@conarium-ai/core 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +131 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +387 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +226 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs +77 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs +108 -0
- package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +425 -0
- package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs +480 -0
- package/bin/conarium-init.mjs +184 -0
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +441 -0
- package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +161 -0
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +610 -0
- package/conarium.config.json +43 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/README.md +79 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/conarium-anchor.service +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/dry-run.mjs +122 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/ecosystem.config.cjs +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/env.example +11 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js +278 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts +123 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js +246 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js +12 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts +104 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.js +391 -0
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts +273 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.js +44 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js +140 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js +37 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js +67 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js +447 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js +131 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js +65 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +153 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js +76 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.js +257 -0
- package/dist/console.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts +100 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js +175 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.js +77 -0
- package/dist/executor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts +124 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.js +977 -0
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.js +221 -0
- package/dist/http.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js +25 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.js +174 -0
- package/dist/keys.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.js +122 -0
- package/dist/license.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js +19 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js +145 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js +25 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js +66 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts +161 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js +210 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js +75 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js +41 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js +79 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.js +379 -0
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js +58 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts +132 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.js +2 -0
- package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +42 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md +136 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md +213 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md.anchors.jsonl +3 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +301 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-07-31-anchor.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md +140 -0
- package/docs/plans/2026-07-02-redteam-harness.md +416 -0
- package/docs/specs/2026-07-02-redteam-harness-design.md +90 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md +23 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-plan.md +200 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-katman0-kapanis-plan.md +231 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-31-per-user-identity.md +667 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md +202 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-31-per-user-identity-design.md +144 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-coverage-proof-design.md +139 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-05-receipt-meta-provenance-design.md +116 -0
- package/examples/claude-desktop-config.json +9 -0
- package/examples/cursor-mcp-settings.json +10 -0
- package/package.json +99 -0
- package/scripts/audit-chain-check.mjs +119 -0
- package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +107 -0
- package/scripts/gen-test-vectors.mjs +193 -0
- package/scripts/pg-snapshot.sql +27 -0
- package/scripts/start-mcp-c1.mjs +70 -0
- package/test-vectors/001-single-receipt/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/002-chain-of-three/receipts.jsonl +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/003-tampered-field/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/004-prevhash-break/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/005-seq-gap/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/006-bad-signature/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/007-schema-invalid/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/008-unsigned-no-pubkey/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/009-unsigned-but-pubkey-given/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/README.md +92 -0
- package/test-vectors/expected-hashes.json +24 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.SECRET-TEST-ONLY.pem +6 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem.keyid +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/manifest.json +95 -0
package/SECURITY.md
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# Security
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Conarium sits between an AI assistant and a database. Its whole claim is that it
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says what it does and does what it says. A governance layer that quietly fails is
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worse than no governance layer, because it converts an unknown risk into a false
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assurance. This document is written on that basis: it lists what we protect, what
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we do **not** protect, what we found when we attacked our own code, and what we
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decided to leave open and why.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Email **e.dogru@conarium.dev**. Please include a reproduction if you have one.
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We will confirm receipt, and we will tell you what we did about it — including
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"nothing, here is why". There is no bounty programme; this is a small project and
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we would rather say so than imply one exists.
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## Threat model
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**Conarium protects against**
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- An AI assistant reading tables, columns or rows that policy does not allow.
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- Personal data reaching the model unmasked when policy says it should be masked.
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- Write operations reaching the database through the assistant. All connectors are
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read-only; SQL is parsed and guarded, not pattern-matched.
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- An access happening without a record. Every tool call — allowed or denied —
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writes a signed, hash-chained, append-only audit entry.
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- The audit log being edited after the fact. Entries are Ed25519-signed and chained;
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`conarium-verify` detects tampering, reordering, gaps and truncation, and it runs
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with zero imports from `src/`, so it does not trust the code that wrote the log.
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**Conarium does NOT protect against**
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- A compromised operator. Whoever controls the config controls the policy.
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- A database credential that is already leaked. Conarium is a gateway, not a firewall;
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it governs the path through it, not every path to your database.
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- The model itself leaking what it legitimately received. If policy permits a row,
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the assistant sees that row.
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- Knowing *which model* is on the other end. MCP does not carry model identity, so
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the receipt records `not declared` rather than guessing. We do not sign what we
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did not measure.
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- Anything at the operating-system level: file permissions, process isolation,
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the security of the host running Conarium.
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**We do not have** SOC 2, an external penetration test, or a formal security
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certification. We are one person. That is not a footnote we would rather you missed;
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it is the reason the code is MIT-licensed and runs entirely inside your own
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infrastructure. No data reaches us, so there is no vendor to certify.
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## Audit of 2026-08-12 — what we found and fixed
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An independent static analysis was run against this repository. Four findings were
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reported; we verified each against the code rather than accepting the report.
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### Fixed
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**1. A session was not bound to the identity that opened it.** (`src/http.ts`)
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An MCP session is opened by an `initialize` POST, which builds a `Server` carrying
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that caller's identity. Subsequent requests were routed by the `Mcp-Session-Id`
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header alone, after checking only that the caller held *some* valid token. So a
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holder of the shared token, presenting a session id opened with a per-user
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credential, would operate with that person's masking profile — and every receipt
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from that point on would name the wrong person.
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The session id travels in a plain header and lands in proxy logs. It is routing
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information, not a secret, and must never be the only thing standing between two
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identities. Sessions are now bound to a SHA-256 of the opening credential and
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compared in constant time; a mismatch is rejected with 403 before the transport is
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touched. Regression test: `test/session_owner.test.mjs`.
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**2. `allowTools` / `denyTools` were never enforced.** (`src/governance.ts`, `src/server.ts`)
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The fields were documented in `types.ts`, editable in the console, and covered by a
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test — but the only implementation lived in `ApiGovernance`, a class nothing in
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`src/` imported. An operator could close a tool and nothing would close.
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This was **not** an exploitable hole: write operations are refused by the connectors
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themselves, and reads pass through `allowsTable`, which is fail-closed. The operator
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was protected — but by a rule they did not write and did not know about. The defect
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was a false statement, not an open door, and for this product that is the more
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serious of the two. `Governance.allowsTool()` is now checked as the first step of
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tool dispatch, denied tools are removed from the advertised tool list, and denied
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attempts are still written to the audit log. Regression test:
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`src/server.tool_policy.test.ts`.
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Note: `allowTools` is deliberately fail-**open** when unset, unlike `allowsTable` and
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`allowsConnector`. The primary gate is table policy and it is fail-closed; making
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this one fail-closed as well would have silently broken every existing deployment
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that never set it — the same class of mistake we were fixing.
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**3. The chat proxy was open when unconfigured.** (`api/chat.js`)
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With no `CONARIUM_CHAT_AUTH_TOKEN` set, the endpoint accepted anonymous calls and
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this was documented as "public mode". But a missing configuration is not a decision
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to be public. An endpoint left open by accident burns the upstream model key on
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strangers' traffic. Anonymous access now requires an explicit
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`CONARIUM_CHAT_PUBLIC=1`; otherwise the endpoint returns 503 and says what to set.
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Token comparison is also constant-time now.
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**4. Dependency tree carried six critical advisories.** (`package.json`)
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No test caught this, because tests measure code and not the dependency graph.
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`javascript-opentimestamps` pulled in `request` (SSRF; the package was abandoned in
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2020 and will not be fixed), `web3` (insecure credential storage) and `crypto-js`
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(weak PBKDF2).
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Timestamp anchoring is an optional feature and the code already loaded the module
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lazily — only `package.json` made it mandatory, so everyone installing the core
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was also installing those advisories. It is now an optional peer dependency with a
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clear error when anchoring is requested without it. **A production install now
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reports zero vulnerabilities.** CI gates on `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high`
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so this cannot come back quietly.
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### Accepted, not fixed
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**DNS rebinding / TOCTOU in the OpenAPI connector.** (`src/connectors/openapi.ts`)
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`enforceSafeRemoteUrl` resolves the hostname and rejects private or reserved
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addresses, then `fetch` resolves again when it connects. The two resolutions are not
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guaranteed to return the same address, so this is a genuine time-of-check /
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time-of-use gap.
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We have left it open, for three reasons stated plainly so you can disagree:
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1. The URL must already be inside `config.allowedBaseUrls`, an operator-authored
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allowlist. Exploiting this requires the operator to have allowlisted a hostname
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under an attacker's control.
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2. HTTPS is mandatory. A rebound internal address must still present a valid
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certificate for the allowlisted hostname; an internal service will not have one.
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3. Closing it properly means pinning the resolved address at connect time, which
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means adding an HTTP dispatcher dependency — enlarging the dependency surface
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immediately after we spent this audit shrinking it.
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If your deployment allowlists hosts you do not fully control, this trade-off is
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wrong for you, and we would like to hear about it.
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**Known-weak advisories in dev dependencies.** The `vitest` / `vite` chain carries
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advisories with no non-breaking fix. They are build-time only and never installed by
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`npm install --omit=dev`. The CI audit gate is scoped to the production tree for
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this reason — the scope was narrowed to be correct, not to make the number smaller.
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## CodeQL findings, triaged
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CodeQL ran for the first time on 2026-08-12 and raised twelve alerts. Each was
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checked against the code rather than accepted or dismissed on sight. One was real
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and is fixed; the rest are false positives and are dismissed in the Security tab
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with the reasoning recorded there, not silently closed.
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**Fixed — `js/missing-rate-limiting` in `src/console.ts` (4 alerts).** The console
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had no rate limit. It binds to `127.0.0.1` and requires a token plus a CSRF header,
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so the exposure was narrow — but `CONARIUM_CONSOLE_HOST` can publish it, and in that
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configuration nothing slowed a token brute force. A limiter now runs **before**
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authentication, deliberately: in `src/http.ts` the limit runs *after* auth so an
|
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+
unauthorized flood cannot burn a real client's budget, whereas here the thing being
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protected is the token itself, and a limit placed after auth would never count the
|
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+
failed attempts. Same library, opposite order, different reason. Test: case `4b` in
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+
`test/security_hardening_14.mjs`, which sends deliberately wrong tokens.
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158
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+
|
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159
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+
One honest wrinkle: **CodeQL still flags these four after the fix.** The analysis
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+
re-ran on the fixed commit and the alerts moved to the new line numbers but stayed
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+
open, because the query looks for a recognised middleware and ours is hand-written —
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+
exactly the situation as the `anchor-service` alerts below. They are dismissed with
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that stated on each one. If you are auditing this, do not read "12 dismissed" as
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+
"12 non-issues": one of them was real, and the fix is in `270ac54` with a test that
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+
fails without it.
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166
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+
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167
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+
**False positive — `js/xss-through-dom` (2 alerts, dismissed 2026-08-12).** Those
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+
alerts pointed at a marketing `index.html` that no longer lives in this
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+
repository. The site is `conarium.dev` (private `nexus` repo). The demo SQL box
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+
there still goes through `hlsql()` → `esc()` before `innerHTML`.
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+
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+
**False positive — `js/missing-rate-limiting` in `src/anchor-service.ts` (2 alerts).**
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The service does rate limit, per owner, returning 429 (`src/anchor-service.ts:135-188`).
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The limiter is hand-written rather than a recognised middleware, so the query does
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not match it.
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+
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+
**False positive — `js/http-to-file-access` in `src/anchor-service.ts` (1 alert).**
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+
The write target is the fixed configured `storePath`; the record id is server-generated
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(`randomBytes(9)`), and `req.params.id` is only ever used to *search* stored records,
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+
never to build a path. There is no traversal.
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+
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+
**False positive — `js/file-system-race` in `scripts/` and `bin/` (3 alerts).** These
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+
are developer and CLI tools. Exploiting the check-then-use window requires local write
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+
access to the same filesystem, at which point the tool is not the weakest link.
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+
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+
## Secrets in git history
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+
|
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+
The full history was scanned for the first time on 2026-08-12 (`gitleaks git .`,
|
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+
65 commits). Seven findings, all in the initial public release commit `e84f8ba`:
|
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+
|
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+
- `demo.ts` contained `sk_live_123456789`, the fake input to the masking demo. It
|
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+
had already been replaced with `sk_live_example_not_a_real_key`.
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+
- `site/.next/**` contained Next.js preview and server-action keys. Build output had
|
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+
been committed by mistake; the directory was later removed from tracking. Next.js
|
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+
regenerates these keys on every build and the site has been redeployed many times
|
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+
since, so the values are dead.
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+
|
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+
**No private key has ever been committed.** The only `.pem` files in history are
|
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+
public keys (`test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem`, `test/fixtures/ots/pubkey.pem`).
|
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+
This was verified, not assumed.
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+
|
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+
We did **not** rewrite history. Rewriting a public repository's history breaks every
|
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+
clone and fork, and would have bought the removal of a handful of dead values. Both
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+
findings are allowlisted narrowly — pinned to that commit and to those paths — so a
|
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new secret in the same files would still be caught.
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+
|
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+
## Automated gates
|
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+
|
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+
Every push and pull request runs:
|
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+
|
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+
| Gate | What it catches |
|
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212
|
+
|---|---|
|
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|
+
| `tsc --noEmit`, `vitest`, `test:checks` | behaviour, including adversarial and conformance suites |
|
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214
|
+
| `npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high` | vulnerable production dependencies |
|
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215
|
+
| Gitleaks (working tree **and** full history) | committed secrets, past or present |
|
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216
|
+
| Semgrep (`security-audit`, `secrets`, `javascript`, `typescript`) | injection, crypto misuse, auth mistakes |
|
|
217
|
+
| CodeQL (`security-extended`) | dataflow — whether untrusted input actually reaches a sink |
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
Semgrep matches patterns; CodeQL follows data. They find different things, which is
|
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+
why both run. CodeQL results are published to the repository's Security tab, so you
|
|
221
|
+
can read them without taking our word for it.
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
Conformance vectors in `test-vectors/` let you verify our receipts with your own
|
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|
+
implementation: nine frozen cases with expected exit codes, plus the public key and
|
|
225
|
+
canonical hashes. If your verifier disagrees with ours, one of us has a bug, and the
|
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226
|
+
vectors are how we find out which.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* conarium-anchor-service — run the hosted anchoring endpoint.
|
|
4
|
+
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Usage:
|
|
6
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_TOKENS=./anchor.tokens.json \
|
|
7
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_BASE_URL=https://anchor.conarium.dev \
|
|
8
|
+
* node bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs
|
|
9
|
+
*
|
|
10
|
+
* Env:
|
|
11
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_TOKENS required — JSON map of {"token":"owner-id"}
|
|
12
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_BASE_URL required — public origin used to build verify URLs
|
|
13
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_STORE default ./anchor-store.jsonl
|
|
14
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_PORT default 8797
|
|
15
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_HOST default 127.0.0.1 (put a TLS proxy in front)
|
|
16
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_RATE default 60 submissions per owner per minute
|
|
17
|
+
* CONARIUM_ANCHOR_UPGRADE_MINUTES default 60; 0 disables the background pass
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* Exits non-zero on missing configuration rather than starting an endpoint that
|
|
20
|
+
* accepts anonymous writes — an anchoring service anyone can write to is a disk
|
|
21
|
+
* filling up, not a service.
|
|
22
|
+
*/
|
|
23
|
+
import { existsSync } from 'fs'
|
|
24
|
+
import { createAnchorService, loadTokensFile } from '../dist/anchor-service.js'
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
function need(name) {
|
|
27
|
+
const v = process.env[name]
|
|
28
|
+
if (!v) {
|
|
29
|
+
console.error(`missing required env ${name}`)
|
|
30
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
return v
|
|
33
|
+
}
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
const tokensPath = need('CONARIUM_ANCHOR_TOKENS')
|
|
36
|
+
const baseUrl = need('CONARIUM_ANCHOR_BASE_URL')
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
if (!existsSync(tokensPath)) {
|
|
39
|
+
console.error(`token file not found: ${tokensPath}`)
|
|
40
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
41
|
+
}
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
const tokens = loadTokensFile(tokensPath)
|
|
44
|
+
if (tokens.size === 0) {
|
|
45
|
+
console.error(`token file ${tokensPath} defines no tokens — refusing to start`)
|
|
46
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
const storePath = process.env.CONARIUM_ANCHOR_STORE ?? './anchor-store.jsonl'
|
|
50
|
+
const port = Number(process.env.CONARIUM_ANCHOR_PORT ?? 8797)
|
|
51
|
+
const host = process.env.CONARIUM_ANCHOR_HOST ?? '127.0.0.1'
|
|
52
|
+
const submitsPerMinute = Number(process.env.CONARIUM_ANCHOR_RATE ?? 60)
|
|
53
|
+
const upgradeMinutes = Number(process.env.CONARIUM_ANCHOR_UPGRADE_MINUTES ?? 60)
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
const { app, runUpgrade } = createAnchorService({ storePath, tokens, publicBaseUrl: baseUrl, submitsPerMinute })
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
app.listen(port, host, () => {
|
|
58
|
+
console.log(`conarium-anchor listening on http://${host}:${port}`)
|
|
59
|
+
console.log(` store ${storePath}`)
|
|
60
|
+
console.log(` owners ${new Set(tokens.values()).size}`)
|
|
61
|
+
console.log(` public ${baseUrl}`)
|
|
62
|
+
})
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
// Bitcoin confirmation takes hours, so nobody should have to remember to run
|
|
65
|
+
// the upgrade. This loop is the difference between a proof and a promise.
|
|
66
|
+
if (upgradeMinutes > 0) {
|
|
67
|
+
const tick = async () => {
|
|
68
|
+
try {
|
|
69
|
+
const r = await runUpgrade()
|
|
70
|
+
if (r.upgraded) console.log(`upgraded ${r.upgraded}/${r.checked} pending anchor(s)`)
|
|
71
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
72
|
+
console.error(`upgrade pass failed: ${err.message}`)
|
|
73
|
+
}
|
|
74
|
+
}
|
|
75
|
+
setInterval(tick, upgradeMinutes * 60_000).unref?.()
|
|
76
|
+
setTimeout(tick, 10_000).unref?.()
|
|
77
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
#!/usr/bin/env node
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* conarium-anchor-upgrade — upgrade pending OpenTimestamps proofs toward Bitcoin.
|
|
4
|
+
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Usage: conarium-anchor-upgrade <anchors.jsonl>
|
|
6
|
+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* For each state:"pending" row, runs OpenTimestamps.upgrade(). On success refreshes
|
|
8
|
+
* ots/state/bitcoinBlock/upgradedAt. If nothing changed, leaves the file untouched.
|
|
9
|
+
*/
|
|
10
|
+
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'
|
|
11
|
+
import { createRequire } from 'module'
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url)
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
function hashPrefixToBuffer(hash) {
|
|
16
|
+
const hex = hash.startsWith('sha256:') ? hash.slice('sha256:'.length) : hash
|
|
17
|
+
if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(hex)) {
|
|
18
|
+
throw new Error(`bad hash: ${hash}`)
|
|
19
|
+
}
|
|
20
|
+
const buf = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex')
|
|
21
|
+
if (buf.length !== 32) throw new Error('hash must be 32 bytes')
|
|
22
|
+
return buf
|
|
23
|
+
}
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
function loadRows(path) {
|
|
26
|
+
if (!existsSync(path)) {
|
|
27
|
+
console.error(`anchors file not found: ${path}`)
|
|
28
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
29
|
+
}
|
|
30
|
+
const raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf-8').trim()
|
|
31
|
+
if (!raw) return []
|
|
32
|
+
return raw.split('\n').filter(Boolean).map((l) => JSON.parse(l))
|
|
33
|
+
}
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
35
|
+
async function main() {
|
|
36
|
+
const path = process.argv[2]
|
|
37
|
+
if (!path) {
|
|
38
|
+
console.error('Usage: conarium-anchor-upgrade <anchors.jsonl>')
|
|
39
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
let OpenTimestamps
|
|
43
|
+
try {
|
|
44
|
+
OpenTimestamps = require('javascript-opentimestamps')
|
|
45
|
+
if (OpenTimestamps && OpenTimestamps.default) OpenTimestamps = OpenTimestamps.default
|
|
46
|
+
} catch {
|
|
47
|
+
console.error('javascript-opentimestamps is required')
|
|
48
|
+
process.exit(2)
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
const rows = loadRows(path)
|
|
52
|
+
let changedAny = false
|
|
53
|
+
const out = []
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
for (const row of rows) {
|
|
56
|
+
if (row.state !== 'pending' || !row.ots || !row.hash) {
|
|
57
|
+
out.push(row)
|
|
58
|
+
continue
|
|
59
|
+
}
|
|
60
|
+
try {
|
|
61
|
+
const hashBuf = hashPrefixToBuffer(row.hash)
|
|
62
|
+
const detached = OpenTimestamps.DetachedTimestampFile.fromHash(
|
|
63
|
+
new OpenTimestamps.Ops.OpSHA256(),
|
|
64
|
+
hashBuf,
|
|
65
|
+
)
|
|
66
|
+
const detachedOts = OpenTimestamps.DetachedTimestampFile.deserialize(
|
|
67
|
+
Buffer.from(row.ots, 'base64'),
|
|
68
|
+
)
|
|
69
|
+
const changed = await OpenTimestamps.upgrade(detachedOts)
|
|
70
|
+
if (!changed) {
|
|
71
|
+
out.push(row)
|
|
72
|
+
continue
|
|
73
|
+
}
|
|
74
|
+
const verified = await OpenTimestamps.verify(detachedOts, detached, {
|
|
75
|
+
ignoreBitcoinNode: true,
|
|
76
|
+
timeout: 15000,
|
|
77
|
+
})
|
|
78
|
+
const height = verified?.bitcoin?.height
|
|
79
|
+
const next = {
|
|
80
|
+
...row,
|
|
81
|
+
ots: Buffer.from(detachedOts.serializeToBytes()).toString('base64'),
|
|
82
|
+
state: height != null ? 'bitcoin' : 'pending',
|
|
83
|
+
bitcoinBlock: height ?? null,
|
|
84
|
+
upgradedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
85
|
+
}
|
|
86
|
+
out.push(next)
|
|
87
|
+
changedAny = true
|
|
88
|
+
console.error(`[upgrade] seq=${row.seq} → ${next.state}${height != null ? ` block=${height}` : ''}`)
|
|
89
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
90
|
+
console.error(`[upgrade] seq=${row.seq} failed: ${err.message || err}`)
|
|
91
|
+
out.push(row)
|
|
92
|
+
}
|
|
93
|
+
}
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
if (!changedAny) {
|
|
96
|
+
console.error('no upgrades applied (file untouched)')
|
|
97
|
+
process.exit(0)
|
|
98
|
+
}
|
|
99
|
+
|
|
100
|
+
writeFileSync(path, out.map((r) => JSON.stringify(r)).join('\n') + '\n')
|
|
101
|
+
console.error(`wrote ${path}`)
|
|
102
|
+
process.exit(0)
|
|
103
|
+
}
|
|
104
|
+
|
|
105
|
+
main().catch((err) => {
|
|
106
|
+
console.error(err)
|
|
107
|
+
process.exit(1)
|
|
108
|
+
})
|