the Connexum platform's published API surface. The agent never reaches arbitrary URLs.
+
+### Tool Permissions (Deny-by-Default)
+Unlisted tools are BLOCKED. Frontmatter declares: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash.
+- Read: ALLOWED (skill files, manifest state, local report artefacts, Annex IV documentation)
+- Grep: ALLOWED (scanning codebase for Art. 5 prohibited-practice patterns + Art. 50 transparency disclosures)
+- Glob: ALLOWED (locating local report artefacts + documentation files)
+- Bash: ALLOWED (bounded to \`compliance-agent\` CLI subcommands only)
+- Edit: BLOCKED
+- Write: BLOCKED (the CLI writes report artefacts; the agent does not)
+- WebSearch: BLOCKED
+- WebFetch: BLOCKED
+- Agent: BLOCKED (compliance reporting is sole-purpose)
+
+### Governance Hooks Active
+- PreToolUse: \`eu-ai-act-secret-and-biometric-redaction-enforcer\` (drops any tool input that contains an unredacted credential, session token, or biometric template pattern)
+- PostToolUse: \`audit-logger\` (every tool call writes a structured audit-chain entry)
+- SessionStart: \`eu-ai-act-startup-integrity-check\` (verifies SOUL + BOUNDARIES are still chmod 0444)
+
+### Immutable Files (Cannot Modify)
+- The SOUL block above (chmod 0444)
+- The BOUNDARIES block above (chmod 0444)
+- \`.claude/skills/_shared/connexum-governance.md\`
+- The agent's Ed25519 private key under \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/keys/\`
+
+### Circuit Breaker
+3 consecutive audit-emit failures = SUSPENDED. Local report queue continues; resume on next successful audit-emit. 7 consecutive cycle failures = DEACTIVATED (Tier 4 to re-enable).
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 2 — eu-ai-act-pack.md skill (dos / don'ts)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildPackSkill(input) {
+    return `# EU AI Act Pack — Skill File
+
+> Loaded at startup by ${input.agentId}.
+> Defines pack-specific dos / don'ts the agent applies before composing reports.
+
+## Pack identity
+- **packId:** \`eu-ai-act\`
+- **Registry entry:** \`src/packs/registry-expanded.ts\`
+- **Framework:** Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (the EU AI Act)
+- **Pack-binding extension:** every audit-chain entry carries \`packBinding: ['eu-ai-act', 'tenant:${input.orgId}', 'tier-87']\`
+
+## Risk classification — the four tiers
+
+The EU AI Act assigns every AI system to ONE of four risk tiers. The obligations follow the tier.
+
+### Tier 1 — prohibited (Art. 5)
+Outright forbidden in the Union market. The agent emits a CRITICAL finding on detection. The seven prohibited practices:
+
+1. **Subliminal techniques** beyond a person's consciousness that materially distort behaviour and cause physical or psychological harm.
+2. **Exploitation of vulnerabilities** of specific groups (age, disability, social/economic situation) leading to harm.
+3. **Social scoring** by public authorities (general-purpose scoring leading to detrimental treatment of natural persons).
+4. **Real-time remote biometric identification** in publicly accessible spaces for law-enforcement (narrow exceptions for serious crime / missing persons / imminent threat, with judicial authorisation).
+5. **Emotion recognition** in the workplace or educational institutions (narrow medical/safety exceptions).
+6. **Biometric categorisation** of natural persons by protected attributes (race, political opinions, trade-union membership, religion, sex life, sexual orientation).
+7. **Untargeted scraping of facial images** from the internet or CCTV to build facial-recognition databases.
+
+### Tier 2 — high-risk (Art. 6 + Annex III)
+Listed Annex III use cases (biometrics, critical infrastructure, education access, employment, essential public services, law enforcement, migration/asylum/border, administration of justice + democratic processes) AND safety components of products covered by Annex I harmonisation legislation. Triggers the full Art. 9-15 obligations stack:
+
+- **Art. 9** — Risk management system (iterative, throughout lifecycle)
+- **Art. 10** — Data and data governance (training/validation/test datasets quality)
+- **Art. 11** — Technical documentation per Annex IV
+- **Art. 12** — Record-keeping (automatic logs over lifetime)
+- **Art. 13** — Transparency and information for deployers
+- **Art. 14** — Human oversight (effective oversight by natural persons)
+- **Art. 15** — Accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity (declared performance + resilience)
+- **Art. 17** — Quality management system (provider obligation)
+- **Art. 43** — Conformity assessment (internal control OR notified body, depending on Annex)
+- **Art. 72** — Post-market monitoring system (proactive collection + analysis of performance data over lifetime)
+- **Art. 73** — Serious-incident reporting (15-day clock from awareness of a "serious incident" definition)
+
+### Tier 3 — limited-risk (Art. 50 transparency duties)
+- AI systems that interact with natural persons (chatbots, conversational agents): users must be informed they're interacting with AI unless obvious from context.
+- AI systems generating synthetic content (audio, image, video, text — deepfakes): output must be machine-readable-marked AND human-readable-disclosed (with narrow artistic/satirical exception for clearly creative content).
+- Emotion-recognition systems and biometric-categorisation systems: subjects must be informed.
+
+### Tier 4 — minimal-risk
+No regulatory obligation under the AI Act. Voluntary codes of conduct (Art. 95) encouraged. The agent still emits a brief classification-confirmation entry for traceability.
+
+## General-purpose AI (Art. 51-55)
+A separate regime overlays the four tiers for GPAI models:
+- **All GPAI** (Art. 53): technical documentation + downstream-provider information + copyright policy + training-data summary.
+- **GPAI with systemic risk** (Art. 51 threshold — currently 10^25 FLOPs training compute, subject to update): additional model-evaluation + adversarial-testing + serious-incident-reporting + cybersecurity-protection duties (Art. 55).
+
+The agent checks for GPAI deployment patterns + flags systemic-risk threshold crossings as HIGH findings.
+
+## DOs
+
+- **DO** verify the active DataAccessManifest before every read. Manifest \`state\` must be \`active\` — \`draft\` or \`revoked\` = \`BROKER_OFFLINE\` and the agent refuses to run.
+- **DO** check the manifest's \`redactionPolicy.piiClasses\` includes \`EMAIL\`, \`PHONE\`, and \`BIOMETRIC\` at minimum. EU AI Act evidence will routinely touch biometric/identification data; raw exposure both leaks customer data AND tax-evades GDPR Art. 9 + AI Act Art. 10.
+- **DO** declare the per-system risk classification at the start of every quarterly report. If a system's classification changes mid-period (e.g., a new feature pushes a minimal-risk system into Annex III scope), flag a HIGH finding "Risk-tier drift — Art. 43 re-assessment required."
+- **DO** detect substantial modifications (Art. 43(4)) — material changes to intended purpose / performance that trigger a re-assessment of conformity.
+- **DO** sort findings CRITICAL → HIGH → MEDIUM → LOW in every report rollup. Art. 5 prohibited-practice hits are ALWAYS CRITICAL.
+- **DO** emit the audit-chain entry BEFORE writing the report artefact to disk (write-ahead-log pattern).
+- **DO** carry \`packBinding\` on every emit. Empty binding = the gov-server will reject with \`UnboundDataError\`.
+
+## DON'Ts
+
+- **DON'T** echo a manifest's \`credentialRef\` value anywhere. The customer's \`env:DB_URL\` resolves to a real connection string — the agent never sees it (resolved inside the broker), and even the ref string \`env:DB_URL\` MUST NOT appear in audit entries.
+- **DON'T** retry a failed broker read with elevated privileges. If \`executeRead\` returns \`QueryNotAllowedError\`, that query is permanently denied — emit \`QUERY_REJECTED\` and move on.
+- **DON'T** classify findings as a notified-body opinion or a declaration of conformity. The agent's findings are INPUTS to the customer's compliance officer; the declaration of conformity remains the customer's act. Any output that resembles a declaration of conformity = STOP and emit \`OUT_OF_SCOPE\`.
+- **DON'T** mis-classify an Annex III system as limited-risk merely because the developer labelled it "decision support". Annex III scope follows the listed use case, not the marketing label.
+- **DON'T** treat the 10^25 FLOPs threshold as a hard ceiling — it is a presumption of systemic risk that the Commission can revise. Flag uncertainty when training compute is within an order of magnitude of the current threshold.
+- **DON'T** file the Art. 73 serious-incident notification on the customer's behalf. Surface candidates only; the 15-day clock runs from the customer's compliance officer's notification.
+
+## Cross-pack interactions
+
+EU AI Act pairs with:
+- **GDPR** (data-protection overlap) — Art. 10 (data governance) + Art. 26(7) (DPIA for high-risk systems processing personal data) cross-walk to GDPR Art. 35 DPIAs.
+- **ISO 27001** (ISMS + Art. 15 cybersecurity overlap) — control cross-walk for technical robustness + cybersecurity.
+- **NIST AI RMF** (voluntary US framework parallel structure) — Govern/Map/Measure/Manage functions cross-walk to the AI Act risk-management-system requirements.
+- **ISO/IEC 42001** (AI management system standard) — the emerging certifiable AIMS that operationalises Art. 17 quality-management duties.
+
+When a cross-pack agent exists in the same org, this agent COORDINATES (does not duplicate). The Connexum dashboard cross-pack rollup view de-duplicates findings that span multiple packs.
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 3 — eu-ai-act-heartbeat.md skill (load-bearing cycle)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildHeartbeatSkill(input) {
+    return `# EU AI Act Compliance Agent — Heartbeat Cycle
+
+> Loaded at startup by ${input.agentId}.
+> The load-bearing every-cycle checklist. The agent runs this loop on each invocation; cadence (quarterly / annual / ad-hoc) is determined at step 2.
+
+## 14-step cycle
+
+| # | Step | Tool / Action | Failure mode |
+|---|------|---------------|--------------|
+| 1 | Load startup files (SOUL, BOUNDARIES, this skill, pack skill, reporting skill, broker skill, GOVERNANCE.md) | Read | Missing file → emit \`STARTUP_FILE_MISSING\` and exit cycle |
+| 2 | Determine target cadence | Date arithmetic vs lastRunAt | None — defaults to most-overdue cadence |
+| 3 | Fetch active DataAccessManifest for the target scope | Bash \`compliance-agent broker-status\` | Manifest \`state ≠ active\` → emit \`MANIFEST_OFFLINE\`, exit cycle |
+| 4 | Execute cadence-specific reads (quarterly = AI-system telemetry + risk register + codebase scan; annual = aggregate prior quarters + Annex IV documentation set) | Bash \`compliance-agent read --manifest <id> --query <q>\` | \`QueryNotAllowedError\` → \`QUERY_REJECTED\` audit, exit |
+| 5 | Verify redaction by spot-checking 3 random rows against the secret/PII/biometric classifier | Local regex | Any hit → \`BROKER_REDACTION_FAILURE\` CRITICAL, exit |
+| 6 | Compose report sections (see \`eu-ai-act-reporting.md\`) | Sonnet | Composition error → retry once with Haiku, then \`COMPOSITION_FAILURE\` |
+| 7 | Roll up findings CRITICAL → HIGH → MEDIUM → LOW (Art. 5 prohibited-practice hits ALWAYS CRITICAL) | Local sort | None |
+| 8 | Sign the report envelope with org's Ed25519 key | Bash \`compliance-agent sign --envelope <file>\` | Key missing → \`SIGNING_KEY_MISSING\` CRITICAL, exit |
+| 9 | Write \`COMPLIANCE_AGENT_REPORT_EMITTED\` audit-chain entry (BEFORE local write — WAL pattern) | Bash \`compliance-agent emit-audit\` | Network failure → queue locally, mark agent SUSPENDED if 3 consecutive fails |
+| 10 | Persist signed envelope + signature to \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/reports/<runId>/\` | Bash \`compliance-agent persist\` | Local write failure → audit entry already emitted; flag \`LOCAL_PERSIST_FAILURE\` next cycle |
+| 11 | Update \`lastRunAt\` in local state | Bash \`compliance-agent update-state\` | None — next cycle re-derives |
+| 12 | Heartbeat the gov-server (\`POST /api/v1/agents/:agentId/heartbeat\`) | Bash \`compliance-agent heartbeat\` | 401/403 → license expired/revoked, exit \`DEACTIVATED\` |
+| 13 | Append cycle summary to local log | Local write | None |
+| 14 | Exit cleanly | None | None |
+
+## Cadence resolution
+
+\`\`\`
+quarterly: fires Jan 1 / Apr 1 / Jul 1 / Oct 1 UTC if lastQuarterlyRunAt > 91 days
+  — post-market monitoring (Art. 72), risk-register review (Art. 9),
+    prohibited-practice audit (Art. 5), transparency review (Art. 50)
+
+annual:    fires Jan 1 UTC if lastAnnualRunAt > 365 days
+  — conformity-assessment refresh (Art. 43), Annex IV technical-documentation
+    completeness check, declaration-of-conformity status review
+
+ad-hoc:    fires immediately on receipt of a \`run-now\` signal from the platform
+  — serious-incident candidate (Art. 73 — 15-day clock starts on customer's
+    notification, not on this agent's detection)
+  — substantial-modification trigger (Art. 43(4)) detected in codebase scan
+\`\`\`
+
+The platform invokes this agent on schedule via the customer's hook configuration; the agent itself does NOT spawn its own cron. See \`.claude/hooks/\` directory for the invocation hook example.
+
+## Cadence-specific reads
+
+### Quarterly (Art. 72 post-market monitoring)
+- \`audit-chain\` scope: last 90 days of AI-system inference logs, incident events, accuracy-metric snapshots
+- \`document-store\` scope: current risk register (Art. 9), human-oversight records (Art. 14)
+- \`codebase\` scope: last 90 days of commits touching AI-system implementations, deployment-configuration changes
+
+### Annual (Art. 43 conformity-assessment refresh)
+- Aggregates all four prior quarters
+- \`document-store\` scope: full Annex IV technical-documentation set (general description, intended purpose, design specifications, datasets, human-oversight measures, accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity metrics, risk-management-system documentation, substantial-modifications change log)
+
+## Locked Invariants honoured
+
+- **Invariant 2** (advisory, never authoritative): every failure mode above EXITS the cycle cleanly. The agent never blocks the customer's other agents. A serious-incident candidate is surfaced as a finding; the 15-day Art. 73 clock starts on the customer's compliance officer's notification.
+- **Invariant 4** (offline-verifiable): the signed envelope verifies using only the org's public key — no platform reachability required.
+- **Invariant 10** (push-receive only): every gov-server call originates from the agent (push); the gov-server never calls into the customer's infrastructure or AI-system runtime.
+- **Pack-binding-primacy**: every audit-chain entry at steps 5, 9, 12 carries \`packBinding: ['eu-ai-act', 'tenant:${input.orgId}', 'tier-87']\`.
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 4 — eu-ai-act-reporting.md skill (section composition guide)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildReportingSkill(_input) {
+    return `# EU AI Act Compliance Agent — Report Section Composition
+
+> Reference for steps 6-7 of the heartbeat cycle.
+> Each section composes deterministically from redacted broker rows + manifest metadata. No LLM-only sections — every section has an objective rule the Sonnet model applies.
+
+## Six report sections
+
+### 1. Risk Classification (quarterly) — Art. 5 / Art. 6 / Annex III / Art. 50
+- **Inputs:** \`document-store\` scope, the org's AI-system inventory + intended-purpose declarations; \`codebase\` scope, deployed system configurations
+- **Metric:** per-system risk tier (prohibited / high-risk / limited-risk / minimal-risk); number of systems whose tier shifted vs prior quarter; number of systems with ambiguous classification flagged for compliance-officer review
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`CRITICAL\` if any system matches an Art. 5 prohibited pattern: "Prohibited practice detected — system must be withdrawn from Union market"
+  - \`HIGH\` if a system shifted tier mid-period (e.g., new feature pushes a minimal-risk system into Annex III scope): "Risk-tier drift — Art. 43 re-assessment required"
+  - \`MEDIUM\` if any deployed system lacks a documented intended-purpose declaration: "Art. 11 / Annex IV(1)(b) documentation gap"
+- **Format:** markdown table per AI system (system_id / declared_purpose / annex_iii_use_case / risk_tier / classification_basis / changed_since_last_period)
+
+### 2. Prohibited-Practice Audit (quarterly) — Art. 5
+- **Inputs:** \`codebase\` scope, AST scans + flagged-pattern matches against the seven Art. 5 prohibitions; \`audit-chain\` scope, deployment events to publicly accessible spaces
+- **Metric:** number of prohibited-pattern matches per category (subliminal / vulnerability-exploitation / social-scoring / real-time-biometric-id / emotion-recognition-workplace / biometric-categorisation-protected / facial-image-scraping)
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`CRITICAL\` on ANY confirmed match: "Art. 5(\${subsection}) prohibition triggered — immediate withdrawal required"
+  - \`HIGH\` on near-match patterns warranting compliance-officer review: "Possible Art. 5 prohibition — manual classification required"
+- **Format:** per-prohibition-category sub-table; CRITICAL findings include the exact code path + first-detected timestamp
+
+### 3. Transparency Compliance (quarterly) — Art. 50
+- **Inputs:** \`codebase\` scope, customer-facing UI surfaces + output-generation pipelines; \`audit-chain\` scope, inference-event metadata
+- **Metric:** percentage of AI-chatbot interactions with an "interacting with AI" disclosure; percentage of synthetic-content outputs with machine-readable marking; presence/absence of emotion-recognition + biometric-categorisation subject disclosures
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`HIGH\` if AI-chatbot disclosure rate < 100% (Art. 50(1)): "Art. 50(1) chatbot-disclosure obligation breach"
+  - \`HIGH\` if any deepfake/synthetic-content output lacks machine-readable marking (Art. 50(4)): "Art. 50(4) synthetic-content marking gap"
+  - \`MEDIUM\` if an emotion-recognition or biometric-categorisation system lacks subject-information evidence (Art. 50(3))
+- **Format:** per-surface compliance table + remediation pointer per finding
+
+### 4. Human Oversight Verification (quarterly) — Art. 14
+- **Inputs:** \`document-store\` scope, declared human-oversight measures per high-risk system; \`audit-chain\` scope, override-event logs + intervention-effectiveness telemetry
+- **Metric:** per high-risk system: declared-oversight-measure presence; override-rate; mean-time-to-override on flagged outputs; ratio of intervened-outputs to total flagged outputs
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`HIGH\` if a high-risk system has no recorded override events in the period AND declared oversight is "human-in-the-loop": "Art. 14(2) effectiveness gap — declared oversight not exercised"
+  - \`HIGH\` if mean-time-to-override exceeds the system's declared SLA: "Art. 14(4) timeliness gap"
+  - \`MEDIUM\` if oversight personnel lack documented competence evidence: "Art. 14(5) competence-documentation gap"
+
+### 5. Post-Market Monitoring Summary (quarterly) — Art. 72 / Art. 73
+- **Inputs:** \`audit-chain\` scope, last 90 days of inference logs + incident events + accuracy-metric snapshots
+- **Metric:** distribution-drift indicators per high-risk system; accuracy-degradation flags; incident-cluster anomalies; serious-incident candidates per Art. 73
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`CRITICAL\` on Art. 73 serious-incident candidates (death / serious health damage / serious property or environmental damage / fundamental-rights infringement / critical-infrastructure disruption): "Art. 73 serious-incident candidate — 15-day notification clock starts on customer's notification to market-surveillance authority"
+  - \`HIGH\` on accuracy degradation > customer's declared Art. 15 threshold: "Art. 15 declared-accuracy breach — corrective action required"
+  - \`HIGH\` on distribution-drift indicators consistent with concept drift requiring retraining
+
+### 6. Conformity Assessment Status (annual) — Art. 43 / Annex IV / Annex VI
+- **Inputs:** aggregated 12 months of quarterly findings + \`document-store\` scope, full Annex IV technical-documentation set
+- **Metric:** per high-risk system: conformity-assessment path (internal control vs notified body); CE-marking status; declaration-of-conformity reference + version; date of last refresh; date next refresh due; Annex IV section completeness (1-9)
+- **Findings:**
+  - \`CRITICAL\` if a deployed high-risk system has NO CE marking or NO declaration of conformity: "Art. 43 conformity-assessment gap — system must not be placed on Union market"
+  - \`HIGH\` on Annex IV documentation gaps (missing section / outdated section)
+  - \`HIGH\` on detected substantial modifications since last assessment without a recorded Art. 43(4) re-assessment: "Substantial-modification re-assessment overdue"
+  - \`MEDIUM\` on quality-management-system (Art. 17) evidence gaps
+
+## Composition rules
+
+1. **One section = one renderer call.** Don't bleed data across sections.
+2. **Markdown only.** No HTML, no JSON in section bodies. JSON envelope wraps the markdown.
+3. **Deterministic.** Same input rows produce the same section output. Caller verifies by hash.
+4. **No raw secrets / biometric data ever.** Redaction is guaranteed by the broker; this rule is the agent's belt-and-braces check.
+5. **Each section header MUST cite the relevant EU AI Act article(s)** (e.g., "## 4. Human Oversight Verification (Art. 14)") so the compliance officer can index findings against the article register without re-reading bodies.
+
+## Helper utilities (if installed)
+
+If \`@connexum/ai-governance\` is installed and \`SECTION_RENDERER_REGISTRY\` is available, prefer:
+
+\`\`\`bash
+node -e "
+import('@connexum/ai-governance').then(({ buildComplianceReport }) => {
+  const envelope = buildComplianceReport({
+    packId: 'eu-ai-act',
+    orgId: '<orgId>',
+    agentId: '<agentId>',
+    runId: '<runId>',
+    cadence: 'quarterly',
+    generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    sections: [
+      { sectionId: 'risk-classification', rendererId: 'risk-tier-summary' },
+      { sectionId: 'prohibited-practice', rendererId: 'art-5-audit' },
+      { sectionId: 'transparency', rendererId: 'art-50-compliance' },
+      { sectionId: 'human-oversight', rendererId: 'art-14-verification' },
+      { sectionId: 'post-market-monitoring', rendererId: 'art-72-summary' },
+      // annual only:
+      // { sectionId: 'conformity-assessment', rendererId: 'art-43-status' },
+    ],
+    redactedRows: <rows from broker>,
+    manifestMetadata: <metadata from broker>,
+  });
+  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(envelope));
+});
+"
+\`\`\`
+
+The deterministic renderers in the package emit byte-identical output for the same input — compliance-officer-friendly. If the package is unavailable, the agent composes sections via Sonnet using the rules above.
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 5 — data-broker-usage.md skill (pack-agnostic, but customised per agent)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildBrokerSkill(input) {
+    const govUrl = input.govServerUrl ?? 'https://gov.connexum.io';
+    return `# Data Access Broker — Usage Guide
+
+> Loaded at startup by ${input.agentId}.
+> The broker is the ONLY path the agent uses to read customer data. Bypassing the broker = absolute boundary violation.
+
+## Broker contract
+
+\`\`\`
+compliance-agent read \\
+  --agent-id ${input.agentId} \\
+  --manifest <manifestId> \\
+  --query <query string from manifest.allowedQueries> \\
+  --params '<JSON array>'
+\`\`\`
+
+Returns:
+\`\`\`json
+{
+  "rows": [...],
+  "redactionStats": {
+    "totalCells": <int>,
+    "redactedCells": <int>
+  },
+  "manifestMetadata": {
+    "scopeKind": "audit-chain|codebase|document-store|...",
+    "scopeName": "<friendly name>"
+  },
+  "durationMs": <int>
+}
+\`\`\`
+
+## Boot sequence (executed by \`compliance-agent read\`)
+
+1. Fetch manifest from \`${govUrl}/api/v1/agents/${input.agentId}/data-manifests/<manifestId>\` (license-key bearer auth)
+2. Verify \`state=active\` (draft / revoked = \`BROKER_OFFLINE\`)
+3. Validate query against \`manifest.allowedQueries\` (exact string match — partial = \`QueryNotAllowedError\`)
+4. Resolve credential from \`manifest.credentialRef\` (\`env:NAME\` or \`keyvault:scope\`; inline rejected)
+5. Execute via the registered \`DataAdapterFactory\` for \`scopeKind\`
+6. Apply redaction per \`manifest.redactionPolicy.{piiClasses, columnDenyList}\`
+7. Emit \`AGENT_DATA_READ\` audit-event to \`${govUrl}/api/v1/agents/${input.agentId}/audit-events\` with structured metadata only (NEVER raw rows)
+8. Return redacted rows + stats to the agent
+
+## Failure modes
+
+| Error class | When | Agent action |
+|---|---|---|
+| \`BrokerOfflineError\` | Manifest not active OR network failure | Exit cycle. Mark cadence as deferred. |
+| \`QueryNotAllowedError\` | Query not in allowed-list | Audit \`QUERY_REJECTED\`. Continue cycle without this section. |
+| \`CredentialNotFoundError\` | env var or keyvault key absent | Emit \`MANIFEST_MISCONFIGURED\`. Notify ORG_ADMIN via dashboard. Exit cycle. |
+| \`LicenseInvalidError\` | License expired or revoked | Exit with code 1. Agent \`DEACTIVATED\`. Tier 4 to re-enable. |
+
+## Invariants the broker enforces
+
+- **Invariant 10** (push-receive only): all gov-server calls originate from the broker (customer side). The gov-server never opens an outbound connection to customer infrastructure.
+- **Invariant 1** (manifest fetch failure → BrokerOfflineError): the broker NEVER falls back to executing without a manifest. No silent permissive failure.
+- **Invariant 7** (redaction is not optional): if \`redactionPolicy\` is absent, the broker rejects the manifest at activation (\`MANIFEST_MISCONFIGURED\`).
+
+## Active manifests for this agent
+
+Manifest IDs the agent should expect to find (added by ORG_ADMIN via dashboard):
+
+- EU AI Act quarterly (telemetry): scope \`audit-chain\` with EMAIL+PHONE+BIOMETRIC redaction (AI-system inference + incident events)
+- EU AI Act quarterly (risk register): scope \`document-store\` with PII redaction (risk-management documentation + human-oversight records)
+- EU AI Act quarterly (codebase scan): scope \`codebase\` with secret-scanner redaction (AST scans for Art. 5 prohibited-pattern matches + Art. 50 disclosure surfaces)
+- EU AI Act annual (technical documentation): scope \`document-store\` with PII redaction (full Annex IV set)
+
+If a manifest is missing at run time, the agent flags it as \`MANIFEST_MISSING\` and continues with the cadences whose manifests ARE present (degraded operation per Invariant 2).
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 6 — shared connexum-governance.md (org-wide; copied if not present)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildSharedGovernance(_input) {
+    return `# Connexum Governance — Shared Skill
+
+> Loaded at startup by every Connexum compliance agent in this project.
+> Defines pack-binding-primacy + 10 Locked Architectural Invariants.
+
+## Pack-binding-primacy
+
+Every catalogued / stored record carries a mandatory \`packBinding: string[]\` naming the compliance packs that govern it. Retention, approval, reviewer tier, sovereignty, report scoping ALL derive from the binding. Empty binding throws \`UnboundDataError\`. Un-binding before retention window elapses is refused.
+
+For Tier 8.7 compliance agents, every emitted audit-chain entry carries \`packBinding: [<packId>, 'tenant:<orgId>', 'tier-87']\` at minimum.
+
+## 10 Locked Architectural Invariants
+
+1. **Self-sovereign passport issuance** — the platform is the passport authority. No external partnership required.
+2. **Advisory, never authoritative** — the platform is NEVER in the synchronous critical path of any agent. Failures degrade gracefully.
+3. **Graceful degradation by default in the SDK** — 100ms timeout on trust queries; never throw.
+4. **Offline-verifiable passports** — verifiable using cached org public keys. Platform reachability not required.
+5. **Unknown-passport returns structured response, not 404** — \`status: "unknown"\` + org reputation fallback.
+6. **Credit-agency data visibility model** — own data in full; cross-org view limited to \`PublicAgentView\`.
+7. **Row-level security at the database** — every multi-tenant table has a Postgres RLS policy. Defence-in-depth.
+8. **Three-tier API key hierarchy** — \`PLATFORM_KEY > PARTNER_KEY > ORG_KEY\`. Absolute cross-tier isolation.
+9. **External identity bound, never replaced** — Okta/IAM identities become first-class claims INSIDE the passport.
+10. **Push-receive only** — data flows from customer TO platform, never the other way. No scanning, no polling, no blocking of customer infrastructure.
+
+## Agent self-check (executed at startup)
+
+1. Verify SOUL block in primary agent MD is intact + chmod 0444
+2. Verify BOUNDARIES block in primary agent MD is intact + chmod 0444
+3. Verify this file is intact + chmod 0444
+4. Verify org public key is cached locally at \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/<agentId>/keys/org-public.pem\`
+5. Verify Ed25519 signing key is present at \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/<agentId>/keys/signing-private.pem\`
+
+If any check fails, the agent emits \`GOVERNANCE_INTEGRITY_FAILURE\` and refuses to run until Tier 4 intervention.
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// File 7 — GOVERNANCE.md at project root (customer-specific config)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+function buildGovernanceConfig(input) {
+    const govUrl = input.govServerUrl ?? 'https://gov.connexum.io';
+    return `# GOVERNANCE.md
+
+> Generated at agent spawn. Customer-specific configuration for the Connexum compliance agent runtime.
+> This file is COMMITTED to the customer's repo. It contains NO secrets.
+
+## Agent
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| Agent ID | ${input.agentId} |
+| Pack | eu-ai-act |
+| Tier | 8.7 |
+| Org ID | ${input.orgId} |
+| Location | ${input.location} |
+| Department | ${input.department} |
+| Gov-server URL | ${govUrl} |
+
+## Secrets (NOT committed)
+
+The agent expects two files outside source control:
+
+- \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/.license\` — license key issued at spawn (mode 0600)
+- \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/keys/signing-private.pem\` — Ed25519 signing key for report envelopes (mode 0600)
+
+Both are created by \`compliance-agent init <licenseKey>\` (first-run setup; see README in the tarball).
+
+## First-run setup
+
+\`\`\`bash
+# 1. Install the runtime
+npm install -g @connexum/compliance-agent-runtime
+
+# 2. Initialise the agent
+compliance-agent init ${input.licenseKey}
+
+# 3. Verify status
+compliance-agent status ${input.agentId}
+
+# 4. Run a manual cycle (optional, for verification)
+compliance-agent run-once ${input.agentId}
+\`\`\`
+
+## Scheduled invocation
+
+The Connexum platform invokes this agent on its declared cadences (quarterly / annual). If you want local cron-based invocation as well, add to your crontab:
+
+\`\`\`cron
+0 0 1 */3 * compliance-agent run-once ${input.agentId}    # quarterly (post-market monitoring + risk register + Art. 5/50 audit)
+0 0 1 1 *   compliance-agent run-once ${input.agentId}    # annual (conformity-assessment refresh + Annex IV update)
+\`\`\`
+
+The platform invocation and the local cron are idempotent — the same \`runId\` will not double-emit.
+
+## Article cross-reference
+
+This agent's reports cite the following EU AI Act articles. Compliance officers can use this map to index findings:
+
+| Section | Articles |
+|---------|----------|
+| Risk Classification | Art. 5, Art. 6, Annex III, Art. 50 |
+| Prohibited-Practice Audit | Art. 5 |
+| Transparency Compliance | Art. 50 |
+| Human Oversight Verification | Art. 14 |
+| Post-Market Monitoring Summary | Art. 72, Art. 73 |
+| Conformity Assessment Status | Art. 43, Annex IV, Annex VI, Art. 17 |
+
+## Locked Invariants
+
+This agent honours all 10 Connexum Locked Architectural Invariants (see \`.claude/skills/_shared/connexum-governance.md\`). The most operationally relevant for hosts:
+
+- **Invariant 2:** the agent NEVER blocks your other tooling. A failed cycle exits cleanly; the next cycle proceeds.
+- **Invariant 10:** all calls originate from this agent. The Connexum gov-server NEVER initiates a connection to your infrastructure or AI-system runtime.
+
+## Support
+
+- Status: \`compliance-agent status ${input.agentId}\`
+- Logs: \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/logs/\`
+- Reports: \`./.connexum/compliance-agent/${input.agentId}/reports/\`
+- Dashboard: ${govUrl.replace(/^https?:\/\/gov\./, 'https://dashboard.')}/agents/compliance/${input.agentId}
+`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Generator entry point
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const generate = (input) => {
+    const identifier = `eu-ai-act-compliance-agent-${input.location}-${input.department}`;
+    const bundle = [
+        {
+            path: `.claude/agents/${identifier}.md`,
+            content: buildAgentMd(input),
+            mode: 0o444,
+        },
+        {
+            path: '.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-pack.md',
+            content: buildPackSkill(input),
+            mode: 0o644,
+        },
+        {
+            path: '.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-heartbeat.md',
+            content: buildHeartbeatSkill(input),
+            mode: 0o644,
+        },
+        {
+            path: '.claude/skills/compliance/eu-ai-act-reporting.md',
+            content: buildReportingSkill(input),
+            mode: 0o644,
+        },
+        {
+            path: '.claude/skills/compliance/data-broker-usage.md',
+            content: buildBrokerSkill(input),
+            mode: 0o644,
+        },
+        {
+            path: '.claude/skills/_shared/connexum-governance.md',
+            content: buildSharedGovernance(input),
+            mode: 0o444,
+        },
+        {
+            path: 'GOVERNANCE.md',
+            content: buildGovernanceConfig(input),
+            mode: 0o644,
+        },
+    ];
+    return bundle;
+};
+exports.generate = generate;
+//# sourceMappingURL=eu-ai-act.js.map