@conarium-ai/core 0.1.0

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Files changed (188) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +131 -0
  2. package/LICENSE +21 -0
  3. package/README.md +387 -0
  4. package/SECURITY.md +226 -0
  5. package/bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs +77 -0
  6. package/bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs +108 -0
  7. package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +425 -0
  8. package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs +480 -0
  9. package/bin/conarium-init.mjs +184 -0
  10. package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +441 -0
  11. package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +161 -0
  12. package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +610 -0
  13. package/conarium.config.json +43 -0
  14. package/deploy/anchor-service/README.md +79 -0
  15. package/deploy/anchor-service/conarium-anchor.service +21 -0
  16. package/deploy/anchor-service/dry-run.mjs +122 -0
  17. package/deploy/anchor-service/ecosystem.config.cjs +21 -0
  18. package/deploy/anchor-service/env.example +11 -0
  19. package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts +39 -0
  20. package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts.map +1 -0
  21. package/dist/anchor-service.js +278 -0
  22. package/dist/anchor-service.js.map +1 -0
  23. package/dist/anchor.d.ts +123 -0
  24. package/dist/anchor.d.ts.map +1 -0
  25. package/dist/anchor.js +246 -0
  26. package/dist/anchor.js.map +1 -0
  27. package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts +4 -0
  28. package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map +1 -0
  29. package/dist/audit-hash.js +12 -0
  30. package/dist/audit-hash.js.map +1 -0
  31. package/dist/audit.d.ts +104 -0
  32. package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -0
  33. package/dist/audit.js +391 -0
  34. package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -0
  35. package/dist/config.d.ts +273 -0
  36. package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -0
  37. package/dist/config.js +44 -0
  38. package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
  39. package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts +23 -0
  40. package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts.map +1 -0
  41. package/dist/connectors/docs.js +140 -0
  42. package/dist/connectors/docs.js.map +1 -0
  43. package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts +10 -0
  44. package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  45. package/dist/connectors/index.js +37 -0
  46. package/dist/connectors/index.js.map +1 -0
  47. package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts +16 -0
  48. package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts.map +1 -0
  49. package/dist/connectors/jira.js +67 -0
  50. package/dist/connectors/jira.js.map +1 -0
  51. package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts +28 -0
  52. package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts.map +1 -0
  53. package/dist/connectors/openapi.js +447 -0
  54. package/dist/connectors/openapi.js.map +1 -0
  55. package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts +17 -0
  56. package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts.map +1 -0
  57. package/dist/connectors/postgres.js +131 -0
  58. package/dist/connectors/postgres.js.map +1 -0
  59. package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts +16 -0
  60. package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts.map +1 -0
  61. package/dist/connectors/slack.js +65 -0
  62. package/dist/connectors/slack.js.map +1 -0
  63. package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts +35 -0
  64. package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -0
  65. package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +153 -0
  66. package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -0
  67. package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts +24 -0
  68. package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts.map +1 -0
  69. package/dist/connectors/zion.js +76 -0
  70. package/dist/connectors/zion.js.map +1 -0
  71. package/dist/console.d.ts +30 -0
  72. package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -0
  73. package/dist/console.js +257 -0
  74. package/dist/console.js.map +1 -0
  75. package/dist/coverage.d.ts +100 -0
  76. package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -0
  77. package/dist/coverage.js +175 -0
  78. package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -0
  79. package/dist/executor.d.ts +12 -0
  80. package/dist/executor.d.ts.map +1 -0
  81. package/dist/executor.js +77 -0
  82. package/dist/executor.js.map +1 -0
  83. package/dist/governance.d.ts +124 -0
  84. package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -0
  85. package/dist/governance.js +977 -0
  86. package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -0
  87. package/dist/http.d.ts +48 -0
  88. package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -0
  89. package/dist/http.js +221 -0
  90. package/dist/http.js.map +1 -0
  91. package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -0
  92. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  93. package/dist/index.js +25 -0
  94. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
  95. package/dist/keys.d.ts +51 -0
  96. package/dist/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
  97. package/dist/keys.js +174 -0
  98. package/dist/keys.js.map +1 -0
  99. package/dist/license.d.ts +35 -0
  100. package/dist/license.d.ts.map +1 -0
  101. package/dist/license.js +122 -0
  102. package/dist/license.js.map +1 -0
  103. package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts +17 -0
  104. package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts.map +1 -0
  105. package/dist/llm-gate.js +19 -0
  106. package/dist/llm-gate.js.map +1 -0
  107. package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts +6 -0
  108. package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts.map +1 -0
  109. package/dist/openapi_connector.js +145 -0
  110. package/dist/openapi_connector.js.map +1 -0
  111. package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts +19 -0
  112. package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts.map +1 -0
  113. package/dist/pseudonymize.js +25 -0
  114. package/dist/pseudonymize.js.map +1 -0
  115. package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts +41 -0
  116. package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts.map +1 -0
  117. package/dist/rate_limit.js +66 -0
  118. package/dist/rate_limit.js.map +1 -0
  119. package/dist/receipt.d.ts +161 -0
  120. package/dist/receipt.d.ts.map +1 -0
  121. package/dist/receipt.js +210 -0
  122. package/dist/receipt.js.map +1 -0
  123. package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts +2 -0
  124. package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
  125. package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js +75 -0
  126. package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js.map +1 -0
  127. package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts +2 -0
  128. package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts.map +1 -0
  129. package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js +41 -0
  130. package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js.map +1 -0
  131. package/dist/search_policy.d.ts +23 -0
  132. package/dist/search_policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
  133. package/dist/search_policy.js +79 -0
  134. package/dist/search_policy.js.map +1 -0
  135. package/dist/server.d.ts +29 -0
  136. package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
  137. package/dist/server.js +379 -0
  138. package/dist/server.js.map +1 -0
  139. package/dist/tokens.d.ts +14 -0
  140. package/dist/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -0
  141. package/dist/tokens.js +58 -0
  142. package/dist/tokens.js.map +1 -0
  143. package/dist/types.d.ts +132 -0
  144. package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
  145. package/dist/types.js +2 -0
  146. package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
  147. package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +42 -0
  148. package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md +136 -0
  149. package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
  150. package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md +213 -0
  151. package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md.anchors.jsonl +3 -0
  152. package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +301 -0
  153. package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
  154. package/docs/dogfood/2026-07-31-anchor.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
  155. package/docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md +140 -0
  156. package/docs/plans/2026-07-02-redteam-harness.md +416 -0
  157. package/docs/specs/2026-07-02-redteam-harness-design.md +90 -0
  158. package/docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md +23 -0
  159. package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-plan.md +200 -0
  160. package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-katman0-kapanis-plan.md +231 -0
  161. package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-31-per-user-identity.md +667 -0
  162. package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md +202 -0
  163. package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-31-per-user-identity-design.md +144 -0
  164. package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-coverage-proof-design.md +139 -0
  165. package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-05-receipt-meta-provenance-design.md +116 -0
  166. package/examples/claude-desktop-config.json +9 -0
  167. package/examples/cursor-mcp-settings.json +10 -0
  168. package/package.json +99 -0
  169. package/scripts/audit-chain-check.mjs +119 -0
  170. package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +107 -0
  171. package/scripts/gen-test-vectors.mjs +193 -0
  172. package/scripts/pg-snapshot.sql +27 -0
  173. package/scripts/start-mcp-c1.mjs +70 -0
  174. package/test-vectors/001-single-receipt/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  175. package/test-vectors/002-chain-of-three/receipts.jsonl +3 -0
  176. package/test-vectors/003-tampered-field/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  177. package/test-vectors/004-prevhash-break/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
  178. package/test-vectors/005-seq-gap/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
  179. package/test-vectors/006-bad-signature/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  180. package/test-vectors/007-schema-invalid/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  181. package/test-vectors/008-unsigned-no-pubkey/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  182. package/test-vectors/009-unsigned-but-pubkey-given/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
  183. package/test-vectors/README.md +92 -0
  184. package/test-vectors/expected-hashes.json +24 -0
  185. package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.SECRET-TEST-ONLY.pem +6 -0
  186. package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem +3 -0
  187. package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem.keyid +1 -0
  188. package/test-vectors/manifest.json +95 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
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+ export interface ConariumConfig {
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+ connectors: ConnectorConfig[];
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+ serverName?: string;
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+ serverVersion?: string;
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+ /** Identity of the consumer (team / editor / user) for audit attribution. */
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+ consumer?: string;
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+ /** Access policy enforced on every connector call. */
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+ policy?: GovernancePolicy;
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+ /** Audit configuration. */
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+ audit?: AuditConfig;
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+ }
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+ export interface GovernancePolicy {
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+ /** Allow-list of schema-qualified tables (glob: "billing.*", "*"). Empty = allow all not denied. */
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+ allowTables?: string[];
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+ /** Deny-list of schema-qualified tables; takes precedence over allow. */
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+ denyTables?: string[];
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+ /** Columns to mask before data leaves the boundary ("customers.email", "*.tckn"). */
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+ maskColumns?: string[];
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+ /** Hard cap on rows returned to the AI assistant (default 100). */
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+ maxRows?: number;
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+ /**
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+ * Mask names that the text itself marks as names — a title ("Sn. Ahmet
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+ * Yılmaz") or a field label ("Yetkili: Ayşe Demir"). Default true.
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+ *
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+ * Names are the one identifier with no shape of their own, so column policy
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+ * was the only thing catching them and free text went through untouched.
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+ * This is NOT name recognition: a bare name in running prose is not detected,
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+ * because guessing would trade this gateway's deterministic decisions for a
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+ * confidence score. Set false where the labelled form is legitimate output —
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+ * typically via a profile, so it stays off for one identified person rather
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+ * than for everyone.
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+ */
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+ maskLabelledNames?: boolean;
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+ /** Allowed API tools (e.g. "addPet", "getUser*"). */
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+ allowTools?: string[];
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+ /** Denied API tools. */
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+ denyTools?: string[];
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+ /** Allowed connector names (glob). Empty = allow all not denied. */
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+ allowConnectors?: string[];
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+ /** Denied connector names (glob); takes precedence over allow. */
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+ denyConnectors?: string[];
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+ /**
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+ * Named masking overlays, applied per person.
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+ *
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+ * The problem this solves: masking that is right for an AI agent is wrong for
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+ * the data controller. A shop owner asking "which customer owes the most" needs
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+ * the name; the assistant summarising revenue does not. A global on/off switch
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+ * would answer that by disabling the product's only real guarantee.
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+ *
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+ * Deliberately narrow: a profile may override `maskColumns` and `maxRows` and
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+ * NOTHING else. Table, tool and connector permissions stay global, so a profile
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+ * can never widen what is reachable — only what is legible within it.
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+ */
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+ profiles?: Record<string, MaskingProfile>;
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+ /**
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+ * Actor id → profile name. Honoured ONLY for actors authenticated with a
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+ * per-user token (`assurance: 'per-user-token'`). A shared token never receives
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+ * a profile: "whoever holds this token sees unmasked PII" is exactly the
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+ * property this product exists to prevent.
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+ */
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+ actorProfiles?: Record<string, string>;
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+ }
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+ /** Per-person overlay. See `GovernancePolicy.profiles`. */
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+ export interface MaskingProfile {
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+ maskColumns?: string[];
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+ maxRows?: number;
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+ maskLabelledNames?: boolean;
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+ }
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+ export interface AuditConfig {
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+ /** Append-only JSONL file path. If unset, audit goes to stderr only. */
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+ sink?: string;
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+ failClosed?: boolean;
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+ /** Optional: append-only JSONL file for verifiable access receipts. If unset, no receipts are produced. */
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+ receiptSink?: string;
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+ /** Model identification for receipts (provider/name/version). */
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+ receiptModel?: {
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+ provider: string;
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+ name: string;
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+ version: string;
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+ };
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+ /** Client identification for receipts (name/version). */
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+ receiptClient?: {
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+ name: string;
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+ version: string;
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+ };
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+ }
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+ export interface ConnectorConfig {
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+ type: 'postgres' | 'supabase' | 'supabase-rest' | 'openapi' | 'files' | 'docs' | 'slack' | 'jira';
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+ name: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ config: Record<string, string>;
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+ }
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+ export interface SchemaTable {
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+ name: string;
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+ schema: string;
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+ columns: SchemaColumn[];
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+ rowCount?: number;
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+ description?: string;
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+ }
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+ export interface SchemaColumn {
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+ name: string;
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+ type: string;
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+ nullable: boolean;
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+ isPrimary: boolean;
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+ isForeign: boolean;
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+ references?: string;
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+ description?: string;
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+ }
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+ export interface QueryResult {
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+ rows: Record<string, unknown>[];
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+ rowCount: number;
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+ fields: string[];
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+ sql?: string;
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+ }
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+ export interface ConnectorCapabilities {
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+ canQuery: boolean;
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+ canListSchema: boolean;
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+ canDescribeTable: boolean;
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+ canSearch: boolean;
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+ }
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+ export interface Connector {
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+ name: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ capabilities: ConnectorCapabilities;
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+ connect(): Promise<void>;
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+ disconnect(): Promise<void>;
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+ listTables(): Promise<SchemaTable[]>;
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+ describeTable(table: string): Promise<SchemaTable>;
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+ query(sql: string, params?: unknown[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
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+ search(query: string, tables?: string[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
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+ }
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map
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package/dist/types.js ADDED
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1
+ export {};
2
+ //# sourceMappingURL=types.js.map
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+ {"version":3,"file":"types.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
1
+ # Conarium architecture
2
+
3
+ ## Thesis
4
+
5
+ MCP made "connect an AI assistant to your data" a commodity. The durable value is **not** the connection — it is everything an enterprise needs *around* the connection before it can safely let an AI read internal systems:
6
+
7
+ 1. **Ingestion** of messy internal sources (schemas today; docs, ADRs, APIs next).
8
+ 2. **Governance + audit** — what the AI may see, and a record of what it saw.
9
+ 3. **Self-hosting** — data never leaves the customer's network.
10
+ 4. **Freshness** — incremental re-index so context never goes stale.
11
+
12
+ Conarium owns this layer and stays **tool-agnostic**: it speaks MCP, so it plugs into Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, Windsurf, Continue.dev — whatever wins.
13
+
14
+ ## Request path
15
+
16
+ ```
17
+ AI client ──MCP──▶ index.ts (tool dispatch)
18
+ │
19
+ ├─▶ Governance.allowsTable / guardQuery / maxRows / redact
20
+ ├─▶ Audit.log(decision)
21
+ └─▶ Connector (postgres | supabase | …) ──▶ source system
22
+ ```
23
+
24
+ Governance is enforced **before** the connector runs (table access, query shape) and **after** it returns (row cap, PII masking). Audit records the decision either way. A connector can never bypass the layer because the layer owns the tool handlers.
25
+
26
+ ## Modules
27
+
28
+ | File | Responsibility |
29
+ |---|---|
30
+ | `src/index.ts` | MCP server, tool dispatch, wires governance + audit around every call |
31
+ | `src/governance.ts` | Policy: allow/deny tables, query guard, row caps, PII masking |
32
+ | `src/audit.ts` | Append-only JSONL audit of every tool call |
33
+ | `src/connectors/*` | Source adapters implementing the `Connector` interface |
34
+ | `src/types.ts` | Config, policy, schema and result contracts |
35
+
36
+ ## Connector contract
37
+
38
+ A connector implements `listTables / describeTable / query / search`. It only knows how to *read a source*; it knows nothing about policy or audit. This keeps new connectors (docs, OpenAPI, Slack) cheap to add — they inherit governance for free.
39
+
40
+ ## Design partner
41
+
42
+ ZION is the first connector and reference deployment: a live ERP with real schemas, real business rules (e.g. "use `price2`, not `price3`"), and real governance needs (mask customer PII, deny accounting-internal tables). It validates the layer against a real company before selling it to others.
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
1
+ # Consent Binding Spec v0.1 (draft — specification only, not implemented)
2
+
3
+ Binding a data-access receipt to the **consent record that authorised it**, so a third
4
+ party can check — offline, without trusting the operator — whether an access had a
5
+ consent basis behind it at the moment it happened.
6
+
7
+ **Status: design published, not implemented.** `Receipt.consentRef` has been reserved
8
+ and `null` since receipt v0.1 for exactly this. Nothing in this document ships yet.
9
+ It is published now so the design is on the record with a verifiable date; see
10
+ [RECEIPT-SPEC §Stamping](RECEIPT-SPEC.md).
11
+
12
+ ## The gap this addresses
13
+
14
+ Two mature standards exist and nothing joins them.
15
+
16
+ [ISO/IEC TS 27560:2023](https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.04528) defines the consent record
17
+ and the consent receipt — an authoritative, machine-readable statement that consent
18
+ exists, what it covers, and what happened to it. Access logs and access receipts (this
19
+ project, and everyone in [`PRIOR-ART.md`](PRIOR-ART.md)) record that data was touched.
20
+
21
+ Nobody joins them cryptographically. So today an operator can hold a perfect consent
22
+ archive and a perfect access log and still be unable to answer the only question a
23
+ regulator actually asks:
24
+
25
+ > *Was there a valid consent basis behind **this specific access**, at the time it
26
+ > happened?*
27
+
28
+ Answering it by matching timestamps in two databases is exactly the self-attestation
29
+ this project exists to replace: both databases belong to the operator, and both are
30
+ editable.
31
+
32
+ ## Design
33
+
34
+ ### `consentRef` in the access receipt
35
+
36
+ `Receipt.consentRef` changes from `null` to either `null` (unchanged meaning: no
37
+ consent evidence attached) or:
38
+
39
+ ```json
40
+ {
41
+ "basis": "consent",
42
+ "recordHash": "sha256:…",
43
+ "recordId": "opaque-operator-id",
44
+ "issuer": "did:example:controller | https://…",
45
+ "state": "active",
46
+ "stateAsOf": "2026-08-06T19:15:25.452Z",
47
+ "source": "verified" | "operator-declared" | "unavailable"
48
+ }
49
+ ```
50
+
51
+ - **`recordHash`** — SHA-256 over the canonical (JCS) form of the ISO 27560 consent
52
+ record as it stood **at the moment of access**. This is the binding. Because it
53
+ sits inside the access receipt's own hash, and the receipt is Ed25519-signed and
54
+ chained, the operator cannot later swap in a different consent record.
55
+ - **`state` / `stateAsOf`** — `active`, `withdrawn`, or `expired`, and when that was
56
+ evaluated. This is what makes the binding worth having: an access carrying
57
+ `state: "withdrawn"` is self-incriminating evidence the operator signed themselves.
58
+ - **`source`** — the same provenance discipline as `model.source` and
59
+ `actor.assurance`. `verified` means Conarium fetched and hashed the record itself;
60
+ `operator-declared` means it was asserted by configuration and **not** checked;
61
+ `unavailable` means the consent store could not be reached and the fields are null.
62
+ A receipt never claims a consent basis Conarium did not observe.
63
+ - **`basis`** — consent is one of six GDPR lawful bases. A receipt may legitimately
64
+ carry `basis: "contract"` or `"legal-obligation"` with no `recordHash`. The point is
65
+ that the basis is *stated and signed*, not that it is always consent.
66
+
67
+ ### Verification, offline
68
+
69
+ A third party given (a) the access receipts, (b) the operator's public key, and
70
+ (c) the consent receipts:
71
+
72
+ 1. Verify the receipt chain — `conarium-verify`, unchanged.
73
+ 2. For each access receipt with a `consentRef`, canonicalize the matching consent
74
+ receipt and recompute its hash. Mismatch ⇒ the consent record shown is not the one
75
+ that was in force at access time.
76
+ 3. Report accesses whose `consentRef` is `null`, `unavailable`, or whose `state` was
77
+ not `active`.
78
+
79
+ Step 3 is the output that matters, and it completes the sentence this project has
80
+ been building toward:
81
+
82
+ > *The vendor declared 400 accesses; I hold 380 receipts; 20 are unaccounted for
83
+ > ([reconciliation](RECEIPT-SPEC.md#reconciliation-two-sided-v01)); and 12 of the
84
+ > accesses I do hold have no valid consent behind them.*
85
+
86
+ ### What it proves, and what it does not
87
+
88
+ It proves that at access time the operator held a consent record with exactly this
89
+ content and this state, and that the claim has not been altered since — because it is
90
+ inside a signed, chained receipt.
91
+
92
+ It does **not** prove the consent was validly obtained. Freely given, specific,
93
+ informed, unambiguous — those are legal questions about how the consent was collected,
94
+ and no hash can answer them. It also does not prove processing was lawful: a missing
95
+ or withdrawn consent may be perfectly fine under a different basis.
96
+
97
+ **Language rule, carried over:** the output says *"no consent evidence is bound to
98
+ this access"*, never *"this access was unlawful."* Same discipline as *"access NOT
99
+ RECORDED"* rather than *"no access occurred."* An operator whose consent store was
100
+ unreachable produces `unavailable`, and that is a different fact from `withdrawn`.
101
+
102
+ ## Prior art, as far as we have looked
103
+
104
+ Two searches on 6 August 2026 (`"consent receipt" cryptographically bound to access
105
+ log audit trail implementation`, and ISO 27560 + access record + cryptographic proof)
106
+ found consent-management platforms that log consent with metadata
107
+ ([UniConsent](https://www.uniconsent.com/blog/uniconsent-consent-audit-trail),
108
+ [consentmanager](https://www.consentmanager.net/en/help/developer-reference/consent-log-protocol-audit-trail/)),
109
+ e-signature audit trails that hash the *document* at signing, and the
110
+ [DPV/W3C guidance](https://www.w3.org/community/reports/dpvcg/CG-FINAL-guide-27560-20240801/)
111
+ for expressing 27560 records. ISO 27560 itself notes cryptographic hashes may protect
112
+ the consent record — **from tampering with itself**, not as a binding to an access
113
+ event.
114
+
115
+ The nearest thing found is the AgentBound framework
116
+ ([arXiv 2606.30970](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.30970)), whose governance receipts
117
+ *"cryptographically bind each discrete agent action to the exact policy artifacts
118
+ responsible for its runtime outcome."* Same architecture, different object: policy,
119
+ not consent.
120
+
121
+ **No implementation binding a consent record to a specific data-access record was
122
+ found.** Two searches are not a prior-art clearance. This is a scan, not a legal
123
+ opinion, and it is recorded here so it can be checked and corrected.
124
+
125
+ ## Before this is implemented
126
+
127
+ - **Patent review is a prerequisite, not a formality.** This area is dense —
128
+ `US 11032071`, `US 10678945`, `US 10440062`, `US 10776518` are known to sit nearby,
129
+ and [h33.ai](https://h33.ai/) states ten pending applications, six numbered publicly.
130
+ None has been read against this design.
131
+ - The consent store interface must be pluggable. Conarium will not become a consent
132
+ management platform; MyData operators, Consentua and the CMPs already do that well,
133
+ and reimplementing them would be the mistake this project made a point of avoiding.
134
+ - `verified` requires reading the consent store on the access path. The latency and
135
+ failure-mode budget for that is not designed yet — and `unavailable` must never
136
+ silently degrade into `operator-declared`.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ 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@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
1
+ # Prior art — who else does this?
2
+
3
+ We make one comparative claim about Conarium:
4
+
5
+ > Conarium is the only implementation **we are aware of** that combines
6
+ > (1) inline enforcement, (2) a portable, offline-verifiable receipt of that
7
+ > enforcement, and (3) coverage reconciliation against the data source's own
8
+ > query counters.
9
+
10
+ A claim like that is unfalsifiable if we just assert it, so this file is the
11
+ evidence behind it: what we searched, on what date, what we found, and — the part
12
+ most comparison pages leave out — **what we could not verify.** If you know of an
13
+ implementation that does all three, open an issue and this file will be corrected.
14
+
15
+ **Scan date: 6 August 2026.** Method: fetched each project's README, docs and
16
+ official site, plus targeted web searches. **Source-code-level search was not
17
+ performed on any repository** — see Limitations.
18
+
19
+ ## What the three parts mean
20
+
21
+ Precision matters here, because two of them are commonly confused:
22
+
23
+ 1. **Enforcement** — policy and masking applied *before* the model sees the value.
24
+ Not "the log records that it happened", but "the value never left".
25
+ 2. **Portable receipt** — a signed artifact a third party verifies **offline**,
26
+ without trusting the vendor or the operator.
27
+ 3. **Coverage reconciliation** — comparing the receipt chain against the **data
28
+ source's own bookkeeping** to surface access the source recorded and the chain
29
+ does not.
30
+
31
+ Part 3 is **not** hash-chain verification. A contiguous, signature-valid chain says
32
+ *"what I hold has not been altered."* It cannot say *"nothing is missing from what I
33
+ hold"*, because a gateway that was bypassed writes nothing at all and its chain stays
34
+ perfectly intact.
35
+
36
+ ## Findings by project
37
+
38
+ | Project | Enforcement | Portable signed receipt | Coverage reconciliation |
39
+ |---|---|---|---|
40
+ | [microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) | Partial — Cedar allow/deny, DLP attribute ratchets; PII masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519, Merkle-chained, `verify_receipt_chain()` | No |
41
+ | [Signet](https://github.com/Prismer-AI/signet) | Partial — policy bound into the receipt; no masking | **Yes** — Ed25519, hash-chained, offline | No |
42
+ | [Handshake.AI](https://handshake.ai/) | No | **Yes** — signed action receipts, DID-issued, offline | No |
43
+ | [hoophq/hoop](https://github.com/hoophq/hoop) | **Yes — strongest here.** ML-based masking before bytes leave the gateway | No — session recording/replay, no signed offline-verifiable artifact found | No |
44
+ | [Circe](https://github.com/wv26296-ux/circe-receipts) | No | **Yes** — Ed25519 + JCS, offline | No — explicitly out of scope |
45
+ | [VeritasActa/Acta](https://github.com/VeritasActa/Acta) | Partial — Cedar policy; masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519, 2 IETF Internet-Drafts, offline CLI | No |
46
+ | [agentreceipts.ai](https://agentreceipts.ai) | Different — parameters hashed, not masked | **Yes** — W3C VC + Ed25519, three SDKs cross-verify | No |
47
+ | [lasso-security/mcp-gateway](https://github.com/lasso-security/mcp-gateway) | **Yes** — Presidio PII masking, injection filters | No — no signing mechanism documented | No |
48
+ | [h33.ai](https://h33.ai/) | **Yes, and further** — FHE; the model never sees plaintext | **Yes** — ZK-STARK + Dilithium, verifiable "years later, offline, without the original vendor" | No |
49
+ | [CertNode](https://certnode.io/solutions/ai-agents) | Weak — no blocking gate | **Yes** — ES256 JWS + RFC 3161 | No |
50
+
51
+ The landscape splits cleanly. One camp enforces well but issues no portable evidence
52
+ (hoop.dev, Lasso). The other issues excellent portable evidence but does not enforce
53
+ before the model (Signet, Circe, Acta, agentreceipts, Handshake, CertNode). Two
54
+ projects do both — Microsoft's toolkit and h33.ai — and neither does the third.
55
+
56
+ ### Two near misses worth naming precisely
57
+
58
+ **Microsoft's toolkit has something called "reconciliation", and it is a different
59
+ thing.** [Agent discovery](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/blob/main/docs/tutorials/29-agent-discovery.md)
60
+ reconciles *discovered agents against a governance registry* to find shadow agents —
61
+ inventory, not data access. Its ["completeness score"](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/blob/main/docs/tutorials/50-decision-bom.md)
62
+ measures how many required fields it managed to populate from signals it already
63
+ collected. Neither asks whether the data source saw access the chain has no receipt
64
+ for. Their own [Discussion #276](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/discussions/276)
65
+ is candid about the boundary: *"What we don't do yet is treat the decision as a
66
+ sealed, independently verifiable artifact in the way you describe."*
67
+
68
+ **[MintMCP Agent Monitor](https://www.mintmcp.com/blog/agent-gateway) is the closest
69
+ commercial attempt at bypass detection** — it *"tracks agent activity across the
70
+ organization, including MCP calls made outside the gateway through hooks in Cursor
71
+ and Claude Code."* That is client-side instrumentation: it sees what the client tells
72
+ it. It is not the data source's own telemetry, and it comes with no signed receipt.
73
+
74
+ ## The closest prior art is a paper, and it names the gap exactly
75
+
76
+ [*Notarized Agents / Sello* (arXiv 2606.04193)](https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04193v1)
77
+ states the problem better than we did:
78
+
79
+ > *"An inclusion proof answers 'is this receipt in the log?' It does not answer 'did
80
+ > the log return every matching receipt?'"*
81
+
82
+ We are not claiming to have discovered this gap — that paper published it, and
83
+ [*Auditable Agents* (arXiv 2604.05485)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05485) independently
84
+ calls evidence integrity and lifecycle coverage the most neglected dimensions of
85
+ current audit approaches. What we note is that Sello's three proposed remedies all
86
+ stay on the log side: a signed exhaustive answer from the log (SCITT/SCRAPI),
87
+ downloading the whole log and scanning locally, or submitting to several independent
88
+ logs. Sello v0.1 explicitly declines to guarantee set completeness.
89
+
90
+ **Reconciling against the data source's own counters is not among the proposals we
91
+ found, in that paper or anywhere else in this scan.** That is the specific thing
92
+ `conarium-reconcile` does, and the specific reason we think the combination is
93
+ currently unusual. Also worth stating plainly: none of the three parts is an
94
+ invention. Enforcement, Ed25519 receipts and query counters are all mature. The
95
+ combination is the claim — the same way SPDX and CycloneDX did not invent dependency
96
+ lists.
97
+
98
+ ## Patent scan, 8 August 2026 — including a correction to this document
99
+
100
+ The scan above looked at *projects*. This section looks at *patents*, and it corrects
101
+ a claim made earlier in this file.
102
+
103
+ **Method:** claim 1 of each patent was read in full and mapped element-by-element
104
+ against the design in [CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md](CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md). Family and
105
+ legal-status data from Google Patents (INPADOC-derived). Claim texts from
106
+ freepatentsonline; **not yet checked against the official USPTO PDFs.** This is a
107
+ scan, not a freedom-to-operate opinion, and it was not performed by a lawyer.
108
+
109
+ | Patent | Owner | Family | Nearest-element verdict |
110
+ |---|---|---|---|
111
+ | `US 11032071 B2` — Secure and verifiable data access logging system | **Microsoft** | US only | 4 of 7 elements absent: no request token is generated or returned to the client, and the data server never calls back for a request digest. Their architecture is three-party and requires changes at the data server; ours is a single in-line gateway against an unmodified PostgreSQL. |
112
+ | `US 10678945` · `US 10440062` · `US 10776518` — Consent receipt management systems | **OneTrust** | US only | At least 5 elements absent in each. These claim a *consent collection* platform: a UI shown to the data subject, generation of a consent receipt key, a virtual browser capturing the blank consent form, and transmission of a receipt **to the data subject**. Conarium never interacts with a data subject and does not collect consent — it hashes a consent record someone else holds into an access receipt. |
113
+ | `US 11790111` · `US 12105843` · **`EP 3861676 B1`** — Verifiable consent for privacy protection | **Google** | US · EP · CN · WO | **Conceptually the closest found.** An attestation token carrying user consent data and a digital signature. But the direction is inverted: theirs is an *input* credential validated before an action is permitted (including a token-freshness window and, in `11790111`, selecting ad components); ours is an *output* artifact recording what already happened. Elements (a), (d) and (f) are absent. |
114
+ | `US 7770032 B2` — Secure logging for irrefutable administration | — | US · EP · WO | **Expired.** Hash-chained, MAC-protected log entries — the technique underneath our own chain. Its expiry is worth stating plainly: tamper-evident logging is old, public art, and we have never claimed otherwise. |
115
+
116
+ ### 🔴 Correction to this document
117
+
118
+ This file names **h33.ai** as one of two projects doing both enforcement and portable
119
+ evidence, and cites its ten stated patent applications. That product-level reading
120
+ stands — it came from their own site and nothing here refutes it. What was wrong was
121
+ the inference drawn from it: that those applications might cover the consent-binding
122
+ ground. The six published application numbers were read on 8 August 2026 and their
123
+ subject matter is **not** consent-to-access binding:
124
+
125
+ | Application | Subject |
126
+ |---|---|
127
+ | `19/645,499` | Substrate — FHE ↔ post-quantum interface architecture |
128
+ | `19/656,024` | NTT — number-theoretic transform optimisation |
129
+ | `19/661,294` | Upstream — asset provenance and encrypted metadata |
130
+ | `19/669,799` | TFHE routing — homomorphic engine selection |
131
+ | `19/683,841` | Q-Sign — authorisation and signing |
132
+ | `19/693,384` | Agent-Zero — multi-agent accountability |
133
+
134
+ `19/645,499` is a post-quantum attestation primitive that commits a computation result
135
+ in 58 bytes and anchors it to Bitcoin. That is a different object from binding a
136
+ consent record to a data-access record. The earlier framing overstated the overlap.
137
+
138
+ Four of the stated ten applications remain unpublished and therefore invisible. That
139
+ uncertainty is unresolved and cannot be resolved from outside.
140
+
141
+ ### What this scan does not settle
142
+
143
+ - `EP 3861676 B1` was granted 2025-08-06 and **Turkey is among its designated states**.
144
+ Designation is not validation: enforceability in Turkey requires a national
145
+ validation filing. **The Turkish register was searched on 2026-08-08 and returned
146
+ no record** (TÜRKPATENT patent search, *EPC Yayın Numarası B1* = `EP3861676B1`).
147
+ The search method was verified against a positive control first: `EP3547077B1`, a
148
+ Google EP that **is** validated in Turkey, returns its Turkish record
149
+ (`2024/002851`). A first attempt using the bare number `3547077` returned nothing
150
+ for that known-good patent — the field requires the full `EPxxxxxxxB1` form, so the
151
+ format had to be fixed before the negative meant anything. Consistent with INPADOC:
152
+ of the 27 countries with national post-grant events on this patent Turkey is not
153
+ one, and the proprietor let it lapse in 18 contracting states during 2026.
154
+ This is a register search, not legal advice, and a register can lag.
155
+ - Only claim 1 of each patent was analysed. Other independent claims were not.
156
+ - Prosecution history, claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents are
157
+ outside what a document scan can reach.
158
+ - Maintenance-fee status was not verified at USPTO Patent Center.
159
+
160
+ ## Limitations of this scan — read these before citing it
161
+
162
+ An unread source is not a cleared source, and an empty search result is not evidence
163
+ of absence. Both mistakes have been made on this project before.
164
+
165
+ 1. **No source-code-level search was performed on any repository.** README and docs
166
+ only. An undocumented `reconcile*` implementation could exist, most plausibly in
167
+ Microsoft's toolkit (hundreds of files) or hoop.
168
+ 2. **[kriyanative.com/blog/13-chain-breaks](https://kriyanative.com/blog/13-chain-breaks/)
169
+ returned HTTP 403 and could not be read.** Its title — *"I hash-chained my agent's
170
+ audit log. Then I found 13 breaks in it"* — touches exactly the integrity-versus-
171
+ coverage distinction. Unevaluated, not dismissed.
172
+ 3. **h33patent.com could not be fetched** (TLS certificate mismatch). h33.ai publishes
173
+ 6 application numbers of a stated 10; the remainder are not public. The six were
174
+ read on 2026-08-08 — see the correction above — but the four unpublished ones
175
+ remain invisible.
176
+ 4. Only four h33.ai pages were read. Its blog archive, PDFs and whitepapers were not.
177
+ 5. hoop.dev's full `docs/*` tree was not traversed — README and search snippets only.
178
+ 6. No formal "non-goals / limitations" section was found for Acta; we could not
179
+ confirm one does not exist. The IETF drafts were not read in full.
180
+ 7. Issue and discussion trackers were not searched for most projects — reconciliation
181
+ may sit on a roadmap.
182
+ 8. **Two searches returned topically unrelated results** (accounting "proof of cash",
183
+ payment reconciliation) rather than nothing. That means those terms are not indexed
184
+ the way we assumed — it is not evidence that nothing exists.
185
+ 9. Searches for `pg_stat_statements` combined with audit reconciliation returned only
186
+ performance tuning and pgAudit material across three separate queries. No
187
+ implementation reconciling those counters against a receipt or audit chain was
188
+ found.
189
+
190
+ ## What we will claim about being early
191
+
192
+ We will not claim to be first in the world at any of the three parts, and certainly
193
+ not at data masking — Presidio, hoop.dev and Lasso all mask, and several of them mask
194
+ better than we do.
195
+
196
+ The claim we will make is narrower and checkable: **this specification and this scan
197
+ were published on a date we can prove.** Both files are stamped to OpenTimestamps and
198
+ upgradeable to a Bitcoin block height (see [RECEIPT-SPEC §Stamping](RECEIPT-SPEC.md)).
199
+ A git commit date proves nothing — `git commit --date` accepts any value — so we do
200
+ not rely on one.
201
+
202
+ That converts an unwinnable argument into an evidentiary one. We are not asserting
203
+ that no earlier implementation exists. We are putting our date on the record in a
204
+ form nobody has to trust us for, and any competing priority claim can be settled the
205
+ same way: show the artifact, show the timestamp.
206
+
207
+ ## Why the claim stays hedged
208
+
209
+ We will not write "the world's first" or "the only one in existence". Those are
210
+ universal negatives, and this project has already had a "first" claim collapse under
211
+ checking four separate times. "The only implementation we are aware of, here is the
212
+ scan, correct us" is both the honest form and — for the kind of reader who audits
213
+ things for a living — the more credible one.
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
1
+ 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2
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