@conarium-ai/core 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +131 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +387 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +226 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs +77 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs +108 -0
- package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +425 -0
- package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs +480 -0
- package/bin/conarium-init.mjs +184 -0
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +441 -0
- package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +161 -0
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +610 -0
- package/conarium.config.json +43 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/README.md +79 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/conarium-anchor.service +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/dry-run.mjs +122 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/ecosystem.config.cjs +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/env.example +11 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js +278 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts +123 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js +246 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js +12 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts +104 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.js +391 -0
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts +273 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.js +44 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js +140 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js +37 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js +67 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js +447 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js +131 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js +65 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +153 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js +76 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.js +257 -0
- package/dist/console.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts +100 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js +175 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.js +77 -0
- package/dist/executor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts +124 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.js +977 -0
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.js +221 -0
- package/dist/http.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js +25 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.js +174 -0
- package/dist/keys.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.js +122 -0
- package/dist/license.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js +19 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js +145 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js +25 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js +66 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts +161 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js +210 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js +75 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js +41 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js +79 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.js +379 -0
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js +58 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts +132 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.js +2 -0
- package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +42 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md +136 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md +213 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md.anchors.jsonl +3 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +301 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-07-31-anchor.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md +140 -0
- package/docs/plans/2026-07-02-redteam-harness.md +416 -0
- package/docs/specs/2026-07-02-redteam-harness-design.md +90 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md +23 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-plan.md +200 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-katman0-kapanis-plan.md +231 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-31-per-user-identity.md +667 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md +202 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-31-per-user-identity-design.md +144 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-coverage-proof-design.md +139 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-05-receipt-meta-provenance-design.md +116 -0
- package/examples/claude-desktop-config.json +9 -0
- package/examples/cursor-mcp-settings.json +10 -0
- package/package.json +99 -0
- package/scripts/audit-chain-check.mjs +119 -0
- package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +107 -0
- package/scripts/gen-test-vectors.mjs +193 -0
- package/scripts/pg-snapshot.sql +27 -0
- package/scripts/start-mcp-c1.mjs +70 -0
- package/test-vectors/001-single-receipt/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/002-chain-of-three/receipts.jsonl +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/003-tampered-field/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/004-prevhash-break/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/005-seq-gap/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/006-bad-signature/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/007-schema-invalid/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/008-unsigned-no-pubkey/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/009-unsigned-but-pubkey-given/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/README.md +92 -0
- package/test-vectors/expected-hashes.json +24 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.SECRET-TEST-ONLY.pem +6 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem.keyid +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/manifest.json +95 -0
package/dist/types.d.ts
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export interface ConariumConfig {
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connectors: ConnectorConfig[];
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serverName?: string;
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serverVersion?: string;
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/** Identity of the consumer (team / editor / user) for audit attribution. */
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consumer?: string;
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/** Access policy enforced on every connector call. */
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policy?: GovernancePolicy;
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/** Audit configuration. */
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audit?: AuditConfig;
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}
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export interface GovernancePolicy {
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/** Allow-list of schema-qualified tables (glob: "billing.*", "*"). Empty = allow all not denied. */
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allowTables?: string[];
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/** Deny-list of schema-qualified tables; takes precedence over allow. */
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denyTables?: string[];
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/** Columns to mask before data leaves the boundary ("customers.email", "*.tckn"). */
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maskColumns?: string[];
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/** Hard cap on rows returned to the AI assistant (default 100). */
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maxRows?: number;
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/**
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* Mask names that the text itself marks as names — a title ("Sn. Ahmet
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* Yılmaz") or a field label ("Yetkili: Ayşe Demir"). Default true.
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*
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* Names are the one identifier with no shape of their own, so column policy
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* was the only thing catching them and free text went through untouched.
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* This is NOT name recognition: a bare name in running prose is not detected,
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* because guessing would trade this gateway's deterministic decisions for a
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* confidence score. Set false where the labelled form is legitimate output —
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* typically via a profile, so it stays off for one identified person rather
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* than for everyone.
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*/
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maskLabelledNames?: boolean;
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/** Allowed API tools (e.g. "addPet", "getUser*"). */
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allowTools?: string[];
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/** Denied API tools. */
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denyTools?: string[];
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/** Allowed connector names (glob). Empty = allow all not denied. */
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allowConnectors?: string[];
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/** Denied connector names (glob); takes precedence over allow. */
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denyConnectors?: string[];
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/**
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* Named masking overlays, applied per person.
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*
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* The problem this solves: masking that is right for an AI agent is wrong for
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* the data controller. A shop owner asking "which customer owes the most" needs
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* the name; the assistant summarising revenue does not. A global on/off switch
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* would answer that by disabling the product's only real guarantee.
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*
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* Deliberately narrow: a profile may override `maskColumns` and `maxRows` and
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* NOTHING else. Table, tool and connector permissions stay global, so a profile
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* can never widen what is reachable — only what is legible within it.
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*/
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profiles?: Record<string, MaskingProfile>;
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/**
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* Actor id → profile name. Honoured ONLY for actors authenticated with a
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* per-user token (`assurance: 'per-user-token'`). A shared token never receives
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* a profile: "whoever holds this token sees unmasked PII" is exactly the
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* property this product exists to prevent.
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*/
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actorProfiles?: Record<string, string>;
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}
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/** Per-person overlay. See `GovernancePolicy.profiles`. */
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export interface MaskingProfile {
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maskColumns?: string[];
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maxRows?: number;
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maskLabelledNames?: boolean;
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}
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export interface AuditConfig {
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/** Append-only JSONL file path. If unset, audit goes to stderr only. */
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sink?: string;
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failClosed?: boolean;
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/** Optional: append-only JSONL file for verifiable access receipts. If unset, no receipts are produced. */
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receiptSink?: string;
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/** Model identification for receipts (provider/name/version). */
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receiptModel?: {
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provider: string;
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name: string;
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version: string;
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};
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/** Client identification for receipts (name/version). */
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receiptClient?: {
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name: string;
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version: string;
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};
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}
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export interface ConnectorConfig {
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type: 'postgres' | 'supabase' | 'supabase-rest' | 'openapi' | 'files' | 'docs' | 'slack' | 'jira';
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name: string;
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description: string;
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config: Record<string, string>;
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}
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export interface SchemaTable {
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name: string;
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schema: string;
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columns: SchemaColumn[];
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rowCount?: number;
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description?: string;
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}
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export interface SchemaColumn {
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name: string;
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type: string;
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nullable: boolean;
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isPrimary: boolean;
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isForeign: boolean;
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references?: string;
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description?: string;
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}
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export interface QueryResult {
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rows: Record<string, unknown>[];
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rowCount: number;
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fields: string[];
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sql?: string;
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}
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export interface ConnectorCapabilities {
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canQuery: boolean;
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canListSchema: boolean;
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canDescribeTable: boolean;
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canSearch: boolean;
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}
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export interface Connector {
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name: string;
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description: string;
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capabilities: ConnectorCapabilities;
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connect(): Promise<void>;
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disconnect(): Promise<void>;
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listTables(): Promise<SchemaTable[]>;
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describeTable(table: string): Promise<SchemaTable>;
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query(sql: string, params?: unknown[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
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search(query: string, tables?: string[]): Promise<QueryResult>;
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map
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|
package/dist/types.js
ADDED
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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|
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1
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+
{"version":3,"file":"types.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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|
1
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+
# Conarium architecture
|
|
2
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+
|
|
3
|
+
## Thesis
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
MCP made "connect an AI assistant to your data" a commodity. The durable value is **not** the connection — it is everything an enterprise needs *around* the connection before it can safely let an AI read internal systems:
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
1. **Ingestion** of messy internal sources (schemas today; docs, ADRs, APIs next).
|
|
8
|
+
2. **Governance + audit** — what the AI may see, and a record of what it saw.
|
|
9
|
+
3. **Self-hosting** — data never leaves the customer's network.
|
|
10
|
+
4. **Freshness** — incremental re-index so context never goes stale.
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
Conarium owns this layer and stays **tool-agnostic**: it speaks MCP, so it plugs into Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, Windsurf, Continue.dev — whatever wins.
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
## Request path
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
```
|
|
17
|
+
AI client ──MCP──▶ index.ts (tool dispatch)
|
|
18
|
+
│
|
|
19
|
+
├─▶ Governance.allowsTable / guardQuery / maxRows / redact
|
|
20
|
+
├─▶ Audit.log(decision)
|
|
21
|
+
└─▶ Connector (postgres | supabase | …) ──▶ source system
|
|
22
|
+
```
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
Governance is enforced **before** the connector runs (table access, query shape) and **after** it returns (row cap, PII masking). Audit records the decision either way. A connector can never bypass the layer because the layer owns the tool handlers.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
## Modules
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
| File | Responsibility |
|
|
29
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
30
|
+
| `src/index.ts` | MCP server, tool dispatch, wires governance + audit around every call |
|
|
31
|
+
| `src/governance.ts` | Policy: allow/deny tables, query guard, row caps, PII masking |
|
|
32
|
+
| `src/audit.ts` | Append-only JSONL audit of every tool call |
|
|
33
|
+
| `src/connectors/*` | Source adapters implementing the `Connector` interface |
|
|
34
|
+
| `src/types.ts` | Config, policy, schema and result contracts |
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
## Connector contract
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
A connector implements `listTables / describeTable / query / search`. It only knows how to *read a source*; it knows nothing about policy or audit. This keeps new connectors (docs, OpenAPI, Slack) cheap to add — they inherit governance for free.
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
## Design partner
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
ZION is the first connector and reference deployment: a live ERP with real schemas, real business rules (e.g. "use `price2`, not `price3`"), and real governance needs (mask customer PII, deny accounting-internal tables). It validates the layer against a real company before selling it to others.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Consent Binding Spec v0.1 (draft — specification only, not implemented)
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
Binding a data-access receipt to the **consent record that authorised it**, so a third
|
|
4
|
+
party can check — offline, without trusting the operator — whether an access had a
|
|
5
|
+
consent basis behind it at the moment it happened.
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
**Status: design published, not implemented.** `Receipt.consentRef` has been reserved
|
|
8
|
+
and `null` since receipt v0.1 for exactly this. Nothing in this document ships yet.
|
|
9
|
+
It is published now so the design is on the record with a verifiable date; see
|
|
10
|
+
[RECEIPT-SPEC §Stamping](RECEIPT-SPEC.md).
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
## The gap this addresses
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
Two mature standards exist and nothing joins them.
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
[ISO/IEC TS 27560:2023](https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.04528) defines the consent record
|
|
17
|
+
and the consent receipt — an authoritative, machine-readable statement that consent
|
|
18
|
+
exists, what it covers, and what happened to it. Access logs and access receipts (this
|
|
19
|
+
project, and everyone in [`PRIOR-ART.md`](PRIOR-ART.md)) record that data was touched.
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
Nobody joins them cryptographically. So today an operator can hold a perfect consent
|
|
22
|
+
archive and a perfect access log and still be unable to answer the only question a
|
|
23
|
+
regulator actually asks:
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
> *Was there a valid consent basis behind **this specific access**, at the time it
|
|
26
|
+
> happened?*
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
28
|
+
Answering it by matching timestamps in two databases is exactly the self-attestation
|
|
29
|
+
this project exists to replace: both databases belong to the operator, and both are
|
|
30
|
+
editable.
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
## Design
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
### `consentRef` in the access receipt
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
`Receipt.consentRef` changes from `null` to either `null` (unchanged meaning: no
|
|
37
|
+
consent evidence attached) or:
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
```json
|
|
40
|
+
{
|
|
41
|
+
"basis": "consent",
|
|
42
|
+
"recordHash": "sha256:…",
|
|
43
|
+
"recordId": "opaque-operator-id",
|
|
44
|
+
"issuer": "did:example:controller | https://…",
|
|
45
|
+
"state": "active",
|
|
46
|
+
"stateAsOf": "2026-08-06T19:15:25.452Z",
|
|
47
|
+
"source": "verified" | "operator-declared" | "unavailable"
|
|
48
|
+
}
|
|
49
|
+
```
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
- **`recordHash`** — SHA-256 over the canonical (JCS) form of the ISO 27560 consent
|
|
52
|
+
record as it stood **at the moment of access**. This is the binding. Because it
|
|
53
|
+
sits inside the access receipt's own hash, and the receipt is Ed25519-signed and
|
|
54
|
+
chained, the operator cannot later swap in a different consent record.
|
|
55
|
+
- **`state` / `stateAsOf`** — `active`, `withdrawn`, or `expired`, and when that was
|
|
56
|
+
evaluated. This is what makes the binding worth having: an access carrying
|
|
57
|
+
`state: "withdrawn"` is self-incriminating evidence the operator signed themselves.
|
|
58
|
+
- **`source`** — the same provenance discipline as `model.source` and
|
|
59
|
+
`actor.assurance`. `verified` means Conarium fetched and hashed the record itself;
|
|
60
|
+
`operator-declared` means it was asserted by configuration and **not** checked;
|
|
61
|
+
`unavailable` means the consent store could not be reached and the fields are null.
|
|
62
|
+
A receipt never claims a consent basis Conarium did not observe.
|
|
63
|
+
- **`basis`** — consent is one of six GDPR lawful bases. A receipt may legitimately
|
|
64
|
+
carry `basis: "contract"` or `"legal-obligation"` with no `recordHash`. The point is
|
|
65
|
+
that the basis is *stated and signed*, not that it is always consent.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
### Verification, offline
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
A third party given (a) the access receipts, (b) the operator's public key, and
|
|
70
|
+
(c) the consent receipts:
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
1. Verify the receipt chain — `conarium-verify`, unchanged.
|
|
73
|
+
2. For each access receipt with a `consentRef`, canonicalize the matching consent
|
|
74
|
+
receipt and recompute its hash. Mismatch ⇒ the consent record shown is not the one
|
|
75
|
+
that was in force at access time.
|
|
76
|
+
3. Report accesses whose `consentRef` is `null`, `unavailable`, or whose `state` was
|
|
77
|
+
not `active`.
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
79
|
+
Step 3 is the output that matters, and it completes the sentence this project has
|
|
80
|
+
been building toward:
|
|
81
|
+
|
|
82
|
+
> *The vendor declared 400 accesses; I hold 380 receipts; 20 are unaccounted for
|
|
83
|
+
> ([reconciliation](RECEIPT-SPEC.md#reconciliation-two-sided-v01)); and 12 of the
|
|
84
|
+
> accesses I do hold have no valid consent behind them.*
|
|
85
|
+
|
|
86
|
+
### What it proves, and what it does not
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
It proves that at access time the operator held a consent record with exactly this
|
|
89
|
+
content and this state, and that the claim has not been altered since — because it is
|
|
90
|
+
inside a signed, chained receipt.
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
92
|
+
It does **not** prove the consent was validly obtained. Freely given, specific,
|
|
93
|
+
informed, unambiguous — those are legal questions about how the consent was collected,
|
|
94
|
+
and no hash can answer them. It also does not prove processing was lawful: a missing
|
|
95
|
+
or withdrawn consent may be perfectly fine under a different basis.
|
|
96
|
+
|
|
97
|
+
**Language rule, carried over:** the output says *"no consent evidence is bound to
|
|
98
|
+
this access"*, never *"this access was unlawful."* Same discipline as *"access NOT
|
|
99
|
+
RECORDED"* rather than *"no access occurred."* An operator whose consent store was
|
|
100
|
+
unreachable produces `unavailable`, and that is a different fact from `withdrawn`.
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
## Prior art, as far as we have looked
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
Two searches on 6 August 2026 (`"consent receipt" cryptographically bound to access
|
|
105
|
+
log audit trail implementation`, and ISO 27560 + access record + cryptographic proof)
|
|
106
|
+
found consent-management platforms that log consent with metadata
|
|
107
|
+
([UniConsent](https://www.uniconsent.com/blog/uniconsent-consent-audit-trail),
|
|
108
|
+
[consentmanager](https://www.consentmanager.net/en/help/developer-reference/consent-log-protocol-audit-trail/)),
|
|
109
|
+
e-signature audit trails that hash the *document* at signing, and the
|
|
110
|
+
[DPV/W3C guidance](https://www.w3.org/community/reports/dpvcg/CG-FINAL-guide-27560-20240801/)
|
|
111
|
+
for expressing 27560 records. ISO 27560 itself notes cryptographic hashes may protect
|
|
112
|
+
the consent record — **from tampering with itself**, not as a binding to an access
|
|
113
|
+
event.
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
The nearest thing found is the AgentBound framework
|
|
116
|
+
([arXiv 2606.30970](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.30970)), whose governance receipts
|
|
117
|
+
*"cryptographically bind each discrete agent action to the exact policy artifacts
|
|
118
|
+
responsible for its runtime outcome."* Same architecture, different object: policy,
|
|
119
|
+
not consent.
|
|
120
|
+
|
|
121
|
+
**No implementation binding a consent record to a specific data-access record was
|
|
122
|
+
found.** Two searches are not a prior-art clearance. This is a scan, not a legal
|
|
123
|
+
opinion, and it is recorded here so it can be checked and corrected.
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
## Before this is implemented
|
|
126
|
+
|
|
127
|
+
- **Patent review is a prerequisite, not a formality.** This area is dense —
|
|
128
|
+
`US 11032071`, `US 10678945`, `US 10440062`, `US 10776518` are known to sit nearby,
|
|
129
|
+
and [h33.ai](https://h33.ai/) states ten pending applications, six numbered publicly.
|
|
130
|
+
None has been read against this design.
|
|
131
|
+
- The consent store interface must be pluggable. Conarium will not become a consent
|
|
132
|
+
management platform; MyData operators, Consentua and the CMPs already do that well,
|
|
133
|
+
and reimplementing them would be the mistake this project made a point of avoiding.
|
|
134
|
+
- `verified` requires reading the consent store on the access path. The latency and
|
|
135
|
+
failure-mode budget for that is not designed yet — and `unavailable` must never
|
|
136
|
+
silently degrade into `operator-declared`.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"seq":1,"hash":"sha256:3de98e511bbc6d8abb40d512ee907fdae43e60b73dec3222bf08e012ddf43428","log":"opentimestamps","ots":"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# Prior art — who else does this?
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We make one comparative claim about Conarium:
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> Conarium is the only implementation **we are aware of** that combines
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> (1) inline enforcement, (2) a portable, offline-verifiable receipt of that
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> enforcement, and (3) coverage reconciliation against the data source's own
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> query counters.
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A claim like that is unfalsifiable if we just assert it, so this file is the
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evidence behind it: what we searched, on what date, what we found, and — the part
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most comparison pages leave out — **what we could not verify.** If you know of an
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implementation that does all three, open an issue and this file will be corrected.
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**Scan date: 6 August 2026.** Method: fetched each project's README, docs and
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official site, plus targeted web searches. **Source-code-level search was not
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performed on any repository** — see Limitations.
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## What the three parts mean
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Precision matters here, because two of them are commonly confused:
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1. **Enforcement** — policy and masking applied *before* the model sees the value.
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Not "the log records that it happened", but "the value never left".
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2. **Portable receipt** — a signed artifact a third party verifies **offline**,
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without trusting the vendor or the operator.
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3. **Coverage reconciliation** — comparing the receipt chain against the **data
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source's own bookkeeping** to surface access the source recorded and the chain
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does not.
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Part 3 is **not** hash-chain verification. A contiguous, signature-valid chain says
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*"what I hold has not been altered."* It cannot say *"nothing is missing from what I
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hold"*, because a gateway that was bypassed writes nothing at all and its chain stays
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perfectly intact.
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## Findings by project
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| Project | Enforcement | Portable signed receipt | Coverage reconciliation |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| [microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) | Partial — Cedar allow/deny, DLP attribute ratchets; PII masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519, Merkle-chained, `verify_receipt_chain()` | No |
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| [Signet](https://github.com/Prismer-AI/signet) | Partial — policy bound into the receipt; no masking | **Yes** — Ed25519, hash-chained, offline | No |
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| [Handshake.AI](https://handshake.ai/) | No | **Yes** — signed action receipts, DID-issued, offline | No |
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| [hoophq/hoop](https://github.com/hoophq/hoop) | **Yes — strongest here.** ML-based masking before bytes leave the gateway | No — session recording/replay, no signed offline-verifiable artifact found | No |
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| [Circe](https://github.com/wv26296-ux/circe-receipts) | No | **Yes** — Ed25519 + JCS, offline | No — explicitly out of scope |
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| [VeritasActa/Acta](https://github.com/VeritasActa/Acta) | Partial — Cedar policy; masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519, 2 IETF Internet-Drafts, offline CLI | No |
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| [agentreceipts.ai](https://agentreceipts.ai) | Different — parameters hashed, not masked | **Yes** — W3C VC + Ed25519, three SDKs cross-verify | No |
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| [lasso-security/mcp-gateway](https://github.com/lasso-security/mcp-gateway) | **Yes** — Presidio PII masking, injection filters | No — no signing mechanism documented | No |
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| [h33.ai](https://h33.ai/) | **Yes, and further** — FHE; the model never sees plaintext | **Yes** — ZK-STARK + Dilithium, verifiable "years later, offline, without the original vendor" | No |
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| [CertNode](https://certnode.io/solutions/ai-agents) | Weak — no blocking gate | **Yes** — ES256 JWS + RFC 3161 | No |
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The landscape splits cleanly. One camp enforces well but issues no portable evidence
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(hoop.dev, Lasso). The other issues excellent portable evidence but does not enforce
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before the model (Signet, Circe, Acta, agentreceipts, Handshake, CertNode). Two
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projects do both — Microsoft's toolkit and h33.ai — and neither does the third.
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### Two near misses worth naming precisely
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**Microsoft's toolkit has something called "reconciliation", and it is a different
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thing.** [Agent discovery](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/blob/main/docs/tutorials/29-agent-discovery.md)
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reconciles *discovered agents against a governance registry* to find shadow agents —
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inventory, not data access. Its ["completeness score"](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/blob/main/docs/tutorials/50-decision-bom.md)
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measures how many required fields it managed to populate from signals it already
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collected. Neither asks whether the data source saw access the chain has no receipt
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for. Their own [Discussion #276](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit/discussions/276)
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is candid about the boundary: *"What we don't do yet is treat the decision as a
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sealed, independently verifiable artifact in the way you describe."*
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**[MintMCP Agent Monitor](https://www.mintmcp.com/blog/agent-gateway) is the closest
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commercial attempt at bypass detection** — it *"tracks agent activity across the
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organization, including MCP calls made outside the gateway through hooks in Cursor
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and Claude Code."* That is client-side instrumentation: it sees what the client tells
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it. It is not the data source's own telemetry, and it comes with no signed receipt.
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## The closest prior art is a paper, and it names the gap exactly
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[*Notarized Agents / Sello* (arXiv 2606.04193)](https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04193v1)
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states the problem better than we did:
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> *"An inclusion proof answers 'is this receipt in the log?' It does not answer 'did
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> the log return every matching receipt?'"*
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We are not claiming to have discovered this gap — that paper published it, and
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[*Auditable Agents* (arXiv 2604.05485)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.05485) independently
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calls evidence integrity and lifecycle coverage the most neglected dimensions of
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current audit approaches. What we note is that Sello's three proposed remedies all
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stay on the log side: a signed exhaustive answer from the log (SCITT/SCRAPI),
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downloading the whole log and scanning locally, or submitting to several independent
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logs. Sello v0.1 explicitly declines to guarantee set completeness.
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**Reconciling against the data source's own counters is not among the proposals we
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found, in that paper or anywhere else in this scan.** That is the specific thing
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`conarium-reconcile` does, and the specific reason we think the combination is
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currently unusual. Also worth stating plainly: none of the three parts is an
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invention. Enforcement, Ed25519 receipts and query counters are all mature. The
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combination is the claim — the same way SPDX and CycloneDX did not invent dependency
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lists.
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## Patent scan, 8 August 2026 — including a correction to this document
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The scan above looked at *projects*. This section looks at *patents*, and it corrects
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a claim made earlier in this file.
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**Method:** claim 1 of each patent was read in full and mapped element-by-element
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against the design in [CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md](CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md). Family and
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legal-status data from Google Patents (INPADOC-derived). Claim texts from
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freepatentsonline; **not yet checked against the official USPTO PDFs.** This is a
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scan, not a freedom-to-operate opinion, and it was not performed by a lawyer.
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| Patent | Owner | Family | Nearest-element verdict |
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| `US 11032071 B2` — Secure and verifiable data access logging system | **Microsoft** | US only | 4 of 7 elements absent: no request token is generated or returned to the client, and the data server never calls back for a request digest. Their architecture is three-party and requires changes at the data server; ours is a single in-line gateway against an unmodified PostgreSQL. |
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| `US 10678945` · `US 10440062` · `US 10776518` — Consent receipt management systems | **OneTrust** | US only | At least 5 elements absent in each. These claim a *consent collection* platform: a UI shown to the data subject, generation of a consent receipt key, a virtual browser capturing the blank consent form, and transmission of a receipt **to the data subject**. Conarium never interacts with a data subject and does not collect consent — it hashes a consent record someone else holds into an access receipt. |
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| `US 11790111` · `US 12105843` · **`EP 3861676 B1`** — Verifiable consent for privacy protection | **Google** | US · EP · CN · WO | **Conceptually the closest found.** An attestation token carrying user consent data and a digital signature. But the direction is inverted: theirs is an *input* credential validated before an action is permitted (including a token-freshness window and, in `11790111`, selecting ad components); ours is an *output* artifact recording what already happened. Elements (a), (d) and (f) are absent. |
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| `US 7770032 B2` — Secure logging for irrefutable administration | — | US · EP · WO | **Expired.** Hash-chained, MAC-protected log entries — the technique underneath our own chain. Its expiry is worth stating plainly: tamper-evident logging is old, public art, and we have never claimed otherwise. |
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### 🔴 Correction to this document
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118
|
+
This file names **h33.ai** as one of two projects doing both enforcement and portable
|
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119
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+
evidence, and cites its ten stated patent applications. That product-level reading
|
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120
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+
stands — it came from their own site and nothing here refutes it. What was wrong was
|
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121
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+
the inference drawn from it: that those applications might cover the consent-binding
|
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122
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+
ground. The six published application numbers were read on 8 August 2026 and their
|
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123
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+
subject matter is **not** consent-to-access binding:
|
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124
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+
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125
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+
| Application | Subject |
|
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126
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+
|---|---|
|
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127
|
+
| `19/645,499` | Substrate — FHE ↔ post-quantum interface architecture |
|
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128
|
+
| `19/656,024` | NTT — number-theoretic transform optimisation |
|
|
129
|
+
| `19/661,294` | Upstream — asset provenance and encrypted metadata |
|
|
130
|
+
| `19/669,799` | TFHE routing — homomorphic engine selection |
|
|
131
|
+
| `19/683,841` | Q-Sign — authorisation and signing |
|
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132
|
+
| `19/693,384` | Agent-Zero — multi-agent accountability |
|
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133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
`19/645,499` is a post-quantum attestation primitive that commits a computation result
|
|
135
|
+
in 58 bytes and anchors it to Bitcoin. That is a different object from binding a
|
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136
|
+
consent record to a data-access record. The earlier framing overstated the overlap.
|
|
137
|
+
|
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138
|
+
Four of the stated ten applications remain unpublished and therefore invisible. That
|
|
139
|
+
uncertainty is unresolved and cannot be resolved from outside.
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
### What this scan does not settle
|
|
142
|
+
|
|
143
|
+
- `EP 3861676 B1` was granted 2025-08-06 and **Turkey is among its designated states**.
|
|
144
|
+
Designation is not validation: enforceability in Turkey requires a national
|
|
145
|
+
validation filing. **The Turkish register was searched on 2026-08-08 and returned
|
|
146
|
+
no record** (TÜRKPATENT patent search, *EPC Yayın Numarası B1* = `EP3861676B1`).
|
|
147
|
+
The search method was verified against a positive control first: `EP3547077B1`, a
|
|
148
|
+
Google EP that **is** validated in Turkey, returns its Turkish record
|
|
149
|
+
(`2024/002851`). A first attempt using the bare number `3547077` returned nothing
|
|
150
|
+
for that known-good patent — the field requires the full `EPxxxxxxxB1` form, so the
|
|
151
|
+
format had to be fixed before the negative meant anything. Consistent with INPADOC:
|
|
152
|
+
of the 27 countries with national post-grant events on this patent Turkey is not
|
|
153
|
+
one, and the proprietor let it lapse in 18 contracting states during 2026.
|
|
154
|
+
This is a register search, not legal advice, and a register can lag.
|
|
155
|
+
- Only claim 1 of each patent was analysed. Other independent claims were not.
|
|
156
|
+
- Prosecution history, claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents are
|
|
157
|
+
outside what a document scan can reach.
|
|
158
|
+
- Maintenance-fee status was not verified at USPTO Patent Center.
|
|
159
|
+
|
|
160
|
+
## Limitations of this scan — read these before citing it
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
An unread source is not a cleared source, and an empty search result is not evidence
|
|
163
|
+
of absence. Both mistakes have been made on this project before.
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
1. **No source-code-level search was performed on any repository.** README and docs
|
|
166
|
+
only. An undocumented `reconcile*` implementation could exist, most plausibly in
|
|
167
|
+
Microsoft's toolkit (hundreds of files) or hoop.
|
|
168
|
+
2. **[kriyanative.com/blog/13-chain-breaks](https://kriyanative.com/blog/13-chain-breaks/)
|
|
169
|
+
returned HTTP 403 and could not be read.** Its title — *"I hash-chained my agent's
|
|
170
|
+
audit log. Then I found 13 breaks in it"* — touches exactly the integrity-versus-
|
|
171
|
+
coverage distinction. Unevaluated, not dismissed.
|
|
172
|
+
3. **h33patent.com could not be fetched** (TLS certificate mismatch). h33.ai publishes
|
|
173
|
+
6 application numbers of a stated 10; the remainder are not public. The six were
|
|
174
|
+
read on 2026-08-08 — see the correction above — but the four unpublished ones
|
|
175
|
+
remain invisible.
|
|
176
|
+
4. Only four h33.ai pages were read. Its blog archive, PDFs and whitepapers were not.
|
|
177
|
+
5. hoop.dev's full `docs/*` tree was not traversed — README and search snippets only.
|
|
178
|
+
6. No formal "non-goals / limitations" section was found for Acta; we could not
|
|
179
|
+
confirm one does not exist. The IETF drafts were not read in full.
|
|
180
|
+
7. Issue and discussion trackers were not searched for most projects — reconciliation
|
|
181
|
+
may sit on a roadmap.
|
|
182
|
+
8. **Two searches returned topically unrelated results** (accounting "proof of cash",
|
|
183
|
+
payment reconciliation) rather than nothing. That means those terms are not indexed
|
|
184
|
+
the way we assumed — it is not evidence that nothing exists.
|
|
185
|
+
9. Searches for `pg_stat_statements` combined with audit reconciliation returned only
|
|
186
|
+
performance tuning and pgAudit material across three separate queries. No
|
|
187
|
+
implementation reconciling those counters against a receipt or audit chain was
|
|
188
|
+
found.
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
190
|
+
## What we will claim about being early
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
We will not claim to be first in the world at any of the three parts, and certainly
|
|
193
|
+
not at data masking — Presidio, hoop.dev and Lasso all mask, and several of them mask
|
|
194
|
+
better than we do.
|
|
195
|
+
|
|
196
|
+
The claim we will make is narrower and checkable: **this specification and this scan
|
|
197
|
+
were published on a date we can prove.** Both files are stamped to OpenTimestamps and
|
|
198
|
+
upgradeable to a Bitcoin block height (see [RECEIPT-SPEC §Stamping](RECEIPT-SPEC.md)).
|
|
199
|
+
A git commit date proves nothing — `git commit --date` accepts any value — so we do
|
|
200
|
+
not rely on one.
|
|
201
|
+
|
|
202
|
+
That converts an unwinnable argument into an evidentiary one. We are not asserting
|
|
203
|
+
that no earlier implementation exists. We are putting our date on the record in a
|
|
204
|
+
form nobody has to trust us for, and any competing priority claim can be settled the
|
|
205
|
+
same way: show the artifact, show the timestamp.
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
## Why the claim stays hedged
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
We will not write "the world's first" or "the only one in existence". Those are
|
|
210
|
+
universal negatives, and this project has already had a "first" claim collapse under
|
|
211
|
+
checking four separate times. "The only implementation we are aware of, here is the
|
|
212
|
+
scan, correct us" is both the honest form and — for the kind of reader who audits
|
|
213
|
+
things for a living — the more credible one.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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2ShqN1LGzzIV4C+8nSNhS+B1+i/LU7h2AQgI8CD6sacs0f2U3jlXPn4tM/2yJA7HbgHNLULtHc7WXirzYggI8SA/7NBmFUEvUUx2H1cTHb8FY5aRtpm+XhAG6RtUwrWyjwgI8CCgpZyU+epWsTV/0BHQgvpzidVsK+60rBSOd7nxDRY6GwgI8CCYgDMYwYxLHpPERMLXO6Hl30e5IMP7ziy96zuC2HXFhwgIAAWIlg1z1xkBA7XWOg==","state":"bitcoin","submittedAt":"2026-08-06T19:54:51.006Z","document":"docs/PRIOR-ART.md","bitcoinBlock":961333,"upgradedAt":"2026-08-08T12:07:38.637Z"}
|
|
2
|
+
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3
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